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The Nuclear Threat to Canada in the 1980s Implications and Planning Data DOCUMENT EPC 2/81 LIBRARY1 Eiti31.10THEQUE EMERGENCY PLANNING CANADA PLANIFICK: ■ D'URGENCE CANADA OTTAWA, ONTARIO UA 929 Emergency Planning Planification d'urgence .C2 Canada Canada N83 1981 Mae nemeeffir Mreffit Cmmen, La the Ugego Umef,emeeme, ffilffle elzzalCze crr,ffitm Prepared by the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Consultant Department of National Defence for Emergency Planning Canada ,...."G "9• -0 ■ e„. ,„;,„0,1 c; •• 4, % , 9' çe • tç ' , ,-.• ,À ,-.• 1.- 9 n. 91, 490 / , CY 03 Came' AMENDMENTS NO. DATED CONCERNING SECTION (S ) AMENDED BY DATE TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AIM LAYOUT 1 PART I - DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREAT 2 Background 2 Possible Attacks 3 Strategic Warning 3 Possible Further Developments 4 PART II - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREAT 5 Weapon Trends 5 Agreements 5 Basic Characteristics 5 Other Considerations 6 PART III - RISKS AND RISK AREAS 7 Likely Canadian Targets 7 Fallout Risks 8 Effects in Canada 9 PART IV - PLANNING DATA - DIRECT EFFECTS 10 Preliminary Data 10 Damage Criteria 11 Casualty Criteria 12 Scales and Templates 12 PART V - PLANNING DATA - FALLOUT 14 Variability 14 Approach 14 Criteria 14 Idealized Fallout Contours 15 Overall Fallout Risks 15 ANNEX A - LIST OF POTENTIAL CANADIAN TARGETS 16 ANNEX B - PRIME US MILITARY TARGETS 17 ANNEX C - AVERAGED FALLOUT FROM NUCLEAR STRIKES ON US ICBMs 18 ANNEX D - RELATIONS BETWEEN PEAK OVERPRESSURES AND STRUCTURAL FAILURE 19 ANNEX E - RELATION BETWEEN CASUALTIES AND DISTANCE AND 22 DIMENSIONS OF CASUALTY ZONES PAGE ANNEX Fi - WINNIPEG, MANITOBA - EFFECT OF 1 MEGATON AIRBURST 23 ANNEX F2 - CHARLOTTETOWN, PEI - EFFECT OF 1 MEGATON SURFACE BURST 24 ANNEX G - BASIC 7 DAY DOSE FALLOUT CONTOURS 25 ANNEX H1 - FALLOUT FROM ATTACK ON US STRATEGIC TARGETS 26 ANNEX H2 - FALLOUT FROM ATTACKON US STRATEGIC TARGETS 27 ANNEX 113 - FALLOUT FROM ATTACK ON US STRATEGIC TARGETS 28 ANNEX I - OVERALL PROBABILITY OF FALLOUT ON PRAIRIE CITIES IN EVENT OF ATTACK ON U.S. MINUTEMAN COMPLEXES (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VARIABILITY IN WIND DIRECTION) 29 TEMPLATES - Inside back cover 1 THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO CANADA IN THE 1980s IMPLICATIONS AND PLANNING DATA AIM 1. The aim of this paper is to provide civil emergency planners at all levels of government with an understanding of the implications of the threat to Canada resulting from a nuclear weapon attack on North America, and to provide data to assist them in preparing the programs and contingency plans for which they are responsible. 2. Maintenance of deterrence through the strategic nuclear balance is a dynamic process in which the probabilities and patterns of possible attacks change over time as policies, intentions and weapon developments are modified in the light of changing circumstances. This paper attempts, by following recent trends, to present a realistic picture of possible attack patterns affecting Canada in the eighties and to provide means of estimating the casualties and damage which will ensue. The intention is to provide data that decision makers will need when making plans to cope with likely attacks while leaving them free to make the decisions necessary for detailed planning. LAYOUT 3. The paper updates and supersedes document EPC 2/78 "The Nuclear Threat, Its Implications and Planning Guidance" and follows a similar layout. It consists of five parts: I - DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREAT II - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREAT III - RISKS AND RISK AREAS IV - PLANNING DATA (DIRECT EFFECTS) V - PLANNING DATA (FALLOUT) o)âceacp:pmânr1 ef Vae Maremt =`,-Pffirt 1U 2 PART I DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREAT 1. This paper is concerned with possible nuclear attack on North America. At the present time there are sufficient varieties of nuclear weapons, nations possessing them and others capable of acquiring them in the near future, to permit an almost unlimited range of possible attacks and attack patterns on North America during the eighties. By far the largest probability is that none of them will occur, but it is nevertheless necessary to determine which types of attack have a significant probability so that emergency protection can be planned. BACKGROUND 2. It is still a fact that the United States and Soviet Union between them own more than 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world so that the possibility of initiation of nuclear war,and still more,of its escalation, depends on the capabilities and intention of these superpowers. However, the possibility of a direct nuclear exchange between them has been materially decreased by the existence of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the continuing secretariat set up for negotiations. Although formal agreements from the talks have so far not been comprehensive, the continuing negotiations have led to a much better understanding of each other'scapabilities, a strong commitment to parity leading to a substantial degree of convergence in weapon development, and to marked reduction in the possibility of surprise attack. This convergence in development is leading both sides to a dependence on smaller,more accurately delivered warheads which makes the utilization of nuclear weapons for purely military purposes more credible.,and using them to devastate an opponent's territory less so. The recently announced U.S. policy of giving priority to Soviet military targets rather than cities,in their targeting policy,is evidence of this trend. 3. Unfortunately, the move towards parity at the superpower exchange level has tended to decrease stability elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Soviet medium and short range nuclear missiles targeted against NATO, which are not included in the strategic balance, were previously compensated for by a superiority in U.S. strategic forces which may no longer exist. The need to negotiate some kind of nuclear balance for Europe, which is necessarily as much tactical as strategic,is pressing. However the rate of progress in SALT, and in the Mutual Force Reduction negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pacç,suggests that progress towards a negotiated nuclear balance in Europe will be slow and perhaps unlikely to be achieved in the eighties. In the meantime both alliances are showing signs of political unrest which could lead to conflict. 4. If there should be a war in Europe in the eighties it is quite likely that one side or the other will see an advantage in using nuclear weapons in a quasi-tactical role, that is primarily against military targets. Canada and the U.S. would necessarily be involved through their NATO commitments and their Atlantic supply lines would be liable to attack. Nuclear war could extend to the Atlantic and possibly to North American ports and supply points. In such a case an enemy would be less inhibited in attacking Canadian targets than U.S. targets since attacking the latter could escalate directly into a strategic exchange. 3 5. In spite of the pressures for arms reduction there is likely to be little change in the level of strategic nuclear weapons in the inventories of the USA and USSR. Any marked reduction depends on first achieving a satisfactory nuclear balance in Europe and, in the case of the USSR, with China in the far east. Neither of these agreements seems imminent. On the other hand the motivation for SALT is largely economic and economic pressures are increasing. This is likely to discourage any significant increase in the nuclear weapon inventories of either the USA or USSR. 6. Little has been done, or perhaps •can be done, to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries. However, most countries which have indicated interest in acquiring them régard them as an insurance against aggressive neighbours in local conflicts. Such conflicts can probably be confined unless they involve conflicting superpower interests, in which case the possibility of escalation exists. Canada can probably avoid involvement unless escalation occurs. 7. Finally, if there is a strategic nuclear exchange between superpowers, it must not be assumed that'all danger of nuclear attack will disappear for the rest of us. Some nuclear weapons will remain and the inhibitions on their use which deterrent forces exerted will no longer be there. There will be inci.easing competition for survival and superiority. Neighbours of the former superpowers, such as Canada, could well be specially vulnerable in such unsettled conditions. POSSIBLE ATTACKS " • . .. • • . .. ' . 8. In the light Of the abOve discussion the possibilities of nucléa.' attack on North America involving Canada are as f011ows', in descending ordei of likelihood: — ' • ' a.