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The Ultimate Cybersecurity Guide for the It Professional

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The Ultimate Cybersecurity Guide for the It Professional THE ULTIMATE CYBERSECURITY GUIDE FOR THE IT PROFESSIONAL { 01101000 01110100 01110100 01110000 01110011 00111010 00101111 00101111 01110111 01110111 01110111 00101110 01100011 01100001 01110010 01100010 01101111 01101110 01100010 01101100 01100001 01100011 01101011 00101110 01100011 01101111 01101101 } THE ULTIMATE CYBERSECURITY GUIDE FOR THE IT PROFESSIONAL 2019 Welcome to our comprehensive guide on the basics of cybersecurity. Whether you've been in IT for a long time or are just starting out, there is an expectation that everyone in IT should have some degree of expo- sure to InfoSec. A good way to do that is to learn from and get connected in the community. Cybersecurity is a fascinating and rapidly evolving area of IT. And those that are involved are friendly people who care passionately about keeping us all safe. With information from over 150 sourced references, and personal input from The Howler Hub community of security experts, this guide contains the key information to help you: • Understand key concepts that drive the security professional. • Learn a common language to engage with cybersecurity professionals. • Connect with sources to stay up-to-date on this evolving field. • Engage with cybersecurity experts and the threat hunting community at large. CONTENTS 01 02 03 History of Attackers + Common Cybersecurity Their Motives Attacks <pg num="001" /> <pg num="005" /> <pg num="007" /> 04 05 06 Terms to Know Experts to Blogs to Read <pg num="009" /> Follow <pg num="014" /> <pg num="013" /> 07 08 09 Events to Books to Read Movies + Shows Attend <pg num="017" /> to Watch <pg num="015" /> <pg num="019" /> 10 11 12 Communities Become a References to Engage Threat Hunter <pg num="023" /> <pg num="021" /> <pg num="022" /> 13 Appendices <pg num="024" /> <pg num="001" /> SEC. //01. _HISTORY OF CYBERSECURITY <pg num="002" /> HISTORY OF 1981 First Outbreak { Elk Cloner } 1984 Thompson Finds First Backdoor CYBERSECURITY 1986 First IBM Virus + Military Attack 1987 Viruses Get Media Attention KEY 1988 Morris Worm Slows Internet 1989 ATTACKERS First Ransomware { AIDS } DEFENDERS 1990–1994 Viruses Create Hysteria Chameleon family of viruses hits Polymorphic viruses created Form virus becomes most common 1974 Rabbit Virus Makes Copies Michelangelo creates digital apocalypse Leandro + Kelly, Freddy Krueger + 1971 First Virus OneHalf spread { The Creeper } 1975 First Trojan { ANIMAL } Tens of thousands of identified malware VIRUSES FOR FUN VIRUSES FOR MASS DESTRUCTION 1990–1994 Influx of New Antivirus 1971 The Reaper Developed to Beat The Creeper Panda Software released Panda AV Trend Micro introduced PC-cillin Symantec launched Norton Antivirus 1.0 Grisoft released Anti-Virus Guard (AVG) 1989 Legacy AV is Born 1988 5 Antivirus Programs Released 1987 Brain + Vienna Neutralized by AV 1986 Astronomer Defeats Military Attack 1970 1980 1990 1968 1969 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 For more details on each event, see Appendix For more details on each event, see Appendix <pg num="003" /> SEC. //01. _HISTORY OF CYBERSECURITY <pg num="004" /> 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2014 2015–2019 Worms Expand to Nasty Worms Spread Quickly Data Theft Evolves Keyloggers Get Bank Info Breaches Made Us WannaCry New Systems Pikachu targets children Nyxem, Storm Worm + Conficker were destructive SpyEye + Zeus get mobile phone banking info Locky infected millions in Europe Boza hits Windows 95 files Anna Kournikova spreads to contacts Keyloggers Zeus, Torpig + Daprosy steal data Anti-Spyware disables AV Tiny Banker Trojan infected over 24 banks First MS Excel virus (Linux) ILOVEYOU worm infects millions 92M records stolen from AOL Flame used for targeted cyber espionage Mirai infected IoT and launched DDoS attacks Staog attacks Linuz machines Fastest worm (SQL Slammer) causes internet Cardsystems Solutions hacked for 40M records CryptoLocker so powerful it gets copycats GitHub, Twitter, Reddit Netflix + Airbnb access denied disruptions within 15 min. Happy99 attached to emails TK/TJ Maxx sees breach of 94M records First IoT virus hits (Linux Darlioz) Wannacry spread globally causing $4B in damages Melissa attacks MS Word + Outlook Credit card scam gets 130M records from Heartland Multiple Sony hacks get 101M records Kedi RAT targeted Citrix users ExploreZip destroys MS Office docs Government loses over 125M records Evernote + LivingSocial each Aadhaar, the India ID system, breached for 1.1B records hacked for 50M records Kak worm exploits bug in Outlook Express Marriott Starwood, Equifax, Yahoo data breach steals 22M records Anthem + Uber suffered major breaches Facebook/Cambridge Analytica case puts data use into question VIRUSES FOR MASS DESTRUCTION ATTACKS FOR RANSOM + DATA CYBERATTACKS AS A BUSINESS MODEL 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2014 2015–2019 Continued AV Innovation Antivirus is a Must-have Rise of Endpoint Protection Endpoint Security Goes Deep Security Advances in the Cloud Bitdefender + Antivirus eXpert (AVX) comes AV for GNU/Linux released called ClamAV 5M new malware samples found annually Fileless malware challenges endpoint Machine learning models displace AV signatures out of Softwin Bit9 (later Carbon Black) was founded Legacy AV companies struggle to keep up protection platforms EPP and EDR converge First Black Hat information security event held Advancing threats convince majority of Symantec develops first Carbon Black develops Endpoint Detection Large scale AI and advanced analytics applied to cloud Many security companies formed following AV companies to buy AV endpoint protection platform and Response (EDR) security data releases in early 1990’s Windows XP service packs pay increasing Carbon Black develops application control Cloud-based security platforms developed Security Operations Centers (SOCs) become commonplace and consolidate stack attention to security Next-gen firewalls detect and block Carbon Black launches the PSC, a single-agent security platform Cloud enables big data collection of endpoint activity undesirable HTTP Third party testing labs re-invent better ways Gartner creates SIEM framework MITRE ATT&CK documents TTPs of adversaries to simulate real-world threats BSides 1.0 held during Threat hunting becomes a security role Billions of investment dollars pour into the endpoint security space Black Hat Security Conference Outsourcing security to MSPs common for smaller companies 2000 2010 2020 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 For more details on each event, see Appendix For more details on each event, see Appendix <pg num="005" /> SEC. //02. _ATTACKERS + THEIR MOTIVES <pg num="006" /> { 01101000 01110100 01110100 01110000 00111010 00101111 00101111 01100011 01100001 01110010 01100010 01101111 01101110 01100010 01101100 HACKTIVISTS 01100001 01100011 01101011 03 00101110 01100011 01101111 01101101 00101111 01100011 01111001 01100010 01100101 <TARGET>: Companies and organizations ATTACKERS + 01110010 01100011 01110010 01101001 01101101 01101001 that are an affront to their religion, politics 01101110 01100001 01101100 01110011 } or cause. <GOALS>: THEIR MOTIVES NATION STATE ACTORS OR Cause disruption for attention to their cause or steal data to damage their targets. 01 CYBERTERRORISTS There are four categories of adversaries that are threatening the <HOW THEY DO IT>: Typical ways hacktivism is executed include website security of today’s companies and organizations. It is important <TARGET>: Governments and businesses defacement, denial-of-service attacks (DoS), to not just understand the different types of attackers, but also running critical infrastructure like power grids. redirects, website parodies, information theft, what motivates them so you can better protect against them <GOALS>: Steal sensitive information, virtual sabotage and virtual sit-ins. disrupt enemy capabilities or create meeting their objectives. <MOTIVATION>: Promote their religion, international incidents. politics or cause. <HOW THEY DO IT>: Sophisticated cyberattacks where the adversary often DAMAGE MEDIUM works directly or indirectly for their government and utilizes highly advanced cyberattacks against targets. <MOTIVATION>: Putting their nation in a better position against supposed enemies. 04 SCRIPT KIDDIES DAMAGE EXTREMELY HIGH <TARGET>: Networks or websites with minimal security. <GOALS>: Gain access to a network to show CYBERCRIMINALS 02 they could or deface a website. <HOW THEY DO IT>: Unskilled hackers <TARGET>: Companies with customer data utilize scripts or programs developed by others. (particularly financial data) or valuable IP. <MOTIVATION>: Impress friends or gain <GOALS>: Steal sensitive information that credit in computer-enthusiast communities. can be sold or directly steal money. <HOW THEY DO IT>: Infiltrate networks, DAMAGE SMALL often through a less secure partner, and retrieve the sensitive data. <MOTIVATION>: Money DAMAGE HIGH <pg num="007" /> SEC. //03. _COMMON ATTACKS <pg num="008" /> Rootkits Trojan Horse A collection of software designed to enable access to a comput- A computer program which misleads users of its true intent. COMMON er or an area of its software. Similar to Trojans, it embeds very Many masquerade as a legitimate file, like an email attachment deep in the OS to mask its existence making it difficult to find or advertisement. Modern forms act as a backdoor to provide and remove. It provides the attacked administrator access
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