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For Free Distribution SURVIVAL WITHOUT RUssIAN GAS: UKRAINE'S LIKELY ALLIES 1914-2014: MIssION POssIBLE IN THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL REALM THE ROLE OF UKRAINIANS IN WWI № 11 (77) AUGUST 2014 A life in war WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM Featuring selected content from The Economist FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION |CONTENTS BRIEFING Between Munich-2 and the Truman Doctrine: Both strategies tReasonable Doubts: The Parliament inherited from Yanukovych were tested in the 20th century. Which one will the world choose holds an imminent threat to Ukraine, yet the recent breakup of to deal with the Russian aggressor today? pro-European coalition could be equally dangerous 24 4 ECONOMICS POLITICS An Economy Under Fire: How the war in Eastern Ukraine affects Survival Without the national economy and the Donbas Russian Gas: Ukraine 28 can stand its ground Deinations for Ukrainian exporters Seeking Their Place in Ukraine earns the mo in foreign currency on the markets of the Mediterranean in a gas war, even if and the Indian Ocean the Sun: How Ukraine The highe trade deficit Belarus Czech Republic it continues for years. Russia Poland Bosnia Lithuania Kyrgyzan Ukraine has diversified its export and Herzegovina Qatar Uzbekian does Greece Sri-Lanka Turkmenian not trade/ Macedonia Indonesia Tajikian barely The biggest threat Romania Malaysia Afghanian trades Serbia Vietnam Pakian with the Slovenia China India countries markets and what more Auria Hong Kong Bangladesh The highe in blue Belgium Taiwan Province trade surplus Morocco is to get hooked on Denmark South Korea Myanmar Niger Iceland Japan Latvia Cyprus Thailand Nigeria Ireland Ghana Eonia Lebanon Singapore Equatorial Guinea can be done Great Britain Guinea Slovakia Israel Philippines South Africa Luxembourg Côte d’Ivoire Hungary Paleine Mongolia Senegal Russian gas again Malta Argentina Moldova Jordan North Korea Ethiopia Sudan The Netherlands Brazil Bulgaria Saudi Arabia Yemen Democratic Repub- Egypt Tanzania Columbia Finland Ecuador Croatia Kuwait Iraq lic of the Congo Cameroon Togo Cuba Sweden Canada Montenegro Bahrain Syria Algeria Kenya Tunisia Mexico Norway Coa Rica Albania UAE Turkey Angola Congo Uganda Panama in exchange for France Puerto Rico Spain Oman Georgia Benin Liberia Chad Peru Switzerland USA Portugal Iran Armenia Burkina Faso Libya Haiti El Salvador 30 Germany Auralia Italy Kazakhan Azerbaijan Djibouti Mauritania Guatemala Dominical Republic a discount from Gazprom SOCIETY 6 The Big Illusion of “Little Russians”: Why Ukrainians still view Lawyer and energy expert Alan Riley: “Ukraine has enough aggressors as “friends” and “brothers” potential to turn itself into the center of gas trading for Central 34 Eastern Europe and Baltic States” KonstantinB orovoy, the leader of the Russian pro-Western 10 opposition, talks about the inevitable breakup of Russia under Chairman of the post-Maidan Lustration the current system, imperial ambitions and ideological special Committee Yehor Sobolev on lustration, operations from the Kremlin the government’s tricks to block it, the 36 Kremlin’s agents and the need to rebuild The Splendour of Money and the government agencies from scratch Misery of Philosophy Bribing 12 Western intellectuals and exporting Yuriy Makarov about the heroes born Russia’s ideology have long been a from the present-day Ukraine favourite diversion of Russian rulers 38 15 HISTORY NEIGHBOURS Between HostileN eighbours: The role of Ukrainians in World European MP Rebecca Harms: War “European leaders and US President Obama have to be clear that they do 40 not accept the zigzag policy of Mr. “For the Freedom of the Putin” Ukrainian Nation, For the Peace of Europe”: 16 Château de Dinteville FOCUS preserves memory of Cossack Hetman Pylyp Collateral Damage: The shooting down of an airliner shows how Orlyk, and his son Hryhir, reckless Vladimir Putin’s sponsorship of Ukrainian rebels has been a French diplomat and 18 a tireless promoter of independence for the Leonidas Donskis on moral blindness and Ukrainian lessons Cossack nation 21 44 The Comic War of Rinat 19th-century Ukraine: Between Conservatism, Liberalism and Akhmetov: Who spoiled his Socialism hopes to keep Donetsk under Ukrainian sociopolitical movement between the mid-19th total control and early 20th century: intelligentsia and the potential of newly- 22 freed peasants 46 E-mail [email protected] www.ukrainianweek.com Tel. (044) 351-13-87 The Ukrainian Week № 11 (77) August 2014 Editors address 37 Mashynobudivna str., Kyiv, 03067, Ukraine Founder ECEM Media GmbH. Publisher ECEM Media GmbH Print run 15 000. Free distribution Address Austria, Am Gestade,1, 1010 Vienna Our partner State registration certificate КВ № 19823-9623ПР 19.03.2013 Chief Editor Alla Lazareva Editors Anna Korbut, Natalia Romaneс, Shaun Williams № 11 (77) AUGUST 2014|THE UKRAINIAN WEEK|3 BRIEFING|PARLIAMENT On one hand, the postpone- ment of the parliamentary election tReasonable Doubts campaign until the spring of 2015, let alone the autumn of 2015 opens the door for reactionary forces to strike back, much like in the post- The Parliament inherited from Yanukovych holds Orange Revolution 2006, or for re- an imminent threat to Ukraine, yet the breakup of forming the majority around the ambiguously titled parliamentary pro-European coalition is potentially as dangerous group For Peace and Stability, which, according to reports in the Author: n July 24, parliamentary month-long countdown to the day media, is funded by the exiled for- Oles factions Vitaliy Klitschko’s the president receives the right to mer president Viktor Yanukovych Oleksiyenko UDAR and Oleh Tyahny- dismiss the parliament and to an- and his associates. The latter sce- Obok-led Svoboda (Free- nounce early elections. Such a move nario would result in worsening so- dom) later joined by the group prompted strong reaction from the cial and economic situation in the called Economic Development, rest of Batkivshchyna faction, country, dramatic drop of the qual- mostly composed of former or pres- whose MPs had hoped to safeguard ity of life, unforeseeable problems ent Party of Regions MPs and led by this coalition and the parliament during the winter heating season, newly ex-Party of Regions MP Ana- until the very last moment. Equally weariness of the war in society, toliy Kinakh, and a number of Yulia displeased was Prime Minister Ar- growing disenchantment of the Tymoshenko-led Batkivshchyna seniy Yatseniuk, who on that very public with the lack of drastic (Fatherland) MPs who aligned day counted on the Rada to approve changes after the victory of the themselves with President Petro Po- a number of important bills to do Maidan, and business conflicts roshenko announced their exit from with financing state expenditure within the coalition's two parlia- the ruling coalition of the Verk- and modernization of the gas trans- mentary groups made up primarily hovna Rada. This launched the portation system. of representatives of the former Ya- nukovych's majority. To picture this An equation with multiple unknowns entire situation one has to look no The support of many political parties found in the late opinion polls may have little further than the winter of 2006. resemblance to the ultimate results of the parliamentary race. The majority of respon- dents are either yet to make their choice or feel that they are likely to reconsider. More Also when it comes to the risks than 40% in Eaern Ukraine claim they are not planning to vote at all, but under certain conditions may change their mind at a later date. of putting back the elections, The UkrainianWeek previously noted % of those who are going to vote, by Rating that Batkivshchyna’s expectation that the disappointed Poroshenko's voters would somehow come back to the ranks of its supporters is nei- ther backed by opinion polls, nor the logic of Ukrainian political pro- cesses of the last couple of decades: in fact the voters disappointed in their idols never come back to them even after getting disappointed in 23.3 16.2 13.0 11.1 7.3 4.9 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.2 2.8 the new ones, instead they tend to seek newer ones still. In this context Solidarni Undecided Radykalna Batkivshchyna UDAR Hromadianska Svoboda CPU (Communi Sylna Ukrayina Party of Front Zmin (Solidarity, Partia (Fatherland, (Vitaliy Pozytsia (Freedom, Party of Ukraine, (Strong Ukraine, Regions (Front of Change, the most recent sociology results, Petro Poroshenko) (Radical Party, Yulia Klitschko) (Civil Position, Oleh Petro Serhiy Tihipko) (Mykhailo Arseniy Oleh Liashko Tymoshenko) Anatoliy Hrytsenko) Tyahnybok) Symonenko) Dobkin) Yatseniuk) where the figurehead of Poroshen- Source: Research by the Rating Group Ukraine over June 28 – July 10, 2014 ko's political project Solidarnist % of those who are going to vote, by KIIS (Solidarity) is named, for example, Yuriy Lutsenko, is very telling. This has a simple explanation: Bat- kivshchyna is associated with the government and its unpopular moves at least as much, if not more than Poroshenko. Should they postpone the parlia- mentary campaign, pro-European politicians would also risk facing growing passivity among their sup- porters as a result of general disap- pointment about “nothing changing after the revolution”. At the same 23.1 12.4 12.3 9.3 6.4 5.6 3.5 3.1 time it would give time and opportu- Undecided Radykalna Solidarni Batkivshchyna Hromadianska UDAR Svoboda Sylna Ukrayina Partia (Solidarity, (Fatherland, Pozytsia (Vitaliy (Freedom, (Strong Ukraine, nity for purely technical or disguised (Radical Party, Petro Poroshenko) Yulia (Civil Position, Klitschko) Oleh Serhiy Tihipko) Oleh Liashko Tymoshenko) Anatoliy Hrytsenko) Tyahnybok) pro-Russian political projects to Source: Research by Kyiv International Initute of Sociology (KIIS) over July 16 – 23, 2014 gather pace and mobilize the former supporters of the Party of Regions 4|THE UKRAINIAN WEEK|№ 11 (77) AUGUST 2014 PARLIAMENT|BRIEFING and the Communist Party of ones that find such scenario unreal- However, when applied in the Ukraine. The current ratings of pub- istic should once again look back at parliamentary republic, the first- lic support that show overwhelming the events of 2006.
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