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Iptrust Botnet / Malware Dictionary This List Shows the Most Common Botnet and Malware Variants Tracked by Iptrust

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ipTrust Botnet / Malware Dictionary This list shows the most common botnet and malware variants tracked by ipTrust. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, since new threat intelligence is always being added into our global Reputation Engine. NAME DESCRIPTION Conficker A/B Conficker A/B is a downloader worm that is used to propagate additional malware. The original malware it was after was rogue AV - but the army's current focus is undefined. At this point it has no other purpose but to spread. Propagation methods include a Microsoft server service vulnerability (MS08-067) - weakly protected network shares - and removable devices like USB keys. Once on a machine, it will attach itself to current processes such as explorer.exe and search for other vulnerable machines across the network. Using a list of passwords and actively searching for legitimate usernames - the ... Mariposa Mariposa was first observed in May 2009 as an emerging botnet. Since then it has infected an ever- growing number of systems; currently, in the millions. Mariposa works by installing itself in a hidden location on the compromised system and injecting code into the critical process ͞ĞdžƉůŽƌĞƌ͘ĞdžĞ͘͟/ƚŝƐknown to affect all modern Windows versions, editing the registry to allow it to automatically start upon login. Additionally, there is a guard that prevents deletion while running, and it automatically restarts upon crash/restart of explorer.exe. In essence, Mariposa opens a backdoor on the compromised computer, which grants full shell access to ... Unknown A botnet is designated 'unknown' when it is first being tracked, or before it is given a publicly- known common name. P2P - Limewire P2P - Limewire P2P - Gnucleus P2P - Gnucleus Conficker C Conficker C is an updated variant of the Conficker A/B worm. It is capable of blocking access to security-related services including websites and software. Conficker C is self-updating and runs many payloads. P2P - Bearshare P2P - Bearshare IRC Bot Various tcp-based bots communicating through IRC for Command and Control. Generic Dropper dŚŝƐĞǀĞŶƚĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽĂŐĞŶĞƌŝĐĐůĂƐƐŽĨ͞ĚƌŽƉƉĞƌ͟ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƐƚĂLJ resident on infected machines, communicate with external command and control servers and load additional malware. HTTP Bot Generic HTTP Bot interface. PoisonIvy Poison Ivy is an advanced encrypted "reverse connection" - firewall-bypassing remote administration tool that gives an attacker the option to access - monitor - or even take complete control of an infected user's system. This allows the following types of theft: * passwords * usernames * banking or credit card information * other personal information The default settings is for the malicious 'server' file to inject itself into the target system's Default Browser memory space and then run as a phony 'duplicate' browser process - which enables it to bypass detection by firewalls and routers. If enabled - the server ... BlackEnergy BlackEnergy is an HTTP-based botnet used primarily for DDoS attacks. Unlike most common bots, this bot does not communicate with its master using IRC. Additionally, there are no known originating exploit activities bot, unlike a traditional IRC bot. This is a small (<50kb) binary for the Windows platform that uses a simple grammar to communicate. Bluenose/Metus A TCP-based bot that generally has a GUI server connector for all clients to report to via specific IP ranges specified in the client built bot. It can be used as a DDoS tool or remote access tool. There are many variants and targets many platforms. Zeus Zeus (also known as Zbot, PRG, Wsnpoem, Gorhax and Kneber) is a Trojan horse that steals banking information by keystroke logging. Zeus is spread mainly through drive-by downloads and phishing schemes. First identified in July 2007 when it was used to steal information from the United States Department of Transportation it became more widespread in March 2009. P2P - Shareaza P2P - Shareaza Hamweq Hamweq -- aka IRCbrute or autorun worm -- is a backdoor worm that copies itself onto the system and any removable drive it finds. Any time the removable drives are accessed, it automatically executes. While an effective spreading mechanism, the malware may also be passed on through other means. The malware creates registry entries to enable its automatic execution at every system startup and injects itself into explorer.exe. Hamweq uses IRC communication to enable the botmaster to execute commands and receive information on the compromised system. P2P - DNET P2P - DNET Baglanti N/A Storm Storm is a botnet that has been linked by the Storm worm, a trojan horse spread through spam e- mail. It has been used in a variety of criminal activities; the US FBI considers the botnet a risk for increased bank fraud, identity theft, and cybercrime. The botnet displays defensive behaviors that potentially indicate that its masters actively protect it against tracking. Buzus Buzus opens a backdoor on the infected machine and tries to steal information such as personal finance data (e.g. credit card numbers, online banking details) and passwords from various e-mail and FTP applications (e.g. Trillian, Microsoft Outlook, CuteFTP). It also tries to compromise security settings of various security-related products. Buzus installs an unauthorized, undesirable file on the infected system; the file is typically a worm, capable of spreading via removable USB devices. The trojan may be distributed as an executable file attached to an e-mail message. Alternatively, it may be downloaded directly onto the computer from a malicious or compromised ... RBot The RBot family of malware opens a communication channel with the malware distributor via IRC. RBots typically disable any antivirus software and can act as proxy servers for IRC or HTTP traffic. Once the victim computer is compromised, the attacker is able to perform malicious operations such as spreading via Windows shares or the DCOM RPC exploit. The backdoor can also be instructed to: - Download and execute additional malware - Export sensitive documents - Log and report keystrokes - Start a SOCKS proxy, or rlogin, HTTP, and/or TFTP servers. The ports used for these are configurable. - Capture and ... Sequence N/A Sality Sality is a family of file-infecting viruses that spread by infecting .exe and .scr files. The virus also includes an autorun worm component that allows it to spread to any removable or discoverable drive. Additionally, Sality includes a downloader trojan component that installs additional malware via the Web. RAT RAT refers to a Remote Access Trojan. There are hundreds of slightly different RATs with the following commonalities: x - Ability to communicate with its Command and Control domain(s). x - Grants the bot master complete control of the compromised system. RATs are more likely to be used for targeted identity theft and malicious activities than most other types of bots. RATs are designed to be steathy, defensive, and resilient, which makes effective removal from a compromised system difficult. DaRK Bot Dark Bot is an IRC (Internet Relay Chat) trojan, which can strongly compromise the user's privacy and security. By using its specific algorithms, this pest infects IRC client and starts performing various destructive actions, such as sending spam messages, logging user's keystrokes, or even damaging system's components. Spam Generic Spamtrap Interface. Bobax The Bobax family of malware turns the infected computer into a remote spam machine. Bobax viruses use DLL injection to insert the spam code into Internet Explorer - activating the virus every time Internet Explorer is run. Members of this family spread by exploiting the LSASS vulnerability (as described in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-11). Bobax viruses can also perform bandwidth and network analysis to see precisely how much spam they can send - and thus are able to tailor their spamming so as not to tax the network - which helps them avoid detection. Some variants are able ... Kraken The BotArmy is stealthy and robust; it includes redundancy mechanisms to allow the bot master to recover victims in the event that one or more primary Command and Control servers is disabled. Kraken also uses encrypted communications to frustrate identification and understanding attempts. Research indicates that primary Kraken C2 servers are hosted in RU, FR, and US. Kraken is believed to use a social engineering-based propagation technique -- the very same used by Storm and other targeted attacks. Kraken, self-updating, is flexible enough to be used as a general-purpose bot for data theft or attack activity. Kraken presents itself ... CIA The Cruel Intentions Administrator (C.I.A.) family of malware are trojans that open backdoors to an infected machine - allowing the malware distributor to access local files and other sensitive information. Members of this family can transfer files between the infected machine and the distributor - log keystrokes - and even take screenshots of the computer. C.I.A. will also transfer arbitrary files back to the distributor - but specifically look for keys to popular software. These viruses often come packed - making their detection difficult. Prosti Prosti is a remote trojan whose primary function is keylogging. Some variants can end security processes while others have been seen downloading additional malware. Given its ability to communicate with a command site, and given the behavior of these variants, Prosti is capable of tasks far beyond keylogging. Bifrose Bifrose is a Remote Access Trojan, which allows an attacker full access to a compromised system. This trojan uses a connect-back function in order to communicate with Command and Control. This connect-back method bypasses most firewall- and proxy-based security measures. Bifrose has kernel-level hooking functionality, and can be exceptionally difficult to remediate. HostBooter HostBooter is a very simple botnet application used primarily to turn compromised systems into DDoS nodes. However, Command and Control does have the ability to instruct the system to update the malware, or to invisibly download and execute any new type of malware. SDBot There are several thousand members of the SDBot family of viruses.
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