Itf<,:R ~ Jewish Ultra-Nationalism in Israel: Converging Strands

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Itf<,:R ~ Jewish Ultra-Nationalism in Israel: Converging Strands ~t1r"J("~ ~l- J C\-('I~"l , j. tI. ClW-. fr(lttt(e t Lcd)1 l l('{('Is/l 1l1Im'''','llllllllll~''' ill l~rtlcl: GIlIi'l..",,·/H;\ SIIll/Ids 29 ~i a.c.t\i',,~ t, itf<,:r ~ 19fs- (Mv~kr-ferd! yfe!jt... A~so ~(d ;vt:y~, meaning is the loyalty or illcntity of an individual with hiS nation rather than '~;v'Hbj(1 PrtU a. ... d LOl.fdC1l-1: C.'(\ U/.1 i other collectivities. Examples of other collectivities would be ethnic. reli­ 1 ~IOUS. regional. or social groups or. in the case of Isradi Jews. the Jewish 'rt ~S.(S, 118T) "eorle as a wholc-i.e.. the international collectivity of Jews. 2 Observers have pointed to the growth and increased militance of Sephardic ethnicity in the last decade. It has been suggested that this ethnic Jewish Ultra-Nationalism in Israel: Identity comes at the expense of national integration and a sense of national I(l~alty. The 19R4 election campaign and voting results suggest that the prob­ Converging Strands lem is less serious than was once thought. Tami. the only distinctively ethnic rarty on the Israeli political map. won 2.3 percent of the vote in 198) and man~ feared that its vote would increase in future elections. In 1984 Tami's CHARLES S. LIEBMAN rroportion of the vote dropped to 1.6 percent and its future seems doubtful. It is true that a new Sephardic party. Shas. won 3.\ percent of the vote. But unlike Tami. Shas did not appeal exclusively to Sephardic voters. Somc of 11\ support came from very religious non-Zionist Ashkenazim who sup­ ported Agudat brad in the past but were unhappy with that group's internal Although Israelis view their hracliness and Jewishness (i.e.. their sense of t-lo.:kering, Shas's leadership is entirely Sephardic hut unlike Tami its cam­ being Jews) as interrelated. their understanding of Judaism. of what it means r;\l~n was not anti-Ashkenazic. Rabbi Eliezer Schakh. the outstanding figure to he a Jew. carries particular nuances that distinguish it from the Judaism of (If the Ashkenazic yeshiva world. quietly endorsed Shas and urged the enter­ DI;I.,pora Jewry. Most Isr.telis. whether ther arc observant or non-observant t.llnmcnt personality Uri lohar. now a yeshiva stuoent himself. to appear at of Je .... ish law. place far greater emphasis on the national and territorial ckl:llon rallie'i on its hehalf. dime/hlllns of Judai... m than do Dia ... pora Jews. Indeed. the development of The National Religious Party. hoping to attract Sephardic voters. placed a Jlstlfh:tively braeli conceptions of JUdaism. a tendency that has become ropular Sephardic canoioate in a very prominent position on its list. Accord­ p<lftl-.:ubrly pronounced in the religious sector in the last few years. is a m~ til an opinion poll. religious Sephardic voters voted or did not vote for 1;I'lm;lting topic fraught with consequences for the future of Israel-Diaspora the N RP without regard to the presence of the Sephardic candidate rc!;ttll'nS. These dit'ferences allow Israelis to differentiate their loyalty to the tlll/I/,.('t::. 9 September 19K4. p. 14). lh~ hr.leli-Jewish collectivity from their loyalty to the world jewish collce­ The mo... t striking evidence for the decline of a distinctive ethnic as op­ 11\ /t~ In other words. the fact that Jcwishness is a central component of posed to a national identity among all Israelis is to he found in the 1994 voter I,raellness docs not mean that Israeli Jews cannot conceive of conflicting 1m ;t!lies to hrae! or to Diaspora Jewry. survey conducted by Asher Arian and l\lichal Shamir. Forty-one percent of n;t1ive Israelis who.,e falhers were also native-born declined to identify Our concern is with two basic questions. First. arc Israeli Jews becoming Ihc..'msclvc ... a., either Ashknazic or Sephardic. The same is true of roughly a fnl're '.'1' Ie:>:> n<ltionalistic',' Second. what are the different strands or compo­ third of the native Israeli'i whose fathers were Sephardic and a third whose nent-, that comprise their national identity'! Neither of these questions ad­ lather'> werc Ashkenazic. mits \-If any ... imple answers. but they afford a convenient framework within \\ hl.:h to discuss Israeli nationalism in 1984. :\ second alternative to a national identity would be identification with the slIl">-cummllnity of rc\igiou:> Jews. Tensions between religious (i.e .• observ­ antl and nonreligious Jews have always characterized Israeli society. But in Committment to Israeli ~ationalism thl" realm a'i well there is evidcm:e that a national identity is replacing a n;trro\,. or c·v.;\u'iivi,tic religious identity among a growing segment of the The answer to the first question. whether Israeli jews arc becoming more reh~lou" population, The proportion of religious voters \l, ho supported non­ ,'r !c.,s nationalistic. depends on the meaning of the term Ilationalism. One n:h~il)U'i partico,; first jumped in 19~J. In that ckction the NRP \o"t almost h;.lt of it'; \ olcr,. primaril\ to partie'> of the right. Thcse voters did not return ( 10 Iljl\·l. Indeed. c'\dudin!l both Kach. the part) of Rabbi Meir Kahane. and (';"c',·, S, Li.:t'>m"n i, Pn>fe"or "f Politic''') ~ludi,-" .n RH,II"n l:ni\c:r'i!\ "nd direct~ Ihe :. ", ", ''')-,' fit l'f ['l ,lIt "'.t! ,,'1<:0;':'-' COllr,,-,, ~,I I'r",-,I" , ()r~n t 'nl\ <:1",,1', H" m,,'l' r"c" nl h,I<lk\ arc T;tn1l, which do 0,)( l."onduct campaign... addres... cd exc!u"ively to religious N, ,',"!! III filii,", Ilkr~cJn .. nd I.", :\n\),·!.:,: In! "hll\ "f C.. I,I"rni" Pr,-,,,. !')XJI und, \ ,'h;r... the prnpllf'tino "flhe rdigioll'> party vote \~a" 9.6 percent in JlJ~l and ",,:r, L'''l"r Ihn'Y<:hi~.I. Rdl,'r:,!! III /llIIeI IHI""'n1n<::"," lnd;"p.:t t O'\'''',iI Pre", IlJl!.Ii. 'J'I ren:ent 10 19;-\4. >";lIt all or the'>c voter'> \~crc relij!ious Jews. This low ::s '-I;,;"~ ~t1r"J("~ ~l- J C\-('I~"l , j. tI. ClW-. fr(lttt(e t Lcd)1 l l('{('Is/l 1l1Im'''','llllllllll~''' ill l~rtlcl: GIlIi'l..",,·/H;\ SIIll/Ids 29 ~i a.c.t\i',,~ t, itf<,:r ~ 19fs- (Mv~kr-ferd! yfe!jt... A~so ~(d ;vt:y~, meaning is the loyalty or illcntity of an individual with hiS nation rather than '~;v'Hbj(1 PrtU a. ... d LOl.fdC1l-1: C.'(\ U/.1 i other collectivities. Examples of other collectivities would be ethnic. reli­ 1 ~IOUS. regional. or social groups or. in the case of Isradi Jews. the Jewish 'rt ~S.(S, 118T) "eorle as a wholc-i.e.. the international collectivity of Jews. 2 Observers have pointed to the growth and increased militance of Sephardic ethnicity in the last decade. It has been suggested that this ethnic Jewish Ultra-Nationalism in Israel: Identity comes at the expense of national integration and a sense of national I(l~alty. The 19R4 election campaign and voting results suggest that the prob­ Converging Strands lem is less serious than was once thought. Tami. the only distinctively ethnic rarty on the Israeli political map. won 2.3 percent of the vote in 198) and man~ feared that its vote would increase in future elections. In 1984 Tami's CHARLES S. LIEBMAN rroportion of the vote dropped to 1.6 percent and its future seems doubtful. It is true that a new Sephardic party. Shas. won 3.\ percent of the vote. But unlike Tami. Shas did not appeal exclusively to Sephardic voters. Somc of 11\ support came from very religious non-Zionist Ashkenazim who sup­ ported Agudat brad in the past but were unhappy with that group's internal Although Israelis view their hracliness and Jewishness (i.e.. their sense of t-lo.:kering, Shas's leadership is entirely Sephardic hut unlike Tami its cam­ being Jews) as interrelated. their understanding of Judaism. of what it means r;\l~n was not anti-Ashkenazic. Rabbi Eliezer Schakh. the outstanding figure to he a Jew. carries particular nuances that distinguish it from the Judaism of (If the Ashkenazic yeshiva world. quietly endorsed Shas and urged the enter­ DI;I.,pora Jewry. Most Isr.telis. whether ther arc observant or non-observant t.llnmcnt personality Uri lohar. now a yeshiva stuoent himself. to appear at of Je .... ish law. place far greater emphasis on the national and territorial ckl:llon rallie'i on its hehalf. dime/hlllns of Judai... m than do Dia ... pora Jews. Indeed. the development of The National Religious Party. hoping to attract Sephardic voters. placed a Jlstlfh:tively braeli conceptions of JUdaism. a tendency that has become ropular Sephardic canoioate in a very prominent position on its list. Accord­ p<lftl-.:ubrly pronounced in the religious sector in the last few years. is a m~ til an opinion poll. religious Sephardic voters voted or did not vote for 1;I'lm;lting topic fraught with consequences for the future of Israel-Diaspora the N RP without regard to the presence of the Sephardic candidate rc!;ttll'nS. These dit'ferences allow Israelis to differentiate their loyalty to the tlll/I/,.('t::. 9 September 19K4. p. 14). lh~ hr.leli-Jewish collectivity from their loyalty to the world jewish collce­ The mo... t striking evidence for the decline of a distinctive ethnic as op­ 11\ /t~ In other words.
Recommended publications
  • Israel's National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
    Leap of Faith: Israel’s National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Report N°147 | 21 November 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Religious Zionism: From Ascendance to Fragmentation ................................................ 5 A. 1973: A Turning Point ................................................................................................ 5 B. 1980s and 1990s: Polarisation ................................................................................... 7 C. The Gaza Disengagement and its Aftermath ............................................................. 11 III. Settling the Land .............................................................................................................. 14 A. Bargaining with the State: The Kookists ................................................................... 15 B. Defying the State: The Hilltop Youth ........................................................................ 17 IV. From the Hills to the State ..............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 11. Nationalism, Nation Making, & the Postcolonial States of Asia, Africa
    After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States Lowell W. Barrington, Editor http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=126246 The University of Michigan Press 11. Nationalism, Nation Making, & the Postcolonial States of Asia, Africa, & Eurasia RONALD GRIGOR SUNY I have benefited enormously from Lowell Barrington’s clarifying essays on ethnicity and nationalism. His distinction insisting on territorial- ity for the nation but not for ethnicity is very useful. At the same time, in our many discussions, I have argued that his de‹nition of the nation remains, for my money, too objectivist. So I have amended the de‹nitions he offers in his introductory chapter as a prelude to my own discussion of nationalism after independence. My additions are in brackets. “What makes nations different from other groups,” writes Barrington, “is that they are collectives [who feel they are] united by shared cultural features (such as language, myths, and values) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination. Put another way, they are groups of people [who believe they are] linked by unifying cultural characteristics and the desire to con- trol a territory that is thought of as the group’s rightful homeland.” My amendments here are meant to emphasize the unease I have about too concrete a notion of “cultural features” or “cultural characteristics.” Having heard all my life about the importance of preserving ethnic culture and remaining unsure about what that entailed, I subscribe to a notion
    [Show full text]
  • Israeli Reactions in a Soviet Moment: Reflections on the 1970 Leningrad Affair
    No. 58 l September 2020 KENNAN CABLE Mark Dymshits, Sylva Zalmanson, Edward Kuznetsov & 250,000 of their supporters in New York Ciry, 1979. (Photo:Courtesy of Ilya Levkov; CC-BY-SA) Israeli Reactions in a Soviet Moment: Reflections on the 1970 Leningrad Affair By Jonathan Dekel-Chen The Kennan Institute convened a virtual meeting and public demonstrators pushed the Kremlin to retry in June 2020 marking the 50th anniversary of the the conspirators, commute death sentences for their attempted hijacking of a Soviet commercial flight from leaders, and reduce the prison terms for the rest. Leningrad.1 The 16 Jewish hijackers hoped to draw international attention to their struggle for emigration to A showing of the 2016 documentary filmOperation Israel, although many of them did not believe that they Wedding (the code name for the hijacking) produced by would arrive at their destination. Some were veterans Anat Zalmanson-Kuznetsov, daughter of two conspirators, of the Zionist movement who had already endured preceded the Kennan panel and served as a backdrop punishment for so-called “nationalist, anti-Soviet for its conversations. The film describes the events from crimes,” whereas others were newcomers to activism.2 the vantage point of her parents. As it shows, the plight Their arrest on the Leningrad airport tarmac in June of the hijackers—in particular Edward Kuznetsov and 1970, followed by a show trial later that year, brought Sylva Zalmanson—became a rallying point for Jewish the hijackers the international attention they sought. and human rights activists in the West. Both eventually Predictably, the trial resulted in harsh prison terms.
    [Show full text]
  • Privatizing Religion: the Transformation of Israel's
    Privatizing religion: The transformation of Israel’s Religious- Zionist community BY Yair ETTINGER The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. This paper is part of a series on Imagining Israel’s Future, made possible by support from the Morningstar Philanthropic Fund. The views expressed in this report are those of its author and do not represent the views of the Morningstar Philanthropic Fund, their officers, or employees. Copyright © 2017 Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. www.brookings.edu Table of Contents 1 The Author 2 Acknowlegements 3 Introduction 4 The Religious Zionist tribe 5 Bennett, the Jewish Home, and religious privatization 7 New disputes 10 Implications 12 Conclusion: The Bennett era 14 The Center for Middle East Policy 1 | Privatizing religion: The transformation of Israel’s Religious-Zionist community The Author air Ettinger has served as a journalist with Haaretz since 1997. His work primarily fo- cuses on the internal dynamics and process- Yes within Haredi communities. Previously, he cov- ered issues relating to Palestinian citizens of Israel and was a foreign affairs correspondent in Paris. Et- tinger studied Middle Eastern affairs at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently writing a book on Jewish Modern Orthodoxy.
    [Show full text]
  • Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13864-3 — the Israeli Settler Movement Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler , Cas Mudde Index More Information
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13864-3 — The Israeli Settler Movement Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler , Cas Mudde Index More Information Index 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the, 2 Ariel, Uri, 76, 116 1949 Armistice Agreements, the, 2 Arutz Sheva, 120–121, 154, 205 1956 Sinai campaign, the, 60 Ashkenazi, 42, 64, 200 1979 peace agreement, the, 57 Association for Retired People, 23 Australia, 138 Abrams, Eliott, 59 Aviner, Shlomo, 65, 115, 212 Academic Council for National, the. See Professors for a Strong Israel B’Sheva, 120 action B’Tselem, 36, 122 connective, 26 Barak, Ehud, 50–51, 95, 98, 147, 235 extreme, 16 Bar-Ilan University, 50, 187 radical, 16 Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, 194, 216 tactical, 34 Bat Ayin Underground, the, 159 activism BDS. See Boycott, Divestment and moderate, 15–16 Sanctions transnational, 30–31 Begin, Manahem, 47, 48, 118–119, Adelson, Sheldon, 179, 190 157, 172 Airbnb, 136 Beit El, 105 Al Aqsa Mosque, the, 146 Beit HaArava, 45 Al-Aqsa Intifada. See the Second Intifada Beitar Illit, 67, 70, 99 Alfei Menashe, 100 Beitar Ironi Ariel, 170 Allon, Yigal, 45–46 Belafonte, Harry, 14 Alon Shvut, 88, 190 Ben Ari, Michael, 184 Aloni, Shulamit, 182 Bendaña, Alejandro, 24 Altshuler, Amos, 189 Ben-Gurion, David, 46 Amana, 76–77, 89, 113, 148, 153–154, 201 Ben-Gvir, Itamar, 184 American Friends of Ariel, 179–180 Benn, Menachem, 164 American Studies Association, 136 Bennett, Naftali, 76, 116, 140, 148, Amnesty International, 24 153, 190 Amona, 79, 83, 153, 157, 162, 250, Benvenisti, Meron, 1 251 Ben-Zimra, Gadi, 205 Amrousi, Emily, 67, 84 Ben-Zion,
    [Show full text]
  • Opinion New Government, New President, New Israel?
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 20, ISSUE 3 Studies Opinion New Government, New President, New Israel? Melanie Carina Schmoll, PhD Israel in summer 2021 – the end of the pandemic seems to be near. Israel opens up, almost all mask requirements are cancelled, international travel groups are welcome and even the individual guests are allowed to travel to the Holy Land with almost no restrictions. It seems Israel is back in pre-pandemic times. But it is not the same country anymore. Some fundamental changes have happened over the last few weeks. When, in March 2021, the Israelis had to vote again for the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, it was for the fourth time within two and a half years. The outcome was almost the same as the three times before. Benjamin Nethanyahu, Israel´s long-time prime minister, won most of the seats with his Likud party. As the State of Israel is a parlamentary democracy the executive branch or the government draws its authority from the Parliament (the legislative branch) and needs its confidence. Therefore, the prime minister is not decided directly by the voters but depends instead on a process of bargaining among the various fractions elected to parliament. In Israel, no single party holds most of the seats in Parliament and thus the process of forming a government is long and complicated.1 Israel also has an extreme proportional system of government, 1 For more information see Melanie Carina Schmoll, “Israel and the permanent siege: The people have spoken - who will find an answer to the needs of the voters?” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 20, 1 (2019).
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism and Religion -- Take 2
    H-Nationalism Nationalism and Religion -- Take 2 Blog Post published by Yoav Peled on Monday, May 24, 2021 In this post Yoav Peled, Tel Aviv University, discusses the relations between nationalism and religion among Muslims and Jews in Israel. In March 2021 Israel held its fourth general election in two years, which resulted in the same deadlock between Benjamin Netanyahu’s populist supporters and his opponents as the previous three campaigns. (This is not an issue of left and right, as the anti-Netanyahu bloc includes several right- wing parties.) Right before the elections, the United Arab List (UAL), an Islamist political party which represents one of two affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel (the other affiliate has been outlawed), split from the United List, a coalition of four Arab political parties espousing different shades of Palestinian nationalism. Upon leaving the United List, UAL’s leader, Mansour Abbas, a dentist by profession, declared that his party would be open to negotiate with either side of the political map, including Netanyahu’s bloc, the most nationalist, i.e., anti-Palestinian, political formation in Israel’s history. As it turned out, after the elections Netanyahu and his bloc were short two Knesset seats (out of 120) to form a governing coalition, and the UAL had four seats, which could have carried Netanyahu over the top. However, Religious Zionism, the most right-wing party in Netanyahu’s bloc, which gained six seats, refused to participate in a coalition that would depend on an Arab party, even if that party’s support will be only in the form of abstaining in the crucial vote in the Knesset.1 Religious Zionism Religious Zionism is a tendency within the Zionist movement, established in 1902.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism Perceptions of Pre-Service Social Studies Teachers in Turkey
    Journal of Education and Practice www.iiste.org ISSN 2222-1735 (Paper) ISSN 2222-288X (Online) Vol.8, No.8, 2017 Nationalism Perceptions of Pre-Service Social Studies Teachers in Turkey Ali Altıkulaç 1* Osman Sabancı 2 1. Faculty of Education, Çukurova University, Balcalı, Adana, Turkey 2. Faculty of Education, Gazi University, Teknikokullar, Ankara, Turkey * E-mail of the corresponding author: [email protected] This article was presented at IV. International Symposium on History Education (1-3 Semtember 2016) held in Mu ğla, Turkey. Abstract The purpose of this paper is to reveal the perception of nationalism of pre-service teachers who will teach Social Studies course in a multidimensional manner. In the study, a total of 381 pre-service teachers who study in department of Social Studies from different universities located in different regions of Turkey was defined as the study group and a descriptive model was used as the basis of the research design. The data include both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. In the scope of the research, a questionnaire was created to determine pre-service teachers’ perception of nationalism. This form consists of three sections. The participants’ demographic data, opinion questions and the nationalism perception scale are presented in the sections, respectively. The questionnaire was applied to the pre-service teachers studying in different regions of Turkey. At the end of the research, various results were obtained regarding the nationalism perceptions of pre-service social studies teachers. Keywords: Education, Social studies, Nationalism 1. Introduction When teaching programs are studied, it is remarkably realized that the concepts such as motherland, ideals, nation, national consciousness, patriotism and nationalism are often given place.
    [Show full text]
  • Knessia Gedolah Diary
    THE JEWISH OBSERVER (ISSN 0021-6615) is published monthly, in this issue ... except July and August, by the Agudath lsrael of Ameri.ca, 5 Beekman Street, New York, N.Y. The Sixth Knessia Gedolah of Agudath Israel . 3 10038. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. Subscription Knessia Gedolah Diary . 5 $9.00 per year; two years, $17.50, Rabbi Elazar Shach K"ti•?111: The Essence of Kial Yisroel 13 three years, $25.00; outside of the United States, $10.00 per year Rabbi Yaakov Kamenetzky K"ti•?111: Blessings of "Shalom" 16 Single copy, $1.25 Printed in the U.S.A. What is an Agudist . 17 Rabbi Yaakov Yitzchok Ruderman K"ti•?111: RABBI NISSON WotP!N Editor An Agenda of Restraint and Vigilance . 18 The Vizhnitzer Rebbe K"ti•'i111: Saving Our Children .19 Editorial Board Rabbi Shneur Kotler K"ti•'i111: DR. ERNST BODENHEIMER Chairman The Ability and the Imperative . 21 RABBI NATHAN BULMAN RABBI JOSEPH ELIAS Helping Others Make it, Mordechai Arnon . 27 JOSEPH FRJEDENSON "Hereby Resolved .. Report and Evaluation . 31 RABBI MOSHE SHERER :'-a The Crooked Mirror, Menachem Lubinsky .39 THE JEWISH OBSERVER does not Discovering Eretz Yisroel, Nissan Wolpin .46 assume responsibility for the Kae;hrus of any product or ser­ Second Looks at the Jewish Scene vice advertised in its pages. Murder in Hebron, Violation in Jerusalem ..... 57 On Singing a Different Tune, Bernard Fryshman .ss FEB., 1980 VOL. XIV, NOS. 6-7 Letters to the Editor . • . 6 7 ___.., _____ -- -· - - The Jewish Observer I February, 1980 3 Expectations ran high, and rightfully so.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism, National Identity and Territory: Jacint Verdaguer and the Catalan Renaixença John Robert Etherington
    Nationalism, National Identity and Territory: Jacint Verdaguer and the Catalan Renaixença John Robert Etherington To cite this version: John Robert Etherington. Nationalism, National Identity and Territory: Jacint Verdaguer and the Catalan Renaixença. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2010, PP (PP), pp.1. 10.1080/01419871003789887. hal-00595189 HAL Id: hal-00595189 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00595189 Submitted on 24 May 2011 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Ethnic and Racial Studies For Peer Review Only Nationalism, National Identity and Territory: Jacint Verdaguer and the Catalan Renaixença Journal: Ethnic and Racial Studies Manuscript ID: RERS-2006-0050.R5 Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript Keywords: Nationalism, Nation, Territory, Catalonia, Verdaguer, Historic Bloc URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers [email protected] Page 1 of 32 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 2 3 4 5 NATIONALISM, NATION AND TERRITORY: JACINT 6 7 8 VERDAGUER AND THE CATALAN RENAIXENÇA 9 10 11 12 Abstract 13 14 15 This paper seeks to explain the historic importance to Catalan nationalism of the 16 For Peer Review Only 17 18 nineteenth-century poet and priest, Jacint Verdaguer.
    [Show full text]
  • A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution WATCH A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution Copyright © 2021 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-900-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org APRIL 2021 ISBN: 978-1-62313-900-1 A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution Map .................................................................................................................................. i Summary ......................................................................................................................... 2 Definitions of Apartheid and Persecution .................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • National Versus Ethnic Identification in Africa
    National versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism Amanda Lea Robinson∗ October 31, 2013 Abstract Communal conflicts, civil wars, and state collapse have led many to portray the no- tion of African nation-states as an oxymoron. Scholars of African politics have argued that strong and persistent ethnic attachments are the result of economic and political modernization, the very forces credited with reducing parochial ties in Europe. Others have argued that national consolidation in Africa is particularly unlikely due to high de- grees of ethnic diversity, colonial rule that exacerbated that diversity, and the partition of cultural groups. Despite the ubiquity of these arguments, there has been very little com- parative, empirical research on territorial nationalism in Africa. Using individual level data from sixteen countries, combined with a novel compilation of ethnic group and state characteristics, I am able to evaluate the observable implications of these long-respected theoretical traditions within a multilevel framework. I find that attachment to the nation, relative to one's ethnic group, increases with education, urbanization, and formal employ- ment at the individual level, and with economic development at the state level { patterns more consistent with classic modernization theory than second generation modernization theory. Thus, if modernization in Africa does indeed intensify ethnic attachment, the impact is overwhelmed by the concurrent increase in pan-ethnic territorial nationalism. Similarly, the results show that ethnic diversity and the partition of ethnic groups by “artificial” state borders increase, rather than decrease, the degree to which individuals identify nationally. Taken together, these results reject pessimistic expectations of African exceptionalism and instead suggest that the emergence of widespread national identifica- tion within territorially-defined African states is not only possible, but increasingly likely with greater economic development.
    [Show full text]