ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 26, No. 1 (MK)

Febr 2020

North Macedonia political briefing: Technical Government in place ahead of the early elections in April Adela Gjorgjioska

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

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Technical Government in place ahead of the early elections in April

With the next parliamentary elections less than 3 months away (scheduled for April 2020) the political temperature in the country started to rise throughout the month of February. The next regular parliamentary elections had been scheduled for November 2020, but Prime Minister Zoran Zaev called for early elections after the European Council failed to come to an agreement on starting talks with N. Macedonia on joining the European Union in October 2019.1 Announcing the early election on October 19th, Mr Zaev said: "I am disappointed and angry and I know that the entire population feels this way". He also added that Macedonians would now "decide the road we are going to take" alluding to the announcement of the early elections.2 The decision to hold early elections meant that a so-called technical government would have to be formed 100 days ahead of the elections, scheduled for April 12th. The requirement to form a technical government stems from the 2015 Przino Political Agreement, which was reached between the main political parties with the mediation of the European Union amid a deep political crisis in 2015.3 According to the Agreement, 100 days ahead of elections, a technical government is to be formed, so that opposition ministers and deputies are included in several key posts in order to ensure a fair vote and to remove doubts about political pressures impacting the electoral process. Additionally, according to the Agreement the Prime Minister’s post should be replaced by a new Prime Minister from the ranks of the ruling party. In accordance with these requirements, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev resigned on the 3rd of January and was replaced by former interior Minister of Zaev’s Social Democrat Political Party. Moreover, the previous Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Mila Carovska, replaced Koco Angjusev in the position of Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs and coordination with the economic sectors. What is more, according to the Przino Agreement, new Ministers and Deputies are also appointed from the ranks of the opposition party, most notably to the Ministries of Interior and Social Affairs, which have in the past been marked as potentially susceptible to electoral irregularities. Thus, Nakje Chulev became a new

1 Rankin, J. (2019). “EU failure to open membership talks with Albania and condemned”, October, 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/eu-refusal-to-open-talks-with- albania-and-north-macedonia-condemned-as-historic-mistake 2 “North Macedonia calls snap election after EU talks setback”, BBC, October, 2019, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50109054 3 “Statement by Commissioner Hahn and MEPs Vajgl, Howitt and Kukan: Agreement in to overcome political crisis” available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_15_5372

1 technical Minister of Interior and Rashela Mizraki became a new technical Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, both from the ranks of the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE.4

Pre-electoral politics and the During the second week of February, the new technical Minister, Rashela Mizraki found herself in the midst of the political and media spotlight. Mizrahi, who comes from the opposition VMRO-DPMNE party, provoked a storm, by standing in front of a plaque bearing the country’s old name, Republic of Macedonia, at a press conference. In response to the situation, Mizrahi said she “should thank” her predecessor, current Vice Prime minister Mila Carovska, for not having commissioned a new plaque for the Ministry with the new name, and so “recognising that this is the Republic of Macedonia and that [we are] Macedonians”.5 Foreign Minister Nikola Dimitrov6 was the first to ask for Mizraki’s dismissal, saying he had received a verbal note of protest from Athens over her actions.7 Couple of days later, the technical Prime Minister submitted a proposal for the dismissal of the technical minister. The official statement given was the following: “Having in mind that minister Mizrahi is consciously and deliberately breaching the constitution, and thus endangering the Euro-Atlantic future of the country, the PM has submitted a proposal for the dismissal of the technical minister… to parliament.”8 By the end of the week, on February 15th, Rashela Mizraki was dismissed from her post, by the Parliamentary Assembly with 62 votes in favor of her dismissal and 26 votes against. This has meant that Mizrahi’s mandate as technical minister lasted only a month and half. Nonetheless, the political attention that Mizrahi received, especially in light of her apparent intransigence to use the new name of the country, are likely to have scored her political points amongst sections of the electorate that oppose the name change. In turn, this is likely to be used as political capital in the elections by the VMRO-DPMNE, specifically to appeal to the voters who oppose the name-change. However, such attempts to capitalise on the anti-name change sentiment ahead of the elections are likely to be hampered and fail to translate into an official campaigning line of the VMRO-DPMNE ahead of the elections. Diplomatic

4 “Macedonia has a technical government following PM Zaev’s resignation” available at: https://smart.sdk.mk/vesti/makedonija-dobi-tehnichka-vlada-po-ostavkata-na-premierot-zaev/ 5 “Mizrahi: The board was not changed, but inherited” available at: https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/mizrahi-tablata-ne-e-smeneta-tuku-nasledena-ne-postoi-druga- tabla 6 Dimitrov signed the Prespa accord with aimed at ending the long dispute over Macedonia’s name. 7“Dimitrov- I am asking for the dismissal of technical Minister Rashela Mizrahi for not respecting the constitutional name”, available at: https://24.mk/details/dimitrov-baram-razreshuvanje-na-tekhnichkata- ministerka-rashela-mizrakhi-za-nepochituvanje-na-ustavnoto-ime 8 “North Macedonia Minister faces sack for name provocation: https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/12/north- macedonia-minister-faces-sack-for-name-provocation/

2 messages to this effect were sent by the US Ambassador in the country, Kate Byrnes, who warned against the pre-electoral use of the Prespa Agreement as a battlefield and asked that the next Government remains committed to Euro-Atlantic integration: “This is a real concern and citizens should not be confused or misled at what’s at stake in this process. It’s important to remember that good neighborly relations are a prerequisite for integration to Euro-Atlantic institutions, for the membership to NATO and the EU. We recognize that Prespa was a compromise, it required tough negotiations and concessions on all sides, but what Prespa did was ultimately unlock the path for “North” Macedonia to become a NATO ally and pursue its path to the EU”, Byrnes added.9

In February, unlike the (now former) Minister Mizrahi, the position of the leader of the opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, Hristijan Mickovski, seemed to follow a more cautious line vis a vis the Prespa Agreement. For instance, Mickovski refused to comment on the actions of Minister Mizrahi, which led to her dismissal. Additionally, Mickovski’s political rhetoric began to shift away from the explicit renunciation of the Prespa name agreement, to a refocus on questions of corruption and economics. At a Party Press Conference he stated: “The Prespa Agreement is not the only problem in this country...The Prespa Agreement is a reality. We cannot ignore this reality. But, injustice has been done, and it is both democratic and european to fight and change this reality. Whether we will succeed, time will show. Whether we will succeed or another future generation will do so, time will tell.”10 Some analysts have ascribed the shift in rhetorics to the diplomatic signals and messages sent by the US Ambassador, and the visit of Olivér Várhelyi, the European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, both of whom have welcomed the Prespa Agreement as an instrument for removing a significant obstacle on the EU-accession and euro-atlantic path of the country.11

9“US Ambassador Byrnes expects a smooth transition to power following the elections” available at: https://english.republika.mk/news/macedonia/us-ambassador-byrnes-expects-a-smooth-transition-of-power- following-the-elections/ 10 “Analysis: (R)evolution in the position of Hristijan Mickoski on the Prespa Agreement”, available at https://bit.ly/3b64ONp 11“Várhelyi in Skopje: North Macedonia is ready for the start of negotiations” available at: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/01/15/varhelyi-in-skopje-north-macedonia-is-ready-for-the-start- of-negotiations/

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“Extorsion” Corruption Trial- Court Proceedings 18 court hearings were announced to take place by mid-March for the ongoing court-case codename “Extortion”. The high-profile court case commenced in October 2019, when prosecutors brought charges against the ex-special prosecutor Katica Janeva and two businessmen. Janeva’s Special Prosecution Office (SJO) created in 2015, was tasked with investigating high-level corruption, only to find itself at the center of such accusations by the autumn of 2019.12 Former Special Prosecutor Katica Janeva faces charges on two grounds -- “taking a reward for illegal influence” and “misuse of office”. In one of the hearings as part of the ongoing court case that has gripped the country, the Prosecutor presented messages that the main suspect, a showman-turned-businessman Bojan Jovanovski, sent to the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, among other people. As the court case continues, it is likely to find its place also in the pre-election campaign with allegations of links between the leader of the Social Democrats, Zoran Zaev, and the accused, likely to impact on the campaign and to be used by political opponents of the ruling SDSM.

New Prosecution Law Following a week of tense efforts to secure a majority in parliament, on the 15th of February the ruling Social Democrats narrowly shepherded a new Prosecution Law through Parliament amid loud objections from the opposition about the regularity of the vote. The law has been described as one which is “designed to secure the continuation of high-profile corruption cases by boosting the powers and competences of the regular Prosecution Against Organised Crime”.13 The law is also said to be an instrument to resolve the question of the disgraced Special Prosecutors Office, whose chief prosecutor found herself in the midst of the on-going “Extortion” scandal (see above). The law was passed with 80 of the 120 MPs voting for the law on prosecution. Similar to the passage of the agreement with Greece in 2018, the SDSM relied on the support of an independent parliamentary group consisting of eight break- away opposition MPs, some from VMRO DPMNE and some from other parties aligned with it.1415 Six voted against while none abstained. MPs from the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE, argued that the vote was illegitimate. The law was passed only after a second vote. According

12 “North Macedonia Prosecutor businessmen charged in extortion-case” available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/north-macedonia-prosecutor-businessmen-charged-in-extortion-case/30211390.html 13 “North Macedonia passes prosecution law in knife edge vote” available at https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/16/north-macedonia-passes-prosecution-law-in-knife-edge-vote/ 14Ibid 15 “The independent VMRO-DPMNE parliamentary group will support the law for public prosecution” available at: https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/nezavisnata-pratenichka-grupa-na-vmro-dpmne-kje-go- poddrzhi-zakonot-za-javnoto

4 to the MPs from the VMRO-DPMNE, a second vote is not procedurally possible when passing such laws. Thus, they argued that the first vote, which only 74 MPs supported, was the legitimate one, whilst the second vote was illegitimate and against procedure, arguing that it was done under pressure from the ruling SDSM party. The leader of the opposition Hristijan Mickovski criticised the law arguing it is anti- constitutional and that it contradicts the country’s criminal code: “What the Social Democrats are attempting to achieve with this law is to secure control over the Prosecutors Office in order to secure informal amnesty for the crimes for which they are (to be) prosecuted. This law brings amnesty for Zaev.”16 Other legal experts similarly criticised the passing of the law, especially the mandate for its passing and the procedure that surrounded it: “A systemic law (for public prosecution) is being proposed by a Technical Government (which has a mandate only to organise regular and fair elections) for which it is necessary to have 80 MPs, is brought in a shortened procedure (smuggled through due to its designation with a european flag17) and passed only with 74 votes, only to provide amnesty for Zaev from criminal prosecution after the elections”18 Supported by the EU and the US, the passing of the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, has been viewed by its supporters, and especially the government, as the final important obstacle on the way to persuading Brussels to finally set a date for the start of the EU accession talks for N. Macedonia. Prior to the adoption, the Head of the EU Delegation in the country, Ambassador Samuel Zbogar, encouraged the adoption of the law. However, he emphasized that the European Commission didn’t indicate the law as a condition but it should be adopted for several reasons: “It is primary for the citizens to believe that there will not be any impunity for the crimes committed. It is important for several member countries that want to see a

16 “With a bent spine there can be no progress: available at: https://press24.mk/hristijan-mickoski-so-iskrivena- kichma-nema-napredok 17 The laws which are aimed at the approximation of the national legislation with that of the EU are marked with a so-called European flag- this often allows for a shortened parliamentary procedure. Often legal experts have criticised the use of the European flag for passing legislation which is not related to the process of harmonisation and unification with the law of the EU. Harmonisation of the legislation of the Republic of Macedonia with the EU acquis communautaire is a process of approximation of the solutions in the national legislation to the EU law. Harmonisation and unification of the law in the EU should enable creation of a single area of freedom, security and justice, and a single market with unobstructed exercise of economic and other functions of the Union. The obligation for harmonisation of the legislation of the Republic of Macedonia with the EU acquis has been incorporated in Article 68 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The new Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, in its Article 135 stipulate that the draft laws harmonising our legislation with the EU acquis should contain information relating to the original acts of the European Union with their full title, number and date along with a statement on the harmonisation status. Once these laws enter parliamentary procedure, they are given European flag indication distinguishing them from the other acts. 18“Apasiev: For the smuggled law on the Public Prosecutors Office” available at: https://expres.mk/apasiev-za- shvercerski-doneseniot-zjo-eu-kale-pribe-beknete-neshto-be-kje-ni-snema-lenta/

5 demonstration of the dedication towards the rule of law. In the end, since we want to see a demonstration of the change in the ways of thinking” said Žbogar.19 Following the adoption, Ambassador Samuel Zbogar voiced satisfaction with the adoption of the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office. “I welcome the adoption of several important reform laws including those on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Council of Public Prosecutors and the Automated Court Case Management System. Their implementation should strengthen the Rule of Law, and allow for greater professionalism and efficiency in the judicial system to the benefit of the citizens of North Macedonia. This legislation, as well as that relating to Persons without Regulated Civil Status and the Electoral Code, respond to the recommendations of the EU country Reports and confirm North Macedonia’s determination to pursue the path of EU integration”.20

19 “EU Ambassador Samuel Žbogar considers the new methodology as a win-win document both for the EU and the candidate countries” available at: https://meta.mk/en/eu-ambassador-samue-zbogar-considers-the-new- methodology-as-a-win-win-document-both-for-the-eu-and-the-candidate-countries/ 20 “Statement by Ambassador Samuel Žbogar on adoption of reform laws in Parliament” available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/republic-north-macedonia/74760/statement-ambassador-samuel- %C5%BEbogar-adoption-reform-laws-parliament_en

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