USAID/OTI MACEDONIA SUPPORT INITIATIVE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT NOVEMBER 1, 2017 – APRIL 30, 2018

APRIL 2018 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development and prepared by AECOM International Development.

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative

USAID/OTI MACEDONIA SUPPORT INITIATIVE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT NOVEMBER 1, 2017 – APRIL 30, 2018

Submitted to: USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

Prepared by: AECOM International Development

DISCLAIMER: The authors’ views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1 II. Political Context 1 III. Program Strategy 4 a. Strategic Framework 4 b. Activity Highlights 4 i.“In Treatment” 4 ii.National Strategies on Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism 8iii. "On the Same Side" 6 IV. Conclusion 6

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative I. INTRODUCTION

In 2015, Macedonia’s four major political parties requested that the European Union (EU) and the United States Government (USG) help Macedonia resolve its political crisis. To assist with this process, USAID launched the USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative (MSI) in September 2015 to support the key reform processes outlined in the Przino Agreement. In December 2015, USAID increased its support to Macedonia by expanding this initiative to a full program, implemented by AECOM International Development. MSI is a three-year program with an activated contract ceiling of US $16,202,525.

From November 2017 through April 2018, MSI worked closely with Macedonian civil society organizations, media groups and government institutions to implement key components of the reform agenda by: • Professionalizing the Macedonia media environment; • Promoting citizen participation in public discourse; and • Supporting democratic reforms in accordance with EU standards.

II. POLITICAL CONTEXT

The political environment in the country remained dynamic during the reporting period. The government enacted complex reforms, while an act of Parliament touching on ethnic relations evoked considerable controversy. Steps taken towards a possible resolution of the dispute with over the country’s name contributed to the shifting political landscape as did the former ruling party’s selection of new leadership.

A new coalition government composed of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) was formed in May 2017. This transition happened after four months of political deadlock and protest following the failure of the former ruling party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), to form a coalition and President ’s initial refusal to grant the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) the mandate to form a government.

October 2017 marked the first three months of implementation of the “3-6-9 Plan”1, which outlines key reform priorities to improve governance and reorient the country’s trajectory towards Euro Atlantic integration at the three, six, and nine month marks.”2 In their assessment of the “3-6-9+ Plan”, as well as its implementation from the fourth to sixth months (October to December 2017), the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” (IDSC) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), cite improvements including “increased quantifiability and predictability” of activities3, the publishing of the specific activities to be carried out in their entirety, as well as the “prioritization of the priority areas” of “the judiciary, the security and intelligence services, and in the public administration.”4 However, the IDSC/KAS maintained a criticism it had of the original “3-6-9 Plan: “the plan still contains activities that are not reform steps, that is, they are line competences of the institutions encompassed by the plan.” Furthermore, the IDSC/KAS point out that the transparency exhibited by

1 Macedonia, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia, “3-6-9 Plan.” 3-6-9 Plan, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia Secretariat for European Affairs, 4 July 2017. www.sep.gov.mk/data/file/Dokumenti/Plan%203-6-9%20ENG.pdf The plan integrates recommendations from the Przino Agreement, the 2015 Priebe Report, and the EU Commission to put forth a reform agenda over three, six, and nine months. 2 Macedonia, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia, “3-6-9+ Plan.” 3-6-9+ Plan, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia. October 2017. http://vlada.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Narrative%20Plan%206-9%20EN.pdf 3 The “activities” referred to are the specific steps the government must take as outlined in the “3-6-9” Plan and “3-6-9+ Plan” 4 Nečev, Zoran. “Hurdling on 3, 6 and 9. Towards an unconditional recommendation? Monitoring the implementation of the second three months of the 3-6-9 Plan.” Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_51741-1522-2-30.pdf?180306152219

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative the government with regard to the plan during the first three months was absent in the second three months, “as the public was not informed in a timely manner about the progress made to implement the measures.”5

The government’s reform process was praised by the European Commission (EC) in its 2018 Enlargement Package, and in the specific report on Macedonia’s progress as an EU candidate country,6 which recommends that accession negotiations be opened with Macedonia. “Since May 2017, the new reform-oriented government has taken steps to address state capture by gradually restoring checks and balances, strengthening democracy and rule of law. The country is undergoing fundamental changes in a more inclusive and open political atmosphere.” Furthermore, the EC notes that “the political agreement (also called "Przino Agreement") has been largely implemented and substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the ‘Urgent Reform Priorities’” that the 3-6-9 plans prioritized.

During this reporting period, Macedonians saw new leadership emerge in the former ruling party. In the wake of VMRO-DPMNE’s defeat at the polls, former Prime Minister (PM) announced he would resign from his party’s presidency in December 2017.7 This was formalized at an urgent party congress called to elect a new president. VMRO-DPMNE’s then-General Secretary, Hristijan Mickoski, was elected as the party’s new leader. In one of his first announcements in his new position, Mickoski declared a boycott of Parliament by VMRO-DPMNE in January 2018 due to alleged “political persecution” of its MPs by the government.8 This was a reference to the number of VMRO-DPMNE MPs who were in detention due to their alleged involvement in violent incidents which occurred in Parliament on April 27, 2017. Despite this boycott, VMRO-DPMNE returned to Parliament to take part in legislative proceedings regarding the Draft-Law on Languages in March 2018. They restarted the boycott immediately following those proceedings until their unsuccessful vote of no confidence in PM on April 11, 2018.

The Law on Languages was listed among the priorities in the “3-6-9 Plan.” In essence, it makes Albanian an official second state language. The status of the Albanian language has remained an unresolved issue for the country for years, stemming from Section 6.5 of the Ohrid Framework Agreement,9 which ended the 2001 conflict. The legislation was first passed by Parliament in January 2018 but was vetoed by President Ivanov. A re-vote in March 2018 overturned this veto but the president has refused to sign the legislation into law, which leaves its future unclear.10

Reactions to the March re-vote were strong, both inside and outside Parliament. As the draft law was being adopted, a confrontation occurred in Parliament between Member of Parliament (MP) Nikola Gruevski, the former PM/former VMRO-DPMNE leader, and Parliament Speaker Talat Xhaferi of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). Protests by citizens opposed to the draft law occurred in

5 Ibid 6 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2018 Report. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia- report.pdf 7 “Gruevski: I will resign and I hope it will help resolve this crisis.” Meta.mk News Agency, 1 December 2017. http://meta.mk/en/gruevski-i-will-resign-and-i-hope-it-will-help-resolve-this-crisis/ 8 “Mickoski: VMRO-DPMNE will not be taking part in the Parliament’s work due to a lack of democratic ambient.” Meta.mk News Agency, 9 January 2018. http://meta.mk/en/mickoski-vmro-dpmne-will-not-be-taking-part-in-the- parliament-s-work-due-to-a-lack-of-democratic-ambient/ 9 Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia Signed at , Macedonia 13 August 2001. https://www.osce.org/skopje/100622?download=true.” 10 “Ivanov: Constitution and my conscience do not allow me to sign the Law on Languages.” Meta.mk News Agency, 15 March 2018. http://meta.mk/en/ivanov-constitution-and-my-conscience-do-not-allow-me-to-sign-the-law-on-languages/

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative Skopje outside of Parliament as well as in front of the homes of several SDSM MPs. One such protest turned violent, when the unoccupied car of an SDSM MP was set on fire.11

The name issue continued to evoke controversy and divide public opinion recently, as it has since the country’s founding. Since gaining independence in 1991, the country’s name, the Republic of Macedonia, has been strongly objected to by Macedonia’s neighbor to the south, Greece. Greece’s northern province is also called Macedonia, and Greece has argued that the use of this name allows its neighbor to make territorial claims. The name issue, Greece has said, is a problem “consisting in the promotion of irredentist and territorial ambitions on the part of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, mainly through the counterfeiting of history and usurpation of Greece’s national, historical and cultural heritage.”12 Greece objects to Macedonia’s use of Alexander the Great, a figure who many Greeks view as exclusively part of their own history. The name issue escalated further in 2008 when Greece blocked Macedonia’s entrance into NATO and the issue has hindered the country’s integration into the EU.

The change in government in 2017 ushered in new hope that progress could be made in resolving the name dispute. In January 2018, PM Zaev and Greek PM Alexis Tsipras held their first meeting on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.13 Following the meeting, PM Zaev announced that his government would make concessions to foster progress on the name issue. Specifically, he announced that the country’s main airport in Skopje and the highway that runs from Skopje to the Greek border, which had both been named after Alexander the Great by previous VMRO-DPMNE-led governments, would be renamed. PM Tsipras said that Greece was ready to allow Macedonia, which he referred to simply as “our neighboring country,” to proceed with increased cooperation with the EU.

Whether these steps will lead the country to a resolution that will be both acceptable domestically in Macedonia and in Greece remains unclear. However, further steps, such as renewed engagement of the UN’s special envoy on the name issue and an uptick in constructive statements from both sides, suggest that the political will for such a breakthrough may exist.

The country’s political transition has had a positive impact by opening up space for a free and independent media. In Freedom House’s Nations in Transit Ratings,14 issued in April 2018, it was assessed that independent media in the country had improved with a score of 5.00, compared to 2017’s 5.25.15 The improved rating was earned, “due to advances in overall media reporting in the country and the new regime’s decision to end government advertising, which had been a mechanism enabling state capture.” Furthermore, Freedom House states that the “change of government…contributed to some positive developments in establishing credible media reporting…By the end of the year, several media outlets biased in favor of VMRO-DPMNE had altered their reporting towards a more balanced and objective tone, while others had shut down due to financial crises.”

The European Commission’s 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy Report on Macedonia, states that: “As regards to freedom of expression, the country has achieved some level of preparation and made good progress, notably through an improved climate for the media and decreased pressure

11 Pajaziti, Naser. “Protests in front of the homes of SDSM’s lawmakers.” Independent Balkan News Agency, 19 March 2018. http://balkaneu.com/protests-in-front-of-the-homes-of-sdsms-lawmakers/ 12 Greece, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “FYROM Name Issue.” https://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/ 13 Marusic, Sinisa Jakov. “PMs of Macedonia, Greece Announce Concessions on Name Dispute.” Balkan Insight, 24 January 2018. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-greek-pms-meet-in-davos-01-24-2018 14 Bliznakovski, Jovan. “Macedonia.” Nations In Transit Ratings. Freedom House, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NiT2018_Macedonia.pdf 15 Freedom House’s ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative on journalists. The country needs to address remaining challenges, including reform of the public broadcaster.” 16

III. PROGRAM STRATEGY

a. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

MSI works closely with Macedonian civil society organizations, media groups, and government institutions to enable democratic institutions to make tangible and timely contributions to the reform agenda. Through this goal, the program seeks to directly contribute to U.S. foreign policy interests to strengthen Macedonia’s democratic reform process and resume the country’s trajectory towards EU and NATO membership. MSI utilizes an iterative model to continually refine its strategic approach within an evolving political context through an on-going learning process. With small awards, both grants and contracts, MSI has continued to support local partners to implement short-term projects to contribute to MSI’s programmatic objectives.

Following the transition to a new government, a window of opportunity emerged to renew support for urgent reform priorities outlined in the Przino Agreement, Priebe Report, and “3-6-9 Plan.” The new government requested MSI’s support to build the capacity of key government institutions to more effectively implement reforms. As the governments began to adopt these, and the space began to open for civic action and free media, MSI adjusted to its strategic framework in November 2017. MSI reconfirmed this framework at its March 2018 Rolling Assessment. It includes three objectives:

• Media outlets will increasingly embrace professional editorial and management practices consistent with a balanced audience-driven media sector that is independent from political party or government control. • Citizens will actively participate in substantive public discourse. • Government and public institutions will design and communicate critical reforms consistent with EU standards.

Figure 1. Distribution across objectives of MSI activities cleared during the reporting period

16 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2018 Report. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of- macedonia-report.pdf

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative b. ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTS

i. “IN TREATMENT”

17 OBJECTIVE: TO EXPOSE VIEWERS TO DIVERSE AND PROFESSIONAL MEDIA CONTENT Entertainment media can be leveraged to create social change by engaging audiences, introducing ideas, and empowering citizens to make better-informed decisions within their socio-political space. This grant activity will address the lack of new and diverse content within the Macedonia media landscape by producing and broadcasting the first season of an innovative drama series known as "In Treatment." Macedonian's media environment lacks the plurality, diverse perspectives, and vetted facts that would entice a viewer's preference for locally-produced content over the international soap operas that currently saturate the market. This activity will support the production and broadcast of a compelling yet critically aware dramatic series, with characters that connect deeply with Macedonia’s politically, socially, and ethnically diverse audiences. With this in mind, MSI partnered in 2016-2017 with Macedonian production company Kino Oko to produce a Macedonian adaptation of the Israeli television show, "In Treatment.”

With its high production quality and cast of relatable characters, the show was widely popular with audiences both on television and online. During the reporting period, thirteen episodes of the show were broadcast, including the final episode on November 17. The final episode had approximately 130,000 viewers with a 21.28% total audience share. At its peak, the show had 160,000 viewers per episode, with 28.86% total audience share. In addition, after each episode many viewers discussed the issues addressed on the show on Facebook, with each episode on average receiving 290 reactions.

In order to augment public discussion of the issues addressed on the program, MSI also supported a debate show that more deeply examined the important topics addressed in the drama series. The debate series explored real-life examples of issues presented in “In Treatment.” Four episodes of the debate show were broadcast during the reporting period. This program was also well-received by the public, with the last episode reaching over 120,000 viewers with a 18.85% total audience share.

ii. NATIONAL STRATEGIES ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

OBJECTIVE: TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EU STANDARDS In July 2017, in an effort to provide national-level coordination to monitor and analyze the prevention of violent extremism and the fight against terrorism, the government established a National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism (NCCVECT). During the previous reporting period, MSI provided the National Committee with targeted subject matter trainings and on the job coaching and mentoring, followed by technical assistance.

In the reporting period, MSI continued its support to the NCCVECT into 2018 with the drafting of a National Countering Violent Extremism Strategy and Action Plan and a revision of its National Counterterrorism Strategy and Action Plan. MSI supported the NCCVECT’s drafting processes, convening intensive drafting sessions for the 22 members of the Committee’s Working Groups, providing subject matter technical assistance, and organizing a workshop for the wider membership of the Committee.

On March 6, 2018, the NCCVECT finalized these strategic documents, which were adopted by the government shortly thereafter. Their enactment is a component of the EU’s accession benchmarks for

17 This objective was part of MSI’s previous media strategy prior to the reporting period. It was, however, in effect when “In Treatment” was in development.

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative Macedonia and was noted in the European Commission’s 2018 Report on Macedonia.18 The documents will now guide the work of the NCCVECT over the course of the next five years. PM Zaev has described the documents as critical starting points for the government’s institutional response to violent extremism and terrorist activity.19 MSI’s assistance to the NCCVECT is planned to continue with strategic communication assistance so that the Committee may establish a comprehensive, inter-ministerial communication plan to inform citizens of its important work. iii. “ON THE SAME SIDE”

20 OBJECTIVE: TO EXPOSE VIEWERS TO DIVERSE AND PROFESSIONAL MEDIA CONTENT According to Freedom House’s “Nations in Transit 2017” report21, “media outlets [in Macedonia] are substantially polarized along political, ethnic, and linguistic lines.” The vast majority of television stations broadcast either in Macedonian or Albanian language and offer limited dual language content. In addition, some political actors have been known to use media outlets, which have traditionally remained closely linked to (or even economically dependent on) political parties, as a tool to perpetuate ethno-nationalistic narratives and discourse that seeks to legitimize or rally support for their causes. MSI partnered with the Macedonian NGO Medium to produce the show, which was broadcast on the country’s most watched television station, TV Sitel. The series investigates Macedonia’s cultural and religious diversity through interviews with religious leaders, civil society leaders, historians, professors, and other key influencers. The shows second season was broadcast during the reporting period. While the first season aired on Saturday mornings, the second season had a much better timeslot on Sunday mornings, which served to increase the shows exposure and increase viewership.

As the name of the show implies, “On the Same Side” strongly emphasizes commonalities among Macedonia’s citizens. For example, the episode which aired on April 8 – the day Easter was celebrated in 2018 by Macedonia’s Christian Orthodox population – featured the true story of two Macedonian families, one Christian and one Muslim, who have built a cordial tradition of visiting and wishing each other well on religious holidays like Easter. The episode, aired on December 31, emphasized peaceful coexistence among Macedonia’s communities as a reason to celebrate the coming new year. Another episode, aired on January 7, explored the many pieces making up the “multicultural mosaic of Macedonia.” On Facebook, the January 7 episode received the most views with 59,000 and 661 reactions. Of the three TV episodes, the January 7 episode also reached the most viewers (over 70,000) with a 13.53% total audience share in the highly competitive Sunday morning time-slot. The second season routinely drew between 40,000 to 60,000 viewers, with an average 13% total audience share.

18 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2018 Report. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of- macedonia-report.pdf 19 Macedonia, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia, “Prime Minister Zaev meets with European Union Foreign Action Service: Republic of Macedonia and EU have common policies and approaches in fight against radical extremism.” 2018. http://vlada.mk/node/14268 (in ) 20 This objective was part of MSI’s previous media strategy prior to the reporting period. It was, however, in effect when “On the Same Side” was in development. 21 Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2017: Country Report on Macedonia. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/macedonia

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative IV. GRANTS SUMMARY

Between November 2017 and April 2018, MSI cleared 20 activities. The average activity size during this period was $95,623 and the largest was $240,890. In January 2018, MSI cleared the highest number of activities during the reporting period with five activities, for a total of $631,474.

Figure 2. MSI Obligation and Disbursement Rates

V. CONCLUSION

MSI has partnered with an increasingly wide range of media actors to foster the adoption of professional editorial and management practices, consistent with a balanced, audience-driven media sector. Through this programming, MSI has collected qualitative evidence from its media partners that indicate that media outlets themselves are adopting more professional practices.

MSI media partners include outlets that were previously not receptive to USAID assistance. This reporting period has seen not only close cooperation with such media outlets, but also their adoption of MSI recommendations related to building editorial, technical, and production capacity and utilizing viewership metrics to reach wider audiences. In addition, there have been several recent instances of outlets utilizing the knowledge gained through MSI-programming to initiate changes on their own that make them more competitive. Finally, media professionals appear to be more receptive to outside support promoting change, while MSI’s audience research has shown that media consumers have come to expect higher quality programming.

As of April 2018, MSI has 27 ongoing activities that aim to engage citizens on issues of importance and support public institutions to address key reform priorities. As the program enters its final eight months, MSI will continue to work with a diverse set of local actors and institutions to build their resiliency and increase access to reliable information, promote civic engagement, and support democratic reforms.

Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative

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Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative