The World Bank and Econonmlc Commission for Aica SAP Working- PapBer Noi
Public Disclosure Authorized 27250 Seminar on Railway Concessioning in Africa Public Disclosure Authorized Proceedings Public Disclosure Authorized
October 13 & 14, 1997
Africa Region The World Bank
>.e. ... i... {;iii..{ ssss Public Disclosure Authorized zII i I
I
I I i i Ii Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program The World Bank and Economic Commission for Africa e SSATP Working Paper No.32
Seminar on Railway Concessioning in Africa
Proceedings
October 13 & 14, 1997
Africa Region The World Bank
Foreword
Railways in Sub-Saharan Africa have probably suffered more than most institutions in the transition from colonial to independent government. Sub-Saharan African governments, struggling to establish the institutions and policies needed to ensure economic development in an increasingly globalizing economy, simply have not been able to set the kind of balanced transport policies and stable funding in the public sector that would have permitted railways to flourish. Also, like railways all over the world, Sub-Saharan African railways have consistently been limited by a lack of clear definition of their role or of the limits of political interference in institutions that must survive in competition with private companies that do not carry "social" burdens. The result of this heritage has been railways that cannot serve well the needs of their economies, are often poorly maintained, are not commercially effective, and are often macroeconomic burdens on their treasuries.
International Financial Institutions and donors have worked hard over many years with Sub-Saharan African railways and governments to put these railways on a sound economic and commercial footing. Although some progress has been made in individual countries for limited periods of time, it is clear that the traditional approach of providing money to fix physical problems or merely changing organizational arrangements while leaving in place policy or political limitations has not led to positive and sustainable results: something more than the old approach will be needed.
There is, of course, no single, "cookbook" solution. Countries, and their railways, are all different and these differences are often highly significant. This said, railway concessioning is emerging as at least one potential tool for use in assisting railways. The objective of this conference was to bring to senior Sub-Saharan African railway managers and their Government officials the experience of those who are now engaged in rail concessioning, both inside and outside Africa, so that Sub-Saharan African officials can make appropriate use of the tool.
The focus of the conference was specifically on experience, not on theory, for two reasons: first, there is a need to act quickly in order to put Sub-Saharan railways back on track, and experience is the best guide to practical action; and, second, there is enough experience now available that the concessioning tool can be confidently applied from hard-earned lessons -- not theory. Participants were able to show how concessioning actually works, and how Sub-Saharan African managers can learn from good (and bad) decisions made elsewhere. Potential rail users were able to show how they have, or will, respond, to improvements in service cost or reliability. Government officials were able to discuss, in concrete terms, the benefits (and risks) of concessioning from an operational and policy-driven point of view. Overall, interested parties were able to assess how and where rail concessioning might be applied for its real utility -- permitting Sub-Saharan Africa's railways to play their proper role in the critically needed transport system of Africa.
supha B. Crookes Acting Sector Director Infrastructure Africa Region i i iI
i i
I
i Contents
Agenda
Synopsis: Railway Concessioning in Africa: An Approach Gathers Steam
Session 1: Opening Address from His Excellency Ezan Akele (Delivered by M. Achi B. Jonas, le Conseiller technique en transports)
Railways in Sub-SaharanAfrica -- What is at Stake? by Tidjane Thiam, Special Advisor to the President of the Republique de Cote d'Ivoire, Head of the Strategic Planning Office
Session 2: ConcessioningRail Activities to the Private Sector, A New Approach to Railway Restructuring by Louis S. Thompson, Railways Adviser, World Bank
Issues and Options in Railway Concessioning by Olivier Ratheaux, Transport Specialist, Caisse Fran,aise de Developpement & Karim Jacques Budin, Principal Railway Specialist, World Bank
Session 3: Railway Concessioning in Latin America by Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management
The On-going Railway ConcessioningProcess in Cameroon by Messrs. Lucas Kamden, Privatization Committee of the Republic of Cameroon & E. Ebata, REGIFERCAM
Session 4: Railway Concessioningin Mozambique by Messrs. Abilio Portimao, Secretary-General, Mozambique Ministry of Transport & Communications & Arun Pai, Adviser CFM (Mozambique Railways)
The First Railway Concession in Africa: The C6te d 'Ivoire-BurkinaExperience Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General, SITARAIL Session 5: Panel: Concessioning and The Railway Clients:
No formal papers presented
Session 6: Panel: Investors' and Operators' Perspectives
Railway Concessioningin Africa: An Investor's Perspective by Henry Posner III, Chairman, Railroad Development Corporation
Summary ofpanel discussion topics by Paul Victor, Anacostia Pacific
Perspectives des operateursferroviaireset des investisseurs: La point de vue de SAGA by Jean-Yves Montpert, SECAF (SAGA/SDV)
Perspectivespour les investisseurs et operateurs by Pierre-Louis Rochet, SYSTRA
COMAZAR: Company Profile and Capacity Statement by Eric Peiffer
Session 7: Panel: The Role of Consultant and Financial Advisors in Concessioning
Railway Privatisation: The Role of the Consultant by Peter Kieran, CPCS Transcom Ltd.
Session 8: On-going Operationsand Prospectsfor Railway Concessioningin Southern and Eastern Africa by Yash Pal Kedia, Sr. Railway Engineer, World Bank
On-going Operationsand Prospectsfor Railway Concessioning in Western and Central Africa by Bernard Zoba, Union of African Railways & A. Tchibozo, ECA
Concessioning and the InternationalRail Community by Philippe Roumeguere, Director General & Vipin Sharma, UIC
Session 9: No formal presentations Annexes:
Annex 1: Papers distributed but not presented at the seminar Annex 2: Africa Transport Technical Note No. 10: Concessioning of Rail Transport Annex 3: List of participants i
I i Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSA TP)
SEMINAR ON RAILWAY CONCESSIONING IN AFRICA
Abidjan (C6te d'Ivoire) October 13-14, 1997
AGENDA
Monday, October 13, 1997
Session I Chairperson: Shigeo Katsu, Country Director for C6te d'Ivoire, World Bank.
08:30 am Participants' Welcome and Seating
08:45 am Official Guests Welcome
09:00 am Opening Address from His Excellency Ezan Akele, Minister of Economic Infrastructure of the Republique de C6te d'Ivoire
09:30 am "Railways in Sub-SaharanAfrica -- What Is at Stake? ", Tidjane Thiam, Special Adviser to the President of the Republique de C6te d'lvoire, Head of the Strategic Planning Office (F)
10:00 am End of Session I -- Coffee Break
Session 2 Chairperson: Bernard Zoba, Secretary-General, Union of African Railways (UAR)
10:30 am "Concessioning Rail Activities to The Private Sector, A New Approach to Railway Restructuring", Louis S. Thompson, Railways Adviser, World Bank (E)
1 1:00 am "Issues and Options in Railway Concessioning", Olivier Ratheaux, Transport Specialist, Caisse Francaise de Developpement; and Karim-Jacques Budin, Principal Railway Specialist, World Bank (F)
12:15 noon End of Session 2
Lunch 12:45 Complimentary, at Restaurant Cascade
1 Session 3 Chairperson: Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General, SITARAIL (F)
14:00 "Railway Concessioning in Latin America", Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management (E)
14:45 " The On-going Railway Concessioning Process in Cameroon ", Messrs. Lucas Kamdem, Privatization Committee of the Republic of Cameroon; and E. Ebata, REGIFERCAM (F)
15:30 End of Session 3 -- Coffee Break
Session 4 Chairperson: Gerard Olivero, French Ministry of Cooperation
16:00 "Railway Concessioning in Mozambique ", Messrs. Abilio Portimao, Secretary-General, Mozambique Ministry of Transports and Communications; and Arun Pai, Adviser, CFM (Mozambique Railways) (E)
16:45 "The First Railway Concession in Africa: The Cote d'Ivoire- Burkina Experience ", Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General, SITARAIL (F)
17:30 Questions and Discussions of Themes Covered in Sessions 3 and 4
18:30 End of Session 4
Dinner Participants' own arrangement
2 Tuesday, October 14, 1997
Session 5 Moderator: Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General, SITARAIL
08:30 am Panel: "Concessioning and The Railways Clients" (E/F)
Participants: Messrs. Diakite, Societe Nationale de Transit du Burkina; Bozec, Ndong Sima, SNBG (Gabon); Abeke, COMILOG (Gabon); Kambalame, PCC (Malawi); Mbale, GRAMIL (Malawi)
Session 6 Moderator: Louis S. Thompson, Railways Adviser, World Bank
9:30 am Panel: "Investors ' and Operators'Perspectives " (E/F)
Participants: Messrs. Henri Posner, Railroad Development Corporation; Paul Victor, Anacostia Pacific; Jean-Yves Monpert, SECAF (SAGA/SDV); Pierre-Louis Rochet, SYSTRA; Eric Peiffer, COMAZAR
11:15 am Coffee Break
Session 7 Moderator: Karim-Jacques Budin, Principal Railway Specialist, World Bank
11:30 am Panel: "The Role of Consultants and FinancialAdvisers in Concessioning" (E/F)
Participants: Messrs. Marcel Sarmet, Coopers and Lybrand; Pieter Kieran, CPCS-Transcom; Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management; Patrice Guiol, Banque Nationale de Paris
12:45 End of Session 7
Lunch Participants' own arrangement
3 Session 8 Chairperson: Manfred Breithaupt, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (Germany)
14:15 "On-going Operations and Prospects for Railway Concessioning in Southern and Eastern Africa", Yash Pal Kedia, Sr. Railway Engineer, World Bank (E)
14:45 "On-Going Operations and Prospects for Railway Concessioning in Western and Central Africa", Bernard Zoba, Union of African Railways; and A. Tchibozo, Economic Commission for Africa (F)
15:15 "Concessioning and the international rail community", Philippe Roumeguere, Director General, and Vipin Sharma. International Union of Railways (UIC) (F/E)
15:45 Coffee Break
Session 9 Chairperson: Honourable Edward K. Salia, Minister of Roads and Transport, Ghana
16:00 Discussion on Railway Concessioning Problems; Conclusions of the Seminar
17:40 Closing Remarks: Snorri Hallgrimsson, World Bank
17:45 Closure of Seminar
Dinner 19:30 Complimentary End-of-Seminar Dinner (salle Anono 1)
Wednesday, October 15, 1995
Visit of SITARAIL (concessionaire of the Abidjan/Ouagadougou railway) (Optional)
8:00 am Departure from the Golf Hotel
13:00 Return to the Golf Hotel
4 Programme pour les Politiques de Transport en Afrique Sub-Saharienne (SSA TP)
SEMINAIRE SUR LA MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER EN AFRIQUE
Abidjan (C8te d'Ivoire) 13-14 octobre 1997
PROGRAMME DU SEMINAIRE
Lundi 13 octobre 1997
Session 1 President de session: M. Shigeo Katsu, Directeur des operations pour la CMte d'Ivoire, Banque mondiale
8 heures 30 Installation des participants
8 heures 45 Accueil des personnalites
9 heures Allocution inaugurale de S.E.M. le Ministre Ezan Akele, Ministre des Infrastructures Economiques de la Republique de CMte d'Ivoire
9 heures 30 "Le chemin defer en Afrique sub-saharienne- Les enjeux", par M. Tidjane Thiam, Conseiller special du President de la Republique de Cote d'Ivoire, Charge de la planification strategique et de la prospective (F)
10 heures Fin de la session 1 et Pause-cafe
Session 2 President de session: M. Bemard Zoba, Secretaire Gendral, Union Africaine des chemins de fer
10 heures 30 "La mise en concession priveie de l 'activiteferroviaire,une nouvelle approche de la restructurationdes chemins defer ", par Louis S. Thompson, Conseiller pour les chemins de fer, Banque mondiale (A)
11 heures "Problemes et options de la,concession ferroviaire ", par Olivier Ratheaux, Ingenieur Transport, Caisse franeaise de developpement et Karim-Jacques Budin, Specialiste ferroviaire principal, Banque mondiale (F)
12 heures Fin de la session 2
1 Dejeuner 12 heures 45 Dejeuner offert aux participants (Restaurant Cascade)
Session 3 President de session: Abdelazziz Thiam, Directeur-General, SITARAIL (F)
14 heures "Les mises en concession ferroviaireen Amerique latine ", par M. Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management (A)
14 heures 45 "Le processus de mise en concessionferroviaire au Cameroun ", par MM. Lucas Kamdem, Mission de restructuration des entreprises du secteur public et parapublic, et E. Ebata, REGIFERCAM (F)
15 heures 30 Fin de la session 3 et Pause-cafe
Session 4 President de session: M. Gerard Olivero, Ministere de la Cooperation de la Republique fran:aise
16 heures "La mise en concession des chemins defer au Mozambique ", par MM. Abilio Portimao, Secretaire General, Ministere des transports et communications du Mozambique et Arun Pai, Conseiller, Chemins de fer du Mozambique (A)
16 heures 45 "La premiere concessionferroviaire en Afrique: L 'experience de la C6te d 'Ivoire et du Burkina ", par Abdelazziz Thiam, Directeur General, SITARAIL (F)
17 heures 30 Questions et discussion sur les themes evoques lors des sessions 3 et 4
18 heures 30 Fin de la session 4
Diner Diner libre
2 Mardi 14 octobre 1997
Session 5 Moderateur: M. Abdelazziz Thiam, Directeur General, SITARAIL
8 heures 30 Panel: "Les clients du chemin defer et la mise en concession"
Participants: MM. Diakite, Societe nationale de transit du Burkina; Ndong Sima, SNBG (Gabon), Abeke, COMILOG (Gabon); Kambalame, PCC (Malawi); Mbale, GRAMIL (Malawi) (F/A)
Session 6 Moderateur: M. Louis S. Thompson, Conseiller pour les chemins de fer, Banque mondiale
9 heures 30 Panel: "La perspective des operateursferroviaireset des investisseurs"
Participants: MM. Henri Posner, Railroad Development Corporation; Paul Victor, Anacostia Pacific; Jean-Yves Monpert, SECAF (SAGA/SDV); Pierre-Louis Rochet, SYSTRA; Eric Peiffer, COMAZAR. (A/F)
11 heuresl 5 Pause-cafe
Session 7 Moderateur: M. Karim-Jacques Budin, Specialiste ferroviaire principal, Banque mondiale
11 heures 30 Panel: "Le r6le des consultants et conseillersfinanciersdans la mise en concession"
Participants: MM. Marcel Sarmet, Coopers and Lybrand; Pieter Kieran, CPCS-Transcom; Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management; Patrice Guiol, Banque nationale de Paris (F/A)
12 heures 45 Fin de la session 7
3 Dejeuner Dejeuner libre
Session 8 President de session: M. Manfred Breithaupt, GTZ (Allemagne)
14 heures 15 "Les operations en cours et les perspectives de mise en concessionferroviaire en Afrique australe et orientale" par M. Yash Pal Kedia, Banque mondiale (A)
14 heures 45 "Les operations en cours et les perspectives de mise en concessionferroviaire en Afrique occidentale et centrale" par MM. Bernard Zoba, Union africaine des chemins de fer et A. Tchibozo, Commission economique pour l'Afrique (F)
15 heures 15 "Les mises en concession et la communauteferroviaire internationale"par MM. Philippe Roumeguere, Directeur General, et Vipin Sharma, Union intemationale des chemins de fer (UIC) (F/A)
15 heures 45 Pause-cafe
Session 9 President de session: Son Excellence Monsieur Edward K. Salia, Ministre des routes et des transports, Ghana
16 heures Discussion generale sur les problemes de la mise en concession ferroviaire et conclusions
17 heures 40 Remarques de cloture, Snorri Hallgrimsson, Banque mondiale
17 heures 45 Cloture du seminaire
Diner 19 heures 30 Diner de cloture du seminaire offert aux participants (salle Anono 1)
Mercredi 15 octobre 1997
Visite de SITARAIL (soci6te' concessionnaire du chemin defer Abidjan-Ouagadougou) (Facultatif)
8 heures Depart de l'Hotel du Golf
13 heures Retour a l'Hotel du Golf
4 Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP)
Railway Concessioning in Africa: An Approach Gathers Steam
Synopsis
On October 13 and 14, 1997, representatives of most of the railways and Governments of Sub-Saharan Africa met in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, with representatives of the World Bank, sponsoring donor agencies including Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), GTZ (Germany) and Caisse Franqaise de Developpement (CFD), the UIC and UAR, and a number of international experts and consultants to discuss the progress of and prospects for railway concessioning in Africa. The conference was arranged by the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (a World Bank/UN collaborative program) and hosted by SITARAIL, the concessionaire of the Abidjan-Ougadougou railway, and SIPF, the railway landlord corporation of C6te d'Ivoire. In all, over 150 people, including representatives of railways, governments, rail labor unions, donor agencies, shippers, international agencies, concessionaires and consultants attended the seminar and participated in the animated discussions that ensued.
Beginning the first session, the overall theme for the conference was set by Mr. Tidjane Thiam, Special Adviser to the President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire who strongly argued the need for change in Africa's railways. Any reasonable reading of the railway experience in Africa shows a declining role for railways in the transport sector, to the point that a continuation of existing trends would cause railways to vanish. The potential benefits from effective railways are far too important to permit this to happen. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the need for railway change fit well into a general program of restructuring many activities in the economy, so the stage was well set for action.
In the second session, the need for change in the railways, and the overall potential for concessioning as a tool in that change was further supported by Lou Thompson of the World Bank who described briefly the fact that railways are often in weak financial condition, they face a significant change in the needs of the transport sector and confront increasing competition from other modes. At the same time, their governments can no longer afford to support them as in the past. Combining these factors with the shift of many economies to market form and trends toward globalization, railways are not going to have an easy life in the upcoming decade. Governments are solving this dilemma by making railways commercial and by increasing the role of the private sector in delivery of rail services. The World Bank has a role to play in this process, both in financing repairs or rehabilitation of facilities, environmental cleanup and labor transitional issues, and in providing technical assistance in planning and managing the transition.
Olivier Ratheaux (Cfd) and Karim-Jacques Budin (World Bank) then provided presentations on the issues and options of implementing concession schemes in railways. These presentations highlighted the fact that concessioning is not a "cookbook" answer to a generalized problem. Instead, implementing concessions requires careful analysis and answers to a number of specific questions, including the scope of the concession, its duration, access to the concession facilities by others (if, for example, freight service is concessioned and passenger is not), the regulatory framework and the interaction between "regulation' and the concession contract, concession payments (if any), and staffing of the concession, among many other issues. In addition, the process whereby the concession is advertised and awarded is important in assuring that the best offer is identified and accepted. Taken together, these considerations set the structure of the relationship between concessionaire and government, and they determine the eventual success of the arrangement.
In the third session, Jorge Kogan (currently Vice President of Mercer Management, formerly Director of the Coordination Agency for Argentine railway concessioning) summarized the experience of concessioning in Latin America. Rail concessioning in Latin America demonstrates the fundamental strength and robustness of the concept. Concessioning has been used to rescue the freight railways of Argentina and to dramatically improve the operations of the suburban passenger services, and the Metro, in Buenos Aires. Similar, positive experience is now being gained in other countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Chile). At the same time, lessons have emerged from this experience including the need to adapt the process to individual circumstances, the need to improve the process of concession award, the critical need to identify issues, such as labor restructuring, that must be fairly solved if concessioning is to proceed, and the need for continuing public involvement in ensuring that the terms of the concession agreement are being met. Overall, change happens only from firm and timely decisions -- most problems can be fixed in the process, but inaction can be fatal.
Lucas Kamden of the Privatization Committee of the Republic of Cameroon and Sebastien Ebata of the Cameroon Railway (REGIFERCAM) discussed the status of the concessioning process now underway in Cameroon. The Government of Cameroon decided to concession REGIFERCAM for many of the same reasons as elsewhere -- to improve service and reduce financial demands on the public till. To date, the government believes that satisfactory progress is being made on the concession.
Session 4 closed the day with a presentation by Messrs Abilio Portimao (Secretary General of Ministry of Transport and Communications) and Arun Pai Lai (adviser) on the status of concessioning in Mozambique (three rail concessions originating in Nacala, Beira and Maputo) and by Abdelazziz Thiam (Director General of SITARAIL) on concessioning developments in Cote d'Ivoire/Burkina Faso. While concessioning is still in process in Mozambique and is facing many of the issues common to concessioning elsewhere, the Abidjan to Ougadougou concession was the first railway concession in Sub-Saharan Africa, and has now been in operation for over two years. In many ways, the experience with SITARAIL is quite similar to that in Latin America: traffic has grown significantly, productivity (especially asset productivity) has climbed, and the concession appears to be on a sound commercial footing. Based on SITARAIL's experience, properly designed rail concessioning in Africa can work, and can yield the expected benefits.
The second day began with session 5 covering the clients' viewpoints toward rail service and the potential for concessioning. Panelists from Burkina Faso (S. Diakite), Gabon (Raymond Ndong-Nsima), Gabon (Marcel Abeke), Malawi (Messrs Dennis Kambalame and Heatherwick Mbale outlined the general dissatisfaction which most shippers now feel about the quality and costs of African rail service. Shortage of equipment and lack of control over service reliability has led many shippers to use truck service, even though it is much more costly; this trend will not be reversed until the railways are more effectively customer oriented. Panelists felt that concessions might provide better service, a point that was reinforced by the SITARAIL experience (although SITARAIL admittedly hopes to make much further improvements).
Session 6 was a panel of officials (Henry Posner of RDC, Paul Victor of FEPASA in Chile, Yves Montpert of SITARAIL, Pierre-Louis Rochet of SYSTRA and Eric Peiffer of COMAZAR) who are actually involved in operation of rail concessions in several countries. Panelists reviewed their experiences in establishing and running concessions, with particular emphasis on the need for clear Government policies toward the concession (concerning regulation, ownership and control, labor) and on the challenges in changing railway culture from public to private approaches. They also emphasized the need for realization that concessions operate in a competitive market with little room for meeting social needs without explicit compensation for doing so. Given adequate flexibility, panelists believed that concessions can and will help in resolving Africa's transport challenge.
Session 7 used panelists (Marcel Sarmet of Coopers and Lybrand, Peter Kieran of CPCS- Transcom, Jorge Kogan of Mercer Management, and Patrice Guiol of Banque Nationale de Paris) to cover the role of consultants in concessioning. Consultants are customarily used to translate general policies into practice in particular situations, a task which is a mixture of experience and creativity. Few countries have the expertise within the railway or Government to complete the tasks of analysis, concession package design, creation of bidder interest, analysis of bids and implementation, so some consulting assistance is critical. A common challenge, though, is that the main repository of information, the railway, needs to be encouraged to provide inforrnation and assistance freely. If the railway management is not favorable toward concessioning, this can be a difficult challenge.
Session 8 covered a number of more general presentations of concessioning in Southern and Eastern Africa (Yash-Pal Kedia of the World Bank), Western and Central Africa (Bernard Zoba of the Union of African Railways and Antoine Tchibozo of the Economic Commission for Africa). Concessioning is quite active in these regions, with programs or discussions underway in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia in Southern and Eastern area, and Republic of Congo (in suspension because of civil conflict), Cameroon and Gabon in the Western area. The UAR, the ECA and SATCC are providing information and assistance to the process where possible.
Session 9 summarized and concluded the seminar. It was chaired by The Hlonourable Edward K. Salia (Minister of Roads and Transport of Ghana). In summary, the ensuing discussion yielded the following generally agreed conclusions:
1. Concessioning has clearly emerged as the most promising avenue to regaining profitability for railways. The experience in Africa is more recent than in other continents, but those African examples which have been developed to any significant degree point in the same direction.
2. The meeting was unanimous in the conclusion that, when designing concessioning agreements, the arrangements to deal with labor redundancies must be based on a consensus with the labor organizations concerned.
3. Reforms in the regulation of operations in other modes of transport as well as in rail will usually be an integral part of the design of a viable concessioning scheme.
4. Given the long time span that concessioning arrangements usually cover, it is important to incorporate clear rules for the dissolution and renegotiation of the concession, should any of the two parties so desire, and/or rules for arbitration prior to dissolution.
5. There is no single, simple formula for success. Any concessioning agreement needs to be adapted to local needs, laws, practices, economic and social circumstances.
The Honourable Oskar Plichta (Minister of Works, Transport, and Communications of Namibia) extended the appreciation of the participants to the organizers of the seminar and to the host country. Session 1 i Ii
t SEMINAIRE SUR LA MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER EN AFRIQUE (Du 13 au 14 Octobre 1997)
ALLOCUTION DE BIENVENUE PRONONCEE PAR MONSIEUR EZAN AKELE, MINISTRE DES INFRASTRUCTURES ECONOMIQUES M ......
Messieurs les Ministres,
Excellences Messieurs les Ambassadeurs,
Messieurs les representants des Institutions Financieres Intemationales et Nationales,
Messieurs les dirigeants des reseaux de chemins de fer,
Honorables invites,
Mesdames, Messieurs.
Je voudrais tout d'abord, feliciter le groupe de la Banque Mondiale, initiateur de cette grande rencontre sur le theme de la mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique et remercier par la meme occasion, tous les bailleurs de fonds internationaux engages aux cRt's de la Cote d'Ivoire pour la poursuite de la relance de son economie.
Je voudrais egalement souhaiter la bienvenue en terre ivoirienne, au nom du Chef de l'Etat, son Excellence Monsieur Henri KONAN BEDIE, 'atous ceux dont la presence a ce forum est pour nous le temoignage de la solidarite et de l'amitie qu'ils portent a notre pays. 2
Soumise a un programme d'ajustement structurel, La Cote d'Ivoire, resolument engagee dans le processus de liberalisation de son economie. a choisi d'eliminer son deficit budgetaire afin d'attenuer l'impact de son endettement et donner au gouvemement, une marge de manoeuvre financiere qui lui permette de soutenir les investissements productifs.
Depuis 1990, un programme soutenu de privatisation de nos entreprises a ete elabore afin d'accroitre le role du secteur prive dans I'activite economique notamment au niveau des investissements. Dans le secteur des transports, les premieres operations de privatisation ont porte sur le chemin de fer, en accord avec le pays frere du Burkina Faso.
En effet, le 24 juillet 1992, les deux Etats ont decide de confier l'exploitation de la ligne Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Kaya, a une societe concessionnaire a capital prive majoritaire, la SITARAIL d'une part, et d'autre part, de creer deux societes de patrimoine: la Societe Ivoirienne de Gestion du Patrimoine Ferroviaire (SIPF) et la Societe de Patrimoine Ferroviaire du Burkina (SOPAFER-B).
La RAN, jadis, fleuron des regies ferroviaires en Afrique de l'Ouest, a connu au cours de la decennie 70-80, la meilleure periode de son exploitation. D'importants investissements ont ete realises. En 1978, elle a transporte un million de tonnes de marchandises et plus de quatre millions de voyageurs dans des conditions de confort indiscutables. 3
Mais des le debut des annees 80, la crise economique due a l'effondrement des cours des matieres premieres sur le marche mondial avec pour consequence une chute de l'activite economique dans la plupart des pays africains, des problemes lies a la gestion, vont se poser et seront a la base de la degradation du transport ferroviaire. La scission de la RAN en deux societes, la SICF pour la Cote d'Ivoire et la SCFB pour le Burkina et ayant en charge les deux (02) reseaux dans le cadre d'une gestion separee convenue par les deux Etats, sera pour le chemin de fer, le pire des remedes.
Cette situation a conduit a la deterioration du materiel, au licenciement significatif de personnel, a une baisse importante du trafic de l'ordre de 60 % pour les marchandises et 50 % pour les voyageurs.
En trois ans de gestion separee, aucun des deux Etats n'a eu les moyens de realiser les investissements necessaires au maintien d'une bonne exploitation.
La mise en concession dans ces conditions est apparue comme la solution la meilleure. Elle a donc ete decidee pour une periode de quinze (15) ans. Cette operation a donne ainsi lieu a la toute premiere privatisation d'un reseau ferroviaire en Afrique. La restructuration de l'entreprise se traduit par une importante reduction du personnel et un plan de remise a niveau des installations et du materiel. Le montant des investissements se chiffre a 40 milliards de francs cfa, realises avec le precieux concours de nos partenaires financiers habituels. Je veux parler de l'IDA, la CFD, le BEI, la BOAD, l'AGCD. Au cours du premier exercice, SITARAIL a transporte 410.000 voyageurs et 500 000 tonnes de marchandises, doublant ainsi le tonnage transporte apres seulement une annee d'activite. .. ./... 4
C'est la preuve que le chemin de fer sort peu a peu de la crise qu'il a connue il y a quelques temps.
Si cette premiere experience en la matiere ne fait pas apparaItre de maniere evidente et immediate les effets de sa reussite economique et financiere, il reste a esperer que le contexte favorable et la reorganisation drastique du secteur par nos Etats conduisent a un avenir prometteur.
Aujourd'hui, dans la plupart des Etats africains, le chemin de fer figure en bonne place sur la liste des entreprises a privatiser. Le Burkina et la Cote d'Ivoire, en tant que pionniers, sont heureux et fiers de partager avec eux leur experience.
La geographie, l'histoire, l'interet et le devoir nous imposent, plus particulierement a nous Africains, d'affronter solidairement les enjeux d'aujourd'hui et de demain.
I1 y a donc de bonnes raisons de croire au chemin de fer: I'economie, les contribuables et la population tout entiere profiteraient ainsi de cet outil indispensable de developpement.
Le Burkina Faso et la Republique de Cote d'Ivoire sortent grandis de cette experience: le chemin de fer Abidjan-Ouagadougou- Kaya, cordon ombilical qui relie de maniere permanente les deux peuples depuis pres d'un siecle est sauve d'une mort certaine. 5
En esperant que cette memorable rencontre reunissant les responsables des reseaux ferroviaires et leurs partenaires, initiee par la Banque Mondiale permettra a chaque Etat de determiner avec discemement les moyens de sa propre rgussite, et par voie de consequence, au succes de notre continent, e declare ouvert, le seminaire sur la mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique.
Je vous remercie.
CA) (A a
, arAJ~~~~4J~~~~ .. t, X c;; e 0- C4 VAV ...... " ', ' ', " ,' , ,,...... I......
SIEfVMINAIIRE SURI LA MISE EN CONCESSIO DES CIJEMINS I)11 FERI EN AFRIQUJE Abidljan, 13 - 14 Octobre 1997
1 \/,POSC iI/ro(dlcti/ dc' 11101Vsie'iF Ti(janie Thtiaiii, I )irclocur c;',c'riI (il Bhircau AlalionIal (I l,1Iii1clCs T' IC/1i(/l(m s cI de I)(c'vc1up)pCnc1c1u
11c "h(+!eiimin (Ide fer en Afriqtie stibsaliarienne 130( R 199Le7s eB EeuxT
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-X -==------
13: O_U.ro-, 197B ET
,...... _.
.. a......
...... ,. X :-~~~~~~~. . ' ...... ' '::
. ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ......
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . :.'...... : .:... ..W.
_....,W:-,.:>_...... :
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .x...... -..
... l ...... v......
...... i......
...... :. :: ......
......
...... K...... F......
......
:: .. .. c .::..
...... a,
* 1° V.I ri~~~~~r
* I~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~ ZO- n cwc)r * e:* 0 : B ~~~~~~~-o
:* F ; L. * Evolution passee v Monopole d 'Etat v Gestion de type public v Per-soninel for-temeiit syndique v Insuffisance de ressources
t de'gradlation de la qualite des services
t baisse des performances
S perte de competitivite
...... ^13/10/97...... B N E TD ...... aL3A[g L6/01 / I ...... I ...... Iv ...... I ...... I...... I...... upjSlut 3.1pe3:np...... tl:otlv. ...... CPV A ...... 1 1 ...... I ...... I ......
...... sap nS ...... t P':Sj:.1103:UO'J J ...... a Aij d ...... I...... I...... s,:n...... u-:aI.. ... j. .n...... b ...... I...... I...... I...... I...... I...... I...... I...... I...... I...... JU4W;)i3d113Sa(j ...... A ...... iip...... p . o. . . lo-ill. . 111.1. . S;)H . .. . . A ...... Sajjanj3u.sa;)UB.pu;),L...... A ...... 9 ...... EXPERIENCE IVOIRIENNE EN MATIERE DE FINANCEMENT PRIVE D'INFRASTRUCTURES PUBLIQUES
,...... 13/10/97 BNETD @@@@-@*e @@...... ------....----...---...-...... -@*-- @Z@@e@@@@@..@@-- @@@......
o~~~~~~~~~~C u
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.- r I e__:-_I
Lr- -C) 25- C:Zj-
. * t Cl ~~~~~~ 5 _ _ _> C 7:~Ct 4 ..
C W tCz , aE5to.O U U j~~~~~~~~0 :~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- r,4
. , .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U
.' ' L .~~~~~~~~~~c
...... ~~~00 ... C......
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c * c; > t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L
:; 2 j! ; _ o Cz. o o , Liv - O
~~~~~~~~*7- C-.
* w - V: D ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z D_zm.
...... ;...... ENJEUX
13/10/97 ~~~~~~~...... BNETD ct~~~c
. ..--...... s
,,...... a).. .
L. ..00@@*.@@@@@...... @ @@.. @@.@ ...... @ - @....
:~~~~ ...... 5m~~~~~~~~~~ .~~ ~ ~~~~~~ ...... *~~~~~~......
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... ow~~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... @. , , ,, , - ,,, ~~~~~., .-...... : ...... e.
L.~ ~ ~~~V
: .. * ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~.. 6 ...... ~ ~~. ~ ...~ . :: ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~......
*m -. * a # - .0...... : ......
: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. -. @. . .. -.-. . ..:
e0...... -...... 0. 2 : :- 0 -=: 2_~c 6 ,*° ..
e C X 6; ...... -.. _...... e.:--:...:::.:.::. .. '...... --^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^^ *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . . . ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ...... B~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... K~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~...... .~~ ~~~ ...... ...... ~~~~~~...... '.''...... ~~~~~~~...... ~~~~~~~...... _------: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... X.-'...... '.' . .. . V. . . . '...... : .. . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... -?.-- ~~~~~~...... : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... H ...... *'I .~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~.8 ...... ", " . .. .' . . . '..''...' ...... ~~~~~~...... ~~~~~~...... ' . ..**..--. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... - I~~~~~~~~~~~ o::::.:...... : :: :.. . a_.,,.,..,,.. , .~~~~~~~~...... : :. : . :. ::::::::..:. :. :. :. ::..::... :.::...... = : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . .'.'. '. :.'..,' . ' .' .,. , . . .. .'''; * ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~_. ~ ...... e _~~~~~~L .. ,._ ...... Z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"' A ...... .Zf+ ', ,' ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... ,',,.. ..'.'. ''...... ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ...... * UJX3AVgT L6/01 /E1 -- . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . . ;. -. . . -.. . : -. -.-.....-.--....::.:.:.:::.: . ::: : :.- : .: ::: -:i ::-.dall : :: : :: -- s~nsi.. sap uoimJr1d. J .: ...... spaid Slp 3,Ut~l,U.IOJ.I;)dA *t7[ ~~~~~~~~~~XfYlfN3 (ILJ3)V4J L6/0 I I ...... ...... U...... / UOiJt1SiJi~~~...d .~od..... iduosnpdy ...... p JJ ds...... !...... XfI3rM3 ...... % 16: ...... ...... I...... I...... I...... 13/10/97 BNE ...... -TD I 17: Eui depit des avanitages qu 'elles preseintenit, les ope'ratioui de privatisationi de lh realisatio,iet dle la gestion des inifrastructures d 'intire'tgelie"ral conmportenit des risques reels. Exemples de risques TYPES DE RISQUES DEFINITIONS Mise en place Rupture des accords pendant la periode _-_ _ _ _ preeedent la signature des accords Construction Non respect du cout, de la qualite ou du dMlai de .. ______real isation _ ___ Operationnel L'op6rateur s'engage sur des niveau'x de performance donnes pendant la duree du contrat Nlarche Fluctuation de la demiianide pour les services dii concessionnlaire Change Fluctuation moiietaire 1Reglementaire _ _ Modifications de la reglementationl . ~ ~As 131/()1/97 ...... BNETD ' g1' X A. hy | K- I ! | r 0W DD S T D ES . DS - DS5 1 aD I- R - 27~~~~~~A _ ~~ !, , n _ _,v- .*v BI Ig ,,-eLffi - t Z e ~~~~} ~~~ tv ] ^ ~~~~~~j'i 6 *. ,-* .t~~ t ...... .s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L Ont observe itine evol,itioit daits I 'approche de I 'Etat s * les ope'rationis les plus re&cenites. DAljoE NIONrIA(-''-E Electriciti ^ 4 199() * Societe d'Etat. proprietaire du patrimnoine : EECI ______Societe de gestion priv6e : CIF, *Chemin ; de fer 1994 * Societes d'Fitat, proprietaire dii patrimnoine: SIPIF SOP)AFFIR-13 _- _ __ 1996 Societe de gestion priv6c SI'lTARAII, Aeroport Felix 1996 * Etat, propri6taire: SODFEXAM HIo u p h o ucet- Bo ign y represeitant de I autorite conc6dante _ Concessionnaire prive: AElRIA CI-TELCOMI 1997 - * I'rivatisation dii patritmoine et de la gestion A .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 107BN T ...... * -E mmA- .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Q ... ;.---.---. *.0-@...... Q-@-@@@ - r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... £: .s ..... x .0.00 Eqt: : :Do~~~~~~~...... o *.... . C..,. . v . .u..0 ~~~~~~-.. _ *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..,...... s...... - - -... %*_ a QI IA ; . .Q *1~~~~~~~~~~~...... :. .1. : ~~~~~~~~~~~...... ...... N ...... ...... ...... ...... ,, ::- .::::: ...... j .::...... ': ., .. ...: ...... : ...... ...... 22..T ...... I.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~221: *Volonte politique * Climat propice: 'I>Saine gestion macro-economique . Environnement juridique . | t ~~Cre'dibilite ] E*quite dans la repartition des gains et des risques entre les clients, I 'Etat, les investisseurs et le preteur ...... _.I...... :IS*' 1(97 BVET TI) 23. * Benefices visibles et quantifiables pour I 'opinion publique et les beneficiaires * Existence d 'operateurs prives desireux et capables d 'accepter I 'ensemble des risques lies a ce type d 'operations * Bonne politique de Communication ...... 13=0I'97 BNETD ANNEXES ...... I 3/1. .. 0197 . . . .. BNE...... TD...... _~~ = 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~- -~~~~~~~ ~ 9 ~ 8_~ _ ~ - 0 = '; C _FC ° .~~ ...... 0 . 0 ...... xx31 .aj3Af9 L(,l6l/0 1, I 1=1: .. 0 It _,.s -_S A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~NI ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~------ ...... Session 2 i i I i I i i i i i I i Railway Concessions: Progress to Date Louis S. Thompson (Railways Adviser) and Karim-Jacques Budin (Sr. Railway Specialist) The World Bank* Railway Restructuring -- Why? Few governments have been fully satisfied with the performance of their railways over the past three or four decades. Stagnant or falling traffic, huge financial losses, poor service to customers -- these are a familiar railway litany. Governments have eventually responded by restructuring, including recasting the railway as a government-owned enterprise rather than a ministry, adopting line of business organizations, spinning off non-rail activities, reducing labor forces and increasing the role of the private sector in doing what it does best -- producing competitively determined goods and services for customers at suitable quality and prices. A particular approach to increasing the role of the private sector is "concessioning," the subject of this paper. What is Concessioning and Why Do It? "Concessioning" is not a precise term. In fact, there is a spectrum of organizational options, starting with total public ownership and operation, continuing through outsourcing, then management contracts, then concessions (a term we use to include leasing or "affermage" (the French term), "franchises," and traditional concessioning), and then proceeding to Build-Own-Operate (BOO/BOOT, etc.) and eventually to one or the other forms of actual divestiture of assets leading to total private ownership and operation. On this scale, concessions are midway as they involve continuing public ownership and oversight of infrastructure, but generally transfer operating responsibility and delivery of services to the private sector. The general thrust in favor of concessioning is now agreed: 1) the private sector can deliver services at lower total cost to the economy than the public sector; 2) the private sector operates more efficiently than the public sector; 3) when private resources are mobilized, the public sector can use its scarce resources in other, higher priority areas; 4) the private sector does a better job of identifying and serving competitive markets than does the public sector; 5) the private sector can do a better job of delivering social services when it is explicitly compensated by the public sector than when the same social services are jumbled into an unclear public/private mission; and, 6) the public sector does a better job of environmental and safety regulation of a private provider than it does in regulating itself. We state these advantages in positive terms: we agree that not all apply in all cases and some may arguably not be true in some specific cases. This should not detract from the overall point. Transport concessions cannot be reduced to a simple "recipe." In order to define a concession, we need to specify a number of dimensions: 1) what is being concessioned in 2 physical terms; 2) how long will the concession last; 3) who will retain ownership of what (who will own the wagons and locomotives, for example); 4) will the state specify the services to be provided or will this be left to the concessionaire and the market; 5) what tariff flexibility will the concessionaire have; 6) will the state pay the concessionaire, or vice versa, and in what form will the payments be made; 7) how will the winning bid be determined (highest payments to, or from, government, lowest tariff, largest investment promised, etc.); 8) under what conditions can the concession be renegotiated; 8) what performance guarantees will be required; 9) who will do investment planning and network planning; and, 10) will the concession be exclusive, or will others have access to the facilities and under what terms? Each of these dimensions can be slightly different for railways (for example) in various countries, and they are usually considerably different among the modes. Experience is showing that, though all concessions are different, there are several typical issues that tend to recur. First, the term of the concession must be consistent with the government's objectives as to the balance of investment between public and private: in general, the private sector will not finance assets whose service life is significantly longer than the term of the concession. Second, public enterprises tend to lose interest in operations and maintenance as soon as plans for concessioning are announced so that the concessioning process, once started, should be finished as quickly as possible in order to minimize damage in the interim. Third, concessioning in railways has always resulted in lower employment levels so a responsible program for dealing with redundant labor must be developed and implemented. Fourth, risks should be in the right place. It is acceptable that government retain the environmental risks of cleanup of already polluted facilities, but questionable for government to take the commercial risk of projecting demand and cost of operation. Finally, concessions inherently require further continuing government involvement in regulating safety, monopolistic behavior, and adherence to the pricing and service requirements of the concession. This does not necessarily imply creation of an elaborate new regulatory mechanism, but it is clear that the state cannot walk away from its transport concessions after they are made. It is also not a trivial matter to define how the "winner" will be selected. Precision in procurement would suggest that everything be defined perfectly and price alone would be the determining factor. On the other hand, allowing the concessionaire maximum initiative argues for broad "performance specifications" from government followed by flexible offers from the private concessionaire. Even the issue of price needs care as there can be a choice between, for example, awarding on the basis of maximum payment to government (or minimum payment by government) as compared with minimum tariff to be charged to users. There can also be a choice between unrestricted bidding versus prequalification followed by bids only from those judged fully qualified. There is no agreed answer to these questions: there are only informed choices, and calculated risks. Few railways have been truly privatized, although there are recent examples available including New Zealand, Canadian National, East Japan, Conrail in the US, and the infrastructure and freight services of the old British Rail. Instead, most governments 3 have preferred to concession ("franchise") their railway. The reasons for the preference for concessioning as compared to privatization are not always clear, but we believe that governments have been wary of what appears to be total loss of control over their railway. Governments appear to believe that concessioning offers them a little bit of the best of both worlds; they retain ultimate control over the infrastructure (at least in the political sense) while at the same time allowing the private sector to carry out the operating functions and compete for customers in the market. In some cases, they also get to put a significant amount of money into their treasury -- never a bad idea compared with a railway that represents a large drain on the national coffers today. The Experience With Concessioning of Railways We should emphasize that rail concessioning is not really new. In fact, many railways were originally built and operated as "concessions" and, had there not occurred after World War II a worldwide political wave of public ownership, especially in countries undergoing decolonialization, many railways would never have been publicly operated. And, if railways had operated successfully in public hands, there might be no pressures to return operations to the private sector. But the decades since World War II have been hard for railways for two major reasons; first, governments have promoted the rise of the highway and air modes, often operated in the private sector and, second and maybe more important, railways have generally become mired in politics, often depriving them of adequate capital for repair and investment, and always lumbering them with a confused and contradictory set of objectives in competition with modes that had a much clearer mission. The results were uniformly disappointing. The downward slide of the nationally-owned railways has happened in parallel with increasing globalization and increased pressure on national finances. Governments can no longer afford bad rail services, and this has led to politically painful measures to fix the problem. With the benefit of some hindsight, we can see that these pressures started the process of change in the early 1990s in Argentina, the UK, and the early measures taken by the European Commission. The success of these early attempts, combined with a lack of credible alternatives, has caused the process to snowball rapidly in Latin America. Concessioning is also beginning in Africa, the Middle-East, and tentatively in Asia. A similar process, partly based on concessioning/franchising, and partly based on privatization has also taken hold in the European Union (EU) countries. We give some summary discussion of the cases below with the caveat that there are probably more cases than we will discuss. We would welcome additional information that anyone wishes to give us. In addition, the list is so long that we cannot provide maps due to high cost of production. We will present maps in the IRCA Congress, and can make maps available to those who request them. We present Table 1 as an overall summary of all of the concessions that we know of along with some broad comparative data describing them. 4 Insert Table 1 here Latin America Argentine Railways: The Process and Results Throughout the 1980s the Argentine national railway, Ferrocarriles Argentinos (FA), was losing approximately US$800 million annually as a result of inefficiency, competition from other modes, weak management and inadequate investment. Traffic fell from almost 30 billion traffic units (combined tonne-km and passenger-km) in 1965 to less than half that in 1991 -- and it was still headed downward. The concessioning strategy selected by the government was grounded in five basic principles: 1) the railway deficit was no longer sustainable; 2) FA was unsalvageable as an enterprise; 3) some freight services were probably viable; 4) the Buenos Aires suburban passenger services, though loss making, were so important to the development of the city that they had to be continued; and 5) operating efficiency, particularly staffing levels, would have to be improved. By mid-1990, the government and the World Bank agreed on restructuring the railway into several separate freight and commuter rail networks, concessioning of these networks, rationalization of inter-city passenger services, establishment of new rail regulatory agencies, creation of a metropolitan transport authority for Buenos Aires, revision of the operating practices and rules, a labor strategy to reduce the size of the work force and improve productivity, and disposal of redundant assets. Six freight packages were created for concessioning on 30 year terms, with an optional 10 year extension. The concessionaires have exclusive use of the tracks, although they must grant access to passenger operations in return for a compensatory track use fee. Concessionaires were required to hire only existing FA employees at the outset, though they were given freedom to employ only those they considered necessary for operational needs. FA made severance payments averaging about two years' wages to staff not hired by the concessionaires. The government marketed the concessions worldwide and received sealed bids for all but the meter gauge Belgrano network (which is being rehabilitated for later concessioning). All bidders had to meet certain technical and financial requirements. Thereafter bids for the freight networks were evaluated on the net present value of the level of "canon" to be paid to the government during the first 15 years of the concession as well as the quality of business and investment plans, staffing levels, the track access fee proposed for inter-city trains, and the share of Argentine interest in the consortium. The bids were graded on a 1- 10 scale on each of the seven criteria, with the individual scores being weighted according to the priority assigned to each category. The bidder's qualifications and the basic investment program were each assigned a 30 point weight, (with a possible five point bonus for additional investment), the number of personnel to be retained 15, canon 12, the maintenance plan eight, and five for the track access fee. The weighting reflected 5 the importance attributed to investment in the railways, but also political compromises over the employment issue. For the suburban passenger concessions, the bidding documents defined the minimum service to be provided (seats per hour, frequency, travel time, punctuality) and a required capital program to make up for years of neglect of maintenance. Maximum fares for standard service, with fare increases as a premium for improved services, were established. Those bidders who satisfied the technical and financial requirements and produced satisfactory business and operating plans were evaluated on the basis of their financial proposal, including the required subsidy. Bidding on the basis of lowest government payment allowed the government to ensure that the bidding process was direct and transparent yet left the concessionaires carrying commercial risks, and making investment timing decisions. Currently there are renegotiations over the investment program level and timing. In freight, this is because the proven demand will not support the investment levels promised: on the other hand, suburban passenger and Metro demand is so much higher than expected that the government-specified capital program is proving to be inadequate and new provisions for investment must be made. By most measures, Argentine railway concessioning has been successful. Figures 1-4 below illustrate the radical transformation in both freight and passenger railway productivity that the concessionaires have been able to achieve. The freight railways (except the Belgrano) were concessioned, starting in 1991. There are four broad gauge concessions - The Buenos Aires al Pacifico (BAP), The Ferro Expreso Pampeano (FEPSA), The Nuevo Central Argentino (NCA), and Ferro Sur Roca (FSR). The Mesopotamico (old Urquiza), a standard gauge railway, has also been concessioned. Insert Figure 1 here The suburban passenger railways were concessioned in 1994-95. Figure 2 shows an abrupt increase in traffic over these lines, though given poor data collection and fare enforcement before concessioning, some of the increase in demand may well be attributable to better fare collection rather than actual ridership increase. The subway system (the Subte) was also concessioned in conjunction with the Urquiza suburban railway (because they are connected, have similar third rail systems, and both are standard gauge). Subte demand is up about 38 percent from 1993 to 1996. Insert Figure 2 here Most interurban passenger services operating before concessioning have now been closed, except between Buenos Aires and Mar del Plata, and a few other shorter haul services operated by the provinces. Buses have picked up most of the former intercity rail ridership. 6 Figures 3 and 4 below give an indication of the scale of overstaffing on the old FA. The Figures are slightly misleading, since prior to the concessioning of FA, there was a full inter-city passenger service, and hence more employees were required. Nevertheless there is a dramatic decrease in the number of employees on the railway (from a total of 94,800 in 1989 to approximately 17,000 today) and a very large increase in labor productivity under the new managements. Insert Figure 3 here Insert Figure 4 here It is always dangerous to claim victory prematurely, and there is still room for things to go wrong. Although most appear stable, none of the freight concessions are fantastically profitable, and some may even be in trouble financially. It is also true that most of the intercity rail passenger services have been lost for good. In addition, Table 1 shows that the traffic density (TU/km) of Argentina's freight railways is quite low and success under these circumstances will be hard-earned. This said, it is hard to deny the real turnaround in traffic trends, quadrupling of labor productivity, improvements in service quality, reductions in prices, and a reduction in the public deficit of about US$600 million per year (about 0.5 percent of GDP). Brazilian Railways There were four principal railways in Brazil, the national railway (RFFSA), the railway of Sao Paulo State (FEPASA), and the two railways owned by the Companhia do Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), totaling approximately 30,000 km of track. RFFSA was the largest of these, and accounted for approximately 2/3 of the track, rolling stock, and employees. Just as for most other railways around the world, development of a substantial highway network in Brazil reduced the importance of the railway over the course of the last three decades, particularly in the passenger market where there are now almost no inter-city passenger services. However railways do still account for about 25 percent of the total freight movements measured in tonne-km. Government intervention in railway operations has been manifold, including: 1) prevention of line closure, despite low traffic density; 2) until 1989, strict control of the level and structure of tariffs -- after 1989, tariff increases remained subordinate to macro- economic plans; 3) uncompensated public service obligations for non-remunerative inter- city and local passenger services; 4) interference in investment plans; 5) political imposition of redundant labor; and, 6) severe restrictions on capital investment leading to deferred maintenance and a low level (<50 percent) of locomotive availability. RFFSA was formed in 1957, by merging 18 independent railways. Though traffic growth was relatively steady following nationalization, the poor management of the business and frequent government interference meant poor financial health. There were many attempts at reform including labor reduction programs, intercity passenger service reductions, and 7 a transfer of the suburban passenger operations and deficits into a separate organization (CBTU). Despite all this, RFFSA remained in consistent deficit, with an annual average operating loss of US $380 million between 1988 and 1991, and with all trends downward. The government considered many different options concessioning for RFFSA before settling on of six exclusive regional systems characteristics as a result of the geographic of the country as well as the gauge differences and the significant cross- regional differences in traffic on the railway. In fact, of the six regional units developed for concessioning, only two were physically contiguous and had the same track (Nordeste and Centro-Leste). The gauge different systems also served very different two (Sudeste and Tereza Cristina) markets: are dominated by a limited number (iron ore, steel, and coal), of commodities the Nordeste is a low density, mixed carrier, Sul and commodity regional Centro-Leste carry a broad mix of commodities, agricultural region and Oeste connects the of the south to the Atlantic ports via FEPASA. There were two other major considerations for restructuring: the government as it assessed employment, and track and rolling stock conditions. Though RFFSA already made substantial progress had in reducing its work force (from 110,000 42,000 in May 1995) labor productivity in 1975 to remained low when compared with both American standards and those of North other Latin American concessioned railways 1). There was also considerable (see Table variation in productivity across the km per employee varying network with tonne- from a low of 200-300,000 on the Nordeste networks to nearly and Tereza Cristina one million on the Sul, Centro-Leste and on the Sudeste. Oeste, and over two million Hence, a redundancy package was developed levels as were target employment which averaged about a 40 percent reduction levels. from immediate pre-concessioning In addition to the legally required severance payments the package includes early retirement and voluntary incentives for separation, involuntary separation grants redundant staff, re-training for the remaining programs based on regional employment job search and outplacement opportunities, and assistance. On average, the total package about 21 months of corresponded to salary. The program was phased so that incentive schemes before concessioning, the for early retirement and voluntary separation further involuntary were introduced, with separation depending on the concessioning, results. In the second phase, after RFFSA paid or will pay involuntary separation grants to remaining redundant staff not hired by the concessionaire. As an example of this process, was concessioned in March the Oeste 1996 with a specified minimum number which was 400 short of employees (1800) of the employment level before concessioning. employees were These 400 surplus therefore compensated by the government separation scheme. under the involuntary Compensation for additional layoffs, if any, beyond the specified number is responsibility of the concessionaire. Because a the initial employment decision is the hands of the concessionaire (unlike outside Argentina), it will be harder for the concessionaire 8 was reflected in the to reach the most efficient levels of employment. Undoubtedly this auction prices. last few years and Government investment in RFFSA had declined significantly over the was below 50 the network quality suffered badly. By mid-1995, locomotive availability locomotives. percent, and RFFSA was actually refusing traffic due to a lack of available and the roadbed In the first eight months of 1995, there were over 200 accidents, The government deterioration meant further reductions in speed and quality of service. stock renewal to therefore had to make decisions about emergency track repair and rolling conditions (and allow the new concessionaires to assume the systems under operable accident rates indeed to meet the stipulations of the concession agreement about lower during the first five years of operation). of the highest bid All six concessions have now been auctioned successfully on the basis are required to pay above the government's stipulated minimum price. Concessionaires of pre-determined an upfront sum immediately after the auction and then a stream variable, and the payments over the life of the concession. The upfront sum is the bidding (now called Ferrovia government established a reserve price for each network. The Oeste price), Centro- Novoeste) was sold for US$63.4 million (3.5 percent above the reserve of US$317 million, Leste (Ferrovia Centro-Atlantica) was sold for its reserve price the Sul (Ferrovia Sudeste (MRS Logistica) sold for its reserve price of US$889 million, price), the Tereza Sul-Atlantico) for US$217 million (37 percent above its reserve and the Nordeste for Cristina for US$18.6 million (12 percent above its reserve price) all of the program of US$15.8 million (38 percent above its minimum price), a total for about US$1.52 billion. to sell its ownership After the RFFSA program began, the Brazilian government decided that CVRD owned. of CVRD, which resulted in the privatization of the two railways and the government Finally, negotiations are underway between the national government of RFFSA. The of Sao Paulo State to concession FEPASA in a manner similar to that services (Flumitrens) State of Rio de Janeiro is now concessioning its suburban passenger is engaged in a and its Metro along lines similar to those of Buenos Aires. Sao Paulo in public operation. similar effort. Within a few years, Brazil will have no railways left have only There are as yet no meaningful results from Brazil since the concessionaires the concessionaires recently begun to operate the properties. Initial indications are that 5 which shows rapidly developing their traffic base and reducing costs (see Figure are in Brazil and labor productivity before and after concessioning in several concessions are met for traffic Bolivia). As Table 1 suggests, even if only the minimum projections higher that growth and manpower reductions, the starting point in Brazil is sufficiently results in Brazil should easily equal or significantly exceed those in Argentina. 9 Chile:A DifferentApproach For several reasons, particularly the continuing importance of passenger services, the government of Chile felt itself unable to adopt the approach in Argentina. Instead, the government initially decided to concession only the freight services on the broad gauge network while keeping the infrastructure and passenger services in public hands. At time the (1995), this was possibly the first of the concessions based on infrastructure separation. In its first years of operation, the freight concession (also called FEPASA) has faced a difficult battle to stabilize traffic, learn to live with their public sector infrastructure partners, get locomotives back in service, and fight back the challenge of trucks (which is not easy since the average length of freight haul in Chile is not favorable for rail). Recent traffic trends suggest that the battle will be won. The government has not been fully satisfied with the operations which remain in public hands and has committed itself to concessioning the infrastructure in one piece, and to concessioning the passenger operations in one intercity piece and two separate suburban services. These concessions will be complex and their implementation will take another year or so for results to show. In addition, Chile has also recently concessioned its meter gauge railway (the old Ferronorte which had been operated separately from the broad gauge railway) and the Arica to La Paz railway, one of the steepest and most difficult railways in the world. Bolivia The government of Bolivia concessioned its railway in two pieces, the Western (Oriental) section which connects to Brazil (the Brazilian Oeste concession, in fact) and the Andina which connects to Argentina and Chile (the Antofagasta and Bolivia and the Arica to La Paz). These were competitively awarded on the basis of maximum price which was to be reinvested in the concessions ("recapitalization"). Traffic in Bolivia has responded well and Figure 5 shows that labor productivity is rising. Mexico Mexico is unusual in that it is a developing country with a border and a free trade area (NAFTA) with developed countries. As a result, the Mexican system was concessioned in a way that maximizes the opportunity for cross-border traffic as well as domestic flows. The system was divided into three major pieces plus a terminal company serving the Federal Capital area which will be jointly owned by the three concessionaires. The Northeast concession connecting to the US at Nuevo Laredo was sold first (for about US$1.4 billion) to a Mexican/US consortium headed by a large Mexican transport company (TMM) and a US regional railway (the Kansas City Southern). The Northwestern Concession (Pacifico Norte) was recently sold for US$524 million to consortium a of Mexican industrial interests and the Union Pacific Railroad in the US. The government intends to market the Southeastern concession in the near future, along with a 10 series of short lines that appear to have more value as independent operations like the short lines in the US. Interestingly, the Mexican government proceeded in a somewhat different way that appears to be useful to governments that want to move rapidly. The railway (FNM) was divided into the four planned concessions which were converted into stock companies with separate management teams already holding the concession while still in government hands. The government then sold a controlling interest in the stock by sealed bids (stock not yet sold must be offered on the stock exchange or purchased by the concessionaire at the original price). By selling stock rather than the concession, the government was able to transfer a going concern, a process that can occur more smoothly and rapidly than a concession alone, and the government was able to influence the behavior of FNM before concessioning was finished. The concessioning in Mexico is too recent to be able to report results. Guatemala The railway in Guatemala (FEGUA) had reached a point in early 1996 in which labor disputes had caused it to be shut down with no prospects for restarting in government hands. After examining all its options, the government concessioned the railway to a Guatemalan/US consortium on a simple, "best efforts" basis in which rebuilding the railway and its services is expected to be a long and slow process. There are no results as yet. Peru and Uruguay: Planned Concessions The government of Peru is now in the process of dividing its railway (ENAFER) into three pieces for concessioning. After a long period of consideration of options, the government has announced that sales should commence in the near future. The government of Uruguay is evaluating approaches to award a concession to haul wood products from inland to seaports. Nicaraguaand Costa Rica: The Cost of Failureto Change Similar to the railway in Guatemala, the railways in Nicaragua and Costa Rica had ground to a halt as a result of non-commercial management and labor disputes. In Nicaragua, the government was unable to reach agreement on a course of action, and the railway was liquidated. The railway in Costa Rica is in a sirnilar position after two years of closure of operations and it is not clear that the railway can now be successfully restarted even though the government is attempting to do so for the Caribbean side. The lesson seems clear: at some point, if solutions cannot be found, railways can and will be liquidated, an outcome that is the worst result for everyone involved. Africa The Abidjan-Ouagadougou Raiway: The Process and Initial Results For many years up to 1989, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou railway (the Regie Abidjan-Niger, or RAN) was managed and operated by a bi-national public company. Originally, it enjoyed a near monopoly on freight traffic to Burkina Faso, but, in the mid-1970s financial performance of the RAN suffered because of growing competition from road transport, as well as the competition for port traffic which Lome, Togo, presented to Abidjan. In 1989, partly as a result of nationalistic pressures, it was split into two separate state-owned companies which further aggravated the decline. In July 1992, both governments decided to reunify the railway and privatize operations under a single operating concession. Partly advised in the later stages by the World Bank, the governments jointly awarded a 15 year concession in 1994 to SITARAIL which is a consortium of a private sector shareholder (51 percent), both governments (15 percent each), railway staff (three percent) and local private investors (16 percent). The concessionaire began operations in August, 1995 (see Table 1 for basic data). The majority shareholder is itself a consortium of international freight forwarders, an international shipping line, an Ivoirian investment group, and international railway engineering consultants. The consortium approach, with a controlling strategic shareholder from the private sector but with significant remaining public ownership is one which has been adopted elsewhere (e.g., Chile, Bolivia, and some of the Argentine freight concessions), largely in response to a lingering political belief that there ought to be a continuing local awareness of railway performance and some public stake in the railway's success. Unlike most other rail concessions, SITARAIL provides both freight and passenger services, and may set its own tariffs for both. The concession contract also provides for services to be operated at government (local or national) request as public service obligations (PSOs). These services will be run under separate contracts specifying the characteristics of service and the financial compensation. To date, there is no such service, despite the fact that the concessionaire abandoned all unprofitable local passenger services when it took over the railway. Because of the relatively short concessioning period, the concessionaire does not own rolling stock or other equipment; instead, two national patrimony corporations have been established. These corporations own both track and equipment, and will lease rolling stock to the concessionaire as necessary (though the concessionaire may purchase its own equipment if it views that as more appropriate). Infrastructure investment is also made by these patrimony corporations, though with advice on priority and desirability SITARAIL, from which also contributes a fee for debt service. SITARAIL is also responsible for maintenance of the track and for a part of equipment maintenance. All of arrangements these are designed to ensure that it is the concessionaire, acting out of commercial interest, who makes decisions about investment needs and timing. 12 SITARAIL's payments for the concession are three-fold: 1) a usage fee, to be negotiated every three years and related to revenues on the railway; 2) the debt service payment incurred by the patrimony corporations; and, 3) a lease fee for the use of motive power and equipment. Payments are kept in an investment and renewal fund to allow the patrimony corporations to refurbish the equipment as necessary. This approach ensures that commercial motivations are uppermost in investment decisions, since the concessionaire is both selecting investment timing and level and paying the debt service. Also, because the usage fee is to be renegotiated every three years, the concession will evolve over time, depending on the nature of the revenue streams and the required investment levels. This represents a compromise, a common feature of concession agreements, between: 1) a desire to remove railway operations and decision making from the government realm; 2) a hope to reduce the extent of uncertainty for investors, who are reassured by a staged negotiation; and, 3) the objective of maximizing government income from the concession. The concession agreement contains an important, controversial feature. Most railways are concessioned on an exclusive basis, with perhaps some track access rights for allowing connecting railways access to certain portions of track, vital to create competition in major markets (as in Mexico) or for non-competing services (such as passenger services on freight tracks). The governments granted SITARAIL only a seven year exclusivity period, after which time SITARAIL must grant track access, for an agreed fee, to any third party carrier requested by the governments. This again was a clear compromise between the govermments' perception that reduction of the monopoly power of the concessionaire, by allowing competitive access to the tracks, would be beneficial versus the private sector stress on the need to have full control over the tracks and full control over the market, to make revenues easier to forecast and adequate profitability more feasible. We have only a little more than one year's experience with the SITARAIL concession, but the initial results are encouraging. Figure 6 shows that freight traffic has turned upward after many years of decline. Insert Figure 6 here two As is universal in state-owned railways, there was substantial overstaffing on the that national railways. During negotiations on the terms of the concession it was agreed select SITARAIL would take on 1,815 of the 3,470 employees, and that it was free to staff. these 1,815. The governments then made severance payments to the redundant attention Figure 6 shows that combining traffic growth with staff reductions and renewed to equipment utilization has produced a significant turnabout in productivity. Insert Figure 7 here 13 SITARAIL's experience is so limited that caution is clearly in order. It is fair to say that the results are positive, and that the trends are in the right direction. Much that SITARAIL has done miffors the actions of the Argentina concessions, and the results look the same as Argentina at the same stage in the process. A number of other African concessioning efforts are underway (see Table 1 for statistics where they are available). Malawi is in advanced stages of soliciting proposals for a concession to operate the Malawi Railway. Mozambique has announced intentions to concession all three parts of the CFM, and bids have been announced for the Maputo and Nacala corridors. Zambia has announced intentions to concession ZR, and requests studies for for marketing the concession will soon be advertised. Zimbabwe has announced intentions to concession the railway infrastructure (but not yet operations), a unique approach. South Africa is intensively evaluating concessioning of the suburban passenger services (but not yet the freight or intercity passenger railway). Madagascar is in the final stages of receiving bids for a concession. The Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and Gabon are completing studies of how to carry out their concession, and Cameroon will be receiving proposals in the near future. As a final note, the railways of Togo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) were, until recently, operated under management contracts. Clearly the role of the private sector in managing African railways will be growing. Other Concessioning and Franchising Programs The government of Jordan has announced its intention to concession the Aqaba Railway, a railway that hauls phosphate rock for the Jordanian Phosphate Mining Company. This is likely to be awarded on a minimum tariff basis and consulting efforts are underway to finalize the terms of the proposed concession. The government of Pakistan is considering options for privatizing part or all of Pakistan Railways, though the choice between concessioning as opposed to privatization is still under consideration. Even Indian Railways now has a privately invested company, CONCOR, engaged in hauling containers over the national network. Although the main topic of this paper is concessioning, at least a short mention of railway privatization seems in order. The old British Rail has been privatized in its infrastructure and freight operations. Passenger services on BR were converted into "franchises" which in effect are short term, negative concessions to provide services under limited terms conditions. and New Zealand sold its railway outright (to the same investor group that subsequently bought the old BR freight services). The Canadian government's shares in Canadian National were sold to the public, as were a majority of the shares which Japanese the government held in East Japan Railways and Central Japan Railways. government The US nationalized Penn Central in 1971, and later sold its shares in the successor company, Conrail, in 1987. Perhaps the most important innovation in railway organization in the next decades will be the European Commission's Order 91-440 and its follow-on Orders opening national 14 networks up to operations from all qualified carriers. While Order 91-440 explicitly it required only that infrastructure accounts be separated from those of operations, and implicitly also required that social passenger services, intercity passenger services freight services be accounted separately in order to show that state subsidies were limited clear solely to social passenger services. The thrust of the Order has actually ignited a trend in the EU toward institutional separation of infrastructure from operations because infrastructure is seen as a state responsibility while operations (except for social services) are seen as commercial. In fact, we argue that one eventual result of institutional and separation is going to be franchising or even privatization of most freight services is possibly intercity passenger services as well. BR has shown that total privatization possible, and DB (Germany) and FS (Italy) have already announced plans to privatize freight services as an initial step. Romania is also considering privatizing freight and services, though there are no plans to privatize infrastructure. Exciting times, change, are in store for railways! The World Bank's Role the The World Bank has strongly supported the process of concessioning in cases where of the proposed conditions appeared to make sense. This has included some or all the following in various rail concessioning efforts: 1) financing new construction where or success of the concession is dependent on new facilities; 2) financing repair 3) rehabilitation to deliver the rail property in operable condition to a concessionaire; or assisting environmental cleanup; 4) helping to finance labor retraining, redundancy is retirement schemes; 5) providing partial risk guarantees where policy implementation in critical to the success of concessioning; and, 6) financing technical assistance concession design, packaging and marketing. In addition, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has taken an investment role in several concessions. Conclusion Each country approached its problems slightly differently, and each provides different insights into what can be achieved through the concession mechanism. However, a few common themes can be discerned: the 1. Restructuring and substantial government investment in the design of concession pay off in successful concessioning; in 2. There are a growing number of companies and consortia interested in investing railway concessions if the concessions are offered on reasonable terms; for 3. Both "positive" (where the concessionaire pays the government an agreed sum the concession rights) and "negative" (where the government pays the concessionaire for operating and maintaining the property) concessions are be possible, hence loss-making but socially necessary services can also concessioned; 15 4. Concessionaires can in fact do exactly what is expected -- increase traffic, improve service and enhance labor and asset efficiency, if they are allowed to do so; and, 5. In virtually every case, the new majority owners of the concession were local investors -- thus no "recolonialization" occurred. Instead, the local owners partnered with foreign operating expertise (thus far US, Canadian, Chilean, French, and Portuguese) which held only a minority share in the equity of the concession. Moreover, the actual number of expatriates involved in concessions has usually started with two to five professionals, and then declined to one or less as local expertise has grown. Concessions work because government interference is ended and commercial management techniques are introduced and allowed to operate. Beyond this, there is nothing magic about successful operations of railways as businesses. As Table 1 shows, concessions or franchises have already been awarded for railway operations in many countries and are under preparation in many others. This includes not just European and Latin American systems, but is increasingly the focus of attention in Africa. As we have tried to stress, concessioning is not simple, and governments must carefully analyze existing networks, their own objectives, and potential interest in concessions, the before embarking. Though the process is complex and is neither a panacea nor risk-free, the results can be the sort of productivity improvements that have been seen in Argentina over the course of the last five years, and as are developing in C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso and in Brazil and Bolivia. Bringing the railways into the market, and allowing commercial incentives to drive management decisions creates an environment in which costs are reduced and railways can once again play a significant role in meeting the transport needs of a country. Under the right circumstances, concessioning works and may be the only way out of downward the spiral in which many government-operated railways are currently trapped. *The authors acknowledge their debt to Nicola M. Shaw who played a major role in earlier versions of this paper and who did much of the organization of the Bank's analysis of concessioning in transport. We also thank Kenneth M. Gwilliam who has contributed much to the discussion of this issue. Readers looking for more detail on the general subject are referred to: Shaw, Nicola M.; Kenneth M. Gwilliam, and Louis S. Thompson, "Concessions in Transport," Paper No. TWU 27, Transport, Water and Urban Department, The World Bank, October 1996. M:\thompson\abidjanURCA1097.doc M:\thompson\abidjan\comp.xls Table 1 ACrUAL OR POTENTIAL PRIMARILY FREIGHIT RAILWAY CONCESSIONS (1994 or late available year) (Italics Indicates railway is alreadyconcessioned or privatized) T-Km P-Km TU/Kms TU/Empl (000,000) (000,000) Line Km Employees (000) (000) 1,259 |ARGENTINA 1. 6,485 29,118 5,151 223 1,375 NCA 1,189 4,520 865 263 1,708 FEPSA 982 5,163 575 190 1,057 FerrosurRoca 854 4,791 808 178 1,880 Bs. As. at Pacifico 2,029 5,493 1,079 369 1,183 Mesopotamico 620 2,751 524 225 624 Belgran (no(tonceioned) S11 6,400 1,300 127 1,389 ICHILE FREIGHT (FEPASA) 2. 1,111 2,200 800 505 966 BRAZIL (RFFSA) 6. 39,193 21,715 40,581 1,805 210 RFFSA: Nordeste 926 4,260 4,402 217 800 965 1.206401 RFFSA: Centro-Leste (CentroAtlantico) 6,886 7,092 8,608 971 2,041 3,256 1.595626 RFFSA: Sudeste (MRSLgistica) 20,370 1,770 9,982 11,508 2.52237 RFFSA: Sul(Sl Atlantico) 9,019 6,814 10,208 1,324 884 2,229 2.269397 RFFSA: Terezina Cristina 96 168 351 571 274 621 1.8I104 RFFSA: Oeste (Novoeste) 1,916 1,611 2,655 1,189 722 1,357 FEPASA 6,520 1,100 4,929 15,319 1,546 497 CVRD: EFVM(1994) 7 50,137 898 4,991 55,832 10,045 CVRD: Carajas(1994) 7 37,500 1,175 1,814 31,915 20,673 BOLIVIA (1993) 697 3,698 5,255 1SS 133 606 2.985361 Andina 322 114 2,082 2,443 209 203 Oriental 370 1,383 1,431 268 380 7S1 2.0S4862 MEXICO (FNM) 37,200 20,445 43,000 1,820 775 Northwest (est) 17,200 6,200 21,300 2,774 808 Northeast(est) 14,000 3,960 9,830 3,535 1,424 Southet (est) 3,200 2,200 9,043 1,455 354 Chihuahua mlPacifico (est) 600 84 1,457 2,053 469 333 Short Lines 2,300 6,543 5,804 352 396 |PERU (1994) 484 241 1,609 3,337 450 217 Southeastern 5 83 1S5 474 Central 209 49 509 507 Southem 269 110 915 414 GUA TEMALA (94 est) 8 28 240 640 430 420 624 COSTARICA(estfrom8Sdet)8 S0 72 480 2,300 317 66 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN RAILWAYS Coted'Ivoire/BurktnaFaso 417 163 1,155 1,823 502 318 Cameroun 592 450 1,006 3,853 1,036 270 Malawi 52 65 789 3,658 148 32 Gabon 295 98 683 1,893 575 208 Congo (Brazzaville) 339 421 510 4,989 1,490 152 Senegpl/Mli (intl only) 752 346 1,548 4,935 709 222 Zambia 1,025 241 1,273 8,544 995 148 Togo (mgt. contract) 19 9 532 800 53 35 RSA (Spoomet) 11. 92,536 9,204 33,275 150,470 3,058 676 [JORDAN 675 293 1,219 2,304 554 PAKISTAN 10. 5,939 16,385 8,775 116,026 2,544 192 INEWZEALAND 5. 2,455 525 4,000 4,500 745 662 |US: CONRAIL 128,627 19,082 24,728 6,741 5,202 CANADIANNATIONAL 4. 159,540 29,700 27,979 5,372 5,702 I. Conceuioned between 1993 ad 1995.Subwben pener cocesrnotnshown. 2. Concesioned in June, 1995 3. Privatized in 1987 4. Pdvatized inlate 1995 5.Pusengert affic estimated. 6. RFFSA concessioning to b complete in 1996 or ealy 1997, except forNordeste. 7.CVRD (Paent company) privated in April, 1997 8. Curntly out of ervice 9. TU means Traffic units, the sum of ton-km (T-KM) and pasenger-km (P-KM) 10. Note majority of traffic is pusenger. 11.Considering concessioning 5 suburban pussger opertions. M:\thompson\abidjen\hablel xls Ton-Kms (millions) 1974- 1975- l 19768 1977 1978 1979 -- 1980 - t 1981- - 1983--( 1984-- 1985 3 1986 ft 1987 1988 1989 t fA 199086 1991 1992 1993 -- 1994- - 1995 1996 IHf1 140.0 Figure 2-- Buenos Aires Suburban Railways Passengers 1972-1996 120.0 100.0~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~4ROCA __ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-U-*-NT'RE -&SARMIENTO 00.0 X ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*S.MARTIN cn ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~-1-URQUIZA -..- BELGRANO 40.0- 0Te since 1994 The Mitre, Sarmiento, and Roca lines have been operated by concessionaires since 1995 The Urquiza, San Martin, and Beigrano lines have been operated by concessionaires C661 Z661I 1661 0661 S t 6~961IB8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~961 0 v-61 9961 .-61 C .- t861 5 | | l .-88~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z61 } t 0 .-08~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~161 8 + .-80616461 09461 1461 . 61 L | ^ , - | * i a~ ~ o I -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C461 0 o 0 Figure 4- TU/Employee on Argentine Railways 1.2 0.3 -*Urquiza 0.6 I--E-Belgrazw -hBroad Giue --- Suburban Railways 0.4I o4 I r I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ! 0 Figure 5 -- Labor Productivity in Brazil and Bolivia Before and After Concessioning (000 TU/Employee) 3500 3000 2500 - 2000 - O Before * After 1500 1000 500 RFFSA: Centro- RFFSA: RFFSA:Sul RFFSA:Terezina RFFSA: Oeste Bolivia: Andina Bolivia: Oriental Leste Sudeste Cristina on Abidjan-Ouagadougou Railway (000,000) 700 - Figure 6 -Tonne-kilometers 600 500 400 300 200 100 I 0 a full year has been extrapolated from the first nine months. No data is available for 1988 and 1989. The concessionaire took over in October 1995 and Figure 7- Productivity on Abidjan-Ouagadougou Railway (1990=100) 300 250 150 50 X = = v~~~~~~~~--Umpoe -U---Dkmwao V~TI Ndataisavailablefor1988and1989.The conesionir_tokveinOcobe195ndaullyerhseenexraolaedeTkmwtn n No data is available for 1988 and 1989. The concessionaire took over in October 1995 and a full year has been extrapolated from the first nine months. i i Ii t I Olivier Ratheaux, French development agency (CFD) Abidjan conference, october 1997 1. DEFINE OBJECTIVES 2. APPRAISE THE FEASIBILITY 3. SECURE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 4. SPECIFY THE GOVERNMENT ADVISOR'S MANDATE 5. INVOLVE THE OPERATOR AND THE RAILWAY STAFF 6. SPELL OUT THE TERMS OF THE CONCESSION 7. GIVE HEED TO COMMUNICATION 8. BE SELECTIVE WITH THE STRATEGIC SHAREHOLDER 9. CLEAN UP FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL LIABILITIES 10. FAVOUR ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL COMPETITION 11. HARMONIZE COMPETITION TERMS IN TRANSPORT review the economic and social role of railway: - market - missions * aim for efficient and sustainable operation of the railway, rather than the budgetary benefits of privatization 2. ~'zt. ISE THE FE.A Si : ILT (INSTITUTI AN ^ L,TECHNICAL SeCU^L N'N FINiANCLL) * legal preconditions * benchmark business plan * financial simulations - concessionaire's perspective -government's perspective * need for clear political will * the leadership of the ministry for privatizations should be coordinated with the transport ministry and the railway com pany * ministerial committee / technical committee for privatization * ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ - * diagnosis * market study * feasibility of the concession * tender documentation and contractual framework * publicity and prospection * support to communication * support to the selection process * accompagnying measures - sector policy - prpare the liquidation of the previous organization 5. INVOLVE THE 0O E*:I TOR AN THE '. AILW^Y ST.A FF * support or supportive neutrality: the transitional directorate * preparatory measures : commercial initiatives, management streamlining, social communication, staff reduction * access to information T'.nE CONCESSIO*N * a cultural (r)evolution : from tutelage to concession * all, and nothing but the concession contract * a balanced contract: public - private partnership * identify non profitable services obligations and provide for specific compensations * government shareholder ? * no rail landlord corporation * regulatory authority or ministry of transport ? 7. GIVE HEED TO COMMUNIC,' Tie*N * open dialogue and transparency * public opinion * railway staff * i nvesto rs * customers 8. BE SELCTV WIT THEvcvl| STR.^ TEGIC SH.A cEHo*LDE.i * investors, operators and clients * conflicts of interests and monopolies: neither suppliers, nor contractors * need for substantial equity * attract private local investors 9'.CLE ^N U' FIN ANCI.A L ^N A SO*Cl AL LIA": ILITIES * concessionaire not responsible for previous liabilities * government paid staff reduction * implementation of work force restructuring * select the strategic shareholder by competitive bidding * eliminate protectionist measures and government-fixed prices * anti-trust control: -competition from road transport - access of other operators to the track - arbitration TEFMS IN T;.A NS- S--T A problems of unfair competition : formal I unformal sectors * marketing rail and road transport * infrastructure pricing * fiscal and customs legislation ------*_..C'AU I.NS.mOU,' ; USSI ,^ MIS zN C*@NC*SSIS*N Olivier Ratheaux, Caisse franaise de de1veIoppement seminaire d'Abidjan, octobre 1997 1. DEFINIR LES OBJECTIFS 2. APPRECIER LA FAISABILITE INSTITUTIONNELLE, TECHNIQUE, SOCIALE ET FINANCIERE 3. APPORTER LE SOUTIEN DU GOUVERNEMENT 4. FIXER LE MANDAT DU CONSEILLER DU GOUVERNEMENT 5. IMPLIQUER L'EXPLOITANT FERROVIAIRE ET LES CHEMINOTS 6. EXPLICITER LES RAPPORTS ETAT - CONCESSIONNAIRE 7. SOIGNER LA COMMUNICATION 8. BIEN CHOISIR L'ACTIONNARIAT DE REFERENCE, 9. APURER LES PASSIFS COMPTABLES ET SOCIAUX 10. DEVELOPPER LA CONCURRENCE EFFECTIVE OU POTENTIELLE 11. HARMONISER LES CONDITIONS DE CONCURRENCE DANS LES TRANSPORTS * reexaminer le role economique et social du chemin de fer: - marche - missions e privilegier le fonctionnement efficace et durable du chemin de fer plutot que les recettes budgetaires de privatisation * prealables juridiques * plan d'entreprise de reference * simulations financieres - point de vue du concessionnaire - point de vue de l'Etat 3. ^. "O;TER LE SOUTIEN IU Go*UVERNEMENT * necessite d'une volonte politique affirmee * conduite du processus par le ministere charge des privatisations en coordination avec le minist'ere des transports et 1'exploitant ferroviaire * instance politique / instance technique des privatisations 4. FIXER LE M^-NIaT *U CC NSEILLER DU GOUVE ; NEMENT * diagnostic du chemin de fer * etude du marche * faisabilite de la concession * dossier d'appel d'offres et cadre contractuel * valorisation du projet et prospection * appui a la communication * appui au choix du repreneur * mesures d'accompagnement - politique sectorielle - preparer la liquidation de l'ancienne structure FER.' oVI.AI'EET LES CHEMINOTS * appui ou neutralite bienveillante: direction de transition * preparer le terrain : mesures commerciales et de rationalisation de la gestion, communication sociale, reduction des effectifs * acces a l'information EtIT - CO*NCESSIOltNN.A I iE * une (r)evolution culturelle : de la tutelle au concedant * tout le contrat de concession, rien que celui-ci * un contrat equilibre : partenariat public - prive * identifier les obligations de services non rentables et leur accorder une compensation financiere specifique * I'Etat actionnaire? pas de societe de patrimoine autorite regulatrice, ou plutot ministere des transports? 7. SS*IGNER L ' COMMUNIC ^ TION * concertation et transparence * opinion publique * cheminots * investisseurs * clientele 8. BIE C'. OISI'?l L'ACTIS* NN A; I AxT DE REFE.' ENCE investisseurs, operateurs et clients conflits d'interet et monopoles : ni fournisseurs ni entreprises de travaux obtenir un apport en fonds propres substantiel attirer des capitaux prives nationaux 9.. ' U ; ER LES Pz SSIFS COMPTA BLES ET SOCkI UX * concessionnaire non tenu des passifs anterieurs * plan social 'a la charge de l'Etat * conduite du plan social * choisir le repreneur par appel d'offres * supprimer les mesures protectionnistes et les tarifs administres * controler les abus de position dominante: - la regulation par la concurrence routiere - I'acces de tiers a la voie ferree * problemes de la concurrence secteur formel / informel * commercialisation du chemin de fer et de la route * tarification de l'usage des infrastructures * regime fiscal et douanier I II i i i i i i RAILWAY CONCESSIONING ISSUES AND OPTIONS Presentation by Karim-Jacques Budin, Principal Railway Specialist, The World Bank, to the Seminar on Railway Concessioning in Africa Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire October 13-14, 1997 Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 2 MAIN ISSUES IN RAILWAY CONCESSIONING A railway concession is a contractual partnership arrangement between the Government and a private operator ("Concessionaire") whereby operation of rail activity is transferred to the Concessionaire under conditions spelled out in the Concession Agreement. Main issues in railway concessioning: * Shaping the Concession Agreement (Which "rules of the game" for railway activity?) * Selecting the Concessionaire Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 3 SHAPING THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT * Scope of the concession * Regulatory framework of rail activity * Access to rail infrastructure * Rail infrastructure management by third-party operators * Motive power and rolling stock . Staffing * Taxation * Concession fee * Duration of the concession * Control of the concession and arbitration Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 4 SCOPE OF THE CONCESSION The Concessionaire is generally responsible for: * operation of freight and passenger railway services * maintenance, renewal and upgrading of rail track and other infrastructure * current management of railway-related real estate As an alternative, passenger services might be operated by a specialized operator distinct from the Concessionaire. Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 5 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF RAIL ACTIVITY Commercial services * Services operated in a competitive and deregulated environment * Freedom for the Concessionaire to define service configuration, set tariffs, contract with specific customers Services operated under a Public Service Obligation (PSO) scheme * Services operated at Government request (mainly passenger) * Operation under a "PSO contract" (configuration of services, tariffs, financial compensation) Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 6 ACCESS TO RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE BY "THIRD-PARTY" OPERATORS * Government may authorize access to rail infrastructure by third party operators in case of abuse of "monopoly" power by the Concessionaire * Best alternative to tariff control by Government or a Regulatory Agency * Trackage fee paid to the Concessionaire by the third-party operator * However, the Concessionaire might be granted exclusive operation of services for a few years at the beginning of the concession Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 7 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT Infrastructure ownership to be retained by Government Operation and maintenance * under the sole responsibility of the Concessionaire. * maintenance standards decided and set by the Concessionaire, provided safety is kept at an "acceptable" level * costs entirely borne by the Concessionaire Renewal and upgrading * investment programs to be prepared and technically managed by the Concessionaire. Large-scale operations subjected to Government agreement (reimbursement of non-depreciated investment at the end of the concession) * financing mobilized by the Concessionaire (Government may guarantee loans) Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 8 MOTIVE POWER AND ROLLING STOCK Existing equipment of the railway company * preferably bought "en bloc" by the Concessionaire. Concessionaire free to sell useless equipment * other option: Concessionaire selects and decides equipment to acquire or lease. Remaining equipment to be sold by Government New equipment * Concessionaire free to buy or lease * Government retains a right of first refusal on the sale of equipment by the Concessionaire Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 9 STAFFING * Staff of the Concessionaire (a) to be ruled by the common labor law applicable to the private sector and (b) to be affiliated to the pension system applicable to private sector employees. * At the beginning of the concession, the Concessionaire will freely select and rehire staff among the existing railway staff. * Government responsible for the dismissal/redeployment of former railway workers not rehired by the Concessionaire. It will also deal with pension issues related to railway workers previously affiliated to specific pension schemes. Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 10 TAXATION * Common regime applicable to the private sector, subject to provisions specific to concessions * No specific tax on railway activity which might distort competition * Petroleum products used in locomotives exempt from specific Road Fund contribution (if any) Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 11 CONCESSION FEE Concession fee paid by the Concessionaire to the Government for the right of disposing of the rail infrastructure and of operating rail services. Various options: * initial lump-sum fee * yearly lump-sum fee * a percentage of the revenue of the Concessionaire * a combination thereof 12 Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options DURATION OF THE CONCESSION * Long-term concession necessary to trigger investment and long-term policy in asset maintenance, staffing, marketing,... * Difficult issues arising during the last years of a fixed-term concession * "Rolling" concession (e.g., initially 20 years, with option to extend the concession for another five years, to be exercised every five years) often an adequate solution Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 13 CONTROL OF THE CONCESSION AND ARBITRATION * Generally no need for a Regulatory Agency * Government control to be specified in the Concession Agreement (focus on safety and environmental control) * Yearly audit of the concession by an independent auditor * Disputes between Government and Concessionaire to be preferably subjected to arbitration (International Chamber of Commerce rules, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,...) Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 14 SELECTING THE CONCESSIONAIRE * A "strategic" shareholder should play a leading role in the equity of the concession company * A bidding process is highly recommended for the selection of the strategic shareholder Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options 15 THE BIDDING PROCESS FOR THE SELECTION OF THE STRATEGIC SHAREHOLDER A three-stage process is recommended. Stage 1: Prequalification of bidders Stage 2: "Technical" selection ("Fail or Pass"). Bidders present a medium-term Business Plan Stage 3: Final selection on the basis of the financial proposal. Concession awarded to the highest bidder for the concession fee (or for the sum of concession fee + price paid for the equipment) MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER ELEMENTS-CLES ET OPTIONS Presentation pr6par6e par Karim-Jacques Budin, Sp6cialiste Ferroviaire Principal, Banque Mondiale, pour le Seminaire sur la mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire 13-14 octobre 1997 Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options 2 ELEMENTS-CLES D'UNE MISE EN CONCESSION FERROVIAIRE La concession ferroviaire est une forme de partenariat entre I'Etat et un operateur prive (le "Concessionnaire") dans laquelle 1'exploitation de I'activite ferroviaire est transferee au Concessionnaire dans des conditions specifiees dans la Convention de concession. Elements-cles d'une mise en concession ferroviaire: * Quelles dispositions adopter pour la Convention de concession (Quelles sont les "r'egles du jeu" de I'activite ferroviaire?) * Comment choisir le concessionnaire? Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cdfs et options 3 QUELLES DISPOSITIONS ADOPTER POUR LA CONVENTION DE CONCESSION? Les principaux points a traiter concernent les aspects suivants * Champ de la concession * Cadre reglementaire de I'activite ferroviaire * Acces d'autres operateurs * Gestion des infrastructures a l'infrastructure ferroviaire * Materiel moteur et remorque * Questions de personnel * Fiscalite * Redevance de concession * Duree de la concession * Controle de la concession et arbitrage Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-clIs et options 4 CHAMP DE LA CONCESSION Le Concessionnaire sera habituellement responsable de: * I'exploitation des services ferroviaires marchandises et voyageurs * I'entretien, le renouvellement et I'amenagement des infrastructures ferroviaires * Ia gestion courante du domaine ferroviaire A titre de variante, I'exploitation des services voyageurs pourrait etre confiee a un operateur specialise, distinct du Concessionnaire. S Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cdes et options 5 CADRE REGLEMENTAIRE DE L'ACTIVITE FERROVIAIRE Services commerciaux * A exploiter dans un environnement competitif et dereglemente * Liberte pour le Concessionnaire de definir la configuration des services, de fixer les tarifs et de negocier des contrats avec certains clients Services exploit6s a titre d'obligation de service public (OSP) * Services exploites a la demande expresse de I'Etat (essentiellement services voyageurs) * Exploitation dans le cadre d'une Convention particuliere (fixant la configuration des services, les tarifs, la compensation financiere versee au Concessionnaire) Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cdes et options 6 ACCES D'AUTRES OPERATEURS A L'INFRASTRUCTURE FERROVIAIRE * L'Etat conserve le droit d'autoriser l'acces a l'infrastructure ferroviaire par d'autres operateurs ferroviaires dans le cas d'abus de position dominante par le Concessionnaire * Alternative preferable au contro'le des prix par l'Etat ou une Agence de Regulation * Peage a payer par l'operateur au Concessionnaire * Une exclusivite pourra toutefois etre accordee au Concessionnaire pour une periode de quelques annees en debut de concession Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Elements-des et options 7 GESTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES FERROVIAIRES Propridt& des infrastructures conservee par l'Etat Exploitation et entretien * sous la seule responsabilite du Concessionnaire * standards d'entretien librement arretes par le Concessionnaire, sous reserve d'assurer la securite b un niveau acceptable * couts entierement support6s par le Concessionnaire Renouvellement et ame'nagement * programmes d'investissements prepar6s et geres par le Concessionnaire. Operations de grande ampleur soumises a I'agrement de I'Etat (remboursement par I'Etat de la partie non amortie de l'investissement en fin de concession) * financement par le Concessionnaire (avec, eventuellement, garantie de I'Etat) Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Eldments-cIds et options 8 MATERIEL MOTEUR ET REMORQUE Materiels existants en d6but de concession * de preference a acheter en bloc par le Concessionnaire, qui pourra vendre les materiels inutiles * autre option: materiels a reprendre librement selectionnes par le Concessionnaire. Materiels redondants a vendre par I'Etat. Nouveaux mat6riels * le Concessionnaire a la liberte totale de les acqubrir ou des les louer * I'Etat a un droit de preemption sur la vente des materiels par le Concessionnaire Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Elements-des et options 9 QUESTIONS DE PERSONNEL * Le personnel du Concessionnaire sera regi par le droit du travail applicable aux entreprises du secteur prive et sera affilie au regime de retraites du secteur prive * En debut de concession, le Concessionnaire selectionnera librement les personnels qu'il reprendra parmi les personnels de la societe de chemins de fer * L'Etat fera son affaire du licenciement/redeploiement des personnels non repris par le Concessionnaire. 11 reglera egalement les questions relatives aux retraites des employes affilies aux regimes particuliers de securite sociale. Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options 10 FISCALITE * Regime fiscal de droit commun applicable au secteur prive, sous reserve des dispositions specifiques aux concessions * Pas de taxes specifiques a l'activite ferroviaire qui pourraient introduire des distorsions en matiere de concurrence * Acquisition des produits petroliers en exemption de contribution au Fonds Routier (s'il en existe un) Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-clds et options 11 REDEVANCE DE CONCESSION Le Concessionnaire versera 3 I'Etat une "redevance de concession" en contrepartie de la mise b disposition des infrastructures et du droit d'exploiter les services ferroviaires. Principales options: * montant forfaitaire payable en debut de concession * montant forfaitaire annuel * pourcentage des recettes du Concessionnaire * combinaison des elements ci-dessus Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Elements-ces et options 12 DUREE DE LA CONCESSION * Une concession de longue duree est necessaire pour inciter le Concessionnaire a investir et mettre en oeuvre une politique a long terme en matiere d'entretien, de personnel, de commercialisation,... * Difficiles problemes les dernieres annees de la concession en cas de concession a duree fixe * La formule de la concession "glissante" (par exemple, duree initiale de 20 ans, avec prolongation eventuelle pour cinq ans, a decider 3 l'issue de chaque periode de cinq ans a partir du debut de la concession) constituera souvent une bonne solution. Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cles et options 13 CONTROLE DE LA CONCESSION ET ARBITRAGE * Une Agence de Regulation est en general inutile * Le controle a exercer par I'Etat doit etre defini en detail dans la Convention de concession (accent a mettre sur la securite et la protection de 1'environnement) * Audit annuel de la concession par un auditeur independant * Litiges entre I'Etat et le Concessionnaire a soumettre de preference a I'arbitrage (Chambre de Commerce International, Centre International pour le Reglement des Differends relatifs aux Investissements,...) Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options 14 COMMENT CHOISIR LE CONCESSIONNAIRE? * Un actionnaire "de reference" devrait detenir la majorite du capital de la societe concessionnaire * 11 est fortement recommande de choisir I'actionnaire de reference par appel a la concurrence Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options 15 LE PROCESSUS D'APPEL A LA CONCURRENCE POUR LE CHOIX DE L'ACTIONNAIRE DE REFERENCE Un processus en trois etapes est recommande. Etape 1: Prequalification des candidats Etape 2: Selection "technique" ("Recu ou Recale") sur la base d'un Plan d'Entreprise a moyen terme presente par les candidats Etape 3: Selection finale sur la base de la proposition financiere. La concession est accordee au candidat ayant presente l'offre la plus elevee pour la redevance de concession (ou pour la somme de la redevance de concession et du prix d'acquisition des materiels ferroviaires) i i I i i Session 3 - 1-- - -l ...- I - Railway Concessioning in Latin America Jorge H. Kogan Vice President Abidjan, October 13, 1997 Mercer Management Consulting MAP OF LATIN AMERICAN RAILWAY PRIVATIZATIONS MEXICO <<7 ~~ENTRAL AMERICA COLOMBIA 9 ~~BRAZIL) VCuz- A. BOLIVIA: C H I L E < !/ tsX HRio de Janeiro ¢( {( jJs~ao Paulo l t J URUGUAY L / Montevideo Buen s Aires Mercer Management Consulting Argentina s .- ailway Concessioning Mercer Management Consulting The Government Policy and the Legal Framework State Reform and Public Enterprises Restructuring Law was passed in August '89 in order to: * restructure Argentina's economy - market-oriented - improve efficiency * tackle fiscal deficit * promote a smaller but solid public sector * encourage private sector operation of state-owned enterprises Mercer Management Consuiting Railway Performance was Poor * More than US$800 million loss (US$3.00 million per sector) * Inefficient operations with surplus labor * Deteriorating plant and equipment * Poor service with declining market share Miercer Management Consulting Argentina's Railways were- Collapsing * With a network of 35,000 km and more than 90,000 employees, the system was not achieving its potential * Freight market share was less than 10 percent * Intercity passenger share was less than 6 percent * In Buenos Aires, with a population of 12 million, 250 private bus companies carry 2.8 billion passengers, versus 274 million carried by rail and 140 million by subway Mercer Management Consulting 3 Railway Privatizations in A-rgentina The Government, determined to face the situation and carry out a major change, undertook the privatization of these services by granting them under concession to private operators as a means to reduce the heavy financial burden represented by railways on public finance, increase railway activity, and introduce new management criteria, oriented towards efficiency, service quality, and profitability. *The Government * Consortia bid * The continues to for long term Government own track and concessions pays the cost of equipment severing excess personnel Mercer Management Consulting 4 Railway Privatization Aims * Reduced subsidies, targeted at capital renewal * Improved service and rail market share * Transfer of technology and management techniques Private sector railway investment to rehabilitate and renew plant and equipment Mercer Management Consulting s \ / i . |z a t * ____-; s tt o a ~ O _0 n m X ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... COMMUTER SERVICES B.A. Metropolitan Area X / D Linea Sarmiento [< 4.jSELinea Mitre Linea Urquiza 112:Lirnea Roca -- .. |LineaSan Mart; _o_o_ f -_ ., 0 t C.t2Q$t~~QwLaituo [_S:N:[ Linea Beigrano Norte F ' ' :Linea Beigrano Sur 11JZIItAIIA WFS / An1160/ ' , A ' . IAI III A';$ *l 0 I; '. '$W,l ll g I 130 Km ~~- .--. 1 /20 Km \ \; BUENOS AIRES SUBWAY SERVICES Mtro.Carranzaa F.Lacroze p.AIemN za.de Mayo Pra.Junta' ConH~~~i-tu on Plaza de Buenos Aires Vi rreyes/ ' i / 0 '. , " .' ' .,, ',. :-,< v a_. ° * A.. Service privatization and restructuring adopted specific characteristics for each of the three major railway "businesses" Freight Buenos Aires Metropolitan Long Distance Region Passengers Passengers * Vertically integrated concessions * Setting up of FEMESA, an * Decision to eliminate autonomous company hived off Federal Government * Network divided into 6 from FA, intended to operate subsidies to intercity concessions metropolitan rail services passenger services • Concessions for 30 years plus 10 Verticallyiintegratedconcessions Assignment of rolling additional optional years * Metropolitan network divided into stock free of charge to 7 concessions ~~~those provinces which * Assignment of rolling stock and * Concessions for 10 years, which decided to continue infrastructure use could be extended for equally decided to conin e long terms if agreed upon by the providing these services * Free rates, in practice parties * Free;rates • Payment of an annual fee for the Assignment of rolling stock and use of infrastructure and rolling infrastructure use stock * Maximum, regulated rates Fee/subsidy payment * Free determination of the number * Free determination of the number of employees, to be mainly of employees, without the selected from FA personnel requirement that they be selected from FEMESA personnel Mercer Management Consulting Results Freight Services - Concessioning of 20,800 Km of network - Discontinuance of 6,500 Km - Creation of F.C. Gral.Belgrano S.A., (state-owned private corporation), company rationaliz;ation of a more efficient operation Mercer Management Consulting Resu ts Intercity Passenger Services - Discontinuation of 75% of 1989 services - Transfer of remaining services to the provinces - Privatization of Bs.As.-Mar del Plata: four bids but not awarded; subsequent transfer to the Province of Buenos Aires * Commuter Services - Setting up of FEMESA - Concessioning the whole Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area rail network and subways Mercer Management Consulting 8 Results * Workshops - Transfer of 6 workshops to cooperatives set up by former railway workers * Personnel - Personnel reduction from 90,000 employees to less than 16,000 - Changes in industrial agreements - A sharp increase in productivity Mercer Management Consulting Results Subsidy - A US$ 280 M contribution from the Treasury in 1995 (22% of the 1980-87 average) - Intended for metropolitan services and some investments in F.C. Gral. Belgrano S.A. - Without subsidy from the National Treasury to freight or intercity passenger railroads Mercer Management Consulting Freight Concessions * Six packages comprising 27,000 Km of track based on original lines. * Concessions for 30 years (plus 10 years). * Concessionaire pays fee, investment plan to its risk and rent for rolling stock * Limited rate control * Must allow operations of intercity passenger service upon payment of trackage rights fee * Government and employees retain minority shareholding position * About 8,000 Km of remaining network were offered to Provinces. Branches not accepted will be abandoned. Mercer Managenment Consulting Bidding Process - Freight Concessions Networks were awarded through national and international competitive bidding. Main aspects considered for selection were: * Technical, Economic, and Financial Stability of Bidders; * Soundness of Business Plans; * Number of Public Railway Employees intended to be hired; and * The Economic Offer, consisting of fees to be paid monthly for the concession and the amount of capital investment committed for the first five concession years. Mercer Management Consulting 12 Freight Concessions Investment for the First 15 Years (in Millions of US$) | FEPSA NCA BAP Mesop. Ferrosur Belgrano Total Rolling Stock | 112 151 144 5 80 100 592 Infrastructure 106 222 204 53 86 150 821 Other 16 13 21 6 7 15 78 Total 234 386 369 64 173 265 1 ,491 Buenos Aires Commuter S-ervices ° Establishment of a separate department (early 1990). * Separation of assets and services into a new state-owned company, FEMESA, in March 1991. * Concession of services together with Buenos Aires Subway system (SUBTE). Concession period: 10 years for six railway lines, and 20 years for SUBTE/Urquiza line; optional 10-year increments if agreed by the parties. * Bidding Documents have defined standards of services, fare structure and basic investme;nt projects. Bidders are proposing business plans and the subsidy (operational surplus or deficit, plus investment cost) required to operate the system. ° Concessionaires will employ FEMESA's and/or SUBTE's personnel according to their needs. Mercer M?nennmen! Cnn1gsuftinn The Bidding Process . encouragement to maximum participation . transparent competitive process * three envelope bidding process - envelope 1: qualifications with emphasis on the operator - envelope 2A: business plan for each concession - envelope 2B: financial proposal and subsidy requirement . selection made on the basis of: - bidders satisfying qualifications required - bidders showing to be capable of operating concession through their business plans (screening process) . winning bidder: from all those successfully passing the previous two steps, the one requiring the lowest subsidy Mercer Management Consulting 14 Commuter Rail Services Investment during Concessions (in Thoustands of US$) MITRE 271,449.1 SARMIENTO 276,214.7 URQUIZAO1 ) 48,382.7 SBASE 1 ) 523,169.9 ROCA 120,858.1 SAN MARTIN 86,775.5 BELGRANO NORTE 82,285.6 BELGRANO SUR 61,563.3 TOTAL 1,470,699.0(2) (1) 20 - year concession period (2) By the end of 1995 works worth US$ 355 million were under execution, and worth US$ 20.2 million had been finalized Schedule of Privatization of Commuter Services-- ERVICES |BIDDINC. SUBMISS. SUBMISS. | STARTING SERVICES DOCUMENTS ENV. I ENV. 2 SELECTION OPERATIONS MITRE 15 NOV 91 31 JAN 92 5 JUN 92 30 DEC 92 27 MAY 95 SARMIENTO 15 NOV 91 31 JAN 92 5 JUN 92 30 DEC 92 27 MAY 95 SUBWAY/URQUIZA 15 NOV 91 31 JAN 92 55JUN 92 | 30 DEC 92 1 JAN 94 ROCA 15 NOV 91 31 JAN 92 26 AUG 92 30 DEC 92 1 JAN 95 SAN MARTIN 15 NOV 91 31 JAN 92 26 AUG 92 30 DEC 92 1 APR 94 BELGRANO NORTE 15 NOV 91 31 JAN 92 25 SEP 92 30 DEC 92 1 APR 94 BELGRANO SUR 15 NOV 91 31 GJAN 92 25 SEP 92 30 DEC 92 1 MAY 94 .JANUARY '93-MAY '95 - Analysis of optional envelope for winner - Negotiation of concession contracts and preparation for take-over - Signing of contracts - Transition to take over Railway Privatizations in Argentina Positive results have been achieved concerning the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region railway services after about 3 years of private management. Demand, service quality, and Government financing requirement indicators show a favorable evolution. Mi.i.nsof Carried Passengers OperatingSubsidy(l) Passonrso Subsidy per Passenger (1) (Inmillions)( millions) 4( illionsfJunc996 IS) O nJune 1996 ISSlpassenger) 50 414 400 335 1.0 400 -345 M ll;;ns UJSS/Passenger 246 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~f300 300 212 0.8 0.6 0.53 200 ~~~ ~ ~~~~~200130 0.4 100 ~~~~~~~~~~~100 58 0.2 0.01 0 / M 0.0_ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1986 1994 1999 (2 2003(2) 1986 1994 1999(2 20032) (Vear!) 1I) (YearS) (Year 10) (Vear I) (YearS) )Prjec lio bb.wdon tiw runs m b itbWyeam. (1)Eslimats1rd.deor (V'earlO) beassmprto.e that in thiwIl4qiza liee.Subwayecacdlo, tbe (t)Esllmaled whblt .. b.dy co. be Hllecaled wader the assamplieatbhll.tt b Urqeu U Sehwaycessiostheb- l the WlequsilIJ. whelsubsidy can beAwe edto the Urq a Um. (2) Pr,jm.e basede. winnin biddr,W i-s. (2) ProjecleI based wiikg bWidnm'oTer lRun Car-Km Canceled and Delayed Trains Millions 150 (In millions) 131 ofa, 300 239 (In thousands of trains) 04 1 Numhcrof 100 ______200 136 0 (m,vcmncninn, Managcmenit 50 I M (.wvmtncitt and 100 - 142 I'rivatc Mgms.t.0.~lllll l'iatl Mgnet(. 11 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996 Source: National Transport Regulatory Commission, Mercer Management Consulting analysis. Mercer Management Consulting 15 Railway Privatizations in Argentina Encouraging results have also been achieved concerning the Buenos Aires Metro Concession. Carried Passengers Operating Subsidy (1) Subsidy per Passenger (1) (in millions) 300 (In(imillions of.lune 1996 IISS) (In June 1996 uISs/passenger) Millionso>1 214 Passcnge1s 171 187 199 2 Mont 19930 1996 1986 200 145 171s M s 30 0.8 0.6- 25- 100 0.4 -0.21 0 020 0 ~~~ _ ~~~~~_ ~ I ~~~~~~~~~~~0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1993 1996 1986 1996 5 0 (sovnimcnt Migpiut U l rivauc Mastasgeanecit 0 (kovenment-n MgnmtUMPrivatc Management ocmn gtEPiaeMngmn "III:s1i..wd ...u.e Ihe aumiss t.ht ine1 tirqniza ib.-Subway sion,the (tI Est_imad under lhe nssnmption that lahe tfirqnia UnSnbbay.oo eenslb- alloaedtote Urqs Un. tl) raetiin basd..d lh, n.1s mohs. l he year. whoe subidyc he..*tloend sobe teqis tie. whoe sbsidy ca. be (2) r.ojcion basedur winning bidders' eIes. (2) ProetioI basd onwinnig bidd.'e fre Run Car-Kin Interrupted Service (In millions) (In minutes) 30 26 27 30.000 Millions 23 Mituics of 23.165 of ~~~20 Itilerrupted 20,732 arm 20 erie 20,000 10,231 9.013 10 10.000 0 0. 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996 0 (iovecnilneit Mgnlt. U I'rivalc Martagelsclit 0 Govenmiit Mgnmt. U Private Maiagemnti Source: National Transport Regulatory Commission, Mercer Management Consulting analysis. Mercer Management Consulting 16 Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico FNM operates a 26,000 km system linking major production and consumption points with ports and gateways to U.S. based railways. * 96% of FNM's revenues were gefierated by freight traffic \~~~~) ~ ~ | - , 7b -- 17~ ~~ - 4~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ o 1994 Revenues (M) ll 5 * USBor Freight N$2,836 Gateway Passenger N$102 Total N$2,938 Note. All currency ifl t1is flocurnent is expressed in nominal new pesos (N$). Source: FNM Documents II(II(JIl95(lIf1 I/u.,d/I/ ...... tJALI AP' I(XN 0Il1nto .s/pe, Morcet Management Consulltig Page 5 Transaction Process Overall, FNM expects an orderly and expeditious transaction process that is consistent with the objectives of the Mexican Government. . The Government will offer a lorng term concession to market and provide service and may consider concession renewal * The concessionaire will operate within a market-based regulatory regime that minimizes governmnent regulation and control * Concessions will be granted with "clean slate" balance sheets with the exception of liabilities and obligations incurred in the normal course of business * The Government expects to assume labor costs incurred prior to concession * The Government expects that there will be a favorable climate for stable and growing employment in a revitalized railroad * The concessionaire will be able to determine its own operating practices, including labor selection and work rules, within the context of Mexican law * The Government will not require a specific capital program, but expects that investments will be made to sustain the business and that proceeds from retirement and replacement of assets will be reinvested to meet the capital requirements of the business * The Government anticipates that the concession will generate income sufficient to provide an adequate return to investors * The limits of foreign investment in the concession are under discussion * There are no restrictions on repatriation of capital * The Government will assumne 100% of liabilities for past environmental damage * The concessionaire is expected to provide cornmercially acceptable levels of safety, quality, service, and insurance Iierce/ Ma:,agetr,eIt Colnsulfa,II ',. :t .*..,s. '.nI.S,', l.tI..@, I tdIAI AV'lSS;I|§§.111 wfe*il@ . Concluding remarks * It is important to define and manage public and Government expectations concerning restructuring from the outset of the process * Need for education and consensus * Keep the process simple * Reach out aggressively to find good bidders * Concessions can be difficult to value correctly Mercer M.nan-mPnt rnnc,!tinn Other Examples of . assenger Railway Concessions in Lati n ^merica Mercer Management Consulting Companhia Paulista de Trens'Metropolitanos - Sao Paulo CPTM currently carries more than 240 million riders per year over an electrified 270-km network. A Lines A and D Lines E and F E-F Lines *83 million *63 million passengers per year passengers per year A-D Lines * 109 route-kms * 83 route-kms o Station * 234 railcars * 333 railcars * Planned Station * 1372 trains per week * 1645 trains per week Lines B andC * 1 :. : 38 * ~~~~~~~~~~~~Power:3-kv DC on overhead cantenary 101~~~~~~~~ milio Guage: 1.6 m on all lines except as noted passengers /_ per_ year M 300Lrines - C l Signaling:_CTCa C pe weekC 1.0 m *.-*--.*Average D *78 route-kms gauge Age of Railcars: 19 years .: 2*Fare Evasion: Minimum 7% (Lines A and D) to *342 railcars +\ < more than 30% (Line F) L~~~~~~~~~~~~D I Mercer Management Consulting 18 Companhia Paulista de Trens'Metropolitanos - Sao Paulo Mercer's financial modeling of the CPTM system under concessionaire operation estimates that the system will recover its operating costs from farebox revenues in the future. • Estimates of future financial performance depend on key assumptions concerning the future environment and concessionaire performance: * Strong passenger volume growth driven by population growth and improvements in service quality * Achievement of benchmarked levels of productivity in transportation and administrative departments * Increases in fleet availability driven by improved maintenance practices * Expansion of the railcar fleet as ridership grows * Programs to reduce fare evasion * The Government does not anticipate providing operating subsidies to concessionaires Combined Operating Revenues and Operating Expenses for CPTM Concessions, 1999-2018 Millions of 450 1995 Reals 400 350 300 250 Operating Expenses 200 150_ 100 NPV of Operating Revenues (1995 Reais): R$1,616 million| NPV of Operating Expenses (1995 Reais): R$1.288 million 50 0 1999 2000 2001 200. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Mercer Management Consulting 19 Companhia Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos - Sao Paulo However, concessionaires' operating cash flow will be insufficient to fund capital renewal and system expansion. * Taxes paid by concessionaires to the Government will offset some but not all costs of capital renewal * The Government is considering several strategies to fund future capital requirements * Assigning responsibility for capital replacement to concessionaires and requesting a negative tender * Assigning responsibility for capital replacement to the government and securing funding guarantees from an international development bank * Negotiating Government capital assistance on an annual or project-by-project basis ma0 Capital Subsidies, Taxes, and Net Transfers for CPTM Concessions, 1999-2018 Millions of 125 1995 Reals 100| 75 -...... aia usde 50 25 '..---'*...-" '' ~~~~~~~~~~~NetTransfers from Govemment to Concessionaire -25 -50 Taxes Paid by Concessionaires -75 -100 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Mercer Management Consulting 20 Colombia Urban Transit System Concessioning: Medellin Mercer is also working with the Metro de Medellin in concessioning the existing urban transit system. *Mercer was hired by the Empresa de Transporte Masivo del Valle de Abura (ETMVA) to assist with the concessioning of the Metro de Medellin (Metro) transit system. *The concession has two components: - The core concession which includes operation, management, maintenance, and commercial development of the existing heavy rail system. - The expansion project concession which includes design, construction, operation, management, maintenance and commercial development of a trolley bus system. *To establish the economics of the project and provide a basis for assessing concessionaire tender bids, Mercer has prepared an evaluation of the Metro. - Mercer evaluation includes a financial profile and comparison of the Metro with other transit systems in the United States and Latin America. Mercer Management Consulting 22 Overview of the Metro de Medellin Transit System The existing Metro system, consisting of Line A and Line B, began partial operations in November 1995 and full operations in late 1996. Line C will begin operations at the beginning of 2001. Metro System Niquia Line A stallp . Typical Numberof At Weekday Train Units/ Spare Line Length' (km) Grade Elevated Ridership Trolley Buses Units' . Line A 23.2 12 7 210.000 32 Line B 5.6 1 5 95.000 5 5 Total 28.8 13 12 305,000 37' Current System Line C 5.6 7 - 53,000 15 4 Total 34.4 20 12 358.000 52 \ - San Antoni ( -g t 30) an Javier 'Does not include junction line of 3.2 km connecting Line A and Line B. 2 Each train unit ("unidad") consists of a married triplet of three vehicles. 3 Current units in service are 42. Ten additional units (i.e., 30 cars) will be bought by ETMVA at the end of this year. Mercer Management Consulting 23 Bidding Evaluation of the Metro de Medellin Transit System Each bidder will submit four envelopes at different times. To be eligible to win the concession, each envelope needs to meet the requirements and qualify. Envelope 1: This envelope will contain general information regarding the bidder such as legal structure, capital, liquidity, etc. Moreover, it will include highlights of the bidder's past experiences in building and operating transit systems. Envelope 2: This envelope will have the business plan, with specifications on how the bidder will operate and maintain the current system Envelope 3: This envelope will contain the technical proposal where the bidder describes how it will build, operate, and maintain the trolley bus system Envelope 4: This is the economic proposal where the bidder will present financial figures for the concession and estimate its net present value ETMVA will award the concession to the bidder who presents the economic proposal with the highest positive net present value. Mercer Management Consulting 25 Colombia Urban Transit System-Concessioning: Cali Mercer Management Consulting, Inc. (Mercer) is currently helping the City of Cali in concessioning its proposed urban transit system. * Mercer was retained by the City of Cali, the Government of Colombia, and MASITRANS to assist with the development of the Cali light rail transit system concession (Cali LRT). *Cali is preparing a design, build, operate, maintain, and transfer (DBOMT) concession for a mass transit system. *To establish the economics of the project and provide a basis for assessing concessionaire tender bids, Mercer has prepared, an evaluation of the proposed Cali LRT. * Mercer evaluation includes a financial profile and comparison of the Cali LRT with other transit systems in the United States and Latin America. Mercer Management Consulting 26 Overview of the Cali Light Rail- Transit System The Cali LRT "core system" consists of Line 2 and Line 3, terminating at Street 50, and encompasses 19 stations. Cali LRT "Core System" AverageN Weekday w -j-. 1 Rldership' Number of Length (km) (passengers) Vehicles AOCore System Stations J Line 2 10.5 136,000 1. Carrera50 Core Sy' te¶flne 3 8.3 to 45 < 2. Carrera 44 174.000 3. Carrera 39 Total 18.8 4. Carrera 29 Note: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5.Transversal 25 r 12J ' / ~~~~~~6.Carrera 15 Note: Headways 10- and 5-minute Intervals. 6. Carrera 15 7. Carrera 10 t(eirrera) g 10. Calle 44N Optional extension 11. Calle 52 Construction is expected to begin in 1998, with partial to Street 122 (not 12. Calle 70N service on Line 2 to start by early 2001, and full service included in Mercer 13; Calle 15 to be provided on Lines 2 and 3 by early 2002 analysis) 14. Plaza de Cayzedo 15. Calle 29 \ Stree (Carrera) 122 16. Calle 34 17. Calle 70 18. Calle 72U 19. Calle 55/83 'Mercer estimate based on first full year of operations (2002). aBased on Mercer's assessment of a bidder's view of equipment needs. Mercer Management Consultiuig 27 Financial Evaluation of the Cali Light Rail Transit System: Operating income At a US$0.35 fare, Mercer estimates modest net operating losses during normalized years, turning into positive operating income starting in 2011. Projected Operating Income 25 Total Revenue' Total Operating 20 B Expenses- US$M 5 Year 0 , _ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 'Total revenue includes fare and non-fare revenue. 2Includus annual capitalized maintenance expenses. Mercer Management Consulting 28 - key factor for success? POLITICAL DETERMINATION - most sensitive issue: STAFF REDUCTION (UNAVOIDABLE) - recommendation MAKE IT SIMPLE AND DO IT FAST - and remember ALMOST NOTHING IS FOREVER i i I i i i i I MISSION DE REHABILITATION REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN DES ENTREPRISES DU SECTEUR Paix Travail - Patrie PUBLIC ET PARAPUBLIC COMMISSION TECHNIQUE MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMNI1NS DE FER DU CAMEROUN Presentation au Seminaire sur la Mise en concession des Chemins de Fer en Afrique. 13 - 14 Octobre 1997 La Consultation Dans le cadre de son programme de restructuration et de privatisation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques du secteur des transports, le Gouvernement du Cameroun a decide de conceder 1'exploitation des chemins de fer camerounais a une societe concessionnaire privee. L'objectif de cette consultation est de selectionner une soci6te actionnaire de reference qui detiendra 51% des actions de la soci6t6 concessionnaire. Mise en concesslon des chemins de fer dii Camerouinr La Consuitaion > 51 % Concessionnaire S.A. La Actionnaire de Douala, Cameroun Consultation R6f4rence Doilt exclusif Duree de d'utilisation des minimale 20 infrastructures ans (type ferroviaires "glissant") Activits Gouverlernent du Cameroun (i L'exploitation technique et commerciale des services de transport ferroviaire l L'exploitation. la mainteniance. le renouvellement et l'amenagement des infrastructures ferroviaires existantes Mise en concession des chemim, (le fer dii Ca,ineonil) Les objectifs vises par la mise en concession - L'acceleration du processus de restructuration et de modernisa'tion des chemins de fer du Cameroun. Le de\veloppement d'un service de qualite pour la clientele des chemins de fer. L'exploitation des chemins de fer dans des conditions commerciales tout en respectant certaines contraintes non commerciales et en minimisant le coCut de ces contraintes pour le Gouvernement du Cameroun. Mise ein concession des clienii. (le fer dui Cametotiii Structure de I'actionnariat s4wounwhteIdIIIoS41.1 Auaous 3 4 %ix z -c66% IllicYI fdHISif 1100 % I Soacite actcmaire deS Auties actionnaifes fietif!iI "Actions " "Actions B"" >51% < 49% - .Societeconcessionnaire S.A. |_ Douala, Cameroun *I , .1.1. *p..imnaii,Ire.a8ub.w% .1. h*t iii.tI.ei.1I .*'eeuv.iiueno. tIttod l 4uhi. *hi loiie.l [email protected]%uI.iotX.Ii .o 0i.*1 .H iIUOoIiddV .144aeio.,teo. r. we., uiii.uoioIe t .i .d.1I I%%Hitt"oii.i i., A,s, -.*ue.1. -i*iI,* |o.tiIi.. Yl..loa o e ii l 1 de*1.i uxt 1 40 I (Nu % WWW i ".1.1 I go ioo.~ihi,.*,ii 51i .1.HIavoIl 4 e *4' o,4i.iIe ilt. Li HIl .11I I(t AM I I 1.1l %o4of4l..is . ni* g..i. .k*Io*ea sls I isvailow u- as.s.oH I.',i ist .1.'%w15550% A to out ImH it. I. Ii.. *. losIsol1II.d L %iP. -I%ss' o "Ii ,%%ios .ii4 i *isi'.*i1.iiit 1. I.505i54l.4*IAikiiH. II Mise eni concession des cheinim de fer dil Catinerouin1 Structure uridique Option 1 Societe concessionnaire S.A. Douala, Cameroun Service Service voyageuLr s imarclianidises Option 2 Auilies (&ivetituellenent) J L'Etat Convention particutliere Soci6td concessionnaire S.A. x %.v 4) '9, iicliiant ilotamimelit couitraintes non Douala, Cameroun coniniercales "Societe fert,miei" Service Seivice iiafcthandises voyagetu s Mise en con7cession des cheminis dle fer dii Camerotini Droits et obligations de la societe concessionnaire 1. Le concessionnaire exploitera des services de transport ferroviaire, de marchandises et voyageurs dits commerciaux. 2. L'exploitation d'autres services de transport ferroviaire de voyageurs, dits services exploites au titre d'une obligation non commerciale qui feront l'objet d'une convention particuli6re signee entre l'Etat et le concessionnaire. 3. L'am6nagement et l'utilisation des infrastructures ferroviaires, incluant - les lignes de chemin de fer, - les gares, - les ateliers de maintenance, - tous autres materiels a l'exclusion du materiel roulant. 4. La selection et location ou acquisition des materiels roulants. 5. La selection des personnels pour la societ6 concessionnaire. 6. La paiement annuel d'une redevance de concession en contrepartie de la mise a disposition des infrastructures ferroviaires existantes et du droit d'exploiter les services. Mise en concession des chemit de fer dii Camnerouin REGIFERCAiM - Le reseau 1 078 Km 622 Km Yaounde-Ngaoundere Transcam 2 264 Km Douiala-YaounL(e Transcam I 165 Km Douala-Nkongsamba Ligne de l'Ouest 27 Km Mbanga-Kumbal Ces lignes sont a voie unliqLe a 1'exception dLI tronyon Douala Bessengue-Bessa Station Mise en) conicessioni des chemin: (le fer dii Cameroan CARTE ROUTIERE ET FERROVIAIRE DU CAMEROUN .,,s.es sas:-_-es A,C :-e-lr -e$le-N r34!a^S;to4-t~~~~ ¢ a X;/N f Vft REGIFERCAM - Indicateurs de Performance I98/I982 1993/1994 Voies kilom6tres 1 078 1 078 Marchandises-tonnage 1 455000 1 417 000 Tonnes- kilo1 n6tres 730 000 000 757 000 000 Recettes * 16 968 18 330 Voyageurs - nombre 2 471 000 1 792 000 Voyageurs - kilometres 463 000 000 334 000 000 Recettes 5 171 3 483 Marchandises (km en % du trafic total) 61 % 69 % Nombre de wagons 1 355 Nombre de voitures 76 Nombre unites-trafic transport par agent 170 000 265 000 millions FCFA (100 FCFA = 1 FF) Mise eni concession des chemi (1o fel (hIICanyoftnin REGIFEIRCAM - Materiel moteur Nombre Tpe Date de mise en service 29 CC 2 200 1981/1983 61 /-- BB 1100 1969/1982 Locomotives - 20 8 BB 1 200 1981/1982 4 BB 1 000 1979-1983/1989 Mise eln concession des chemiii. de fer dil Camerouni) L'actionnaire de reference devra faire preuve, a-i rninimum : d'une comp6tence commerciale dans le domaine des transports. d'une compe'.ence technique en tant qu'op6rateur des chemins de fer. d'une assise financiere suffisante pour assurer les investissements n6cessaires. d'une connaissance du Cameroun ou de pays comparables. Mlse el) concession des cheim,. de fer dii Cameioill) Description a. Localisation dans le Golf de Guinee, superficie: 475 442 Km2 _* Population : 12,9 millions en 1994 2 langues officielles : fran9ais et anglais Independance en 19,05i _ 1eres elections libres :21 janvier 1996 Mise eni concessioni des chenuIn). (Il!fer dii Cat?iefotui Principaux Indicateurs Economiques (en milliards de FCFA) 19"/19 1992/1993 1993/11994 1994/11995 Produit Interieur Brut aux prix courants 3 174,4 3 172,1 3 470,1 4 350,0 en francs constants 3 151,7 3 181,5 3 043,5 3 248,0 PIB par habitant en USD 933,5 960,4 626,6 636,6 Taux de croissance du PIB -3,2 % 0,9 % -1,2 % 3,3 % Taux d'inflation 1,9 % -3,7 % 12,4 % 17,6 %* Exportations FOB 543 438,3 691,8 1 000,3 Importations FOB 286,8 270,9 450,0 565,0 En-cours de la dette publique 1 975 2 235 4 160 4 303 Solde budgetaire -296 -275 -207 -190 *apres tine devaltiation de 50 " di I U A at, 1 1 lanvie 199$,(100 I I A:- 1 Tr) Mise eni coi1Ccessioi des chemi d( for dii Cammioftw SEMINAIRE SUR LES MISES EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER EN AFRIQUE ABIDJAN / COTE D'IVOIRE 13 et 14 Ocotbre 1997 "M'ISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER DU CAMEROUN I- LA REFORME INSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA REGIFERCAM 1.1- Analyse des indicateurs de gestion de 1982-1983 a 1994-1995 Chiffre Tonnage Voyageurs Ch.persi Productivit6 M.B.A. Subvention Comns 11sultat net EXERCICE d'affaires transporte Voygus Ch.A Effectifs (en milliers (millions demillions de Omnsbus (millons de (millions) (milliers) d'uk) fcfa) fcfa) fcfa) fcfa) 1982-1983 25 362 1 761 1 866 46% 6 725 181 917 1 356 -1 049 1986-1987 22 411 1 416 2 268 72% 6 639 169 -3 548 9 389 3 249 1991-1992 23 527 1 279 2 349 45% 4 033 299 3 452 98 2 365 -1 895 1994-1995 29 734 1 452 1 728 35% 3 714 304 8 060 400 3 198 1 576 Importantes dates: 1985 ouverture de la route bitum6e entre DOUALA et YAOUNDE 1987 lancement des op6rations de restructuration 1994 int6gration de la R16gifercam dans le r6gime do droit commun on matibre de fiscalit6 lancement de I'etude sur les reformes institutionnelles I- LA REFORME INSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA REGIFERCAM 1.2- Le choix ciu mode de privatisation A- CESSION DES ACTIFS. Domaine ferroviaire Absence de l'Etat B- AFFERMAGE SociWt6 de patrimoine Engagement de l'Etat C- CONCESSION Dhsengagement de l'Etat Contr6le de 1'exploitation du domaine public ferrovialre PROBLEIATIOUE DE IA PRIVATISATION DES CNEINS DE FEE ADEQUATION ENTRE: - LES CONTRAINTES SOCIO-POLITIQUES DES GOUVERNEMENTS ET: - LE SOUCIS DE RENTABILITE FINANCIERE D'UN INVESTISSEUR PRIVE II- LE PROCESSUS DE MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FZR DU CAMEROUN * PHASE 0: Juillet 1994: Signature du decret soumettant la R6gifercam a la proc6dure de privatisation * PHASE 1: Travaux preparatoires 1- Cr6ation du Comitd Interminist6riel et du Comit6 de Pilotage 2- S6lection du consultant financier. * PHASE 2: Preselection des candidats 1- Pr6s6lection de 12 candidats 2- Pr6sentation g6ndrale de la R6gifercam aux candidats pr6s6lectionn6s II- LE PROCESSUS DE MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER DU CAMEROUN * PHASE 3: Lancement des appels d'offre 1- Elaboration des termes de r6f6rence 2- R6le des diff6rents acteurs: Le Comite Interminist6riel Le Comit6 de Pilotage Le Consultant La R6gifercam 3- Problemes rencontr6s Les d6lais de prise de d6cision * PHASE 4: Analyse et notation des offres techniques Methodologie: Notation Audition des candidats Principe des offres techniques r6vis6es III- RESULTATS OBTENUS A CE JOUR 1- LES CANDIDATS EN LICE Le Groupement SAGA/SDV/SYSTRA Le Groupement COMAZARJGEODIS/CFD/TRANSURB Le Groupement CANAC/SNC-LAVALLIN 2- EVOLUTION TECHNiQUE DU PROJET Analyse des offres techniques r6vis6es Analyse des offres financibres Pr6sentation du processus de d6cision IV- RESULTAeS ATTENDUS. 1- Am6lioration de I'activit6 dans le secteur du transport ferroviaire 2- Am6lioration des flux financiers vis-A-vis de I'ETAT IV- PROBLEMES SOCIAUX. 1- REDUCTION DES EFFECTIFS M6thodologie adopt6e Financement 2- RETRAITE DU PERSONNEL DU STATUT PARTICULIER PERMANENT Estimation des charges pendant les 20 ans de la concession: 40 milliards Estimation des versements du personnel en activit6 pendant les 20 ans de la concession: 1,3 milliard M6canisme envisag6 3- DETTE SOCIALE VIS-A-VIS DE L'ORGANISME DE PREVOYANCE SOCIALE (C.N.P.S.) Niveau des arri6r6s dus: 9 milliards I l Session 4 i i I i Ii i i i Private Sector Participatioii Sclheimie Maputo Corridor Revitalization Project October 1997 E, Overall structure of PSP Scheme Issue Alternatives Decision One or two tenders Two separate tenders Port and Railway Separation (d .D , ~~~~~~Concession contract * Outsourcing Concen * Management Contract * Lease Private * Concession participation * Outright sale scheme ShareholdingStructure Issue Decision ! ti A¶ 'I * 51 = Consortium with each holding not Tm,, I1 'more than 20% of voting rights. I33 % CFM & employees Shareholding . 16% = minorty shareholders structure CFM's role Participate in Board metings & safeguard J g * Governments's interests * Share future profits * Take over unit at end of term Social Plan Issue Decision , 919gy3 * Concessionaires not obliged to take over any specified number of existing staff but free to determine the staff required to manage operations. Social issues * Concessionaires to select required level of staff from existing CFM workforce. * Social plan - counselling, retirement retrenchment packages etc. - to be funded by GOM with assistance from donors. Elements of concession Issue Alternatives Decision _____ Infrastructure, Infrastructure & 7,*______superstructure, Superstructure- j __-_-_- equipment & small concession v*- _,! s ' - items Eqpt- lease or sell What to concession Small items - sell gconrc CFM or Concessionaire CFM. Why? Assets not to be used as security for loan Ownership of CFM uses depn. as concessioned assets deductible expense I -/ Elements of concession Issue Alternatives Decision | 1997 -? * - feedback IrJ 1 2 13 14 Short to long term 15 years 5-2in N-ww-Im on investment plan Term of * Extension - 10 years c mutal agreement concession Entire system or * 5 packages - 3 lines, individual lines yard, workshops * Bidders can bid on any or all 5 packges Package size Concessionpackages Perimeter of the Five Railway lots Ress : |S 9 4 : I 0 fr~~~~~.7 .. 0,. 4 L_ A_ * 9 S 0b * "", -. " - _" ** * ;s v L r4UEUIUWLX * * * r W *./ Z 0~~~-TOL * ll~~~~~~~IIAI W *v" A°" 'PZ * , . t s 0 +~~~~~~~~~~~~APT Elements of concession Issue Alternatives Decision Tariffs subject to No tariff regulation certain levels or no regulation Tariff Authority Specify investment *Specify minimum 41! program or standards (regional) minumum standards Investment Strategy Fee obligations Issue Alternatives Decision , j ;9 Entry fee, variable fee, *Entry fee = US$5 mln. fixed> e fee *Variable fee = 5% of gross revenues without Fee obligations deduction of tax *Fixed fee = award criterion. Payments to be made quarterly & suitably indexed. Elements of concession Issue Alternatives Decision Administrative Mediation Commit. I \'-4' ' court or domestic, - 7 members 1E ~~~international A *1 international Investment Law - ' ~~~~~arbitration.. - intl. arbitration Mediation ~--~ * Entire or limited *Within perimeter - 4~< term entire term *Outside perimeter - no exclusivity & Exclusivity company has no first right of refusal Concessionaire's obligations & rights Issue Decision Obligations * Rehabilitate - minimum standards (3 yrs) * Maintain assets to minimum standards * Install maintenance, safety procedures * Equal access to all users Rights * Establish tariff & salary policy * Negotiate terms & conditions of all contracts (investment, commercial etc.) 4k .'4 Special decrees DECREE FOR CONCESSION purview of investment law provision for international arbitrartion ownership of concessioned assets DECREE REGULATORY AUTHORITY Composition of body 'w Functions Degree of independence Thle PromisedLand p. I~~ j /- l / ! 41-- rp i i i I iII i i i i i Ii La mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique Abidjanl3&14/10/97 La premkere concession ferroviaire en Afrique: 1 experience de la COte dIvoire et du Burkina Presentation du 13/10/97 par A.A. Thiam ntro uction La declaration du 24/07/92 : debut du processus - lancement A.O. - designation adjudicataire provisoire - negociation - signature de la Convention de concession le 12/12/94 a Ouagadougou * L'entree en vigueur le 20/08/95 Plan de la presentation * Le reseau * La concession : mecanisme * la concession: ses problemes * Questions pour 1'avenir Le reseau * Voie metrique unique, * Inauguration de la longueur 1.260 km ligne Abj/Ouaga le i 37 km de double voie 4/12/54 en 3 portions dans le * 41 gares ouvertes sud - 28 gares commerciales i demarrage de la - 13 gares securite construction 12/01/1904 Le materiel concede * 20 locomotives GM CC 2200 * 17 locotracteurs Henschel * 600 wagons de marchandises * 40 voitures de voyageurs inox * Traction assuree pour environ 180 wagons de particuliers: hydrocarbures - clinker Le PIU Programme d' Investissement dUrgence La concession: son mecanisme * La SITARAIL * Les bases * quelques resultats Societe International de transports africains par rail * Societe anonyme de * repartition du capital droit ivoirien - Etats 30% * capital 5 milliards * BF 15 CFA * RCI 15 - Personnel 3% - prives 67% * Saga/SDV 42,88 * GIP(SICC) 8,04 * Systra 6,70 * Maersk 5,36 * Transurb 4,02 Les bases * Les acteurs * Quelques resultats - Autorite concedante societes de patrimoine - concessionnaire bailleurs * Le principe * La redevance DU -FIR - Remboursement La concession: ses probkemes les questions pour 1'avenir (I) * La complexite du montage le nombre des intervenants le nombre des bailleurs - la procdedure de maitrise d'oeuvre du PIU - 1 'entree en vigueur precipitee La concession : ses problemes (II) * les effectifs - la reprise des effectifs la selection des agents le dimensionnement des effectifs LII~ PRORAME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE FER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU / KAYA CREDIT SIPF / BAILLEURS DE FONDS SITUATION DES MARCHES (V-OLET c65TE DivoIiggj Chapite N' d. MA,-hi DWagnatlond. m-,che Ent,.pr,e si4t..n dumarh. (F.CFA)' 001/SIT/GMi8 Pices por scrn e GM CC2200 _EMD-GM I 739 889 229 1 739889 2291 100,0 IDA MATERIELROULANT 002/SITIMR/CCGMWCI/968PcepourocrnoeGM t. CC2200 CIglM.LOGERAIL 487231 603 301 565 987j 61,9 012/SIT,MRITMGMWCI97 Riihab:itab- 21mtur d. ca-Son GM CIM-LOGERAIL 268 590 000 28 859 000 ~ 100 ______090/SITl1P/..CI/9~7 Re1,abditaSnintllsn air corn rirn BERNABE-CI 88 108870 ______100.0 ______SC n 2808 A6hab.Iita0onCC2205 E.I.C. 58953642 58563842 15 8C n1 2822 R4habilitas- CC2209 E.I.C. 1 848 159 1 848 9w 99 BC n1 2815 R61habilitcOonCC2202 E.I.C. ___ 807 084 1 807 084 100,0 BC n' 2825 RihabilftabonCC221 9 E.I.C. 2 034 714 2 034 714 100.0 ______BC n 2833 Riihabilnd-o CC2220 E./.C. 2 925 324 1 170 130 40,0 BC nW2834 R6h.b,Iita5onCC2207 E./.C. 1 901 858 760 744i 40.0 ______BCWn2837 R6habdiltton,CC2212 E.I.C. 38862184 1484 874J 40.0 BC n 2840 R6habddattonCC2201 E.J.C. 2 390 674 ______BC n" 2808 Rh.hbildattn egin demanu,,tenStn GEMA 18 400 942 17 083 1921 2, BC n 2811 at n 2823 Reha.bilitabonpont tran.bordeur, SORIM 13 736 298 13 736 298j 100.0 BC n2812 Rih.b.dital pon,ntruntet paredsI METALOCK. 24 258 44.4 24 208 4.44 100,0 ______BC rt'2813 pdjirrmcniulans METALOCK( 19 454 384 19 404384 100,0 ______BC n'2814 Chas ernentdes sAblesetlafrodo METALOCK 20 200 160 20 200 160J 100,0 BC n' 2818 eitur ou 10 lOOoosCC2200 APR/RAIL 13 880000 8 318 000 60,0 BC n' 2821 Acha-t coue/cm8 GM SAEC ASTRAL 2 033 200 2 033 200 100,0 ______BC n' 284.3 Achat peo,ture locomo a GM SAEC ASTRAL 3 201 138j SC n' 2824 Remlseend,tat d. 1. son,d.esehag. S.AFRECI - 424801 8 424 801 100,0 BC nW2938 Foriuemtraspoor 180odes hWIes OFT/CUE I. 8 621 000 4 3109500 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S/TOTAL2 738534 708 218993230331 80.3 4 158 0006000 015/SI/IFITBACI/96 -or/uervreeb.tonarmdi SIBM 303008,000 308017 684 101.61 VOIE ET BATIME-NTS 016/SiT/IFfrM/C1196 Fourniture atersa mdtalliq... lED BOCCARD 910000 000 911977 3386 100,21______017/SIT/1F/ATT/CI/96 Founlur attaches 4. voi- trr. (A) CIM-LOGERAIL 147083 000 132 530 977 90.1______0181SIT/AF/ATTIC1186 Fourn,itueattaches d. voic terr. (B Ž1C) TRANSTRAOE 201888 800 183 078 131 95.6 0191P/SIFAISOUD/CI/96 Foumitur ma .elsudurdaovoi (4/ GEISMAR 18 136 440 18 136400 100.0 ______020/SIF/IFISOUO/Cl/96 Fou-nituremaon/ssodura d. -oi (1. 2, 31 RAILTECH 2__91486440 _ _ 292408290 100.3 021/SIT/lF/RAILICI/96 Fournit ..e... 1s30 kg /E0 BOCCARD 1 323 0160500 1 330 690 686 100.6 022/SIT/IF/RAIL/CI86 FournitureraIs 38 kg tED BOCCARD 337 743 700 336 862 784 99,7 ______023/SiTA1P/BALUJCUS6 Fournilurebclast SISAG 431 746 032 431 746 032 100,0 ______057/SIT/1FVEHICI/97 AhdevhuesourssLo_1 t2)/ AFRICAUTO 70 313 977 70 313 977 100,0 ______058151T/IFNVEHICI/97 Achat do veh-icuesrue (103) CFAO -Cl 14 300000 14 300000 100.0 060/SITFIVFEH/CI/97 Achat dc vehicuIes -oue- (/0t4) PROMOTO 139800000 13 850030 100.0 S/TOTAL 4 0878863880 3 893864370 97,9 4 391 000000 BC ri' 2802 FountrE prisde esr labs CFIE 22 994 600 229984600 100.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONSBC n,'2803 FZournitrjrelbass do mcre radio SITEL 8 129000 9 129 GOOt o6o, BC n' 2904Fourniure de pieces de echcn9crigulsOonSITEL 20 806 892 2806892 100.0 BC nW2806 Fourolure ai L SITEL 2 537 432 _ !2563:7:432 100.0, BC nW2801 Fourrrilua ib de rech-gro tel6phore-~ COP/B 80620000 8 620 0001 100,0I______BC nW2800 Pournitre radio VHFzone-dAian /TL ___2040 2500 10001 ______BC W 2832 Fo,rniur at pose,, 8plits6e ELECTROHALL 6 511 362 I______BC n~ 2836 Fourriiturc eguipemant Lbs TO Alidin MLO 2 050 000 1 060 0001 40.01______BCFoursilure n 2838 ertuipements Idlecom SITEG 5~~~~~~765 ~ ~~~9221 1845531 520.01______00 BC n, 2841 Rep.mr,so rdcpteur SPM 30 S/COREL 995 870 497 935,1 J I______S/TOTAL 81 721 921 68 3844121 83.71 400 000000 001/siTAlF/BNRI/Cl//6 RihcOiitason d'l draisinetadld bourreuce MAT/SA 489 175 100 499 175 1001_ 100,0 ______CFO VOIE ET BATIMEN4TS 003/SIT/IP/BNRI/C)186 Fou,rmturedune, bourru_ MATISA 570 164 000 57 510 400 100 004/SITAP/SZ/CI/96 Fa/ue4 draisine da chantter SOCOFER 504350 000 504 350, 006/SIT/IP/CIM8 Foam/lure dune.draisn diseOn GEISMAR 14 007 000 124 007 0301 100~,j 024/SIT/IPIAPPVOIpJCW,6Fsu-itr.r appare,isde usi. COG/FER 208 0790500 20900795001 i00,0j______038/SIT/IFIRHSZ/CV96 RAihabilitb-n40 2 draisinasde ohanber SOCOFER __665420600 1~l9962 780 ~ 30. ______S/TOTAL 1 978319 200 1 414090880/ 71,5 2 310 00000 007/SITA1F/STS/Cl/96 Fsurnilur ePo'. dc ab/es ,RTCA 41 385 405 41 385 4551 100.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS008//SIT/AFSTS/CI196 Foumitureradi.oso-train BOSCH 111 103550 11 110350T 10.0 0/ST/IPSTS/C596 Fournilure cutocommul.tareur BOSCH 1 137 592 700 13 759 2701 100 S/TOTAL 2900001705 88 235080/ 22,8 21300000 062/S/T/MR/WAG/C//97 Fourn.tur. pieces 65 wagons.(A, Abis) CIM LOGERAIL 71733 600 0.0 BEI MATERIELROULANT 033/SIT/MRNV4AG/C//96 Fsurnitura pieces85 wagos. (B.C,D,E,O( CIM LOGERAIL 206 099714 04 7583301 26.0 034/SIT/MRAiVAG/C//96 Fou. lr pieces 60 .agons (F,G,H,'L) ST, 23 448300 2344600 10.0 035/SlT/MR/WAG/C/56__ Fou1rniur 'ptece 65 wagons/J, lN SAECASTRAL 9 908 560 890 656 10.0 036ISITIMRNVOIT/Cl/96 Foriuepi&c.s pour Ovoitlures (A,EH) COFIE 44842 400 4 484204 10,0 037/SIT/MRNVOIT/C//96 Fourn,iturepi-ce pour 10 uo.ures (BCEIJK) C~IM_LOGERAIL 223 511 057 98 828416 44.2 G41151T/MRNVOIT/CI/97 R6hab,iitaSon48 10 voitura--vyageurs AFR/RAIL 152 030000 95 136 800 58,0 0421SIT/MRNVOITIC//97 RAh.bilittcOon4. 1 0otrs-sa us KLI/MBA 118 499950 09 007224 50,6 048/SIT/MR/LT/Cl/97 Rehabi/itb.rn do Isc...clar 66,S163 APR/RAIL 48 750000 19 500 000 40.0 ___ 049/SIT/MR)LT/CI/97 Rehabli/tuorsnduloCtrcat.ur AAllo APR/RAIL 40520000 28 367 500 70.0 061/SITIMR/GRUE/CS/97 R`ehabi/ita-o fl6chas gr... 8Ot806 losse AFRIRA/L 18 711 000 18711 000 1000 S/TOTAL 858 057 636 372 167 956 38,9 1851 000000 025/S/TIIF/OUTVOIPJCI/96Fou-ntur -a// gsspci/ie do ol L GE/SMAR 145704 827 14 570482 1. VOIE ET BATMMEPNTS026/SIT/AF/OUTV ,C/8Funlr u/ac p4c.ia/isb d. so,e RAILTECH 08 380 978 0204,2892 90,0 027/SITA/1/0AIC1186 Ritcsbon doi talus cu PK 0 495 COM-Ci 3807 770 360571770 100.0j 047/SlTI/F/OANCI/97 Posedune, busc PK 186 n 841 COM-C/ 28 456390 2458 390 100,0 ___ 091/S]T/IF/BAT/CI/97 RbhabidilcOodes Obibmants(lots I at 7) AL/MCO 1_.27405 548' 092/SIT/AF/BAT/CI/87 Rehab,litasondesOmns lt 2 5.16 EN/TA 151151 739 ____ 1093/SIT/AP/BATICl/97 Reh.biditW8ndee bibats /01 00 24 144005 ____ 084/SIT/lPBATICI/97R6hab,iitabon des Obhbinantslord4 IBATEL 41 159 80856 _____ S/TOTAL 813 025 113 132_148524 21.6 46 000 5000 01CI/SIT/INF/86 Pourni,tura iiodntu AS400 ICBM ___168743 890 189743 890 100.0 INFORMATIOUE 02C1)SIT/INF/96 Pourn,turamicros e npmcts SIMO 63 080000 63 090 000 100.0 03C1/SIT/1NF/96 Fo..m/ltorecabinrg systm - AOEMAT 20 079721 25 078 721 100,0 04C1/SIT/INF/96 FournituraIiia/ons normnaSguas SITEG 9 497 195 9 497 195 100,01 06C1/SIT/INF/96 Pours/itor.mtril desonesio UNICAP 13 6908639 138890639 100,0 07C1/SIT/ANF/96 Fou..nit- reodulur 40tVA AOEMAT 12 958 266 12 958 286 100,0 08C1/SIT/1NP/96 Fourn,iture-ndlers TIERI1 2 589000 25S89000 100.0o 09C1/SITAlNP/96 Fourn-r. P/mberRESTA SCES I 1 580 652 1 080 652 100,0 S/TOTAL 298234 363 298234 363 100.0 2490005000 BOAD VOIE ET BATIMENTS 039/S/T/IF/OA/C1196 R6f.taclo do ta/us cu PK 25 J.LEFEBVRE 102061 865 999144057 97.4 ______388600000 ______05015IT/MO/SYSTRA/Cl/7 Miiadourrasltansucedr 1 SYSTRA 05215IT/MO/SYSTRA/Cl/97MaitPisa doauv,re r6hab.iitcon inhrolructures SYSTRA 951 677 800 ______0821S1TlP/BALLICUB97 Fourniturem delu. carbe SAC/SIC-TP 414 000 000 _____ 083/SIT/IPIENGTP/Cl/87 PF-rnitur. angi-s TP (lot. 1 at 2) MANUTENT/ON 134 347276 ______084/51T/PF/ENGTPICI/97 C/CA AUTO 51 750 000 ______S/TOTAL 1 293039 941 99 944 087 7.7 - 1 957 000000 JAGCDO MATERIELROULANT 0686/SIT/MR/MTGM/97 Rehabi/ittaoon33 mnoeursd. t-coSo GM 050 ALSTHOM 475 114827 ______S/TOTAL 475 114827 0 ~ 00 488000 000 (3)0 (2)/(1) TOTALGENERAL 12781 769 304I 9834 1886751 67.51 18755 000 000 (5)o(1)1(4)~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~%d. -i. -- g.p,,p.t .b.gl(5 6 SITARAILC.C11l1lMarhe,06DABXL. 03/11/1997 SUIVI DE LEXECUTION DU CREDIT IDA 2786 WVC Proc6dure Investissement Donnees a b d e i Total A Somme Contrevaleur CFA 1 376 610 056,90 0,00 1 917 712 935,45 41 619 178,00 0,00 3 335 942 170,35 Somme Contrevaleur USD 2 353 179,58 0,00 3 278 141,77 71 143,89 0,00 5 702 465,25 Somme Part IDA 2 353 179,58 0,00 3 278 141,77 67 586,70 0,00 5 698 908,05 B Somme Contrevaleur CFA 0,00 88 108 670,00 0,00 162 096 029,00 30 000 000,00 280 204 699,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 0,00 150 613,11 0,00 277 087,23 51 282,05 478 982,39 Somme Part IDA 0,00 150 613,11 0,00 263 232,87 51 282,05 465 128,03 C Somme Contrevaleur CFA 431 746 032,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 431 746 032,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 738 027,41 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 738 027,41 Somme Part IDA 738 027,41 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 738 027,41 D Somme Contrevaleur CFA 1 660 760 200,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1 660 760 200,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 2 838 906,32 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2 838 906,32 _ Somme Part IDA 2 838 906,32 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2 838 906,32 E Somme Contrevaleur CFA 1 213 088 000,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1 213 088 000,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 2 073 654,70 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2 073 654,70 Somme Part IDA 2 073 654,70 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2 073 654,70 F Somme Contrevaleur CFA 349 082 800,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 349 082 800,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 596 722,74 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 596 722,74 Somme Part IDA 596 722,74 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 596 722,74 G Somme Contrevaleur CFA 309 622 880,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 309 622 880,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 529 269,88 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 529 269,88 Somme Part IDA 529 269,88 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 529 269,88 H Somme Contrevaleur CFA 103 463 977,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 103 463 977,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 176 861,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 176 861,50 Somme Part IDA 176 861,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 176 861,50 Somme Contrevaleur CFA 0,00 0,00 0,00 81 721 921,00 0,00 81 721 921,00 Somme Contrevaleur USD 0,00 0,00 0,00 139 695,59 0,00 139 695,59 Somme Part IDA 0,00 0,00 0,00 135 412,91 0,00 135 412,91 Total Somme Contrevaleur CFA 5 444 373 945,90 88 108 670,00 1 917 712 935,45 285 437 128,00 30 000 000,00 7 765 632 679,35 Total Somme Contrevaleur USD 9 306 622,13 150 613,11 3 278 141,77 487 926,71 51 282,05 13 274 585,78 Total Somme Part IDA 9 306 622,13 150 613,11 3 278 141,77 466 232,48 51 282,05 13 252 891,54 IDA_CI.XLS FeuiI4 03/11/1997 PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE FER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU / KAYA CONVENTION DE CREDIT N° 53 247 75 001 OS/CCI 1078 01 ENTRE LA SITARAIL ET LA CFD SITUATION DES MARCHES ( VOLET C6TE D'IVOIRE) ChapIt. MNdu Marchd D6sa tIon du marchd Entrepres SITUATION DU MARCHE (F.CFA) ont aprvu Uontant (1) Uont nt decW t2) %Decalss6 (3J au budget (4) 028/iT/MRFwAGICI/96 Fourniture pieces 246 wagons (J) SAEC ASTRAL 30958 665 3 095 870 10.0 CFO tMATERIEL ROULANT 029/SIT/MRI/WAG/CI/96 Foumiture_ pi_ 246 wagons (ABCDEPQR) CIM-LOGERAIL 1 105 308 993 959 429 998 86.8 030/SIT/MRfWAGVCI/96 Foumiture pieces 246 wagons (H) COFIE 14 273 477 14 273 477 100.0 031/SIT/MRjWAGWCI/96 Fourniture pieces 246 wagons (GKLO) GEMAA 57851183 5 785 118 10.0 I______044SIT/MO/SYSTRAl96 Maitrise d'oeuvre rehabilitation materiels SYSTRA 484 000 000 482 976 600 99.8 (3) = (2)/(1) TOTAL 1 692 392 318 1 465 561 0631 86,60%1 1 947 000 000 (5) = (1)/(4) %de march6se anaparra pportsu budgt(5) 87% SITUATION DES MARCHES ( VOLET BURKINA FASO) ChapIt&* Ir du March6 Ddlgtlon du marchf Entreprise Situation du marche Montant prevu Montant (F.CFA) Montant d6calss %DicaIs6 au budget (F.CFA) _006/SIT/MR/WAG/BF/96 Foumiture pieces 64 wagons (ABCD PR)_ CIM-LOGERAIL 373 939 237 257 559 228 68.9 CD MATERIEL ROULANT 044S1T/MO/SYSTRAN96 Maitrise d'oeuvre r6habilitation mathriels -SYSTRA 613 000 000 21 158 000 3,5 045/SlT/MRJWAG/BF/97 Foumiture piAces 64 wagons (ljL CORIE 3 945 511 394 551 10,0 046/SIT/MR/WAt3/BF/97 Foumiture pieces 64 wagons (J) SAEC ASTRAL 9 481 624 948 162 10,0 TOTAL 1 000 366 372 280 057 9411 28,00%1 1553 000000 1%de march6s angair r rapport mubudt 64% Montant Total pr6vu au budget 3 500 000 000 Montant total des march6s ongag6s 2 692 758690 % do march6s engag6s par map rt au budget total 76,94% SITARAIL-CelIuIe March6s SIT.XLS 03/11/1997 PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE FER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU / KAYA CREDIT SOPAFER-B / BAILLEURS DE FONDS SITUATION DES MARCHES (VOLET BURKINA FASO) Chap_lr Ddslgaon du marchi Entrepda sl7i7N DUMARCHE (p. I montantprnvu Monant (O) Iltant ddcalsd 12) %DkviS40) au budget (4) 001WSIT/GM/8 Pices Paourocomotives GM CC2200 EMD -GM 1 066 38372 106 383721 1000 IDA MATERIEL ROULANT 043SITIMR/CCGM/BF/97 Pikces pour locomotives GM CC2200 CIM-LOGERAIL 594598 914 619 852144 104,2 056/SITMGM/BF/97 Rihabilitation 21 motsursd traction GM CIM-LOGERAIL 268590 000 241731 000 90 0 _ | tW/SIT MR/GMfBF/97 Plices pour locomotives GM EMD -GM 83 793724 0.0 089T/MR/GS(BF Pihces Pourlocomotive GM EMD- GM 294121 404 _ S/TOTAL 2 307 487 7 1 927 966 836 253000 000 064/SIT/IFIVEH/SF/97 Achat v6hicule routilr Pot31 AFRIOUEAUTO 8 252 279 62 939 6 VOIE ET ATIMENTS O6S/SIT/IFNEH/BF/97 Achat v6hicuteroutier ots 1et 2) CICAAUTO 15 253 000 _- SITOTAL 81 05279 62 939 666 77.2 150 D0000 W2/SIT/lF/BNR4BFt96 Remise en &Atduns bour use lourde MATISA 244116 000 144859 60t 60,0 CFO VOlEET ATIMIENTS 008/SIT/ F/ NRIBFM Foumituredune boumeus MATISA 575 164 000 345 098400 5000 014SIT/IF/BF/9 Foumiture4 draisines do chantier SOCOFER 504 350 000 302610 000 6000 051/SIT/MOVSYSTRAIBF/97Maitrbe Cdoeuv ouvr dcart SYSTRA 201 400 000 130 853 110 64. 9 053/SITIMOVSYSTRAIBF/97Maitiee d'oeuvre intrstructures SYSTRA 459417 100 183 7B 8401 40,0 O4/SIT/1F/ENGTP/BF/97Foumiture dauneniveleuso SFCE 67 693 000 61 103 700 0 90.0 08S/SIT/IF/ENGTP/BF/97Foumiture dune bull et cune chargeuse CICAAUTO 112 500 000 101250 000 90.0 087/SIT/IF/OA/SF/97 R6habilitation ouvr9es dart (lots 1at 2) FADOULTECH. 412 270 158 0.0 072/$IT/RHSISBF/97 Rehabilitation do 2 draisines de chantier SOCOFER 70 483 900 42 290 340 e0.0 073/SIT/IF/APPVOIE/BF/97 Foumiture apails do voie COGIFER 161082 500 48 324 750 30.0 075/SIT/IF/RAILBF/97 Foumitur ails 30K IED-BOCCARD 240 54S552 00 07I/SIT/IFSOU D/BF/97 Foumiturosoudure aluminothermiCu (12.3) RAILTECH 347 88330 104365 000 30.0 077/SIT/lF/SOUD/BF/97 Foumiturode matriels de meulae GEISMAR is 136700 0.0 07'/SITIIF/OUTVOIE/BF/97 Foumiture oulilae spdalisaes de vole GEISMAR 144609 212 00 _ 079/SIT/IF/OUTVOIE/BF/97Foumiture outitga sp665alis6a de voie RAILTECH 57 929 507 5 792950 10.0 OB/SIT/IF/rM/BF/97 Foumiture de 5000 travemes m6tallioues IED-BOCCARD 130 000 000C00 S/TOTAL 3 753 7 979 927231 110 247 5 157 000 000 014/SITA/F/STS/BF/97 Foumitureradio aol-train BOSCH 81 579 560 8 157955 10 0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 040/SIT/IF/STS/BF/97 Foumiture do 4 utocomMutteurs BOSCH 112 948 800 11 294 BB0 100 0 IT#F/STS/F/97 Foumiture Pices t6iScoms (2 4 et 7b) SITEL 33 027 142 000 071/IT/IF/STS/SF/97 Foumiture pices til6coms (2biset B) COFIE 28 625561 6 587 6681 30,0 S/TOTAL 256181 083 28040 503 10.9 265 000 000 OBSIT/MR/VOITTBF/97 Foumitureotces pour 10 voituree(AE,H) COFIE 44 842 460 4 484245_ BUE MATERIEL ROULANT 087 IT/MK/VOIT/BF97 Foumitureoic" our 10voituros (SCEIJUK CIM LOGERAIL 223511 087 22 381105 OSITMR"T/BF/97 R6habilitaion do 4 voltures- rageurs KAUMBA 85 350 000 42 875 000 _ _ 05SIT/MRNVOIT/BF/97 Rtihabilitstion do 4 Volturos-VoyaVours GEMA 8s 010000 0 _ ______S/TOTAL 408713507 97 5508o3n 753000 000 013/SIT/IF/SALUSF/97 Foumiture do matinaux de carrire 0 KANAZOE 598 475 000 59 647 500_ 10-0 VOIEET SATIMENTS 06"/SIT/IF/OA/BF/97 RFihabilitationouvrage dart (lot 3) BAUDINCHAT. 532 862 593 53 26 259 10 0 069/ITpIF/OA(BF/97 R1habilitaton ouVrgm dtrt (lot4 ) NORD-FRANCE 742917 622 74 291762 - 100 074/SIT/IFIATTISF/97 Foumitureamtaches dlastaques non viss6es PANDROLUK 416 826 000 125047 B00 300 _ S/TOTAL 2 291081 216 312 473 321 13.6 2 81 000 000 IOBF/SIT/INF/96 Foumituremini-ordinateur AS400 ICBM 14 833050 14 833 050 100.0 INPORMATQUE I 1BF/SIT/lNF/96 Foumituremicros et impomanwts SIMO 44 965000 44 965000 1000 12OF/SIINF/96 Foumiturematitel do connexion UNICAF 5 751027 5 692255 99 0 13BF/SIT/#NF/96 Foumitturonduleur TIERI 2 520 000 2 520000 100 0 S/TOTAL _69 077 600 305 1 6, 150000000 081/SIT/MgfMTGM/8F/97 Rdhabititation33 motera de tractionGM GECALSTHOM 475 114 827 AGC MATeRIELROULANT ______IIIIIIIIIIII __I______S/TOTAL 475 114627 ° °0 488000000 (3) - (2)/(1) TOTAL GENERAL | 9 233 220 1931 3 424 212 6251 37 09%1 12 348 000000 (5) (1)(4) L%de march*s engt ptrra;;7 au budg (7)S 75%6 SITAPkII -C.lul MArchie SITMARBFXLS 03/1111997 PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE PER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU I KAYA CREDIT SIPP I BAILLEURS DE PONDS SIUTINDS MARCHES (voLET c6TE DivoiRE) Chop"lr Nr du Um,hd Dd.4eignatndu -mhre Ern&opr. Sitato du nmarhi IF.CP MnAntpidv AMotant (1) antnt E-isaIeed %Dcata-. S u budet (4) 001/SIT/GM/96 R~~ice0r looovsGM CC2200 EMO- GM 1 739669229 1 739 699 229 100.0 _____ IDA MAT IENIIROULANT IT/R/CGM/Cv9 Pices locomokve"sGM CC2200 CIM-LOGEFAIL 487 231 603 330 937 710 67.9 O12/SITlMR/TMGM/CV97 RlhabillitR#on21 motsur de VractIo GM CIM-LOGERAJL 268 500 000 242 041 740 901 ______OO0/SIT/iP/..JCI/97 Ri/btaa nIII/asarer e SERNASE-CI 69108 670 _ ____ SCn.12606 .R*hab4lfa4onCC2205 E.IC. 5 962942 6 9529842 100.0 _____ SCn 2622 RihabOtlla/la CC2209 ESIC. I 6 49 169 1 646 159 99.9 ______BC *261 5 Rihabil/aden CC2202 E.IC. 1 607 064 1907 064 10,0______SCn'2825 Rihab4Ia6anCC22 I9 .I.C. 2 034714 2 034 714 100.0___ __ BC n 2633 Rilhbdf/laola CC2220 E.I.C. 2 9256324 1170130 40,0______- SC n 2634 fthablita6an CC2207 EIC. 1 901 859 760 744 40.0 ______SC n 2637 fihabiila6an CC2212 E.I.C. 3 682 164 1 414 874 40,0 ______SC n'2640 RlhsbIlitatlon CC2201 ESIC. 23900674 _____ Cn'2809 Rihabifita/i anenind. -nulenla GEMA 16 4006942 17 063192 92,68 ____ SC n 261 1 at n' 2623 oantpiaI Ilrasbardaur SORIM 13 736296 13 736 296 100.0 ______SC n'2612 Rihabifiaban po.t rou1anl at appareila METALOCK( 24 256 444 24256 444 100.0______SCno2613 Revisin mecanoue dan METALOCK( 19464 364 19414 364 100.0 SC m*2614 C.h-enual dos cAblesallrrdos METAL.OCK 20 200160 20 200160 100-0 SC no26l6 in.Pa.r/l1apa l ootaai-as CC2200 AFRIRAJL 1366W0000 6316000 60,0 SC nl 2621 Aehal wslbtumIoeao-vae GM SAEC ASTRAL. 2 033 200 2 033200 1000,0 ____ SC n1 2643 Achtl Psialur locamave GM SAEC ASTRAL. 3 201 136 _____ SC n 2624 Rem/es an ila de la tslaS de icehage SAFRECI 842468016 6 424601 100.0- SC n 2836 F-un/tur miAl4rel pou abo d.. hubs OPITIQUE1. 86216 000 4 310 960 ______------2 738 634 709 2 4436077496 8. - . O 015/SI/IFTAC/8 F,urmSjrlravraaan bilaar ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S/TOTALSIaM 303066000 3086017684 101.6 VOtE Er SATIMI4TS016/SITIP/Thl/CI/0 Fa-milura fravesasn4t.lbques IEO SOCCARD I 910 000 000 911 977 336 100.21______017'SITA/1FATT/CI96 Faurnitre attacheede vala forre) (A) CIM-LOGERAiL! 147063 000 132 520977 90 ____1 OI8/SITAIF/Arr/Cll9 Fourn/iJr attchaa do voia ferris (C et C TRANiSTRADE 201 NO9600 193076 131 95.6 ______019/SIFA1F/SOUO/CI/9 Fournture matir.Iasoudwred. -aeal4l GElSMSAR IS6136440 16 136410 100.0 _____ O2O1SIFAIF/SOUO/CV/9 Fown/lure matkir/la soudure d.-oovale 112. 3 RAILTECH 291 416 440 2924155290 100,3J 021'SITAIP/RAILICV96 Faumilurs tails 30 kg IED SOCCARD 1 323 0165$00 1 330660686 100.6~ 022/SIT/AF/RNILJCU98 Fumnilure rails 36 kg ISD SOCCARO 3377432700 3366862794I 99.7 0230STAIP/SALU/CU9 Fa-urneur babt SISAG 431 741032 431 746 032 100.0 057/SITA/VENS/CI/97 Aeht d-6vhiculsa -bue.a I Iota 1.1t2) AFRICAUTO I 76 313 977 75 3139177 100.0 066/SIT/IFNE 1C/97 Achted-avI-oulsrudom raIta3) CFAO -CI 14 300000 14 300 000 100,0. 060SIT FNEHCI97 Aehatd.vi4h!.uilaarou/lota a4) PREMOTO 136860000 136850000 100.0 ______S/~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~$TOTAL 4 067 663 NO 3 963 643 370 97,9 4 391 000CO SC n'2602 Faurnbite appoarla do teuaaba COFIE 22994600 22 994600 100,0 TUECOMMUNICATIONS SC n 2803 Fourituro banedomsaureadio SITEL 6129 000 6 129000 1000O SC n' 2904 Faun/tur do pubce da rohange rigulalim SITEL 2068066692 2068066692 100.0 BC n'2306 Fou/urnitoad/a SWU SITEL 25237422 26537422 100.01 SCnml2601 Fourniolureicedorochwv e thamie COFIE 6 620 000 6 620 000 100,01 SC n' 2606 Foriwerda rado VHF zone dAbiclan UFTEL 2 554 000 25564000 100.01 __ C n'2832 Fourrtw tuposl ode 6sp. ELECTROHALL 6 511 362 ______SC n'2636 Foumiture 6ul wnts Labo TS "an MELEDJ 2 650000 1 060 000 40,0__ _ SC n'239 Fouraltura6uIp montl Alicorn SITEG 6 922 766 1 164553 2020 SC n' 2641 Ri aralomriceptour 6PM 30 SICOREL 9656$70 497 936 60.0 ______6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SCTA1 721 921 66 384 412) 83.71 400000 000 001/SITAF/SNRV146 Rihabililaltan dlI draeinset dl/I bawurreu MATISA 499 175 100 499 176 100 100.0 CFO VOlE!Er RATIUUT 006/SITAP/BNRVClff6 Founilured'une bourrause MATISA 676164 000 576516400 10.01 0O4/SIT/iF/SZ/I/9 Foumitlre 4 dralaineadechardwr SOCOFER 604 350000 60 350 100 100.01 OO6/SIT/IF/ChUS Foum/lure du.n.drsai/ne dlnapeeaon GEISMAR 12070 2"400700 100,0______0241SITA1P/APPVOI/8Forniumture app-el. do oe COGIFER 209 079600 206 0796500 100.0! 038/81T/FIFRHSZ/C6 Rihabil/lation do 2 drajainosde chanaer SOCOFER 66 642 600 19662 760, 30.0 ______~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ rTAL, 1978319200 1 414 090680 71' 2 310000 000 007 SITiF 6/SCl/SO Founitureet p-deciblg RTCA 41366 466 41 366 416 1000 TULEOMMUNICArIOS OO6/SIT/IF/STSIC146 Pomumir radio s.l-taln BOSCH III 1036$60 11 110366 10.0 OOO/SIT/IF/STS/CM4 Fournilure auloeommutateurs BOSCH 1376392700 1239833430 9000 2I006170 176 309240 Gs 300O 06/ITMRIWAG/CV47 Fournitre ice.s 86 mago (Al. CIM LOGERAJL 71 733600 OO Sm AT61IILROUJLANT O3/IT/MR/AG146 Foaurn/oureiieagagonsAlBCAOEAO CIM LOGERAIL 206066714 170349 217 67 03/SIT/U WA4 Fournilure pieee Siwagons (J,I SAEC ASTRAL. 990666 9s0a6 1010 O3 IT/RIVOIT cv6 Foumn/luepieee IOvwModue(AH) COFIE 44642 460 4 484264 10,0l 037/SIT ANOMITA148 Paurmiture es ulOveikres (SCELJU CIM LOGERAIL 2236511057 160 266411 60.7 ____ 041/SIT/MRNVOIT/CV97 RihabIitsdon de 10 voitu,e-vo,vag*urs AFRIRAIL 162030 000 66 136800o 5660_____ O42*ST/MARNVOT/CIt97 FRihabitlitaon de 10 voitures-vyageurs KAUMBA 116469690 69 007224 60.6 ______048/SIT/MP/LT/CY97 R6habll/taUn du aeaValeteu681523 AFRIRAIL 46750 000 19600o000 40.0 049/SIT/MRILT/CI/97 Rihabibltiaon du 1aeotrat*ur AAI I0 AFRIRAIL 406525000 26 3676500 70.0 061/SIT/MR/GRUE/CI/97 Rt"itabdil06nlihes grue60el80 tonnes AFRIRAIL 16 711000 16 711 0001 100.0 ______S/TOTAL NO6067 86M NO917768621 59.5! 166 1 000 000 O25/SlT/1F/CUrVOIE,CI/S6 F.umiture aubta iag /ao de voie L GEISMiAR 146 764 627 146814 527' 100.0 ______VOlE Efr ATIMaNTS 026/SIT/IFOTV0IS/CI/6 Foumi/lur o.0/I&gossp6ieallais de,vaie RAILTECH 66 360976 56390 979 100.0 O27/SIT/IF/oAC /9 R&teesondu tel uePKs 5 495 COM.CI 36571 770 386571770 100.0 047/SITAIF/0AIC147 Fo.. du.ne bu.e au PKC166 .841 COM-CI 26 456300 26 466 390 100.0 ______091/Srr/IF/BAT/C147 Rihabilitatlon des bilimter(lotlte 17) AUMCO 127406 546 O92/SITiF 6T/CV97 Rihabitita.n des b&aments(lat. 2, 6.1 ENITA 151 161739 092/IT/IF/BT/ 147 R&Ahabit/loa des bAlmenta 113) ODI 24 144 006 O94/SITAIF/SAT/CV07 Rihabfti/aln des bim,ents (lot 41 ISATEL 41 1596666 S/TTAL 6 13025113 269 223 9681 43.91 am8000 000 OICI/SIT NP/96 Fournitu- minl-ard/nateur AS400 ICBM 169 742890 16974266901 100,0! __ EPORMATnQUE 02C1/SIT/INF/ Ftmlremeo SImpnmnt.. S/MO 63 060000 83 0600001 1000! 03CVSIT/INF/90 orilr cbigaae ADEMSAT 25 079721 25 079 72' 100,0 04CVSITiNPF Fwn/ur lIisn /nlarne/lgSITEG 9 497 196 9 497 195 100.0 GOCUITANPM Fourniture na%tielsde co.nneion UNICAF 136600639 13 600639 100,0 07C0SITANP/SO Fourn/lure anduleur 40KVA ACEMAT --12 966266 12 968266 1000O 000 TNP/SO Fown/ture onduleur TIERI 265890~00 26689000 1000 09 TiNP ___ Foumitureeiaber PRESTA SCES 1 566 652 1 5666652 100,0 I ~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~S/TTAL298 234 303 266 234 303 100.0! 249 000 000 OD VOlE Efr SAflMSTS 039/SITA/IFACd/S Rilsthon du talu au PKC25 J. LEFEBVRE 102681 6865 69449057 9741 060/S1ITMO/SYSTRA1C47Malaised .. maurrihebliataon auvn, den SYSTRA 38600 000 092/SITYSTRNC197 MaiftsiC. w6urerhebifdtoninfrasrucures -SYSTRA 561 677 000 ____ P$fi/BALL/CV47 Foumiluremalrirux de eat/ire SAC/SIC-TP 414 000000 060/SITiF/ENTP/CIf7l F..n/lure engins TP lola 1 02) MANUTENTION 134347 276 _ ___ P6A/MNTP/CV97 Faumilur engins TP 10 3) CICA AUJTO 61 760 000 ______~~~~~~~~~~~~_ ____ ~~~~S/TOTAL1 2930306 41 90944"057 77 1387 000 000 MGOiFATRIELROUJLANT T/MRJMTGK"7 Rihebdit/ltln33noatursdetfrclan GM --GEC ALSTHOM 475 114 627 ______6/TOTAL ~~~~~~~~~~~~4751140627 0 00 466000000 (3) .(1/(1) TOTAL GENERAL 12 781 769 3041 9 3226629 46L 72.91 10 76000 1%demreis i p err -u bft (5) 76% SITARAIL.Ceskl Marhia SITMARCI.XLS 03/11/1907 SITARAIL ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS uxuon C oU . BEI: BF OR P N. MARCHE N * FOURNISSEUR OBJET MONTANT CA_ NTurn ______PCFADat. bs A 10 T IF/SITiNFI96 ICBM Ecrns St Imprimantn A8400 FCFA 14 833 OK 14 833 0K _ 1 11 BF ITANF196 SIMO Micros et Imprimant FCFA 44 965 000 44 965 000 1 12 BF /SlTT/NF196 UNICAF Matrnl de connexion FCFA 5692 255 5602 255 1 13BF /SITANF96 TIERI Onduleum FCFA 2 520 000 2 520 000 1 086/SIT/MRNOITIBF/97 KALIMBA Rhabilitftion do 4 voiessvoy gun FCFA 42 675000 42 675 000 1 013/SITAF/LUBF/97 KANAZOE Mailaux do carri6 FCFA 59 47500 50875987 SK 1 074/SITAIF/ATTABF/97 PANDROL UK LMTED Aftaches atigues sp6cials FRF 1 250 478,00 125 04780 _800 1 060/SITIIF/OAJBF/97 NORD FRANCE ENTREPRISE Constuction douvraga d'art FCFA 74 291 762 74 291 762 1 087ISITiMRNVOIT/BFI97 CIM LOGERAIL Pi6ces do rechango pour 10 FRF 223 511.05 22 351 106 108SITAIWM OIT/BF/97 COFIE edoe porug o 1 FRF 44842.45 4 484 245 1 t)68oSITrAF/oA18F/97 BAUDIN CHATEAUNEUF Construction dcouvrag0cdart FCFA 53 28 259 53 286 259_ ______449M _ _1 ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS E1.XL3W1n1 SITARAIL CIUIL O5CANW1aWUIT BEI: Cl ORP D R F MARCHE N' FOURNISSEUR OBJET MONTANT DECAISSEMENTS 1D6vise F CFA Date DWvise I 1025/SITAF/OU1VOIE/CI/ F CFA L. GEISMAR Outilages spWCialls6s de voe FF 145 754,82 14 575 482 27-maF97 14 575 482 3 FF 1 312 393,45 131 239 345 _ 1 458148,27 145 814 827 14 575 482 1 026/SITAIF/OUTVOIE/CU9 RAILTECH Outllages sp6cialis6s do vos FF 396 368.32 39 636 832 27.mai-97 39 636 832 2 _ FF 171 308,90 17130890 3 FF 16132,56 1 613 256 683 809,78 58380 978 39 636 832 027/SITAF/AOlICU COM-CI Talus do Is vole au PK 5+495 + F CFA 36 571 850 36 571 850 27-mai-97 I _ I ______36 571 850 Avenant N "I______03VSIT/MR/IWAG/CU96 REMAFER R6h. 65 wags march. Pots A.Ab) _ 1 033/SIT/MRNWAG/Ca98 CIM-LOGERAIL R6h. 65 wag. march. (ots B,C,D,E, FF 206 099,71 20 609 971 27-ma=97 20 609 971 2 __._,_._._FF 341 893.35 34189 335 3 ______FF 1 155 499,11 115549 911 1 703 492,17 170 349 217 20 609 971 2 0341SIT/MRAWAG/CM98 STI R6h. 65 wag. march. (ots F,G,H,L) FF 23 446,30 2 344 600 I 035/SIT/MRNWAG/CU98 SAECASTRAL R6h. 65 wag. march. (lots J et K) F CFA 990 866 990 866 27-mai-97 990 856 I 036/SIT/IMRNOIT/CU98 COFIE Psces pour 10 voltures -voyageur FF 44842,45 4484 245 27-mai.97 4484 246 I 037/SIT/MRNOIT/CU97 CIM-LOGERAIL PFcs pour 10 voitures -voyagour FF 223 511,06 22 351 106 27-ma497 22 351 106 2 _ FF 764 753,10 76475 310 3 _ 814 599,95 81 459 995 ______=______1 802 864,11 180 286411 1 041/SIT/MRNOIT/CU 22 351 106 AFRIRAIL R6h. 10 voitures -voyageurs F CFA 45 609000 45 609000 27-mai-97 45609000 2 _ F CFA 29 645 85 29 645 85 3 CFAI 9 881 950 9 881 950 ______85136 800 85 136 800 _ _ 45 609 I 042/SIT/IMRNOIT/CU97 000 KALiMBA R*h. 10 voiture -voyagurs F CFA 34 949 985 34 985 27-mr-97 34 949 985 2 ______F_ _ PCFA 24057239 24 057239 59 007 224 59 007 224 34 949 98 .2 047/SIT/IFIAO/CU97 CC)M-CI Pose dune bus. au PK 186+841 F CFA 28 486 390 28 456 390 2 48/SIT/MR/LT/C197 AFRIRAiL Rhhab. Locotractur BB 163 F CFA 19 500 000 19 500 000 2 491SIT/MRILT/CU97 AFRIRAiL R6hab. Locotrsctur M 110 F CFA 16 210 000 16 210000 3_ _ CFA 12 157 5C 12 157 50C __ 0 000< 00 0 < <-~~~~~~~~~~~28387 60C 28 367 60C 2 061/SIT/MR/GRUE/C197 AFRIRAIL Remise en Mtt grue 60T et SOT F CFA 10093 000 10093 000 3 __ __FCFA 8618000 8618000 18 711 000 18 711 ooa fI 01 CUSiT/NF/96 ICBM Mini Ordinaibur F CFA 169 743 890 169743 89 27-mai47 169 743 890 1 02 CUSiTANF/96 SIMO Mcros et Imprimantes F CFA 63090 000 63 090 000 27-mn.97 63 090 000 1 03 CUSITANF/96 ADEMAT Cabling Systm F CFA 25 079 721 25 079 721 27-mai-97 25 079 721 1 04 CUSIT/NF/96 SITEG Liaison inform ues F CFA 9 497195 9497195 27-ma197 9497 195 1 06 CUSITAiNF/6 UNICAF MMoeriel do connadon F CFA 13 690 639 13 690 639 27-mai97 13 690 639 1 07 CUSITAiNF/96 ADEMAT Ondulurs F CFA 12 958 266 12 958 266 27-ma197 12 958 266 1 08 CUSIT/INF/96 TiERI Ondulurs F CFA 2 589 000 2 589 000 27.mal-97 2 589 000 09 CUSiTANF/96 PRESTA SERVICES Climadisurs F CFA 1 585 652 1 585 652 27-maF97 1 585 652 1 TECHNIQUES 298 234 363 298 234 363 298 234 363 =______= 136 636_1 2611 = = 518 013 690 es ezt c9gCget 9 ez'9969OSOI, OV99gLg.L 111 ______ 811 L"aJU 000013 6116 ILl 006-lz ---a10 ~ M66 PogIt 1069e It's 069£ L#-dS-#m 6PlI*l .- la C,09 "ll-i LO ~s ~~~~I~~S A~~~ *O'QI~~~~*it £6I-dh-6 g0-pg ~ ~~~~ LMmoa1diIIJ6Igo ojnvowdY_v__ 0Wl 16i Viod 161*zz 6a auto egppon ne o9oelg gpuew V16 Le-dI-SI 6e-806-l 66l101rVg1iUJJa1 BsI lgpPli Viod 16-00-lI. a iWI-h- e nmgee too ZgUg 0£ WMI~ 06 Lt--*sc It"M61 96MfllnvowullemSI BSis 63460911 ViOd 1OsU-"- I 6'-%06 lu mlam1 16116 Ml 66'116we 16-ur*6 D-0991 guonrwujjg,jegz awooce rag-,i m3minouo 166imme 965 atluz6am68 oeasinin "A 9g-oqs 6t iw quaowMs p ggggpog 9,61 Suwe geoqurn 606 ~ nwui~o0100 OIi3fO0SAL5 i to 69 ,Wqdwoov"& qLg, 10 UnlggSI 9 1'316g11 96-09-61 oo somomnoVwiII.1g1 aWOOOUrolN661Sd0otI DWORW JVJM 30-p 9'P61%06 1P16100M pe'gopso, So.ospc L6-u19l66111011MSl1JJM6810 HI1V6IOS6601161 9MX16166t&9666121161 1g1661D 115 jIj 9-0qp£ et - ______...... 9~ ...... lW ~~~~~~~~96pUW%0B10609911 cele60 £ 61116z661 16-UI* 966I0I1VIAiWJg8l0toVUisNI 1611086 6602161L11669MmeMO kOLgBI Hli 96-099-1 f 911dMIOOV VW11110 6Gl66P6 1066191g L6t'frIa 996IDII1VIJUSIIS61 SYiNMID'66 NA01V-go5 O1 91o1qdiUOOYGL 996 &66 P691aR 96000 61 96-09991 900-20I 66IDIUViisiiSILovoer3j 3unw 160111 JlAl 61.-go ______~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~too I . m zE t 0 I... ____ 6- 9ipm31% O Le 00661610L 16610 L6lm 10o L6-a 1*6--0990 9666011.1jIlewvi9 MOO a3116501 £6U116 66216 01116 00001 SIdi 66_-0--a a "P-N%09 M~~~~~~~~~~~~~6'-ZZ 96II0iSUMi6iJI61ii9I 11"l3001 MIo66IMAM £661W108 111U11 0001i 611 adANA 16--61 12 tB 9101~%aqd-IOv 01 611 6611£E91 P ILSLW6,11*et --Pe i-so6 966i30N1OM1m61IJ10 11VlI3001 M I 00'66 66 lIdA 16011 01 too11 Il 0011661o 19,06111 £6-dU-91 111 M1 P11 01'66S6l 61l190G& 1-dmA zo 94-m14%00 £0614181 16 61%61 WIN661 i6-I-U' 9q0P 9106 96966616 00's"10I 61610091 Le-pll1 "9-01- 960l61001lI61iISM0 D1L6611013 9661M16 961£ 68 l6 136ES 061n 9649-Lic I 65 61a1 911 1161166 016160199 6 zeF I -99 I.N 1I06V 660iI9I10 NOISIaIOAUOWONi0I1J o 6 U 4 063n66-91 a 65 IINVUIEIO 161116MILONW 1190061 11"'me PCs61 966-099- W-0061 665)1i16I10 nosIIAla 1A11061-0lI10313 09316O'LtWe ae- 1 Si 3 It A Viod -WFA I61n0 -'A 610 W"ut0 -160 66 .01 "610 "-a .6 1409106 16nlfliDV "P"06 IIVQ W-pui Sp $-W *M v a I -d q-W.0911 A~~~~~~~~dg16 3140V61 saanggiiwnoi IV G ie ~~ v a gmdqumua.~~~~qia ac ~ ~~u.w.bs6u~~~ UWOODB0 IIP9JO OP 66461 i OAt9hLZ.A IO: CyI JBltd £66181131 S1XWVlIdO ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SIN3IN3SSIV33a SMG VAL _1Ivuivs SITARAIL ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS CELLULE DECAISSEMENT CFD:CI Coventkon de Prt N 52 24712 001OMICCI 1077 1 du 02104199t:26 000 000.00FRF sot 2 600 000 000 FCFA D R F MONTANT FACTURE MARCHE TrngmiPFn * RECLEMENT DCaissements N- DATE Devises F CFA N- DATE | Term de paienent FOURNISSEURS N* DATE CFD/SPF RF 6 Date 14 24-mar-97 FRF 1437 047,55 143704 755 9046/47 03-mar-97_ _ _ 2e83e tarme MATISA OOISITIIF/BNRUCU96______26-r-96 24-mar-97 ~~~2203ce_~~~. 12-mai-9 ~ 143~ 704~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rer 755 2 26-ao0-96 FRF 1 497525,30 149 752 530 9031 10-jul-96 Acompte 30% MATISA OO1ISITAF/1BNRUCU96 26-vr-96 2601199 6507 21-nov-96 149 752 530 10 16-jan-97 FRF 1 958 223,15 195 822 315 9640 17-dec-96 2eterme 65% MATISA 001/SITAF/1NRVCU96 26-avr-96 20jan-9 987 22-mar-9 19582231 18 18-jun-97 FRF 98 955,00 9895 501 9051 10-jun-97 Solde MATISA OO1/SITAIFIBNRUCU96 26-avr-96 18-jun-9 4076 01-aoO-9 9 895 59 4"91751,00 499 1751 49 175101 8 16-jan-97 FRF 575 164,00 57 516 49 9034 27-nov-96 Acompte 10% MATISA 0O3ISITIF/BNRICI96 3t8/96 16101/199 1548 01-avr-97 57 516400 3 18-nov-96 FRF 504350.00 50 435 001 789 - Acomnpte10% SOCOFER 004/SITIF/SZ/CU96 30-aoO-96 18t011991 7047 16-dec-96 50 435 09 16 09-jun-97 FRF 4 034800,00 403 480001 9705008 17-mai-97 Acompte 80% SOCOFER 004/SIT/IF/SZICU96 30-ao0-96 13-jun-9 3321 01-jul-9 403 480 20 27-aoO-97 FRF 504 351,00 50 435 10 9708010 22-aod-97 Solde SOCOFER 004/SIT/IF/SZ/CU97 31-aod-96 5560 08-oct-97 50 435 5 843 501,00 504 350 IO5 504 350 1 21-aoO-96 FRF 615 320,00 61 532 Divers Diverses Remboursement a SITARAIL SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SIT/IF/95 19-jan-96 21108/96 6241 25-oct-96 61 532 4 20-nov-96 FRF 267 750,00 26 775 0 DiversDv Dvwses Remboursement ASITARAJL SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SIT/IF/95 19-jan-96 20t11/199 7154 20-dec-96 26 775 OD 9 17-jan-97 FRF 178500,00 17 850 oa Divers Diverses RemboursementA SITARAIL SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SIT/lF/95 19-jan-96 20-jan-97 1183 14-mar-97 17 850 00 15 03-avr-97 FRF 178500.00 17 850 oa 11&12f97 17-jan-97 Remboursement a SITARAIL SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SITsIF/95 19-jan-96 03-avr-9 2422 27-mai-9 17 850 1 240 070.00 124 007 W 124 007 000 11 28-jan-97 FCFA 4 136 545,00 4 136 545 189=01970S/-H08-jan-97 Acompte 10% RTCA/SCIMI 007/SIT/AFISTS/CU96 20-sep-96 28-jan-9 1573 02-avr-9 4 136 54 21 18-sep-97 FCFA 37 228 910 37 228 91 6301104 31-ju-97 Solde RTCANSCIMI 007/SIT/IF/STS/CV96 20-sep-96 41 365 455 41365 455 4136 545 6 20-nov-96 FRF 111103,55 11 110 355 760035 05-nov-96 Acompte 10% BOSCHTELECOM O08/STITIF/STS/CU96 20-sep-96 20/11/1996 7322 30-dec-96 11 110 3S 5 20-nov-96 FRF 137592,70 13 759 270 760 955 10-sep-96 Acompte 10% BOSCHTELECOM 009/SlT/IF/STSICI96 30-ao0-96 20/11/199 7046 16-d6c-96 13 759 27 19 13-oct-97 FRF 1190D741,60 110 074 160 2 730 350 11-jul-97 2eme Term.e BOSCHTELECOM 009/SIT/IF/STS/CU97 30-aoO-96 7 26-nov-96 FRF 209 079.50 20 907 97/9119 30-sep-96 Acompte 10% COGIFER 024/SIT/lF/APPVOIE/CU96 30-ao0-96 26/11/199 7051 16-dec-96 20 907 13 11-mar-97 FRF 1 672 636,00 167 263 60 5214 31-jan-97 2eme terme 80% COGIFER 024/SITAIF/APPVOIE/CIV96 30-aoO-96 11-mar-97 1995 23-avr-97 167 263 17 09-jun-97 FRF 209079,50 20 907 950 5215 31 -jan-97 Solde COGIFER 024/SITAIF/APPVOIE/C/96 30-aoO-96 13-jun-97 4071 01-ao0-97 20 907 2 090 795,00 209 079 50 209 079 12 30-jan-97 FRF 199627,80 19 962780 797 23-jan-97 Acompte 30% SOCOFER 038/SIT/MR/RHSZ/CV96 10-jan-97 30-jan-9 1055 08-mar-9 19 962 FRF I TOTAL 1590400120 1443 096 950 CFD.XLS17:2828/10/1997 SITARAIL ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS vs cm C F D: SITARAIL Connntbnonde PrWt 53 24 75001 OSCCa1079 01 du 021041: 35000 000.OOFRF soft 3 50 000000 FCFA DR F MONTANT FACTURE MARCHE Rglement Oi.-d.S N. DATE Dewises F CFA N Date T do FOURNISSEUR N. Objet rm Die 4 16-an-97 FRF 373 939,24 37 39392 96.0008.417 12-d6c-96 Acompte 10% UM LOGERAIL 006ISITIMRNVAGBFIN96Pices et matibres pour wagons 1 994 23-avr-97 37 393924 10 09-jiWt-97 FRF 197731,88 197731U 8.449 27-mai-97 Acompte 80% CIM LOGERAIL 006ISTIMRNVAGIBFI96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 3066 24-jun-97 19 773188 13 04-jul-97 FRF 984 107,17 98 410 7178.465;8.459; 8.469 18 et 23/6/97 2 bme terme PartilM CM LOGERAIL 0061SITRURNVAGIBF/96Pices et mati4res pour wagons 4 566 28-ao0-97 98 410 717 16 04-o0-97 FRF 76 560,95 7 656 09 97.0008.476 22-jul-97 2 nmeterme Parti6l CIMLOGERAIL 006/9ITARNVAGOBF/96 Pikces et mati6res pour wagons 4 566 28-aoO-97 7 65609 19 02-sep-97 FRF 473 818,07 47 381807 97.0008.485,497,503 13-aoO-97 2 Ameterme PartiN CIMLOGERAIL 0061SITIMROVAG/BF196Pices et mati6res pour wagons 47 381807 21 04-sep-97 FRF 34 627,88 3 462 788 7.0008.493 13-ao0-97 2 bme terme Partibi CIM LOGERAIL 0061SITIMRNVAGIBF196Pieces et mati6res pour wagons 3 462 788 25 04-sep-97 FRF 434 807,09 43 480 709 97.0008.512 22-ao0-97 3 4me terme PartiN CIM LOGERAIL 006fSlT/MRNVAGfBF,97 Pikces et matiAres pour wagons 43 480 709 2 575 592,28 257 559 228 257 559 228 2 14-jan-97 FCFA 3 095 870 3 095 870SIN. 18-d6c-96 Acompte 10% SAECASTRAL 028/SiTMRWNAGlCU96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 879 20-f6v-97 3 095 870 7 14-mai-97 FRF 675 179,00 6751790097.0008.445 05-mai-97 2 8me terme Partibl CIM LOGERAIL 029MT/MRNVAGICW6 Pikes et matiures pourwagons 3065 24-jun-97 67517 900 12 04-jul-97 FRF 2 196879,45 219 687 945 8.463 et 8.457 18-jun-97 2 4me terme Partiel CIMLOGERAIL 029/SIT/MRNVAGICI/96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 4 546 27-aoG-97 219 687 945 17 04-aoO-97 FRF 1 084863,40 108 486 340 97.0008.474 22-jul-97 2 eme terme Partial CIM LOGERAIL 029/SIT/MRNVAGMlI/96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 4 546 27-aoO-97 108 486 340 20 02-sep-97 FRF 1014 499,12 101449 912 97.0008.491 et495 13-aoO-97 2 eme terme Parti4l CIMLOGERAIL 029/S1TlMRNvAGlCU96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 101449 912 22 08-sep-97 FRF 202 315,37 20231 537 97.0008.505 13-aoO-97 2 bme terme PartiAl CIM LOGERAIL 029/SIT/MRNVAG/CI/96 Pikces et matieres pour wagons 20 231537 1 14-jan-97 FRF 1 105309,00 110530 900 96.0008.409 13-nov-96 Acompte 10% CIM LOGERAIL 029/S[TMRANVAGICI96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 853 20-fev-97 110 530 900 11 09-jun-97 FRF 325 910.19 32 591019 39563 27-mai-97 Acompte 80%/ CIM LOGERAIL 0291SITIMRNVAG/CI196 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 4 546 27-aod-97 32 591 019 23 16-sep-97 FRF 399 746.08 39 974 608 454,458, 464, SIN' 1806197e 3 fme terme Parti4l CIM LOGERAIL ______029/SITIMRNVAGICU97 Pieces et matieres pour wagons ______05/0 5/97 ______24 26-sep-97 FRF 2 589 598,37 258 959 837 514, 525 2/08/97, 2 Ome terme Partil CIMLOGERAIL 029/SIT/MRNVAG/CU98 Pices et matibres pour wagons 9 594 299,98 959 429 998 660 495 553 3 14-jan-97 FRF 14 273,47 1 427 347 8669 27-nov-96 Acompte 10% COFIE 030/SITflRNVAGtCU96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons 266 07-mar-97 1 427 347 9 09-jun-97 FRF 114187,81 11 418 781 8742 22-mai-97 Acompte 80% COFIE 0301SITIMRNVAGOCI/96Pieces et matibres pour wagons 3 708 15-jul-97 11 418 781 18 06-ao8-97 FRF 14273,49 1 427 3498774 30-jul-97 Solde COFIE 030SIT/MRIVAGCI196 Pieces et matibres pour wagons 4 567 28-ao0-97 1 427 349 142 734,77 14 273 477 14 273 477 6 21-avr-97 FCFA 575119 5 73511 287197 13-mar-97 Acompte 10% Gnrdrafde Manufackire 031/SITIMRNVAGOC196 Pices et mattures pour wagons 2 396 23-mai-97 5 785 118 5 27-flv-97 FRF 4 829 766,00 482 976 6W 6/12.255/ 1978BG001 31-d6c-96 Missionl0O%A et Acompte 40%D SYSTRA-SOFRETU-SOFRERAIL044filTASYSTRA196 Maitrise d'oeuvre r6hab materiel 1 056 06-mar-97 482 976 600 14 04-jul97 FRF 222061,60 22 206161 7/03.13211978 04-jul-97 SYSTRA-SOFRETU-SOFRERAIL0441SITAMOYSTRA,96 Maitrise d'oeuvre rihab. materiel 4 250 14-ao0-97 21 156 W( 5 051827,60 505 1t2 70 504 132 600 8 09-jun-97 FRF 3 945,51 394 5518729 14-avr-97 Acompte 10% COFIE 045OITAARNVAGOBF)96Pikces et mati*res pour wagons 4 251 14-aoG-97 394 551 15 16-jul-97 FCFA 543162 948 182 97020697 29-mai-97 Acompte 10% SAECASTRAL 046iTMRNVAGOISI96 Pices et matidres pour wagons TOTAL 1746614 _ _ 1 4473S 337 SITARAIL ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS c0L6a erc _ AID: BF DR F FACTURES LetUres de Cr6dd E_gt FOURNISSEURS ______MARCHES REGLEMENTS par I D A ______SP&d ______Obervetlons W ~.. d T~ e W DATE D_4. KU-*n-t Mlni-t W ______- D e-vis-es.5 e $ V l u Date Date N Date Objet Date D evises US FCFA DRF E 1 07-aw47 _ _ 2 060953.33 30.062197 07041997 13aoen9e E M D OOIISITIGM195 211031199S Pices pour L ocomotives GM LeUre de CredR 67 2 17J-97 - 114 787.43 CIM LOGERAIL 043/SITIMRICCGM,BF/97 011i1997 PIhces pour L ocomnotives GM ______i478 743 Acompte 10% _ 3 17-47 -Rr 268 590,00 CIM LOGERAIL 056/SlITTfMGMBF197 1110411g97 R6habilition 2ioteurs traction GM ______26 859 00t Acomnpte 10% 4 19-ia7 rer 2146 720,0 3003U97 011oW9719 CiM LOGERAIL 0561SITITMGMIBFI98 1110W11997R6h1bilitation 21moteur traction GM Lettrede Credit_ _ 19Jim-l7 s 918299.48 J0.ee7 0110711997 CIM LOGERAIL 0431SITIMRICCGM/BFJ97 01J/1997 PlAcea pour L ocomotives GM Lettre de Cr6dit 6 11--97 6cr62 939 68 AFRICAUTO O64iSiTIiF1VEHJBFI97 2110511997 Achat v6hicules routiUe ___2 = 62 939 Solde March _ ______= ______=______= ___ 277__4n ___ =_ SITARAIL ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS CELLULE DECAISSEMENT C F D:B F Convention de Pret N 52 287 12 001 OY/CBF 1082 01 et 52 287 12 002 OJICBF 1082 02: 57 300 000.00 FRF solt 5 730 000 000 FCFA D RF MONTANT FACTURE MARCHE Situation Pret en FCFA N DATE Devises F CFA No Date Terme de FOURNISSEUR ______~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~palementN | Date Daissements Non MobLiis I 05-nal-97 FRF 3 026100,00 302 610 000 804 22-avr-97 ler SOCOFER 010/SITIIFSZIBF/96 01-avr-97 302 610 000 2 05-mnal-97 FRF 1 237 000,00 123 700 000 82 et 84 10-avr-97 ler SYSTRA 051/SITIMOISYSTRAIBF/97 10-avr-97 123 700 000 3 06-mal-97 FRF 1 837 668,40 183 766 840 81 10-avr-97 ler SYSTRA 053ISITIMOISYSTRAIBFI97 I10-avr97 183 766 840 4 06-ma-97 FCFA 61 103 700 61 103 700 10497 et 09-avr-97 er et2 Am S.F .C .E 054/SITIIFIENGTPIBF/97 14-avr-97 61 103 700 5 27-mal-97 FRF 1 488 696,00 148 869 600 9048 12-mal-97 ler MATISA S.A 002ISITIIFIBNRIIBF/96 26-avr-96 148 869 600 6 27-mal-97 FRF 3 450 984,00 345 098 400 9050 12-mal-97 ler MATISA S.A OO5ISITflFIBNRIIBF/96 01-avr-97 345 098 400 7 27-mal-97 FRF 81 579,55 8157955 760656 07-avr-97 I er BOCH TELECOM O14ISIT/IFISTSIBFI96 01-avr-97 8 157 955 8 27-mal-97 FRF 112 948,80 11 294 880 P73012 06-mal-97 I er BOCH TELECOM 040ISIT1IFISTSIB1`I96 20-jan-97 11 294 880 9 03jun-97 FRF 69 531,10 6 953 110 072 at 89 21-mal-97 SYSTRA 051/SIT/MOISYSTRA/BF/97 10-avr-97 6 953110 _- 10 14107197 FCFA 11 250 000 11 250 000 1642 18jun-97 I er CICA AUTO 055/SITIIFIENGTPIBFI97 24-avr-97 11 250 000 11 22-eoO-97 FRF 1 043 650,00 104 365 000 396 23-jul-97 1 er RAILTECH O76BSIVTIFISOU1DF1197 21-jul-97 104365000 12 22-ao0-97 FRF 57929,50 5 792 950 395 2310797 1 er RAILTECH 079/SITIIFIOUTVOIE/BFI97 21-jul-97 5 792950 13 22-aoD-97 FRF 85 876,68 8 587 668 8777 11/0897 1 er COFIE o71SITIFSTS/BF/97 05-aoCi-97 8 587668 14 02-sep-97 FRF 422903,40 42 290 340 815 01 -oO-97 I er SOCOFER 072/SITRFIRHSZ/BFI97 24-jul-97 42 290340 15 27-jul-97 FCFA 90 000 000 90 000 000 1643 18-jun-97 2eme CICA AUTO 055ISITfiFIENGTPIBF/97 24-avr-97 90 000 000 16 17-sep-97 FRF 483 247,50 48324 750 9157 29-aoCi-97 ler COGIFER 073ISITIIFIAPPVOIEIBFI97 21-jul-97 48 234 750 ______17 17-sep-97 FCFA 9908143 9908143 971DA1494 19-ao-7 lcr SITEL O7O0SITflFISTSIBF/97 29-jul-97 18 24-sep-97 FRF 56 585,52 5658 552 9770034 18-aoO-97 ler L GEISMAR 077/ST/IFISOUDIBFI97 04-ao&-97 19 24-sep-97 FRF 146 609,21 14 660 921 9770035 18-aoO-97 ler L GEISMAR o76ISITIIFIOUTVOIEIBFI97 05-aoO-97 TOTAL 1 532392 809 1 502 075193 4227924807 CFD XLS28/10/1997 L66L eJqOO3 VZ eJ!OAIIP O103 ua os!esueJJ 83JOWwo3 Op GJqWeBq el IUUAOP Uo!Ie;ueseJd iai3aeawoA attuiwoaoa,j anod saqwuo3aia salojpn 3HIOAI.a 31Qo 3a.3nori9nld3H VI 13 OS I VNINunfsl 3i 3UIN3 S3HI1511/H03=13 SIHOdSNVIiL s3a NOIlVJIOIdX31 3Ca NOISS33NO3 N3 3SIW k ! ! M _g S S i ~~~~F S:3!S-.INHODAVL4 3( 1jj NN)SU)d *30 3IVIIV. LCNI TRANSPORT FERRCAJRE DrE PERSOtNNES EI'DE MARCHANDISES SOMMAIRE: I - HISTORIQUE ET CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA LIGNE FERROVIAIRE ABIDJAN/OUAGA/KAYA 11- EVOLUTION DE L'ACTIVITE FERROVIAIRE 11-1 Trafic marchandises 11-2 Trafic voyageurs 11-3 Chiffre d'affaires III - LA MISE EN CONCESSION DU RESEAU 111-1 Objectif de la concession 111-2 Principe de la concession 111-3 Presentation de SITARAIL IV - RETOMBEES POUR L'ECONOMIE IVOIRIENNE IV-1 Les atouts du chemin de fer IV-2 Retombees directes IV-3 Retombees indirectes SITAR/l4e 4 a I. TRANSPOR FERROVLURE DE PERW)NE[S EI DE MARCHANDiSES I - HISTORIQUE ET CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA LIGNE FERROVIAIRE ABIDJAN/OUAGA/KAYA i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~SI TARA %1 f II ~~TR1'.SPOR F-RRQVIAW DE PERSOtNN[S EI[DE MARCHA1NDISES Les travaux de construction ont debute 'aAbidjan en 1904 pour s'achever a Kaya en 1988. * 1960: Convention conclue entre la Cote d'lvoire et la Haute Volta fixant l'organisation et les conditions de fonctionnement de la ligne ferroviaire Abidjan/Ouaga dont la gestion a ete confiee a un 'tablissement international a caractere industriel et commercial denomme Regie des chemins de fer Abidjan-Niger; * 1989: Abrogation de la convention de 1960 et creation au niveau de chaque Etat d'exploitation d'une societe du chemin de fer, la SCFB au Burkina et la SICF en Cote d'lvoire. TRANSPORT FERROV1AIRE DE PERSCNN.FS ET DE W.ft'HAR'CD)SES Les principales caracteristiques de ce chemin de fer etaient les suivantes: - Longueur de la ligne 1260 Km a ecartement metrique a l'exception de 3 tron9ons d'une longueur cumulee de 37 Km, qui sont a double voie et situes sur le territoire ivoirien: croisement dans les gares. - 41 gares ouvertes dont 28 assurent le trafic commercial, 13 assurent uniquement la securite; - La voie se trouve dans un etat moyen et souffre particulierement, sur certains troncons, de rails ayant atteint le seuil d'usure critique et d'un manque de ballast =: nombreux deraillements. - La plus grande partie du materiel roulant se trouve dans un etat de degradation critique due aux retards enregistres en matieres d'entretien courant; - 3470 agents en 1994, dont 2100 pour la SIPF et 1370 pour la SCFB. ;t1 I I V Awl * TRAN4SPRT FERRQVIAJE * - DE PERSOtNNES EIDE AARCHA.NL}SEs 11 - EVOLUTION DE L'ACTIVITE FERROVIAIRE 11-1 Trafic marchandises n EVOLUTION DU TRAFIC TOTAL DE MARCHANDISES _ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Tonne-Kilometre is ...... E : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... . .. >.,...... >>r^,* C ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..* 600--_=asaasaa : -xa^SisBx ...... ::.>:.:::.:.:>B.:-.-.:.:'.::.:::Be||||...... aR c 300-U. E.:2x.,^6 ...... g$,mtaBaBaa|...... |.a r2Rxy 40 t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- . . --'2-i''a0ia_'EEm^a>ga>.Rz....I aa-fa:aa .-- 600 H iF'v-vv1 .- U gL nne-KilAnnere 1 500-200100 --. I r 1g-.gg|||1 | :X,X,a2 | . - X . Ra ::::R:y5Zy '.t; 18 1988 1990B 1991 1992t...... 018 19819i9119 ;ESiTARAVi TRANSPRT I FERRRE DE PERSONNES ET DE MARCWHNDiSrS 11-2 Trafic voyageurs ii EVOLUTION DU TRAFIC TOTAL DE VOYAGEURS 2000 ...... *~~:*'*** ...... '...... a 1800 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . g _Voyageur 1800.b ... *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . -.-.-.:---..... 28000 ..4 -voyageur-Kiomelre 3tiSg3-l0 < un 1600 4 A^^*---_:'-.::.g:':B'.':...... :::'.::.'':.::'::':I.':::':.'.-:B'.:':BBBBB::o:':":'.:::':BB" ...... 8 o aaSBgS2B88R5BSaXB'.&X:...... gsaaga;:'-.s2x...... BB&B&'BB'82g...... 8.:.:.:..:.::.-': E 1200 1000 800 tb8& -.- 8i,a <:&z 8BB sR8a 1000 R a 8asassasssssRa 6. 00 co*...... -...8s-'aa*>400a i' 200... ..B 1 A sS - .1987 a 1 200 - 0J 8 s --- 3ga.....BR2.. Aai-BBB's 1990. 199 Ann6os'§XC' o~~~~18 1800 198 3 600 m = 0 . . . Bi".S:sasSR:U c ...... TRANSPORT FERROVIARE O1 1)ERSONNES ET DE MARCHANDISES 11- LA MISE EN CONCESSION DU RESEAU 111-1 Objectif de la concession * Assurer la perennite et le developpement du mode de transport ferroviaire. * Contribuer au desenclavement des pays limitrophes et des regions eloignees atlantique. de la facade * Stimuler les echanges commerciaux entre la Cote d'lvoire et le Burkina et de la sous-region. avec les autres pays * Supprimer toute forme de subvention des etats a I'activite ferroviaire. i0 O1 ||TRANSR FER -- ~DE PERSONNES ET DE MARCHANDISES 111-2 Principe de la concession * Les etats sont proprietaires des infrastructures et du materiel roulant par l'intermediaire des societes de patrimoine. * La SITARAIL dispose du materiel et des infrastructures en contre partie du versement d'une redevance dans le cadre d'une concession de service public. * Les investissements sont finances par les etats qui empruntent aux bailleurs de fonds, SITARAIL assurant le service de la dette dans le cadre de la redevance. Par derogation au code des marches publics, SITARAIL est le maltre d'oeuvre du premier Programme d'lnvestissement d'Urgence (P.l.U). *SITARAIL est en charge de la maintenance des immobilisations concedees. *SITARAIL dispose de la liberte tarifaire et de la liberte de definition du plan de transport. Exclusivite d'exploitation pendant 7 ans. Duree minimale de la concession 15 ans, renouvelable par periodes de 5 ans, tous les 5 ans. I i SiTaRAIa TRANSPORT FERROVIAIRE * rrE PERSOtNNE;i [-f )E MRARCHAN4DES 111-3 Presentation de la Societe Internationale de Transports Africains par Rail (SITARAIL): l2 REPARTITION FUTURE DU CAPITAL DE SITARAIL (5 Milliards de F.CFA) PERSONNEL 3,00% Ci 15,00% _ _ lll SAGA/SDV 42,88% TRANSURB 4,02% MAERSK --- - 5,36% SYSTRA GIP 6,70% 8,04% TRANS$PORT FERROVIAME Dr-, PER( SCNNE3 [E')E MARCHANIDSES Quelques Resultats: Tableau 1: Trafic marchandises: 94/95 95/96 96/97 Effectif Tonnage Effectif Tonnage Effectif Tonnage SICF/SCFB 3 200 305 000 SITARAIL 1850 486 000 1850 568 000 Projet hyp haute 1815 499 000 1815 589 000 Projet hyp basse 1815 504 000 1815 540 000 Tableau 2: Trafic voyageurs: 95/96 96/97 Realisation Prevision Projet Realisation Prevision Projet Voyageurs 410 000 357 750 405 000 477 257 (000 vk) 161 000 125 200 158 000 167 000 TRANSPORT FERRO'vWRE :DEPERSFONNES E DE MARCHMSES IV RETOMBEES POUR L'ECONOMIE IVOIRIENNE IV-1 Les atouts du chemin de fer - Au dela de 300 Km, le chemin de fer est plus competitif que la route pour l'acheminement des produits pondereux; - Permet 1'evacuation de tonnage important par la composition de trains blocs (hydrocarbures, conteneurs, etc....); - Plus de securite et de respect pou'r 1'environnement compare a la route. TRAISPORT FERROVIAJRE DE PFERSOtNNE.S EI )DEMARCHANDISES IV-2 Retombees directes La mise en concession du reseau ferroviaire a permis: * De preserver 1100 emplois en Cote d'lvoire dans l'immediat, * D'accroltre la competitivite du port d'Abidjan, * De reporter des trafics de I'axe routier revetu nord-sud sur le chemin de fer => Economies substantielles en matiere d'entretien, de renforcement et de construction de routes neuves; * D'eviter une flambee des tarifs de transport routier de l'ordre de 20% (Cf. 'Interet economique du transport ferroviaire sur I'axe Abidjan/Kaya' CFD-1990) qui se produirait si le chemin de fer venait a cesser ses activites; * De supprimer les concours financiers de l'etat - Confiance des bailleurs de fonds a la privatisation: Financement du PIU a hauteur de 37 milliards. (marches directs passees dans le cadre du PIU avec entreprises locales a la date d'auiourd'hui; 2.455.000.000 F.ICFAI WF ~~TRANSPRT FERROVIARE DE PERSONNES E1 JDE MARCHANDSES IV-3 Retombees indirectes Strategies de SITARAIL: Faire du transport des personnes et des marchandises son activite principale et sous-traiter tous les travaux annexes a cette activite. S/traitance des travaux de mecanique, de genie civil et d'entretien du parc par les entreprises locales (AFRIRAIL, GEMA, GTF, EIC, etc ...... ). =-AFRIRAIL et GEMA enregistrent deja un chiffre d'affaire cumule d'environ 500 millions de F.CFA par an avec SITARAIL. S/traitance des travaux de voie et de la maintenance des engins a l'etude. Session 5 i I i i i i Session 6 I RAILWAY CONCESSIONING IN AFRICA: AN INVESTOR'S PERSPECTIVE Henry Posner III Chairman RAILROAD N 0 C DEVELOPMENT sJ J ~CORPORATION 381 Mansfield Avenue, Suite 500 Pittsburgh, PA 15220 U.S.A. Phone: 412/928-0777 Fax: 412/928-7715 World Bank Railway Seminar Abidjan, Ivory Coast 14 October 1997 Theme Africa's railways are diverse in terms of markets and assets. However, in financial terms the structural fundamentals are the same. A major opportunity is therefore to build from the diverse, and often expensive, lessons recently learned in the USA and Latin America. Conversely, a major risk is to misinterpret those lessons. World Bank Railway Seminar H RAILROAD Coast ~~~~~~~2 DEVELOPMENT Abidjan, Ivory Coast CORPOATION 14 October 1997 * Background on RDC * Successful Restructuring Has Been Driven by Marketing... * ... Conversely, Misreading the Market Has Led to Expensive Mistakes * Africa's Freight Rail Markets Are Fundamentally Sound ... * ... Making Concessioning Preferable to Commercialization * Afiica Will Support Market-specific Private Sector Solutions ... * ... However, Many Transactions Will Require Public Investment to Attract Private Investment * Results of Concessioning to Date Have Been Mixed ... * ... And Future Transactions Are Also Likely to Have Mixed Results * Conclusions World Bank Railway Seminar Abidjan, Ivory Coast H RAILROAD ECORPOVLTION 14 October 1997 Background on RDC - Businesses Pittsburgh -based railway investment & management company Unique in its focus on privatization in the Developing World. IOWA INTERSTATE RAILROAD * 1,000 km of former Rock Island trackage between Chicago and Omaha (August 1991). * Provider of Information Systems to railways in the USA, Argentina, Chile, Brazil and South Africa. * Host to Management Groups from Latin America, Africa, Asia. BUENOS AIRES AL PACIFICO SAN MARTIN S.A. * 5,500 km of former Ferrocarriles Argentinos between Buenos Aires and Mendoza (August 1993). IA FERROCARRIL Xs MESOPOTAMICO General Urquiza S.A. * 2,500 km of former Ferrocarriles Argentinos between Buenos Aires and Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay (October 1993). TRANSACTIONS IN PROCESS * Guatemala (Awarded June 1997) * Chile (Arica - La Paz) (Awarded July 1997) Background on RDC - Philosophy Railway aspects are not the most important structural element. (Descending importance) 1. Committed Seller 2. Transparent, Disciplined Bid Process 3. Local Partners 4. Management Investment 5. Marketing (Revenue) 6. Technical (Costs) World Bank Railway Seminar f RAILROAD Abidjan, Ivory Coast 5 E~Em DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 14 October 1997 Successful Restructuring Has Been Driven By Marketing,., EXAMPLES PHASE I . Identify Core Markets Freight vs. Passenger SURVIVAL Block Train vs. Carload Freight (Europe) . Reconfigure A:ssets around Core Markets Rolling Stock Allocation Facilities Rationalization * Separate Assets Unrelated to Core Markets Excess Property Social Services PHASE II . Build Core Markets Volume growth GROWITH Yield Growth (Latin America) . Attract Investment Rehabilitate Assets Working Capital PHASE III * Develop Incremental Markets Marginal Traffic PROSPERITY Service-Sensitive Traffic (USA) . Develop Strategic Alliances Multimodal Transportation Connecting Railways World Bank Railway Seminar H RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT Abidjan,Abidjan, IvoryIvory CoastCoast_6 , J CORPORATION 14 October 1997 .0. Conversely, Misreading the Market Has Led to Expensive Mistakes Examples Bankruptcies in the USA are typically due CM&W (USA) to revenue shortfalls, not cost overruns. Charterail (UK) Overoptimistic Bids are often driven by the CC&P (USA) auction process to introduce fixed costs FEPSA (Argentina) (acquisition debt, capital investment) that are not sustainable by the market. Wasted Investment - Investments in assets Conrail Electrification (USA) to serve markets that shift, disappear or are Speedlink (UK) illusory. World Bank Railway Seminar Abidjan, Ivory Coast H RAILROAD Abidjan,Octoery coa9CORPORATION 7 DEVELOPMENT 14 October 1997 The Fundamentals of Africa's Freight Railways Are Sound ... Latin Southern USA Europe America Africa REVENUE . Competition Other RR Other RR Truck Truck * Market Share Mature Mature Low Medium * Traffic Base Mature Mature Expanding Reviving COSTS * Infrastructure Good Excellent Fair Fair * Rolling Stock Good Excellent Poor Fair * Staffing Low High High High * Railway Capital Mature Emerging Emerging Minimal M arkets World Bank Railway Seminar H RAILROAD Abidjan, Ivory Coast 8 CDVELOPM ENT 14 October 1997 ... Making Concessioning Preferable to Commercialization COMMERCIALIZATION CONCESSIONING Financing Public Private Political Sensitivity High Low Focus Internal (Process) External (Customer) Management Stake Salary Investment World Bank Railway Seminar Abidjan, Ivory Coast n RAILROAD 14 October 1997 CORPORATIONDEL Africa Will Support Market-Specific Private Sector Solutions Se. Market Objective Market Response Example Urban Passenger Minimize Subsidy Operator Bidding FEMESA (Argentina) UK Passenger Franchises Intercity/Rural Passenger Minimize Subsidy Operator Bidding Trem do Prata (Brazil) Core Freight Maxim-iize Purchase/ Operator Bidding Conrail (USA) Lease Price New Zealand Rail Light Density Freight Maximize Purchase/ Operator Bidding Regional Railroads (USA) Lease Price BAP/FMGU (Argentina) International Freight Divert Truck Traffic Inter-RR Cooperation Interline Traffic (USA) World Bank Railway Seminar RD RAILROAD Abidjan, Ivory Coast CORPORATION 14 October 1997 ... However, Many Transactions Will Probably Require Public Investment to Attract Private Investment Example: "Smaller" Latin Freight Railways Capital Needs Market Constraints Length of Traffic Service Track Equipment Terminals Haul Potential Suspended Colombia X X l l l_l_ l Costa Rica X X X Ecuador X X XX____X__ X __ Guatemala X X X X Jamaica X X X X X Panama X x Paraguay X X World Bank Railway Seminar 1 Abidjan, nfn DOADRAILR Ivory Coast 11 14 October 1997 CORPORATION Results of Concessioning to Date Have Been Mixed ... Examples POSITIVE * Operating Performance Argentina - BAP, FR, NCA * Investment Programs Argentina, Chile * Traffic Increases Argentina * Lower Tariffs All NEGATIVE * Traffic Shortfalls Argentina - FEPSA * Few Bidders Argentina - I or 2 each Bolivia - I each Chile- I Brazil - 1 to 3 each Mexico - 1 to 2 each * Premature Liquidations/Suspensions Nicaragua Costa Rica Guatemala * Political Interference Pakistan New York R RAILROAD World Bank Railway Seminar OPMENT , 2 * DEVEL Abidjan, Ivory Coast 12CORPORTION 14 October 1997 ... And Future Transactions Are Also Likely to Have Mixed Results Examples POSITIVE . Efficiency of Railways All * Capital Markets' Interest Argentina - BAP Equipment Brazil - Strong Bidders * Strength of Macro Economies Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico NEGATIVE * Sellers' Expectations Bolivia * New Entrants' Over-optimism Mexico/Nicaragua/Guatemala/ Costa Rica "Dry Canal" World Bank Railway Seminar Abidjan, A 13 H RAILROAD Ivory Coast DEVELOPMENT v J J CORPORATION 14 October 1997 Conclusions Positive higher. * Afiican railways compete with trucks, not other railways, therefore margins are potentially * African railways serve reviving economies, have market share upside. * African railways' cost structure presents much room for improvement. Negative * Many African lines present revenue risk due to lack of meaningful historic trends in Africa * Difficulty in obtaining debt financing due to lack of experience in financing railways Other * Marketing is even more important than cost reduction will not be * Commercialization is not a substitute for concessioning, as those leading the process disciplined by having investment risk. restructuring), as * Africa can look to the USA and Latin America, for positive experience (marketing, well as expensive mistakes to avoid (asset allocation, finance). nln n RAILROAD World Bank Railway Seminar EE. DEVELOPMENT 14 11 Ll CORPORATION Abidjan, Ivory Coast 14 14 October 1997 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION TOPICS WORLD BANK SEMINAR ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST OCTOBER 1997 Previously, Mr.Kogan of Mercer Mgt. aptly summarized concessioning the process in Latin America. The level of public support expressed in terms of ton km's and passengers carried, successful indicates a result. The historic trendline of declining output levels was halted, new investments in infrastructure were facilitated, the and issue of labor productivity and transition protection were directly addressed. also The process has resulted in some general how to principles developed overtime. From the stand point of a potential the operator following points should be considered for a smooth bidding process and startup: 1. Stick to the plan and timetable originally express the public. to Delays in the process should only be considered when parties a1i registered feel that a delay or change will materially improve some aspect of the transaction. 2. Minimize time from decision date to date of takeover. This intermediate time period is extremely risky. period During this the existing administration is in a lame-duck status. historic work The flow and purchasing cycles however good or bad tend to come to a near stand still, generally accelerating deferred maintenance and other operating problems. 3. The new operator must be given the operational latitude to implement new rules and procedures in the field. A common pitfall is the divergence between the policy level where changes form an integral part of the process versus the regulatory and bureaucratic level where any change may be subject to potentially difficult and exhaustive delays. 4. It is generally not desirable to divide control of the Right of Way from the transportation function. Capital requirements and their impact on operational procedures are not easily divisible. Operational rules and standards are interactive among tracks, signals, and the trains that are operated over them. If one party cannot control all aspects, the solution could be a higher projected level of fees for the unknown as well as potentially excess capital spending. 5. The project must -be of a magnitude to cover certain threshold costs. Subdivision of large scale project into pieces to stimulate future competition is desirable. The key is to insure that each component has critical mass. 6. The government and concessionaire to some extent should view one another as partners. Therefore. variable fees should be factored into the compensation scheme if possible. High fixed fees at startup only add to immediate cash needs at the same time when startup costs are at a high point for training, inventory buildup, and initial capital programs. 2. 7. Short term traffic goals must be realistic. expect that is don't immediate sweeping imDrovement without reasonable lead times. Frequently, at takeover time, the operation is at capacity in terms of physical constraints. Capital programs take and time to implement deliver results. In addition, the shipping or traveling must be sold" public on the idea that the railroad can supply long reliable service. This term implies a period of test evaluations by the public to build a base of customer satisfaction commitments before significant are made on the part of the shippers or passengers. 8. Labor issues must be addressed immediately. Labor must know the policies and man power requirements of the new operator. Failure to provide timely information misinformation. will lead to Once this occurs unfounded rumors can lead to polarized attitudes and potentially dangerous almost actions. To date no acts of sabotage have occurred in the privatization process in Latin America. Clear procedures must be established for employees that will matriculate to the new company as well as who for current employees will be subject to protective labor condition payments. 3. iI Ii i PERSPECTIVES DES OPERATEURS FERROVIAIRES ET DES INVESTISSEURS LE POINT DE VUE DE SAGA 1- Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Pr6sident, Mesdames, Messieurs, experience, quoique mon encore r6cente, de ma participation a ce type de s6minaires m'a montr6 que, trop souvent, * les intervenants ne traitaient pas toujours le sujet demand6, mais sujet; parfois un autre * leur expos6 d6passait presque toujours le temps imparti; * enfin, plus que la pr6sentation faite par l'orateur, c'est avant tout 116s au jou des les 6changes questions/r6ponses, a l'issue de 1'expos6, qul se r6v6lalent les plus Int6ressants pour I'auditoire. Je m'efforcerai, par consequent, d'etre bref et concret, d'autant que j'ai d6ja eu l'occasion d'aborder ce sujet devant certains d'entre vous, vous proposant plut6t de m'interroger ensuite dans le cadre de cette table ronde. 2 - L'an dernier, en effet, a l'occasion du s6minaire a Reperes )), organis6 par l'UIC a Rabat, traitant sensiblement du meme sujet, je m'6tais expose alors efforc6, dans un probablement trop " th6orique ,', d'analyser les d'une diff6rentes motivations entreprise privee pour s'int6resser aux mises en de chemin concession de lignes de for. C'est ainsi que, dans un premier temps, je n'avais entre l'lnvestisseur pas distingue pur directement interess6 a la rentabilite de ses capitaux, prestataire de services, le pour qui c'est une opportunite pour d6velopper ses activit6s, le fournisseur d'6quipements qui entend accroltre enfin le son chiffre d'affaires, chargeur dont l'approche s'apparen.e a celle d'un utilisateur int6resse a la qualit6 directement du service en meme temps qu'a sa p6rennite On voit les motivations peuvent ainsi que beaucoup diff6rer selon les partenaires priv6s. Et je crois qu'au sein de celte table ronde ceote diversite est partiellement m6me qu'on repr6sent6e, de la rencontre souvent au sein des groupements qui se constituent repondre aux propositions pour de mise en concession actuelle de r6seaux ferroviaires. je m'en tiendrais Fidele, cependant, a mon engagement d'etre bref et concret, 3 - auquel j'appartiens aujourd'hui a l'approche sp6cifique du Groupement SAGA, a cet titre, conduit le Groupe des repreneurs au sein de depuis 5 ans, et qui, en meme que nous nous interessons tout particulierement a la mise SITARAIL, de degr6 des chemins de fer du Cameroun (REGIFERCAM), et, a un concession chef de file), a celle du cgmoindre )) (c'est Ldire que nous ne pr6tendons pas etre processus amorc6s au reseau de I'OCTRA au Gabon, tandis que nous suivons les Congo (CFCO) et pour le Dakar/Bamako. que j'ai de partenaires prives interess6s aux concessions ferroviaires Des 4 types la derniere prec6demment, SAGA appartient, incontestablement, a repertories cons6quent, des categorie, c'est-a-dire a celle des chargeurs et, par Je ne suis pas la, bien sur, pour faire la promotion de ma utilisateurs/clients. au travers d'une societe mais seulement pour exposer notre approche, illustr6e celle de SITARAIL. Je premiere experience, abondamment cit6e dans ce seminaire, donn6es essentielles me contenterais donc de rappeler, rapidement, quelqioes transposables d'ailleurs a SDV, puisque j'appartiens sur SAGA, partiellement des a une filiale commune & ces 2 groupe, la Soci6t6 d'Exploltation desormais largement de Fer Africains (SECAF), o'u nous sommes cependant Chemins directe la oCu majoritaires, alors que, par ailleurs, SAGA et SDV sont en concurrence elles exercent les memes m6tiers. En effet, SAGA a pour principaux m6tiers de base: * d'une part, la commission de transport et le transit International; shipping o ou de la * d'autre part, les services portuaires, ceux-ci allant du - fonction d'agence de ligne jusqu'& la manutention et a l'entreposage; de surface (routiers, * enfin, la logistique au sens large ainsi que les transports ferroviaires et fluviaux). SAGA soefforce d'occuper une place d'excellence Sur chacun de ces creneaux, a nord/sud, en France, avec parfois quelques al6as dont la presse sur les trafics implantations rendu compte en son temps, comme en Afrique, oiu nos premibres dire, par cons6quent, & quel point SAGA est d6pendante, remontent A 1929. C'est du de la bonne exploitation des ports africains et de l'ensemble en particulier, pour y faire de transports terrestres qui permet de les Irriguer, tant r6seau et de matieres affluer le fret, essentiellement constituA de produits de base destine a l'exportation et charge sur les navires des armements premieres, I'hinterland, et en maritimes que nous repr6sentons, que pour 6vacuer vers particulier les pays enclaves, les marchandises g6nerales importees. 2 4 - Quiconque s'est interesse a l'histoire des chemins situation de fer en Afrique, et a leur pr6sente au sein des economies nationales, sait que ceux-ci: * ont longtemps Wt6 la seule voie d'acces, a partir des ports, vers continent, meme l'int6rieur du si desormais ils sont largement concurrenc6s par la route; * sont particulibrement bien adapt6s a la nature des trafics et des flux de marchandises transitant par les ports; * souffrent, par contre, de dysfonctionnements de plus en une des plus nombreux dont principales causes r6side dans une absence d'investissements conduisant & une degradation prononc6e de l'outil ferroviaire. SAGA, pr6sente dans tous les grands ports de l'Ouest africain d'Afrique Centrale ainsi que ceux tout en ayant des filiales tres actives dans les pays (Mali, Burkina Faso, de l'int6rieur Niger, Tchad, Centrafrique....) s'est ainsi retrouv6e confront6e & la carence des soci6t6s de chemins de fer, incapables d'acheminer l'ensemble du fret que nous manutentionnons dans les ports ou, alors dans des conditions inacceptables pour nos clients : d6lais prohibitifs, marchandises, pertes ou vols de d6gradations diverses...Mon role ici n'est pas d'analyser causes diverses de ces dysfonctionnements les ni meme des meilleurs moyens d'y rem6dier, ces sujets ayant d6ja ete trait6s par ailleurs. SDV, Par contre, SAGA, comme figurant au rang de premiers clients de nombreux r6seaux pouvait, par consequent, ferroviaires ne se desinteresser de leur sort alors meme qu'une institutionnelle radicale, 6volution au travers d'une mise en concession ou d'un affermage, semblait se dessiner pour certains d'entre eux. 5 - En effet, outre la n6cessit6 absolue pour SAGA de s'assurer qu'au travers de cette modification du mode de gestion, il en r6sulterait la une r6elle am6lioration de qualite des services offerts, et par consequent de la satisfaction la mise de nos clients, en concession de certains r6seaux ferroviaires offrait excellente opportunit a SAGA une strat6gique en nous permettant de mieux maftriser l'ensemble des maillons de la chaine de transport, nous assurant de conforter a la fois 2 axes forts de notre strat6gie globale: d'une part, renforcer nos (4 filieres produits )) (bois, cafe, cacao, coton...), consistant a specialiser certaines filiales et certains sp6cifiques; ports a ces trafics tres 3 une strategle de 4(bout a bout )) visant a assurer * d'autre part, d6velopper eventuel, des prestations de logistique (stockage, traitement l'ensemble de garantir a nos clients acheminement, transport, manutention et livraison...) afin la qualite des prestations offertes. De ces choix, nous attendions, par consequent, comme a un accroissement de nos parts de march6s, a l'import * d'abord, le mode ferroviaire, et l'export, grace en particulier a la confiance retrouv6e dans a une plus grande satisfaction de nos clients et armateurs; sein des 6conomies ensuite, un rentorcement de nos positions au * partenaires majeurs, en nationales, oCu nous comptons nous affirmer comme particulier par l'importance des investissements consentis; a politiques ), dans la enfin, sur les moyen et long termes, des retomb6es plus * d'un service public ne mesure ou la reussite d'operations de mise en concession des Autorites et des peut que renforcer notre image de marque vis a vis principaux acteurs 6conomiques des Etats concernes. proposais d'etre bref et 6 - J'ai precise, en introduction de cet expose, que je me d'ajouter que, dans cette concret. Neanmoins, pour etre complet, je me dois approche: a notre entreprise le maximum de chargeurs, * nous souhaltons associer en et Internatlonaux, de ces chemins de fer: nous consid6rons, nationaux les propos de n'est de meilleurs actionnaires (ou, du moins, reprenant effet, qu'il clients de ces prononc6s ici meme hier, de moins mauvais...) que les la CFD de transparence de m6mes soci6t6s, la pluralit de ceux-ci 6tant synonyme la gestion et de dynamisme de l'exploitation; du nous fondons ainsi beaucoup daespoir sur le d6veloppement * dans ce but, les r6seaux : chacun sait qu'en particulier, en Afrique francophone, multimodal interdisant le des diffrents pays concern6s n'ont jamais et6 achev6s, ferroviaires ; que, du moins alors, maillage initialement pr6vu par la puissance colonisatrice source de d6veloppement du transport cet handicap Initial soit desormals et permettant, a partir de gares soigneusement choisies multimodal en nouveaux equipees de terminaux adaptes, de desservir de pr6alablement en projet en grace au transport combin6. Cela est deja en cours ou territoires au depart de FERKE CMte d'lvoire et au Burkina Faso, vers le Mali en particulier, DIOULASSO, de meme qu'au Cameroun, nous entendons et de BOBO a partir de d6velopper les liaisons vers le Tchad et la Centrafrique NGAOUNDERE et NGAOUNDAL; 4 * cette recherche d'alliances a, cependant, ses limites: financiers prenant des risques importants, que ce soit au travers des parts de societ6s concessionnaires capital des futures comme dans la souscription des emprunts acqu6rir le mat6riel ferroviaire destin6s a ou a r6habiliter celui-ci et les infrastructures fixes, nous entendons, en contrepartie, assumer la gestion responsabilit6 entiere de la des reseaux que nous nous proposons de reprendre, ou nous du moins ceux sommes parmi les premiers clients. Si j'ai dit precedemment reussite de ces operations que la ne pouvait qu'avoir d'heureuses consequences pour nos filiales implant6es sur place, la r6ciproque est serait tout aussi vraie: tout echec d6sastreux pour un Groupe implante en Afrique ans, dont il tire depuis pres de 70 une large part de ses resultats, et depasserait bien 6videmment cadre des seuls Etats concern6s le ; nous n'avons donc pas le droit & 1'erreur ! * nous entendons, d'ailleurs, tout autant associer Etat(s) et Personnel au suivi de 1'exploitation ferroviaire, sous la seule cependant reserve que nous soit garantie la libert6 de gestion commerciale, c'est-a-dire definition du plan la libre de transport, tout comme la liberte tarifaire, sans autant exclure, bien 6videmment, pour d'eventuelles obligations de service public, trait6es alors dans le cadre de conventions sp6cifiques. Dans ce dernier cas, il s'agira, le plus souvent, surtout de transports de Bien que cela ne corresponde voyageurs. pas aux m6tiers de base de SAGA, je crois avons su montrer jusqu'alors que nous que nous n'en r6cusions nullement le principe, qu'il me paraisse difficile, bien en Afrique comme ailleurs, d'y gagner beaucoup d'argent tandis que la qualite du service exige, aussi bien pour la voie que les gares et, fortiori, le materiel roulant, en a rench6rit singulierement les couts, d'autant que la couverture des risques exige, en outre, de solides assurances. 7 - Ayant ainsi, du moins je l'espere, explicite l'int6ret en meme temps limites, de groupes tels que que ses le notre pour ces mises en concession de reseaux ferroviaires ainsi que les principales regles que intervention nous souhaitons lier a notre dans de tels processus, je me propose maintenant vos eventuelles questions. de r6pondre a 5 qui m'est auparavant, cependant mettre a profit ce bref temps de parole Je souhaite, En effet, nous pour appeler votre attention sur un dernier point qui m'est cher. alloue sous la plume des entendons dire ici ou la, ou nous voyons dans la presse, comme autoris6s, qu'une c4convention est faite pour 6tre journalistes presentes avec les ),. Si nous sommes partisans du dialogue permanent ren6goci6e Organisations concern6es, Autorites de tutelle, Soci6t6s de Patrimoine, instances d'echanges fructueux, representatives du personnel, sans lequel il ne peut y avoir ou de prise en compte de contraintes impr6vues, j'ai la d'ameliorations permanentes priv6s, cependant, de croire qu'on ne saurait exiger des partenaires faiblesse, a politiques ", amends a prendre des risques importants (financiers, reprendre et gerer, dans un contexte pleinement concurrentiel, commerciaux) pour a la de transport initialement delabrees, qu'ils renoncent, en outre, des entreprises simulations que le cadre institutionnel sur lequel ils ont 6tabli leurs garantie et a respecter la soit du moins respect6. Habitues a tenir nos engagements d'attendre la reciprocite signature donnee, il me semble que nous sommes en droit entendu bien evidemment que l'lnstance de suivi de la de nos partenaires, 6tant et de Concession doit demeurer un organisme d'echanges permanents Convention ferroviaire. de concertation au profit exclusif du d6veloppement du transport a nos yeux: on ne fait Quelques mots ultimes, aussi evidents que fondamentaux, )) contre le personnel, et les aspects soclaux, A ce titre, pas une le Ministre, Monsieur le President, Mesdames et Monsieur avoir J'espere, Monsieur prive tel a votre attente en vous exposant le point de vue d'un Groupe ainsi r6pondu des chemins de que SAGA, principal acteur actuellement des mises en concession tiens d6sormais a votre fer en Afrique. Souhaitant ne pas avoir et6 trop long, je me disposition pour repondre a d'eventuelles questions. 6 SOFRETU 000 I/PDG/347-97 SOFRERAIL SEMINAIRE CONCESSIONS DES CHEMINS DE FER ABIDJAN 13/14 OCTOBRE 1997 Resumne le l'intervention (le P.L ROCHET, Prisident(le SYSTRA, (lurant Ia Table Rondle * Perspectivespour les investisseurs et opdrateurs4' QUELLES SONT LES RAISONS POUR SYSTRA D'ETRE INTERESSEE PAR UNE CONCESSION DE CHEMIN DE FER ? - Comme operateur : c'est la vocation et le m6tier de SYSTRA, qui est issue de la fusion de SOFRERAIL et de SOFRETU, et est dlonc Line ingenierie de transports ferroviaires et urbains, A forte culture de concepteur-exploitant, adoss6e A 2 grands exploitants francais: la SNCF (chemins de fer) et la RATP (exploitant urbain de metros, a Paris tramways et bus). Ceci donne A SYSTRA une forte capacit6 d'initervention en exploitation et d'appui tecluhique (ces 2 exploitants regroupent au total 200 000 personnes). A ceci s'ajoutent si n6cessaire les ressources nord-aniricaines de CANARAIL et de SYSTRA USA, du meme Groupe. L'interet de SYSTRA est de mettre en place du personnel en management d'exploitation et de fonrer le personnel de la societe exploitante en vue d'une op6ration efficace et A coCit minimum. Comine investisseur: il est demand6 en g6n6ral A SYSTRA d'etre investisseur (ce n'est pas qui sa vocation), le conc6dzat estimant souvent qtue l'op6rateur technique reference doit de participer au capital, ceci etanit destine Adiminuer le risque opr&ationnel. QUELLES SONT LES CONDITIONS A REMPLIR PAR LE PROJET ETRE INVESTISSEUR? POUR Credibilite: . politique le consenisus est necessaire, . tecluhique: le projet doit etre coherent avec l'environinienient g6n6ral du pays. et d'etre bien formule tecliniqueiiient, . financi&re : retour satisfaisaint sur investissemenit pour le concessionniaire, et rentabilit6 socio-6conomiqLue pour le conc6dant. Equilibre: . dans la repartition des responsabilites, . dans la repartition des risques. L'exp6rience montre que les concessionls ou les BOT d6s6quilibr6s dans ce domaine ne se font pas ou conduisent Ades situations malheureuses. 0001/PDG/347-97 - Durabilite: Une concession avant une duree de 15 a 40 aiis environ, le partenariat public-prive doit etre equilibre stir la dur6e. La presence d'un exploitant solide est n6cessaire, y compris lors de la definition du projet, et pour la duree de la concession. LES SCHEMAS PEUVENT ETRE VARIABLES ET ADAPTES . Concessionnaire compreinant l'exploitant. * Concessionnaire conitractant avec une societe exploitanite. . Exploitalt contractant avec uine ou des societes de mainlteniance. comozor COMPANY PROFILE AND CAPACITY STATEMENT OF COMAZAR (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED (Registration Number: 95/01226/07) a private company with limited liability and incorporated in terms of the Company Law of the Republic of South Africa comazor The address of Comazar's Head Office is: Physical Address Comazar (Proprietary) Limited Room 810 222 Smit Street Braamfontein Johannesburg South Africa Postal Address Comazar (Proprietary) Limited Room 810 222 Smit Street Private Bag X47 Johannesburg, 2000 South Africa Tel. No. (27) (11) 773-3003 Fax. No. (27) (11) 773-2846 comazar COMAZAR'S OBJECTS Comazar's objects are to operate rail networks and provide ancillary services and any other transport related business either directly or through joint venture companies. COMPANY PROFILE AND ACTIVITIES COMAZAR ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA has a 51 % shareholding in its subsidiary; ((Societe Interregionale Zairoise du Rail (SIZARAIL)>> which is a private company registered in Zaire. SIZARAIL has been operating the Southem rail network of O.C.S. (Office de Chemins de Fer du Sud) and.the Eastem rail network of S.F.E. (Societe du Chemin de Fer de l Est) in Zaire since 1 July 1995. The rail network being operated by Sizarail in Zaire comprises 3 500 km of track including 800 km of electrified track. Sizarail also operates the Port of llebo on the Kasai River in Zaire, the Port of Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika and the Port of Kindu as well as the cornidor, Kindu - Ubundu - Kisangani in the North-East in Zaire. has completed a study for the Ressano Garcia - Maputo corridor in Mozambique, Southem Africa, on appointment by Spoomet, for the purpose of becoming involved at a later stage in the operations on that project. has entered into a agreement with a successful Coal mining concessionaire of Australia for the exploitation of the Moatize coal mine in Mozambique and has completed the first part of transportation feasibility studies for the coal concessionaire with the purpose of operating the coal traffic by rail via the most economical rail route to a port in Mozambique. has secured with ((Interafrica Railway Corporation Ltd> the 20 year concession in favour of ((Interafrica Railway Corporation (Tanzania) Ltd)) to construct and operate a container transfer terminal on the Tazara line at Kidatu and to operate trains between Kidatu and Mwanza on the Tanzania Railways Corporation's (T.R.C.) network. ((lnterafrica Railway Corporation (Tanzania) Ltd) will be operational to promote unit container trains Northbound from Johannesburg, South Africa through Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and via the Kidatu project across Lake Victoria to Kampala, (Uganda) and also Southbound container traffic. was preselected in 1996 and is leader of the Consortium with ((Geodis International)) and ((C.F.D.)) of France and ((Transurb Consult)> of Belgium in the bidding for the concessioning and privatization of the National Railways of Cameroon, < has submitted studied of railways to the Govemment of Congo (Brazzaville) and was pre-qualified in 1997 to tender for the privatization of the railways (C.F.C.O.) in Congo (Brazzaville). COMAZAR ACTIVITIES IN PAKISTAN partook in the bidding for the RECO- Oil Train project in Pakistan at the end of 1996 in the consortium with ((C.P.C.S.>> of Canada, ((Marubeni)) of Japan and ((GM (Pakistan))) and await the outcome of negotiations. COMAZAR ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL Ferroeste Project: Paraguay - Cascavel - Curitiba - Port of Paranagua com azar has studied the sourcing of rolling stock and operational staff and operating of the Ferroeste Project in Brazil. The Ferroeste Project comprises a '30 year concession for: a. The operating of the new section Guarapuava - Cascavel (250 km) that has been completed earlier in 1996 and in need of the sourcing of locomotives, wagons and staff and the operating of this section. The traffic potential amounts to 4,5 million tons per year. b. The operating of the terminal at Cascavel. c. The operating of the Cascavel - Paraguay section (150 km) to be constructed. d. The operating of the traffic generated from Cascavel on the existing RFFSA section Cascavel - Curitiba - Port of Paranagua and with back loads which amounts 1,3 million tons per year. The Group that won the bid for the Sub-concession from Ferroeste in December 1996 namely: * FAO ENDREEMOIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES LTDA: A subsidiary of -Interfinance Bankw of Brazil. * GEMON GERAL DE ENGENHARIA E MONTAGENS S.A: A subsidiary of -M.P.E.- of Brazil. * POUND S.A., A subsidiary of -Banco Euroinvest S.A.- of Brazil with COMAZAR (PROPRIETARY LIMITED) will create a concessionaire company in Brazil before 9 February 1997 with each party holding 25 % in the voting capital. Comazar will operate the project for the concessionaire company. COMPANY STRUCTURE 72, Transnet Limited Limited (South Africa) (lrqInd) 165 % 114% 21 % 100 % SPOORNET DO ITD/CSAP/UTIL COMAZAR BRASIL (South Africa) INTERFERREA 20 Servicos % SNCC Ferroviarios | GEMON 2% e Intermodias S.A. GMN 25 % 7% MIBA 333% MICOR (Brasil) FAO_ 1 eans % POUN 10 % -d ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~InterAfrical BCZ Garanta 42,5 % 42,5 % 7,5 % 25 % 51 % 33,3 % Ralph F TRANS AFRICA Judori 7,5 % INTERFERREA FERROVIA SIZARAIL Railtex LOGISTICA RAILWAY PARANA I S.A.R.L. CORPORATION CSN S.A. S.A. | (Congo (DRC)) TANZANIA CVRD (Brasil) LIMITED MPE (Brasil) (Tanzania) 12,5% I 87,5% 80% 20% 55,2% 48,8% Ferrovia Centro Ferrovia Sul Spoornet Tragao Atlantica Atlantica S.A. FCA FSA (Brasil) (Brasil) (Brasil) (rsl DESCRIPTION OF COMAZAR'S SHAREHOLDERS The incorporation of Comazar (Proprietary) Limited, a private company with limited liability registered in South Africa, was the result of the joint venture entered into by its principle shareholders, Transnet Limited and Transurb Consult, that combined their resources and capabilities. TTransnet Limited is a public company, registered in South Africa and operates through its divisions and subsidiaries in the transport and logistical markets. Transnet s rail transport activities are handled by Spoomet the railway division. Spoometoperates 35 000 kilometres of rail network in South Africa of which 6 560 kilometres are electrified. Spoometowns a fleet of 142 000 rail wagons, 1 410 diesel and 2 092 electrical locomotives and handles 164 million tonnes of freight per annum. Spoomet also owns and operates 14 000 containers. Spoornet is a founder member of the Intemational Heavy Haul Association (IHHA) and a participant since its inception in 1982. Spoomelis renowned for the operations on its heavy haul export lines namely Richards Bay Coal Line (60 million tons per year) and the Sishen-Saldanha Iron Ore Line (20 million tons per year) which was valued by Mercer Consulting (USA) in its benchmarking, as the best mass rail transportation systems in the world. Spoomet also holds the world record for: * the operations of the longest trains over the longest section of network; and * the world speed record on narrow gauge (1067 mm) lines. Spoometoperates its inter city main line passenger services in South Africa through its division by Interpax. The daily handling of 2,2 million commuter trips in South African Metropolitan Centres namely Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretora and East London is performed by Metro, a division of Transnot. Transurb Consult] was created in 1983 at the instigation of the Belgian state to make the know-how and experience, which has been acquired in urban and regional transportation, available to those faced with similar problems. Transurb Consult is a Belgian company with 72,5 % interest held by S.N.C.B. (Belgium Railways), 18,5 % held by C.F.L. (Luxembourg Railways) and Brussels Urban Transport with the remaining 9 % interest being held by Tractabel and various other private parties. Transurb is highly specialized in the following transport modes for passengers and freight: - Rail transport * railway * suburban * urban - Road transport * urban * regional and international - Intermodal transport and more specifically in: * High speed train systems * Urban Mass Transport (train way, trolley bus, bus) * Freight Intermodal Transport The sector-related skills of Transurb are guaranteed by the manpower potential and technological achievements of its members, together with its worlddwde experience in some 50 different countries on the 5 continents, partly gained through its subsidiaries. ArtcoEl Invesents| is a company registered in Ireland and is responsible for sourcing |Limited | French speaking expatriate managers to the operations of Comazar on Francophone projects. At this stage the expatriates deployed in Sizarail in Zaire by Artcole is an efficient and success story. CD,% CD,%- CD' C K N CD CQ Ql -. U lWI-0 ~ A_ X s| SIZARAIL SOCIETE INTERREGIONALE ZAIROISE DU RAIL SARL A SUBSIDIARY OF COMAZAR REGISTERED IN ZAIRE Sizarail is a subsidiary of Comazar that operates the Southem rail network (former O.C.S.) and Eastem rail network (former S.F.E.) in Zaire. A mandate for a 5 year pedod, that commenced on 1 March 1995, was signed by Comazar and the Govemment of Zaire. Sizarail is in the process of rebuilding the infrastructure and restructuring the railway organizations of the former S.N.C.Z. in Zaire. Sizarail is also commercially exploiting the operations in Zaire and the following information is an indication of the efficient performance experienced over the last year since operations were taken over by Sizarail. FINANCIAL RESULTS I January to 1 J*to 31 December 1996 31 Dommbr 1995 Revenue US$ US$ a. Goods traffic 53 403 037 19 514 729 b. Passenger traffic 3 090 451 1 216 683 c. Other revenues 12 280 542 5 153 576 Total revenue 68 774 030 25 884 988 Expenses a. Contribution to S.N.C.Z. Group 11 357 980 9 603 339 b. Operating expenses of Sizarail 51 834 748 13 196 106 c. Contribution to Comazar 1 813 010 Total Expenses 63 192 728 24 612 456 Sizarail is actively involved in implementing solutions for the social problem of workers of S.N.C.Z. group and has contributed US$ 9,6 million in 1995 to salaries and pensions. .Sie:ge Sociall. liiniiietiale lale (mnItnunautit, l vIIt iqtie Direction Gdnerale 20ne ,lrvitage,Bid du 30Jtuin, B.R 14816 'I'61&ecl: 44115 Telecel: 47409-47809-47909 KI NSISIIASA - ZA I R h:Fx : (001) 212-3769522 LU'BUMBASHI - ZAIRE SUPPLY CONTRACTS SECURED BY COMAZAR TO SOURCE ITS PROJECTS The following supply contracts for resources have been secured by Comazar to source its activities: Type of Contract Description of Resource With sourcing party 1. Locomotive rental. * 20 x locomotives: Spoomet Contract for Zaire. (Type GE-U15c) 5 years 2. Tanker cars * 100 x Tanker cars Spoomet 5 years 3. Interchange contract * All Spoomet wagons Spoomet for all daily wagon in Zaire rentals in Zaire. 5 years 4. Passengercoaches * 10 x Passenger coaches Spoomet 5 years 5. Locomotive lease * 60 x locomotives :- Spoomet Agreement for Brazil (Type GM-GT26MC) 30 years 6. Locomotive lease * 20 x locomotives Spoomet Agreement for the (Type GE-U20c) Congo 5 years 7. Locomotive lease * 8 x locomotives: Spoomet Agreement for (Type GE-U15c) Tanzania / Uganda 20 years 8. Locomotive lease * 20 x locomotives: Spoomet Agreement for the (Type GE-U20c) Cameroon 20 years 9. Locomotive lease * 40 x locomotives: Spoomet Agreement for the (Type GE-U20c) Moatize Project, 20 years Mozambique 10. Expatriates * Managers, Consultants Artcole Invest- and Operators in ments Ltd Francophone countries (Ireland) 11. Expatriates * Managers, Consultants Comatrans and operators in International Anglophone and other S.A. countries (Luxembourg) ROLE OF COMAZAR (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED IN A CONSORTIUM TRANSNET IRCA (Pty) Ltd LIMITED CONTRACTS South Africa South Africa Risk & Safety Individual: CONTRACT Management Professional PROTEKONRaly Consulting, Construction -PROTEKONOprts & Maintenance Supply expertise & ConsuKtants PERSONNEL -TRANSB [ ------_ COMATRANS nkpl=1_ . INTERNATIONAL S.A Luxembourg INCSENT CONTRACT | 72,5S.N.C.B. % | ~~~TRANSWERK Supply Blgu wagons Managers 8 Openrators TRANSURB 2 CONSULT 2% CON TRACT Belgium SPOORNET Lease of Lodomotives ARTCOLE 14% INVESTMENTS Ireland ------_- _ ------_------THE CONSORTIUM l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . . ,...... , .:.. : ' --...... -'' CONTRACT COMAZAR Suppl______> (Proprietary) Ltd SupplY A B 1 Professional a South Africa Managers& - ...... Operators A "Operator"' "Partners/Investors" Legend: .L _- __OPERATING- - _ JOINT Contracts Contract , VENTURE COMPANY ___TOShareholding Operate FOR THE PROJECT COMAZAR'S ACCESS TO RESOURCES of its shareholding c o m a z a r can draw on the vast resources companies Transnet Limited/Spoomet and Transurb Consult conceming all types of operational resources. In this regard Comazar has contractually signed up the provision of 200 diesel electric locomotives which will be provided by Spoomet for Comazars deployment in projects. Spoomet has also made railtanker cars, wagons and passenger coaches available to Comazar for deployment. has developed the latest simulation systems to determine for train operations. Its CoQ m a z a r the most cost effective systems communications and software systems are technically advanced. has access to human resources, expertise and managerial corn azar and operational capabilities through its own personnel, expatriats and consultants resourced by the companies Comatrans Intemational S.A., a public company registered in Luxembourg and Artcole Investments Limited, a public company registered in Ireland as well as Spoomet and Transurb Consult. through its managers, has the know-how to manage any rail level of efficiency within co m azar operation to the highest possible the physical designs possible, through the systems and facilities it owns. has as part of its capabilities, a group of managers and experts with years of experience of railway operations in the field of freight as well as commuter and long distance passenger transportation. w w ;' SIZARAIL SOCIETE INTERREGIONALE ZAIROISE DU RAIL SARL FREIGHT TRAFFIC PRIVATE MANAGEMENT SINCE MARCH 1995 Semesters 1994 1995 1996 Traffic l stt er 2nd semeter 1st semester 2nd semter 1st semst | 2nd semester Import 48 525 24 861 35 996 32 813 46 430 56 759 Export 0 485 327 1 557 50 245 40 422 Local 216 265 234 794 274 088 345 022 382 795 466 432 Total 264 790 260 140 310 411 379 392 479 470 563 613 Passenger 46 418 33 426 20 832 79 134 131 706 173 284 FREIGHT TRAFFIC 550000S- 500000- 350000- 360000 - 2000000- - I 200000-_._Ill 199/1 1994/2 1995/1 1995/2 1996/1 Somet 1996/2 Sic!es.,.ial. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -gt. limitetibc title C(la nmuniuatjt FIL*I6niqutel Direction Ginirale 2cew awt:ige,Bltl itl30juii, B.P 14816 '1'Iiecl :4411 TIle KINSHiAS l 47409-47809-47909 A - ZAIRE Fx: (001) 212-3769522 -LLBLMIBASFI-1- ZAIRE Fepasa and its Brazilian partners ((Banco Interfinance/Banco EuroinvestVM.P.E.>> have agreed to study, and if feasible, bid for the networks in Brazil namely the Fepasa (Sao Paulo network) networks, which will be auctioned in Brazil during the first quarter of 1998. also obtained 7,5 % shareholding in the company < -oOo- Session 7 4 1 II Ii I i i i I Railway Privatisation: The Role of the Consultant .. I, .. - - , - - ...... 13etcr- Kicei'an CPCS I'ranscom LtAd. Abi-djC October 1997 Content of the presentation <,^I ntroduLctionI to CPCSTiIranscom Ltd. .-- RaiIway privaltisation process ~-Focus on railway an-d port privatisatio sXCPCS + F11 ickll I-anlsco *Comiibinationi of management consUlting and railway cngyineerl)go SWe are the leadingo- comiipaniy inc the plivatisation of liailways anid ports in Africa -- A f Operated by state -- railway companies KPrivatization Projects Underway or Planned I Privatization Projects I Managed or proposed by CPCS Transcom Railway privatisation process :r'Privatisationi is the eind resuIlt ofla continllULmn of small steps wlhich canl trans-l'orm a railway flroom a governmient departmcnit all the way to a pr-ivate company if desired. Continuum of Privatisation/C omrnercialisation 1 l,e ('"onttuuumuillu of (uiuIe,elliel-ciI.liauiol Olion S4;. *urei -|- -. _ re _.e/.#eiiainI. .. .e.I.a _) _ j . _ __,_.~. l *;. .g...... | riauif"Pa Eforenpetter.. eg~a .. __,l |. C isaInftstIiuep legy(Xr.,ieg { -- E [ Je ge cuvga-- - j c L17 I'rleul I:utqwE aeiaaiire*.$ Iii^ IXagle eelR 6%fss Railway privatisation process - YouL ImuLlst be liv iln the overall inicrease in the efficienicy'olfthie private sector "Do niot make substantial inivestmenits in the iifinastl-rLcturle beb'or-c the pr-ivatisationi - you alrc Lilikely to get the inoniey back 6_. - -~ e 6 e-~ _ _X 0 -~ ~ 0 C~~~C 0 ~ _ cr~: Rol.e of the Consultant - 2 4''>PIelilminary sta(yes cominiiicrcialisatioii costilng performiiance coIntracts conitr actintg out ofl services elimiiination of loss making services dlelfinition of publ'ic service obligations Role of Consultants - 3 ;rivatisationl Conisultanits Role IInvest igation i Iol'nlorlationi Ieviewv o foptions establislh pi-ocess (lecisioni to proceed detailed anialysis detailed desi,bmi ecoinomlic anialysis regulatioll legislationi i-ivest. priotiotioi prepaation of, p)1re selectioni dimeii s implemienuLtion plrloilnotioln Role of the Consultant - 4 esimplemerntation: The bidding teams for the concessioni canl iniclude: r'ai lway operatingl comiipaniies ^ service pr-ovidels (maintcnance) % riailway encgineering consultants ^ imianiagemelent conisultanits ^ tranisportation comiipaniies investors Client expectations 'Sensitivity to the pcolitical and social. envira&ment . . "I KInowledge of.experiencc.and. lessorns learned rom both.. the. gove.mment anid the investor side .. .. AbiIity.:to communiicate hew. concepts and ideas. La privatisation des chemins de fer: Le role du conseiller Peter Kieran CPCS Transcom Ltd. Abidjan October 1997 i i I Table des matieres CPCS Transcom Ltd. -La societe CPCS Transcom Ltd. awPrivatisation des chemins de fer et des ports .La processus de pri%atisation 'CPCS + Hickling Transcom - Le role du conseiller Integration des conseils et du g6rie en -Les attentes du client matierre de chemins de fer .- En Afrique. nous sommnes la societe dominante en matiere de privatisation des chemins de fer et des ports La processus de privafisation -Le privatisation est le resultat d'une succession de petites etapes i laide desquelies on peut transformer, si on le desire, une lipe de chemins de far, d'un rministere a une socicte privee. - 4w. urSn La continuum de la privatisation et de la commercialisation Le processus _~C i- -On doit 6te convaincu que le secteur priv& I est en gin6ral plus efficient =D ne faut pas faire d'investissement I ______importants d infrastructure avant de privatiser - cet argent sera perdu Ur -- ______.1 t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Le r6le du conseiller Le r6le du conseiller - 2 -Les conseillers jouent un role dans chaque -Les etapes pr6limiinaires etape . commercialisation * Les etapes preliminaires . etablissernent des couts * La pniatisation -l'octroi de concession . contrats plans * La mise en oeuvrc . contrats de service avec des entrepreneurs * elimination de services deficitaires * definition des obligations de service public Le role du conseiller - 3 R6le du conseiller - 4 ' La privatisation a R6le w La mise en oeuvTe: les equipes pour la * enquete * informaton concession peuvent comprendre: * exiCfn dc opoons * cion du preuus * des soci6tes d exploitation de chemin de fer * decioon de condinuer . azulse approfaidze * conciztion de ontainuer a a . des fournisseurs de services (entrctien) * rigpemention . xegislayon * des conseillers en genie ferroviaire * promotion des invest * priparaton de * des conscillers en gestion * Pri-selecion documcnts * des societes de transport * ien oS ve . promotion * des investisseurs Les attentes du client Les attentes du client - 2 a Sensibilite au milieu politique et social wMaximisation de la valeur pour l'Etat aussi aConnaissance de 1'experience et des lecons bien que de 1'inv estisseur apprises du cote de l'Etat aussi bien que de 'Prestation de soutien, d'arguments ' investisseur nationaux et d' exemples en faveur d' un aCapacitd de communiquer de nouvelles changement structurel notion et id6es wMaximisation des avantages pour 1'economie local, en assurant un transport ferro%iaiare efficient et concurrentiel Session 8 ------CONCESSIONING STATUS COL' rRY: ZA MBI1A RA-IL SYsTrEM: ZLAN\IBIA RA-% IIL-WAYS GOVERNMENT CONIMII TMEN r: SUBSLrN FII.\_LL C0IN I lITED TO PRIVA.\TIZ.\TION BtLT NO TIME TABLE \S Y-ET RAIL\\VA YS CO.\I.\IITM EN r: SUBSTAN ri.LLYAOcmmi C r,TED INFRASTRLUCrTURE CONDITION: 4 OPERAT\ING .ASSETS: 7 RESTRLUCTU RING PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING: ALMOST NO RESTRICTING - SOME STAFF REDUCTION - ASSETS REVALUED - NO CLEAR STRATEGY FOR FlRTHER STAFF REDLUNDANCY - NO KNO\WN STEPS ro\.ARDS RE\VS;ION OF RAILW\.AY- RELATED LEGISLATION - RATWO-YEAR MIANAGEMENT CONTRACT U NDER NEGOTIATION - REGULATORY FRA.\EW\ORK STILL TO BE DISCUSSED CONCESSIONING MODE: NO DECISION AS YET CONCESSIONING METHOD: NO DECISION CONCESSIONING STATUS: CATEGORY - C (LNCERTAIN) LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING: JUNE '000 'ONCESSIONING METHOD: POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL COM PETI TI VE CONCESSION[NG STATUS: CA.\ECORY- B LIKFLY TO II.\PPEN I'KELY D.A rE OF SIGNING: JULNE I'99 COLN'TRY: ZI \I B.\ BWE 'AlL S'S,STEM: NA TIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE GO\ERNMENFV COMMIITNMIENT: DECISION TO SEPARATE i\FRASVTRUCTLrRE FROM OPERA FIONS AND CONCIESSION THE NFR.\s rR L TC'RE BL'T \NC) FORM1.AL ST.A TE.IENT RAIL-WAYS CONMMI FMENT: rrEDIO\INIIr- ChANGE BUT SKEP FICAL ABOL[r SEP.ARATION INFRNSTRUCTLRE CONDITION: S (PERATING ASSETS: RESTRUCTURiNG PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING: SLBSTANTI.ALL RES TRL CTU RED * 30 STAFF REDUCTION DURING THE LAST THtREE YEARS - ORGANIZATION RESTRL CTURING RATIONALIZATION OF INFRASTRL CTURE AND OPE RATIG .ASSETS - ASSETS REVALLED - ' )PERATIONS RESTRLCTLRING - CLEAR STRATEGY FOR FLURTHER STAFF REDUNDANCY - RAIL.WAY ACT 7NDER REVISION - REGULATORY FRAMEWORK STILL TO BE DISCUSSED CONCESSIONING MODE: - SEPARATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE - CONCESSIONING OF INFRASTRUCTURE AFTER SEPARATION I CONCESSIONING ST.vTLS OLNTRY: M1O ZA.\MBIQUE R.-NIL SYSTEM: IWIR.A PORT R-IL SYSTEM (o\'ERN.\IEN r COMMITMENT. i:u Il comm VrrED KEY CO-MPONlENT OF FRA\SPORr POLICY RAILWAYS CONINIITMIENT: Fl LL" CONI.MI I'TED C ONCERNS A BOU T 'STAl:F REDU.NDANCY INFR-R\STRLUcTrURE CONDITION - ON ONE LINE I!ON TE SENA LINE OPER.- rING ASSETS: RESTRL CTU'RING PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING: ASSET' RE VAL L ED - NO CL-EAR S FRATEGY FOR --TAFF REDlUNDANCY - LEGAL FRA.kNIEW ORK UNDER STLDY - REGLULATORY FRAME.\WE\ORK STILL UNDER DISCLUSSION CONCESSIONrNG MODE: ONE CONCESS10N FOR THE WHOLE SYSTEM OR ONE CONCESSION FOR THE OPERATING PART OF THE SYSTEM WHILE THE FEASIBILITY OF THE REST OF THE SYSTEM IS ESTABLISHED CONCESSIONING METHOD: NO DECISION CONCESSIONING STATUS: CATEGORY - A (MOST LIKELY TO HAPPEN) LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING: DECEMBER 1998 .CONLTRY: NIOZ \"I BIQU E ;(AIL SY STEMt: AI.\PL TO PORT RAIL SYSTEM C,CV R.NIEN r C(O)\N\lITMlE\NT: LY CO.\ I I IT T T ED KEY COMPONENT OF TR.\NSPWORT i'Ol. ICY RAILWA YS Co\\IN I TNIENT F l LLY COMINIITTED CONCERNS ABOLUT STAFF REDUNDANCY INFRASrRLCFIRE CONDITION: - ON A ONE TO TEN SCALE O(PER-\ riG .\SSETS: REs rRL CTL RING PRIOR TO CONCES'iONING: - \SSETS RE\ALLUED \0 CLEAR STRA [EGY FOR STAFF REDLUNDANCY L EGAL FRANI.\IEWt)RK UNDER STU DY REGULLATORY FRAM.\E\\WORK 'STILL LUNDER DISCU'SSION CONCESSIONING MODE: ONE CONCESSION FOR THE WHOLE SYSTEM OR SEP.ART'PE CONCESSION'S FOR THE THREE LINES. MARSHALLING YARD AND \ ORK,SHOP CONCESSIONING NtETHOD: IN'TERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE BIDDING CONCESSIONING STATUS: CATEGORY- A (MOST LIKELY TO HAPPEN) LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING: MARCH 1998 COUNTRY: MlOZ.\ANBIQLE AlL SYSTEM: \ACAL.\ PORT R.IL SYSTEM (OVTERNNIEN r cONi i I NiEN-T FJ LLY CONINl ! r ED KEY' C,()\IPO\I.N -OF IRA\SPCRIT ?OL ICY R-IL\\ \YS COMNII \I\Tr.I F LLLY C )IN I lTTED CON\CERNS ABOUT STAFF RE D U\DA.NCY INFR.-\A rRL CTLRE CO\DI 110N - ON A ONE TO TEN SCALE oPERATING ASSETS:- RESTRUCTURING PRI(-R rF) CCYNCESSIONING: A\SSETS REVALL ED - NO C LEAR STRA FEGY FoR SJTAFF REDLNDANCY - LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER S TL DY REGLUL.FrORY FRA.\IEWO PK STILL UNDER DISCUSSION CONCESSIONING MIODE: ONE CONCESSION FOR THE WHOLE -SYSTEM CONCESSIONING MIETHiOD: DIREC r NEGOTIATIONS WITH AN LNSOLICITED BIDDER CONCESSIONING STATRS: CATEGORY- A.MOST LIKELY TO -IAPPEN) LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:; MARCH 1998 I ii I 1 i i I I it (UNTRY: MALAWI I AIL SYSTENM: \IAL.\WI R\ILW\AYS (;(\Ai:R\\iE\ r C.O)MI\]TMIE\r: FU1.LYCCONi rtiED KEY CO.\P )NENl OF rRANSPORT RAIL\\ .XYS COMmI rmENT: FULLY COMMITTED !NFR.S I R CTl RE C(C)NDI r0N 8 .PERA rING, .ASSETS: RES FRL CTLTR1\G PRIOR TO C(NCESSIONING: - COMNPLETEL) RESTRLUCTURED * sEP.\RA-\rE NEW COMPANIES FOR RAIL .ANDLAKE SERVICES I\CORPORA rED - t@hOST.\FF RETRENCHED - 50%v ASSETS DECLARED SL RPLL'S *ASSETS REVALUED - OLD MALAWl RAIL\W AY'S 5NDER 'INDING LIP - CLEAR STRATEGY FOR FU-RTHER STAFF RE DLNDANCY *DD C LEG.AL FRAMEWORK CLEAR REGULATORY FRAMEWOR.K LNDER DISCU'SSION CONCESSIONING MODE: ONE CONCESSION FOR THE WHOLE SYSTE.M CONCESSIONING METHOD: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE CONCESSIONFNG STATUS: CATEGORY- A (MIOST LIKELY TO HAPPEN) LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING: JUNE 1998 "AILWAY SYSTEMS CONSIDERED: I' GOVERNMEN r CONtMIITMlENT: FUt.LLY COMNII I *ro CONCESSIONING SUBS r.\NTIALLY COMNI%T'rED.- 5 UNCERT.\IN -5 CONCESSIONING FIMIET.\BLE: 1998 - 4 1999 - 3 L000 - 5 CONCESSIONING MODE ONE CONCESSION FOR T1HE WHOLE RAILW\.AY - 6 \IORE THAN ONE CONCESSIONS IN ONE RAIL WA -' SEPARATION OF INFRASTRUCTUR.E- 2 UNCERTAIN - 7 RESTRUCTU'RING ST.-\TUS SUBSTANTIAL - 4 SOME - 4 NEGLIGIBLE -9 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK SOME THINKING - 4 "OLNTRY: KENYA 'L\IL SYSTEM: rHE \k IIOLE RAILWAY SYSTEM CiUV LRN\MENT COMINII FNiFN F. S LBST.\ rl. .LY C ON\1.\I 1-1 ) R.AILWY\\\S O)NMITN1ENT sli13ST\N TI.\ . LLY CO \1 I rI If) INFRAS rRL 'C'L RE CON DI HION ')PER- [ING .\SSE rs RES RtRC TRING PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING VERY LITTLE *O\C. SSION!NG MODE; \0 DEC!SION BL'T CONCLES: ..0NING xND COPEN -\CCESS LIKELY CO\CESSIONING ME [HOD: NO INDICATION CONCESSIONING SrT. rLS: C.ATEGC)RY- C (VNCER FA.\\ LIKELY D.ATE OF SIGNING: LNCERTAIN COUNTRY: U.GAN DA i.AlL SYSTEEM: TIlE WIHOLE RAILW.\' SYSTEM .)VLRN1Ntl'N CO\I .I TIEN\T. S'BS r.AN 1.\LLY CONINtI fTED R.\ILVAYS.x\'< COMMITMl'r\lENT: NO IND1C \ [IION IN FRASTrRL CTL'RE C(-ON'DITION: OPERA rING .ASSETS: REST RLCTURING PRIOR ro CONCESSIONING: \ERY LITTLE CON\CESSIONING MODE. NO DECISION BL'T CONCCESSIONCING LIKELY CONCESSIONING METHOD> NC) INDICATION CONCESSIONING ST.ArT'S: CA FEGOkY - C VUNCERTAINX LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING: UNCERT.-\IN 'OLNrRY: TANZANI A i(AIL SYSTE M: TANZANIA RAILWAY CORPORA riON GOVEfRNMENT COCIMMITMEIEN r. F LI.LY COmmIrFED RAII -WAYS *(TNII \ 1BSFMEN F \NTII I I C\ENFUI rTEDF INFR\STRL CTL RE CO-N DI I-ION. OPER\ FING ASSETS 4 RESrRL CTL'RING PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING: SOME RESTRICTING - VERY LirTLE STAFF REDL CTION - AS'ETS REVALUED - O0 CLEA%R STRATE(GY FOR STAFF REDUNDANCY - -OPERATIONSRESTRLUCT RING NO KNO\\W S'TEPS TOWARDS REVISION OF RAILWAY- RELATED LEGISLATION - REG ULA TO RY FRA.\IE WO,R STILL TO BE DISCLSSED CONCESSIONING .MODE: NO DEC'SION .AS YET CONCESSIONING MIETHOD: N0 DEC!SICON BLT INTERNA T' oN.AL COMIPETITIVE BIDDING LIKELY CONCESSIONING STATUS: CATEGORY - .A(MIOST LIKELY TO HAPPEN) LIKELY D.ATE OF SIGNING: DECEMBER 1999 cou\ rRY: BIOTSWANA. SWAZILAND. TAZARA. SO'TH AFRICA A.. I1.S STEM1: WHOLE RAILWA.\Y SYSTEMS (o\uIER\N\ENT COMMNII f\ENT: N\ INDIC.\TION RAILWAY.\S C(N)NIII FMENT \C) INDIC\ FION INFRASTRU.CTURE CONDIriON 6-8 OPERA\ ING A\SSETS 6-8 RESTRUCTURING PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING: VARYING CONCESSIONING NMODE: NO INDIC.A rION CONCESSIONING METHOD NO INDICATION 0ONCESSIONING STA rUS C.\TEGORY - C (L-`NCERT.\IN ' IKELY DATE OF SIGNING. UNCERTAIN COLNTRY: NANMIBIA AlL SY STEM1: \\WHOLE RAIL\\AY SYSTENt GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT: INTENTION Bro SEP.-RA rE INFRASTRUCTrRE FROM !PERP lIONS BU'T NO INDIC.I\ rON ON CONCESSIONING ulR PRI VA IVZ ION RAILWAY S COMMITMENT: NO INDICATION INFR-\STRU CTURE CONDITION: 7 OPERAkING ASSETS: 8 RESTRUCrT RING PRIOR TO CONCESSIONING: - CORPORATE RESTRICTING COMPLETED RAIL\WAY A. SEP ARATE AUTONOMOUS COMPANY V ERY LITTLE STAFF REDUCTION NNOT N0W\ N NO KNOWN STEPS TOWARDS REVISION OF RAIL-WAY- RELATED LEGISLATION REGULLATORY FRAM.\lEWORK STILL TO BE DISCLUSSED JNCESSIONING MODE: NO DECISION ONCESSIONING METHOD: NO DECISION JNCESSIONINTG STATUS: CATEGORY - C (UNCERTAIN) KELY DATE OF SIGNING: UNCERTAIN i i i I I UNION AFRICAINE DES COMMISSION ECONOMIQUE CHEMINS DE FEER POUR L'AFRIQUE MISE EN CONCEESSION FERROVIAIRE EN AFRIQUE CENTRALE BREF APERqU SUR LES EXPERIENCES EN COURS Expose presente au Se'minaire sur la Mise en Concession Ferroviaire en Afrique Abidjan, 13-14 octobre 1997 Bernard ZOBA Secritaire G6n6ral Union Africaine des Chemins de Fer Antoine TCHIBOZO Expert Ferroviaire Commission Economique Pour I'Afrique i ! 1. REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO A. CAS DU CHEMIN DE FER MATADI-KINSHASA (CFMK) Ce chemin de Fer est g6r6 par l'Office National des Transports (ONATRA). OPTION DU GOUVERNEMENT - Concession de l'exploitation ferroviaire au secteur pnv6 - Creation d'une soci6t6 priv6e de maintenance du mat6riel ferroviaire - Creation d'une societ6 privee d'entretien et de renouvellement de la voie - Sous-traitance d'autres activit6s connexes (exemple: carriere - ONATRA a ballastre) devient une societe de patrimoine PROJET DE L'ONATRA - Creation d'une soci6t6 de materiel roulant (filiale du CFMK) - Favoriser la creation des soci6t6s de wagons et acquisition des wagons par des tiers (clients importants du CFMK) - Creation d'une soci6t6 de maintenance du materiel ferroviaire - ONATRA conserve les installations fixes du CFMK (T6l6communications, signalisation, voie) mais scus-traite les grands travaux - ONATRA conserve l'exploitation du Chemin de Fer du CFMK - Cession de l'action commerciale au secteur priv6 par la cr6ation des commissionnaires - exp6diteurs Le projet de I'6tude de mise en concession du KINSHASA Chemin de Fer MATADI- (CFMK) est en cours de r6alisation par l'ONATRA et sera soumis Gouvernement de la au R6publique D6mocratique du Congo. CHEMINS FER DU CONGO (SNCC) B. CAS DE LA SOCIETE NATIONALE DES SNCZ, exploite actuellement 3729 km de Cette societe, precedemment denommee du Katanga). voie et a son siege a Lubumbashi (Province PROJET SIZARAIL creation en 1995, de la Societe - Sur decision du Gouvemement de 1'ex-Zaire, interconnecte. SIZARAIL chargee de 1'exploitation du r6seau (entreprises publiques zaTroises - Structure de SIZARAIL : 49 % d'actions zafroises ZaTre, contre 51 % d'actionnariat et entreprises d'interets belges installees au ET SPOORNET). etranger (COMAZAR, comprenant TRANSURB - Projet SIZARAIL comportait deux phases: de 5 ans; . une phase de collaboration elargie d'une duree la periode de 5 ans, . une phase de concession envisageable apres de la premiere phase sous reserve notamment d'une 6valuation positive de collaboration; SIZARAIL, entre autres: - Nombreuses critiques formulees sur le projet consid6re comme trop . niveau d'intervention de COMAZAR dans SIZARAIL SNCZ n'en possedait que eleve (51 % des actions, alors que le Groupe une alienation du 20 %), ce qui apparaissait au niveau local comme prive; patrimoine national au profit d'un groupe d'interet A titre d'exemple, le . apport financier de COMAZAR juge insuffisant. de l'Office des Chemins de programme triennal 1995-1997 de redressement etait estime a Fer du Sud (O.C.S.), un des membre de la SNCZ, global de COMAZAR sur 5 ans 29.049.134 $US, alors que l'apport financier n'etait que 2.500.000 $US; juge excessif (4.000.000 $US/an, . cout du partenariat SNCZ avec COMAZAR par rapport a l'apport de 500.000 $US/an). 4 CHANGEMENT INTERVENU Avec la lib6ration du ZaTre, devenu R6publique D6mocratique du Congo, les nouvelles Autorit6s, estimant que le projet SIZARAIL frisait le bradage du patrimoine national, ont d6cid6 d'y mettre fin. La SNCZ, devenue depuls lors, la SNCC a, par la r6vocation du mandant A donn6 SIZARAIL, r6cup6r6 sa fonction d'explottant dep transports ferroviaires et demeure une SocI6t6 d'Etat. 11. REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO (CFCO) CAS DU CHEMIN DE FER CONGO-OCEAN A. DEMARRAGE DU PROCESSUS avec le choix en 1996 par le Gouvemement Le processus a d6marr6 effectivement Ltd pour: Congolais, de la Soci6t6 CPCS Intemational de Privatisation, qui, dans le cas du - apporter un appui au Comit6 National de cette entreprise; CFCO, devait piloter la mise en concession du CFCO durant la p6riode - assurer une administration provisoire int6rimaire (_ 12 mois). B. CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA CONCESSION sur des periodes de 5 ans - Dur6e : 20 ans, avec possibilite de prolongation par un Comite de suivi. - Suivi d'execution et reglement de litiges - Le concessionnaire assure: des services marchandises I'exploitation technique et commerciale et voyageurs; l'am6nagement des Ia maintenance, le renouvellement et infrastructures ferroviaires; Ia gestion domaniale du domaine public. notamment) qui seraient exploites a - Les 6ventuelles services (voyageurs l'objet de compensation financiere. titre d'obligation de service public feront ans) dont beneficie le concessionnaire - A l'issue de la p6riode d'exclusivite (5 utiliser, notamment sur des op6rateurs secondaires pourront egalement contre paiement au demande de I'Etat, les infrastructures ferroviaires concessionnaire d'un p6age. restent propriete de I'Etat et mises a la - Les infrastructures ferroviaires sont et de pret a usage. disposition du concessionnaire au titre pris en location par le - Les materiels ferroviaires du CFCO seront le cadre de contrats de location. concessionnaire (apres selection) dans du personnel du CFCO librement - Le concessionnaire reprendra une partie prevu pour le personnel non repris. s6lectionn6 par lui. Un plan social sera redevance, en contrepartie de - Le concessionnaire versera a I'Etat une 6 l'utilisation des infrastructures et du droit d'exploiter les services ferroviaires. - La Soci4t4 concessionnaire sera une societe anonyme par actions de droit congolais, et sera structur6e de la maniere suivante: . I'actionnaire de ref6rence possedera 67 % du Capital de la Soci6t4 (Action A), dont la moiti6 au moins appartiendront aux actionnaires nationaux, ou entreprises de droit congolais; . I'autre partie du Capital de la Soci6t6 concessionnaire (Actions B) sera souscrite a plus de 50 % par des personnes physiques de nationalite congolaise ou par des entreprises de droit congolais ; 5 % seront reserves au personnel de la societe et 15 % au maximum A I'Etat. C. ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DU PROCESSUS - Le Cabinet CPCS International Ltd a depose en f6vrier 1997, un rapport diagnostic. - Des problemes lies au conflit de comp6tence entre la Direction du CFCO et l'Administrateur Delegue ont conduit a la r6daction de nouveaux termes de reference sur les activit6s du Consultant qui, d6sormais, est a Conseiller en privatisation du CFCO )) et non plus Administrateur Delegue. - Le planning initialement retenu est le suivant: lIancement de I'appel d'offres :15 juillet 1997 . remise des offres techniques :15 novembre 1997 . evaluation des offres techniques et demande des offres financieres : 15 janvier 1998 . D4p6t des offres financieres : 1er mars 1998 . Selection de l'adjudicataire : 15 mars 1998 . Reprise par l'adjudicataire : I er juillet 1998 La guerre survenue a Brazzaville a momentan6ment interrompu le processus. 7 Ill. REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN DE FER DU CAMEROUN CAS DE LA REGIE NATIONALE DES CHEMINS (REGIFERCAM) A. DEMARRAGE DU PROCESSUS le choix par le Gouvernement Le processus a d6marr6 concretement avec CONSULTANTS (Paris) en camerounais, de la Societe COOPERS & LYBRAND pour conseiller et appuyer le liaison avec COOPERS & LYBRAND Afrique Centrale la REGIFERCAM. Comit6 de pilotage de la mise en concession de B. CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA CONCESSION - Dur6e: 20 ans, renouvelable. cr6er sont et resteront - Les infrastructures ferroviaires existantes ou A et amenagement propri6t6 de l'Etat. Leur maintenance, renouvellement seront finances par le concessionnaire. disposition du - Les biens du domaine ferroviaire sont mis A la fin de concession. concessionnaire par l'Etat a qui ils sont rendus en par d'autres operateurs - Possibilite d'utilisation du reseau ferroviaire concede du concessionnaire, soit a moyennant conventions passees soit a l'initiative la demande expresse de l'Etat. concessionnaire, soit - Mat6riel roulant de transport est soit propri6te du propri6t6 de tiers en location ou location-vente. en contrepartie - Une redevance sera versee A l'Etat par le concessionnaire de l'utilisation des infrastructures. est l'un des elements - Le nombre d'agents de la R6gie repris par le candidat effectifs cible est fixe A important d'appreciation des offres. Le niveau des 3.000 agents. structuree de la manikre - Lactionnariat de la societe concessionnaire sera suivante: r6ference 1. Les 66 % des actions de la Societe Actionnaire de ; 34 % etant (actions A) appartiendront aux investisseurs etrangers r6serv6s aux actionnaires nationaux. maximum 51 % de la La soci4t6 actionnaire de ref6rence poss6dera au societ6 concessionnaire. La participation d'int6rets 6trangers au capital de la soci6t6 concessionnaire n'exc6dera donc pas 34 %. 2. 30 % des actions (actions B) seront souscrites pour des personnes physiques ou morales de nationalit6 camerounaise, 15 % au maximum par l'Etat et 5 % au minimum par le personnel. C. ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DU PROCESSUS En janvier 1997, suite a l'analyse des offres techniques de la mise des chemins en concession de fer du Cameroun, les trois groupes d'entreprises ci-apres ont 6t6 admis a presenter une offre technique revisee et une offre financiere: - CANAC, SNC/LAVALIN - COMAZAR, TRANSURB-CONSULT, GEODIS-GETMA - SAGA, SDV, SYSTRA-SOFRERAIL-SOFRETU Le calendrier previsionnel se presente comme suit: . 04/08/97 : Lancement de l'inventaire du patrimoine de la REGIFERCAM, . 30(09/97 : remise des offres techniques revisees et des offres financiWres, . mi-octobre 97: depouillement des offres et analyse et r6ception des resultats de l'inventaire de patrimoine de la R6gie. 9 IV. REPUBLIQUE DU GABON FER TRANSGABONAIS (OCTRA) CAS DE L'OFFICE DU CHEMIN DE comme suit de mise en concession se presente L'etat d'avancement du processus de int6ress6s pour la reprise de 1'exploitation - Environ 14 societes sont I'OCTRA le 25/01/1997; - L'appel d'offres a ete lanc6 le 30/09/1997; - La remise des offres a lieu une epreuve offres se fera en deux etapes avec - Le depouillement de ces prevu une selection. technique au terme de laquelle if est qui determinera le Ensuite, interviendra l'epreuve financiere concessionnaire. retenue une totale libert6 en concession accordera a la Societe - La mise et d'investissements pour le maintien dans la gestion, avec engagement l'amelioration de l'outil. ".I Sg ~the Railwary of the 21st CenWrv : "ConsX 'lk chemi-n de fer "du21e sice: "'Gestalt' g - der.7Bahn. -ties 21.Jh. -21| §3UiC "Shaping Railway of2the u c the 21nst Certyr" _' 9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1922-199r L60t - ZZ6L 0-. g 6 ) .. ') } § [Z oil lf fv."I!o Pql/ Xfuidoqy,, W~~~~~~~~~~~tY.W 'R 'S§ O n a ° ) q ° t '.,,'t.!', ','. ^ "0 O z p l Ib os-.,. Z . ; * ly IA 7 J;.'rj _r7M, ui 7'y . T"-_ _7: -, '---7- 54 7A J;?;: lij t I 1-M Bu' gin v S F4.. k X Rf I a.. .4 "Al'k Ddd-nw, ik IP. Y :+ -lkl Nli` 4A V 4 JV 04 4,60.1; -0i 40W 41 9A lique-es. u uo SS06U;,,o, I~~~~~~~~i '.- q7 , Ttj 7m *v. 5L* .1~~~~1.* ~~ ~ ~ Z Al5v "j.~~~~~~~I ~~~'1*''..~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~Y-' %-. lklkrll~~~~~~~~-~~II 41; 17:p-A MA~~~~~~~~~~~~~I ~~~~~~~~~~~I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ &IV .I~~~~~~~~~~~~~.*~ '~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~ ~-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~~~~**'*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~h,~~~~N 41 . ,*~~~~~~~~L . . ~~~ 'Imo _41~~~~~~~~~~~1 tiS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ : 7,, f. -..f}.W.a,-'-. 1 I-A~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - I0~- (9A 1 Aka4 %~~ 4i .I., ______-~ ~ ~ -'54~~~~~~~~~~A Y.~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~j ~ 4 ~~~~~~~~~~~~U ` If 2 -- - * ;- * - r; 2 r z * : ,X' ' .:, . .; . ; t . *t6IS9 Zl-*-iR11/)1/,}ItJ .%'/7>ll7,,*z7l/rlZ-, df/j AI1108AI HIV .,,,, ' $ t > A , ' t s * , W i i i~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * 7'2p 1z-l" 9 , lu u ! a l S x a «o; a f i u ^o^ - @ X 3 i "';'q' ' s |~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i X~~~~~~w ou pus-& id'0' 'U'l 'ig5StEms'S::":00 : '' -' } W g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O ' 1 ' (9/97) ~~~~~~~~~ l 1 - t W 6WZ~~~~~~~IN IV u 5/),RU J11MMUM3 -g;w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l 41e.' :' -- 1::. . ¢ ,«, ,, :8 . t, ! ,@ @ ,4!1g , ' . ,., ,,$,,,, ,, z;,,= , S L w - zU|cHwaysail PIat v>| -i~~n grtls-1.01 Oft : h1!J in -<9r cst d petfitt,m7 t1fP -- tIt Transport Policy Workshop - 12th Sept'97 - Paris QI-.e Es: J.; * Analysis of current situation in the different reg of the world, as- regards to inter-mode competitive position. it Identificanon -of the areasrkaving major im on. rail-mode. - Review of the UIC diiftSpar on Tranot Policy, - and rec--x-nd-eoy actio.pa -o-WC X Finalisation of working strategy on the subject of Transport Policy. *@h t . e~~ : 'w'''. . ,X * | * . fi ,, *, . *- ff , , _'k '-; , *.,- . ' ( ;. .. r r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_ n f I".Thlft ;e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i SIN ro~~~~~.4th...... x 4.!.i UICMEER GAUGE GROUP - R £haimgn: Mr. A. S. LE ROUX, Chief Executive, SPOORNET C - t s" t p t o g r e s s ; : . - r. S " ' ' * ; wh 1 ~' 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'- eWt .Zdz~~~~tign praci : ! :,i*,4;X Johan -N~~~~~vIDIIC- 6r n.146r,~~~~~ - Development, of second-hand market, (ID) l' DevelopmientI * Deveopment Aopuestterna ionaI1 trafic corridors.X IL,*V.. | w . M * liUIC - *do~n-to Meter Gauge - (I-Q - Meter Gauge specific seminar. * Johannesbnr> * NakAbi Riwlr _- t -'^'1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~JJJ 4 I4 V444 .. .4. .4 ; 4 *J*s ^ ., ,4 - .~~ ,. r ,t __ _ ' . _ 1t,1- -__ __~V.. -_ .,. . .~ w I W. .-, . ._____ ',''itr). ; *1 - - -. . i Kn mr n a Lr ' t ' ' - i- C,st,,,,j t! f't-'_ 'tJ ~~~~~~~~- !.-''.'. 5t>zz /,t_¢gt ,,.} J>;{ .4 r 44* . ,,. _ ^ N4 X t.. ' . . . 4.~~~~~~~~~~( ,] -,lv -4 4 (~MeCdM)A=' m u.p,mw, 1 '. 40gZZ|Z=i|* ,d 4. h#. ''4. . i. *; ., '- _ 2 .;i~~~~r9~~9wiAFT6 uvJu4O'u O U44344 -tdUld 61 -B r "k.I1g1l,d) p4 JnSI/i /0.%V* /"l/ di-II )lo.w' )jf 8oi ... . :: 'suoteondde. - ' T b. , ' 7 1. g..=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C.1''-1 *" ' ~T. .,: s.i ,W,, .U, .' { .S - l or ' . ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e WA S S b~~I- 1T I ~~~ .AI * ft LAO-1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:=~ 'I ~UM e * .~~~~~~~~~~~~j * 'VP ______U.:0 :, / - ~ 'e- ~~ > ..... 4 ~~~ >. -- -^ { * Ft t - *- ;L' ; '. - .; ;w L'.arket rineds Competitton with other mnoces-.other mo~~~ie~ ;-: Exteral. effects The ELuropean mcmension -EU tran9port policy . , . EU ifre~ctves: EU- rasearch policy .nf- rastructure Investment$ - - ; Coordination Grou u Priority Areas - _ . . . . FRtdiw.in jouriey conventiona timos on 1ln~ei j )0ovom0nt . * .~~~~~~~~~~~- visloo_:~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t- -!WnnfEns asevie>-! Extonsion of dis ibutiontsYstcM faci' eas: electronic UcketingIcas&- - -_ Passenger : : a ::-: :_._._*_-_._-_--_-. Rail Freight Freeways - . Modularg.nt freight wagons train unit Ecoosting quaity Improved informatonAriormat on techno Orw-on1y automabe Freight oHigherao- Ioad.@a. -dsr- -ax .t.o# Eliminstion of operional controls atfrontie.s ;,.___._-_-- Uniform managemzent metholsin East.;1.< .RedUction - - ti~~R1ductonconvntourd of ioumeV.-: Augmentatin of axle Capacity management loads - infrastnctu ,. na e -. C a nd-co;t.olconte- d nctucit.::. .. InEfratruc~J - asn.rTytT .- ::.--- NetwoOk i i I i Session 9 i I i I Annexes I ! iI ANNEX 1 Seminar on Railway Concessioning in Africa Abidjan, Cote dlvoire October 13-14, 1997 THE CAPITALIZATION OF THE BOLIVIAN STATE RAILWAY The Railroad Privatization Experience in Bolivia Benjamin L. Anderson, CFA, ASA ANDERSON CONSULTING GROUP 90 Park Avenue, Suite 1700 New York, N.Y. 10016 USA Good morning. My name is Ben Anderson and I am a principal Consulting in Anderson Group in New York City. I recently had the privilege of Strategic serving as the Advisor to the Government of Bolivia in the capitalization of the State Railway, Bolivian also known as 'ENFE." On December 14, 1995, the Government Bolivia successfully of auctioned a 50% interest in each of the two new railway companies created from ENFE. Cruz Blanca of Chile was the successful bidder for both of those companies. During my presentation, I would like to review the technique and of "capitalization" how it differs from a conventional privatization. I will also describe alternative some of the models for the privatization of railways, including the traditional concession model. Then I would like to focus on some of the issues facing capitalization the of ENFE (or any other railroad privatization), and how we resolved in Bolivia. them I. CHOOSING THE PRIVATIZATION MODEL There are a number of different ways to privatize a railway. Choosing the method is a matter best of developing a set of criteria for selecting the privatization model. The model that satisfies the largest number of those criteria, according social, to the political, and economic context of the particular country, is the one chosen. that should be The criteria are the following: 1. political acceptability; 2. attractiveness to private sector investors; 3. attractiveness to the govemment; 4. network benefits available from maintaining the integrity of the national system; 5. the amount of privatization benefits achieved; 6. the degree and complexity of regulation required; and 7. minimization of legal impediments to the privatization. Brazil and The regional concession model -- such as that used in Argentina, although Bolivia -- is one of at least nine privatization models that can be identified, into three there may be more or less depending on how they are classified. Divided major categories, the models are as follows: A. Single Unit Transaction 1. Sale as a single unit, without a prior restructuring 2. Concession as a single unit, without a prior restructuring 3. Sale as a unit, preceded by restructuring 4. Concession as a unit, preceded by restructuring B. Subsystem Transaction 1. Sale of regional subsystems 2. Concession of regional subsystems C. Separation of Operations from Infrastructure 1. Grant of exclusive operating rights to the entire railway system the 2. Grant of non-exclusive operating rights ("open access") to entire railway system 3. Grant of exclusive or non-exclusive operating rights to designated portions of the national system of every Unfortunately, we don't have time to discuss the all the characteristics the best but some examples may make them seem more familiar. Two of model, A-3, that is, are Conrail and New Zealand Railways, both representing option known National as a unit with prior restructuring." The privatization of the Japanese "sale said before, represents option B- 1, "sale of regional subsystems." And as we Railways Other Brazil and Bolivia chose the regional concession model, option B-2. Argentina, within the useful examples include Sweden and Britain, which are using variations from operations." third general category, Category C, "separation of infrastructure it has of the major benefits of the regional concession model, at least as One the in Argentina, is that it requires the minimum prior investment by been applied the before the privatization. Typically, in a subsystem transaction, government capital railroad is not rehabilitated first. The concessionaire makes agreed-upon the government of the improvements as specified in the concession contract, relieving it is privatized. obligation to restore the physical condition of the railroad before immediately upon Furthermore, the government's funding of operating losses ceases of operations by the concessionaire, although someone (usually the the startup All of these government) must take financial the responsibility for displaced workers. attractive to the factors, except the worker severance benefits, make the model very govemment, helping to satisfy Criterion #3. 2 If displaced workers receive severance benefits, the political acceptability privatization of the is increased (satisfying the first criterion), and the fact that government the (not the concessionaire) may fund those benefits helps satisfy Criterion #2 (attractiveness to investors). The regional concession model also avoids other problems. The government's lack of clear title to the railroad property becomes far less important, because everything but the property title is transferred to the concessionaire. This helps us meet Criterion #7, the minimization of legal impediments. Political acceptability (always the most important criterion!) is further increased by the regional concession model because the grant of a concession may be presented to the public as an interim step (rather than an irreversible sale) that may or lead to full may not privatization. The government may subsequently regain the property upon the expiration of the concession, or upon a breach of the concession contract by the concessionaire. The preservation of network benefits (Criterion #4) was not a significant factor in Bolivia because the national railway was already divided into two separate systems that were not interconnected. Furthermore, many of the benefits of an integrated national railway system may be preserved by making provisions for voluntary co- operation (as in the United States by the Association of American Railroads) or by regulation. For example, Brazil is now implementing voluntary co-operation mechanisms to integrate the operations of its six regional concessions. Multiple regional systems also reduce the amount and complexity of regulation required, helping us to satisfy Criterion #6. Multiple concessions provide a basis to judge the fairness of one railroad's tariffs with those of another, much like the phenomenon of "yardstick competition" between electrical utilities in the United States. However, the most meaningful comparison or "yardstick" is that between transportation modes, not between railroads, except in the case of captive traffic that can only be moved by one mode. II. OVERVIEW OF THE BOLIVIAN CAPITALIZATION PROGRAM Now I would like to describe the model selected by Bolivia and how that employed county an unusual technique to accomplish what has been achieved by "privatization" in other countries. In Bolivia, the state-owned railway was not "sold" in the conventional sense. Rather, the enterprise was "capitalized" through the infusion of new capital in an amount equal to the company's book value, for investor which the received a 50% ownership interest and management control. Each capitalized newly company (called the "SAM," or Sociedad Anomina Mixta, or "mixed capital company') was granted an exclusive concession to operate a designated section of national railroad the for a period of 30 years. In Bolivia, the national system was divided into two subsystems, the "Andina" and the "Oriental." Each was the subject of a separate capitalization. 3 I must emphasize that this was not a case of the investor buying 50% of a company from the Bolivian Government. Rather, it was a contribution, or infusion, of capital in that company. The difference between this and a privatization is that when the investor takes control of the company, the money he has "paid" is still in the company's treasury, not in the treasury of the Government. If we were to look at the balance sheet of the newly capitalized company, we would see that on the left-hand side, the cash account has increased by the amount of the capital infusion; on the right-hand side, the eguitv account has increased by the same amount. The investor, the so-called "strategic partner," now owns 50% of this new equity and has management control. The Government owns the other 50%, but it is the intention of the Bolivian Government to turn this half interest over to the Bolivian people by contributing it to privately managed pension funds. If the strategic partner manages well, he will have a satisfactory return on his capital because his 50% interest in the newly invigorated company will be worth more than a 100% interest in the company that existed previously. Both the investor and the Bolivian people will benefit. Of course, achieving this result will be a difficult task. The remainder of my presentation will describe some of the major issues in implementing the capitalization model relative to a railroad. Not only are these issues common to both privatization and capitalization, they will be encountered in any transfer of railroad operations from the government to the private sector. III. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE CAPITALIZATION OF ENFE I would like to discuss five significant issues that we faced in the capitalization of the Bolivian State Railway: 1. the treatment of ENFE's debts; 2. the disposition of ENFE's excess real estate; 3. subsidies and tariffs; 4. the regulatory mechanism; and 5. what to do about excess employees. These aren't the only issues, of course, and we probably haven't come up with the definitive solution for any of them. Our goal was to come up with a solution that would be, first, politically acceptable, and second, lead to a successful transaction. We could not afford to alienate either the Bolivian people or the prospective investors. If you do not satisfy both groups, you will not have a successful transaction. Although my bias was toward making the transaction attractive to investors, the Government had to deal with political realities. Usually, the political realities are the deciding factor. 4 1. The Treatment of ENFE's Debts Regarding the treatment of the state railway company's debts, we sought minimize the amount to of debt to be assumed by the new company. This was advisable for two reasons: (1) the larger the amount of debt in the SAM the less after the capitalization, equity the investor would be willing to infuse; and (2) much existing of ENFE's debt was related to projects that a commercially operated railway have undertaken. would never Furthermore, servicing the old debt would remove capital from SAM, thereby contradicting the the intent of the capitalization, which was to infuse cash into the new company rather than remove it. We decided to include in the opening balance sheet only that portion of the external debt directly related to the operating, non-infrastructure assets, that locomotives, rolling is, stock, and equipment. Infrastructure assets were not included the opening balance in sheet of the new company; instead, the right to use that infrastructure was granted under a long-term concession. "Infrastructure assets" included land; track and track structure; and buildings, including stations and shops. This technique minimized the debt to be included, while leaving amount a meaningful of debt to be assumed by the new company. If the bidders had to suggest, been allowed as part of their bids, the amount of debt that they would assume, be willing to an aggressive bidder would have taken on as much debt as minimized possible (and his equity contribution). Fixing the amount of debt any assume bidder had to discouraged such behavior. All the bidders were thereby given forma the same pro balance sheet for the SAM; all agreed to assume the same amount Because of debt. it created a natural constraint on the bidding process, this approach discouraged bidders from creating the impression of a higher bid by simply agreeing to assume more debt. At the same time, it would have been politically difficult to allow begin the bidder to with a completely "clean" balance sheet. Therefore, the transfer debt of a low level of that was supportable by the economics of the business was compromise. a judicious Because the people of Bolivia would be partners in the new company, the Government had to be concerned about the financial success enterprise. of the new 2. Disposition of Excess Real Estate Relative to the disposition of excess real estate, the Government all non-operating decided that property, including real estate that could be developed, remain in should what we will call "ENFE Residual." This decision was very important strategic perspective, from a because otherwise the bidding process would have been distorted by the presence of bidders whose principal objective was real estate speculation rather than railway operations. 5 Proceeds from the orderly liquidation of this property will be used to fund employee separations and repay that part of the external debt that was not transferred to the SAMs. ENFE thereby would become a "liquidating trust," much like the Railways Corporation in New Zealand or the Japan National Railways Settlement Corporation, both of which were established for the same purpose. 3. Tariff and Subsidy Policy Although the Government of Bolivia has not determined the exact outline of its tariff policy, it has developed a plan for the gradual elimination of subsidies over a five-year period. Tariff regulation is contemplated only where there is an absence of effective competition. We believe that it is very important to prepare a schedule for the gradual elimination of subsidies. If all the bidders respond to the same schedule, it is easier for the government to evaluate the bids. This technique is preferable to having each bidder state his minimum required subsidy, or his own schedule for the elimination of the subsidy. It reduces the possibility that bidders will propose a low required subsidy in order to win the concession, and then threaten to discontinue railroad operations if no additional subsidy is forthcoming. In Bolivia, the government subsidy will be gradually replaced by a "subsidy" created by the increased efficiency of the new operator. On the Oriental (the eastern network that connects with Brazil), the old tariff, which was also the maximum tariff, will be reduced by a "compulsory efficiency adjustment" of 7.5% each year as the subsidy is gradually eliminated. On the Andina (the western network that connects with Chile), where effective competition exists, there will be no compulsory efficiency adjustment and no regulation of tariffs. The fixed subsidy (on the Oriental) that existed before the capitalization acted as a disincentive for ENFE to become more efficient, as well as a disincentive to the development of a parallel road as an alternative mode of transportation. Tariffs for soybeans had risen to a high level despite the subsidy. ENFE claimed that without the subsidy, the transport of soybeans was uneconomical; at the same time, the shippers said the subsidy was necessary to protect them from monopolistic pricing by the railroad. The result was an excessive tariff for exactly the kind of traffic that the railroad should have hauled most efficiently. Under the new approach, protection against monopoly abuses on the Oriental is accomplished by the yearly reduction in tariffs, and efficiency is promoted by the eventual elimination of the subsidy. If the rate reductions had been more aggressive, however, the soybean producers would not press for the completion of the new road between Santa Cruz and Brazil. Now the railroad must become more efficient in order to meet the actual or potential competition of the highway. Once the highway is built, tariff limitations will no longer be necessary, because the highway will impose a natural limit on how high those tariffs can be set. 6 4. The Regulatory Mechanism for the Railway Sector The regulatory model (including tariff Bolivia. regulation) has not yet been finalized in However, we know that most railroad regulation forms: the economic takes two fundamental regulatory function (analogous to Commerce Commission that of the former Interstate in the United States), and the safety that of the Federal function (analogous to Railway Administration in the United States). In Bolivia, the gradual elimination of subsidies will be closely development of a system related to the of tariff regulation that will accomplish two objectives: tariffs that assure important the economic viability of the new railroad and the protection of shippers companies, from monopoly abuses. Where there is effective competition, the market will determine tariffs, involved and the Government will not be in determining the reasonableness of rates. Ultimately, we know that unless the Bolivian railroads based on economic are allowed to set rates forces, they will be unable to attract sufficient private enterprises. At capital to survive as the same time, the system of regulation must captive shippers are protected ensure that from the effects of monopoly. The mechanism determine when rates applicable must to such "captive" commodities exceed a reasonable level, consistent with the goal of providing an adequate return to the operator of the railway. The result should be a set of prices those that combines market based prices with that are subject to certain regulatory constraints. Two other regulatory issues frequently investors: arose in our discussions with potential standards for track maintenance, and abandonments. We recommended that the regulatory mechanism include provisions for the abandonment well-articulated or discontinuation of operations. The regulatory agency, in reaching new Bolivian a decision, should balance such factors profitability of the line, as the the expense of continued operation, the profitability, the availability likelihood of future of alternative transportation, and the local communities. These extent of harm to standards could be similar to those in the where, based on public convenience United States, and necessity, the government permits termination of service after the balancing the needs of shippers and communities the burden on the rail carrier against from continued operation of the line in question. We also recommended that maintenance standards should level of traffic on the line; be related to the this is best expressed in terms of the maximum speed for the specific line. operating This would allow the standards to be self-enforcing, because the operator would have an economic interest in maintaining an economically important line at a high level. maintain Conversely, he would not want to a little used line at a high standard. Locomotives other hand, should and rolling stock, on the have absolute maintenance and safety standards track speed or economic justification. unrelated to 7 5. Labor Issues and job rights to which Finally, labor issues, including severance benefits aspects of the transfer of a are entitled, are usually the most controversial workers The simplest solution is to railroad from the government to the private sector. should be an economic issue recommend that the number of retained workers decided by the bidder. workforce as possible to insure We know that a railroad must have as small a have the right to determine the its economic viability; ideally, the bidder should this view, redundant personnel should number of workers needed. Consistent with which would be responsible for all labor become the responsibility of the Government, liabilities arising out of the transaction. It requested bidders to Bolivia, the Government chose to take this view. In necessary for an efficient they thought was a reasonable level of workers specify what on a composite of those A "required" level was then determined based operation. remained with "ENFE residual," estimates. Workers not needed by the new SAMs employment or the payment of severance which will be responsible for their continued benefits. III. CONCLUSION overview of some of the During this presentation, I have given you an the regulatory system, have not significant issues we faced in Bolivia. Some, notably itself, while fundamentally sound, has yet been finalized; the capitalization program the technique of 'capitalization" and not yet been fully tested. I have talked about have also described some of the it differs from a conventional privatization. I how including the traditional alternative models for the privatization of railways, concession model. achieved two significant things. It is clear from our experience that Bolivia has a new model for transferring it has already implemented, with some success, First, is well suited to capital-short state enterprises to the private sector. This model significant domestic opposition, it has countries like Bolivia. Second, in the face of traditional symbol of state sovereignty, completed the transfer to private control of a a politically difficult task has been national railroad system. The fact that such the of the model but to the accomplished is a testament not only to the integrity Government's resolve. 8 Seminaire de la Concession du Chemin de Fer en Afrique Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire le 13 - 14 octobre 1997 LA CAPITALISATION DU CHEMIN DE FER BOLIVIEN L'Experience de Privatisation en Bolivie Benjamin L. Anderson, CFA, ASA ANDERSON CONSULTING GROUP 90 Park Avenue, Suite 1700 New York,N.Y. 10016 USA Bonjour. Je m'appelle Ben Anderson et je suis le principal responsable de < Pendant ma presentation, je voudrais developper la technique comment de < I. LE CHOIX DU MODELE DE PRIVATISATION Il y a plusieurs manieres de privatiser un chemin de fer. Choisir la meilleure de developper un ensemble methode est de criteres pour selectionner le modele de privatisation. qui satisfait la Le modele plus grande partie de ces criteres, selon le contexte economique politique, social, et d'un pays, est celui qui devra etre choisit. Les criteres sont les suivants 1. l'acceptabilite politique; 2. l'interet des investisseurs pour le secteur prive; 3. l'interet du gouvemement; 4. les avantages disponibles du reseau pour le maintien de l'integrite 5. la somme du systeme national; realisee des benefices/avantages de privatisation; 6. le degre et la complexite des regulations exigees; et 7. la minimisation des obstacles legaux Ala privatisation. et en -- tel que ceux utilise en Argentine, au Bresil, Le modele regional de concession bien qu'il de privatisation qui peuvent etre identifies, Bolivie - est l'un d'au moins neuf modeles dont ils sont classifies. Divises en trois categories puisse y en avoir plus ou moins selon la facon majeures, les modeles sont les suivants: A. Transaction d'Entite Simple aucune reconstruction prealable 1. La vente en tant qu'entite simple, sans sans aucune reconstruction prealable 2. La concession en tant qu'entite simple, une reconstruction 3. La vente en tant qu'entite, precedee par par une reconstruction 4. La concession en tant qu'entite, precedee B. Transaction de Sous-systeme 1. La vente de sous-systemes regionaux 2. La concession de sous-systemes regionaux C. La Separation des Operations de l'Infrastructure sur le systeme de chemin de fer en 1. L'accord de droits d'operation exclusifs entier ouvert >>) sur le systeme de chemin 2. L'accord de droits non-exclusifs (<< acces de fer en entier des portions designees du systeme 3. L'accord de droits exclusifs ou non sur national de discuter de toutes les caracteristiques de Malheureusement, nous n'avons pas de temps nous les rendre plus familiers. Deux des chaque modele, mais quelques exemples peuvent Railways, tous les deux representant les mieux connus sont Conrail et New Zealand modeles par une reconstruction. Et concemant la vente en tant qu'entite, precedee l'option A-3, celle choisit le modele de t6t, l'Argentine, le Bresil, et la Bolivie ont comme nous l'avons dit plus la Suede et D'autres exemples significatifs comprennent concession regionale, l'option B-2. des la troisieme categorie, la Categorie C, < 2 facteurs, except6 les indemnites de rupture des travailleurs, font que le modele pour est tres attractif le gouvemement, tout en satisfaisant le critere #3. Si les travailleurs deplaces re9oivent des indemnites de rupture, l'acceptabilite politique de la privatisation est augmentee (satisfaisant le premier critere), et le fait que (pas le concessionnaire) le gouvemement puisse payer pour ces benefices aide Asatisfaire le critere des investisseurs). #2 (l'int6ret Le modele de concession regionale evite egalement d'autres problemes. Le manque bon titre de propriete devient de moins significative car tous les droits sauf le titre de propriete transfere au concessionnaire. est Cela nous aide Arealiser le critere #7, la minimisation obstacles legaux. des L'acceptabilite politique (qui reste le critere le plus important!) est de plus augmentee par le modele de concession regionale puisque l'accord de concession peut etre pr6sente au public en tant qu'etape temporaire (au lieu d'un vente irreversible) qui peut ou non aboutir A la privatisation complete. Le gouvernement peut recuperer par la suite la propriete d'expiration en cas de la concession, ou apres infraction du contrat de concession concessionnaire. par le La preservation des avantages du reseau (critere #4) n'a pas ete un facteur significatif en Bolivie puisque le chemin de fer national etait dejA divis6 en deux systemes s6pares qui n'ont pas e connectes entre eux. D'ailleurs, plusieurs avantages d'un chemin de fer national integre peuvent etre preserves en faisant des provisions pour une cooperation volontaire (comme le cas des Etats-Unis avec « The Association of American Railroads >>) ou par la regulation. Par exemple, le Bresil developpe maintenant des mecanismes de cooperation volontaire afin d'integrer les operations de six concessions regionales. Les systemes regionaux multiples reduisent la quantite aussi bien que la complexite de la regulation exigee, qui nous aide Asatisfaire le critere # 6. Plusieurs concessions constituent une base pour juger l'equite des tarifs d'un chemin de fer face Aceux des autres, tout comme le phenomene de comparaison des tarifs entre les different foumisseurs d'electricite aux Etats-Unis. Pourtant, la comparaison la plus significative est celle concemant les modes de transport, autre que les chemins de fer, sauf dans le cas d'un monopole lorsque les affreteurs n'ont qu'un seul moyen de transport A leur disposition. II. RESUME DU PROGRAMME DE LA CAPITALISATION BOLIVIENNE Maintenant je voudrais decrire le modele choisi par la Bolivie et comment ce pays a employe une technique exceptionnelle afin d'accomplir ce qui a ete realise par < privatisationx> dans les autres pays. En Bolivie, le chemin de fer d'Etat n'a pas t < 3 national pendant une periode de 30 exclusive a operer sur une section designee du chemin de fer < 1. la traitement des dettes de 1'ENFE; 2. la disposition des exces d'immobilier de 1'ENFE; 3. les subventions et les tarifs; 4. le mecanisme regulateur; et 5. que faire avec l'excedent d'employes. certainement pas trouve Ce ne sont pas les seules problemes, bien entendu, et nous avons trouver une solution qui soit une solution definitive pour chacun d'eux. Notre but a ete de deboucherait sur une d'abord acceptable politiquement et qui dans un deuxieme temps, le peuple Bolivien, pas plus transaction reussie. Nous ne pouvions pas nous permettre d'ecarter groupes simultanement, il n'est que les eventuels investisseurs. En ne satisfaisant pas les deux pas possible d'aboutir a une transaction reussie. Bien que mon penchant ait transaction attrayante e de rendre la aux investisseurs, le gouvemement a dfu faire Habituellement, face A des realites politiques. les realites politiques forment le facteur de decision. 1. Le Traitement des Dettes de 1'ENFE En ce qui conceme les dettes du Chemin de Fer de l'Etat, nous avons oeuvre de facon a reduire au minimum la dette qui devrait etre assumee par la nouvelle compagnie. Ceci a e le meilleur choix pour deux raisons: (1) le plus le montant de la dette du SAM apres la capitalisation, le moins l'investisseur auraient voulu investir, et (2) une grosse existantes de 1'ENFE partie des dettes correspondait A des projets qu'une operation commerciale n'aurait pas pu du chemin de fer supporter. De plus, combler l'ancienne dette aurait s'opposant diminue le capital du SAM ainsi a l'intention de capitalisation qui etait d'augmenter diminuer. le capital plut6t que de le Nous avons decide d'inclure dans le premier bilan seulement la partie de la dette directement en relation avec externe les biens operationnels hors infrastructure, c'est-A-dire, wagons, et l'equipement. locomotives, Les biens d'infrastructure n'ont pas ete inclus dans la nouvelle compagnie, le premier bilan de alors que le droit d'utilisation de cette infrastructure une concession a ete accordee sous Along terme. Les biens d'infrastructure inclussent structures, le terrain, les voies et leurs ainsi que les batiments comprenant gares et ateliers. Cette technique a minimise la dette Ainclure, tout en laissant un montant consequent de la dette a la charge de la nouvelle societe. Si les encherisseurs avaient ete autorises Asuggerer le montant de la dette qu'ils voulaient prendre en charge, un encherisseur agressif aurait suggerer plus gros montant possible (en minimisant le ainsi sa contribution d'equite). En fixant le montant de la dette a prendre en charge par tout encherisseur, un tel comportement a ete evite. Tous les encherisseurs ont donc fourni le meme bilanproformapour le SAM, tous d'accord pour supporter la meme charge de dettes. Parce que cela Acr6e une contrainte naturelle processus d'encherissement, sur le cette approche a decourage les encherisseurs de hautes de creer l'impression encheres en acceptant de supporter plus de dettes. En meme temps, il aurait ete politiquement difficile d'autoriser un encherisseur A commencer avec un bilan compltement propre. C'est pourquoi le transfert d'une dette niveau Asupporter par le de bas resultat economique de l'entreprise a ete un bon le peuple de compromis. Parce que Bolivie d6sirait etre partenaire de la nouvelle societe, concern6 le Gouvemement a e par le succes financier de la nouvelle entreprise. 2. La Disposition des Exces d'Infrastructure Gouvemement a decide que Concernant la disponibilite des exces d'infrastructure, le etre developpees, devrait rester toute propriete non operationnelle, incluant les biens qui pourrait a ete tres importante pour la dans ce que nous appelons 1'<< ENFE residual »>. Cette decision aurait ete deforme par la perspective de strategie parce que sinon le processus d'encherissement immobiliere plut6t que les presence d'encherisseurs dont le principal objectif est la speculation operations de chemin de fer. utilis6s afin de fournir les Les benefices de la liquidation progressive de ces biens seront la dette externe non transferee au SAM. terminaisons des employes et de financer cette partie de la meme maniere que < 3. Politique des Tarifs et Subventions exactement sa politique de Bien que le Gouvemement de Bolivie n'a pas determine tres des subventions pendant une periode de tarifs, il a developpe un plan pour l'elimination graduelle la oiu il y a une absence de competition cinq ans. La regulation des tarifs est observee seulement efficace. l'elimination graduelle des Nous croyons qu'il est important de preparer un plan pour il est alors plus facile pour le subventions. Si les encherisseurs repondent au meme plan, est preferable plutot que d'avoir chaque Gouvemement d'evaluer les encheres. Cette technique ou son propre plan d'elimination des encherisseur qui fournit son attente minimale de subvention soumette une demande de subventions. Cela reduit les risques que chaque encherisseur ils menacent de cesser l'activite du subvention minime pour obtenir la concession et qu'ensuite chemin de fer si d'autres subventions ne sont pas versees. remplacee par une En Bolivie, la subvention du Gouvernement sera progressivement operateur. Du c6te Oriental (le «subvention >>generee par la meilleure efficacite du nouvel egalement le plus eleve, sera reduit par reseau de l'est qui relie le Bresil), l'ancien tarif qui etait annee jusqu'A ce que la subvention un < 6 chemin de fer aurait du transporte le plus efficacement. Avec la nouvelle approche, une protection contre les abus du monopole sur l'Oriental est etablie par une reduction des tarifs a l'annee, et l'efficacite est promue par l'eventuelle elimination de la subvention. Si les rabais avait pourtant ete plus agressives, les producteurs des graines de soja n'insisteraient pas pour l'achevement de la nouvelle route entre Santa Cruz et le Bresil. A present, le chemin de fer doit devenir plus efficace afin d'atteindre l'efficacite reelle ou potentielle de l'autoroute. Des que l'autoroute est construite, des limitations de tarifs ne seront plus necessaires parce que l'autoroute imposera une limite naturelle concernant la hauteur possible des tarifs. 4. Le Mecanisme de Regulation Pour le Secteur Ferroviaire Le modele regulateur (comprenant la regulation des tarifs) n'est pas encore finalise en Bolivie. Par contre, nous savons que la plupart des regulations ferroviaires prennent deux formes fondamentales: la fonction de regulation economique (analogue a celle de l'ancienne < En Bolivie, l'elimination progressive des subventions sera liee etroitement au developpement d'un systeme de regulation des tarifs qui aboutir a deux objectives importantes: les tarifs qui assure la viabilite economique des nouvelles compagnies ferroviaires, et la protection des affreteurs contre les abus d'un monopole. La ofi il y a la veritable competition, le marche determinera les tarifs, et le Gouvernement n'aura pas a s'engager dans un choix raisonnable de tarifs. Finalement, nous savons qu'a moins que les chemins de fer boliviens soient autorises a definir les tarifs base sur les forces economiques, ils seront incapables d'attirer un capital suffisant pour survivre en tant qu'entreprise privee. En meme temps, le systeme de regulation doit assurer que les affreteurs qui n'ont qu'un seul moyen de transport a leur disposition (les < Deux autres problemes reguliers frequemment abordes dans nos discussions avec les investisseurs potentiels: les standards pour le maintenance des voies ferrees et les abandons. Nous avons recommande que le mecanisme regulateur inclue les conditions bien articulees pour l'abandon ou la discontinuite des operations. La nouvelle agence regulatrice bolivienne, en abordant une decision, devrait peser de tels facteurs face a la rentabilite de la ligne, la depense d'une operation continue, la vraisemblance de rentabilite future, la disponibilite d'une alternative de transport, et l'etendue des nuisances aux communautes locales. Ces standards pourraient etre similaires aux ceux des Etats-Unis oui, base sur les avantages et l'utilite 7 publique, le gouvemement autorise l'arret des services apres avoir evalue les besoins des affreteurs et des communautes contre le fardeau de l'operateur en fournissant le service en question. Nous recommandons egalement que les standards de maintenance soient lies au niveau de trafic sur la ligne; cela est mieux exprime en termes d'une vitesse maximum approprie pour la ligne en question. Cela permettrait les standards d'etre autosuffisant, puisque l'operateur aurait un interet economique Amaintenir une ligne lucrative A un haut niveau. Les locomotives et les wagons, d'autre part devraient avoir des standards de maintenance et de securite absolus sans rapport avec la vitesse de la voie ferree ou la justification economique. 5. Les Questions du Travail Finalement, les questions de travail, comprenant les indemnites de rupture et les droits de travail auxquels les travailleurs sont attaches, sont habituellement les aspects les plus controverses du transfert d'un chemin de fer du secteur public au secteur prive. La solution la plus simple est de recommander que le nombre des travailleurs retenus doit etre une question decidee par l'encherisseur. Nous savons qu'un chemin de fer doit avoir le plus petit main d'oeuvre que possible afin d'assurer sa viabilite economique ; idealement, l'encherisseur doit avoir le droit de determiner le nombre des travailleurs necessaires. En accord avec cette consideration, le personnel superflu doit devenir la responsabilite du Gouvemement, qui serait alors responsable pour tous manques de travail relevant de cette transaction. En Bolivie, le Gouvemement a choisit cette position. I1 a demande Ace que les encherisseurs precisent ce qu'ils estiment etre un nombre raisonnable des travailleurs necessaires pour une operation efficace. Un niveau < IV. CONCLUSION Au cours de cette presentation, je vous ai presente un resume de quelques questions significatives auxquelles nous avons et confrontes en Bolivie. Quelques-unes, notamment A propos du systeme de regulation, n'ont pas encore ete finalises; bien que le programme de capitalisation soit solide, il n'a pas encore ete completement epreuve. J'ai parle de la technique de < I1 est evident A partir de notre experience que la Bolivie a acheve deux elements significatives. D'abord, elle a dejA mis en cruvre, avec succes, un nouveau modele pour transferer les entreprises etatises au secteur prive. Ce modele est bien assorti aux pays a faibles 8 capitaux comme la Bolivie. Deuxiemement, en face d'une opposition nationale significative, elle a acheve le transfert au controle prive d'un symbole traditionnel de la souverainete de l'etat, le systeme national du chemin de fer. Le fait qu'une telle tache politiquement difficile a ete realisde est un preuve non seulement de l'integrite du modele, mais aussi de la volonte du Gouvemement. i Ii Ii i i iI 1 i I ANNEX 2 Africa iranspow R)X Technical Note Railway Restructuring (RR) A New Approach to Restructutring Railways in Sub-Saharan Africa Concessioning of Rail Transport Karim-JacquesBudin TI f he concessioning of rail op- the railway, the railway's status as a erations is a partnership be- public enterprise still leaves it open tween the state and a private to state mismanagement. operator (the concessionaire) in which, while maintaining ownership Finally, concessioning is the oppor- of rail infrastructure, the state trans- tunity -in the same way other re- fers railway operations to the con- structuring plans would be -to free cessionaire under conditions spelled the railway sector of "past sins," es- out in a concession agreement. Rail- pecially railway corporations' weak way operations are handled by the financial structure and overstaffing. concessionaire as a commercial ac- Concessioning should bring an im- This-Article was5 pubIshued ithe rativity, at its own expense and risk. provement in the financial perfor- July-August 1995 issue of the rail- Depending on the mode of invest- mance of the rail sector, which ment financing, the railway conces- would then cease imposing a heavy The purpose of this series is to sion is generally made up of two dis- burden on public finances. The share information on studies of the tinct legal structures: the concession state's financial contributions SSATP. The opinions expressed in in the SSThsTudieshae thoseiof thexauthosiitself and a leasing arrangement. Rail- sector would then be limited to and do not necessarily reflect the way concessioning is not a complete whatever compensation its public views of the World Bank or any of privatization of rail activity since the service obligations might impose on its affiliated organizations. state retains ownership of the infra- the railway. structure and, conceivably, some of For information on these notes,L * contact Leita Jones in the Africa the railway equipment. Technical Department of the Concessioning's World Bank, Washington, DC. The primary goal of concessioning "Rules of the Game" Internet address: rail transport is to increase efficiency. Ijones2@worldbank-org- This happens when the railway op- The concession's mechanisms are erator manages the operations in a defined by the concession agreement, solidly commercial way, adapted to a contract signed between the state the needs of the market. and the concessionaire. The princi- Concessioning also clearly defines pal mechanisms cover the scope of relationships between the state and the concession, the regulatory frame- the rail operator and, in particular, work for rail activity, the manage- prevents the state from mismanag- ment of railway infrastructure and ing day-to-day railway operations, the locomotives and railway wagons, which is often at the root of railway the concessionaire's staff, the conces- corporations' problems. Whatever sion fee, the tax scheme applicable formal measures may exist concern- to rail activity, the duration of the ing the management autonomy of concession, and the monitoring of 3 Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) * UNECA -aKid The Woirid Baink __ 2 -Transport en Afrique Railway activity regilatoryframework.The regulatory At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th framework for railway activity must encourage the Atteendtofithe 19thmanyrads te beginning oferathe 2h concessionaire to adopt commercial behavior as well centuries, many railroads were built and operated by as encourage competition with other transport modes. private enterprises under a concessioning scheme, Since railway activity is essentially commercial, op- most notably in Europe, Latin America and North Af- erated in a competitive and deregulated environment, rica. Beginning inthe 1930s, this railway management the concessionaire must be free to set configuration, method gave way, for the most part, to state manage- fix public tariffs, and negotiate individual contracts ment, generally through national corporations. Today, with large freight forwarders. At the request of the State management is the rule in almost all the railroads state, or locality, the concessionaire might also be of Sub-Saharan Africa. While in the past few years required to run certain operations as a public service, many railroads in developing countries have suffered particularly those for local, rural, or sub-urban pas- through a major crisis, private sector operation of rail senger transport. These operations should be con- activity in a concessioning framework now appears to ducted under specific agreements signed with the state be a promising method for restructuring, thus permit- or locality, with the concessionaire receiving com- ting railroads to be converted to commercial enter- pensation for deficits incurred while carrying out the prises. The formula was first used in the early 1990s public service obligation. in Argentina, where the existing rail network was re- structured, forming six freight railways and three groups The state would also compensate the concessionaire of suburban railways, all concessioned. In Sub-Sa- for other public service obligations imposed, such as haran Africa, C6te d'lvoire and Burkina Faso signed a fare reductions for certain clients, or the maintenance joint concession agreement in December 1994 with the of infrastructure for national defense. To dissuade or prevent either rate abuse by the concessionaire on private corporation SITARAIL for the operation of the market segments where the railway might enjoy a railway. The agreement mak sgett hr h ala ih no Abidjan/toutagadoffectiugou/satAbidjan/Ouagadougou/Kaya r . Inlightoftheagreement monopoly, or rail activity falling under the influence was to take effect in August 1995. In light of the (still of a cartel, the concession agreement should allow rare) recent experiences on the subject, Karm-Jacques for other operators on the infrastructure managed Budin, Railway Specialist in the Transport division of by the concessionaire. This would be allowed after a the World Bank, here introduces the main features of period of exclusive operation granted to the conces- railway operations concessions and examines the op- sionaire for a few years at the beginning of the con- tions and methods which might be recommended for cession. Any third-party operators that the state as- putting a concession into practice. signed after examining the concessionaire would use the infrastructure, on a non-discriminatory basis, for a fee paid to the concessionaire. the concession by the state and the resolution of con- Management of railway infrastructure.Although owned flicts between the state and the concessionaire. by the state, railway infrastructure ismanaged and main- tained under the technical and financial responsibility Scope of the concession. The concessionaire will usually of the concessionaire. The concessionaire should be able be responsible for (i)the technical and commercial op- to establish maintenance standards and methods, with eration of freight and passenger rail transport services the caveat that rail traffic safety, according4o the nature and activities linked to transport; (ii) the operation, of the operations, not be compromised. The concession- maintenance, refurbishment and expansion of existing aire also has responsibility for initiating, establishing, rail infrastructure (excluding new construction of infra- and supervising infrastructure improvement and expan- structure expansion, which generally remains the respon- sion programs. sibility of the state); and (iii) routine management of the public railway domain. Generally, separating the man- Management of locomotives and rolling stock. The con- agement of transportation services (carried out by the cessionaire must be granted complete responsibility for concessionaire) from management of infrastructure (car- determining the number, features, and origin of the lo- ried out by a separate public agency) is not a solution. comotives, freight wagons, passenger coaches, and other On the other hand, it may be advantageous to assign rail equipment. The concessionaire decides whether to the operation of passenger services to a different opera- purchase, rent or lease equipment, and selects equip- tor than the concessionaire. In such a case, the passen- ment for the operation from among that available at ger operator would run its trains - for a fee - on the the outset of the concession. This equipment is gener- infrastructure managed by the concessionaire. ally bought or, more often, rented by the concession- Note technique 13 aire from the state on commercial terms. New equip- carry out adequate policy on investments, staffing, and ment needed to develop or expand the concession dur- marketing. However, the state should also be wary of ing its course will be acquired or rented directly by the choosing too long a concession, which could reduce the concessionaire, without state intervention; however, concessionaire's incentive to remain competitive. These the state should maintain the right to lay first claim on two contradictory needs can be reconciled by adopting equipment sold by the concessionaire, particularly dur- a "rolling" concession, of an initial 20 years or so, which ing the last years of the concession. can be extended by both parties after each five-year pe- riod for successive five-year periods. Concessionaire's Staff. For effective management, the concessionaire's staff must be governed by legislation State Monitoringofthe Concession andDisp ute Resolution. and regulations (work code, collective agreements) ap- The state's monitoring of the concession should not in- plicable to private sector companies and be affiliated with terfere with the management of the concessionaire's the private sector's health insurance and retirement company. In practice, monitoring should apply to the funds. The special status which railway workers in many safety of rail operations and environmental protection. railway corporations enjoy (often like that of civil ser- The concessionaire should send the state information vants) cannot be preserved. When a railway corpora- on its activity in documents whose content and issuing tion is handicapped by redundant staff, as is often the are clearly specified in the concession agreement. An case, the concessionaire cannot be required to hire all annual audit of the concession, exploring the conditions the existing staff. At the start of the concession, the con- in which the mechanisms called for in the agreement cessionaire selects the employees whom it wishes to hire are applied, should be carried out by an independent from among the staff of the railway corporation. The auditor. Finally, litigation concerning the concession state bears responsibility for severance programs and agreement should be handled through arbitration, pref- for training and re-employment for personnel not hired erably, for example, according to the arbitration rules by the concessionaire. The state will also have to deal of the International Chamber of Commerce. with questions of rail workers previously covered by special social benefit plans (special fund for the railway corporation, civil servants' funds). Choosing the Concessionaire Concessionfees. In exchange for the use of rail infrastruc- Once the rules have been defined to promote the busi- ture and the right to operate rail services, the conces- ness-like management of rail transport, in healths com- sionaire will pay the state a concession fee. This fee can petition with other transport modes, the concessionaire be either a fixed annual sum, which could vary from must be carefully chosen. year to year, and be indexed to inflation, or established according to the physical volume of rail traffic; or, it To be effective, the concessioning company must pos- can be set as a percentage of the concessionaire's receipts. sess strong leadership which is committed to the idea In addition to this fee, the concessionaire pays rent to that rail transport management be on commercial the state on rolling stock, as well as specific annuities grounds, and is commited to implementing this ap- owed on any investments the state has made in infra- proach. This requirement will be met by having a stra- structure upgrading and expansion. tegic investor within the concession corporation who holds a majority on the board of directors and desig- Taxation. The tax scheme applicable to the concession- nates the company's general manager. The strategic in- aire must be the common law applicable to private cor- vestor must hold a significant - not necessarily a ma- porations in the transport sector. In the concession agree- jority - share of the company's capital. International ment, the state must guarantee that it will not impose competitive bidding to choose the strategic investor is any special taxes which might introduce distortions into strongly recommended; this guarantees the transparency competition between the railway and other transport- of the selection and, if done properly, yields the most ers. Since the concessionaire will bear the expense of favorable proposals. Choosing the strategic investor by maintaining, upgrading, and developing railway infra- direct negotiation would be acceptable only in very spe- structure, petroleum products used in locomotives and cial cases, such as when the concession is awarded to an other engine cars should be exempted from the portion almost exclusive user of the railroad. of the fuel tax collected by the state as user costs for road infrastructure. The concession corporation's shares, other than those held by the strategic investor, would be acquired accord- Duration of the concession. The concession should last ing to mechanisms defined by local capital market con- long enough to allow the concessionaire to form and ditions. When a stock exchange exists locally, listing the 4 1 Transport en Afrique stock on the stock exchange (following, if necessary, a * In a final selection phase, the candidates chosen after period of stock carrying either by the strategic investor the second phase will be invited to make an offer of or by other organizations) is one way of fulfilling the their proposed concession fees, based on the concession company's equity subscription. The concession agreement details as finalized by state decree. The can- corporation's staff can also enjoy privileged conditions didate with the highest offer will then be selected as stra- for acquiring shares of the capital. At first glance it may tegic investor for the concession company. seem inadvisable for the state to acquire capital in the concession corporation; but this isacceptable if its share Ideally, this bidding process should take about twelve is a minority one and its stock does not form part of months. Four to six additional months would be re- that of the strategic investor. State shareholding should quired for the concessionaire to prepare the railway's also be planned so as not to open the door to meddling operational start-up (creation of a corporation, employee in the company's management. In fact, if public minor- selection, etc.). ity shareholding in the concession company's capital becomes necessary, the shares should be held by a pub- The state must set up a structure for liquidating the lic establishment which has a direct interest in the former public railway corporation (this could be the smooth running of railway operations, such as, for ex- public railway corporation itself). The liquidation struc- ample, a port enterprise. ture will carry out a staff redeployment and reduction plan for those not hired by the concessionaire, resolve In all cases, local private stockholders should be encour- questions concerning employee retirement funds for aged to invest in the capital of the concession corpora- those belonging to special retirement schemes, and sell tion, including the strategic investor. If necessary, a mini- the railway assets not taken by the concessionaire. This mum percentage of local private stockholders could be liquidation structure must also ensure the financial settle- imposed on candidates. ment (payment of debts and arrears) of the former rail- way corporation. Recent experiences involving the choice of strategic in- vestors for concessioning companies -whether for rail- As with many railways in developing, and developed, ways or in more-or-less similar sectors (water, electric countries, Sub-Saharan Africa's railways are now at a energy, telecommunications) - point to a three-step crossroads. Facing increased competition, the African set of recommendations for the use of international com- railways will play an important role in the national and petitive bidding: regional transportation systems only if they reform their management practices and redefine their economic role * The first step concerns the pre-qualification of candi- by concentrating on the market segments where they dates for strategic investor. In practice, it is always made perform better than their competitors. up of consortia. The pre-qualification process is based on technical capacity and financial stability criteria. This Where the state has the will to reform railway trans- step must be preceded by an intense effort to find po- port completely and wishes to make full use of the tential candidates in order to open up competition. strengths of the private sector, both foreign and national, the concessioning of railway operations seems one of * The pre-qualified candidates receive a complete con- the most promising techniques for transforming the rail- sultation file which will include, most importantly, the road into a true commercial enterprise. proposed concession agreement. The candidates will be invited to present a draft medium-term business plan, including their comments and suggestions on the pro- posed concession agreement. The state and the candi- dates will then discuss these matters. Following these dis- cussions, for the final step of the procedure, the state will select the candidates that present a satisfactory business plan and will finalize the text of the concession agreement. 21rw.ibrt en Afr,'ije11 IIIcD -!technique x - e N t..q.L.. T-iL c h n.que e Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) Railway Restructuring(RR) UNECA and the NVorld Bank Note No. Io Julillet 1997 Une Nouvelle Approche de la Restructuration La Mise en Concession des Chemins de Fer en Afrique Sub-Saharienne de 1'Exploitation Ferroviaire Karim-Jacques Budin La concession d'exploitation ferroviaire peut etre d6flnie comme une forme e partenariat entre l'Etat et un op6rateur priv6 ("le concessionnaire") dans laquelle I'Etat conserve la propri6t6 des infrastructures ferroviaires et transfere 1'exploitation de l'activit6 ferroviaire Get article a ete publie au concessionnaire, dans des dans le numero de Juillet- conditions specifiees dans une convention de concession. Lactivite ferroviaire Aout 1995 de la Revuie sera exploitee par le concessionnaire a titre d'activit6 commerciale, a ses frais, getierale des risques et perils. La concession chemins de ferroviaire sera en g6neral un melange des deux recommandatioris formes juridiques que distinguent, en fonction qui y du mode de financement des sont presentes ne investissements, les juristes de tradition frangaise, investissements,les juristes la concession stricto sensu, refletent pas d'une part, et l'affermage, d'autre part. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~obligatoirementla La concession ferroviaire n'est pas une politique officielte privatisation de l'activite ferroviaire au de la sens complet, puisque l'Etat conserve la Banque mondiale propriete des infrastructures (et, eventuellement, d'une partie du materiel ferroviaire). L'objectif de cette snrie est de partager Le principal objectif de la mise en concession de l'activit6 ferroviaire est l'information sur les sujets d'accroitre l'efficacite des transports ferroviaires, traites dans les etudes du grace a la mise en oeuvre par SSATP. Les opinions l'operateur, soumis aux disciplines de gestion du secteur prive, d'une gestion de exprimees dans letude type resolument commerciale de l'activit6, orient6e vers la satisfaction des citee et dans cette serie besoins du march6. La formule permet egalement de clarifier les relations entre nengagent que les l'Etat et l'op6rateur ferroviaire, et interdit notamment l'ing6rence de l'Etat dans aucune maniere etre la gestion courante de l'activite ferroviaire, ingerence qui est souvent pour une attribuees au groupe de la part importante aLl'origine des difficultes des entreprises ferroviaires et que, dans autres partenaires au la pratique et quelles que soient les dispositions formelles relatives a l'autonomie SSATP de gestion de l'entreprise ferroviaire, le statut d'entreprise publique du chemin de fer peut toujours laisser craindre. La mise en concession est enfin l'occasion Pour tout renseignement - au m8me titre que le seraient d'autres schemas de restructuration - de sur ces notes lib6rer le secteur ferroviaire des "p6ch6s contactez du passe" qui pesent lourdement sur Leita Jones au l'activit6 du secteur, notamment pour ce qui concerne l'inadaptation de la Departertent technique structure financiere de l'entreprise pour t'Afrique a la ferroviaire et les sureffectifs du personnel. Banque mondiale, Globalement, la mise en concession de l'activit6 ferroviaire devrait conduire a une Washington. D C am6lioration notable de la performance financiere du secteur ferroviaire, qui Adresse surInternet cesserait ainsi de peser lourdement sur les finances publiques, les concours financiers de l'Etat au secteur se limitant alors a la compensation eventuelle des obligations de service public qu'il imposerait au chemin de fer. z I Africa Transport Les regles du jeu de I'activite ferroviaire dans un regime de concession A la fin du XIXe siecle et au debut du XXe siecle, de la concession -qui LcnstmtuenismesLes mecamismes deglaconessionjeu de Fautivt de nombreux chemins de fer ont 6te construits et constituent les "regles du jeu" de l'activite exploit6s par des entreprises privees, sous le ferroviaire - sont d6finis par la convention de r6gime de la concession, notamment en Europe, concession, document contractuel signe entre en Amerique latine et au Maghreb. Ce mode de l'Etat et le concessionnaire. Les principaux gestion de l'activit6 ferroviaire a dans la plupart mecanismes concernent le champ de la des cas c6de la place, A partir des annees 30, A concession, le cadre reglementaire de l'activit6 une gestion par l'Etat, en general par ferro'%riaire,la gestion des infrastructures l'interm6diaire de soci&es nationales. La gestion ferroxiaire,sIa estio des irteructresq,tatique est en particulier la regle aujourd'hui ferroviaires et du materiel moteur et remorque, pour la quasi-totalite des chemins de fer d'Afrique le personnel du concessionnaire, la redevance de sub-saharienne. Alors que de nombreux chemins concession, la fiscalit6 applicable A l'activite de fer dans les pays en voie de developpement ferroviaire, la dur6e de la concession et le connaissent depuis plusieurs annees une crise contr6le de la concession par l'Etat et l'arbitrage profonde, l'exploitation de l'activite ferroviaire l'Etat et le concessionnaire. par le secteur prive, dans le cadre d'une des conflits entre concession, apparait aujourd'hui comme une modalit6 prometteuse de restructuration Champ* de la concession. Le concessionnaire permettant de transformer ces chemins de fer en sera normalement responsable (i) de entreprises commerciales. La formule a 6te pour l'exploitation technique et commerciale des la premiere fois mise en oeuvre, au debut de la services de transport ferroviaire de marchandises d6cennie 90, en Argentine, oui le reseau ferroviaire et de voyageurs et des activites annexes au existant a et6 restructure en six chemins de fer transport; (ii) de l'exploitation, la maintenance, marchandises et trois groupements de chemins eransor; et , . de fer de banlieue, tous mis en concession. En infeastrenouvesem fetroair aesmexisantdes(A Afrique sub-saharienne, les Etats de C6te d'Ivoire infrastructures ferroviaires existantes (a et du Burkina ont conjointement sign6 en l'exclusion de la construction d'infrastructures Decembre 1994 une convention de concession nouvelles de developpement, qui resteront en d'exploitation du chemin de fer Abidjan/ g6neral de la responsabilit6 de l'Etat); et (iii) de Ouagadougou/Kaya avec l'entreprise priv6e la gestion courante du domaine public SITARAIL, dont l'entree en vigueur est prevue en Budin, Specialiste ferroviaire. De maniere generale, la s6paration Aout 1995. Karim-Jacques de la Banque ' . ~~~~ferroviaire a la Divisionvsen 'fransportsTraprts dala de de la gestion des services de transport (qui serait mondiale,moniale, presentepr ci-apres, a la lumiere des effectuee par le concessionnaire) de la gestion (encore rares) exp6riences r6centes en la matiere, des infrastructures (qui serait effectuee par un les principales caract6ristiques de la concession organisme public distinct) ne constituerait pas d'exploitation ferroviaire et examine les options une solution adequate dans les chernins de fer et modalit6s qu'il semble possible de consideres. Par contre, il pourrait dans certains recommander pour sa mise en oeuNTe. cas s'averer opportun de confier l'exploitation des services de transport ferroviaire voyageurs AL un operateur distinct du concessionnaire; l'operateur voyageurs ferait alors circuler, movennant peage, ses trains sur les infrastructures gerees par le concessionnaire. * Cadre rgglerentaire de I'activit6fermoviaire. Le cadre reglementaire de l'activit6 ferroviaire - qui doit etre entierement defini dans la convention de concession - doit encourager le concessionnaire A adopter une comportement commercial et etre incitatif A la concurrence avec les autres modes de transport. L'essentiel de l'activit6 ferroviaire correspond aux services de transport A caractere commercial, qui scront exploit6s dans un cnvironnement concurrentiel et d6reglement6; le concessionnaire devra avoir toute liberte d'en d6finir la Technical Notes I 3 configuration, d'en fLxer les tarifs publics et de n6gocier d'amenagement devrait, de pr6ference, etre assure des contrats particuliers avec les chargeurs importants. directement par le concessionnaire. Toutefois, cette Le concessionnaire pourrait 6galement etre amen6 a formule peut ne pas toujours s'av6rer faisable; les exploiter certains services a titre d'obligation de service capacit6s d'endettement du concessionnaire pourront public, a la demande expresse de l'Etat (ou, etre limit6es, et les credits commerciaux auxquels il 6ventuellement, des collectivit6s locales), en particulier aura acces pourront assez frequemment s'averer dans le domaine des transports %'ovageurs locaux, inadequats, en particulier en ce qui concerne leur rurautx ou suburbains; ces sernices devraient etre duree, a financer les investissements en infrastructure. exploit6s par le concessionnaire dans le cadre de La mobilisation du financement de ces investissements conventions particulieres sign6es avec l'Etat ou les par l'Etat constituerait alors une formule acceptable, collectiNit6s locales, avec versement au concessionnaire pourvu que le concessionnaire en supporte le cofit, par de contributions pour obligation de service public versement a l'Etat d'annuites specifiques permettant compensant les d6ficits encourus du fait de l'activite. d'assurer l'amortissement et la remun6ration du capital Dans les memes conditions, I'Etat compenserait investi par l'Etat. financierement le concessionnaire pour les autres obligations de service public qu'il pourrait lui imposer, * Gestion du niate1riel nteur et renwrque. Le par exemple dans le domaine des r6ductions tarifaires concessionnaire devra etre entierement responsabilise au profit de certains clients, ou de maintien en service pour ce qui concerne la definition du nombre, des d'infrastructures pour les besoins de la defense caracteristiques et de l'origine des locomotives, wagons nationale. A titre de dissuasion, afin de pr6venir tout marchandises, voitures v,oyageurs et autres mat6riels risque soit d'abus tarifaire par le concessionnaire sur ferroviaires; il pourra choisir entre l'acquisition, la les segments du marche sur lesquels le chemin de fer location ou le leasing des mat6riels. Parmi les disposerait d'une position de monopole ou d'une mat6riels existant en d6but de concession, le position dominante, soit de cartellisation de l'activit6 concessionnaire selectionnera les materiels necessaires fcrroviaire, la convention de concession devrait ouvrir la a son exploitation; ces mat6riels seront soit achetes, possibilit6 pour d'autres op6rateurs d'exploiter des soit, le plus g6neralement, lou6s par le concessionnaire services ferroviaires sur les infrastructures ger6es par le aupres de l'Etat, dans des conditions commerciales. concessionnaire, a l'issue d'une p6riode d'exclusivit6 d'exploitation accord6e au concessionnaire pour quclques ann6es en debut de concession. Les tiers op6rateurs 6ventuels, que l'Etat agr6erait apres avoir Le principal objectif de la cntendu le concessionnaire, utiliseraient les infrastructures, sur des bases non discriminatoires, mise en concession de moyennant paiement d'un peage au concessionnaire. I'activite ferroviaire est * Gestion des infrastrucwuresferro%iaires. Les d'accroitre 1'efficacitL des infrastructures ferroviaires, dont la propri6te est transports ferroviaires conscrv6e par I'Etat, seront ger6es et entretenues sous la rcsponsabilite unique et a la charge du conccssionnaire; les standards et les methodes d'entretien m6ritent d'etre librement arret6s par le Les materiels nouNeaux, necessaires au titre du conecssionnaire, sous r6serve que la securite des renouvellement ou du d6veloppement de l'activite en circulations ferroviaires soit assuree a un niveau cours de concession, seront acquis directement par acceptable compte tenu de la nature des services le concessionnaire ou loues par lui. au choix du exploit6s. En matiere de renouvellement et concessionnaire, sans intervention de l'Etat; d'am6nagement des infrastructures, l'initiative, la toutefois, l'Etat devrait conserver un droit de d6finition et la maitrise d'ocuvre des programmes sont preemption sur la vente des materiels appartenant au 6galement a confier au concessionnaire. Le concessionnaire, particulierement pendant les fiinancement des investissements de renouvellement et dernieres ann6es de la concession. 4 I Africa Transpart . Personntel du concessionnaire. Afin de permettre au mat6riels roulants loues aupres de l'Etat, ainsi que des concessionnaire de mettre en oeuvre une gestion annuites specifiques dues au titre des eventuels efficace de l'activite, il est indispensable que son investissements de renouvellement et d'amenagement personnel soit regi par la legislation et la des infrastructures finances par l'Etat. reglementation du travail applicable aux entreprises du secteur priN'6 (Code du travail, conventions collectives) . Fiscalite. Le regime fiscal applicable au et soit affilie au regime de securite sociale maladie et concessionnaire doit etre le regime de droit commun retraites du secteur prive. Le statut particulier, applicable aux entreprises privees du secteur des souvent inspire du statut de la Fonction publique, dont transports. LEtat doit s'engager dans la convention de beneficient actuellement les cheminots dans de concession a ne pas imposer de taxes specifiques a nombreuses entreprises ferroviaires, ne pourra ainsi pas l'activite ferroviaire qui pourraient introduire des etre conserv7. Dans une situation oiu l'entreprise distorsions en matiere de concurrence entre le chemin ferroviaire est souvent handicap6e par d'importants de fer et les autres transporteurs. Le concessionnaire sureffectifs, il ne peut etre impose au concessionnaire supportant, selon les mecanismes decrits ci-dessus, les de reprendre la totalite des effectifs des personnels charges d'entretien, de renouvellement et existants. En debut de concession, le concessionnaire d'am6nagement des infrastructures ferroviaires, les selectionnera librement les personnels qu'il reprendra produits petroliers utilises dans les locomotives et parmi les personnels de 1'entreprise ferroviaire. LEtat autres engins sur rail devraient etre exempt6s de la fera son affaire de la mise en oeuvre et du financement fraction de la taxe sur les carburants per,ue par l'Etat du programme de redeploiement et de reduction des en contrepartie des cofits d'utilisation des personnels non repris par le concessionnaire. LEtat infrastructures routieres. aura aussi a traiter les questions relatives aux retraites des cheminots anterieurement affilies aux r6gimes * Duree de la concession. La concession devrait avoir particuliers de securite sociale (Caisse particuliere de une duree suffisamment longue pour permettre au l'entreprise ferroNiaire, Caisse des fonctionnaires). concessionnaire de concevoir et mettre en oeuvre une politique adequate dans le domaine des investissements, du personnel, du marketing. Toutefois, l'Etat pourrait etre reticent a l'egard d'une L'essentiel de l'activite ferroviaire concession trop longue, qui pourrait par ailleurs etre moins incitative a la recherche de la competitivite par correspond aux services de transport le concessionnaire. Une bonne solution pour concilier a caractere commercial ces imperatifs contradictoires est d'adopter une concession "glissante", d'une duree initiale d'environ 20 ans, et qui peut etre prolongee d'accord parties, a l'issue de chaque periode quinquennale, pour des periodes successives de cinq ann6es. * Redevance de concession. En contrepartie de la . Contr6le de la concession par l'Etat et arbitrage. mise a sa disposition des infrastructures ferroviaires Le contr6le de la concession par l'Etat doit etre concu existantes et du droit d'exploiter les services de maniere a eviter toute interference de l'Etat dans la ferroviaires, le concessionnaire versera a l'Etat une gestion de la societe concessionnaire. Dans la pratique, redevance de concession. Cette redevance pourra soit le contr6le devrait concerner essentiellement la rck-6tir la forme d'un montant forfaitaire annuel, securite des operations ferroNiaires et la protection de cventuellement variable d'une annee a I'autre, et l'environnement. Le concessionnaire devrait index6 sur l'inflation, soit etre d6terminee en fonction transmettre a l'Etat des informations sur son activite du volume physique du trafic ferroviaire, soit enfin etre par l'interm6diaire de documents dont le contenu et la fix6e comme un pourcentage des recettes du periodicite seront definis avec precision dans la concessionnaire. A cette redevance s'ajoutera le convention dc concession. Un audit annuel de la paiement par le concessionnaire des lovers des concession, examinant les conditions dans lesquels sont Technical Notes 15 appliques les micanismes prevus a la convention, dc%Tait etre effcctu6 par un auditeur ind6pendant. d'actions pour une fraction du capital. La participation Enfin. les litiges relatifs a la convention de concession de l'Etat au capital de la societe concessionnaire ne dovraient. de pr6f6rencc, etre resolus par voie semble a priori guere souhaitable; toutefois, dans le cas d'arbi\trage, par exemple selon les regles d'arbitrage de oii l'Etat l'estimerait indispensable, cette participation la Chambre de commerce internationale. serait acceptable si, minoritaire, elle s'effectuait en dehors de l'actionnariat de reference et etait con,ue de Comment choisir le concessionnaire? maniere Ane pas ouvrir la porte A l'ingerence de l'Etat Les regles du jeu 6tant d6finies de maniere A dans la gestion de l'entreprise. En fait, si une promouvoir une gestion commerciale de l'activite participation publique minoritaire au capital de la ferromiaire, en concurrence active et saine avec les societe concessionnaire est jugee n6cessaire, il autres modes et entreprises de transport, le succes de semblerait plus judicieux que cette participation la concession implique que ... le concessionnaire soit s'effectue par l'intermediaire d'etablissements publics A bien choisi. caractere 6conomique int6resses directement au bon fonctionnement de l'activite ferroviaire, par exeemple Pour ere efficace. Ia societe concessionnaire doit etre une entreprise portuaire. dotee d'une direction forte, entierement acquise a lid6e d'une gestion commerciale de l'activite ferro%iaire et disposant des movens pour mettre en oeuvre sa politique. Cette e.xigence sera satisfaite par la presence, au sein de la soci6te concessionnaire, d'un Pour etre efficace, la societe actionnaire "de r6f6rence", qui d6tiendra la majorite au Conseil d'administration et designera le Directeur concessionnaire doit 6tre general de la soci6te. L'actionnaire de ref6rence devra dot6e d'une direction forte a cet effet d6tenir une part significative - dventuellement, mais pas obligatoirement, majoritaire - du capital de la societe. Lappel a la concurrence internationale pour le choix de l'actionnaire de reference est fortement recommande; une telle formule est garante de la transparence du processus et permet, si elle est bien conduite, d'obtenir les propositions les Dans tous les cas, la participation importante plus int6ressantes. Le choix de l'actionnaire de d'actionnaires veaux prives auans le capital de la socide ref6rence par n6gociation directe ne serait acceptable concessionnaire, y compris au sein de l'actionnariat de que dans des cas tres particuliers, lorsque notamment reference, merite d'etre encouragne. Un pourcentage la concession serait octroyee A un utilisateur quasi- minimal de partiipation d'actionnaires prives locaux exclusif du chemin de for. dans l'actionnariat de ref6rence pourrait en particulier, le cas 6cheant, etre impose aux candidats. Les actions de la societe concessionnaire autres que L celles ddtenues par l'actionnaire de ref6rence seraient es experiences recentes de chos' d'actionnaires de souscrites selon des mecanismes a definir en fonction reference de societes concessionnaires, tant dans le des conditions locales du marche des capitaux. domaine ferroviaire que dans celui de secteurs plus ou Lorsqu'il existe localement une Bourse des valeurs, le momis semblables (eau, energieflectrique, placement des actions en bourse - a l'issue, le cas t6necommunications) et les diffncultes rencontrees cchCant, d'une periode do portage des actions soit par amenent A recommander l'adoption d'une proc6dure l'actionnaire de r6ference, soit par d'autres organismes d'appel a la concurrence internationale en trois etapes. - constitucra tine des modalites ad6quates de souscription du capital do la soci6t6. Le personnel de La premiere dtape de ia procedure concerne la pre la socikt6 concessionnairo pourrait par ailleurs qualification des candidats a I'actionnariat de b6n6ficicr do conditions prihil6gi6es d'acquisition refrence-qui seront dans la pratiquc toujours 6 -Africa Transport constitues en consortiums - cette pre-qualification Une structure dc liLuidiation- qui pourrait etre 6tant effectu6c sur des criteres de capacite technique l'entreprise publique de ehemins de fer - devra etre et de solidite financiere. Cette etape devTa etre mise en place par l'Etat. avee pour mission de mettre pr6c6d6e d'un intense effort de prospection des en oeuvre le programme de red6ploiement et de candidats potentiels, de maniere a ouvrir le plus reduction des effeetifi; dii personnel de l'ancienne largement possible la concurrence. entreprise publique ferro;iaire non repris par le concessionnaire, r6soudre les questions relatives aux Les candidats pre-qualifies recevront un dossier de retraites des personnels affiliCs a des regimes consultation complet qui comprendra notamment le particuliers de retraite et vendre les actifs ferroviaires projet de convention de concession. Les candidats non repris par le coneessionnaire. Cette structure de seront inmit&s a presenter un projet de Plan d'entreprise liquidation devra 6g;1lenient assurer l'apurement de a moven terme, accompagne de leurs commentaires et financier (reglemcnt dles dettes et arrieres) suggestions sur le projet de l'ancienne entreprise convention de concession. ferroviaire. Ces elements seront discut6s entre l'Etat et les candidats. Les chemins de fer dAfrique sub- Les chemins de fer A l'issue de ces discussions, d'Afrique sub-saharienne, I'Etat selectionnera pour la saharienne... sont aujourd'hui a la comme de nombreux autres phase ultime de la crois6e des chemins chemins de fer dans les pays procedure 1'ensemble des en voie de developpement candidats avant present6 un ... et dans les pays plan d'entreprise juge developpes, sont satisfaisant et arretera aujourd'hui a la croisee des d6finitivement le texte de la convention de concession. chemins. Dans un contcxte futur oii ils auront a faire face a une concurretnce accrue, les chemins de fer Dans une derniere etape de s6lection, les candidats africains ne pourront conserver un r6le important dans que agrees a l'issue de la deuxidme etape seront invites a les systemes nationaux et r6gionaux de transport presenter, sur la base des dispositions de la convention s'ils savent a la fois reddfinir leur r6le economique en se de concession definitivement arretee par l'Etat, leurs concentrant sur les segments du marche oi ils peuvent propositions en matiere de redevance de concession. etre plus performants que leurs concurrents, et Le candidat avant presentee la proposition la plus reformer profondenient lcurs modes et pratiques de 6levee sera alors retenu comme actionnaire de gestion. Li oiu l'Etat a une reelle volonte de r6former r,6f6rence de la soci6te concessionnaire. en profondeur l'actimit6 fcrroviaire et souhaite utiliser pleinement les capacites du secteur priv6, etranger et La duree totale de la procedure d'appel a la national, la mise en c.oncession de l'exploitation concurrence telle que decrite ci-dessus devrait 8tre ferroviaire semble desormais constituer l'une des d'environ 12 mois, auxquels s'ajouteraient de quatre a techniques les plus prometteuses pour transformer le sLx mois pour la preparation de la reprise effective de chemin de fer en *ine veritable entreprise commerciale. l'exploitation ferroviaire par le concessionnaire (cr6ation de la societe, selection du personnel...). ANNEX 3 List of Participants Liste des participants Name | Contact DONOR/INTERNA TIONAL ORGANIZA TIONS Adolehoume, Amakoe (Mr.) Delegue General SITRASS INRETS, 2 Avenue General Malleret Joinville 94114 Arcueil Cedex FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 47 40 726 Fax: 33 1 45 47 56 06 Email: [email protected] Adolehoume, Beatrice (Mrs.) Charge du pole transports Institute des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Equipement et de 1'environnement pour le developpement (ISTED) 6 rue Talleyrand 75007 Paris, FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 44 186 392 Fax: 33 1 45 55 72 82 Bonnamour, Luc (Mr.) Directeur d'Agence Caisse Frangaise de Developpement 8th Rangoon Close, P.O. Box 9592 Airport, Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 77 87 55/77 87 56/77 38 40 Fax: 233 21 77 87 57 Breithaupt, Manfred (Mr.) 415 - Energy and Transport GTZ Postfach 5180 D-65728 Eschborn, GERMANY Telephone: 49 61 96 79 16 19 Fax: 49 61 96 79 71 44 Jahn, Helge (Mr.) Project Manager, East Africa Department Kreditanstalt fur Wideraufbau (KfW) Palmengartenstrasse 5-9 60325 Frankfurt am Main, GERMANY Telephone: 49 69 74 31 0 Fax: 49 69 74 31 2944 Khorsi, Zahia (Mrs.) Chief, Infrastructure & Industry Division West Africa Department African Development Bank (AfDB) 01 Boite Postale 1387 Abidjan, COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 204 444 ext. 4115 Fax: 225 21 63 73 Olivero, Gerard (Mr.) Direction du Developpement Sous-direction du developpement economique et de I'environnement Bureau infrastructure et services collectifs 20, rue Monsieur 75700 Paris 07 SP FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 53 69 30 36 Fax: 33 1 53 69 37 17 1 Name Contact Rieckhoff, Kurt (Mr.) Senior Railway Engineer Kreditanstalt fUir Wideraufbau (KfW) Palmengartenstrasse 5-9 60325 Frankfurt am Main, GERMANY Telephone: 49 69 74 31 0 Fax: 49 69 74 31 2944 Smagghe, Jean (Mr.) President Institute des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Equipement et de 1'environnement pour le developpement (ISTED) 6 rue Talleyrand 75007 Paris, FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 40 81 24 06 Fax: 33 1 40 81 23 31 Souley, Mani (Mr.) Banque Ouest Africaine de Developpement Lome TOGO Tchibozo, Antoine (Mr.) United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) P.O. Box 3005 Addis Ababa ETHIOPIA Telephone: 251 1 51 72 00 Fax: 251 1 51 03 91 Werner, G6sta (Mr.) Project Manager SIDA, INEC/INFRA S-10525 Stockholm, SWEDEN Telephone: 46 8 698 5431 Fax: 46 8 698 5620 COUNTRY PARTICIPA TION BENIN Agbayahun, Jean (Mr.) Directeur Adjoint de Cabinet Ministere des Finances BP 302 Cotonou, BENIN Telephone: 229 30 17 73 Fax: 229 30 18 51 Ahimakin, Camille (Mme) Directeur du Contr6le de Gestion Organisation Commune Benin-Niger (OCBN) BP 16 Cotonou, BENIN Telephone: 229 311 794 / 31 33 80 / 31 33 83 Fax: 229 31 41 50 Bonou, Raphael (Mr.) Directeur-General Organisation commune Benin-Niger (OCBN) BP 16 Cotonou, BENIN Telephone: 229 313 360 / 31 33 80 / 31 33 83 Fax: 229 31 41 50 Degila, Blaise Mahoutondji (Mr.) Secretaire General Ministere des Travaux Publics et Transports BP 35 Cotonou, BENIN Telephone: 229 312 100 Fax: 229 310 617 2 Name Contact Denonkpon, Comlan Georges (Mr.) DAEP/MPREPE Commission technique de decentralisation CTD/MPREPE 08 BP 18 Cotonou, BENIN Telephone: 229 31 43 82 Fax: 229 31 23 15 BURKINA FASO Diakite, S. (Mr.) Directeur General Societe nationale de transit du Burkina (SNTB) Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO Telephone: Fax: Faho, Elisabeth (Mrs.) Economiste Ministere des Transports et du Tourisme (MTT) 03 BP 7048 Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO Telephone: 226 30 62 11, poste 453 Fax: 226 31 19 04 Yameogo, Souleymane Zassin (Mr.) Representant de SITARAIL au Burkina Faso SITARAIL 01 BP 5699 Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO Telephone: 226 31 07 39 Fax: 226 31 07 33 Zongo, Oumar (Mr.) Directeur General SOPAFER - BOI BP 192 Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO Telephone: 226 31 35 99 Fax: 226 31 35 94 CAMEROUN Favre, Jean-Paul (Mr.) Conseiller Technique Ministere des Transports / Ministere des Travaux Publics Yaounde CAMEROUN Telephone: 237 22 47 57 Fax: 237 22 47 57 Mballa, Isabelle (Ms.) Yaounde, CAMEROUN Makang Mbeinun, Jean (Mr.) Comite Technique de Suivi des Mesures Finances et Economiques (CTS) Yaounde, CAMEROUN Ngabmen, Hubert (Mr.) President du Comite de Privatisation SNI Building, 9th Floor Yaounde, CAMEROUN Telephone: 237 23 51 08 / 23 97 50 Fax: 237 23 51 08 Sindeu, Jean-Bernard (Mr.) Coordonnateur du PST Ministere des Transport Yaounde, CAMEROUN Telephone: 237 22 96 94 Fax: 237 22 97 05 Name T Contact CONGO Kimbatsa-Koudimba, Joseph (Mr.) Directeur d'Equipement au CFCO Membre du Comite de Privatisation du CFCO Chemin de Fer Congo-Ocean (CFCO) BP 651 Brazzaville, CONGO Telephone: 242 94 12 30 / 94 04 47 Fax: 242 94 12 30 / 94 18 98 Koutoundou, Jacques (Mr.) Chemin de fers Congo-Ocean Boite Postale 301 Pointe-noire Brazzaville, CONGO Telephone: 242 94 12 30 / 94 73 60 Fax: 242 94 12 30 Nguimbi Manitou, Ted (Mr.) Chef Departement Juridique et du Contentieux Membre du Comite de Privatisation Chemin de Fer Congo-Ocean BP 651 Brazzaville, CONGO Telephone: 242 94 12 30 / 94 04 47 Fax: 242 94 12 30 / 94 18 98 COTE D'IVOIRE Bahi, Edouard Kore (Mr.) Directeur Administratif et Financer Ste. Ivoirienne des Gestion du Patri. Ferr. (SIPF) 16 BP 1415 Abidjan 16 COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 96 24 Fax: 225 21 39 02 Blanc, Eric P. (Mr.) Adjoint au Conseiller Ambassade de France Abidjan COTE D'IVOIRE Diallo, Mariam (Mrs.) COTE D'IVOIRE Essoh, S. (Mr.) BNETD Abidjan COTE D'IVOIRE Hounsinou, Folli Francis Thomas Joel (Mr.) Chef de Departement contr6le de gestion SITARAIL 16 BP 1216, Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 06 36 Fax: 225 22 48 47 Kadjo, N'Guetta Louis (Mr.) Directeur Technique Ste. Ivoirienne de Gestion du Partr. Ferr. (SIPF) 16 BP 1415 Abidjan 16 COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 96 24 Fax: 225 21 39 62 Koffi, Konan Rene (Mr.) Directeur General Societe Ivoirienne de gestion du Patrimoine Ferroviaire 16 BP 1415 Abidjan 16 COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 96 24 Fax: 225 21 39 62 Labonne, Philippe (Mr.) DGA-ADM Finances Commercial SITARAIL 16 BP 1216, Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 06 36 Fax: 225 22 48 47 4 Name Contact Malu-Malu (Mr.) Marche Tropicaux Abidjan COTE D'IVOIRE Niagne Lasme, Eugene (Mr.) President du Conseil d'Administration Ste Ivoirienne de gestion du patrimonie ferroviaire 16 B.P. 1415 Abidjan 16 COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 96 24 Fax: 225 21 39 62 Nouhoun, Keita (Mr.) SITARAIL 16 BP 1216 Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 06 36 Fax: 225 22 48 47 Thuveny, Michel (Mr.) DGA Ferroviaire SITARAIL 16 BP 1216 Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE Telephone: 225 21 06 36 Fax: 225 22 48 47 GABON Abeke, Marcel (Mr.) Administration - Directeur General Compagnie Miniere de d'Ogooe BP 27-28 Mouanda, GABON Telephone: 241 6773 10 Fax: 241 66 11 57 Bayle, Yves (Mr.) Directeur-generale Adjoint Compagnie Miniere d'Ogooe BP 27-28 Mouanda, GABON Telephone: 241 6773 10 Fax: 241661157 Damas, Richard (Mr.) Coordinateur PAPSUT BP 114 Libreville GABON Telephone: 241 76 58 30 / 751 775 Fax: 241765831 Gora, Firmin (Mr.) Directeur-general OCTRA (Office du Chemin de Fer Transgabonaise) B.P. 2198 Libreville, GABON Telephone: 241 7021 93 Fax: 241 70 20 38 Meye Bekourou be Obame (Mr.) Secretaire du Comite de Privatisation de la Republique Gabonaise Ministere des Finances, Charge de la Privatisation B.P. 9672 Libreville GABON Telephone: 241 76 06 77 Fax: 241 76 59 74 Ndong Sima, Raymond (Mr.) Directeur General HEVEGAB B.P. 316 Libreville GABON Telephone: 241 72 08 29 / 37 Fax: 241 72 08 30 5 Name T Contact GHANA Adams, David Annang (Mr.) First Trustee Railway Workers' Union of TUC (GHANA) Box 206 Takoradi, GHANA Telephone: 233 31 22181 / 22505 Fax: 233 31 4966 Adinkrah, Oscar (Mr.) General Secretary Railway Works Union of TUC (Ghana) Box 183 Sekondi, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 466 56 Fax: 233 21 31 49 66 Agboletey, Samuel Kwashivi (Mr.) Ag. Deputy MD (Admin & Opr) Ghana Railway Corporation P.O. Box 251 Takoradi, GHANA Telephone: 233 31 22181 Fax: 233 31 23797 Amoah, John Kwesi Asmah (Mr.) National Secretary Association of Railway Senior Officers Ghana Railway Corporation, Box 251 Takoradi, GHANA Telephone: 233 31 22181 / 22189 Fax: 233 31 23797 Ampah, Mavis (Ms.) Consultant Ministry of Roads and Transport P.O. Box M38 Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65 Fax: 233 21 66 71 14 Amponsah, Major (rtd) Samuel Kwame Member of Railways Board of Directors and Member of Parliament Ghana Railways c/o Managing Director Ghana Railways Takoradi, GHANA Arthur, Moses Kaku (Mr.) Managing Director Ghana Railway Corporation P.O. Box 251 Takoradi, GHANA Telephone: 233 31 237 97 Fax: 233 31 237 97 Azumah, Dominic A. (Mr.) Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Roads and Transport c/o Ministry of Roads and Transport P.O. Box M38 Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65 Fax: 233 21 66 71 14 Barnafo, Albert Owusu (Mr.) Managing Director Aldo Consulting and Engineering Services Limited P.O. Box 15644, Accra-North, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 77 21 18 Fax: 233 21 77 30 34 6 Name Contact Kwakye, E.A. (Mr.) Director (Planning) Ministry of Roads and Transport P.O. Box M38 Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65 Fax: 233 21 66 71 14 Oboh, Isaac Anaful (Mr.) Deputy General Secretary Railway Enginemen's Union Ghana Railway Corporation P.O. Box TUC 13 Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 666 757 Fax: 233 21 667 285 Opoku, Emmanuel (Mr.) Project Manager Ghana Railway Corporation P.O. Box 2203 Takoradi, GHANA Telephone: 233 31 22648 Fax: 233 31 237 97 Poku, Eric (Mr.) National Chairman Railway Enginemen's Union Ghana Railway Corporation Loco Running Shed P.O. Box 143 Takoradi, GHANA Salia, Edward Kojo (Honourable) Minister of State Ministry of Roads and Transport P.O. Box M38 Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65 Fax: 233 21 66 71 14 Yeboah, Johnson (Mr.) Sr. Economics Officer: World Bank Desk Ministry of Finance P.O. Box M 40 Accra, GHANA Telephone: 233 21 665 441, ext. 6387 Fax: 233 21 66 70 69 GUINEE Camara, Marguerite (Mrs.) Directrice-general ONCFG - Office Nationale des Chemins de Fer de Guinde BP 715 Conakry, GUIN1E Telephone: 224 45 46 13 /41 36 39 Fax: 41 35 77 Diallo, Alpha Abdoul (Mr.) Chef Division Gestion Portefeuille Ministere Economie et Finances BP 579 Conakry, GUINEE Telephone: 224 41 3717/40 43 67 Fax: 41 34 21 Diallo, Mamadou Larry (Mr.) Chef, Section Formation des conducteurs Direction Nationale des Transports Terrestres Ministere des Transports BP 715 Conakry, GUINEE Telephone: 224 41 27 68 Fax: 224 41 35 77 7 Name Contact Falilou, Barry (Mr.) Administrateur Civil, Conseille Industriel du Ministre Ministere de la Promotion du secteur prive de l'industrie et du commerce BP 468 Conakry, GUINEE Telephone: 224 45 32 62 Fax: 224 41 39 90 Sylla, Alseny (Mr.) Directeur National Adjoint du Department Industriel Ministere de la Promotion du Secteur Prive, Ind. & Commerce BP 648 Conakry, GUINEE Telephone: 224 45 18 65 Fax: 224 41 39 90 KENYA Murage, Zachariah (Mr.) Corporate Planning Manager Kenya Railways Corporation P.O. Box 30121 Nairobi KENYA Telephone: 254 2 221 211 Fax: 254 2 340049 MADAGASCAR Andrianantenaina, Solofomaharavo Jaona (Mr.) Chef du Service des Transports Ferroviaires Minisere des Transports et de la Meteorologie BP 4139 Antananarivo, MADAGASCAR Telephone: 261 2 261 48 Fax: 261 2 240 01 Rakotoniaina, Richard (Mr.) Chef de Departement Etude Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy 1, Avenue de l'Independance Antananarivo B.P. 259 MADAGASCAR Telephone: 261 2 205 21 Fax: 261 2 222 88 Rakotonirina, Charles (Mr.) Directeur des Transports Terrestres Ministere des Transports et de la Meteorologie BP 4239 Antananarivo 101 MADAGASCAR Telephone: 261 2 249 06 Fax: 261 2 240 01 Rarivony, Elisabeth Thdodore (Mrs.) Attachee aupres de l'Administration Delegude Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy 1, Avenue de l'Independance Antananarivo B.P. 259 MADAGASCAR Telephone: 261 2 205 21 Fax: 261 2 222 88 Razafindrabe, Daniel (Mr.) Administrateur Delegue Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy 1, Avenue de l'Independance Antananarivo B.P. 259 MADAGASCAR Telephone: 261 2 205 21 Fax: 261 2 222 88 MALA WI Dzanjalimodzi, Respicius P. (Mr.) Principal Secretary, Ministry of Finance P.O. Box 30049 Lilongwe 3, MALAWI Telephone: 265 782 199 / 783 440 Fax: 265 781 679 8 Name Contact Limbe, Enoch (Mr.) General Manager Malawi Railways 1994 Ltd. P.O. Box 5144 Limbe MALAWI Telephone: 265 640 844 / 640 747 Fax: 265 640 683 MALI Dicko, Housseiny (Mr.) Conseiller Technique Ministere de l'integration Africaine Bamako MALI Telephone: 223 23 63 44 Kone, Lassana (Mr.) President - Directeur-general Regie du Chemin de Fer au Mali BP 260 Bamako, MALI Telephone: 223 22 59 68 Fax: 223 22 54 33 Sanogho, Khalilou Bougounno (Mr.) Conseiller Technique Ministere des Travaux Publics et des Transports BP78 Bamako, MALI Telephone: 223 22 33 80 MOZAMBIQUE Elias, Alberto (Mr.) Director Mozambique Ports and Railways Praca does trabalhadores Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE Telephone: 258 1 300 360 Fax: 258 1 301 508 NAMIBIA de Paauw, Eugene (Mr.) Deputy Director Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications Government of Namibia Rehobother Road Snyman Circle Private Bag 13341 Windhoek, NAMIBIA Telephone: 264 61 208 8806 Fax: 264 61 224 060 Plichta, Oskar (Honourable Minister) Minister of Works, Transport and Communications Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications Government of Namibia Rehobother Road Snyman Circle Private Bag 13341 Windhoek, NAMIBIA Telephone: 264 61 208 8809 Fax: 264 61 224 381 Name Contact Poolman, Stefaans (Mr.) Under-secretary for Transport Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications Government of Namibia Rehobother Road Snyman Circle Private Bag 13341 Windhoek, NAMIBIA Telephone: 264 61 208 8803 Fax: 264 61 224 060 NIGER Aboubacar, Nomao (Mr.) Directeur des Transports Terrestres Ministere des transports BP 12 130 Niamey, NIGER Telephone: 227 73 54 89 Fax: 227 73 55 53 Moussa, Maiga Mahamoudou (Mr.) Directeur-general Adjoint OCBN - Organisation Commune Benin-Niger des Chemins de Fer et des Transports BP 16 Cotonou, BENIN Telephone: 229 313 284 Fax: 229 31 41 50 Souleymane, Djambouto (Mr.) Directeur Trafic et Fret Conseil Nigerien des Utilisateurs de Transports Publics (CNUT) BP 11048 Niamey NIGER Telephone: 227 735 185 /73 21 87 Fax: 227 73 52 11 Yonli, Soukari (Mr.) Secretaire General Ministere des Transports B.P. 12130 Niamey NIGER Telephone: 227 7354 89 Fax: 227 73 55 53 NIGERL4 Alao, Abiodun (Mr.) Assistant Director Federal Ministry of Finance P.M.B 14 Garki - Abuja NIGERIA Telephone: 234 9 234 0437 Fax: 234 9 234 3609 Dange, Alhaji Mahe (Mr.) Director-General, Chief Executive Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology Zaria P.M.B. 1148 Zaria, Kaduna State NIGERIA Telephone: 69 34095 / 343 58 Fax: 69 34095 llukwe, Gregory Chinwuba (Mr.) Sole Administrator Nigerian Railway Corporation P.M.B. 5016 Abuja, NIGERIA Telephone: 9 523 1913 / 523 7535 Fax: 9 5231913 10 Name Contact SENEGAL Camara, Serigne Ahmadou (Mr.) Directeur Cellule de Gestion du Portefeuille de l'Etat Ministere de l'Economie de Finances et du Plan B.P. 5700 Dakar/Fann SENEGAL Telephone: 221 233428/23 34 29 Fax: 221 22 56 31 Dembele Sall, Salimata (Mrs.) Expert Programme d'Ajustement sectoriel des Transports (PAST) CP 12 Fann Residence Dakar, SENEGAL Telephone: 221 257 358 /257 356 Fax: 221 258061 TANZANL4 Kyesi, Prosper (Mr.) Project Coordinator Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) P.O. Box 468 Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA Telephone: 255 51 110 693 Fax: 255 51 116 525 Liamba, B.A.N. (Mr.) Ministry of Communications and Transport P.O. Box 9144 Dar-es-Salaam, TANZNIA Telephone: 255 51 112 858 Fax: 25551 112751 Mboma, Linford (Mr.) Director General Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) P.O. Box 468 Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA Telephone: 255 51 112 695 Fax: 255 51 116 525 Shamte, Rukia (Mrs.) Chief Commercial Manager Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) P.O. Box 468 Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA Telephone: 255 51 112 529 Fax: 255 51 116 525 Temba, Gregory (Mr.) Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) P.O. Box 468 Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA Telephone: 255 51 110 599 Fax: 255 51 116 525 TOGO Fiaty, Yao Hetsu (Mr.) Directeur du Budget Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances B.P. 1183 Lome, TOGO Telephone: 228 21 03 16 Fax: 228 21 09 05 Gbedessi, Afatchao Prosper (Mr.) President du Conseil d'Administration Societe Natinale des Chemins de Fer du Togo BP 7226 Lome, TOGO Telephone: 228 21 22 11 Fax: 228 21 22 19 Name Contact Twesu, Koukou A. (Mr.) Conseilleur technique Secretaire d'etat charge des Transports et de Ress. Hydrau. B.P. 13078 Lome, TOGO Telephone: 228 22 16 26 Fax: 228 22 17 16 UGANDA Kwesiga, Samwiri M. (Mr.) Acting Managing Director Uganda Railways Corporation P.O. Box 7150 Kampala, UGANDA Telephone: 256 41 254 961 Fax: 256 41 344 405 ZAMBIA Littleford, David (Mr.) Board Member - Zambia Railways P.O. Box 31830 Lusaka, ZAMBIA Telephone: 260 1 227 339 Fax: 260 1 227 277 Mutambo, George Lytton (Mr.) Manager - Metal Exports Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Mutondo House P.O. Box 20172 Kitwe, ZAMBIA Telephone: 260 2 245 009 Fax: 260 2 222 854/245 736 Nyendwa, Rosanna (Mrs.) Programme Officer Trade and Economy Swedish Embassy Haile Selassie Avenue P.O. Box 30788 10101 Lusaka ZAMBIA Telephone: 260 1 251 711 Fax: 260 1 254 049 Simasiku, Godfrey (Mr.) Deputy Minister Ministry of Finance and Economic Development P.O. Box 50062 Lusaka, ZAMBIA Telephone: 260 1 253 388 Fax: 260 1 250 012 Simpasa, Charles (Mr.) Ministry of Communications & Transport Lusaka, ZAMBIA Telephone: 260 1 251 444 Simpungwe, Patrick (Mr.) Senior Business Analyst Zambia Privatisation Agency Privatisation House P.O. Box 30819 Lusaka, ZAMBIA Telephone: 260 1 238 303 Fax: 260 1 225 270 ZIMBABWE Kudambo, Lea Nyembezi (Mrs.) Deputy Secretary for Finance and Administration Ministry of Transport and Energy P.O. Box CY595 Causeway, ZIMBABWE Telephone: 263 4 700 693 12 Name Contact OTHER COUNTRIES: Anderson, Ben (Mr.) Principal Anderson Consulting Group 90 Park Avenue, Suite 1700 New York NY 10016 USA Telephone: 212 249 1981 Fax: 212 249 2884 Email: [email protected] El Gueddari, Mohammed Dahbib (Mr.) Directeur Finances et Gestion a l'ONCF Office National des Chemin de Fer du Maroc Rue Abderrahmane El Ghafiki Agdal-Rabat MOROCCO Telephone: 212 7 779 623 Fax: 2127773919 Gerard, Quentin (Mr.) Charge de mission SECAF 38, Quai du Point du Jour 92659 Boulogne Billancourt FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 41 41 55 48 Fax: 33 1 41 41 50 38 Guillot, Gerard (Mr.) Ingenieur Transport Caisse Francaise de developpement (CFD) 35, rue Boissy d'Anglas 75379 Paris Cedex 08, FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 40 06 34 56 Fax: 33 1 40 06 38 62 Guiol, Patrice R. (Mr.) Head of Advisory - Africa and Latin America Banque nationale de Paris Emerging Markets Group 1, rue Taibout 75009 Paris FRANCE Tel.: 33 1 4014 1568 Fax: 33 1 4014 3889 Krohn, Ted (Mr.) Director, International Policy Federal Railroad Administration US DOT 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C., USA Telephone: 202 632 3153 Fax: 202 632-3705 Laporte, Andr6 (Mr.) director, Business and Development Africa Consultants CANARAIL 1140 boulevard de Maisonneuve Ouest, bureau 1050 Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3A 1M8 Telephone: 514 985 0930 Fax: 514 985 0929 le Bussy, Roger-Herbert (Mr.) Consultant ferroviaire Gerant de la Societe GEMA a Abidjan Avenue de roi Albert, 52 - 1340 Ottignies BELGIUM Telephone: 32 4 338 91 15 (w) 32 10 414 535 (h) Fax: 32 4 338 91 85 13 Name Contact Maubouche, Francois (Mr.) Associe Coopers and Lybrand Consultants 32, rue Guersant 75833 Paris Cedex 17 FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 45 72 82 63 Fax: 33 1 45 72 84 01 Nizard, Alexandre (Mr.) Sales Manager, Africa Shell Additives International Ltd. Shell Centre London SE1 7NA UNITED KINGDOM Telephone: 44 171 934 5045 Fax: 44 171 934 3558 Punungwe, Godwin M. (Mr.) Railway Expert SATCC CP 2677 Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE Telephone: 258 1 420 246 / 14 Fax: 258 1 420 213 Reuter, Jochen W. (Mr.) Head of Regional Department Africa/America Deutsche Eisenbahn-Consulting GmbH Oskar-Sommer-Strasse 15 60596 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY Telephone: 49 60 63 19 340 Fax: 49 69 63 19 333 Sichula, Ingwa (Mr.) Regiional Sales & Customer Support Manager ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation (South Africa) Ltd. (Adtranz) P.O. Box 857 Johannesburg, SOUTH AFRICA Tarczay, Geza (Mr.) Transportation Economist TRANSCONSULT 3465 Cote des Neiges, Suite 301 Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3H 1T7 Telephone: 514 931 0504 Fax: 514 931 0504 Wrighton, John (Mr.) Head of Railways Crown Agents St. Nicholas House Sutton, SMI IEL UNITED KINGDOM Telephone: 44 181 643 3311 Fax: 44 181 770 7448 PRESENTERS/PANELISTS Ebata, Sebastien (Mr.) Directeur du Contr6le de Gestion Regie nationale des chemins de fer du Cameroun (REGIFERCAM) BP 304 Douala, CAMEROUN Telephone: 237 42 97 59 Fax: 237 42 32 05 Kambalame, Dennis (Mr.) Lilongwe MALAWI 14 Name Contact Kamden, Lucas (Mr.) Commission Technique de Privatisation et des Liquidations Mission de Rehabilitation des Entreprises du Secteur Public et Parapublic SNI Building Yaounde,CAMEROLTN Kieran, Peter (Mr.) Chairman CPCS Transcom 350 Sparks Street Suite 602 Ottawa KIR 7S8 CANADA Telephone: (613) 237-2500 Fax: (613) 237 4494 Kogan, Jorge (Mr.) Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA 541 394 0184 (w) 541 394 6488 (w) 541 784 8338 (h) 541 449 292 (cell) 541 326 7445 (fax) U.S. Voice Mail: (202) 778 7000 (202) 778 3031 (voice mail) Email: Isolda-Rodriguezgmercermc.com Mbale, Heatherwick(Mr.) Lilongwe MALAWI Montpert, Jean-Yves (Mr.) Societe d'exploitation des chemins de fer africains (SECAF) 38, quai du Point du Jour 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt FRANCE Telephone: 1 41 41 54 92 Fax: 1 41415038 Pai, Arun (Mr.) Advisor Mozambique Ports and Railways P.O. Box 3158 Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE Telephone: 258 1 300 360 Fax: 258 1 301 508 Peiffer, Eric (Mr.) Director of COMAZAR & SIZARAIL Kinshasa DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Portimao, OF CONGO Abilio David (Mr.) Permanent Secretary Ministry of Transport and Communications P.O. Box 276 Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE Telephone: 258 1 416 236 Fax: 258 1 431 539 Posner, Henry (Mr.) Telephone: (412) 928-0777 Fax: (412) 928-7715 Ratheaux, Olivier (Mr.) Ingenieur Caisse Francaise de Developpement (CFD) 35 rue Boissy d'Anglas 75379 Paris Cedex 08 FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 40 06 32 53 Fax: 33 1 40 06 38 63 15 Name Contact Rochet, Pierre-Louis (Mr.) Chairman and CEO Systra 5, avenue du Coq 75009 Paris, FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 40 16 6301 Fax: 33 1 40 16 6350 Sarmet, Marcel (Mr.) Coopers and Lybrand Consultants 32, rue Guersant 75833 Paris Cedex 17 FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 45 72 84 01 Fax: 33 1 45 72 84 00 Sharma, Vipin (Mr.) Director, World Division International Union of Railway (UIC) 16 rue Jean Rey 75015 Paris, FRANCE Telephone: 33 1 44 49 21 20 Fax: 33 1 44 49 20 29 Thiam, Abdelazziz (Mr.) Directeur Gendral SITARAIL 16 B.P. 1216 Abidjan 16 COTE D'IVOIRE Tel.: 225 21 06 36 Fax: 225 22 48 47 Thiam, Tidjane (Mr.) Chef de la Cellule de Strategie Prdsidence de la Rdpublique Abidjan, COTE D'IVOIRE Victor, Paul (Mr.) c/o Larry McCaffrey New York: Telephone: (212) 687-9500 Fax: (212)687-9501 Waterkein (Mr.) TRANSURBCONSULT Consult Directeur Zone Afrique Belgian Transport & Urban Infrastructure Rue Ravenstein 60 B18 B 1000 Bruxelles, BELGIUM Tel.: 32 2 548 5311 Fax: 3225139419 Email: [email protected] Zoba, Bernard (Mr.) Secretaire-General Union Africaine des Chemins de Fers 869 A. Tombalbaye B.P. 687 Kinshasa I DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO Telephone: 243 12 23861/25166 Fax: 871 1125 125 Alternate Address: c/o ESACC - GT BP 13225 Brazzaville CONGO Fax: 242 836839 16 Name Contact WORLD BANKSTAFF Budin, Karim (Mr.) TWUTD World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 473-4764 Hallgrimsson, Snorri (Mr.) Transport 2 Africa Region World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 473-4997 Jones, Leita (Ms.) Transport I Africa Region World Bank 1818 H Street, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 473-5030 Katsu, Shigeo (Mr.) Country Director World Bank Resident Mission Abidjan Cote d'lvoire Telephone: 225 44 22 27 Kedia, Yash Pal (Mr.) Transport I Africa Region World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 473-4544 Mbi, Emmanuel (Mr.) Transport 2 Africa Region World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 473-4953 Thompson, Louis (Mr.) TWUTD World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 473-3785 October 30, 1997 17 I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~