The Egyptian Military, Part Two: from Mubarak Onward Ahmed Hashim

MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XVIII, NO. 4, WINTER 2011 THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY, PART TWO: FROM MUBARAK ONWARD Ahmed Hashim Dr. Hashim is an associate professor at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies and academic coordinator/research manager at ICPVTR, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. he assassination of President attackers.2 The key worry, though, was the Anwar Sadat on October 6, armed forces, the only organization capa- 1981, inspired profound fear for ble of violently displacing the government. Egypt’s stability. However, rapid Nothing revealed more clearly the possible Televation to the presidency of Vice Presi- existence of religious extremism within dent Hosni Mubarak, former head of the the armed forces than the fact that Sadat’s Air Force, assured continuity of govern- assassins — Colonel Abboud Zumur, ment. Lacking the charisma of a Nasser or Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, Sergeant Sadat, Mubarak was regarded as an interim Hussein Abbas Muhammad (the sniper leader with too few political skills to stay who shot the president in the neck) and in power for any length of time. To the their cohorts — all were fervent Islamists.3 surprise of many, he managed to overcome There was considerable fear that Islamists numerous obstacles and threats, consoli- had made serious gains among enlistees date power and remain in office until 2011, and the junior and middle ranks of the offi- when popular fury forced him out.1 cer corps. The writings of al-Qaeda leader The two immediate concerns of the Ayman al-Zawahiri have made clear that new president back in 1981 were, first, one of the key goals of Islamic Jihad, the whether the killing of Sadat presaged Islamist group with whom he was associat- an attempt to seize power, and, second, ed at the time, was to recruit from among whether the loyalty of the armed forces to the military; the other main radical group, the state had been compromised by wide- al-Gamaa al-Islamiyah, sought to mobilize spread penetration by religious extrem- the people to rise up against the “infidel” ists. In October 1981, within days of the regime.4 The conscripts, who came from assassination, ebullient supporters of the the urban and rural poor and were increas- assassins came out of the woodwork and ingly impoverished as a result of economic attacked government property and Coptic restructuring undertaken by Sadat in the Christians. The government airlifted in 1970s, were susceptible to the siren song units of paratroopers and special forces, of the extremists. They had spent years en- who swiftly and efficiently crushed the gaged in harsh military training and then at © 2011, The Author Middle East Policy © 2011, Middle East Policy Council 106 HASHIM: THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY, PART TWO the gabha — the front with Israel. On their already present. In 1986, military intelli- return home, they were promised release gence uncovered a plot by junior and mid- from the military, provision of services and ranking officers who had allied themselves consumer goods, and job training for civil- with civilian plotters allegedly linked with ian life. Very little of this happened and the Islamic Jihad.7 However, at the turn of the military retained a large number of sullen millennium, the efficient oversight sys- and hardened conscripts.5 Those people do tem began to falter. Many senior officers not stage coups. The threat they potentially believed that the promise of a lucrative pose lies in a reluctance to deal with large- job in the future was enough incentive for scale outbreaks of domestic violence. In the officers at the bottom to persevere as duti- few instances where the state had sent the ful servants of the system. Officers were army into the streets to deal with threats to not indoctrinated with any commitment internal stability, it has generally used top- to a system of beliefs or values along the level units manned by professionals. lines of the Turkish military, whose politi- The Mubarak government immediately cal power the Egyptian senior command initiated an internal study to assess the rea- now seeks to emulate. The weakness of sons for the growth of Islamist militancy, the assumption that junior officers would particularly within the armed forces, and wait patiently for their rewards was that how to combat it. Economic distress and the Egyptian army is huge and top-heavy poverty were singled out as the culprits.6 with officers. The chances of snagging a In response, the armed forces moved to lucrative post-retirement position were ensure that conscripts were literate so slim because of the number of aspirants, that they could think for themselves. The particularly as such positions depended military took measures to prevent infiltra- on patronage and kinship ties. A retired tion by mutaasibin (religious fanatics) officer got a lucrative job in the military’s and went as far as investigating soldiers’ commercial complex only if he had ties family backgrounds, particularly of indi- to someone already in the system. The viduals seeking commissions in sensitive failure of many officers to hit the jackpot positions. Senior officers benefited from bred resentment against those who did, and the existing system. They were judged against the nouveaux riches of the liberal unlikely to succumb to the message of class who were in control of the vibrant religious extremists even if they and their sectors of the economy. families had become more pious in recent years. After all, they had the promise of INTERNAL SECURITY, 1980s early retirement, a pension and the lure of One of the oddest characteristics of a lucrative position in one of the numerous Egyptian authoritarianism was the inef- military-owned commercial companies. ficiency of its large coercive apparatus, Nonetheless, in the wake of Sadat’s as- despite the vast financial and human sassination and the uncovering of extrem- resources directed its way and its well-de- ists within the armed forces, the state was served, ruthless reputation. Time and time not going to take any chances. It created an again, the government failed to deal with oversight institution to prevent infiltration low morale, poor training and dismal pay of the armed forces by subversive ele- that festered well into the twenty-first cen- ments and to weed out extremists that were tury. The police and paramilitary failed to 107 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XVIII, NO. 4, WINTER 2011 deal with bread riots in 1977; the army was as the southern-based units were consid- called in, as briefly discussed in Part One ered unreliable. (Middle East Policy 18, no. 3; Fall 2011). By the 1980s, the police and paramilitary MUBARAK AND THE FIELD had become the problem. Finally, they did MARSHAL not perform well during the revolution of Between 1981 and 1987, the second 2011 either, as was highlighted by a post- most powerful man in Egypt, after the Mubarak report on internal security that president, was the defense minister, Abdul emphasized the low level of training and Halim Abu Ghazala. Relations between the skills of the paramilitary Central Security two were strained, with Mubarak resenting Forces (CSF). Abu Ghazala’s independence and promi- One of the most serious internal nence.10 The defense minister was articu- threats to the Mubarak presidency came in late, cosmopolitan, fluent in English and February 1986 with the “revolt” of 20,000 played a key role in promoting American CSF members.8 A conscript force of military aid to Egypt to the advantage of 300,000 men, made up largely of illiterate Egypt’s defense industry.11 His relations peasants from remote rural areas rejected with the Americans turned tense when for military service because of their low he roused Washington’s displeasure with educational level and poor health, the CSF Egypt’s role in a semi-covert ballistic- was used to maintain security around pub- missile project involving two unlikely lic facilities and to put down demonstra- partners, Argentina and Iraq. tions by students and workers. Rumors Abu Ghazala went out of his way in that the government had decided to extend 1981 to deny rumors that he was a candi- its unpopular term of service provoked date for vice president: “All this talk is un- a mutiny among 20,000 members of the true. Of course, President Hosni Mubarak force.9 The military was called in to put is the one who will choose the vice presi- down the rebellion even though there dent and, of course, he has his own way of was no danger that the CSF revolt would choosing. I absolutely do not wish to figure gain traction with disgruntled elements of among the ones from whom the choice will urban society; the two groups were cultur- be made.”12 If the appointment of a vice ally alien, even if they shared straitened president was intransparent, so was the economic circumstances. coordination on national security between The government did not learn much the civilian government and the military. from the CSF revolt. Very little was done As defense and war production minister, to improve quality of life, pay or skill Abu Ghazala often provided detailed levels. Units based in Lower (northern) overviews of Egyptian national-security Egypt were given more perks, better bar- threat perceptions and future projections to racks and improved training, but those in the Defense and National Security Com- Upper (southern) Egypt, where the Islamist mittee of the ruling National Democratic insurgency erupted in full force in the Party (NDP). In July 1986, for example, he 1990s, remained deprived and susceptible delivered a comprehensive statement to the to penetration by Islamist activists. Not NDP in which he discussed political and surprisingly, the government used northern military developments in the Middle East CSF units to deal with unrest in the south, and their impact on Egypt.

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