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North Macedonia Political Briefing: Technical Government in Place Ahead of the Early Elections in April Adela Gjorgjioska

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North Macedonia Political Briefing: Technical Government in Place Ahead of the Early Elections in April Adela Gjorgjioska ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 26, No. 1 (MK) Febr 2020 North Macedonia political briefing: Technical Government in place ahead of the early elections in April Adela Gjorgjioska 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Technical Government in place ahead of the early elections in April With the next parliamentary elections less than 3 months away (scheduled for April 2020) the political temperature in the country started to rise throughout the month of February. The next regular parliamentary elections had been scheduled for November 2020, but Prime Minister Zoran Zaev called for early elections after the European Council failed to come to an agreement on starting talks with N. Macedonia on Joining the European Union in October 2019.1 Announcing the early election on October 19th, Mr Zaev said: "I am disappointed and angry and I know that the entire population feels this way". He also added that Macedonians would now "decide the road we are going to take" alluding to the announcement of the early elections.2 The decision to hold early elections meant that a so-called technical government would have to be formed 100 days ahead of the elections, scheduled for April 12th. The requirement to form a technical government stems from the 2015 Przino Political Agreement, which was reached between the main political parties with the mediation of the European Union amid a deep political crisis in 2015.3 According to the Agreement, 100 days ahead of elections, a technical government is to be formed, so that opposition ministers and deputies are included in several key posts in order to ensure a fair vote and to remove doubts about political pressures impacting the electoral process. Additionally, according to the Agreement the Prime Minister’s post should be replaced by a new Prime Minister from the ranks of the ruling party. In accordance with these requirements, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev resigned on the 3rd of January and was replaced by former interior Minister Oliver Spasovski of Zaev’s Social Democrat Political Party. Moreover, the previous Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Mila Carovska, replaced Koco Angjusev in the position of Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs and coordination with the economic sectors. What is more, according to the Przino Agreement, new Ministers and Deputies are also appointed from the ranks of the opposition party, most notably to the Ministries of Interior and Social Affairs, which have in the past been marked as potentially susceptible to electoral irregularities. Thus, Nakje Chulev became a new 1 Rankin, J. (2019). “EU failure to open membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia condemned”, October, 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/eu-refusal-to-open-talks-with- albania-and-north-macedonia-condemned-as-historic-mistake 2 “North Macedonia calls snap election after EU talks setback”, BBC, October, 2019, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50109054 3 “Statement by Commissioner Hahn and MEPs Vajgl, Howitt and Kukan: Agreement in Skopje to overcome political crisis” available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_15_5372 1 technical Minister of Interior and Rashela Mizraki became a new technical Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, both from the ranks of the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE.4 Pre-electoral politics and the Prespa Agreement During the second week of February, the new technical Minister, Rashela Mizraki found herself in the midst of the political and media spotlight. Mizrahi, who comes from the opposition VMRO-DPMNE party, provoked a storm, by standing in front of a plaque bearing the country’s old name, Republic of Macedonia, at a press conference. In response to the situation, Mizrahi said she “should thank” her predecessor, current Vice Prime minister Mila Carovska, for not having commissioned a new plaque for the Ministry with the new name, and so “recognising that this is the Republic of Macedonia and that [we are] Macedonians”.5 Foreign Minister Nikola Dimitrov6 was the first to ask for Mizraki’s dismissal, saying he had received a verbal note of protest from Athens over her actions.7 Couple of days later, the technical Prime Minister submitted a proposal for the dismissal of the technical minister. The official statement given was the following: “Having in mind that minister Mizrahi is consciously and deliberately breaching the constitution, and thus endangering the Euro-Atlantic future of the country, the PM has submitted a proposal for the dismissal of the technical minister… to parliament.”8 By the end of the week, on February 15th, Rashela Mizraki was dismissed from her post, by the Parliamentary Assembly with 62 votes in favor of her dismissal and 26 votes against. This has meant that Mizrahi’s mandate as technical minister lasted only a month and half. Nonetheless, the political attention that Mizrahi received, especially in light of her apparent intransigence to use the new name of the country, are likely to have scored her political points amongst sections of the electorate that oppose the name change. In turn, this is likely to be used as political capital in the elections by the VMRO-DPMNE, specifically to appeal to the voters who oppose the name-change. However, such attempts to capitalise on the anti-name change sentiment ahead of the elections are likely to be hampered and fail to translate into an official campaigning line of the VMRO-DPMNE ahead of the elections. Diplomatic 4 “Macedonia has a technical government following PM Zaev’s resignation” available at: https://smart.sdk.mk/vesti/makedonija-dobi-tehnichka-vlada-po-ostavkata-na-premierot-zaev/ 5 “Mizrahi: The board was not changed, but inherited” available at: https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/mizrahi-tablata-ne-e-smeneta-tuku-nasledena-ne-postoi-druga- tabla 6 Dimitrov signed the Prespa accord with Greece aimed at ending the long dispute over Macedonia’s name. 7“Dimitrov- I am asking for the dismissal of technical Minister Rashela Mizrahi for not respecting the constitutional name”, available at: https://24.mk/details/dimitrov-baram-razreshuvanje-na-tekhnichkata- ministerka-rashela-mizrakhi-za-nepochituvanje-na-ustavnoto-ime 8 “North Macedonia Minister faces sack for name provocation: https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/12/north- macedonia-minister-faces-sack-for-name-provocation/ 2 messages to this effect were sent by the US Ambassador in the country, Kate Byrnes, who warned against the pre-electoral use of the Prespa Agreement as a battlefield and asked that the next Government remains committed to Euro-Atlantic integration: “This is a real concern and citizens should not be confused or misled at what’s at stake in this process. It’s important to remember that good neighborly relations are a prerequisite for integration to Euro-Atlantic institutions, for the membership to NATO and the EU. We recognize that Prespa was a compromise, it required tough negotiations and concessions on all sides, but what Prespa did was ultimately unlock the path for “North” Macedonia to become a NATO ally and pursue its path to the EU”, Byrnes added.9 In February, unlike the (now former) Minister Mizrahi, the position of the leader of the opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, HristiJan Mickovski, seemed to follow a more cautious line vis a vis the Prespa Agreement. For instance, Mickovski refused to comment on the actions of Minister Mizrahi, which led to her dismissal. Additionally, Mickovski’s political rhetoric began to shift away from the explicit renunciation of the Prespa name agreement, to a refocus on questions of corruption and economics. At a Party Press Conference he stated: “The Prespa Agreement is not the only problem in this country...The Prespa Agreement is a reality. We cannot ignore this reality. But, injustice has been done, and it is both democratic and european to fight and change this reality. Whether we will succeed, time will show. Whether we will succeed or another future generation will do so, time will tell.”10 Some analysts have ascribed the shift in rhetorics to the diplomatic signals and messages sent by the US Ambassador, and the visit of Olivér Várhelyi, the European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, both of whom have welcomed the Prespa Agreement as an instrument for removing a significant obstacle on the EU-accession and euro-atlantic path of the country.11 9“US Ambassador Byrnes expects a smooth transition to power following the elections” available at: https://english.republika.mk/news/macedonia/us-ambassador-byrnes-expects-a-smooth-transition-of-power- following-the-elections/ 10 “Analysis: (R)evolution in the position of Hristijan Mickoski on the Prespa Agreement”, available at https://bit.ly/3b64ONp 11“Várhelyi in Skopje: North Macedonia is ready for the start of negotiations” available at: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/01/15/varhelyi-in-skopje-north-macedonia-is-ready-for-the-start- of-negotiations/ 3 “Extorsion” Corruption Trial- Court Proceedings 18 court hearings were announced to take place by mid-March for the ongoing court-case codename “Extortion”. The high-profile court case commenced in October 2019, when prosecutors brought charges against the ex-special prosecutor Katica Janeva and two businessmen. Janeva’s Special Prosecution Office (SJO) created in 2015, was tasked with investigating high-level corruption, only to find itself at the center of such accusations by the autumn of 2019.12 Former Special Prosecutor Katica Janeva faces charges on two grounds -- “taking a reward for illegal influence” and “misuse of office”. In one of the hearings as part of the ongoing court case that has gripped the country, the Prosecutor presented messages that the main suspect, a showman-turned-businessman Bojan Jovanovski, sent to the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, among other people.
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