Moldova: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report | Freedom

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Moldova: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report | Freedom FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2021 Moldova 61 PARTLY FREE /100 Political Rights 26 /40 Civil Liberties 35 /60 LAST YEAR'S SCORE & STATUS 60 /100 Partly Free Global freedom statuses are calculated on a weighted scale. See the methodology. TOP Note The numerical scores and status listed above do not reflect conditions in Transnistria, which is examined in a separate report. Freedom in the World reports assess the level of political rights and civil liberties in a given geographical area, regardless of whether they are affected by the state, nonstate actors, or foreign powers. Disputed territories are sometimes assessed separately if they meet certain criteria, including boundaries that are sufficiently stable to allow year-on-year comparisons. For more information, see the report methodology and FAQ. Overview Moldova has a competitive electoral environment, and freedoms of assembly, speech, and religion are mostly protected. Nonetheless, pervasive corruption in the government sector, links between major political figures and powerful economic interests, as well as critical deficiencies in the justice sector and the rule of law continue to hamper democratic governance. Key Developments in 2020 • Former premier Maia Sandu of the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) became Moldova’s first female president, defeating incumbent Igor Dodon in a free and fair two-round November election. • While authorities instituted largely proportional COVID-19-related restrictions, some businesses and individuals received arbitrary fines and the media regulator unsuccessfully attempted to limit journalists’ ability to quote unofficial sources. Nearly 144,000 COVID-19 cases and 3,000 deaths were recorded by year’s end. • Oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who fled Moldova in 2019, was charged by TOP prosecutors for his alleged involvement in a banking scandal in May. Despite attempts to extradite him from the United States and Turkey, Plahotniuc remained at large at year’s end. Political Rights A. Electoral Process A1 0-4 pts Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 4 / 4 The president is elected by direct popular vote for up to two consecutive four-year terms. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round, the two leading candidates compete in a second round. Former premier Maia Sandu of the PAS defeated incumbent president Igor Dodon in the two-round November 2020 contest. Sandu won 57.7 percent of the second-round vote, while Dodon won 42.3 percent. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers called the election competitive, but reported that electoral authorities did not investigate allegations of first-round irregularities. A prime minister nominated by the president and confirmed by Parliament holds most executive authority. Ion Chicu, who became prime minister in November 2019, resigned in December 2020. Sandu nominated Foreign Minister Aureliu Ciocoi as acting prime minister on New Year’s Eve. A2 0-4 pts Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 3 / 4 Voters elect the 101-seat unicameral Parliament to four-year terms. In February 2019, Moldova held its first parliamentary elections using a mixed electoral system, underTOP which 51 lawmakers were elected in single-member constituencies through the first- past-the-post system and 50 were elected through proportional representation from closed party lists in one national constituency. OSCE observers considered the elections competitive, but noted shortcomings including credible allegations of pressure on public employees, indications of vote buying, and abuse of public resources for partisan electoral aims. Outcomes were also affected by limited space for independent media to present alternative viewpoints to voters. Five parties entered Parliament––the PSRM with 35 seats, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) with 30, the ACUM (“Now”) bloc of the PAS and the Dignity and Truth (DA) party with 26, and the Șor Party with 7—3 independent candidates also won seats. ACUM and the PSRM subsequently formed a short-lived coalition led by Sandu. After that government fell in November 2019, the PSRM and PDM supported Chicu, who was succeeded by Ciocoi in December 2020. A3 0-4 pts Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? 2 / 4 The February 2019 parliamentary elections were governed by a 2017 revision to electoral rules that introduced a mixed system featuring both single-member constituencies and seats allocated proportionally by party lists. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe had opposed the new system. Parliament restored the old proportional system that July. The OSCE 2019 election observation mission noted “a lack of inclusive public debate and meaningful consultation with relevant stakeholders and no broad consensus” on the 2017 electoral rule amendments. The monitors otherwise assessed that year’s elections positively, and considered their administration professional and transparent. Local elections held in October and November 2019 were competitive and mostly compliant with electoral standards, though observers noted a number of TOP shortcomings, including cumbersome registration processes and a lack of adherence to gender parity laws. OSCE monitors largely lauded the November 2020 presidential contest, noting that polling stations were calm and orderly. However, they reported that complaints regarding alleged irregularities were largely dismissed by the Central Electoral Commission. B. Political Pluralism and Participation B1 0-4 pts Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or 3 / 4 groupings? Political party legislation in Moldova is generally liberal, but does include restrictions. Parties seeking legal registration must enlist 4,000 members coming from at least half of Moldovan districts. These requirements effectively disallow regional, municipal, and local parties, as well as parties representing geographically concentrated ethnolinguistic minorities (for example, Gagauzians and Bulgarians). Despite these limitations, 14 political parties and one bloc participated in the February 2019 parliamentary elections, of which four gained seats. Three independent candidates, meanwhile, won single-member constituency seats. In February 2020, the Constitutional Court ruled those provisions unconstitutional, instructing Parliament to revise the Law on Political Parties by July 2021. B2 0-4 pts Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 4TOP/ 4 Opposition parties have a strong presence in Parliament and other elected offices, and can gain support through elections. Following the February 2019 parliamentary elections, the three then opposition parties—the PAS, DA, and PSRM—came to power, ousting the PDM. Following the November 2019 fall of the Sandu government, the ACUM bloc returned to opposition. B3 0-4 pts Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ 2 / 4 extrapolitical means? Oligarchs and business interests strongly influence and corrupt national and local political institutions, undermining political accountability. B4 0-4 pts Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and 3 / 4 electoral opportunities? Women and minorities do not face direct legal barriers to political participation, but social obstacles prevent women from having a proportional role in Moldovan politics. Representation of women, people with disabilities, and Roma remains low, though women and members of ethnic minorities attain office. Some 25 women hold parliamentary seats, representing just under a quarter of the body. Lawmakers from Moldova’s ethnic minorities, including Gagauzian, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Romany, also hold seats. The October and November 2019 local elections brought slightly more women and Roma into elected local positions. Maia Sandu became Moldova’s first female president in November 2020. LGBT+ people organize and advocate for equal rights, are discouraged from political engagement due to harassment. TOP C. Functioning of Government C1 0-4 pts Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? 3 / 4 Before resigning as PDM head and fleeing Moldova in June 2019, oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc played a key role in policymaking, despite holding no elected office and enjoying little public support. Since the 2019 establishment of two governments—in June and then in November—business elites have exerted less control over the state. Before his electoral defeat in November 2020, former president Dodon, despite holding a nonexecutive, nonpartisan office, interfered with the executive agenda and supported the PSRM, which he led before becoming president. In early December, PSRM and allied lawmakers attempted to shift control over the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) from the presidency to Parliament, which would have undercut incoming president Sandu's authority. However, the Constitutional Court suspended the legislation after a legal challenge.
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