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Usaid/Oti Macedonia Support Initiative Semi-Annual Report November 1, 2017 – April 30, 2018

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Usaid/Oti Macedonia Support Initiative Semi-Annual Report November 1, 2017 – April 30, 2018 USAID/OTI MACEDONIA SUPPORT INITIATIVE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT NOVEMBER 1, 2017 – APRIL 30, 2018 APRIL 2018 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development and prepared by AECOM International Development. Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative USAID/OTI MACEDONIA SUPPORT INITIATIVE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT NOVEMBER 1, 2017 – APRIL 30, 2018 Submitted to: USAID Office of Transition Initiatives Prepared by: AECOM International Development DISCLAIMER: The authors’ views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 1 II. Political Context 1 III. Program Strategy 4 a. Strategic Framework 4 b. Activity Highlights 4 i.“In Treatment” 4 ii.National Strategies on Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism 8iii. "On the Same Side" 6 IV. Conclusion 6 Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative I. INTRODUCTION In 2015, Macedonia’s four major political parties requested that the European Union (EU) and the United States Government (USG) help Macedonia resolve its political crisis. To assist with this process, USAID launched the USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative (MSI) in September 2015 to support the key reform processes outlined in the Przino Agreement. In December 2015, USAID increased its support to Macedonia by expanding this initiative to a full program, implemented by AECOM International Development. MSI is a three-year program with an activated contract ceiling of US $16,202,525. From November 2017 through April 2018, MSI worked closely with Macedonian civil society organizations, media groups and government institutions to implement key components of the reform agenda by: • Professionalizing the Macedonia media environment; • Promoting citizen participation in public discourse; and • Supporting democratic reforms in accordance with EU standards. II. POLITICAL CONTEXT The political environment in the country remained dynamic during the reporting period. The government enacted complex reforms, while an act of Parliament touching on ethnic relations evoked considerable controversy. Steps taken towards a possible resolution of the dispute with Greece over the country’s name contributed to the shifting political landscape as did the former ruling party’s selection of new leadership. A new coalition government composed of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) was formed in May 2017. This transition happened after four months of political deadlock and protest following the failure of the former ruling party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), to form a coalition and President Gjorge Ivanov’s initial refusal to grant the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) the mandate to form a government. October 2017 marked the first three months of implementation of the “3-6-9 Plan”1, which outlines key reform priorities to improve governance and reorient the country’s trajectory towards Euro Atlantic integration at the three, six, and nine month marks.”2 In their assessment of the “3-6-9+ Plan”, as well as its implementation from the fourth to sixth months (October to December 2017), the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” (IDSC) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), cite improvements including “increased quantifiability and predictability” of activities3, the publishing of the specific activities to be carried out in their entirety, as well as the “prioritization of the priority areas” of “the judiciary, the security and intelligence services, and in the public administration.”4 However, the IDSC/KAS maintained a criticism it had of the original “3-6-9 Plan: “the plan still contains activities that are not reform steps, that is, they are line competences of the institutions encompassed by the plan.” Furthermore, the IDSC/KAS point out that the transparency exhibited by 1 Macedonia, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia, “3-6-9 Plan.” 3-6-9 Plan, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia Secretariat for European Affairs, 4 July 2017. www.sep.gov.mk/data/file/Dokumenti/Plan%203-6-9%20ENG.pdf The plan integrates recommendations from the Przino Agreement, the 2015 Priebe Report, and the EU Commission to put forth a reform agenda over three, six, and nine months. 2 Macedonia, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia, “3-6-9+ Plan.” 3-6-9+ Plan, The Government of the Republic of Macedonia. October 2017. http://vlada.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Narrative%20Plan%206-9%20EN.pdf 3 The “activities” referred to are the specific steps the government must take as outlined in the “3-6-9” Plan and “3-6-9+ Plan” 4 Nečev, Zoran. “Hurdling on 3, 6 and 9. Towards an unconditional recommendation? Monitoring the implementation of the second three months of the 3-6-9 Plan.” Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_51741-1522-2-30.pdf?180306152219 Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative the government with regard to the plan during the first three months was absent in the second three months, “as the public was not informed in a timely manner about the progress made to implement the measures.”5 The government’s reform process was praised by the European Commission (EC) in its 2018 Enlargement Package, and in the specific report on Macedonia’s progress as an EU candidate country,6 which recommends that accession negotiations be opened with Macedonia. “Since May 2017, the new reform-oriented government has taken steps to address state capture by gradually restoring checks and balances, strengthening democracy and rule of law. The country is undergoing fundamental changes in a more inclusive and open political atmosphere.” Furthermore, the EC notes that “the political agreement (also called "Przino Agreement") has been largely implemented and substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the ‘Urgent Reform Priorities’” that the 3-6-9 plans prioritized. During this reporting period, Macedonians saw new leadership emerge in the former ruling party. In the wake of VMRO-DPMNE’s defeat at the polls, former Prime Minister (PM) Nikola Gruevski announced he would resign from his party’s presidency in December 2017.7 This was formalized at an urgent party congress called to elect a new president. VMRO-DPMNE’s then-General Secretary, Hristijan Mickoski, was elected as the party’s new leader. In one of his first announcements in his new position, Mickoski declared a boycott of Parliament by VMRO-DPMNE in January 2018 due to alleged “political persecution” of its MPs by the government.8 This was a reference to the number of VMRO-DPMNE MPs who were in detention due to their alleged involvement in violent incidents which occurred in Parliament on April 27, 2017. Despite this boycott, VMRO-DPMNE returned to Parliament to take part in legislative proceedings regarding the Draft-Law on Languages in March 2018. They restarted the boycott immediately following those proceedings until their unsuccessful vote of no confidence in PM Zoran Zaev on April 11, 2018. The Law on Languages was listed among the priorities in the “3-6-9 Plan.” In essence, it makes Albanian an official second state language. The status of the Albanian language has remained an unresolved issue for the country for years, stemming from Section 6.5 of the Ohrid Framework Agreement,9 which ended the 2001 conflict. The legislation was first passed by Parliament in January 2018 but was vetoed by President Ivanov. A re-vote in March 2018 overturned this veto but the president has refused to sign the legislation into law, which leaves its future unclear.10 Reactions to the March re-vote were strong, both inside and outside Parliament. As the draft law was being adopted, a confrontation occurred in Parliament between Member of Parliament (MP) Nikola Gruevski, the former PM/former VMRO-DPMNE leader, and Parliament Speaker Talat Xhaferi of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). Protests by citizens opposed to the draft law occurred in 5 Ibid 6 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2018 Report. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia- report.pdf 7 “Gruevski: I will resign and I hope it will help resolve this crisis.” Meta.mk News Agency, 1 December 2017. http://meta.mk/en/gruevski-i-will-resign-and-i-hope-it-will-help-resolve-this-crisis/ 8 “Mickoski: VMRO-DPMNE will not be taking part in the Parliament’s work due to a lack of democratic ambient.” Meta.mk News Agency, 9 January 2018. http://meta.mk/en/mickoski-vmro-dpmne-will-not-be-taking-part-in-the- parliament-s-work-due-to-a-lack-of-democratic-ambient/ 9 Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia Signed at Skopje, Macedonia 13 August 2001. https://www.osce.org/skopje/100622?download=true.” 10 “Ivanov: Constitution and my conscience do not allow me to sign the Law on Languages.” Meta.mk News Agency, 15 March 2018. http://meta.mk/en/ivanov-constitution-and-my-conscience-do-not-allow-me-to-sign-the-law-on-languages/ Semi-Annual Report | USAID/OTI Macedonia Support Initiative Skopje outside of Parliament as well as in front of the homes of several SDSM MPs. One such protest turned violent, when the unoccupied car of an SDSM MP was set on fire.11 The name issue continued to evoke controversy and divide public opinion recently, as it has since the country’s founding. Since gaining independence in 1991, the country’s name, the Republic of Macedonia, has been strongly objected to by Macedonia’s neighbor to the south, Greece. Greece’s northern province is also called Macedonia, and Greece has argued that the use of this name allows its neighbor to make territorial claims.
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