Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović (ed.)
YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
The Atlantic Council of Croatia Center for International Studies
Zagreb, 2012
INTERNATIONAL SUMMER SCHOOL ŠIPAN
President Radovan Vukadinović, The Atlantic Council of Croatia and Center for International Studies
Editors Gordan Grlić Radman, Center for International Studies Mladen Nakić, Center for International Studies
Editor in Chief Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović
Editorial Board Fraser Cameron, Institute for Political Studies, Bruxelles John Groom, Kent University Joseph Joseph, University of Nicosia Konstantin Khudoley, University of Sant Petersburg Steve Larrabee, RAND, Washington D.C. Stefano Pilotto, University of Trieste Peter Stania, International Institute for Peace, Wien Dragan Vukčević, University Donja Gorica, Montenegro
Partners Casa Mediterraneo, Barcelona Center for American Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade European Academy Berlin, Berlin Florida State University, Tallahasse Hanns Seidel Sitftung, Zagreb Humanistic Studies, University of Donja Gorica, Montenegro International Institute for Peace, Wien Kennedy School of Government, University of Harvard NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Bruxelles Universita di Trieste, Trieste
Editorial correspondence and ordering information should be addressed to Editor The Atlantic Council of Croatia, Zagreb, Lepušićeva 6, Fax. 0038514655316, e-mail: [email protected]
Copyright The Atlantic Council of Croatia, Center for International Studies, Zagreb, 2012 ISSN 1846 - 4149
Abstracting and Indexing service PAIS – Public Affairs Information Service
This publication is co-founded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Zagreb
Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović (ed.)
YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
The Atlantic Council of Croatia Center for International Studies
Zagreb, 2012
YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface ...... 7
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović Towards NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit ...... 9
Sharyl Cross Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities ...... 12
Marijana Petir The Impact of Global Climate Change ...... 29
Anton Bebler The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring” ...... 38
Filip Dragović The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions ...... 45
Peter Schieder Future and Significance of Neutrality ...... 59
Gordan Grlić Radman Danube Countries and Multilingualism ...... 66
Ivo Samson New NATO Member States: Contribution of Central Eastern Europeans to European Unity? Slovakia as a Model Case ...... 77
Predrag Simić Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans ...... 85
Mladen Nakić Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view ...... 97
James Seroka United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential ...... 106
Jozo Radoš The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia ...... 118
5 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Mile Lasić The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging ...... 127
Arian Starova Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges ...... 136
Jasminka Simić Serbia between neutrality and NATO ...... 155
Aida Cvjetković Šipan – the Golden Island...... 165
6 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Preface
In summer 2002 the Center for International Studies of the Croatian Association for International Studies and The Atlantic Council of Croatia have organized the first International Summer School on the island of Šipan, Luka Šipanska, hotel Šipan. The school, consisting of the separate, one-week scientific seminars, is foremostly intended for young leaders: attendants of post graduate and doctorate studies, diplomats, journalists, military officials, foreign affairs officials, civil servants, teachers, NGO members and all those who are, or will be, professionally involved with some aspects of the complex issue of international relations. The content of the summer school seminars is primarily focusing on topics relating to South East Europe and Euro-Atlantic integrations, which is understandable having in mind the venue of the summer school (the Republic of Croatia) and the significance of the South East Europe and the Euro-Atlantism within the emerging new European and world order. The Šipan Yearbook 2011 is the ninth publication of this school. This year also the Šipan Yearbook is published in English language only, which fact further affirms the international character of the school, its participants, and messages being conveyed. Papers published in Šipan Yearbook 2011 are illustrating some of the issues and topics discussed in four scientific seminars during the summer school of 2011: 13th to 18th June 2011 - 'Western Balkans after the Lisbon Summit' in cooperation with Royal Danish Embassy in Croatia 5th to 9th July 2011 - 'Mediterranean and NATO after Lisbon Summit' in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels 11th to 16th July 2011 - 'European Union and Western Balkans' in cooperation with International Institute for Peace – Vienna and Renner Institute, Vienna 29th August to 3rd September 2011 - 'Euro-Atlantic relations in the 21st Century - Opportunities and Challenges' in cooperation with Hanns Seidel Stiftung in Zagreb During the last eleven years our summer school gathered more than 1500 speakers and participants from the following countries: Albania, Austria, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine and USA; as well as representatives of various international organizations, such as NATO, EU, Atlantic Treaty Association – ATA, Council of Europe, RACVIAC and relevant NGOs from the region. The aim of the Šipan International Summer School is to reflect upon and analyze the complexities present in South East Europe, to provide a forum for exchange of thoughts and perceptions between the members of younger generation,
7 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Preface and to foster independent approaches to these issues through workshops and case simulations, constantly seeking for new suggestions on how to solve the numerous and complex problems of this part of Europe in a most efficient manner. On a small Mediterranean island, in a relaxed and informal atmosphere, young leaders are given the opportunity not only to contemplate on these issues together with the lecturers from academic circles, international organizations, NGOs as well as high ranking political officials and diplomats (president of state, ministers, ambassadors, military leaders), but also to meet their colleagues and establish professional and private contacts needed in their future professional development. The interest for these courses so far bears witness to the fact that the ŠIPAN summer school has found its place among the similar international summer schools, that it has proven its value and reputation and that by entering into its 11th year of existence the summer school in Šipan is gaining on its institutional value. Publication of the Yearbook Šipan certainly contributes to this fact, thus Šipan Yearbook 2011 contains 16 presentations from the last year summer school. Publication of the Yearbook Šipan 2011 is financially supported by the Hans Seidel Stiftung. This organization has recognized our summer school and the whole project as a valuable and useful effort. Activities of the Šipan International Summer School would not be possible without the assistance of the co-sponsors: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels; Royal Danish Embassy in Croatia; Hanns Siedle Stiftung, Zagreb; International Institute for Peace, Vienna and Renner Institute, Vienna. It must be accented that valuable and active support is provided by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, along with several other sponsors. The Yearbook Šipan 2011 is intended for domestic and foreign public and should serve as useful and interesting reading for all those who are actively and practically involved in the international relations, as well as those who are studying international relations from more theoretical aspects. Times of crysis that is being felt in all countries has not stopped our activities. Again it was proven that even in toughest times, with strong will on organizer’s side and interest for certain topics, it is possible to continue the work in spite of all the difficulties. The so called Western Balkans continues to be an area of special interest, with plenty of room for discussion and education within all pending strategic processes. And this is exactly the primary goal of the International Summer School: to continue supporting this spirit of a democratic and free dialogue that represents the only road towards new relations in this region. Contrary to some predicaments saying that The Atlantic Council of Croatia’s activities will subdue, or even become obsolete in times when Croatia has become a full NATO member and is preparing to join the EU, The Atlantic Council of Croatia is proving them wrong, notably through the work of this summer school – the work that has been recognized internationally and at home. This motivates us further to continue with this work and to become a center of promotion of Euro – Atlantic idea in this part of Europe. In this we hope that we can count on full support of our existing friends and partners, as well as new ones that are yet to join us. Editor
8 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović1 Towards NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit
Since NATO’s creation in 1949 -- and especially over the past two decades – the international security environment has changed enormously. Yet despite those changes, NATO remains vital to our security. NATO is the only permanent Alliance that unites North America and Europe. It is the only Alliance through which two continents are able not only to protect, but also to promote, their shared values – freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. NATO has grown from 16 to 28 member nations in just a few years. It is really no surprise that several more countries wish to join the Alliance -- including here in the Balkans region. And the Alliance is open to that possibility. The key reason for NATO’s continuing importance and attraction is the Alliance’s proven ability to adapt to the ever-changing security environment. For its first four decades, NATO prevented the Cold War from getting hot. After the end of the Cold War, some felt that the Alliance had lost its reason to exist. But they were proved wrong. Because NATO turned into a real engine for positive change. It reached out to countries all over Europe. And it helped former foes to become friends. In the 1990s, when Yugoslavia broke apart, NATO was at the centre of a unique, multinational effort that brought peace to the Balkans. Almost exactly ten years ago, in the wake of “9/11”, NATO took the unprecedented decision to invoke the Article 5, collective defence clause of its founding treaty. This demonstrated in the clearest possible terms that the attack on the United States was considered an attack on all the Allies. And earlier this year, under a historic United Nations’ mandate that centred on the “Responsibility to Protect” , NATO deployed to Libya to protect the country’s innocent civilians from the violence of the Qadhafi regime. The lesson from history, and the key to NATO’s success, is that as the world changes, NATO needs to change too. It must be able to influence that changing environment in a positive direction. And it must be able to respond to new security challenges so it can continue fulfilling its fundamental purpose of safeguarding the security and shared values of its member nations. While NATO’s past and present speak for themselves, the Alliance’s future is not yet written. Next May, NATO leaders will gather in Chicago. And building on the new Strategic Concept that they approved in Lisbon last year, they will use their Chicago Summit to ensure that the Alliance is fully prepared to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
1 Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, M.A., Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO
9 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Towards NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit
It is too early to predict the agenda for the Chicago Summit. But I do believe it is possible to identify some of the key factors that will shape that agenda. And they can be listed under three broad headings: commitments, capabilities, and connectivity. First - commitments. While we are enjoying all the comforts of Sipan island, nearly 150,000 brave men and women are deployed across 3 continents conducting six NATO-led operations and missions. In Asia, NATO is steadily bringing security and stability to Afghanistan, and it is training national security forces in Iraq. In Africa, the Alliance is protecting the innocent people of Libya from the tyranny of Colonel Qadhafi and his regime, and it is helping to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. And in Europe, NATO continues to keep the peace in Kosovo, as well as provide maritime counter-terrorist patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. This wide range of commitments plays a vital role in the international community’s efforts to preserve peace and strengthen security. It demonstrates that the Alliance is not only responding to change. It is also shaping change. And a key objective of our Chicago Summit next year will be to underline NATO’s determination and ability to do so. This leads me to the second major issue for next year’s Summit, which are the Alliance’s capabilities. Technology is changing rapidly. And NATO’s capabilities need to keep pace. Our Libya mission has reinforced the need for the Alliance to have available the full range of military capabilities, including those at the technological edge. Certain aspects of this operation simply could not have been conducted without some of the highly advanced military capabilities of the United States – capabilities such as drones, surveillance equipment, and precision weapons. European NATO Allies risk falling behind the pace of technological change. Over the past two years, they have cut their defence spending by 45 billion dollars. And those cuts look set to get even bigger. We have a NATO target of 2 % of Gross Domestic Product to be spent on defence. Yet very few Allies meet this. Some are barely spending 1 %. Many European nations are unable to provide individually some of the high-tech equipment that we require for our operations. But as a matter of fact, we don’t actually need each and every Ally to have the full range of equipment. What we do need is this: to have the right equipment available within NATO – to enable each Ally to play an appropriate part – and to bring it all together with strong, integrated NATO command and control arrangements. That is why the Alliance is promoting the idea of “Smart Defence”. To help nations to develop, acquire, and maintain capabilities together that they can’t afford alone. To build greater security -- not with more resources, but with more coordination and more coherence. “Smart Defence” will help nations to keep up with the fast pace of technological change, and to share the burden of developing new capabilities. It will also ensure that the right capabilities are available in NATO. And the aim is for our Chicago Summit to showcase a number of concrete multinational projects. Finally - connectivity.
10 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Towards NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit
Terrorism, proliferation, piracy, cyber attacks – these new challenges all demonstrate how the 21st century security environment is changing. They call for a changed approach to security. They call – in particular – for much greater cooperation between nations and organisations. And NATO must be part of that. The Alliance already provides a tried and tested framework for partner nations to make their own military contributions to international efforts. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya are clear examples where NATO-led operations include significant contributions from partner countries. And the Alliance has also increasingly become a forum where partner nations come to discuss new threats and challenges with the Allies. In recent months, for example, NATO nations have met with a wide range of partners to discuss issues such as cyber defence, and piracy. Russia occupies a special place among NATO’s partners. Because just like NATO, Russia is also a key security player. And working together, we can have a major, positive influence not only on Euro-Atlantic, but global security. At our Lisbon Summit last year, NATO and Russia agreed to build a truly strategic partnership. Since that time, we have made good progress in enhancing our practical cooperation, for example in the fight against terrorism and piracy. And we are also continuing to explore the possibility of working together on missile defence. Having said this, let me stress that NATO is determined to deepen and broaden all its partnerships, not just our partnership with Russia. We want to involve our partners even more closely in our operations. To intensify our political consultations with our partners. But also to reach out to new countries that are interested in talking and working with NATO, wherever they may be located. And there are many of such countries. Finally, of course, as NATO looks to develop its partnerships, we do not forget that several nations are interested in actually joining the Alliance as a member. And this includes a number of countries from our region. When he visited Montenegro at the end of June, Secretary General Rasmussen sent a very strong message to all Balkan leaders. He noted that Euro-Atlantic integration is the best guarantee for peace, progress and prosperity. He also noted that NATO was there to help all the countries of the region. And to embrace those countries that wish to move from partnership to membership. But he made it very clear that further change must come, first and foremost, from the region. He encouraged political leaders to look to the future, rather than the past. And to focus on the common ground and the common good. Speaking from my own personal experience here, and having been called to help the NATO Alliance move forward, I can only echo those words. And to express my hope – and my expectation -- that political leaders throughout our region will demonstrate the vision and courage to create a better future. For over 60 years, NATO has successfully met the challenge of change. Its success has been founded on common values, common interests, and common approaches. As we look towards the complex challenges of the twenty-first century, NATO must continue to adapt. And it will. Next year’s Chicago Summit will show that -- through its commitments, its capabilities, and its connectivity -- the Alliance will continue to serve as a real anchor of stability. Not only for its member nations, but for nations well beyond our borders. And for many years to come.
11 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Sharyl Cross1 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
“I can tell you that in the United States, the fact that we have free internet - or unrestricted internet access- is a source of strength, and I think should be encouraged. I think that the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments accountable. They can begin to think for themselves. That generates new ideas. It encourages creativity." President Barrack Obama
“Terrorists are using the Internet in an extraordinary way. We will target Internet cafes because we realize terrorists are going to these cafes because they have guaranteed anonymity there.” President Nicolas Sarkozy
The “battle for ideas” has become “as important as the military conflict.” “These young [Afghan] boys & the struggle for their views, for their understanding, for their ideas is at least as important as the military battle.”
Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
This is “a battle of ideologies, & struggle for survival, & a war with no truce…Al Qaeda must get our message across to the ummah…& break the media siege on the jihad movement. This is an independent battle that we must launch side by side with the military battle.” Ayman al Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s designated successor as leader of AQ
1 Dr. Sharyl Cross is Professor of International Security and Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen Germany.
12 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement that Al Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden had been killed by U.S. Navy seals on May 2, 2011 marked closure to a decade effort to find the individual responsible for orchestrating the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 that had resulted in the deaths of 3,000 American and international citizens. While bin Laden’s death will surely diminish the mythical appeal of Al Qaeda’s leadership, the world community still must face the ideological challenge posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Policy communities must deal with entirely new arenas in the Internet and social media networks so critical for disseminating the extremist narrative on a global scale. The United States policy community defined countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST) under the previous Administration of George W. Bush or countering violent extremism (CVE) by the Barack Obama Administration as a vital priority in the overall effort to combat terrorism worldwide.2 In response to the series of terrorist incidents in their nations over the past decade (London, Madrid, Beslan, Moscow, and others), policymakers and scholars in Europe and Eurasia began to devote greater attention to examining the significance of the “battle of ideas” for responding to challenges posed by violent extremist ideology within their respective nations.3 Any successful CIST/CVE effort will demand unprecedented levels of coordination among nations committed to protecting the world community from the devastation and loss incurred as a result of terrorist acts inspired by violent extremist ideology. The strategy must concentrate significantly on the new information/media dimensions of the ideological struggle. Much work remains to be done in integrating both intra-agency and international strategies and responses for countering the threat posed by perpetrators of violent extremist ideology in the Internet/new social media domains. This paper explores the potential for building international cooperation in CIST/CVE in the era of the new media information age. The recommendations presented emerge from a series of conference gatherings devoted to these questions involving counter terrorism practitioners, academic specialists, and theologians from Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
The transatlantic community: de-legitimizing ideological support for terrorism
While the U.S. Administration of George W. Bush recognized that the hearts and minds dimension of the overall counter terror effort was essential, the United States was not able to develop a full-scale intra-agency strategy for addressing this complex challenge during the initial declared “War on Terrorism” response to the 9/11 attacks. The first efforts were directed to enhancing public diplomacy and strategic communication capacities, but a well coordinated
2 See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House) March 2006, 9–11, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense) 1 February 2006, 24–25. 3 See The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (Brussels: Council of the European Union) 25 November 2005.
13 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities comprehensive State Department, Department of Defense, and other agency strategy on the ideological or hearts and minds aspects of CT was still lacking. In fact, in 2006, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld offered the assessment that America’s performance in “the battle of ideas” with a near failing performance of a “D or D+.”4 The Obama Administration replaced the prior references to CIST with countering violent extremism or CVE. A six person CVE unit was established at the United States Department of State in 2009 tasked with determining responses for stopping those “most at risk for becoming terrorists.”5 The United States also continues to try to build internal intra-governmental coordination on CVE to include not only the State Department CVE unit, but also contributions from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, intelligence agencies, U.S.A.I.D., and international partners to develop a sustainable intra- agency and international strategy for meeting this challenge. The current U.S. approach recognizes that some aspects of CVE should be most appropriately handled by the civilian side of government, and others by the military. The U.S. government CVE approach also includes provision for partnering with NGOs and local communities which in some cases may be more able to contribute to the overall objective of delegitimizing the ideological appeal of the terrorist narratives. The Obama Administration has also emphasized that the enemy is not terrorism, describing terrorism as a tactic making it impossible to be at war with a tactic. The U.S. policy community emphasizes that Al Qaeda does not represent any religious authority, and that “neither Islam or any other religion condones the slaughter of innocents…”6 For the Obama Administration, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are “not religious leaders, but rather killers….”7 Administration officials make the point that the response can’t be based on fear, but rather presenting a future representing a hopeful and positive alternative to the vision offered by terrorists.8 The CVE approach also underscores the point that “military power, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts alone will not solve the long term challenge…the threat of violent extremism.”9 The emphasis is placed on looking to the “political, economic, and social factors that terrorists exploit,” and the “ideological forces that drive vulnerable groups or individuals toward terrorism.”10 The Obama Administration calls for targeting “upstream factors” suggesting that U.S. efforts should be directed toward “resolving grievances” exploited by terrorist
4 “Rumsfeld: We’re Losing Battle of Ideas,” Carlisle Sentinel, 28 March 2006. 5 For Obama Administration policy on CVE see National Security Strategy, White House, May 2010, Daniel Benjamin, U.S. Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism, Testimony Before the Emerging Threat and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 10 March 2010 and “State and Defense Officials to Senate: Military Alone Cannot Counter Violent Extremism,” 31 March 2010. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Daniel Benjamin, U.S. Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism, Testimony Before the Emerging Threat and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 10 March 2010.
14 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities groups.11 The National Security Strategy of the United States released in 2010 emphasizes that while “extremists destroy,” the United States offers a “desire to build.”12 U.S. State Department Coordinator of Counter Terrorism Daniel Benjamin states that U.S. policy would be directed toward “marginalizing violent extremists by contrasting our positive vision with the terrorists’ commitment to murder, violence, and destruction…”13 The emphasis should be on engaging civil society to delegitimize the narrative of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Another core feature of the Obama Administration’s approach is to stress that there should be no trade off between values and security. In discussing strategic communication, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Admiral Michael G. Mullen has repeatedly emphasized that our actions speak louder than words, or implying that America should expect to be judged more by what we do than what we say.14 The Obama Administration moved quickly to announce the intention to take steps toward closure of the prison at Guantanamo Bay, and to forbid torture with the hope of improving perceptions of America’s image. In 2005, the European Union issued The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism suggesting that the EU “continue to develop its collective understanding of the issues, listening to Muslims, and others, comparing national situations,” and that the “key to success” would be “the degree to which non-governmental groups—communities, religious authorities and other organizations—across Europe play an active part in countering the rhetoric of the extremists and highlighting their criminal acts.”15 The U.K. strategy concentrates on addressing the inequalities and lack of opportunity that contributes to radicalization, legislation to combat radicalism, and engaging the Muslim community.16 The White Paper on Domestic Security Against Terrorism issued in 2005 outlines France’s doctrine for dealing with terrorism, and includes an entire section devoted to the “Battle of Ideas.”17 While the French rejected references to a “war” on terrorism, the “fight” or “battle” of ideas includes a strategy focused on promoting the basic values of the democratic tradition as a foundation for countering religious extremism.18 NATO has been criticized for failing to devote significant emphasis to the ideological dimension in countering terrorism. While the Alliance is based on
11 National Security Strategy, White House, May 2010. 12Daniel Benjamin, U.S. Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism, Testimony Before the Emerging Threat and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 10 March 2010. 13 Ibid. 14 See for example M.G. Mullen, “From The Chairman: Strategic Communication Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Forces Quarterly, #55, 2009. 15 The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (Brussels: Council of the European Union, Brussels) 25 November 2005. The European response to countering ideological support for terrorism was also discussed by the author in a previous article “U.S./NATO- Russia and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism: Toward Building a Comprehensive Strategy,” Connections, Vol. V, #4, Winter Supplement 2006. 16 Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, July 2006. 17 “Winning the Battle of Ideas,” White Paper on Domestic Security Against Terrorism, Paris, 2005, 113– 23. 18 Ibid.
15 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities shared values, it is still difficult to find common ground or approaches for countering violent extremist ideology. The ideological factor in countering global terrorism has frequently been referenced in NATO’s bilateral consultations. For example, among many examples, NATO Deputy Secretary General Minto Rizzo cited countering extremism as a priority shared challenge at a 2007 NATO-Saudi Arabia Conference held in Riyad. NATO officials have acknowledged that rendering the Taliban irrelevant by providing a more stable security environment in Afghanistan would be the best way to defeat extremism. It is recognized among the NATO community that the current conflict reflects a “struggle of ideas.” NATO assessments suggest that promoting shared values, rule of law, protecting human rights, and strengthening democracy will all be important for undermining the legitimacy and appeal of terrorist groups. Most recently, the report of the committee of experts chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright offering recommendations on the development of NATO’s new Strategic Concept included reference to building enhanced capacity in several dimensions of counter terrorism to include social networking. 19 In June 2010, the United States and nations of the European Union held a first seminar in Brussels devoted to the issue of violent extremism. The sessions focused on achieving better coordination of U.S.-EU approaches, and finding ways to develop mutually supportive approaches in various geographic regions. An action group was established to facilitate further U.S.-EU cooperation in a number of areas of CVE to include countering terrorist online activities along with movement (travel) of terrorists; establishing partnerships with immigrant/diaspora groups on CVE; challenging violent extremist narratives by amplifying the voices of victims of terrorism; conflict prevention/resolution in third countries; and establishing benchmarks for assessing progress in U.S.-EU CVE initiatives.20 The Russian position has emphasized the importance of avoiding a real or perceived “clash of civilizations.” The perspective from Moscow tends to identify the unique cultural contribution that Russia can make to “bridge” the conflict between Western and Islamic nations.21 Anatoly Saffonov, who held the position (created in 2004) of special envoy of the Russian Federation’s president on issues of international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism and international crime, advocated preventing the misuse of religion by terrorists and countering the appeal of terrorist ideology as major topics for international collaboration.22 Addressing the ideological foundations of terrorism is consistent with the focus of the Russian counterterrorism policy community on the importance of addressing the “root causes” of terrorism.
19 NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, NATO/Brussels, 17 May 2010. 20 Joint Statement Following the First U.S.-EU Seminar on Preventing Violent Extremism,” U.S Department of State, accessed online at [http://useu.usmission.gov/radicalization_seminar.html], 17 June 2010. 21 Mikhail Titarenko, “The Islamic World and Russian Foreign Policy,” International Affairs (Moscow), 4 2005. 22 This position was created following the Beslan tragedy in 2004, and Anatoly Saffanov was the first appointment to the position.
16 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
Although there are certainly differences between the United States, European nations, and Russia with regard to appropriate areas of emphasis, terminology, and strategies in addressing the ideological foundations of terrorist movements, there is a consensus that this is a critical dimension of the overall global counterterror effort. Through greater collaboration and discussion of issues and actual cooperation in the coming years, these nations should be able to improve their levels of coordination and effectiveness in countering violent religious extremism. Nations of the transatlantic community will also have to develop partnerships throughout the world with communities most affected by the appeal of violent extremist ideology, and where local residents are more familiar with circumstances in particular regional contexts.
Building an international response: the legal regime
In terms of building an international response, it is important to work to establish a legal foundation for meeting the CVE threat in the world wide web networks. The United Nations establishes a legal foundation for responding to terrorism in UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1624. While UNSCR 1373 made no mention of terrorist use of the Internet, UNSCR 1624 did address the expanded range of challenges posed by terrorism stemming from the Internet domain. In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of expression, a major factor often impeding prosecution of suspected terrorists in the Internet/new social media spheres where speech or even intended incitement of violence is insufficient basis for legal action. The U.K. is not bound by the same constitutional restrictions as the U.S., and has been more willing to prosecute terrorists in the Internet domain on the basis of intent to incite violence. The U.K.’s Terrorism Act of 2006 for example provided for broadening the government’s authority to deal with those who seek to provoke terrorist acts to include regulation or dissemination of violent extremist publications. Beyond the U.S. and U.K., one finds variations in the legislation or legal regulations to counter terrorist activity online. Following the London bombings in 2005, Italy passed a law imposing additional measures to combat terrorism including imposing further restrictions aimed to prevent terrorist financing, increasing time suspects could be retained in custody without charges, and permitting interrogation of terrorists suspects without the presence of a lawyer. The new law also called for surveillance of the Internet and phone networks requiring owners of Internet cafes to make photocopies of the documents of every customer using the Internet. Major legislation in Greece voted into law in 2001 and 2004 provides the basis for convicting terrorist groups which threaten the “constitutional, political, financial or social structure…”23 This legislation provided the basis for the arrest and trial of the “November 17 Group” terrorist organization, and subsequent terrorist threats to domestic society.24 In Russia, the tragic Beslan school hostage attacks resulted in
23 See Andreas Banoutsos, Mapping the Development of Anti-Terror Legislation in Greece in the Aftermath of 9/11, Research institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Research Paper #120, April 2008. 24 Ibid.
17 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities increased centralization of government decision making and enhanced powers and accountability for law enforcement and security forces in combating terrorism. In 2006, a new anti-terror law came into force in Russia permitting the military to fire on passenger planes taken hostage by terrorists. The legislation provides Russia’s security services sweeping powers to act against suspected militants and their supporters. Russian officials and lawmakers have pressed for stricter laws to regulate Internet usage both at home, and in cooperation with other nations of the world community. Following the March 2010 subway bombings in Moscow, President Dmitri Medvedev ordered that even tighter anti-terror laws be implemented. Jordan was the first country in the Middle East to endorse anti-terrorism legislation which was similar to most European nations. Jordan’s Anti Terrorism Law was implemented in 2006 following a series of suicide bombing attacks carried out by an Al Qaeda affiliate in Amman in 2005 that killed more than 60, and injured many more victims. In March 2008, Jordan began to impose additional restrictions in Internet cafes requiring owners to collect personal information on Internet users and to install cameras to be used for monitoring Internet usage. Turkish laws on terrorism demonstrate the variance among national legislation. Turkey’s 1991 law on terrorism imposed restrictions on the publication of leaflets, periodicals, and forming associations. Until July 2010, when an amendment was passed to soften Turkey’s anti-terrorism law, the imprisonment of minors was permitted for alleged involvement with terrorist groups. The prior law was enforced to imprison minors involved in protests supporting the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party). Turkey has no law specifically governing the Internet, though the law enforcement bodies have attempted to apply the Turkish Press Law to restrict the use of the Internet. International treaties or legislation clearly delineating national and international responsibilities for addressing the challenges presented by the use of the Internet/new social media to disseminate extremist material or to indoctrinate recruits for the purposes of ultimately inciting violence or to bring harm to the public might certainly be desirable. However, identifying common ground or establishing the basis for a unified international approach is fraught with difficulties as illustrated by the divergence among constitutional and legal provisions, and varying social-cultural expectations regarding the restrictions of freedom of expression and communication.
New media revolution: ideological factor in the cold war & the contemporary struggle against violent extremism
The proliferation of information technologies surely contributes to making the current hearts and minds challenge threat far more difficult to manage than the ideological threat faced during the decades of the Cold War when such instantaneous and vast global information networks did not yet exist. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports that there are presently thousands of web sites today promulgating the violent extremist message, while previously there were only a handful of such sites. The greatest growth in Internet access has taken place
18 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities in Europe, but Internet usage has increased at an enormous pace over the last decade in other regions with Africa registering a 2,527.4% increase from 2000-2011, the Middle East at a 1,987.0 % increase for the same period, and Asia increasing at 706.9% for the same period 2000-2011.25 The world community must not only confront terrorists in our public venues and in the physical war zones, but equally or potentially even more important are terrorist’s harnessing of the social networking sites to include YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, email, and chat rooms in advancing their narratives and interests. Moreover, all trends would only point toward the Internet/new social media venues continuing to expand in the future, and so too should we expect further enlistment of these platforms to advance the agendas of those who are purporting violent extremism. The plethora of extremist video sites available at YouTube, Google Video, and other venues featuring highly creative and illustrative images are widely accessed, particularly among the youth. The policy community is sorely in need of innovative and creative approaches capable of fully grasping the dimensions of such a threat in an increasingly globalized world where information can be exchanged instantaneously and freely from any point on the earth. Al Qaeda and its affiliates recognize the importance of images and perceptions, and have made full use of the traditional media and online platforms to disseminate their messages. Terrorist groups have skillfully harnessed Internet technology to recruit and indoctrinate followers, disseminate literature, instantaneously broadcast beheadings and other outrageous acts of violence, and to finance and coordinate attacks. The Task Force on the Future of Terrorism formed by the United States Homeland Security’s Advisory Council (HSAC) in 2007 offered the conclusion that the “Internet has become a major facilitator of terrorist activities, especially the spread of jihadist ideology…” 26 Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek have documented the development of use of the Internet by contemporary terrorists groups. The establishment of azzam.com, originally established in 1996, eventually came to feature reporting on the Chechen and Afghan mujahedeen and providing a forum for exchanging teachings among the AQ affiliated network throughout the world.27 Sites such as Al Neda, Global Islamic Media Front, Laskar Jihad and others have served the full range of objectives for these groups including facilitating the transfer of ideological convictions.28 Observers have noted that the appeal of these sites stems from the fact that they are anonymous, cheap, provide global reach, and prove difficult to monitor or control. The Internet/new social media arenas offer the gathering point or virtual forum for like-minded individuals with shared views, grievances, and perhaps some basis for common identity. As Sajjan Gohel notes “…the virtual world is fast becoming the most important meeting place for terrorists…. After consolidating relationships over the internet, the recruits can then plot and plan mass casualty
25 World Internet and Population Statistics 31 March 2001, Internet World Statistics, accessed online at [http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm]. 26 Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force, Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2007. 27 Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and the New Media: The Post Al Qaeda Generation (London: Routeldge, 2011), 26-27. 28 Ibid.
19 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities attacks while remaining in contact with their handlers over the world wide web…..”29 Johnny Ryan has observed that participation in these chat rooms and web sites advancing conspiratorial or religio-identity messages and symbolism may fulfill a deep psychological need for community or identity in an otherwise existence devoid of a social network. As Ryan states: “To be a part of an elite network, particularly a conspiratorial one, might be a large part of a person’s existence….” which “…..allows a connection to an amorphous community to discuss matters regarded by the wider society as subversive, to find mentors, seek out justification….”30 We will have to work together with partners throughout the world in finding the proper balance between protecting civil liberties and securing free and open nations against the terrorist threat. At what point do nations undermine the basis for a democratic society in attempting to manage violent extremism in the Internet/new social media arenas? How far can nations go in regulating websites, for example, when those sites are used to recruit terrorists and organize violent attacks? The new media venues will continue to present challenges for democratic societies in considering imposition of various levels of regulation when the technology is manipulated for purposes of fostering destruction and violence. Effective management of the information medium is critical to shaping the impressions and judgments that viewers form, and to influencing the ultimate consequences of these viewers’ actions. Every effort must be made to ensure credible, consistent, reliable, honest, and efficient management of information.31 While on the one hand terrorist may exploit the Internet/new social media, at the same time these venues provide even greater opportunities for meeting and countering the terrorists message in the virtual space. Proponents of the violent extremist message should have to be prepared to counter an equally virulent and robust response from those who seek to counter their message of violence. Ideas and images presented in the Internet/new social media are exposed in the public sphere, and can be discredited as well as accepted as a result of rigorous public scrutiny and debate. It must be recognized that de-legitimizing ideological support for terrorism will involve much more than simply responses in the realm of public diplomacy. An adequately funded and skillfully orchestrated public diplomacy effort offers one means of an overall strategy, but it is only one component. As we develop an international effort to counter violent extremism, we should begin with the fundamental assumption that perception—or even every element that might influence perceptions—must be considered. We must constantly evaluate and re- evaluate how our actions, behavior, messages, and policies are interpreted. In this context, the implications of the Internet/social media arenas must be fully explored and appreciated.
29 Sajjan M. Gohel, “The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. #2, Issue #12, December 2009. 30 Johnny Ryan, “The Internet, the Perpetual Beta, and the State: The Long View of the New Medium,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 33, 2010, 676-677. 31 This point was made by Lt. Col. Fred T. Krawchuk. in “Strategic Communication: An Integral Component of Counterinsurgency Operations,” Connections 5:3, Winter 2006.
20 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
Working through the development of CIST/CVE programs for the new media arena and utilizing the range of information/communication sources and networks must include engaging partners familiar with local cultures and traditions. There will be no single approach widely applicable for all communities. We should promote greater appreciation for the potential contributions of NGOs, clerics and religious leaders, educators, and the private sector to challenging the ideology perpetrated by extremists in all new media sources. As collaboration develops at the traditional state-to-state level and among communities, there should be an accompanying momentum toward addressing this issue on the basis of shared strategic objectives.
Elements of building a comprehensive international strategy
The U.S. National Security issued in 2010 calls for addressing the challenge presented by violent extremist ideology with “…a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judicially applies every tool of American power-both military and civilian-as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions….”32 The document also refers to “strengthening our international partnerships” to include “developing norms for acceptable conduct in cyber space…”33 All nations face resource constraints and most countries lack sufficient funding to carry out effective cyber counter strategy, and therefore it only makes sense to share this responsibility. In a recent article entitled “Countering Internet Extremism,” Timothy L. Thomas has provided a thorough summary of U.S. government initiatives to respond to the threat from violent extremist ideology.34 Thomas summarizes a number of institutional, policy, and resource measures implemented over the past several years to better respond to the threat posed by violent extremist ideology. While the responses on the part of the U.S. government have provided a basis for beginning to address the challenge, these new measures constitute only the first steps in preparing to establish the capacity for responding to a new security challenge likely to consume attention and require constant flexibility and innovation for decades to come.
Countering the extremist narrative in the internet/social media domains
In responding to the violent extremist online media offensives, governments throughout the international community have increasingly realized the importance of engaging the citizens of the world through the Internet and social media mechanisms including YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, chat rooms, and so forth. It is no longer unusual to find presidents of nations engaging in the blogosphere.
32 National Security Strategy, White House, May 2010. 33 Ibid. 34 Timonthy L. Thomas, “Countering Internet Extremism,” IOSPHERE, Winter 2009. Among them he sites the creation of the positions of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy in 1999, and later the OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy from 2007-2009.
21 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander frequently offers “tweets” on Twitter commenting on the most pressing security issues facing NATO and the world community. U.S. President Barack Obama’s strategy places less emphasis on attempting to impose restrictions on Internet/social media sources, and greater focus on faith that open communication via these new mechanisms would further expose and erode the appeal of the extremist narrative and messages. The International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, released by the Obama Administration in May 2011 calls for supporting “civil society actors in achieving reliable, secure, and safe platforms for freedoms of expression and association.”35 The document states: “We encourage people all over the world to use digital media to express opinions, share information, monitor elections, expose corruption, and organize social and political movements…”36
Challenges in attempting to manage, regulate or monitor the internet and new social media arenas
At the most fundamental level, we must first recognize the magnitude of the task in attempting to manage the Internet/new social media mediums for preventing the promotion of violent extremist ideology. The sheer volume of communication in the Internet/new social media arenas would render attempts to monitor or impose restrictions on communication through these channels overwhelming. National or international government efforts to censor or filter sites or chat rooms have not been effective. Officials in Saudi Arabia have complained that while they may be successful at shutting down a website promulgating a violent message in their country, it will not be effective if the same user can find a willing ISP host in another nation. It has been frequently the case that Western ISP’s can end up hosting these same sites without realizing it only because of the language barriers. Intelligence agencies have certainly benefited by monitoring these sites and chat rooms providing opportunities to learn more about the ideology and tactics of these groups, followers, and so forth. It is equally daunting to consider the challenge of building broadly accepted standards acceptable to all nations of the international community for regulating the Internet and new social media of the 21st century. Even for two countries sharing most common values, the United States and United Kingdom, there are significant differences in the level of public/societal tolerance for freedom of speech/communication. Building commonly accepted standards and norms for managing these new mediums among the diverse global community may never be fully realized. Europol’s project “Check the Web” has been an effective step toward building cooperation in monitoring terrorist use of the Internet, especially for purposes of recruitment, training, and dissemination of propaganda. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called for a “civilized Internet”—imposing controls
35 International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, White House, May 2011, 23. 36 Ibid.
22 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities to make the internet safer for children, commerce, and so forth.37 Among important preliminary steps, one might suggest certain critical areas that should be considered by governments, governments collaborating with the private sector, NGOs, or religious authorities in developing an international approach to counter the violent extremist message in the Internet/new social media arenas:
Diffuse the Perceived War on Religion Themes and Images
Challenge Extremist Fantasy Imagery and Messages Associating Death, Destruction, and Hate with Promoting the Will of God and Progress for Humankind
Focus on Identifying and Addressing Actual Real Immediate and Long Term Needs in Developing Counter-narratives and Messaging
Recognize that Legitimate Religious Authorities Possess the Greatest Potential for Discrediting the Violent Extremist Narrative; Messages Offered by Trusted Sources Are Most Critical (Amman Declaration, Sakinah Campaign)
Counter-narratives Must Be Validated with Actions or Policy
1) Diffuse the Perceived War on Religion Themes and Images
In attempting to build a comprehensive approach to counter violent extremist ideology throughout the world wide web, our communication and narratives should continue to reinforce the fact that we reject any notion of a “clash of cultures” or “clash of civilizations.” Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi set the foundation for transforming the international order decades ago: “the objective of Islamic jihad is to eliminate the rule of a non-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about universal revolution.”38 Fanatic core adherents are driven by rage against an international order that they deem unjust, immoral, and fundamentally divorced from God and all that is sacred. “Sacred terrorists” have emerged throughout history to distort the teaching of religious traditions in many faiths and cultural contexts. It is imperative to work to foster broad international consensus of nations committed to protecting civilian populations from harm by those who distort religious teachings for political purposes. Influential representatives of the world’s Muslim communities have and will continue to openly discredit the vision and tactics offered by the Islamist extremists. The Amman Declaration, widely circulated in print and online, clearly disassociates that Islamic faith with violence perpetrated by terrorist groups.
37 “Chaos of Internet Will Meet French Sense of Order,” New York Times, 20 May 2011. 38 Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, “Jihad in Islam,” lecture delivered in Lahore on Iqbal Day, 13 April 1939, reprinted in Voices of Terror, Walter Laqueur ed. (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 398.
23 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
Jordan’s King Abdullah II has called for the “quiet majority of Muslims” to “take back our religion from the vocal, violent, and ignorant extremists….”39 The Grand Sheik of the al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo, Sheik Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, consistently spoke out against acts of terrorism. Representing the highest spiritual authority for Sunni Muslims, he condemned suicide bombings against Israelis and characterized “extremism” as “the enemy of Islam.”40 The fact is that the militant radical message is largely rejected within the Muslim world as being inconsistent with the most fundamental teachings and values of Islam and as lacking relevance to the realities of modern life. The recent uprisings sweeping Arab nations reflected the legitimate democratic aspirations of these societies and desire for greater economic opportunity and quality of life, not to promote the vision of a totalitarian global caliphate envisioned by AQ and its affiliates for the future of nations or the world community. Partnering with Muslim communities to ensure that militant extremists are thwarted in their attempts to attract additional recruits holds the most promise for long-term success. Osama bin Laden had attempted to characterize this conflict as a religious war, referring to “a new crusade led by America against Islamic nations,” and calling for the umma to “unite to defend Islam.”41 The enemy should be clearly defined; the threat comes from the small extremist core, not from Islam or most of the Muslim populations. Failure to precisely distinguish the source of the threat will make it easier for extremists to manipulate greater numbers to advance their political aspirations by depicting the nature of this conflict as a war against Islam.
2) Challenge Extremist Fantasy Imagery and Messages Associating Death, Destruction, and Hate with Promoting the Will of God and Progress for Humankind
The visual messages featured on the websites of violent extremists often couple imagery of heaven and virtue with the violent cause. Communication at every level should challenge messages depicting death, destruction, and hate with promoting the will of God and human advancement. Visions of free political expression, justice, rule of law, and economic opportunity may have wide appeal, even in the cases of societies that are divided by ethno-religious loyalties and suffer from relative economic disadvantage. The channels for participating in the political process or resolving grievances available in established democratic systems can provide appropriate and effective alternatives to violence and terrorism for those seeking to achieve political objectives. The tsunami of violent upheaval sweeping Arab nations was to no small extent fueled by Internet/new social media savy young people who seek freedom, opportunities for self expression in governance, and after decades of suffering could no longer continue to tolerate entrenched authoritarian repression and lack of opportunity.
39 “Jordan’s King Abdullah Pushes for Moderation,” Washington Post, 14 September 2005. 40 See “Grand Sheikh Condemns Suicide Bombings,” BBC News 4 December 2001; and “Cleric Condemns Suicide Attacks,” BBC News, 11 July 2003. 41 “Correspondent Meets with Opposition Leader Bin Laden,” Channel 4 (London), 20 February 1997, and “Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin,” Islamabad, Pakistan, 18 March 1997, cited in Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” CRS Report for Congress, 26 January 2006; updated 24 January 2007, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80743.pdf.
24 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
In an effort to de-legitimize the ideological underpinnings of militant extremist ideology, it is critical to use the Internet and new social media arenas in exposing the vision offered by Al Qaeda and its affiliates for the future of the international order. The ideological mind-set for those adhering to Al Qaeda’s vision includes a worldview characterized by a sense of crisis seeking redemption by violence. The imposition of a fanatic totalitarian theocratic order hardly seems like a realistic or appealing prospect for today’s international community, or for most of the world’s Muslim population. Women in Muslim communities harnessing the power of the Internet, chat rooms, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other sources offer great potential source of contributing to counter the violent narratives. To the extent that these women remain silent, those seeking to promote violence and terror will monopolize the public agenda in the name of religious legitimacy. Bin Laden repeatedly argued that Afghanistan had become a model Islamic state under the Taliban.42 There is no debating the fact that women suffered tremendous injustice, deprivation, and humiliation under the Taliban order. The experience of women under the Taliban is fortunately not illustrative of the conditions under which women live throughout the entire Muslim world, and it is important to appreciate that realization of the core aspirations and objectives of the self-professed militant jihadist would be unacceptable to most women of the international community of the twenty-first century. Disseminating messages emphasizing the common positive values (family, dignity, justice) shared by both Western and Muslim societies can contribute to building common understanding and improving impressions. Both traditional and Internet/new social media technologies should also be fully utilized to focus public attention on the atrocities suffered by the victims of terrorism. Revealing the plight of the victims contributes to develop global norms that stigmatize terrorist acts. The efforts of international diplomatic and security organizations toward using Internet/new social media sources to publicly exposing the vision and behavior of violent extremists should gradually contribute to unifying world opinion, thus eroding the potential of extremists for gaining greater influence.
3) Focus on Identifying and Addressing Actual Real Immediate and Long Term Needs in Developing Counter-narratives and Messaging
Nations committed to combating terrorism must continue to devote attention and resources to addressing the underlying societal forces that create the environments that fuel terrorism. Much of the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas or Hezbollah results from their ability to meet the desperate social service needs in poor communities or war-ravaged societies. Socially responsible private industry can create the economic opportunities, training programs, and career alternatives for those in despair. We must provide potential recruits with better options than joining the ranks of terrorist movements. Educational efforts on every level are obviously key to combating the terrorist narrative. The Internet/new social media arenas can provide major sources
42 “Al Jazeera Program on Bin Laden,” Al Jazeera Television (Doha, Qatar), 10 June 1999; cited in Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” 3.
25 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities of information and knowledge resources, and should be fully appreciated and utilized in positive directions in pursuit of learning. Engaging the younger generation through these channels has become, and is likely to be even more important for the future. Governments should pursue all options in partnering with the private sector to develop Internet/new social media initiatives targeting those vulnerable to the militant agenda, and contribute to developing alternative more productive paths. Some have recommended that popular celebrities and comedians of the entertainment community can use their recognition in the Internet/new social media arenas to reach out to communities, young people, and discredit those promoting messages of violence and hate.
4) Recognize that Legitimate Religious Authorities Possess the Greatest Potential for Discrediting the Violent Extremist Narrative; Messages Offered by Trusted Sources Are Critical
The responsibility for scriptural interpretation and managing teaching in educational and religious institutions must rest with the designated leadership and religious authorities in Muslim communities. Success in the competition of ideas will depend on the discernment, guidance, and response of current and future generations of Muslim communities. Leading specialists on politics and Islam share the assessment that the spiritual foundations and traditions of Islam provide the best solution to counter the ideology of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui, Director of the Muslim World Initiative at the United States Institute of Peace, argues that “the problem of ‘religious extremism’ in the Muslim world is an ideological challenge best confronted by drawing on Islam’s humanist and progressive traditions.”43 Iranian scholars Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, writing in the Journal of Democracy, argue that there is “in the history of Islam no precedent for the utterly unrestrained violence of Al Qaeda or the Hezbollah.” They assert: “To kill oneself while wantonly murdering women, children, and people of all religions and descriptions—let U.S. not forget that Muslims too worked at the Trade Center—has nothing to do with Islam…”44 All investigations with respect to addressing this problem point to the critical role that religious authorities can offer in discrediting the militant extremist agenda. There is no greater source of legitimacy for countering the distortions purported by Al Qaeda and its affiliates than the influence of the religious leadership of the Islamic faith. The publication of the Amman message on the official web site of the Jordanian government, and in many other Internet sites featuring official religious denunciation of violence has been quite significant in discrediting the
43 Presentation by Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui delivered at the conference entitled “Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism/Lessons Learned and Future Policy: Interdisciplinary, Theological, and International/Regional Perspectives,” Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 15 September 2006 and Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 164, July 2006. 44 Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, “Terror, Islam, and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, # 2, April 2002, 6.
26 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities violent extremist agenda. The Saudi Sakinah campaign which engages Islamic clerics online to turn extremists away from violence has demonstrated results, and offers a promising approach for the future. This program includes focus on identifying the many ways in which radical/extremist discourse is generated and disseminated by new information technologies such as cell phones, Internet blogs, chat rooms, and social networking venues. In turn, the Imams are able to enter these new media venues with a well supported counter narrative denouncing the path of violence by specific reference to religious teachings. Directing resources toward amplifying the speeches of clerics who renounce violence are surely among the most effective strategies for addressing this problem.
5) Counter-narratives Must Be Validated with Actions or Policy
Our communication response must make full use of the most sophisticated new technologies of the information revolution. It is critical that the effort to win the hearts and minds of the potential audience for the violent extremist movements not be perceived as an attempt to manipulate societies or practice ideological “spin.” Governments must be effective in creating and maintaining a narrative consistent with national identity and positive values, and statements must be consistent with actions. The U.S. State Department has developed a team of bloggers in the Department’s Counterterrorism Communication Center to counter false stories and disinformation in a number of languages, but this effort should be expanded dramatically and particularly aimed toward reaching the younger populations. To be effective, public diplomacy efforts and the messages delivered must be consistent with substantive policy and behavior. Otherwise, any public diplomacy or communication effort is likely to be dismissed as simply propaganda or attempts to manipulate perceptions. Implementing a comprehensive strategy for violent extremism must include constant assessment of the impact of policy priorities and choices. Striving for consistency between our stated intentions and our actions will weaken charges of hypocrisy or pursuing double standards, and should help to contribute more favorably influencing the hearts and minds of the next generation. Internet/new social media sites and real time communication forums in chat rooms or blogs provide significant venues for officials to engage directly with the public and the youth, and potentially greater transparency and better understanding of particular policy responses.
27 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Defining Elements for International Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the Internet and New Social Media Communities
Literature:
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House) March 2006, 9–11, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense) 1 February 2006, 24–25. - The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (Brussels: Council of the European Union) 25 November 2005. - “Rumsfeld: We’re Losing Battle of Ideas,” Carlisle Sentinel, 28 March 2006. - Daniel Benjamin, U.S. Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism, Testimony Before the Emerging Threat and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 10 March 2010 - NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, NATO/Brussels, 17 May 2010. - Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and the New Media: The Post Al Qaeda Generation (London: Routeldge, 2011), 26-27. - Johnny Ryan, “The Internet, the Perpetual Beta, and the State: The Long View of the New Medium,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 33, 2010, 676-677. - International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, White House, May 2011, 23.
28 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Marijana Petir1 The Impact of Global Climate Change
Croatia is not an island. Croatia and its future must be viewed within the complex of global political, social and economic trends, closely tied to natural phenomena and influences such as climate change. The security of societies and states is predicated upon the overriding trends and interplay between the following elements: a stable economy (including resources and the economic system as a whole), social relations (political, societal and social trends), environmental conditions (the dictates of resources and ecology, and climatic conditions) and international relations (including local and global relations between states and global relations often dictated by the interests of various groups – both state-level and economic). If we compare the aforementioned postulates with the tenets of “sustainable development” ensuing from the International Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, after which there was much systematic talk about sustainable growth grounded in the necessary balance between environmental, economic and social issues (like communicating vessels) with fresh interpretations from the onset of the twenty-first century insisting upon due consideration of international relations (in the sense of which side of a vessel will be tipped and how long – naturally without spillage of their common content or even its breakage due to careless handling), we can see that the security of societies in every state and sustainable growth in each state are essentially closely tied – without security there is no sustainable growth, there is, in fact, no growth at all. Within this context, it is necessary to examine a given society’s attitude toward nature and the environment, because upsetting the balance between the communicating vessels (ecologies/environments, economies and social trends) within the framework of international activity or even the destruction of one of the vessels may lead to a collapse in the organization of society as we know it today. Global climate change, according to the IPCC Report of 2004, which is in a way the foundation of international negotiating policy in the post-Kyoto era, has been caused by human activity with a 90% probability. The consequence of neglecting the scientific facts (either consciously or unconsciously, knowing that the scientific basis and forecasting of such change have their roots in the early nineteenth century: Fourier 1820 – mathematical postulates and natural base, Tyndall 1859 – first laboratory evidence, Arrhenius and Chamberlain 1896 – fundamentals of the Industrial Revolution’s impact on the greenhouse effect, Callendar 1938 – first global measurement and evidence of the impact of rising temperatures, Keeling 1960 – significant rapid atmospheric CO2 concentrations) of this dependent relationship leads, in the modern day, to a “tempest” (or perhaps, better stated, a
1 Marijana Petir , Member of the Croatian Parliament
29 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change
“typhoon with floodwaters”) in this vessel that threatens to imbalance the system and damage the other two vessels.
On the climate and climate change
The climate is constantly changing and this manifests itself in the totality of all impacts on the climatic system over varying chronological scales. Over a long-term chronological scale (over 1,000 years), climate change is strongly correlated with astronomical events, just as change is rooted in the tilt of the Earth’s axis of rotation – the Earth’s precession, which is why a process of global cooling is in progress. Over a short time scale (100 years), climate change is very likely (90%) quite strongly correlated with human activity: a process of global warming is under way. The cause of global warming is greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions as a result of intensified human activity, particularly the release of energy from fossil fuels. Recent climate change is the sum of large- and small-scale inputs, wherein the process at the smaller scale is much more notable, so that the totality of climate change assumes the form of very marked global warming. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges confronting the world today. Croatia is also facing the effects of climate change, and these effects will only grow in the future. The negative impact includes damages caused by more frequent and forceful natural disasters, rising sea levels, increasingly difficult food production, and considerably poorer human health. The question of climate change and its consequences to the development and stability of societies is moving closer and closer to the forefront with each passing day. Ignoring these facts restricts options, creates the risk of hampered and uncertain growth and has a long-term negative impact on the development of human societies. In this regard, global climate change may be seen as a new force, an external pressure (again dictated and in large measure caused by the activities of the human species) which is long term (beginning with the Industrial Revolution, persisting over the long term, with no chance of disappearing on its own), although fortunately, according to current knowledge, predictable with a relatively well- and long-known operational mechanism (although there may be aspects of which we are still unaware), but exceptionally difficult to rein in (requiring the efforts of the entire international community to retard its effects and alleviate its consequences). This force may be picturesquely illustrated as the final step of stairwell of varying height (with a growing tendency insofar as none of the required measures aimed at mitigation and adaptation are undertaken – or even if they are undertaken) prior to the threshold of transition from security (such as it is) to general insecurity (caused by large-scale natural disasters, or smaller-scale disasters with greater frequency). Because of this, the impact of global climate change must be taken as one of the variables (unfortunately very unstable in terms of intensity and frequency) in the creation of an “equation” of security for each state and society. Climate change is not a “bogey man”, it is a reality, a scientific fact, it is here and as such it must be anticipated with the utmost gravity and incorporated into all calculations.
30 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change
Perceiving the severity of the problem, the Croatian Parliament’s Environmental Protection Committee has been actively involved in this matter, taking various forms of action both at the national and local levels, as well as working on the positions which the Republic of Croatia advocates before the International Conference on Climate Change and other global bodies dealing with problems pertaining to the climate. Every year the Committee organizes a special topical session dedicated to climate change, and the Committee’s members have also participated in the conferences in Copenhagen in 2009 and in Cancun in 2010. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Croatian team of experts who spend the entire year studying the actual impact and forecasting the future impact of climate change, which are essential to strategic thinking on Croatia’s future given the international commitments dictated by the struggle against climate change. In examining Croatia’s strategic stance where this concerns climate change, this year the Croatian Parliament had the exceptional honour of hosting Dr. Rajendra Kumar Pachauri, the chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an organization which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. Dr. Pachauri delivered an address before the forty-sixth session of the Environmental Protection Committee on the topic of “Stategic Planning in the Republic of Croatia with regard to Climate Change”. Our distinguished guest came at the invitation of the speaker of the Croatian Parliament and at the initiative of the parliamentary Environmental Protection Committee, with the assistance of the representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Croatia and the National Hydrometeorology Bureau. In his address, he provided an overview of the activities of the IPCC and the entire international scientific and political community, and he briefly presented the IPCC’s fourth report. He underlined in particular that the conclusion of the completed research shows that greenhouse gas emissions must not exceed the critical level that would result in a global increase in air temperature of over 2 degrees Celsius in the twenty-first century. Anything above this level would set off irreversible additional warming processes which could no longer be influenced by reduced emissions, and which would in turn result in catastrophic natural repercussions, such as a 6 to 7 meter rise in mean sea levels. It was precisely due to this discovery that the Nobel Foundation’s explanation for conferral of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 particularly stressed that these facts must be addressed with all due seriousness and they must never be ignored. Significant climate change may alter and threaten the living conditions of the majority of humankind. This in turn may lead to major migrations, as people seek out the resources essential to life, and to intensified competition in the use of these resources. Such changes will place the most vulnerable countries in the world in the worst position. Because of this, there is a heightened threat of brutal conflicts and wars both inside and between states. Upon the close of these deliberations, it became possible to conclude that the relevant Croatian agencies and institutions are cognizant of the problem, aware of all possible risks and consequences, and, backed by the requisite depth of knowledge, they can fully foresee future climate-related trends and circumstances in line with their own capabilities.
31 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change
As stated in the Nobel Foundation’s explanation, decision-makers (in Croatia as elsewhere) must approach the existing scientific indicators with the maximum sobriety and, based on the best available data and forecasts, formulate developmental policy for states and their security with full consideration of the impact of climate change. All consideration of Croatia’s future developmental strategies (for physical planning, energy, agriculture and so forth) must incorporate the elements of mitigation and adaptation which the state implements independently or within the framework of global efforts.
The threat to security posed by climate change
Taking into account the Nobel Foundation’s concluding remark, in which the dangers of climate change to humanity are underscored, several aspects must be considered. What risks will confront Croatia due to climate change, and what risks will emerge due to change at the global level? What effects are expected in Croatia’s territory? In the UNDP Report on social development in Croatia for 2008, climate forecasts for the period up to the end of the century indicate that Croatia will be warmer and drier, particularly during the summers, the winter snowpack in northern Croatia will become increasingly uncertain, and the moisture content of soil in the spring will decline. How will Croatian society be influenced by these effects? According to models, by the end of the twenty-first century sea levels are expected to rise from 9 to 88 centimetres (this seems modest even for 100 years; however, it must be noted here that these are differences in absolute values, and coupled with the effects of ordinary variations such as high and low tides, which also vary depending on natural cycles, the weather and contact between the water and dry land – the overall sum of effects under extreme conditions is harmful, i.e. flooding). If the sea level rises by only an average of 50 cm, it will engulf an area of 100 km2 of valuable (today the most valuable) tourist, agricultural and commercial land in the Adriatic seaboard, including all coastal cities and settlements. The consequences to agriculture in the Neretva River Valley, combined with the river’s reduced flow, would be catastrophic. From time to time, some effects can be observed even today: incursions of the sea and increased salinity at the river’s mouth during individual inclement periods. Climate models predict that, should greenhouse emissions continue to rise, summers throughout Croatia will be 3 to 3.5°C warmer from 2040 to 2070. This will have repercussions to both human health and the quality of life in the Adriatic zone. For example, the heat wave in August 2003 saw an estimated 4% increase in the mortality rate compared to the average in preceding years. There are also the extreme fluctuations in temperature, up to 10°C, in very short periods, as well as the exceptionally polar frigidity during winters in Europe, which also takes a high toll in human lives. The consequences of rising temperatures, droughts and imbalances in the quantity, frequency and intensity of precipitation are today considered the most significant negative effects of global climate change. Sectors such as agriculture, fishing, health-care, hydropower, tourism and the coastal zone account for 25% of the Croatian economy, employing almost 600,000 people and generating for a total annual GDP of €9 billion. Some of the
32 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change consequences of climate change will certainly be reflected in the economy as a whole. The greatest damages due to climate change are expected in agriculture. Extreme weather phenomena have resulted in average annual losses of €176 million during the 2000-2007 period (droughts, severe hail storms). This sum is 0.6% of GDP, or 9.3% of the gross value-added (GVA) from the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector. The value of water for consumption, hygiene, agriculture, hydropower, balanced eco-systems, etc. is virtually inestimable. Climate change is expected to cause more droughts, reduced river flows, and declining water tables. These effects may lead to direct losses ranging from €17 to €86 million annually in the energy sector alone due to reduced hydropower output. For example, in 2003, droughts caused an almost 20% reduction in electricity production from hydroelectric plants. This cost Croatia approximately €96 million, which had to be compensated by importing and producing energy using more expensive fuels. However, climate change can also have positive effects on some branches of the economy. The longer dry and warm periods may mean that the high tourist season will actually have two peaks (possibly May/June and then August/September), which in Croatia’s territory would extend the tourist season, while tourism facilities in Gorski Kotar and Lika, adjacent to the seaboard, would benefit during periods of unbearable heat on the coastal belt. Even so, some other forecasts indicate that destinations on the Mediterranean and Adriatic will be bypassed altogether, with entirely divergent economic effects. In Europe, we are aware of the changes and problems against which individual states are struggling. Under the project “The spatial effects and management of natural and technological hazards in general and in relation to climate change”, conducted within the ESPON 2000-2006 Programme, data on the evident impact of climate change on the European continent have been accorded special emphasis. However, almost every day we bear witness to catastrophic events which are undoubtedly growing in frequency. The rising sea level constitutes the principal challenge for the Netherlands and northern Germany. Violent storms in 1956 and 1962 caused the deaths of 2,500 people. The construction of well-fortified beachfronts and sound management in this area meant that during the storms in 1973, 1981 and 1990 there were no casualties, despite higher sea levels and stronger storms (of which the last was the strongest ever recorded in that area). Growing risks will necessitate raising and reinforcing the already well-fortified seashores. Fierce storms with abundant precipitation are hitting Central Europe (floods in Central and Southern Europe, and then in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Serbia – only Croatia was spared significant damage along the flood wave), as well as the Mediterranean regions (Italy, Spain, southern France), where such floods are often accompanied by drastic erosion (landslides and rockfalls). This summer as well France was beset by more intense droughts. The programming of almost all television broadcasters now frequently includes messages from the relevant national water management authority such as “Use dishwashers because they use less water” or “It’s not necessary to shower every day”, or even
33 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change more extreme messages incorporated into acceptable children’s cartoons which are aired more often. Droughts and extreme heat are conducive to more frequent and fierce wildfires, and in recent years we have seen Croatian firefighting planes deployed to Greece and Israel. Therefore, in addition to the well-known and already apparent primary effects (rising sea level, rising average air and sea temperatures, more frequent and violent storms and abundant precipitation causing flash floods and landslides, more frequent droughts in Europe), it is also necessary to foresee the secondary effects (such as changes in ecological relationships: replacement of biological communities and habitats with others, increased mortality due to heatwaves or floods, shortfalls in crop yields), and the consequences of these effects on national economies (e.g. physical damage to facilities and infrastructure, disappearance of individual commercial species of fish or other natural resources, increased energy consumption for heating/cooling) and the living standards of citizens and society as a whole (decreased economic activity, unemployment, higher fuel prices, higher living costs due to increased need for the funds required to implement mitigation and adaptation measures). Based on the facts and relevant indicators established thus far, it has been estimated that the struggle to alleviate climatic repercussions or to recover from the direct or indirect consequences of global warming will cost an average of 2% of GDP in every country (and that is if action is taken immediately). Besides these state-level problems, it is also vital to recognize the problems at the higher regional level, the European level, all the way to the global level. The problems of climate refugees, resource shortages (such as increasingly scarce water), energy security and the commitment to climate-neutral technologies (use of renewable energy sources – wind, water, sunshine and biomass) should not be overlooked either. There is also the matter of arranging joint efforts (through international climate conferences) at the global level, which should help in achieving a common binding agreement on measures to prevent the rise of global temperatures by more than 2°C to the end of the twenty-first century. Croatia’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions (deemed the primary driver of climate change) is not great, as Croatia’s per capita emissions are 6.9 tCO2- eq, which is 38% less than the average (Exhibit 1), and 34 % less than the average for EU member states. In policy matters tied to climate change issues, Croatia wishes to contribute to the global efforts for a better tomorrow, and in this sense it has assumed obligations at the global level as well. So Croatia’s objective by 2020 is largely oriented toward the energy sector, calling for an increase in the share of renewable energy sources in overall and direct consumption from 12%, which it was in 2005, to 20%, an increase in the share of renewable energy sources in electricity production from 20% to 36%, an increase in the share of biofuels in transportation to 16%, an increase in the share of renewable energy sources for heating and cooling to 16%, and an increase in energy efficiency by 9% in comparison to the average in for the 2001-2005 period. Naturally, all of these problems and challenges should be incorporated into our strategic thinking through the careful planning of investment models for
34 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change development that will generate the best results while observing all assumed international commitments.
Political (and economic) implications
The damages associated with the consequences of climate change (as well as those not associated with it) are, according to research conducted by Munich Reinsurance Company (2004) and Swiss Re (2003), have shown a clear growth trend from 1950 to the present: from a value of US$1 billion in 1987 to US$170 billion in the period from 1990 to 2000. This pointedly indicates the need to reduce vulnerability, and not only vulnerability to the risk posed by unwanted occurrences. It is also essential to see this in the context of adaptive measures which primarily serve to reduce vulnerability to an event in a high-risk area. When viewing the economy and policy, it is necessary to bear in mind that the economy drives politics and the world. Declining economic activity leads to disruption of social peace, even as economic expansion and growth have an environmental impact. In this context, any political agreement has inevitable economic implications. The absence of an agreement (final and binding) at the climate conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun illustrate the almost insurmountable rivalry between growing economies and developed economies. Often attempts at instituting obligations that favour the level of development and technological advancement in individual countries are proposed under the guise of environmental protection (e.g. restriction of volatile organic compounds (HOCs) from paints and resins – justifiable, but one should keep in mind that this closes the EU market to products from India, China and Egypt, which will need another 3-5 years to achieve the level of Euro-Atlantic technology, which has in turn transferred the problem of airborne VOCs into the release of certain carcinogens into waterways). In this way, the justified struggle against climate change becomes a means to settle accounts and apply pressure within an international framework, and to restrict the marketing and sale of technologies which are deemed contributors to climate change. This struggle is simultaneously an opportunity for “backward” economies to implement technological and economic development that will skip several steps considered undesirable today, as well as an opportunity to avoid receiving the often morally dubious “donations (at reasonable cost)” of old technologies or technologies for which there are indications (or even the certainty) that they will soon be unacceptable. The political implications of climate change and the struggle against it, coupled with the previously mentioned problems, manifest themselves in instability caused by the inability of states to function in securing the minimum living conditions for their populations. This is reflected in migrations (climate refugees), internal conflict and revolts, and resource wars. The consequences of these events once more hit the most threatened sectors of society (both locally and globally) the hardest. The incapacity of systems within states, the pressure of neighbours and the struggle for resources, water and energy generate hardship and economic dependence, and ultimately entire nations suffer, as do their neighbours and then the
35 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change entire world as a result of terrorist threats (often cloaked as a struggle for rights) which emerge and flourish in the world’s unstable zones.
The importance of communication with the public
Last, but certainly not least, I wish to underscore the necessity of proper communication by the executive and legislative authorities with the broadest swath of the public. The public must be prepared for the difficult challenges confronting us by raising awareness of the need to adapt to the imminent circumstances and conducting transparent sectoral policy (and also overall policy) with clear-cut objectives and developmental guidelines. Economic initiatives oriented toward the development of new energy production technologies or even energy savings depend on civic and public initiatives, to which the numerous positive experiences in Austria, Denmark, Germany, France and other countries testify. Solidarity and assistance measures (such as the newly-established Green Fund to assist countries already confronting the effects of climate change and those needing emergency aid as organized during times of crisis by the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Caritas, USAID and others) and endorsement of joint efforts will make it easier to weather the arduous times that are undoubtedly ahead of us.
Conclusion
The views and data presented above must be given the most serious consideration in the process of strategic thinking on our future and the overall global future. It is the responsibility of all decision-makers to make the best possible decisions based on the best available information. Regardless of how small or large a given country is, and the extent of its greenhouse gas emissions, the responsible behaviour of every state and every inhabitant of this planet Earth is essential. Croatia can boast of numerous activities in this field, and I would like to particularly emphasize that the UN proclaimed 2011 the “International Year of Forests” precisely at Croatia’s initiative, prompted by the advocacy of the outstanding staff of the country’s national forest management company. The use of renewable energy sources and the promotion of energy efficiency, which may lead up to 30% energy savings, are ever-present challenges. It is important to simplify the procedures to construct energy production facilities using renewable sources to encourage investors to produce “green energy”. The Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund in the Republic of Croatia has thus far disbursed HRK 417 million to co-finance 1,145 projects in the field of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency for the 2011/12 period, and approved an additional HRK 250 million for 250 projects.
36 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Impact of Global Climate Change
Literature:
- IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007 (AR4) - Doprinos 1. radne skupine Četvrtom izvješću o procjeni promjene klime Međuvladinog panela, http://klima.mzopu.hr/default.aspx?id=86 - Doprinos 2. radne skupine Četvrtom izvješću o procjeni promjene klime Međuvladinog panela, http://klima.mzopu.hr/default.aspx?id=86 - Doprinos 3. radne skupine Četvrtom izvješću o procjeni promjene klime Međuvladinog panela, http://klima.mzopu.hr/default.aspx?id=86 - Reducing Transport Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Trends & Data 2010, OECD/ITF 2010 - Zapisnik sa 46. sjednice Odbora za zaštitu okoliša Hrvatskog sabora
37 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Anton Bebler1 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring”
Starting in early 2011 an unprecedented wave of social unrest and political upheavals has swept across the Near East and Northern Africa. To the initially spontaneous, massive and peaceful demonstrations the ruling regimes have in most cases responded by brutal police repression and in some countries even by using regular army units and heavy conventional weapons even against crowds of unarmed civilians. Following the first demonstrations in Tunisia and the flight of its President Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia the wave engulfed most of the Arab world, from Morocco to Syria and Bahrain. The world’s attention had centered however, for a while on the, by far the largest and geopolitically most important Arab state – Egypt. In Kairo several weeks of massive protests and sit-ins on its main square Al Tahrir provoked a palace coup d’etat and the dismissal of the long-time President Hosni Mubarak and his appointed Vice President. Later the attention of the media and of the UN Security Council shifted to the bloody repression by Moamer Ghadafi’s heavily entrenched dictatorial regime in Libya. The “Arab spring” has reflected and made part of a much wider phenomenon of social fever which in 2010-2011 led hundreds of thousands protesters to streets and squares in many capitals and major cities on four continents, from Northern America and Europe, all the way to Teheran. Some underlying reasons for the unrest and protests were very similar – the deep dissatisfaction with the general economic situation, the respective government’s austerity measures, high unemployment etc. In Arab countries the protesters were additionally strongly motivated by rising food prices, by the regimes’ loss of legitimacy, by heavy – handed oppression and by wide-spread corruption, particularly among the elites. The exceptionally high rate of unemployment also among the well educated and the lack of opportunities for social promotion brought to public manifestations tens of thousands young people, initially mostly urban unmarried males. The protests were provoked by the price hikes for staple food which resulted largely from the draught, floods and fires in several important world’s exporters of grain. The social unrest and subsequently political upheavals and revolutions in several Arab lands have typically activated a glowing cross section of urban population, including ultimately also females, teachers, medical nurses, doctors and other groups of civil servants. Although many supporters of Islamist parties and associations participated in demonstrations no Islamist and anti-Western slogans were this time notably displayed. The main targets of protesters were exclusively domestic regimes and hated home-grown dictators.
1 Dr. Anton Bebler, Professor at Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana
38 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring”
There has been no credible indication of non-Arab interference, of outside fomenting of or Al-Kaida’s contribution to the troubles. However intra-Arab demonstration effect has been obvious, particularly salient prior and during the mass demonstrations in Kairo. Having been blocked by the regime-controlled public communication system the young organizers successfully used for inciting mass demonstrations electronic social networking through personal computers and the Internet. This has been a new social and political development of major significance. Although some similarities were observed with the earlier East European wave of liberal democratization in the late 1980 - early 1990s the “Arab spring” has greatly differed from it. Among the East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) the breakdown of their authoritarian regimes was triggered by the protests against external political and military domination as well as against authoritarian domestic regimes imposed and maintained by the communist superpower (USSR). The democratization wave had greatly affected then all East European communist states, including the two non-WTO members (SFR Yugoslavia and Albania). In 2011, on the other hand upheavals did not take place in all Arab countries and, more importantly, their dynamics and outcomes have varied greatly from one country to another. By December 2011 only two dictatorial regimes disappeared for good (in Tunisia and Libya). In contrast to most of Eastern Europe (with partial exception of Poland, SFR Yugoslavia and Romania) the Arab armies and professional military played a crucial role in determining the outcomes of democratic upheavals in their own and even in neighboring countries (Bahrain). These roles varied from the attempts of brutal and determined suppression (Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria), changing and vacillating position (Egypt) to squarely protecting unarmed demonstrators against brutality by the police (Tunisia). Unlike in Eastern Europe several Arab regimes could not have been defeated without a massive foreign military intervention. In Egypt an ex-general dictator was replaced by the rule of a military junta, while in Yemen and Syria the two dictatorial regimes are still in control inspite many months of mass demonstrations, thousands of victims and the Yemeni President Saleh’s formal resignation. Not less importantly the three Arab seasons in 2011 (spring, summer and autumn), unlike in Central-Eastern Europe, have brought neither radical geopolitical realignment and nor the disbandment of the regional interstate organization (the Arab League). The social and political upheaval did not create a new, hitherto unknown variety of direct and partiless variety of politics as some West European leftist dreamers hoped for. There has been no radical change in the Arab economies or in the patterns of trade relations with their major international partners. The earlier East European experience of region-wide transition to competitive politics and market economy thus remains of only limited relevance and cannot be replicated in the Arab world. Given its liberal democratic credo the European Union has been widely expected to actively support the democratic change, economic development and social stabilization in its Southern Mediterranean neighborhood. The political, social and economic problems that sparked the Arab upheavals offered useful starting points for new EU policy initiatives. It has been important to help the new governments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt so they would not be dragged down by the
39 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring” problems inherited from their dictatorial predecessors. There has been a great deal that EU and its member-states could do to support the democratizing political transformation in the Arab states. Yet the “Arab spring” found the European Union, with its network of Delegations in most Arab countries, unprepared, poorly informed, confused and hesitant in its response. The obvious tension between the propagated general values on which the EU External Action is supposed to be based and the admitted real goals of the European Neighborhood Policy (stability, security and prosperity along the EU external borders) have been the main source of the EU predicament. The ensuing confusion had produced an inaction when dealing with dictatorial Arab regimes at the time when the massive wave of social and political protests flooded the streets and squares of major Arab cities. To this dramatic occurrence across the Mediterranean the EU Commission responded with proposal for a new “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”. This paper plank however brought nothing new and only somewhat altered the label on the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP). The sanctions imposed by EU on several dictatorial regimes have also produced no notable effect on the political dynamics in the Arab world. Moreover, the reaction to the crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria exposed serious disagreements among the EU members, a very considerable gap between EU’s proclaimed values and the actual policies of its member states and insufficient coordination between the EU Commission and the EU External Action Service. The EU’s Mediterranean policy as part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has been proven ineffective inspite very considerable funds spent over years on officially promoting liberal reforms and human rights in Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU Commission has in fact been concerned primarily with maintaining political stability, assuring uninterrupted oil and gas imports from North Africa and the Near East and with preventing excessive illegal migration into the EU territory. Leaders of important EU member states have visibly entertained cordial relations with and more than tolerated dictatorial regimes which presumably guaranteed stability and served as a bulwark against Islamic Jihadism and Al Kaida. They have often turned a blind eye on wide-spread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in practically all Arab states. As a result of its inaction the European Union at a crucial moment failed to seize the opportunity to project itself as key geopolitical factor and to influence tangibly the seminal developments in the immediate Southern neighborhood in accordance with EU’s real long-term interests. The democratic developments during the Arab spring and summer 2011 had involved also NATO. For the first time in its history an Alliance’s “out of area” operation has been initiated jointly by two European members France and Great Britain. USA joined in, provided crucial military assets, intelligence and logistical support but this time declined to take the lead role. The operation “Unified Protector” had been operationally commanded by a Canadian general. It was based on a UN Security Council Resolution 1973 adopted on March 17, 2011 by a surprisingly strong majority of its members and supported by the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic States. This gave the NATO military action the much needed legitimacy as a humanitarian operation with the clearly stated objective of protecting Libyan civilians from brutal repression by the Ghaddafi regime. The
40 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring” operation started on March 19, 2011 with missile and bombing strikes against Libyan military targets, with the imposition of a no-fly zone for Libyan aircraft and of a naval blockade in the Mediterranean to prevent the flow of war materials to Libyan ports. The initial missile attacks were carried out by the US Navy, while subsequent bombing and fighter raids by the air forces of US, France, UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Spain. On the average 150 air missions were flown daily. By September 29, 2011 the total included 23.246 sorties, of which 9.040 “strike missions”. With these air attacks NATO very soon neutralized the Libyan Air Force, the government’s command and control centers, anti-aircraft defenses, combat units armed with and using heavy conventional weapons as well as destroyed a good deal of the stocks of ammunition and fuel. The UNSCR 1973 excluded a “foreign occupation force” in Libya. NATO did not in fact carry out a ground invasion although such contingency plans were developed in the NATO Southern Command. There were several problems in connection with the operation “Unified Protectors”. Not all NATO members supported it, including notably Germany and Turkey, while only seven European members actively participated in it. Due to disagreements among its member states NATO had from the outset no clear agreed upon political strategy. This fact prevented a desired close fit between the mission’s operational objectives and the means required. The “Unified Protector” confirmed the continuing insufficiencies in the capabilities of the European allies to carry out large scale air combat operations, particularly in intelligence, reconnaissance, target acquisition, precision ammunition and air refueling. Most of these lacking capabilities were provided by the US forces. The constraints contained in the UN mandate (and occasionally sand storms) increased the number of targeting errors, undermining political support, particularly in Arab states. On a number of occasions the NATO force overstepped the restrictions on the use of force imposed by the UN Security Council resolution and caused moderate collateral damage and deaths among the Libyan civilian population and also among the rebels. Moreover in the Libyan civil war NATO clearly took the side with the anti-Ghaddafi’s forces superimposing on the legitimate humanitarian mission a politically much more problematic and controversial but determined military operation to help overthrow Libya’s dictatorial regime and its main protagonist. Inspite NATO’s full dominance in the airspace and in the coastal waters, heavy losses suffered by the Libyan government’s armed and security forces and wide international, moral and political support to the rebels the thoroughly but not fully isolated Ghaddafi regime resisted fiercely for more than six months, twice longer than in 1999 the militarily much stronger Milosevic regime in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These two elements combined made it politically impossible to undertake a similar international humanitarian action of preventing even more numerous civilian casualties inflicted on peaceful demonstrators by another Arab dictatorial regime in Syria. Unlike the European Union NATO performed well and more than fulfilled the immediate objective. The Alliance proved to be the only international organization capable of dealing effectively with severe humanitarian crises in Europe’s neighborhood. Inspite internal disagreements among its members NATO
41 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring” had been able to successfully organize and well execute a large scale “out-of-area” military operation. The Alliance forces had decisively contributed to the overthrow of Ghaddafi’s regime and accidentally even to the dictator’s capture and his hasty execution by the rebels. Following this event NATO officially terminated the operation on October 31, 2011 although the National Transitional Council of Libya asked for its prolongation for several more months. The success of the “Unified Protector” allowed the National Transitional Council to declare an end of the civil war and the beginning of preparations for orderly rebuilding the Libyan state on the principles and norms of representative democracy. NATO has much more effectively than the European Union contributed to creating favorable internal and external conditions for democratic development in the Southern Mediterranean leaving to the Libyans themselves to decide on their state’s future. Only if the new legitimate Libyan authorities were to request additional assistance the Alliance would be ready to provide advice in rebuilding the Libyan armed forces, carrying out a security sector reform and developing democratic civil-military relations. Following the failure of the EU policies in the Southern Mediterranean the EU Council and Commission is expected to review and set clearly EU’s future priorities. EU would be well advised to present itself not as a European fortress but as an unbiased, open-minded and liberal Europe extending its friendly assistance not only to the governments but also to the civil societies in Arab countries. This need comes at the difficult period of financial crises in several Mediterranean EU members (notably in Greece) and in the eurozone as a whole. The economic downturn and stagnation in most EU members increases pressures on the EU budget. It would be thus unrealistic to expect that the European Neighborhood Policy and the EU External Action will receive important funds additional to those foreseen in the 2007 – 2013 Financial Perspective. The same limitation applies to the European Investment Bank as well. The philosophy behind the European Neighborhood Policy has been so far based on the assumption that the partner countries should reform themselves but not EU itself. In fact the crisis showed the need to change some EU policies related to the Mediterranean. In other to promote long-term democratic stability in the Southern Mediterranean and in the Near East the European Union should: - remove protectionist bareers, liberalize trade in agricultural products and in labor intensive industrial products which would promote economic development in the Southern Mediterranean and bring down the pressure of illegal migration into EU; - develop proactive immigration policy which would help to reduce the very high unemployment levels in some Arab countries and alleviate the problems of the aging population in most EU member states; - adapt the Schengen system to possible future extraordinary events in the neighborhood; - stop using double political standards in dealing with Arab regimes; - assume an active role in managing the Israeli – Palestine conflict instead of frequently simply waiting for and following the USA policy, which has been
42 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring”
for internal political reasons biased in favor of Israel and harmful also to American political and economic interests in the Islamic world. Moreover, the “strategic partnership” between EU and NATO has practically not functioned, making in this case also the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and its specialized part the Common Security and Defense Policy in the EU immediate neighborhood highly disappointing failures. During the next two Presidencies in the EU Council in 2012 (Denmark and Cyprus) it would be very difficult to improve the situation concerning ESDP. The very modest achievements of the “Arab spring”, particularly in Egypt, and the lack of progress in managing the Arab-Israeli conflict has exposed the limitations of the European Union’s and NATO’s political influence on the developments in the Arab world. The EU Mediterranean Policy and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, the two organizations’ relationship and corresponding agreements with North African and Near Eastern states will have to be reviewed and adapted to the new situation. There is also a need to rethink the “Berlin-plus” arrangement, introducing possibly a Berlin-plus-in-reverse mechanism. The EU- NATO cooperation could be improved by combining the top-bottom and the bottom-up approaches. It is also essential that Turkey and other non-EU contributors to ESDP are given full rights in the Committees of Contributors to the EU ESDP missions and that Greece and Cyprus are not allowed to sabotage them. There is a pressing need to clarify the rules for application of the “responsibility to protect” and to use this doctrine consequently without double standards applied. The recent dramatic events in the Southern Mediterranean have provided thus both EU and NATO with ample grounds for serious introspection.
43 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The European Union, NATO and the “Arab spring”
Literature:
- Asseburg, M., Salem, P., No Euro-Mediterranean Community without peace. (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009.) - Barry, B., Libya’s Lessons in Survival: Global politics and Strategy, vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 5-14 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011) - De Vasconcelos, A. (ed.), The Arab democratic wave: How the EU can seize the moment. (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2011.) - Gaub, F., Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum in Research Report (Rome: Research Division – NATO Defense College, 2011.) - Gaub, F. et al., NATO’s Role in a Post-Conflict Libya in Research Report (Rome: Research Division – NATO Defense College, 2011.) - Forging a democracy from Libya’s Jamahiriya in Strategic Comments, vol. 17, comment 31 (International Insitiute for Strategic Studies, 2011.) - Sloggett, D., Libya resolutions pose international questions in Jane’s Defence Weekly (Surrey : November 30, 2011.) - Smith, S. J., EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? in European Security, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 243-264 (Routledge, 2011.)
44 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Filip Dragović1 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
The police represent public service of society and state which, within national territory, takes care of obeying the law, maintaining public order and social discipline; protection of citizens, constitutional order and material goods; acts in prevention, repression and discovery of criminal and misdemeanour offenders. At the same time the police is the main operational interagency coordinator of various emergency cases, extraordinary events, interventions, alerts and represents indirect and direct bearer of protection of the ever growing number of mutually networked and dependent systems. Along with the police work, in many countries it performs various administrative tasks for state administration. Depending on socio-political system, historical heritage and development the role of the police oscillates from country to country in the work scope and in their functions. The general trend is that with the globalization influence, changes in viewing and conducting the sovereignty and the necessity of proactive actions, many countries are increasing the police responsibilities and authorities so they will be able to answer the ever growing challenges and threats. Consequentially, the police, along with the police work within their national territories which represents the essence of their existence and actions, are getting more noticeable international role because the internal dimension of security is unavoidably tied with their outer component. Because the modern asymmetrical threats (terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime, drug trafficking, trafficking in arms, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography, economic crime and corruption) do not have exclusively national designation and component, but are international, the international role is imposed on the police. Therefore the goal of the article is to informatively show the international place and role of the police model that is being developed in the countries of the European Union, noting that, because of space issues, it is not possible, however briefly, to exhaust every police work in that segment. Therefore the goal is to direct attention to the three dimensions: strengthening the international role of the police in European territory; the role of the police in the international peace operations, where they are trying to eliminate the causes of the security threats in their source; and to represent the international and cooperative activities of the Republic of Croatia’s Police force, as a public service of the country that is about to become full-fledged member of the European Union and represents the role model of reform and success regionally as well as globally. All of these areas of activities represent the synergy with European security model which is extremely well
1 Filip Dragović, M.A., Director of Directorate for European integration and international relations of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia.
45 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions presented in the Internal security strategy for the European Union from 2010. In the strategy it is stressed that it represents ''a firm commitment to continuing to make progress in the area of justice, freedom and security through a European security model which faces the following challenges: protecting rights and freedoms; improving cooperation and solidarity between Member States; addressing the causes of insecurity and not just the effects; prioritizing prevention and anticipation; involving all sectors with a role to play in public protection (political, economic, social, etc.); communicating security policies to the citizens; and, finally, recognizing the interdependence between internal and external security in establishing a ‘global security’ approach with third countries.''2 In the establishing the European security model the integrated approach which integrates action on law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border management and civil protection is extremely important.
The strengthening of the international role of police in the European territory
The common European internal space of justice, freedom and security represents the concept and the platform upon which the elements of the European Union’s member states are mosaically woven into the unique set of values, where the obligations and the responsibilities are shared on partner bases. The role of the police in all of these processes is progressively increasing. It is a long known reality that no country is able to independently solve current complex issues, especially in the conditions where post-Cold war surroundings have brought the significant opening of the borders which resulted in conclusive connection between the internal and external aspects of security. To consider the increased role of the police as one of the key elements of European countries’ national securities it is important to observe several parallel processes which are culminating in the last ten years and are leading the police into dimensions unimaginable a few decades ago. We single out the next processes: The transformation of the European security area with the end of the Cold war; the creation of the internal European space without boundaries; and, the response to all transnational threats and challenges. The European perspective after the 2nd World war was marked with ideological and military bloc division where the separation between the two camps was set through the middle of the continent and by that determined the whole life, development and security situation. Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic Germany’s chancellor of that age, has significantly declared that “security isn’t everything, but everything else without security is nothing”. Security was the central pillar of all significant life discussions in Europe. Consequentially the concepts of the national securities were conditioned primarily by military factor where all other bearers in the security area were subordinate to such model. Military forces were the main bearers of the national securities, the guardians of sovereignty through control
2 ''Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model'', page 7-8, link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, loaded on February 17, 2011.
46 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions and border protection and powerful factor of the countries’ internal stability. The police had lower ranked role and had predominantly maintained public order and safety. It is important to state that the police forces have mutually cooperated through Interpol which was founded in 1923, but that cooperation wasn’t nearly the same dimension as today. By the ending of the Cold war bi-polar division of the world has ended and the system of international relations has entered into a new phase. The bloc tensions based on military factor and military threat were erased but the lack of maintenance of the global balance of power and control has brought new and unpredictable challenges. Although the traditional military threats, connected with the classical international conflicts, are still present, the most serious peril to the international peace and security comes from so called “asymmetrical” threats such as: global terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled migrations and instabilities created by unsuccessful countries. These types of threats have brought to the rejection of the former distinctions between internal and external politics as inadequate and obsolete.3 The systems of national securities and the politics of the national securities have experienced transformation. Security that was formed on a military factor became conditioned by the processes which are happening in all spheres of society, significant reduction of the military dimension within the system of national security and the increase in the roles other services (police, intelligence agencies, civil protection systems) is coming to pass. Europe, as a former ideological and military dividing line has experienced the greatest changes. Of all the services the police have experienced the biggest expansion and promotion of jobs and functions. The police forces have from military taken over the protection of borders, had to answer the requirements for increased international exchange of information and better coordination and cooperation in establishing the series of specialized international law enforcement agencies. The political frame for the development of the internal European area of justice, freedom and security has been directed through the European Council guidelines in the special meetings dedicated to the areas of judiciary and internal affairs (Tampere, Haag and Stockholm). At these meetings the five years plans for the development of judiciary and internal affairs were adopted in the European Union’s level. The European Council has held, on 15th and 16th October 1999, in Tampere (Finland), first special meeting for the areas of judiciary and internal affairs, where the determination of the vision of the development of the European Union as the area of freedom, security and justice, was confirmed.4 The vision of the Tampere meeting represented the alignment of what the EU represents and of what it strives to be in the future with all the challenges that appear in the European area and all the areas for which EU has interests, all in with the purpose of increasing internal level of freedom and security and, also, to provide assistance to those who need it. To achieve the secure, but also the open European Union, the Union that
3 Reindorp, N. (2002) ''Trends and challenges in the UN humanitarian system'', in: Macrae, J. /ed./ The new humanitarianism: a review of trends in global humanitarian action, HGP Report, London: Overseas Development Institute, page 29-38. 4 ''Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions'', link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, loaded on May 22, 2011.
47 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions provides security to its citizens and protects the citizens of the third countries who need protection, the issues like the strengthening the police cooperation and border control represent extremely important segment of the whole mosaic of what is the EU today. Although not all of the Tampere goals were achieved in the measure in which they were envisioned, the accomplishments are visible in the increase of the EU efficiency in the areas of police, customs and judicial cooperation, as well as the additional development of the common policies on issues of asylum, migrations and external borders control. The next five year plan was brought by the European Council at the meeting in Brussels on 4th and 5th November 2004, under the name Hague Programme for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the EU.5 The fundamental goals of the Hague Programme or the directions for action of the member countries are: further strengthening of common capabilities of the EU and its member countries in view of respect for the fundamental human rights; refugee protection; regulation of the migratory flows; external borders control; preventing trans-boundary crime; combating terrorism; better use of the Europol6 and the Eurojust7. It is indicated that freedom, justice, the external borders control, internal security and preventing terrorism represent the indivisible values within the Union as a whole. The principles of the optimal level of protection of the areas of freedom, security and justice demand multi-disciplinary and coordinated action on the EU level as well as the national level between competent law enforcement authorities, especially police, customs and border police. The strengthening of security is the central part of the document in which is stated that the national security services should be used not only for own security but also for the internal security of other member states. Special attention is paid to the strengthening of the information
5 ''Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions'', link: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/14292- r1.en04.pdf, loaded on May 22, 2011. 6 Europol (European Police Office) is a part of the group of agencies with competences in police and judicial cooperation in the criminal issues which were established as the assistance to the member states so they could cooperate in combating the organized international crime. Its base is in The Hague (the Netherlands). The Europol was founded by the Convention on Europol and has become operational in 1999. The Convention was updated by the Council’s Resolution on 6th April 2009, by which the change was made in the legal personality of the agency which resulted in the widening of the mandate and the sphere of work, the data processing and its protection was improved and improvement was also made in the area in the administrative and the operational capacities. The Agency coordinates the police cooperation of the member states in the areas of prevention and combating the various forms of the organized international crime. The areas of cooperation and the sphere of work are: drug trafficking; illegal immigrant networks; resale of stolen vehicles; human trafficking; child pornography; the money and other means of payment counterfeiting; resale of the radioactive and nuclear substances; and terrorism. The Europol personnel consist of representatives of the national law enforcement services such as the police, the customs, the immigration services, etc. 7 Eurojust (European Body for the Enhancement of Judicial Cooperation) is the Union’s agency competent for the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Eurojust was founded by the Council’s Resolution no 2002/187/JHA from 28th February 2002. It is based in The Hague (The Netherlands). Its purpose is to enable the efficient detection and the processing trans-boundary organized crime offenders in all of the member states territories. The basic goals of Eurojust are: encouraging and improving the cooperation of the member states in the field of investigating and criminal prosecution, improving the cooperation of the member states governments in the area of mutual legal assistance and providing assistance in the extradition, efficient investigation and prosecution.
48 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions exchange so that, from 2008, data possessed by one police force is available to other countries. After that the European Council has, during Swedish presidency over the Union in the second half of 2009, approved the fact that it gives great importance to the further development to the areas of freedom, security and justice, and has adopted the new five year plan, called The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, for the period from the year 2010 to the year 2014.8 The balance of securing the respect of basic freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing the security in Europe has been stated as the greatest challenge. The tools for realization of the stated goals are: mutual trust, efficient execution, legislative initiative, increased coherency and coordination, objective and impartial estimation of the execution of the policies, improvement in the training of the judges, prosecutors, police, customs and border police (implementation of the European training system), and improvement of the communication and the dialog with the citizens. The creation of the internal European space without the boundaries is, along with the introduction of the common currency, the greatest European Union’s achievement since its founding. The aforementioned is carried out through the Schengen treaties. The creation of the space without the internal borders between the European countries has begun with the signing of the Treaty between the governments of the states of European Union of Benelux, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France on gradual suspension of control at the common borders (the Schengen treaty) from 14th June 1985 and with the adoption of the Convenction on execution of the Schengen treaty between the aforementioned governments on gradual suspension of control at the common borders from 19th June 1990 (the Schengen implementation covention). These treaties have created the security frame in the signing countries after the removal of border controls at the common state borders. The acquisition of these norms has impacted the common cooperation and security at both sides of the borders.9 The stated treaties have, through the Amsterdam treaty10, become the part of the primary European Union’s legislative and are the cause, the frame and the pointers for the new method of police and other competent authorities’ cooperation, with the common goal – the strengthening of the security of each country while easing the travelling across state borders. The creation of the space between the countries without the internal controls has brought the police cooperation and border security to a higher level. With that the police work has become the internal business of the European Union. The removal of borders in itself is not a problem as long there exists a mechanism for keeping the achieved level of security, however, at the beginning of this great “project” there was no such mechanism and quality police cooperation nor have the police services been prepared for such a step out of the national legislative and
8 ''The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens'', Council of the European union, Brussels, 2 December 2009, link: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm_program_en.pdf, loaded on May 22, 2011. 9 More in: Anderson M. and Apap J. (2002) ''Police and Justice Co-operation and the New Borders'', European Monographs, Kluwer Law International. 10 The Amsterdam Treaty was brought in the 18th June1997, and came into force in 1999. The European Union Contract and Economic Community Contract were changed with it.
49 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions administrative capacities. At the time of opening the borders the account was taken mainly about economic advantages and the question of security was not properly addressed. The Schengen treaties have changed the entire security model, established the new mechanisms and changed the apprehension on police work.11 The acquiesced obligations are based on the common belief that, in the interest of greater public, the possible loss of security after the removal of border controls would be unacceptable. In the desire to avoid the worsening of security that would happen because of the removal of control, the countries that have signed the Schengen treaty have through the treaty determined the short and the long term measures to be taken. To the end of complete abolishment of control the signing countries have adopted the compensation measures and have strengthened the control of the outer borders for the protection of the internal security and the prevention of illegal entry of the people who are not citizens of the European Union’s member states which brought to many later decisions on strengthening primarily police and customs cooperation. One of the basic measures is the tight cooperation between the authorities responsible for the internal security within the Schengen countries and the information support for which reason the Common information system was created (Schengen information system or SIS). Also it was determined to establish the common border controls at the neighbouring border crossings. The question of protection and control of the outer borders of the European Union has become one of the main political, social, economic and security areas of interest and action of the member states and the Union as a whole.12 The needs and the necessities of the unified and the efficient control of the outer controls according to the unique principles, coordination of the visa policies and asylum directives, coordination of the armament laws, introduction of trans-boundary control and stronger crime suppression, improvement of juridical assistance and extradition in the criminal matters and the tougher control regarding the drugs, were determined. The protection of the individual rights and the protection of the personal information have received special attention. The principle of inner border crossing without any control of the persons may be forlorn only in emergencies when it is required by the public order or national security, and even then only in the limited period after the consultations with other members of Schengen space.13
11More in: Šegvić, S. (2011) ''Šengenski režim upravljanja vanjskim granicama EU''. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, Year 48, No. 1/2011, page 11-31. 12Frontex is the European agency for regulating the operative cooperation in the outer borders of the European Union’s member states. Frontex belongs to the group of agencies that were founded by the act of the secondary legislative of the Union which have the goal of realization of very specific technical, scientific and coordinating tasks. The Agency is based in Warsaw (Poland). Frontex coordinates the operative cooperation of the member states regarding outer borders control; it helps the member states in the training of national officials that work on borders, including the implementation of the common training standards; it analyses risks; it follows research important to control and supervision of outer borders; it helps the member states in the circumstances that demand increased technical and operative assistance on the outer borders and provides assistance to the member states in the organization of the operations of common return. 13Few examples: Belgium has, in the beginning of the year 2000, introduced the border control due to the increase in the number of illegal immigrants; Austria has implemented the same order during the European Economic Summit in the beginning of July 2001 for the reason of expected disorder and protests; After that Austria has again introduced the border control during the European Football
50 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
The answer to the transnational threats and challenges is best show through the European security strategies which identify such threats and create the strategic frame for answering them. Within the spectrum of all the answer mechanisms the police represents extremely important link. European Security Strategy from 2003 states that the traditional concept of security has been based on the “threat of invasion” and that, as a contrast to the visible threats during the Cold war, none of the new threats are strictly military, nor can it be counteracted exclusively with military means. The strategy has, as the key threats which are dispersed, less visible and harder to predict, stated threats which mainly aren’t military in character.14 The following instances were recognized as the key threats to Europe: terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, unsuccessful countries and organized crime. Responding to these sorts of threats, which are for the EU predominantly outer in character, the Union has responded by: the series of preventive measures; distinguishing the importance, the commitment and the strengthening of the international legal frames; greater cooperation with the partners (UN, NATO, the USA); and developing new and dynamic response instruments.15 The European strategic concept of internal security is based on the spreading of the security zones across the outer borders, the integration of the eastern and south- eastern European countries in the EU and the partnership relations with the countries on the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean. It is a very challenging and, at the same time, very demanding project, especially for the police forces which have had to diametrically change the concept of their actions from reactive to proactive in a short time. Spreading the stability zones and moving the outer borders further away from the centre proves the responsibility which the EU has towards the areas it is integrating. However, the expansion leads to reducing the distance between the internal borderless space and the current asymmetrical perils. Security without the risks isn’t feasible and such strategic goal of spreading outer borders and creating new areas of security and stability speaks of the idea, power and strength of the EU. Especially where we see that the entire internal security of the Union and the “old” member countries is responsibly being relinquished to the newly integrated countries which are becoming the outer borders of the common areas of peace, stability and security. The strategy has set the frame and the way of action of the EU outside outer borders. Five years later, in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy from December 2008, the Union recognizes itself and states that it is the anchor of security, that its responsibilities are larger than ever before, and that the policy of the integration of the new countries has spread the democracy and prosperity throughout the continent. The new regional and global reality has been recognized. Some of the crises were mitigated and some were deepened. In this light the EU stays consistent to the responsible participation in resolving the challenges and the problems throughout the world with the special
Championship in 2008; Germany has done the same during the World Football Championship in 2006; the last significant example of border control has happened between France and Italy during 2011, because of the large number of refugees from southern Mediterranean countries. 14More in: Vukadinović, R. i Čehulić, L. (2005) Politika europskih integracija. Zagreb: Topical. 15More in: ''A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy'', link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, loaded on September 2, 2011.
51 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions attention towards those that have direct influence to the internal European security. Through the European security and defence policy as the integral part of the Common foreign and security policy, in cooperation with its partners, the EU is trying to resolve the challenges at their sources.16 The report recognizes the need for better coordination, transparency and flexibility in the various agencies work on the national and on the Union level. The question of borders is also recognized as an extremely important component of the total development and the security of the Union and its members. Afterwards, during 25th and 26th March 2010 the European council has approved the Internal security strategy for the European Union. Within the strategy the concept of the internal security is understood as a wide and comprehensive approach which consolidates several sectors with the goal of resolving the threats which have direct influence on life, security and wellbeing of the citizens. It is recognized that there is no possibility of the absolute protection and that the security is the key factor in the protection of the high quality of living of the European citizens, the critical infrastructure and threat prevention. Additionally the strategy is significant because it is the first document that has set the guidelines for the development and binding of the national strategies of the member states security on the Union level. For the threats and challenges that are trans-boundary and surpass the sole member state abilities for prevention and response, the synergic and subsidiary action on the Union level is necessary. The strategy sets the principles how to act since the management, the control and the protection of the outer borders is out of extreme importance so the goals of the internal can be carried out.17
The role of the police in the international peace operations
One of the more important instruments of the foreign security and defence policy of the European Union are peacekeeping missions. Along with the previous generally accepted opinion that the military forces are the primary subjects for the peace missions, the change in the international security system, the threats and the European Union’s action discourse, soon contributed to the usage of the police forces in the peacekeeping mission in the equal manner as their military colleagues. The beginnings of police forces participation in the European Union’s peacekeeping missions are almost parallel with the participation of the military forces in the Union’s peacekeeping missions. With the end of the NATO’s operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia on the 31st March 2003, the operation was taken over by the
16''Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World'', Brussels, 11 December 2008, link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf, loaded on September 2, 2011. 17The Strategy relates to and supplements all the previous documents and serves as the guide for ensuring the internal security on Union level. More in: ''Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model'', link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, loaded on February 17, 2011.
52 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
European Union, as the mission successor, under the name operation Concordia. It was the first military operation of crisis management under the EU’s leadership. The
Overview of the civil and military past and present missions and operations of the European Union Source: European External Action Service; EU Operations operation Concordia has had for its goal the security of the EU an OESS monitors during the implementation of the Ohrid treaty. The Union’s member states were under the opinion that the operation was a success and that it should be replaced by an operation of a police type. The military operation Concordia has been brought to an end on the 15th December 2003 and has been replaced by the civil police EU operation Proxima with the task of monitoring and counselling the Macedonian police in their fight against the organized crime. After that, under the very similar principle, the EU has taken over NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO’s peacekeeping mission Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), the Union has taken over on 2nd December 2004. The operation was dubbed Althea.18 The EU has engaged a large number of member states’ police officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were focused on the training
18Grizold, A. and Čehulić, L. (2006) Međunarodna sigurnost i NATO u Novom svjetskom poretku. Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
53 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions of the local police officers in accordance with the European standards and practices. In May 2007 the EU has decided to send a police mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL).19 Till now the Union has participated in 25 peacekeeping missions, of which 11 are finished and the rest are still continuing. In the aforementioned missions the member states’ police forces have given a major contribution.20 Along with the above stated tasks that the police forces performed in the peacekeeping missions it is important to emphasize that the police forces represent the best adapted tool for countering the most serious security challenges and that way the EU endeavours to remove the security threats at their source. The importance of the role of the police in the international operations has been recognized and superbly described by David H. Beyley and Robert M. Perito in the book The Police in War: fighting insurgency, terrorism and violent crime.21 Analysing the two, in all respects extremely important international operations, the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have concluded that “the unilateral failure to create an effective civilian police force in Iraq was paralleled by a multilateral but equally unsuccessful effort to train and equip an effective civilian police force in Afghanistan… In terms of human suffering, this failure was catastrophic.”22 Both missions have, after the initial military phase, experienced a dead end, which lead to the consolidation and reconceptualization to the counterinsurgencies operations. Beyley and Perito unequivocally show that in counterinsurgencies operations “fundamental goal is political – namely, the creation of a self-sustaining legitimate government – the primary vehicle for dealing with an insurgency should be the police.”23 That is because only the police forces are able to win over the local populace the legitimate government goals. This leads us to the conclusion that no peacekeeping mission should be planned without military and civilian part, where the role of the police forces is extremely important if not crucial. The proof that it really is so is confirmed by the following analysis: “[a] US Department of Defence (DOD) study group (2006) analysed thirty-four counterinsurgencies from 1948 onward and found that in the cases in which counterinsurgency operations was successful, the police had gained the public's trust, whereas in all the unsuccessful cases, the police had neither participated significantly nor made effective contact with the population.''24
19More in: Delegacija Europske unije u Republici Hrvatskoj; Zajednička sigurnosna i vanjska politika, http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/?lang=hr&content=985, loaded on December 22, 2011. 20More in: European External Action Service; EU Operations, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en, loaded on December 22, 2011. 21The book will be translated to Croatian and published during 2012 by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia. 22Beyley, D. H. and Perito, R. M. (2010) The Police in War: fighting insurgency, terrorism and violent crime, page 17. Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London. 23Ibid, page 68. 24Ibid, page 55.
54 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
The overview of the international actions and cooperation of the Republic of Croatia’s police force
The Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia has in the last ten years, with the successfully implemented reforms, become the example of efficiency within the system of state administration and a regional leader in police tasks. The international dimension of the Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of Interior can be viewed through the following areas: the initiation, the development and the signing of the contracts and acts; the activities in regard to the Republic of Croatia’s joining the European Union.; the activities regarding the implementation of the international projects; the activities regarding the peacekeeping missions; and the activities of the liaison police officers abroad. The initiation, the development and the signing of the contracts and acts is the extremely important segment of the action, because only by the creation of the legal base the abilities, skills and knowledge that the Republic of Croatia’s police force has can come to fore. By the middle of 2011 the Ministry of the Interior has signed 27 bilateral contracts and 9 international contracts and has joined some significant organizations such as: Interpol, Europol and Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). The most significant fact is that all the relevant accords, protocols and implementation accords with all our neighbouring and strategic partners (the EU, Federal Republic of Germany and the USA) have been signed. With that all of the areas crucial to the successful work of the Croatian police have been legally covered. As one of the most interesting accords, which is visible every year, and practically represents the Croatian innovation, is the Protocol of cooperation during the tourist season, through which the other countries police officials are staying in the Republic of Croatia and are joining their Croatian colleagues in patrolling the most visited tourist resorts. The activities in regard to the Republic of Croatia’s joining the European Union have marked the cooperation in achieving the strategic goal of the Croatian foreign policy. The Ministry has actively participated in the activities in the area of harmonisation of legislation with the Acquis communautaire and the best practice of the EU member states. The intensive work has been done in the improving and achieving the EU standards in areas of legalisation and internal affairs which are covered by Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security. The Republic of Croatia obligations and demands toward the European Commission’s that arise from the screening within which we have fulfilled the measures for the Chapter 24, that is the Updated Action plan of the integral control of the border of the Republic of Croatia, have been fulfilled. The activities regarding the implementation of the international projects is the area in which the Ministry has achieved of the most successful result in attracting the financial means from the EU funds. Through those projects the development, equipping and the professional improvement of the large number of systems and business processes, and the most importantly the police officials, have been provided. The most important projects in which the Ministry has participated in can be categorised as: the national projects (CARDS 2003, CARDS 2004, PHARE 2006, IPA 2007, IPA 2008, IPA 2009); the regional projects (CARDS 2005, IPA
55 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
2007, IPA 2009, IPA 2010); the Twinning light projects (PPF 2005); the technical assistance project (PPF 2005 and PPF 2006). The activities regarding the peacekeeping missions are getting ever more attention within the Ministry but also the State. The Ministry of Interior participates in the UN, EU and NATO lead operations. The Republic of Croatia’s police officials in peacekeeping missions have been engaged as councillors in establishment and reconstructions of existing police systems and as experts in the training of the police officials. Currently we are participating in the three UN missions (at Cyprus, Haiti and East Timor) and the two EU missions (EUPOL Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo). In Afghanistan, beside the other duties, the police officials participate in the mixed military-police training teams POMLT (Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams) with the members of the Republic of Croatia’s armed forces in the task of training the Afghanistan national police. Beside the stated the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia is, traditionally, once a year organises and conducts the licensed UN’s international course UNPOC Croatia dedicated to the peacekeeping UN missions’ candidate training. Additionally it is important to highlight that in the 2011 the police officials have, at the invitation of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Monte Negro, spent two weeks in the Monte Negro where they have shared their knowledge and experiences from the participations in the peacekeeping missions and have in that manner trained the Montenegrin police officials for participation in the peacekeeping missions. The activities of the liaison police officers abroad is an important segment of the outer dimension of the Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of Interior police actions. The coordination between parent police forces is improved through liaison officers. Till now the police liaison officers are active in Europol, Interpol, SECI Centre, Serbia, Austria and Israel. Of other activities it may be worth mentioning the participation in the international project IPA 2008 “Combating the organized crime, especially drug trafficking and prevention of terrorism”. The European Commission has authorised the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Austria and the Federal Criminal and Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany for the implementation of the project. Croatia has been selected as a partner in the project in the implementation of the prevention of terrorism component. Through stated component the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia experts for terrorism prevention are transferring the EU’s best practise in this field to the countries that are users of the project (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte Negro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia) and are helping them improve the administrative capacities with the objective of terrorism prevention. Beside that the OSCE has recognized the Ministry of the Interior as a successful organization which has qualitatively implemented the internal reforms and has started the cooperation which has as the object the reforms of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajikistani police according to the Croatian model. The stated perennial cooperation has started in the beginning of 2011.
56 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
Conclusion
The modern police represent: the face of the government that citizens mostly see; the best adapted tool for the opposition to the most serious security challenges and one of the key elements of national and international security whose role is progressively growing. To explain what the police represents today the three extremely important areas for the development and the functioning of the modern police services of the European type are shown: the strengthening of the international role of the police in the European area through development of the European area of justice, freedom and security because, consequentially, the role of the police has experienced radical changes in its sphere of work and has become directed to the international cooperation; the role of the police in the international peacekeeping missions where it participates in the removal of the security challenges at their source; and finally, the analysis of the international action and cooperation of the Republic of Croatia which represents the role model of reform and success both regionally and globally. Analysing the above stated there are some inevitable questions: In the light of changes in which the civilian sector is gradually replacing the military forces as the bearers of security, can the police, with its structure, organization, roles, tasks and authorities, answer the demands of time? Can the police forces preventively act on the global level with quality? Is there a possibility that, before a crisis escalates, the international police receive a mandate and a supporting role for host government representatives and implement a reform of local police so it will be able to establish order itself? The concluding thought is: as the threats and environments are changing we must change security concepts and our infrastructure simultaneously.
57 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Role of Police in the International Environment and Peace Missions
Literature:
- Anderson M. and Apap J. (2002) ''Police and Justice Co-operation and the New Borders'', European Monographs, Kluwer Law International. - Beyley, D. H and Perito, R. M. (2010) The Police in War: fighting insurgency, terrorism and violent crime, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London. - European Council (1999) ''Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions'', link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, loaded on May 22, 2011. - European Council (2003) ''Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions'', link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, loaded on May 22, 2011. - European Council (2004) ''A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy'', link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, loaded on September 2, 2011. - European Council (2008) ''Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World'', Brussels, 11 December 2008, link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/10 4630.pdf, loaded on September 2, 2011. - European Council (2009) ''The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens'', Council of the European Union, Brussels, 2 December 2009, link: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm_program_en.pdf, loaded on May 22, 2011. - European Council (2010) ''Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model'', link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313E NC.pdf, loaded on February 17, 2011. - Grizold, A. and Čehulić, L. (2006) Međunarodna sigurnost i NATO u Novom svjetskom poretku. Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. - Šegvić, S. (2011) ''Šengenski režim upravljanja vanjskim granicama EU''. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, Year 48, No. 1/2011, page 11-31. - Vukadinović, R. and Čehulić, L. (2005) Politika europskih integracija. Zagreb: Topical.
58 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Peter Schieder1 Future and Significance of Neutrality
If you google neutrality you will get a lot of answers. Neutral and neutrality may mean different things in mathematics, chemistry, physics, statistics, ecology, economy, behaviour, journalism, politics, and law, and even many other fields of natural or social sciences. In international law the definitions are quite clear: A neutral power in a particular war is a sovereign state which declares it to be neutral towards the belligerents. A non-belligerent state does not need to be neutral. The rights and duties of a neutral power are defined in Sections 5 and 13 of the Hague Convention of 1907. A permanently neutral power is a sovereign state which is bound by international treaty to be neutral towards the belligerents of all future wars. The concept of neutrality in war is narrowly defined and puts specific constraints on the neutral party in return for the internationally recognized right to remain neutral. Neutralism or a "neutralist policy" is a foreign policy position wherein a state intends to remain neutral in future wars. Non-alignment is the implementation of neutralism by avoiding military alliances. A sovereign state that reserves the right to become a belligerent if attacked by a party to the war is in a condition of armed neutrality.
Today’s Neutral and Nonaligned States
Beside Austria many countries are recognized as neutral, even if not all of them are in accordance with the Hague-definitions. The “model” of a neutral country is Switzerland. The Swiss neutrality is self-imposed, permanent, and armed, designed to ensure external security. Switzerland is the second oldest neutral country in the world; it has not fought a foreign war since its neutrality was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1815. Although the European powers (Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden) agreed at the Congress of Vienna in May 1815 that Switzerland should be neutral, final ratification was delayed until after Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated so that some coalition forces could invade France via Swiss territory. The oldest neutral country is Sweden (since 1814). Like Finland (neutral since 1947) it sees itself more and more as military neutral or non-aligned.
1 Dr.Peter Schieder, Former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Austrian Parliament, from 2002 to 2005 President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Today he is President of the International Institute for Peace, Vienna
59 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Future and Significance of Neutrality
Ireland has since 1922 a traditional policy of military neutrality defined as non-membership of mutual defence alliances. The same applies to Malta since 1980, guaranteed in a treaty with Italy concluded in 1983. Europe has two more “old” neutral countries, even if they are very small. Liechtenstein is neutral since its army was dissolved in 1868 and San Marino has it security guaranteed in treaty with Italy in 1862 and renewed again in 1931. Ukraine declared policy of state non-alignment in 2010. Moldova’s 1994 Constitution proclaims "permanent neutrality" and the National Assembly of Serbia declared armed neutrality in 2007 – but both states are not internationally recognized as neutrals. Costa Rica became neutral after abolishing its military in 1949. Japan is constitutionally forbidden from participating in wars, but maintains heavily-armed self-defence forces and a military alliance. Other neutral countries are Panama (since 1989) and Turkmenistan (1995). Cambodia claimed neutrality in 1993, as Mexico did in 1939 (with the exception of its participation on the side of the Allies in World War II. From 2000- 2006 Mexico ignored the neutrality policy. Whether historical neutrality is to be kept is now internally debated. The Mexican formulation of neutrality is known as Estrada doctrine). For the sake of completeness, however, it should be mentioned that the Lateran Treaty signed in 1929 with Italy imposed that "The Pope was pledged to perpetual neutrality in international relations and to abstention from mediation in a controversy unless specifically requested by all parties" thus making Vatican City neutral since then too.
The Austrian Neutrality
Austria is neutral since 1955. The experts2 on international law see the adoption of a permanently neutral status as the price Austria had to pay politically to the Soviet Union for the latter‘s agreement to restore full Austrian independence in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. In the Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955, the USSR agreed to sign the State Treaty in exchange for the declaration of permanent neutrality by Austria. The Memorandum was legally non-binding, however. Even though neutrality was not really a free choice, it was the best deal Austria could get at that point. On the legal level, however, Austria tried to avoid the image of a neutralized state. It was felt that permanent neutrality imposed on the country in a treaty, especially in an agreement with the great powers, would make this status less respectable. Hence, the Austrian Parliament adopted the Federal Constitutional Law3 not before it regained full independence (it waited until the last soldier of the occupation forces had left its territory):
2 See Heinz Gärtner and Otmar Höll in „Austria“ at: www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf-pool/publikationen 3 Austria’s Federal Constitutional Law of 26th October 1955 on the Neutrality of Austria.
60 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Future and Significance of Neutrality
“(1) For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal. (2) In order to secure these purposes Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory.” Since 1955 Austria’s neutrality has already de facto adapted several times to changing situations: the permission for the aircraft of the anti-Iraq coalition to overfly Austrian airspace in the second Gulf War (1990/91) was compatible only with a broad interpretation of the legal concept of neutrality; membership in the EU with its CFSP and Amsterdam Treaty (that includes peacemaking) had in the eyes of many experts little to do with traditional understandings of neutrality. Some critics claimed, that after all this adaption’s and interpretations little remains of the Austrian neutrality, once ironically described by an leading Austrian diplomat as the “Sinatra principle”, referring to Sinatra’s song “I did it my way”. In my eyes these changes demonstrate the flexibility of the concept even within its existing legal framework – and guarantee the future of the Austrian neutrality in a changing world.
Solidarity and Participation in Peacekeeping
For Austria solidarity is not contradictory to its neutrality. Other than Switzerland it joined the UN at the first possibility, Council of Europe and OSCE too. An excellent example for the Austrian willingness to demonstrate international solidarity is the full participation in various UN-missions. This participation in peacekeeping operations represents one of Austria’s most essential contributions to the United Nations’ efforts to maintain peace and international security. In 1960 Austria participated for the first time in a UN-led operation by despatching a medical contingent for the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC). Since then, more than 54,000 Austrians have served in UN peacekeeping troops and six Austrians have been appointed commanders of peacekeeping operations by the UN Secretary-General. In July 2001, an Austrian was appointed head of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Since June 2004 an Austrian has held the office of leading military adviser in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In 1997, the Federal Constitutional Act on Co-operation and Solidarity in Despatching Units and Individuals Abroad was adopted. This Act, which was adapted to the changed situation and replacing the Act on Despatching of 1965, represents the new constitutional basis for the participation of Austrians in UN operations. Austria fully supports the efforts by the UN to plan peacekeeping operations more efficiently and to be able to respond more effectively to crisis situations through more rapid deployment.
61 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Future and Significance of Neutrality
Austria is therefore a member of the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (SAS) established in 1994 and takes part in the UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was set up on a Danish initiative and can be transferred to the operational area within 30 days for a maximum term of operations of up to 6 months. SHIRBRIG’s headquarters element contributed substantially to building up the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). Currently some 1,200 Austrian soldiers and 50 police officers are involved in peacekeeping missions. As of the end of 2005 Austria was one of the 30 most important providers of troops to the UN, and among the EU Member States Austria was one of the largest suppliers of personnel. At present there are up to 450 Austrians taking part in the following United Nations peacekeeping operations4: UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) in the Middle East: since 1948 UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) on the Golan Heights: since 1974 MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara): since April 1991 UNOMIG (United Nations Observation Mission in Georgia): since 1993 UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo): since June 1999 UNMEE (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea): since 2000 UNFICYP (United Nations Forces in Cyprus): since 1964 UNMIS (United Nations Mission in the Sudan): since 2005 UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) Besides, Austria also participates in the following operations authorised by the UN Security Council: ISAF (Afghanistan): since February 2002 KFOR (Kosovo): since June 1999 EUFOR ALTHEA (European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina): since 2004 (see also ESDP)
The “Austrian Way”
As far as NATO membership is concerned, the Austrian neutrality does not allow joining a military alliance. The necessary two-thirds- majority to change it and to open the way to NATO never existed in the parliament. The Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP) in the past was very ambitious to reach it, but currently NATO full membership is no issue for them too. All polls show that the big majority (between 60 and 70% in the last decades) of the Austrian population is FOR neutrality and AGAINST full membership in NATO.
4 See homepage of the Austrian Foreign Ministry: www.bmeia.gv.at; “Austrians in Peacekeeping Operations”.
62 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Future and Significance of Neutrality
But Austria recognizes that NATO is not only a classical military alliance but at the same time a comprehensive security community contributing also to security and stability in the world. In February 1995 it signed therefore a framework document with NATO. Our country participates actively in the PfP, the PfP “plus”, and is actively involved in the work of the European Partnership Council (EAPC). And it took part – as already mentioned – in IFOR/SFOR and KFOR operations. The status of a neutral country has served Austria well since 1955. In 1970 Chancellor Bruno Kreisky with his “policy of active neutrality”, also described as the “Austrian way”, combined foreign and security policy, Austria’s political “bridge-function”, development policy, peace negotiation and mediation efforts with the presentation of Austria and its capital Vienna as a meeting and mediating place. So Austria became one of the seats of the UN and the headquarters of IAEA, UNIDO, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission (CTBTO), and also OPEC. The OSCE is based in Vienna too. Neither the Soviet Union nor the USA was always totally satisfied with this policy. For many USSR diplomats Austria behaved (not only in human rights questions) not “neutral” enough and too “western” and the USA5 was at least “astonished” that Kreisky showed his and Austria’s independent approach with his decision that Austria should participate in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, despite the boycott of the games orchestrated by United States president Jimmy Carter in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Austria also did not adhere to the economic boycott of Iran organized by the United States after the seizure of its embassy in Tehran in 1979. The US Library of Congress notes, that during the 1970s, Austria collaborated extensively with other neutral and nonaligned countries in the UN. Austria developed an independent voting profile, frequently joining with other neutrals such as Sweden to press for action on issues ignored by countries belonging to military alliances. Austria also pursued this kind of diplomacy with the nonaligned countries belonging to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. For the Austrians the Austrian neutrality meant much more than its legal content says, it was even more than an institution of international law and an instrument to block NATO full membership – it developed to the synonym for the country’s international efforts, its foreign and security policies, its active participation in the UN, its policy which combines remaining outside of a military alliance with participation in international peacekeeping missions.
Today the Austrian neutrality is an integral part of the Austrian identity.
Neutrality means Security
Representing here on the wonderful island of Sipan our International Institute for Peace, I have to mention, that our institute became in the years since its
5 U.S. Library of Congress, http://countrystudies.us/austria
63 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Future and Significance of Neutrality re-charter in 19896 one of the main Austrian think-thanks on neutrality, its roots and tasks, its significance and future. At a symposium on neutrality in the Austrian Parliament IIP presented an expertise on “Austria’s Security in the New Europe”7. I would like to finish my contribution here with some of these important items: Austrian neutrality has always been an instrument of Austrian security policy for us, and never an end in itself. Therefore it is, like other institutions as well, exposed to the structural change of the international system. Our current conception of neutrality differs fundamentally from Austrian conceptions of neutrality in the 1950ies and 60ies. Nevertheless the core of our perception of neutrality remains the same. Austria must not be involved in a war. As a result there is no necessity to abolish or change the “Federal Constitutional Law on Austria’s neutrality” and the ban on the establishment of foreign military bases, the non-participation in wars or Austria’s non-alignment. Austria’s permanent neutrality is fully consistent with Austria’s EU-membership. We advocate a comprehensive security approach. Security must not be reduced to military aspects. A comprehensive security policy aims for political, economic, ecologic, social and military stability. Our concept of security policy is strongly based on the Charter of the United Nations as the only comprehensive legal foundation of international peace and security, which encompasses the entire community of states. We therefore welcome the efforts for a reform of the UN Security Council concerning its composition as well as its voting procedure. We strictly dismiss the threat of the use of nuclear weapons because of the devastating and in the truest sense of the word “limitless” consequences of their use, which we regard as an unbearable anachronism. As a result we will use all possibilities to reach a general ban of nuclear weapons on the level of international law.
6 The International Institute for Peace exists in Vienna since 1956. In 1989 a re-charter took place, the former Austrian Foreign Minister Erwin Lanc became President and Peter Stania Director. In 2009 Peter Schieder took over the chairmanship from Erwin Lanc. 7 „Österreichs Sicherheit in Neuen Europa“, an Expertise by the International Institute for Peace, done in October 2001 and published in „Neutralität im Neuen Europa“, Agenda-Verlag 2004.
64 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Future and Significance of Neutrality
Literature:
- Heinz Gärtner, Otmar Höll, „Austria“ at: www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf- pool/publikationen - Austria’s Federal Constitutional Law of 26th October 1955 on the Neutrality of Austria. - “Austrians in Peacekeeping Operations”, Austrian Foreign Ministry: www.bmeia.gv.at - U.S. Library of Congress, http://countrystudies.us/austria - International Institute for Peace, „Österreichs Sicherheit in Neuen Europa“, Neutralität im Neuen Europa, Agenda-Verlag 2004.
65 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Gordan Grlić Radman1 Danube Countries and Multilingualism
As a major Central European waterway, the Danube River has played a significant strategic role over history. Together with the Rhine, the Danube links the North Sea with the Black Sea over a length of 3,500 km, directly connecting ten countries. The Danube countries, for the most part, belonged to the Austrian- Hungarian Empire and later, during the Cold War, to the Eastern Block. The early attempts in the 19th and early 20th centuries to establish multilateral cooperation along the Danube, usually in the form of federalism, are interesting with regard to the recent institutional developments in the basin. These attempts were unsuccessful, mainly because of nationalistic trends and because the international powers of that time were suspicious about Danube unity (Stojić, 1990). In the 20th century, control over the Danube meant control of a major boundary and point of access between Eastern and Western Europe. Hence “… the Danube has always been a political question. As a commercial route, it has never lived up to its potentialities. Those Powers which have been concerned with opening or closing it have been more interested in their influence and control in the Danubian region than in navigation on the river itself” (Campbell 1949). The dominant role of the Soviet Union was established by the 1948 Belgrade Convention, which was attended by the USSR, its satellite riparian countries, and France, Great Britain, and the USA. “At this conference, western interests were overruled by the majority in the East, and the resulting Belgrade Convention substituted the concept of free navigation to navigation under the exclusive control of the participating countries which included all of the then-existing eight riparian countries with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany” (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 1996). Since the collapse of Communism and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the majority of the Danube riparian countries have joined both NATO and the EU. The Danube today has become a river connecting not only the bordering countries, namely Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine, but also other countries not immediately bordering the Danube but situated in its drainage basin, including the Czech Republic and Slovenia and the countries in South-Eastern Europe, like Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.
1 Dr. Gordan Grlić Radman is permanent representative of the Republic of Croatia to the Danube Commission in Budapest and also the Secretary of the Danube Commission
66 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Danube Countries and Multilingualism
Danube Strategy
Aware of the importance of the Danube and as a follow-up to the EU’s Baltic Strategy, in June 2009, the European Council requested that the European Commission prepare an EU Strategy for the Danube Region by the end of 2010. The European Commission has proposed the reunification of the Danube region as part of the integration process in Central and South-Eastern Europe. The long-term goal is to establish the grounds of a Central and South-Eastern European emerging area.2 In other words, it is the goal of the Strategy to ensure more socioeconomic cohesion throughout the Danube Basin. This will require the involvement and hard work of the states interconnected by the Danube, and all the EU institutions and various organizations and initiatives already in place in the area, such as the Danube Commission (DC), the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP) or the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR). Consequently, the strategy should take the position of all those involved into account, including regional and local authorities, inter-governmental bodies, and experts and representatives from the private sector. The main reason for drafting the Danube Strategy, as stated by the European Council, is to create an integrated European transnational approach that will help bring about the prosperity of this region, and improve handling of its cross- border challenges. Primarily, the Danube strategy should be an effort reflecting the specific circumstances and needs of the Danube River. The countries involved are those currently included in the Danube Cooperation Process: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany (Länder Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine. Certain national initiatives, such as the ‘Bavarian Danube Initiative’, contain proposals aimed at affirming a common intellectual basis of culture, history and art. For the Bavarian Danube Initiative culture, history and art must be more strongly embedded in the structural and regional development in the future. One of the most important Bavarian Danube Initiatives is to intensify Bavaria’s relations to the Danube region through the promotion of the language and culture of the German minorities in the Danube countries.3
Multilingualism
“Languages are the best vehicles of mutual understanding and tolerance. Respect for all languages is a key factor for ensuring peaceful coexistence, without
2 “These macro-regional strategies are a new form of cooperation to achieve our objectives more effectively. I think this second macro-regional approach is the first one where you can really see the new philosophy, or the adjusted philosophy of regional policy, with a strong focus on results,” said Johannes Hahn, EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, when presenting the proposal to journalists in Brussels on 9 December 2010. 3 “The Danube – Axis for the development of the new Europe” (Arguments in favour of a new strategy for the Danube Region – Elements of a 'Bavarian Danube Initiative“ for even stronger cooperation with the Danube Region – 5 May 2009
67 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Danube Countries and Multilingualism exclusion, of societies and all of their members,” said UNESCO Director-General, Irina Bokova, last year in her message for International Mother Language Day.4 The most common definition of multilingualism says: “Multilingualism is the act of using, or promoting the use of, multiple languages, either by an individual speaker or by a community of speakers. Multilingualism refers to the presence in a geographical area, large or small, of more than one ‘variety of language’. Multilingual speakers outnumber monolingual speakers in the world’s population; multilingualism is actually a widespread form of a language community” (Tucker 1999). Multilingualism was more common in the past than is usually supposed: in early times, when most people were members of small language communities, it was necessary to know two or more languages for trade or any other activities outside one’s own town or village, and this holds true today in places of high linguistic diversity, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and India. Linguist Ekkehard Wolff estimates that 50% of the population of Africa is multilingual (Wolff 2000). However, in multilingual societies, not all speakers need to be multilingual. Some countries have multilingual policies and recognise several official languages, such as Canada (English and French), Belgium (Dutch, French and German) and Switzerland (German, French, Italian and Reto-Roman). It is important to remember that as early as in the period after 1848, the Habsburg Monarchy enabled their peoples the opportunity of having judicial and public administration terminology printed in their own separate languages. This was great progress, not only of cultural, but also of literary and national significance. A Ministerial Decision dated 4 March 1849 stipulated that all Austrian laws were to be translated from the German original into all other languages of the Monarchy and so published at the state’s expense. In addition to state laws, special official gazettes were published in the ten official languages of the Habsburg Monarchy: Czech, German, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, Rusyn, Slovene, Serbian, Croatian and Romanian (Vince 2002). From this, it is evident that Croatian and Serbian, for example, were always perceived as two separate languages and remained so during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy until its breakdown in 1918.
UN and Multilingualism
The issue of multilingualism has been a recurring one on the agendas of many governing bodies of the United Nations system organizations, including the General Assembly of the United Nations where it has been considered on a biennial basis since 1995. In that connection, and on the occasion of the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Charter, on 2 November 1995 the General Assembly approved Resolution 50/11 on multilingualism, whereby it recalled that “the universality of the United Nations and its corollary, multilingualism, entail for each State Member of the Organization, irrespective of the official language in which it express itself, the right and duty to make itself understood and to understand others”. The Assembly also emphasized “the
4 See http://www.unesco.org/en/languages-and-multilingualism.
68 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Danube Countries and Multilingualism importance of providing access for all Governments and all sectors of the civil society to the Organization's documentation, archives and data banks in all the official languages”. It requested the Secretary-General “to ensure the strict implementation of the resolutions establishing language arrangements for both the official language and the working languages of the Secretariat”, and invited “Member States to do likewise” (Kudryavtsev et al.). On 19 February 2010, the United Nations launched UN Language Day, a new initiative seeking to celebrate multilingualism and cultural diversity and to promote the equal use of all six of its official working languages throughout the Organization. Nevertheless, according to contemporary exploration, it must be considered that half of the world's languages, approximately 6,500, will disappear by the end of the century — currently, at least one language is disappearing every 14 days.
EU and Multilingualism
The fact that the EU must work in all its official languages, instead of using just a couple as other international organizations do, “…lies in the very nature of the European Union and in the Commission's role as the 'Guardian of the Treaties' that provide the legal basis for the EU”.5 “Everyone in the Union is entitled to contribute to the discussion in the official language of his or her choice”.6 However, the European Union does not have a common language policy. This falls under the responsibility of the Member States. Although the EU has very limited influence in this area, as the content of educational systems is the responsibility of individual Member States, a number of EU funding programmes actively promote language learning and linguistic diversity.7 The EU considers that multilingualism is an integral part of its existence and that it is a reflection of its rich cultural inheritance. Articles 21, 314 and 290 of the Treaty and Regulation No 1/58, as amended by the successive Act of Accession (the Regulation), laid down the basis for multilingualism in the EU. For all its institutions, multilingualism is an expression of the democratic foundations of the Union, as all citizens have the right to be informed and to be heard in their own official language. On the other hand, this prevents the dominance of a single language such as English. However, “in the interests of cost-effectiveness, the Commission conducts its internal business in English, French and German, going fully multilingual only when it communicates with other EU institutions, the Member States and the public.”8 However, since the arrival of Jose Manuel Barroso as the head of the EC, a clear priority has been made in the EU regarding the issue of languages. This is obvious in the establishment of a special area set up by the Commissioner for
5 See http://europa.eu 6 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/bookshelf/brochure_en.pdf 7 See EUROPA – Education and Training – Action Plan Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity 8 See http://europa.eu
69 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Danube Countries and Multilingualism multilingualism, a Romanian national, Leonard Orban (the new Commissioner is Ms. Androulla Vassiliou) following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU. Commissioner Orban’s goal was that every EU citizen should speak at least two other foreign languages besides their own mother tongue. The percentage of such citizens has increased by nine percent in the last five years. According to the contemporary statistics of all the foreign languages in the EU, 34 percent of citizens speak English in addition to their mother tongue, 12 percent speak German and 11 percent speak French as a foreign language.
Danube Organizations and Multilingualism
The most famous international organization in the Danube region is the Danube Commission (DC). The history of the Danube Commission extends over one and a half centuries. The first Danube Commission was founded at the Paris Conference in 1856, and was one of the first international organizations in the world to establish an international regime to safeguard free navigation on the Danube. The contemporary Danube Commission was established on the basis of the Convention regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube of 1948, aimed at supervising the implementation of the 1948 Convention and fulfilling various other tasks to ensure adequate conditions for shipping on the Danube. Eleven of the state parties to the Convention of 1948 are Member States of the Danube Commission: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. Observer states of the Commission are France, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Montenegro and Belgium. After the adoption of the revised Convention regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube, it can be expected that the number of parties will be increased by the European Union, France and Turkey. The official languages of the DC are German, Russian and French. The International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), founded in 1998, works to ensure the sustainable and equitable use of waters and freshwater resources in the Danube River Basin. In addition to the European Union, parties to the Convention include: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Montenegro, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. According to the Convention of 1994, the official languages of ICPDR are English and German. Danube Cooperation Process. Since 2002, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has tried to increase cooperation among the riparian countries of the Danube across a number of sectors and has also focused in particular on promoting the increased use of the Danube as an environmentally friendly mode of transport. The Working Community of the Danubian Countries was established as an association of the regions in the Danube River basin. It was founded on 17 May 1990 in Vienna with the signing of the Joint Statement of the Premiers of member regions, and it currently assembles 24 members from 11 countries. The official language of the Working Community is German, however, the languages of member countries are used at the Premiers Conference, and at all other sessions of the High Officials Working Group.
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The best example of the use of all official languages is the Alps-Adriatic Working Community. This organization promotes both cultural diversity and language diversity. The Alps-Adriatic Working Community was founded in Venice on 20 November 1978. The founding members were: Bavaria, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Carinthia, Croatia, Upper Austria, Salzburg (active observer), Slovenia, Styria, and Veneto. The socio-cultural contacts in this area are of great importance for the success of European collaboration. The shared history and past experiences prove that future-oriented peace work is essential in this part of our continent. The official languages of the Alps-Adriatic Working Community are the languages of their members: Italian, Croatian, Hungarian, German and Slovenian. Signing the “Joint Declaration” therefore was more than just a formal act to mark the birth of the Alps- Adriatic Working Community – it was also an important step on the path to a future for Europe. Today, the Alps-Adriatic Working Community counts 10 members: Barany, Burgenland, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Carinthia, Croatia, Lombardy, Slovenia, Styria, Vas and Veneto. The Alps-Adriatic territory covers a total area of 172 405 km² and is home to over 24 million people. The Alps-Adriatic idea is to bridge linguistic, political and social differences — a challenge that takes a brave attitude and open-mindedness to see and develop what we have in common. Therefore, the official languages of the Alps-Adriatic Working Community are the respective languages of its members.
Danube Countries and Multilingualism
German is the official language in Germany. Germany is a signatory to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages which entered into force on 1 January 1999. In accordance with the Charter, Niederdeutsch is protected as a regional language, and funding is provided to further its use in the counties (Länder) where it is spoken. The protected minority languages benefit from funding provided by the Bundesregierung (Federal Government) and countries in which they are spoken. Minority languages (indigenous minorities) are protected by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.9 German is also the official language in Austria. Minority languages are Croatian and Hungarian (mostly spoken in Burgenland) and Slovene (mostly spoken in Carinthia). Austria attaches great importance to the promotion of minority languages and multilingualism. In Burgenland, for example, Hungarian language instruction is provided at the elementary education level.10 The official language in Slovakia is Slovak. The language policy is also governed by appropriate laws. In Slovakia, other languages are used by ethnic minorities: Hungarian, Polish, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Czech, Croatian, Tatar, and Roma. Great strides in the protection of minority language rights were been made after the collapse of the bipolar system and after the democratic changes that took place in the early 1990s.11
9 See more http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/germany 10 See more http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/austria 11 See more http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/slovakia
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After the end of the Cold War, Hungary made significant progress in the language policy of national minorities. According to Article XXIX of Hungary’s new Constitution, “nationalities living in Hungary shall have the right to use their native languages and to the individual and collective use of names in their own languages, to promote their own cultures, and to be educated in their native languages.” According to the information submitted by the Council of Europe, the national public television in Hungary broadcasts regular weekly or biweekly 25- minute programmes in 7 minority languages and combined programmes for 6 more cultures, all of which carry Hungarian subtitles. The practice of bilingual street-signs is increasing in villages of mixed ethnicity.12 In the period from 1918 to 1990, during the first and second Yugoslavia, Croatian was called “Croato-Serbian” or “Serbo-Croatian”. In this compelling and imposed cultural space, the authorities tried to define a language policy by creating an artificial official language, which the Croats never accepted. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the international recognition of Croatia in 1991, Croatian became the official language of the Republic of Croatia. The laws of 2000 regulate the status of minority languages and their use at the local level, ensuring education in minority languages, such as Serbian, Italian, Czech, German and Hungarian. Croatian Radio Television also broadcasts special and regular news programmes in several minority languages.13 In Serbia, the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet are in official use. In Serbia, there is a large number of ethnic minorities whose language policies are regulated by relevant laws. This is particularly the case in Vojvodina, the region that is home to the largest number of ethnic groups. “In Vojvodina, 20 municipalities use an ethnic minority language in addition to Serbian. Eleven municipalities recognise two ethnic minority languages, and five municipalities and the city of Novi Sad use three ethnic minority languages in addition to Serbian. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia stipulates that the Serbian language and Cyrillic script shall be in official use in the Republic of Serbia, and that official use of other languages and scripts shall be regulated by law, by virtue of the Constitution. In addition, the provision of Article 79 of the Constitution precisely establishes the rights of persons belonging to national minorities to preserve uniqueness, which among other things, involves the right to use their language and script.”14 Romanian is the official language in Romania. The basic principles of Romanian linguistic policy as regards national minorities have been stipulated in the Constitution and special laws. Romania is a signatory to the European Cultural Convention and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The main concern of language policy in Romania is the protection of the nineteen languages of the national minorities. Protective principles are regulated by the Local Public Administration Law, including the right to use a mother tongue within administrative procedures (Article 8), or the systematic translation of geographical names and indicators in all the spoken languages of a given area (Article 10 to 13).15
12 See more http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/hungary 13 See more http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/croatia 14 http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/serbia 15 http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/romania
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Based on the Constitution of Bulgaria, Bulgarian is the official language in that country. The Bulgarian Constitution follows the concept of a "one-nation state", meaning that it does not recognize national minorities. In Bulgaria, however, the notion of ethnic or minority groups was introduced, including the Turks (9.4%) and Roma (4.7%). Other "minorities" (Macedonians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks) are included in the category "other" which account for 2%. The Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe notes that the Bulgarian authorities do not recognise the existence of the Pomak and Macedonian minorities as such, despite their request presented to the Advisory Committee that they should be protected by the Framework Convention as national minorities.16 Minority rights in Bulgaria are guaranteed by international conventions to which Bulgaria is a signatory, and which relate to minorities. Bulgaria is not, however, a signatory of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Bulgarian law provides that Bulgarian citizens, members of other language groups in Bulgaria, have right to attend school in their own mother tongue, with the compulsory teaching of Bulgarian language (Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria).17 However, according to the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee from 2010, the television programmes currently offered in minority languages are insufficient to meet the needs of persons belonging to national minorities. In addition, the situation with regard to the use of minority languages for topographical indications and in dealings with administrative authorities has not improved in Bulgaria since the first monitoring cycle. The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe has recommended “increasing financial support to ensure access of persons belonging to national minorities, including numerically smaller groups, to radio and television programmes in their language and to ensure that the Turkish community continues to benefit from the daily Turkish TV news programme.”18 In Moldova, the majority of the indigenous population speaks Romanian. The issue of the official language reflects on the cultural and linguistic identity, and has its roots in the time immediately prior to the dissolution of the Soviet regime, when Moldova introduced three laws regarding the issue of the official language. Critics of these laws believe that the laws contain the non-scientific concept of “the Moldovan language”.19 It is considered, namely, that the Moldovan language is one of many dialects of the Romanian language. Moldova is a divided society with regard to linguistic identity. While the state authorities practice the term “Moldovan language”, the schools, universities and media use the term “Romanian”. For now, there are no new state programs and strategies that would regulate the issue of the official languages and the language policy in general.
16 http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/bulgaria 17 (1) The study and use of the Bulgarian language shall be a right and an obligation of every Bulgarian citizen. (2) Citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall have the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language (Art. 36 of the Constitution). 18 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second Opinion on Bulgaria, adopted on 18 March 2010 19 http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/moldova
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The situation in Ukraine regarding the language policy is somewhat better than in Moldova. The Constitution of the Ukraine (Article 10) guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities. According to the census of 2001, 67.5 per cent of the population considers Ukrainian as their mother tongue, while 29.6 per cent of citizens consider Russian as their native language.20 However, nearly half of the population prefers to use Russian in daily communication. This presents a significant issue in Ukraine, as it will not be easy to harmonize the ukrainianization of the government policies that are intended to give the Ukrainian language a strong and important identification component of nation building on the one hand, and to cater to the Russian-speaking population and the justified requests of the Council of Europe on the other.
Concluding remarks
The Danube River has been uniting countries and nations along its banks for centuries, bringing them ever closer, especially after the end of the ideological split between the East and West in the early 1990s. It has served their peoples, not only as one of the most crucial transport and commerce routes, but also as an instrument of cultural exchange. Eight of the thirteen basin countries have changed their political status. Some have since joined both NATO and the EU. Partnership in the Danube Region today is marked by mutual dependence, reliability and trust, and deserves to be enhanced and strengthened. Within a relatively short time frame, virtually the entire stretch of the Danube River will be located within the European Union. The new EU macro-regional strategy for the Danube Region opens new opportunities, and offers a new level for further development of efforts to deepen mutual understanding, coherence and cohesion along the Danube River. The Danube region is home to a great number of indigenous languages. However, in such a socio-cultural diversity and multilingual informal society, it is not possible to have a common cultural policy. The EU also does not have its own language policy, since this is the responsibility of the Member States. However, the EU-institutions support the language policies of the Member States while advocating greater rights for the use of minority languages in the Member States. The EU also encourages all its citizens to be multilingual and to be able to speak two languages in addition to their mother tongue.21 On the other hand, the Danube region countries, whether western or eastern, have formed their own language policy by favouring or discouraging the use of a particular language. We had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the language policy of the Danube riparian countries, starting at its source in Germany to its outlets in Romania and Ukraine, which drain into the Black Sea. It is interesting that the language policies of these countries become more complicated as the river flows downstream. Every one of these countries has one official language, like most other western European countries. In accordance with western European democratic standards and international standards regulating the protection of regional and minority languages, the language policies of these
20 http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ukraine 21 European Commission Multilingualism (EU Language Policy)
74 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Danube Countries and Multilingualism countries are sworn to uphold international standards. As these are primarily central and Eastern European countries, which until recently were governed by totalitarianism and a cultural space created by force, the process of granting language rights to national minorities or ethnical groups is a much more complex and longer-lasting issue. In some countries, monitoring the process of respecting language rights of national minorities was introduced. From a social and cultural point of view, the issue of language is also a security issue in the countries where institutions of democratic power have not been built on solid ground. On the other hand, the more stable the system of a country, the happier the citizens with the social situation and economic development, and the more open they are towards national minorities. Such countries, for example Germany, are interested in promoting the German language and culture in the countries of the Danube region where a German minority lives. Thus, the issue of language policy remains an issue of the national policy of a country and its citizen. There is an interesting practice of official languages in the work of Danube organizations as regards language policy. The official languages of the oldest organization, the Danube Commission are German, Russian and French. The latter two languages are the heritage of the Cold War, whereas German was introduced only in 1999. German is the predominant language in other organizations, while other languages of the member states can be spoken in the Working Community of Danube countries, except at the prime-ministerial level where German is required. English, together with German, is only used in the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River. The efforts to have equal representation of languages of all Member States at least in the Danube Commission have not been fruitful. The prevailing opinion is that the introduction of multilingualism and translation into all languages of the Member States would create great expense, although the costs of translation in the case of the EU are about € 2 per capita, or less than 1% of the total EU budget.22 Thus, the road to true multilingualism and practicing it will remain a thorny one, while the world languages will remain predominant in the work of international organizations.
22 http://europa.eu/dgs/translation/booksehlf/brochure_en.pdf
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Literature:
- Angelov, Angel G., David F. Marshall (2006). Ethnolinguistic minority language policies in Bulgaria and their Balkan context, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia, Bulgaria; University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, USA - Arel, Dominique (2002). Interpreting ‘Nationality’ and ‘Language’ in the 2001 Ukrainian Census, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 238-243 - Bhatia, Tej K., William C. Ritchie (2006). Handbook of Bilingualism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing - Burck, Charlotte (2005). Multilingual Living. Explorations of Language and Subjectivity. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan - Campbell, C. John (1949). Diplomacy on the Danube, Foreign Affairs, XXVII (January 1949) - Constantin, Sergiu (2004). Linguistic policy and national minorities in Romania, European Academy of Bolzano - Kudryavtsev, Eduard, Louis-Dominique Ouedraogo (2003), Implementation of Multilingualism in the United Nation System, Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva - Kulyk, Volodymyr (2006). Constructing common sense: Language and Ethnicity in Ukrainian public discourse, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 281-314 - Kulyk, Volodymyr (2008). Language policy in Ukraine: What people want the state to do, Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, Ukraine National Academy of Science - Linnerooth-Bayer, Joanne, Susan Murcott (1996). The Danube River Basin: International Cooperation or Sustainable Development; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. - Vince, Zlatko (2002). Putovima hrvatskoga književnog jezika, Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske Zagreb - Council of Europe: Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second Opinion on Bulgaria, adopted on 18 March 2010
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Ivo Samson1 New NATO Member States: Contribution of Central Eastern Europeans to European Unity? Slovakia as a Model Case
The question, if the long-expected admission of Central Eastern European (CEE) countries meant a contribution to Trans-Atlantic unity, has proved not to be very controversial. Theoretically, the admission of ten “post-communist” newcomers to NATO (and EU) was accompanied by hopes of both increasing the political relevance of the Trans-Atlantic link and of enlarging the modus operandi of Europe at the international scene. However, still before the official entry of the first eight countries from CEE into the EU in 2004 it had become clear that practically all these countries were going to assume an articulated position on the issue of security and foreign policy, and especially security and defense policy. In the strife between “Atlanticists” and supporters of European autonomy in security and defense issues, they, e. g. definitely sided with the US policy concerning the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In between (as seen in 2011), some of these countries have softened their original strong support for the American policy in the course of “war on terror”. Anyway, the modifications of attitudes toward Trans-Atlantic issues in the last years cannot conceal the fact that Central Eastern Europeans did contribute more to Trans- Atlanticism than to European autonomous security and defense policy. Their pro-US policy on the eve of the Iraqi war helped the radicals in Washington to display “New Europe” against some allies in the NATO and to postpone the implementation of the European security and defense policy project indefinitely. In the enlargement of NATO, the US found an appropriate instrument in intervening successfully with EU internal affairs, as the NATO enlargement coincided with that of the EU. Even in the year preceding the Iraq war and the deep division in the ranks of Europeans on this issue, the official US reports betrayed confidence as to the support by the new allies in CEE: “Finally, we were convinced, as have been many US Government officials, that the seven countries seriously under consideration for NATO membership, in addition to the three new members of NATO, are more committed Atlanticists (with the possible exception of Slovenia) than many of the current NATO allies.”2 The wave of CEE support for the “war on terror” policy of the former (until 2008) US President George Bush came at the time the governments of eight countries had already dates for EU membership. Despite of this, three of them – Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – joined some “old” EU countries at the head
1 Dr. Ivo Samson, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava, Slovak Republic 2 Report of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, August 30, 2002, p. 3.
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with the UK in February 2003 and expressed their unlimited support for the planned invasion of Iraq in the controversial Letter of Eight.3 And quite independently, ten members of the so-called Vilnius Group – an ad hoc regional group of ten countries from CEE created with the aim to support each other´s NATO entry ambitions (including several countries with EU entry dates plus Bulgaria and Romania) – signed a similar letter some days later. This was, once more, widely used by the US public diplomacy in collecting voices of support for the Iraq invasion. This, reciprocally, led some “old” Europeans to harsh reactions at the address of CEE countries, the most notable case being the former French president Jacques Chirac´s rebuke telling that the letter was “infantile” and that “they missed a great opportunity to shut up”.4 In other words, since at least 2003 up to 2011, the new EU (and NATO) members from CEE hardly contributed to more cohesiveness of the EU in the sphere of foreign and security policy, not to speak about defense policy. Even if some countries – most visibly Slovakia – have strongly damped their Trans- atlanticism in between (especially during the government led by Social Democrats between 2006 and 2010), there have appeared several other points of friction between the EU and the EU newcomers from CEE, e.g. positions taken vis a vis the International Criminal Court, voting in the UN Security Council by Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, anti-missile defense based on the bilateral agreements between the US and CEE countries (Poland and Czech Republic) or the “autonomous” policy of the Czech Republic (to be followed by Slovakia) in negotiations with the US concerning the visa waiver program in 2008.5
Reasons for EU “Disloyalty”
The reasons the CEE countries produced accusations of being European unity “breakers” are various and have been mostly correctly analyzed in the last years. Let us mention the notoriously famous reasons why the CEE countries were so much eager to express support for US foreign policy throughout the 1990s and have often preserved it up to 2011. One of the reasons can be called historical. It was the US who appeared as winner of the Cold War in the eyes of CEE and many politicians appreciated the “Americans” as those bringing freedom and democracy to their respective countries. Another reason might be found in the continuing emphasis of CEE on hard power, which has remained the domain of NATO, not EU. As can be easily established by studying basic security documents – especially “Security Strategies” and “Military Strategies” – the perception of security has remained very traditional and is still focused on the strong role of military. Fear of Russia did not fully disappear in CEE after NATO enlargement. In connection with the recent attempts to strengthen the role of Russia (including the Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty or the threat to aim Russian missiles bearing
3 The text of the statement see in: Leaders´ Statement on Iraq: Full text. In: BBC News – World Edition, Thursday, 30 January, 2003. 4 Chirak Lashes out at “new Europe“. In: CNN.Co./World, February 18, 2003. 5 Bouda, Ondrej: New U.S. visa requirements divide EU. In: The Prague Post, February 20, 2008.
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nuclear warheads at CEE because of anti-missile plans of the Czech and Polish governments), US might once more appear as a power worth of close alliance links. Gratitude (regardless of the highly questionable value of this category in realpolitik) for the US role in pushing through the NATO enlargement process in the 1990s, which was seen as an impetus for the EU to re-consider the originally (up to the Luxembourg EU Summit in December 1997) EU´s indecisive enlargement policy. Continuing super power position of the US is another factor that contributed to the decision to rely more on the “big American” than on the EU, which has proven a limited ability up to now in implementing its ambitious goals as formulated – still before the debt crisis struck the EU in 2011 – in the Lisbon process.6 Lack of unity among “old EU Member States” has made it easier for CEE countries to ignore the call for a more coordinated EU foreign and security policy approach. Failure (up to 2011) to develop the CFSP and security and defense policy processes, permanent postponements of the building up of Rapid Reaction Forces and/or the Battle Groups, as well as the inability to bring the European Security Strategy (2003, slightly updated in 2008) to practical conclusions, which would entail the ability of EU to engage in crisis management operations everywhere in he world. In spite of the fact that the European Security Strategy celebrated the 8th anniversary in December 2011, the declamations about the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters “early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention”7 or the claim that the “first line of defense will often be abroad”8 don’t seem to be confirmed. One cannot disregard the fact, however, that the heyday of the unlimited support for the US foreign policy in some CEE countries seems to belong to history, even if most CEE countries can still be regarded as more “pro-Atlanticist” than the average of “old” EU Member States. Generally one has to admit a change of hearts in several capitals of CEE and a more sober assessment of bilateral relationship with the USA following the controversial achievements of US forces in Iraq and the US- led dominated forces in Afghanistan. Perhaps the most significant change has become visible at the level of public opinion in most CEE countries, which has been characterized by a steady decline of popularity of the once celebrated big North American ally.
Government Policy: Trans-Atlanticism in Slovakia Slovakia as a Model Case
Since the late 1990´s up to at least 2006, the Slovak security and foreign policy has been tied more to NATO membership than to the CFSP and security and
6 Zgajewski, Tania – Hajjar, Kalila: The Lisbon Strategy: Which Failure? What Failure? And Why? In: http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/Lisbon-Strategy-TZKH.pdf. 7 European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 11. 8 Ibid., p. 6.
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defense policy within the framework of the EU. Nominally, Slovakia has always supported the idea of a collective European defense but practical steps have been oriented at NATO as the only realistic supplier of Slovak hard security guarantees. Almost without exaggeration one can say that at the time of the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 (the summit Slovakia was invited to NATO), the Slovak Prime Minister was probably even more pro-American than President G. Bush, which could be explained by the desperate need of Slovak political elites to bring the country into NATO after it had been harshly rejected at the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 and was left behind all three Central European neighbors (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). The then strongly pro-US foreign and security policy of Slovakia might have been the reaction to a period of an almost anti-US foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in the mid-1990´s. The years 1994-1998 meant a relatively anti-American foreign policy position assumed by the populist-nationalist-leftist government. It has to be emphasized that this policy did not mean looking for any alternative in the EU. Both EU and USA were criticizing the so-called “democratic deficits” of the then Slovak government. As the rejection of Slovakia by NATO preceded the rejection of this country by the EU, the US was regarded as the original spoiler of Slovak integration ambitions. After the parliamentary elections of 1998 Slovakia turned to be strongly pro-US in the following eight years. Thus, 1998 brought to an end a period in which the US Government had openly criticized the policy of the Slovak Government and had limited the official contacts with Slovakia to a minimum. In the official Report on Meeting the Goal of the Slovak Foreign Policy for 2001 with the Outlook to 2002, USA is already seen as a strong ally.9 In the Report the relations between Slovakia and the USA are described as having reached the “best level in the hitherto history of bilateral relations” and the relations of Slovakia to USA “will preserve their foreign policy priority”.10 The pro-American orientation was formulated in several ways:
In the practically de facto foreign policy doctrine of the Slovak republic expressed by the new Prime Minister M. Dzurinda at the end of 1988 and repeated after the Washington Summit in 1999.11 In the strong support of the NATO campaign against the former Yugoslavia (1999) in spite of strong anti-American (more than anti-NATO) reactions of the absolute majority of the population. In the almost uncritical support of the US in advance of the invasion of Iraq in 2002/2003 and in the following participation of Slovak troops at the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq in 2003 – 2007.
As to the official expressions of leading Slovak politicians to the possibility of Slovakia´s support for a US attack on Iraq, out of the seven parliamentary parties,
9 Sprava o plneni uloh zahranicnej politiky Slovenskej republiky za rok 2001 a zameranie na rok 2002, in: Report of the Government of the Slovak Republic no. 1419, 2002. 10 Ibid., pp. 6, 14. 11 “Although we are not members of NATO, we will behave as if we were NATO members”. In Slovakia, it should be noted, NATO is largely identified with the leading position of the USA.
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really negative voices were heard only from the Communist Party of Slovakia. The other oppositional political parties have not taken such an outright negative position against the war in Iraq. After the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002, the Slovak PM said in an official statement: “Now, Slovakia has a government that will not hesitate to take a principal attitude, if the question of values is in the game”.12 Practical steps – sending a contingent of Slovak soldiers to Kuwait and then to Iraq – followed. The policy of the government was generally viewed not as “anti-European” but as distinctly pro-American and seemed to express best the US view how “New Europe” should behave in times of crisis. Prime Minister M. Dzurinda has had strong statements of support for US policy during the whole time in office (1998 – 2006). With regard to possible solutions to the Iraqi crisis, at a time of European hesitation prior to the Prague summit, the head of Slovak government said: "Slovakia is and will be a firm, strong ally of the United States of America. In any case, under any circumstances."13 This meant practically, issuing a support blank check for everything the US was going to do in its foreign policy. From this point of view, the Slovak foreign and security policy had demonstrated a model example of behavior of “New Europe” the US administration was dreaming of. The government policy was accompanied by activities of the NGO´s. These, however, were oriented not so much at the dispute between “Atlanticists” and pro- European “autonomists”, but at the integration of Slovakia into NATO before 2004 and afterwards. Admittedly, main reasons for the Government´s initiative towards the NGOs has been the insufficient level of public support for NATO membership. Whereas a strong third of the Slovak society has never doubted the necessity to enter NATO for political, economic, security, historical and even moral reasons (predominantly younger and more educated people living more in urban than in rural areas) and a weaker third of the population rejected the NATO entry of the country, there still remained about a third of the total population being indifferent or “lukewarm” as to the Slovak NATO integration. The positive record of the non- governmental organizations in raising the interest in political activities prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections led the government to the identification of principal roots of these phenomena that had been perceived as foreign policy deficits contradicting to the post-Madrid, i.e. Washington criteria. The deficits in public support for NATO membership (e.g., at the beginning of the “campaign”, in March 2000, it was not more than 43%, according to several combined opinion polls) have been identified as:
. A low awareness of Slovak citizens about international and security issues and about their impact on the so called ordinary lives of average people. . A low level of knowledge about the Alliance, its history, role in the post-Cold War development, its function, mission and decision-making mechanisms. . The perception of the government as a body acting according to outside considerations, if not even pressure, left only a minimal space for government´s efforts to increase the stable, however, not absolute, public
12 M. Dzurinda, in: http://www.sdkuonline, November 10, 2002. 13 Press Conference of the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Bratislava, 22 November 2002.
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support. On the contrary, the input of impartial knowledge and information created a possibility for the removal of prejudice, anti-NATO bias and disinformation among the “third pillar” of the society – the indifferent ones.
The Public Information Strategy that was launched in 2000 followed the goal to increase the public NATO integration support. The NGO´s that participated at the implementation of these goals, followed an indirect approach to NATO issue. Like in the election campaign of 1998, in 2000 and 2001 their aim was to provide the Slovaks with relevant information about Slovakia´s security position in the Central European region, about NATO as well as about costs and benefits of NATO membership. It means, raising public interest in security issues, pro- or anti-NATO attitudes. It should be frankly admitted, that although the Government might have expected a “propaganda” in favor of NATO, it was clearly left to the responsibility of NGO´s how to activate their impartial potential and to stimulate the public interest. As to NATO, it has not always been affirmative: risks, possible additional costs and obligations of any NATO newcomer (especially following the September 11, 2001). The non-governmental organizations were included in the activities due to the implementation of the N MAP (National Membership Action Plan. As for all areas of Slovakia´s preparation for NATO membership, also for the public opinion area an interagency working group (WG) was set up, in this case WG No. 2 under the auspices of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The public information activities under the responsibility of the MFA were been guided by the strategy of a wide involvement of the civic society through the project of non-governmental organizations. The NGO projects have varied greatly in term of communication tools they use as well as the target groups they aim to address. Most of them have been projects of direct, live public debates that have been dominated by lectures, seminars, conferences, round tables, discussions in schools, etc. The second largest target group has been represented by media projects of some sort (e.g. web page projects, local print media cooperation projects, dailies and weeklies, or local radio station projects, but also projects such as a design, manufacturing and placement of posters in public transport in selected Slovak towns and villages. It has also included media projects of special mono-thematic issues. The target groups that the projects address also vary, but most often they have been aimed at young people. Geographically, the project considered the only slightly unhappy “geopolitics” of the country (far from, e.g. the Republic of Chile, where one half of the population lives in the “big head” region, i.e. in the capital area) and projected its outreach to the “periphery”, outside the Capital. 90% of Slovaks do live in the regions and the (above mentioned) one third of citizens that were indifferent or “lukewarm” to Slovakia´s NATO membership. It was because of this asymmetry that one of the biggest NGO projects that has been realized so far was the “Atlantic Tour”. What is remarkable is the lasting effects of the pro-NATO attitudes up to 2011 (unlike the pro-US attitudes, which have been weakened in between).
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Instead of Conclusion: End of “Fatal Friendship”
Still before the parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 2006, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to produce two program documents, in which the foreign policy and the security policy of the country was closely linked to the alliance with the USA. In the first document adopted by the Government – The Medium-Term Strategy of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic until 201514 – NATO is seen as the main instrument of peace and stability in the world and as the guarantee of national security and territorial integrity of the country (the EU has not been mentioned at all in this context). The USA has been explicitly mentioned as the “strategic partner” in the document. The second document – The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic15 – was adopted in the Slovak Parliament (National Council) in September 2005. Here one finds that “the relations with the USA will have a special place in guaranteeing the security interests of the Slovak Republic”.16 After the parliamentary elections of 2006, the emphasis on the security and foreign policy cooperation with the USA practically disappeared from official documents and declarations. One of the first steps of the new government composed of Social democrats, populists and nationalists was to withdraw completely Slovak peace-keeping troops from Iraq and to reject the deployment of the Slovak contingent in those places in Afghanistan considered dangerous. Even more, the foreign policy of the USA has been many times criticized like the “pro-American” policy of the previous government. At the same time, the distrust of both NATO and USA in public opinion polls continued to increase. Only 44% of the population believed that NATO membership is necessary for the security of the country in 2007 (still 52% in 2005)17 and the most shocking results concerns the popularity of the USA. In 2007, only 16% of the population was of the opinion that the leading position of the USA in world politics is desirable.18 From this point of view, the above mentioned two documents, with the help of which the previous government wanted to secure the continuity of foreign and security policy of the country, do not correspond either with the prevailing opinion in the population, nor with the foreign and security policy as implemented by the present (2008) government. In other words, the exaggerated discussion about “New Europe” in 2003 and about a long-term Trans-Atlanticism in CEE countries does not match the present reality – at least not in Slovakia.
14 Strednodoba strategia zahranicnej politiky Slovenskej republiky, Headquarters of the Government of the Slovak Republic, 20. September 2004. 15 Bezpecnostna strategia Slovenskej republiky, National Council of the Slovak Republic, 27. September 2005. 16 Ibid, par. 73. 17 Butorova, Z. – Gyarfasova, O.: Verejna mienka („Public Opinion“). In: Slovensko 2007 („Slovakia 2007“). Bratislava, Institute for Public Affairs 2008, p. 270. 18 Ibid., p. 268.
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Literature:
- Report of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, August 30, 2002, p. 3. - Leaders´ Statement on Iraq: Full text, BBC News – World Edition, Thursday, 30 January, 2003. - Chirak Lashes out at “new Europe“, CNN.Co./World, February 18, 2003. - Bouda, Ondrej: New U.S. visa requirements divide EU, The Prague Post, February 20, 2008. - Zgajewski, Tania – Hajjar, Kalila, The Lisbon Strategy: Which Failure? What Failure? And Why?, http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/Lisbon-Strategy- TZKH.pdf. - European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 11. - Sprava o plneni uloh zahranicnej politiky Slovenskej republiky za rok 2001 a zameranie na rok 2002, Report of the Government of the Slovak Republic no. 1419, 2002. - M. Dzurinda, in: http://www.sdkuonline, November 10, 2002. - Strednodoba strategia zahranicnej politiky Slovenskej republiky, Headquarters of the Government of the Slovak Republic, 20. September 2004. - Bezpecnostna strategia Slovenskej republiky, National Council of the Slovak Republic, 27. September 2005. - Butorova, Z. – Gyarfasova, O.: Verejna mienka („Public Opinion“), Slovensko 2007 („Slovakia 2007“), Bratislava, Institute for Public Affairs 2008, p. 270.
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Predrag Simić1 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
The war in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was the first serious crisis in Europe after the Cold War. This crisis „has opened the first serious debate on foreign policy and international relations after the Cold War in the U.S.“2 and influenced the evolution of the main institutions of European and Euro-Atlantic security, primarily, the European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).3 While early attempts of mediation on the part of the EC/EU in the former Yugoslavia brought limited results, NATO’s military interventions – the first in the organization’s history – were conducted in 1995 and 1999 in the Balkans. Pressure of the EU and NATO terminated the war in Yugoslavia, but this area has remained a potential crisis spot due to the legacy of war, open ethnic and border disputes, and mutual mistrust between the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. One consequence of the dissolution and war in the former Yugoslavia was the fragmentation of the region and the creation of new states which have remained burdened by the consequences of war and the disintegration of the former common state. Countries of the region were lagging behind due to the legacy of the Cold War division of the Balkans, which in the last half of the 20th century was divided between NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Aligned movement and self-isolated countries. Hence the Balkans can be referred to more in geographic terms, rather than as a region connected with economic, social, political and other links.4 Even the commitment of all of these countries to join the EU, and most of them to join NATO (except Serbia), does not automatically imply their willingness to restore mutual relations and create regional institutions. Moreover, the European orientation of former Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s was more driven by a desire to „escape from the Balkans“ and integrate with the developed part of Europe, whilst emphasizing their mutual differences and hostility.
1 Dr. Predrag Simić is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science University of Belgrade. 2 Robert W Tucker and David C. Hedrickson, America and Bosnia, National Interest, Fall 1993, p. 14.
3 „Dynamic changes in the Balkans in the nineties also gave the ground for development in Europe and to the way in which we study international phenomena today“, Emilian Kavalski, Extending the European Security Community - Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Extending the European Security Community - Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Tauris Academic Studies, London and New York 2007, p. 3. 4 On this point see: Predrag Simić, Do the Balkans Exists?, in: Dimitriou Triantaphilou (ed.), The Southern Balkans, Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Papers, No. 46, ISS, Paris 2001, pp 17-36.
85 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
These were some of the reasons why major initiatives towards the renewal of regional cooperation in the Balkans came from outside. For the EU and NATO, fragmentation and crises in the region became obstacles to its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Early attempts at restoring regional ties (for instance, the Royaumont Initiative, SECI, etc.) all had limited results. The EU, therefore, after the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, began systematic efforts in this direction within the frame of the so-called regional approach to the Western Balkans.5 These efforts on the part of the EU were given full swing only after NATO’s military intervention against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, when the Stability Pact in South-East Europe was established at the EU summit in Cologne. The common stand taken at European summits in Zagreb (2000) and Thessaloniki (2003) was that all Western Balkan countries could be admitted into the EU if they fulfilled the required conditions. The prospect of membership and the requirement on the part of the EU pertaining to regional cooperation have contributed to the restoration of mutual connections and the relatively rapid development of regional relations, starting from cooperation in the field of infrastructure, the fight against organized crime, the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers. and the development of economic and military cooperation, mainly within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The Western Balkans is now surrounded by the EU and NATO members and is one of the few areas on the political map of Europe not fully integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. Despite the end of armed conflict, this area is still burdened by a number of problems which make the probability of their integration into the EU (except Croatia) unlikely. In addition to the legacy of war and incomplete transition of their economic and political systems, these countries continue to be burdened by ethnic tensions, unresolved territorial disputes, migration problems, underdeveloped infrastructure, corruption and organized crime. A particular problem are the areas that are still under international protectorate. The commitment of these countries to EU accession and, in most cases, membership in NATO, opens the possibility of building a new security architecture; not only in the region of the Western Balkans, but in the Balkans as a whole. In addition to continuing and deepening the region’s economic integration, the need to create a so- called security community in the Balkans – which would serve as a framework for resolving inter-state disputes and integration into the EU and NATO – is frequently emphasized.
Security Communities
The concept of a „security community“ was introduced in the late 1950s by the American Professor Karl Deutsch in his book, „Political community and the North Atlantic area“6 In short, security communities define regions or groups of
5 Former Yugoslav republics, except Slovenia (joined the EU in 2004), plus Albania. 6 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Or- ganization in the Light of Historical Experience, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York 1957.
86 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans countries that have voluntarily waived their right to resolve mutual disputes by force and where the likelihood of violence, i.e., a war, is minimal or impossible. According to Karl Deutsch, „a security community“ is „a group of people, which has become integrated“. He refers to integration as the „attainment, within a territory, of a ‚sense of community‘ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‚long‘ time, dependable expectations of ,peaceful change‘ among its population.7 By „sense of community“, Deutsch means „a belief amongst individuals in the group that they attained an agreement on at least one of the issues: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ,peaceful change‘.8 Such a change involves resolving social problems through institutionalized procedures and without resort to physical force on a large scale. A security community is, therefore, a community where there is „real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. If the whole world was integrated into a security community, wars would be automatically excluded“9, concludes the author. Karl Deutsch in his book identified two types of security communities. The first type are so-called „amalgamated communities“, whereby two or more in- dependent units connect into a common and broader unit, within which a certain form of shared power arises. Such examples are the United States and, perhaps also, the former Yugoslavia — which, according to the definition of this author, could be designated as a failed security community, since it disappeared in the war. The second type are so-called „pluralistic security communities“, in which smaller units retain legal independence and separate governments. Deutsch identified such a community in North America between the U.S. and Canada. Pluralistic security communities are more common, and as examples of this type we could specify the Euro-Atlantic area integrated within NATO, the European Union in Europe, ASEAN in Asia and Mercosur in South America. Although the theory of Karl Deutsch emerged in the late 1950s, it gained its full influence only after the Cold War, when his ideas were further developed by social constructivists Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in their book „Security Communities“.10 According to Adler and Barnett’s view, security communities, as well as all other types of human communities, are distinguished by three characteristics. First, community members share a common identity, values and meanings. Second, community members have many-sided and direct relations. Third, communities exhibit some kind of long-term interest of the community members or even altruism: „long-term interest arises from the knowledge of the
7 Ibid, p. 5. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.
87 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans other with whom you interact while altruism may be interpreted as a sense of obligation and responsibility“.11 Adler and Barnett state that security communities should be built gradu- ally: an emerging community corresponds with the basic needs of peaceful change, while a mature security community is characterized by the collective security mechanisms, as well as by supranational and transnational elements. In contrast to Deutsch, Adler and Barnett distinguish between tightly and loosely integrated communities. Following these ideas, some other authors talk about „inter- state security communities“ (among whom war is not possible) and „comprehensive security communities“ (in which even civil war is not possible). Communication and transactions between countries lead to what Emanuel Adler calls the „socialization“ and building of a new common identity, on which the solidarity of members of the security community rests. According to Adler, this means that „national politicians must accept new meanings and interpretations of reality, as they are created in intellectual, bureaucratic and political circles, due to which they must change their interests, abilities and/or willingness to consider new courses of action“.12
The role of international organizations in the Balkans
In the theory of social constructivism, „socialization“ is one of the most important ideas through which individual actors create identities and ideas that govern their behavior. This idea, meanwhile, has also been accepted by the constructivist theory of international relations13, which perceives international institutions as social institutions around which the identities, ideas and expectations of their members are built. According to American authors, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, socialization in international relations usually occurs after wars and other major crises, in conditions of great social and political turmoil and when the domestic institutions are more willing to accept external influence“.14 An example of this is post-war Europe, which accepted the Marshall Plan, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the idea of early European communities, even though its previous legacy pointed to a different direction. As a result of the process of „socialization“, modern Europe emerged, gathered around the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance.
11 Ibid, p. 31. 12 Emanuel Adler, Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress, in: Adler and Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations, p. 52. 13 See, for example: Nicholas G. Onuf, Constructivism: A User's Manual, in: V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf, and P. Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY 1998, pp. 58-78. 14 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, International Organization, Vol. 44/1990, pp. 283-315.
88 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
Even though, according to constructivist views, international organizations and institutions arise as a result of this process, they may also be its drivers. Many Anglo-Saxon authors today see confirmation of this in changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, where these changes were driven by the EU, NATO or the OSCE.15 Following this logic, some authors believe that the EU and NATO could play a similar role in the creation of a security community in the Balkans.16 According to such a view, the following three assumptions are required. First, that would imply the creation of preconditions, i.e., factors that can incite regional actors to start approaching each other through technological advances, demographic, economic and environmental changes, an external threat and changed notions of „social reality“. Second, structural and procedural factors that lead to development of the security community are important, such as factors of power and knowledge. Power factors can also be external (in this particular case, the EU and NATO) and internal (in the form of new political elites). Knowledge relates to new ideas, such as liberal democracy, civil society, the rule of law, and human rights, which all encourage the development of mutual trust and a sense of community amongst regional actors. They are expected to intensify various forms of mutual communication and exchange, starting from economic to social, security and political. The third assumption is a continual action on the part of international factors in the direction of creating a security community. By „promoting the development of a shared definition of security, proper domestic and international action, and regional boundaries, social learning encourages political actors to see each other as trustworthy. Also it leads people to identify with those who were once on the other side of cognitive divides.”17 Seen from a constructivist perspective, the contemporary Balkans seeming- ly fits into this model: the region has gone through a decade of violent conflict in which the former joint state disappeared, whilst successor states and their societies are burdened with post-conflict trauma, their economies fragmented and the political elites mutually opposed. However, certain assumptions for the process of reconciliation and the creation of a security community in the region exist: it is emphasized that NATO’s two military interventions (1995 and 1999) terminated armed conflicts, that the political scene was abandoned by the main protagonists of these conflicts, and that all of these societies have undergone the process of transition by following, to a lesser or greater extent, the same principles and values of liberal capitalism.
15 However, in debates on the role of international institutions, the realists dispute their importance in triggering those changes in countries which reduce the risk of the use of armed force. See, for example: John J. Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions; International Security, Winter 1994/95, pp. 5-49. 16 For example: E. Kavalski, Suzette Grillot et al., Developing Security Community in the Western Balkans: The Role of EU and NATO, Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference May 17-19, 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada, Srdan Vucetic, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution, Southeast European Politics, October 2001, pp. 109-134. 17 Adler and Barnett, A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, in: Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, p. 45.
89 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
In addition to Slovenia – which was the only former Yugoslav republic to become a member of both the EU and NATO – Croatia and Albania became NATO members in 2009, whilst Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been included in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). To some extent, the only exception is Serbia, which declared neutrality; although it is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, an associate member of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly and is very active in military cooperation with its neighbors. All Western Balkan countries have concluded Stabilization and Association Agreements with the EU and some have started talks on future membership. The most advanced is Croatia, which is currently finalizing accession negotiations with the Union. In the mid-1990s – after the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Her- zegovina was signed – the EU adopted a policy towards the Balkans which was a part of its broader policy towards Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike the first and second generation of „Europe Agreements“, stabilization has been set as a precondition for these countries in order to join the EU. The policy of „stabilization and association“ has two main instruments: a regional approach and a policy of conditionality. The regional approach to the so- called countries of the Western Balkans aims to build a regional economic and security community, whilst conditioning means that these countries now have the opportunity to become members of the leading western institutions, i.e., the EU and NATO. The condition for that is a process of „socialization“, which would make them more compatible with the values, goals and practices underlying the European and Euro-Atlantic community. The view that the improvement of relations and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is a precondition for successful integra- tion of these countries into the EU has become the official policy of the EU in relations with all of them: „Regional cooperation is also a specific requirement under the stabilization and association agreements, which are already in place with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia … Regional cooperation is therefore a cornerstone of the EU’s policy framework for the western Balkans.“18 For its part, NATO’s policy in the region has relied on its peacekeeping missions, two of which are completed (in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia), whilst the mission in Kosovo (KFOR) has been prolonged; on receiving new countries as members and through activities within the PfP program. On the basis of this, the Adriatic Charter was signed in 2005, which enabled the creation of the Adriatic Group, gathering Croatia, Albania and Macedonia as a sort of regional alliance within NATO. This policy has, after 2000, brought some results: the number of regional initiatives, organizations and projects has increased, economic and political relations between the Western Balkans countries have clearly improved (especially between the three formerly leading Yugoslav republics: Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia) and many barriers to the free circulation of people and goods in the region have been removed.
18 See: The Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: A Policy Priority for the Euro pean Union, European Commission, Brussels 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf.
90 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
It should, however, be noted that the development of regional cooperation is a result of relations of each country with the European Union and NATO, respectively. Moreover, even some serious territorial disputes that have threatened to undermine the newly-created balance in the region (for example, the Piran Bay dispute between Slovenia and Croatia) were resolved by direct diplomatic intervention of the leading members of NATO and the EU. Probably the greatest progress in building a security community in the Western Balkans was noted between Serbia and Croatia over the past few years. In a series of highly symbolic manifestations of reconciliation and regional cooperation, the presidents of both countries indicated the possibility of creating a regional community in this area which would be compatible with the EU and NATO. However, the progress in relations between Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia has not been followed with adequate progress in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and some other areas of the Western Balkans, where the situation remains unchanged or has even deteriorated. During the last decade, a significant change in the form of NATO’s presence and its role in the Western Balkans occurred. After military interventions in 1995 and 1999, NATO assumed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR, subsequently SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). The peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was an undoubted success, given that ever since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed and NATO forces deployed, there was no single armed conflict or casualty of combat operations. This mission left Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, after which it was replaced by the EU’s limited forces. The NATO mission in Kosovo was met with a far more complicated situation, with many more armed attacks against the Serb population, also including attacks and large-scale ethnic cleansing in March 2004, which KFOR managed bring under control only with great effort and a significant number of casualties. However, in this case, only NATO’s robust military presence prevented the continuation of armed conflict from the late 1990s and the continuation of ethnic cleansing. A change in relations between Serbia and NATO came in April 2001, with the outbreak of a revolt by Albanians in the Preševo Valley. Although at first it seemed as if the scenario of Serb-Albanian conflict from 1998-1999 was to be repeated, the representatives of the new government in Belgrade (Nebojša Čovic and Goran Svilanović) contacted the then NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, after which the Serbian security forces and KFOR (i.e., NATO) jointly stopped the actions of Albanian paramilitary forces, the so-called Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (UÇPMB). As a result of this cooperation, a so-called Ground Safety Zone – from which the UÇPMB was operating – was reduced, while Serbian forces took over control of the administrative border with Kosovo from KFOR. Although this episode renewed trust between Serbia and NATO, the next step in mutual convergence occurred as late as 2007, when Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. „The turnaround in relations between NATO and Belgrade is probably the most spectacular security-related development to have taken place in the former Yugoslavia since the Kosovo campaign in 1999“, noted NATO expert, Robert
91 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
Serry.19 Accession of the Western Balkans countries into the PfP, as well as the accession of Croatia and Albania to NATO, strengthened the position of this organization in the Balkans and has also ensured a long-term influence on security sector development in all countries of the region, including the scope and structure of their national armed forces, their interoperability and joint military exercises, etc. Strong external pressure on the development of regional cooperation in the Balkans prompted some analysts to question the motives behind these efforts. International mediators in crises, in addition to a general interest in contributing to resolving problems, often have some special, public or hidden interests. For some analysts of the EU and NATO’s policies in the Balkans, their motives are, amongst other things, also hidden in the desire to enhance their own legitimacy. So, for example, Philipp Borinski believes that NATO uses the possibility to achieve a „double expansion“ in the Balkans, i.e., to simultaneously achieve „expansion in geographic terms, as well as in terms of its role which, if successfully achieved, would contribute to the prestige of the organization“.20 The role of the EU is interpreted in a similar way: „only by stabilizing the Balkans, the EU can make its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more convincing and present itself as an important geopolitical factor.“21 Analysis of the effects of the EU’s and NATO’s efforts to encourage regional cooperation in the Balkans over the last decade shows that, in addition to the results achieved, it has also had some unexpected consequences. Despite the desire of all Western Balkans countries to become members of the EU, it does not automatically affect improvement in their mutual relations.22 Similar to the 1990s, each of these countries is interested in its own accession to the EU, even if that does not increase the chances of their neighbors achieving the same. Some researchers estimate that „attempts on the part of individual countries to accelerate the process of EU integration have resulted in weakened cooperation at the regional level“.23 Moreover, membership in the EU is sometimes used as a means to resolve some territorial or other disputes with neighbors by blocking their accession to the EU. Accession of a divided country, Cyprus, into the European Union before this dispute was resolved between the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities on the island, was seen in the EU as a strong warning that something similar should not be
19 Robert Serry, NATO’s Balkan Odyssey, NATO Review, 2003. Source: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/ 2003/ issue4/english/art3.html. 20 Philipp Borinski, NATO Towards the Double Enlargement: The Case of the Balkans, Revue d’integration européne, 24/2002, pp. 113-136. 21 Milada Anna Vachudova, Strategies for European Integration and Democratization in the Balkans, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2004, pp. 92-105. 22 In 2007, the South East European Barometer conducted a public opinion survey in the Western Balkans countries on the attitude of their citizens towards the prospects of their neighbors’ future accession into the EU, which demonstrated a significant lack of interest in this issue. South-East Europe Barometer, Public Opinion Compared in 7 Countries. 23 East-West Parliamentary Practice Project (EWPPP), Legislatures and Citizens: strengthening democratic institutions and civil society in the Western Balkans, http://www.ewppp.org/pro- gramnies/western—balkans.php.
92 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans repeated in the case of the Western Balkans. The EU and the U.S., learning from this experience, reacted strongly in the border dispute between Slovenia (EU member) and Croatia (candidate) which, at least temporarily, was removed from the agenda; though the dispute between its other member, Greece, and Macedonia, over the name of this former Yugoslav republic, remains an obstacle in relations between the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and this country, on the other. Contrary to expectations, such data indicates that regional cooperation initiated from the outside does not necessarily lead to improvements in trust amongst the countries of the region, nor to the prospects of creating a lasting „security community“. These problems are even more conspicuous when it comes to NATO’s influence in the Balkans. For example, this issue faces strong resistance in Serbia due to NATO’s role during the war in Yugoslavia and, in particular, its military intervention against the Republika Srpska in 1995 and Serbia in 1999. For a large part of Serbian public, NATO remains an opponent and an organization that committed war crimes against civilian population in Serbia (bombing of Radio- Television Serbia, the destruction of a passenger train in Grdelica gorge, bombing of a bridge in Vladičin Han, the use of cluster bombs in Nis, the use of ammunition with depleted uranium, etc.). Although the negative attitude towards NATO has somewhat declined in recent years owing to the role of KFOR in Kosovo (especially in March 2004), support to negative attitudes towards NATO’s role in the Balkans comes from countries that are strongly opposed to its further enlargement (Russia and some of the Arab countries). On the other hand, for other former Yugoslav republics and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, membership in NATO is a guarantee of their independence and security from threats that are still primarily perceived as coming from Serbia.
Conclusion
Endeavors to condition the progress of the countries of the region in their relations with the EU and NATO through normalization of relations between the Western Balkans countries and the development of regional economic, political and security cooperation has borne some results. Undoubted progress has been made in the renewal of economic relations and the free flow of goods between Western Balkan countries, especially within the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA). At present, Slovenia and Croatia are amongst the largest investors in Serbia and other former Yugoslav republics, though their markets are still relatively closed to investors from the Western Balkans. Significant progress and cooperation has also been attained between internal affairs institutions and judicial authorities in the fight against organized crime, as well as in some other areas. Over ten years after the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, relations between these countries are stable, though not completely normalized. The biggest obstacle to the creation of a regional community remains the problem of Kosovo, whose status is still open. Kosovo is not only an unavoidable problem on Serbia’s path towards the EU, but also an obstacle to the stability of the entire southern Balkans. On the other hand, even sixteen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still more of a mechanical connection of the three
93 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans peoples living in it, rather than a community with a certain perspective. Even relations between the two largest former Yugoslav republics, Serbia and Croatia, which in the last decade saw significant progress, remain burdened with the legacy of war. Confirmation of this has been provided by the recent events in Croatia following the verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on two Croatian generals, which led to a wave of protests across the country and a temporary cooling of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade. The problem of refugees and internally displaced persons from the war-affected areas is still pending. The ruling elites and public opinion remain divided over the recent past, as well as over the causes and consequences of the war in the former Yugoslavia. That is confirmed, amongst other things, by the very fact that the interpretation of recent history in the Western Balkans is still fundamentally different and that it is quite unlikely that joint history textbooks will be written soon. Recent polls show that a high degree of ethnic distance between the inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia still exists. National identities remain firmly rooted in negative stereotypes about „the other“, „oriental“ and „Western cultural heritage“, whilst neighbors are still seen as „historic enemies“ rather than partners in the creation of a new European and regional identity. Thanks to pressure from outside, Western Balkan societies have accepted the idea of modernization, which is generally identified with „Europeanization'“, i.e., European and Euro-Atlantic integration, though there is still strong resistance to the creation of a common regional identity with a Yugoslav or Balkan prefix. This phenomenon is not, however, unknown in the European Union itself. In Spain, the Catalans and Basques put their local and even their European identity before their sense of belonging to Spain. In Belgium, the Flemish and Wallonians put their respective identities before their belonging to Belgium. In the UK, Scottish, Welsh or Irish identities are given priority over the British identity. Even in France, the cradle of civic national identity, according to which the citizens of a country identify themselves with it, it is not uncommon that, for example, the inhabitants of Brittany, place their Breton and European identity above their belonging to the French nation. Neighbors are, through such a lens, seen as opponents or what is in Anglo-Saxon anthropology referred to as a „constitutive other“, which is perceived as a threat leading to national homogenization. Experience of two world wars and the post-war development of European identity has largely absorbed, but not eliminated, ethnic differences. The consequences of three armed conflicts in less than a century (1870- 1871, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945) between the major European nations, France and Germany, have over the last fifty years led to the creation of European communities and the collective European identity, as well as to the new vision of a shared history, whereby these conflicts are interpreted as „European civil wars“, while pejorative descriptions of the other nation have disappeared from both languages.24
24 That is, for example, present in the recent historiography and in a joint French-German history textbook (Historie/ire/Geschichte, L’Europe et le monde depuis 1945, Klett & Nathan, Paris Stutgart 2007), as well as in the art projects funded through EU funds, such as the film „Merry Christmas“, which in 2007
94 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
This process, however, lasted for a very long time and was under the influ- ence of joint institutions created after World War II such as, for example, a joint institute for writing history textbooks (Internazionale Schulbuch Institute in Braunschweig) or a common media organization (Franco-German TV channel „Arte“) . In the Western Balkans, similar attempts such as creation of a joint „Commission for Truth and Reconciliation“ has not yielded results, though some approximation within the triangle of Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the field of media and art has been noted, and to a much smaller extent, between Serbs and Albanians. In short, over the last decade the EU and NATO have invested great effort to stop the spiral of war in the former Yugoslavia and have launched the process of reconciliation, regional cooperation and new forms of community sense in the Western Balkans. Relying on the common desire of all societies in the region to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structures and thus „escape from the Balkans“ and from the logic of „Balkanization“, these efforts have brought some results, especially regarding the development of a European identity amongst the Balkan peoples. The results, however, are largely absent when it comes to developing a regional identity, which is still strongly influenced by negative stereotypes, the legacy of war and the logic of „Balkanization“. Moreover, the problems of the EU and, especially, the global economic crisis, which has strongly affected the Balkan countries in recent years, have weakened the impact of the EU and NATO, and led to a substantial decline in the mood of these societies to join them. Opinion polls indicate that the percentage of support for the EU in Serbia is at its lowest in the last ten years, whilst in Croatia – following the verdicts for generals Gotovina and Markač – it has dropped to only 42%. The percentage of support for membership of some of these countries in NATO is at a much lower level, even in countries included in the MAP (Membership Action Plan), such as Montenegro. In addition, the impact of the EU and particularly of NATO in the Western Balkans in recent years has also faced competition from new regional actors, some of whom are strongly opposed to further Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans.
was a French candidate for the Oscar Award. It is, however, important to emphasize that in Germany today, there are increasingly less people learning French language, and vice-versa.
95 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Euroatlanticism and Creation of Security Community in the Balkans
Literature:
- Emilian Kavalski, Extending the European Security Community - Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Extending the European Security Community - Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Tauris Academic Studies, London and New York 2007. - Predrag Simić, Do the Balkans Exists?, in: Dimitriou Triantaphilou (ed.), The Southern Balkans, Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Papers, No. 46, ISS, Paris 2001, pp 17-36. - Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York 1957. - G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, International Organization, Vol. 44/1990, pp. 283-315. - John J. Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions; Inter- national Security, Winter 1994/95, pp. 5-49. - E. Kavalski, Suzette Grillot et al., Developing Security Community in the Western Balkans: The Role of EU and NATO, Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference May 17-19, 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada - Srdan Vucetic, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution, Southeast European Politics, October 2001, pp. 109-134. - Philipp Borinski, NATO Towards the Double Enlargement: The Case of the Balkans, Revue d’integration européne, 24/2002, pp. 113-136. - Milada Anna Vachudova, Strategies for European Integration and Democratization in the Balkans, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2004, pp. 92- 105.
96 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Mladen Nakić1 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view
Southeast Europe especially part of the Balkan Peninsula that western politicians and authors prefer to call the Western Balkans is a challenge for European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for past two decades, but also presents an important issue for the wider geo-strategic discussion. At the time of the existence of the former Yugoslavia, this area was largely pacified, but never spared of potential ethnic conflict. Disintegration of Yugoslavia opened the questions of ethnic identity, administrative borders of former republics and provinces and, finally, the main issues – how to consume the right of secession and full sovereignty which is enabled the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1974. The consequences of the wars for independence in the 1990s have not yet been fully overcome and can potentially endanger the euro-integration processes, but also the stability of the EU. Ongoing process of reconciliation is solid foundation for building regional and pro-European future based on cooperation and common responsibility. Speaking of European integration, new course should be taken by the EU to better respond on current integration process in the region that slowing down in a practice. Some countries of the region need affirmative support and clear programmed road map of activities that should to be done in precisely defined time.
Stabilization of the region is primarily European issue
Indeed, the EU has no time to postpone decisive political discussion to solve the rest of problems of its southeastern part. If the EU really has a problem how to deliver the sustainable strategy paper for South East Europe, it is obvious that Brussels should redefine its policy approach to this issue. Instead to deal with the region on bureaucratic way, the EU politicians could rather respond on more pragmatic way with concrete and sustainable analyses and recommendations. The countries of the Western Balkans have been put in the EU’s “waiting room” for more than ten years. To be better prepared for EU accession, those countries are being asked to implement difficult and demanding reforms. Having in mind slow reform process and progress that is too mild in some countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina e.g.), it seems necessary for the EU to change the approach and
1 Dr. Mladen Nakić is Executive Director of the Centre for International Studies, a European think tank based in Zagreb. He is also a lecturer at the University College of International Relations and Diplomacy „Dag Hammarskjold“ in Zagreb.
97 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view become more decisive and assertive. Western politicians and respective EU institutions can do two things. First, to continue with current practice of passive monitoring the process of reforms without regular interventions to make corrections if necessary, and second, the EU can redefine policy approach in a way to re- enforced and increase its influence through drafting concrete programmed and supervised process with attainable goals for each single country (Grabbe, Knaus and Korski, 2010).2 Without daily monitoring of process and more frequent assessment, the consequences would be the same - slow progress will continue and unsatisfactory results are expected. Many policy makers and analysts point to the danger of halting the reform process to a level where it was seriously threatened. Notable European skepticism for further enlargement after Croatian accession can be explained with fear that if Balkan countries approach to EU membership too fast and unprepared, it could jeopardize EU stability. Additionally, prevailing viewpoint in the EU is to avoid any possible scenario that includes receiving new members with existing unresolved disputes with neighbours. Now, the question is - how to balance between the risk of premature accession and indefinite postponement of the enlargement? Both risks should be managed to provide optimal dose of optimism, which implies realistic and executable road map with motivational and pragmatical arrangement.
Is ongoing security challenges means lessons (not) learned?
Instability in the region is primarily a European problem, then the problem of NATO and United States. All these parties were involved in the regional business at the very beginning. Twenty years after, the truth is - there is no open or visible threat by war or ethnic conflict in the Balkans. However, some challenges to security are still exist as a seed for potential crisis.
There is still unfinished business in Bosnia and Herzegovina that threatening fragile ethnic stability. Kosovo is fighting for its full independence promotion as a sovereign state and facing strong Serbian diplomatic action to oppose unilaterally declared Kosovo independence. Macedonia has dispute over name with Greece and still has to wait for the NATO membership as well as to begin negotiation process for EU. Serbia is recognized as a country importantly involved from many perspectives in the regional stability. Serbia is responsible for future constitutive status of Bosnia and Herzegovina through its relations with Republika Srpska and as a co-signatory of Dayton Peace Accords. On the other side, Serbian diplomatic offensive worldwide to oppose Kosovo sovereignty has negative impact on regional cooperation and stability.
2 See: H. Grabbe, G.Knaus and D. Korski, Hedging Balkan Risks: The Case for a More assertive EU, 2010.
98 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view
Bosnia and Herzegovina
B&H remains stick in a political and constitutional crisis with never overcome ethnic divisions and exclusiveness since Dayton Peace Accords was signed in mid 1990s. It is more than obvious that local and national political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina are unable to provide state functionality. There are many evidence of lack of political will to change current unacceptable situation and trend. Besides, the main imperative during the war was territory. Even today, in an effort to achieve a balanced political solution among Bosnia’s three constituent peoples, the issue of the territory still prevails. The Commission’s annual “2011 Progress Report” states that „one year after the October 2010 general elections, political bickering and a refusal from the country’s six main leaders to agree on who should lead the country’s Council of Ministers – an executive branch of governance".3 Politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of ethnic origin, should be aware of their responsibility to deliver a new European constitution and to create the rest of preconditions to provide functioning state. One of the promising signals sent from EU was invitation for joining to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) that can begin when defense-related property is under the possession of the state. Second, even more important act of European good willingness is visa liberalization for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, for this new step forward, B&H is invited to shows more concrete political initiatives toward implementing European standards and approach. It is clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina could officially apply for EU accession after Office of High Representative (OHR) is closed. At this moment, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the most demanding security and political challenges for EU. If B&H failed to overcome ethnic divisions, EU and international community should be deeper involved in a way to impose a political solution. Additionally, the Commission’s report states that: “the failure of leaders to reach a political agreement on the formation of authorities has hampered Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress on much-needed reforms, in particular on the harmonization of the Constitution with the European Convention on Human Rights and the adoption of State Aid law at state level.”4
Kosovo
As youngest state has a serious problem with functionality and self- promotion as a sovereign state. Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo is under international protectorate. Serbia strongly opposes Kosovo unilaterally declared independence and as a result of this fact, regional cooperation suffers its full and unconditional implementation. Legal opinion of International Criminal Court (ICJ) in The Hague stated a clear answer to the question of whether is unilaterally declaration of independence of Kosovo in accordance with international low. In July 2010 the ICJ said in a non-binding ruling requested by Belgrade, that Kosovo's
3http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_oct_2011_en.htm 4http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_oct_2011_en.htm
99 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view separation from Serbia in 2008 did not violate international law. Even before the ICJ’s opinion, it was unrealistic to expect of those countries that recognize Kosovo to withdraw their recognition. Now, it seems necessary and reasonable only to renew the negotiation on how to provide normal everyday life for people in Kosovo instead of re-discussion the status of Kosovo. Apart of ongoing political talks, nobody can exclude even theoretically, possible territorial division of Kosovo. This option is not officially on the table yet. Serbian strategy couldn’t ignore any possibility to bring the game in the field of political compromise and try to save the territory north of Ibar River most inhabited by Serbian ethnic majority. On contrary, some ethnic Albanians in Serbia would like to affiliate Presevo Valley (often called “Eastern Kosovo”) in south Serbia with Albanian majority. Having in mind political reality, both options seem unrealistic and unacceptable for international community because of potential further destabilization of entire region if re-open borders issue. It is more realistic and politically correct to provide full independence and territorial sovereignty of Kosovo, but also the cultural autonomy for Serbs in the North. It is more likely acceptable solution for Serbs to have common and peace future rather than to live separately with a constant insecurity and fear. It is to believe that Serbian leadership will share this as well. There is no doubt; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have European perspective, but it won’t happen before they solve their own internal problems and current status under international protectorate.5
Serbia
Serbia has made progress submitted application for EU membership in December 2009. Serbian leaders emphasize readiness to continue with democratic reforms and to build administrative capacities. Cooperation with International Crime Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shows progress on the way towards the EU membership. Full cooperation with the ICTY is one of the conditions stipulated by the EU for moving forward on the road to European integration. Serbia delivered war criminals Mladić and Hadžić to ICTY and has opportunity to continue its integration process. This means step forward to Serbian wish to receive the candidate status and to start the negotiations process in 2012, which is also scheduled as an election year. While the European Commission progress report on Serbia has praised the country's reforms and recommended that Serbia be granted candidate status, Brussels has emphases that further progress towards membership depends on reopening constructive dialogue with Kosovo. The report praised the start of EU-mediated talks between the two sides in the spring, noting that they were “conducted in generally constructive spirit until September”.6
5 Wolfgang Benedek, The Role of the International Community with regard to Human Rights and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, 2010. 6http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_oct_2011_en.htm
100 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view
Belgrade and Pristina commenced talks in Brussels in March 2011. These were the first direct talks the two countries had held since Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. In July 2011, after the sixth round of talks - which were expected to yield an agreement on Kosovo’s custom stamps - the next round was postponed until September. In early September, Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on custom stamps allowing Kosovo to export goods to Serbia for the first time since it declared independence in 2008. But in mid-September, Kosovo deployed customs officers at the two checkpoints in the Serb-run north of Kosovo, stating that this was part of the agreement. In the ensuing clashes with local Serbs, one Kosovo police officer was killed. To start accession talks, it said, Serbia has to fully respect the principles of inclusive regional cooperation. This means finding mutually acceptable solutions to disputes over telecommunications, mutual acceptance of each other's diplomas, and continuing to implement all agreements reached with the EU mission in Kosovo, EULEX, enabling it to exercise its functions in all parts of Kosovo - including the territory north of Ibar River.
Montenegro
Montenegro was invited to MAP (2009) and being encourages continuing its way to NATO. It is expecting to get invitation for the membership at the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012. After submitted application for EU membership (December 2008), and in October 2011 received encouragement with the European Commission’s confirmation that the country is reaching the benchmarks necessary for launching accession talks. The EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle said “Montenegro has worked hard. We have seen real progress including in judicial reform, revising the electoral law, media freedom, anti-discrimination and the fight against corruption and organized crime. I am, therefore, proposing today to open accession negotiations with Montenegro”.7
Albania
Albanis as a full NATO member sent its answered questionnaire to the Commission (April 2010), but facing the political crisis followed by the country's June 2009 parliamentary elections. Therefore, Albania has faced political deadlock over the results of the elections, which Berisha's party narrowly won. It caused that the visa liberalization decision is postponed and expected to happen by end of 2010. The Progress Report on Albania is part of the 2011 Enlargement Package adopted by the European Commission on 12 October. The European Commission concluded that, although progress was made during the last year in some of the 12 key priorities identified in the 2010 Opinion on the country’s European Union
7http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/commission-recommends-montenegrin-accession-talks
101 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view membership application, conditions for opening of accession negotiations have not yet been met. Albania has made limited progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. Albania’s government made efforts to move ahead on the EU integration agenda, notably through the preparation of an Action plan to address the EU’s key priorities. This process included discussion with opposition in the Parliamentary committee for European integration. There have been some limited improvements in parliamentary rules of procedure. Electoral reform has stalled. Essential steps in public administration reform have not been completed and the functioning of the judicial system needs to be further improved. Progress on fighting corruption has been limited.8
Macedonia
The Greek government’s current position is that a single name should be found that includes the term Macedonia but also a fair geographic (and not ethnic) connotation, thus preventing monopolization of all things Macedonian by FYROM. The Macedonian name dispute has to be understood within a framework that involves a different set of politico- economic criteria. Thus, symbols play a tremendous role. In the past, Athens insisted successfully that FYROM change its flag that depicted the ancient Macedonian star of Vergina. There has been traumatic historical record relating to Macedonian issues. Greeks fought over Macedonia during the “Macedonian Struggle” (1904-1908 guerrilla warfare during Ottoman times), as well as during two Balkan Wars and two World Wars. Crucially, Greek Macedonia was contested during the Greek Civil War. The name issue also has an economic dimension involving the trademark of many Greek products that include the term Macedonian (such as Macedonian wine or halva). During the last few months the political leadership in Skopje has made a point of provoking Greece. Gratuitously provocative statements, the renaming of the Skopje and Ohrid airports as “Alexander the Great” and erected 11-meter-high statue of as “Alexander the Great” on a 10-meter-high pedestal in downtown Skopje that cost Macedonia nine million euros have worsened matters and ensured that the veto threat remains credible and popular among ordinary Greeks. The Macedonian name dispute relates to matters of identity, symbols, history, products and provocations. This is a potent combination that deserves deeper scrutiny and understanding. Nevertheless, it is possible to finally resolve this most intractable of issues. Both Athens and Skopje ultimately have a common interest in the region’s stability and both sides have interest to continue Macedonian path towards Euro-Atlantic integrations. Name issue should not re-extend the membership of Macedonia into NATO and to further postpone opening the EU’s accession talks. Both sides should show more pragmatism and wisdom in negotiating about the name.
8 http://www.iewy.com/35001-key-findings-of-the-2011-progress-report-on-albania.html
102 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view
Clear Euro-Atlantic perspective is the way out
To remind, in its annual progress reports on the Western Balkan’s countries, released on 5 October 2011, the Commission noted that Croatia had concluded successfully its accession talks, recommended a start of talks with Montenegro and recommended granting Serbia EU candidate member status. Clearly, the regional countries are still facing a lot of business that need to be done. As a matter of fact, the region is in the second third of its long way between lose-lose and win-win situation. Wars in the 1990s were response to Milosevic’s politics to create a Great Serbia and entire region was stopped in further development and progress. Twenty years after, South East Europe moving forward to re-institutionalize themselves as a part of Europe. Parallel process of war recovery and democratization of society in some part of the region go too slowly and do not have visible progress in the field.9 Regionally speaking, tangible progress has been achieved and each single country is far away from an open conflict. However, the rest of the way to full European integration is still sufficiently demanding and require considerable effort as previously noted. Why is important for the region to continue with Euro Atlantic integration? The fact is that NATO and EU need regional countries as much as they need both of these organizations. A few things need to be pointed out.
1. Positive and encouraging fact is political readiness of each country in the region and their relevant political leaders for joining NATO and EU as a clear way to continue European integrations policy.
2. After wars we witnessed in the region, it is expected that general public opinion opposes any irrational political pamphlets as an alternative for prosperity and safe future based on modern democratic system, and
3. The lessons learned provide additional argument that the region is aware of the fact that the Balkans was black spot on European political map.
Today, we are facing two risks: first, EU consider the Balkans to be unprepared for moving towards the EU, and second, postponing accession issue indefinitely, we jeopardize peace and stability in the region that will damage hard- made progress in past 20 years. For many reasons, the “open door” policy is one of the most visible and successful instruments of promoting Trans-Atlantic integrations. Speaking of NATO business, the NATO Summit in Chicago will reflect that as well. There is a very strong view about the need for the Western Balkans to remain high on the Alliance agenda.
9 Adela Halo, Desecuritization through Integration: A State Functionality perspective, 2010.
103 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view
Regional ownership means common responsibility
Regional initiatives are very useful form of cooperation regardless of the degree of integration with the EU. In fact, regional cooperation has no better alternative. Unlike in the past, cooperation is not only important in order to show good political will. Today's cooperation is seen as something inevitable and useful, and as a something that belongs to the region. There are several regional initiatives, which allow a regular exchange of thoughts and attitudes in various areas. Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) needs a new wind in its sails in promoting regional ownership and to keep being one of key regional organization. RSS is coordinating instrument arises primarily from the fact that the two basic guidelines for RCC operations – cooperation in the region and full integration into Euro-Atlantic associations – are at the same time strategic interests of all regional countries. Functioning as a focal point for regional cooperation, the RCC provides operational capacities and acts as a forum for the continued involvement of those members of the international donor community engaged in the region. RCC is example of regional ownership and run by the countries in Southeast Europe aimed at strengthening peace, democracy and the economy in the hopes that the newfound stability can be supported by those countries who not so long ago were the perpetuators of volatility. There are several other regional organizations and forums for promoting regional cooperation such as Central European Initiative - CEI, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative - AII, Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative - MARRI, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative – SECI. In the framework of SECI was established South East European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC) which has fulfilled the requirements for entering into force of the new legal framework for co- operation of the states in South East Europe in the field of combating trans-border organized crime. By participating in various regional organizations, initiatives and forums each single country has confirmed its commitment and contribution to regional co- operation as a crucial instrument of stability, trust and progress for all countries in the region.
Conclusion
The only long-term and sustainable solution for stability in the region is to continue Euro Atlantic integration. Regional cooperation is finally recognized as inevitable instrument for building common regional security and European future. Today, even with still existing problems (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo e.g.), the region in not facing visible threat, but some fears to stability shouldn’t be ignored. Unfortunately, B&H and Kosovo are not capable to solve current internal difficulties. International community has responsibility and is invited to work with EU to enable those countries to build their own political and administrative capacities to prevail ongoing challenges. Experience with visa liberalization confirms how the EU still has the soft power to motivate regional countries to
104 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Persisting Security Challenges in South East Europe: A Threat to EU’s CFSP - A comparative view continue with reforms. Without outside assistance and close engagement, those imposed challenges that we are still facing in the region could easily become crisis that we witnessed two decades ago. Nobody would like to see this scenario again. Because of keeping the Balkan countries in the waiting room indefinitely increasing risks, need to be offered “exercise room” with a new EU’s Individual Membership Action Program (IMAP) with concrete timetable and homework for each single aspirant country with strict time execution. Besides, countries in the region need to intensify mutual cooperation on concrete projects especially in the area of implementing EU standards and reach the level for being better prepared of using available EU pre-accession assistance (IPA). Last, but not least, state-building and strengthening administrative capabilities, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are priorities to ensure democratic and efficient governance. The Western Balkans is challenging next five to ten years that will be either make-or-break time for the Western Balkan. The region needs to be offered the next qualitative step. The current waiting room is not just enough. It seems endless. We need an exercise-room instead the waiting room with clear and motivated path towards EU.
Literature:
- Adela Halo, Desecuritization through Integration: A State Functionality perspective, 2010. - Jan H. Grabbe, G.Knaus and D. Korski, Hedging Balkan Risks: The Case for a more assertive EU, 2010. - Wolfgang Benedek, The Role of the International Community with regard to Human Rights and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, 2010. - http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_oct_2011_ en.htm - http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/commission-recommends- montenegrin accession-talks
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James Seroka1 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
I. Overview
The urgency of the security issues facing the Western Balkans and the strategic significance of this region for the United States have lessened considerably since the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 and the end of NATO hostilities with Yugoslavia in 1999. Today, the likelihood of armed interstate conflict within the region is slight; the U.S. military presence throughout the region has shrunk to less than 800 personnel; Albania and Croatia have earned full NATO membership; Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia have become active participants of the PfP; and the armed forces of the states in the Western Balkans have been reduced to a small fraction of their former size. Practically speaking, the threat of armed conflict within or among the Western Balkan nations is all but eliminated, and the region can no longer be characterized as that apocryphal “powder keg”. Although the Western Balkans has not yet emerged as a security provider in Europe, it can no longer be considered a security consumer or threat. Over the last few years, the diminished threat of imminent widespread violence emanating from the Western Balkans has provided an opportunity for the United States to reduce its footprint and involvement in the region. For the first time since World War II, the Western Balkans no longer commands high level and concentrated strategic attention by the United States. Events in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, North Korea, Libya and Yemen demand far more attention and represent vastly more problematic global security threats. Even within Europe’s borders, the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus region have more urgency and threatening potential for explosion than do political events in the Western Balkans. The strategic de-prioritization of the threats originating in the Western Balkans, however, does not imply that the U.S. considers that all is well in the region. Regional integration has made only halting progress, and integration of the states within the EU is likely to be delayed for a decade or more for all nations in the region, save Croatia. Political instability, weakness in democratization, threats to rule of law, trafficking, international crime, corruption, and stagnation in economic growth are also problematic within the region. Despite these problems, it is highly improbable that any state in the Western Balkans would engage in interstate conflict with its neighbors, or adopt a path leading to civil war, a breakdown in civic peace, a return to ethnic cleansing, or the
1 Dr. James Seroka, Professor at Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama USA
106 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential emergence of authoritarian state governance. It seems inconceivable now that any national government or elite within the Western Balkans would deliberately engage in or promote a return to authoritarian behavior and risk cutting off their population from further participation in the European grand vision. For the U.S., the proliferation of security problems in other distant lands, the reduced probability of security relapses in the Western Balkans, and the willingness and enhanced capabilities of the Europeans to assume responsibility for conflict management in the region have all contributed to placing this region on the proverbial back burner of U.S. strategic concerns. The Western Balkans now represents one of the very rare, if not unique, occurrences where the U.S. is content to practice a policy of strategic restraint and a form of off-shore balancing. In this regional situation, the U.S. appears content to encourage others (i.e. the European Union) to exercise regional leadership, and it has continued to give nearly unqualified policy support to European actors and institutions to take the initiative and drive policymaking in the Western Balkans. The Obama’s administration’s willingness to encourage the Europeans to assume responsibility for the region does not imply that the U.S. has abandoned the Western Balkans, or is unconcerned about the region, or intends to wash its hands of future involvement. Rather, the transference of Western Balkan policy control by the U.S. to the Europeans represents an acknowledgement by the U.S. of its limited ability to continue to project global power simultaneously in multiple theatres throughout the world. It is also an outgrowth of the commitment to employ U.S. strategic resources only when its vital interests are involved, and serves as a demonstration of the trust and confidence that the U.S. now extends towards European integration and Europe’s conflict management capabilities. Strategically, the Western Balkans region is still important to the United States, but circumstances have evolved to the point where the Obama administration now feels confident that boots on the ground contribute little to Western Balkan stability. The U.S. is confident that it can transfer responsibility for the region to competent multilateral institutions, such as the EU Commission, that share U.S. values and have an equal or greater stake and involvement in the region. For the U.S., the Western Balkans has become a real world demonstration of how America can adapt its national security behavior and decision-making to conform to an emerging multi- polar world. U.S. policy behavior in the Western Balkans may also serve as a test case for the U.S. on how to best transition towards a policy of strategic restraint and offshore balancing.
II. U.S. Strategic Policy Fundamentals in the Obama Administration
Throughout much of the post cold war period there has been remarkable continuity in the basic fundaments of U.S. national security strategy and in its global outlook, particularly as they concern Europe and the Western Balkans. The presidencies of the first George Bush, Bill Clinton, and second George Bush each embraced a unipolar perspective of global affairs where the U.S. often claimed the exclusive right to guide events and exercise primacy in nearly every region of the
107 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential world. The Obama administration, however, has introduced a new way to conceptualize U.S. global national security and foreign policies; a perspective that takes into account the Rise of the Rest, and one which would permit the U.S. to better manage the tools and resources at its disposal to conduct national security policy at a more affordable cost and with a more realistic risk calculus. The new conceptualization of U.S. national security decision-making includes several new features. First is the adoption of Smart Power as the framework for policy-making. Second is a recognition and acceptance of the need to exercise strategic restraint in formulating and conducting U.S. national security policy; and third is an awareness of the necessity to practice meaningful engagement with potential competitors or adversaries in the international system. The first pillar of President Obama’s national security decision making process is characterized by the exercise of Smart Power. For the Obama Administration, Smart Power is designed to be a strategic alternative to the heavy reliance on military force and unilateral action that characterized the second George Bush presidency. It is characterized by an explicit prioritization of national threats and interests; it is guided by interagency cooperation; and it utilizes the targeted application of the most appropriate mix of the instruments of national power. The intended goal is to help decision makers avoid policy decisions that may result in military commitments and engagements not directly in support of vital U.S. interests.
As Joseph Nye, a major advocate of Smart Power, points out: A smart power narrative for the twenty-first century is not about maximizing power or preserving hegemony. It is about finding ways to combine resources into successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion and the “rise of the rest.” As the largest power, American leadership remains important in global affairs, but the old twentieth-century narrative about an American century and primacy or, alternatively, narratives of American decline are both misleading about the type of strategy that will be necessary.2
For the Obama Administration, Smart Power is a methodology that: (1) provides alternative choices or options in national security decision-making; (2) sets parameters on the growth of defense spending; (3) identifies the most effective and efficient strategy and tactics to achieve U.S. national interests to include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power; and (4) attempts to minimize the loss of U.S. power, blood, and treasure for missions peripheral to vital national security concerns. The Whole of Government approach is an essential component of the exercise of Smart Power. It defines a bureaucratic decision-making environment where all relevant governmental agencies coordinate their efforts, share policy responsibilities, expertise, and resources, and develop national security policy in a collegial and cooperative deliberative environment. The Whole of Government approach means that the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, Justice,
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power. Public Affairs: New York (2011), pp. 207-208.
108 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential etc. share their expertise, plan cooperatively, communicate openly, and execute policy jointly using the most appropriate mix of national resources determined by Smart Power principles3. Under the Obama administration, Smart Power has also taken on a multi- national character. U.S. national security policy planning and implementation increasingly exhibits a willingness to solicit the active and autonomous participation of allies, partners, and multinational bodies to resolve second or third level global security threats. Rather than pressuring others to join “coalitions of the willing” under U.S. tutelage, U.S. policy makers appear to be willing, if not eager, to step away from exercising automatic leadership and to accept a supporting role in those security situations where its stakes are secondary to those of our allies. This tendency for the U.S. to pass on the baton of leadership to others is becoming more common in those venues where the vital interests of the allies and partners are involved, and where these partners are more committed to assume the costs and risks associated with such activities. NATO’s current operations in Libya are one such example where a group of European allies have taken on the leadership role and conducted complex military operations with the encouragement, but not under the direction, of the United States. More pointedly, the Western Balkans is another major arena where the role of the United States has shifted sharply from exercising the dominant leadership role over its partners to embracing a more supportive role for the EU and European members of the North Atlantic community. While there may be relatively minor nuanced differences between U.S. policy in the Western Balkan region and that of the EU, it is clear that the U.S. now links its policies in the region to that of the EU, and that it closely coordinates its policies with the EU members to prevent Western Balkan governments from exploiting any differences between the U.S. and EU. Effectively, it is the European Union, not the United States, which now drives policy in this region. A second shift in emphasis that characterizes the Obama administration’s conduct of national security policy is the acknowledgement that U.S. power is overstretched and that the U.S. must find ways to practice strategic restraint. In other words, the U.S. must pick and choose and prioritize its global strategic goals, based on a firm ranking of national security interests and threats. It is now clear to U.S. decision-makers that the U.S. cannot afford to engage everywhere, or to make commitments that are not based on a hard realistic appraisal of its national security interests or threats to those interests. For the Obama administration, the unilateral exercise of military pressure as practiced by the most recent Bush administration is no longer a viable and realistic policy option. Instead, the devolution of non core U.S. security responsibilities to allies, partners and multinational organizations is now on the table for consideration. There is also the real possibility that the U.S. may turn to off-shore balancing in less vital strategic regions as a cost effective way to protect U.S. global interests and allow it to redistribute national power resources where they are most needed.
3 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Bob Gates, and Vice President Joseph Biden have been strong advocates of Whole of Government decision-making and have modeled this approach in the U.S. National Security Council.
109 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
The days of the U.S. unilateral struggle against the forces of the Axis of Evil have past, and the Obama administration recognizes that it cannot pursue and confront alone rogue states such as North Korea, dictatorships such as Assad in Syria, or regional threats such as Iran. It also cannot rely on the type of hubris voiced by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that America is a special nation not constrained by international protocols and practices:
If we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.4
If nothing else, the Obama administration recognizes that the Iraq and Afghanistan adventures have demonstrated that there are limits to U.S. power and its ability to act unilaterally or in venues where vital U.S. interests are not involved. For the U.S. leadership today, it is becoming clearer that current global commitments are beyond the capacity of the U.S. to manage alone. Strategic overstretch is a reality, and strategic restraint must be employed to avoid disaster5. Meaningful engagement with allies, friends, competitors, and potential adversaries is the third new feature of U.S. national strategic policy making under the Obama administration. Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the George W. Bush administration articulated a morally dichotomized U.S. national security policy that divided the world between the forces of good and those of evil. While initially popular in the U.S., this simplification of global affairs eventually caused considerable damage to the global standing, influence, and power of the United States, as well as peace and security in the world. Regimes perceived as hostile to U.S. interests were categorized by the U.S. as agents of the Axis of Evil to be isolated from the world community until regime change occurred (e.g. Iraq). Hesitant allies such as France who were reticent to follow U.S. leadership endured harsh criticism, and relations with Russia deteriorated to the point where it appeared likely that the U.S. and Russia might renew the nuclear arms race that had been abandoned in the 1980s. By 2005, world public support for U.S. leadership had collapsed, and much of Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia perceived U.S. leadership and policies to be a threat to world peace and security6. Upon taking office in 2009, the Obama administration quickly moved to adopt a less polarized foreign and national security policy and to engage allies, competitors, and potential adversaries. Relations with European allies quickly recovered, and the Obama administration began to enjoy considerable enthusiasm throughout much of
4 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Interview on NBC-TV "The Today Show" with Matt Lauer Columbus, Ohio, February 19, 1998 as released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State 5 Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rule: America’s path to Permanent War, Metropolitan Books: New York (2010), 6 See the Pew Global Attitudes Project http://pewglobal.org/database/
110 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
Europe7. An important feature of this engagement process is the Reset program with Russia that not only reduced U.S. – Russian tensions and led to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, but it also markedly improved European and NATO relations with Russia and formed the basis for fruitful discussions on such issues as missile defense, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and energy policy. In the Western Balkans, Obama’s engagement policy with Europe restored the level of confidence and trust between the European Union and the United States. It encouraged closer cooperation and engagement between the U.S. and EU on such problem areas as Kosovo and Bosnia. Engagement also improved U.S. bilateral relations with the Western Balkan nations as demonstrated by U.S. Vice President Biden’s 2009 visit to the region where he announced willingness “to seek a new start” and to open a dialogue with Serbia despite disagreements over Kosovo independence. Finally, the Reset with Russia facilitated a relaxation of tensions in the Western Balkans as the EU’s policy of European integration with the region served to encourage Russian investment in the region and the expansion of commercial and economic exchanges. The open engagement policy with Russia, in short, helped Russia to see itself as a potential beneficiary of the EU/NATO/US Western Balkan integration project.
III. U.S. Strategic Perspectives of the Western Balkans
During the past two decades, the U.S. strategic perspective of the Western Balkans has changed enormously from a cynical belief that the unremitting ethnic and confessional violence of the Balkans could never be overcome, to a hopeful belief that the region could transform itself and become an integral part of a prosperous and secure Europe. In the 1990s, the prevailing view of the Balkans among U.S. decision makers was that the Balkan region was plagued with an insoluble security problem caused by “age old ethnic and religious based hatred and enmity.” Little, if anything, could be done to overcome this situation, and the potential for renewed civil strive and violence was understood to be very real, if not historically inevitable. To prevent a reoccurrence of the brutal violence and ethnic cleansing, security needed to be imposed by the international community, ethnic groups needed to be kept separated from one another; and minorities needed to have constitutionally guaranteed representation, and perhaps veto power, to prevent a resurgence of civil strife. In 2000, the critical American lesson derived from the wars of Yugoslav succession was that only the U.S. had the will and vision to impose order, while the Europeans lacked the unity of purpose and resolve to intervene and secure the peace. Paraphrasing Madeleine Albright again, the Balkan wars underscored for America that the U.S. was the indispensible nation which towered above others and saw further into the future.
7 According to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the German public’s confidence in the U.S. President climbed from 14% in 2008 to 93% in 2009. In France public confidence in Bush had dropped to 13% in 2008, but rebounded to 91% in 2009 with the Obama presidency.
111 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
Moving forward ten years to the present, the situation on the ground in the Western Balkans is unrecognizable from the past. Relations among the Western Balkan nations with one other and with the U.S., NATO, EU and Russia have been transformed. The primary interstate security problems in the region are now transnational crime and border security; and, with the notable exception of Kosovo/Serbia, these problems are addressed in the region jointly and cooperatively. The numbers of foreign troops in the region have steadily declined8, and those non indigenous military units that still remain have shifted their primary mission from providing direct military security to engaging in security and law enforcement training and support. Today, rather than threatening to fight each other, the region’s armed forces are serving together with distinction in ESDP, UN, and/or NATO peacekeeping missions, and there has even been some discussion about the region’s militaries standing up an ESDP battlegroup unit. With the exception of the Serbia/Kosovo dyad, there are regular high level meetings of ministers, presidents and prime ministers in the region, and there has been considerable progress in developing a common regional policy on energy, economic development, transportation etc. Accession to the EU is a fundamental goal for each of the Western Balkan nations, and popular support for governments can rise and fall on how well they conduct EU accession negotiations. For much of the population, particularly among the younger cohorts, joining Europe is highly desirable9, and identity with the EU is viewed as a pathway to overcome the negative stigma associated with a Balkan identity10. From the perspective of the governments in the Western Balkans, it is the EU, not the U.S. that holds the levers of influence and soft power to shape the region and to offer both tangible and symbolic benefits. For the nations in the region, membership in the EU, not only offers economic opportunity, but it also provides a new and desirable cultural identity. The United States welcomes this shift in influence and expresses no intention to compete for influence with Europe. Instead, it is the goal of the U.S. to encourage the Western Balkans to work with the EU, achieve collective security within Europe, and contribute to security through European institutions. Over the past decade, the U.S. strategic perspective on the Western Balkans has been transformed from seeing the region as a long term burden and security consumer for the U.S., to becoming an integral part of the Europe and a contributor to Europe’s security. As Philip Gordon, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs pointed out in articulating the Obama administration’s vision for Southeastern Europe:
8 For example, U.S. forces in the region now total about 800. About 40 serve in Bosnia, to provide training assistance. The remainder is U.S. National Guard personnel in Kosovo KFOR to assist European EULEX forces in supporting the rule of law and internal security missions. 9 In the 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor, less than 10% of respondents in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia characterized membership in the EU as a bad thing. In Serbia and in Croatia those with a negative opinion of the EU was 17% and 32% respectively. www.balkan- monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf 10 This is an argument made by Dimitar Bechev, Constructing South East Europe: The Politics of Balkan Regional Cooperation, Palgrave Macmillan: London (2011).
112 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
We have a vision of a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous region and we believe the path to achieving this vision for Southeastern Europe is through integration into Europe’s political and economic institutions11.
For the United States, security policy in the Western Balkans cannot be separated from security in Europe and European integration. U.S. assistance programs emphasize fostering reforms needed for integration into NATO and the EU and the development of a regional approach, rather than continuing to deal with the aftermath of the conflicts of the 1990s on a bilateral basis12. The U.S. perspective is that cooperation and alignment with Europe are essential for progress in the region, and that “Europe will not be complete until all of the countries of the Western Balkans are full EU members13.” The devolution of significant responsibilities for Western Balkan security from the U.S. to Europe also holds advantages to the U.S. from a hard power/military perspective. As the Commander of the United States European Command, Admiral James Stavridis, testified before the U.S. Senate and House Armed Services Committees, NATOs New Strategic Concept (NNSC) introduces a new way of thinking about security issues. The NNSC underscores that it is more effective to act to prevent security breakdowns and manage or forestall crises when they first threaten to emerge, than to respond only after the breakdown of civil order. The NNSC also reinforces advocates a comprehensive approach involving a range of resources and instruments of power that supplements military assets. Finally the NNSC relies on partnerships, explicitly the EU and the conflict management capabilities of the European Security Defense Policy14. In summary, the U.S. perspective on security in the Western Balkans has undergone a significant transformation during the past 20 years. Regional security is understood to be inseparable from that of European security, and progress and stability in the region depends upon integration in Europe, and close cooperation with Europe. For the U.S., devolution of primary responsibility for the region to Europe is now an accepted and desirable outcome. Significantly, the U.S. is more than willing to take a secondary role in the Western Balkans, and to support fully the integration of the region into European institutions at the direction and in conformity with the EU enlargement process. It expects Europe to take care of itself and does not have the desire to create order in a continent that is not a problem15.
11 Remarks by Philip H. Gordon, John f. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge MA (February 17, 2010). www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/137012.htm 12 Executive Summary: Fiscal Year 2010 Report on U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (February 1, 2011). www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/159358.htm 13Testimony of Philip H. Gordon to the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on European Affairs (May 18, 2011). www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2011/163616.htm 14 Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee (March 29, 2011). http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Stavridis%2003-29-11.pdf 15 Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations: London (October 2010).
113 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
IV. Closing the Security Gap – What Can Be Done
As noted earlier, the security environment of the Western Balkans is vastly improved and much less explosive than the situation just ten years ago, and militarily, no state in the region possesses sufficient armed force to threaten its neighbors. With the exception of the Serb minority in Kosovo, there is no government or mass movement in the region that is committed to overturn the current regional security arrangements or to revert to the chaos and violence of the past16. For both the United States and NATO, the Western Balkans is no longer on the cutting edge of their security concerns and the region is unlikely to threaten collective security on the continent. Russia, for example, has reached an informal accommodation with Europe and NATO regarding the Western Balkans, and is not overtly interested to extend the Collective Security Treaty Organization or Russian security umbrella to states in the region. NATO’s New Strategic Concept gives only passing reference to the Western Balkans, and gives much more emphasis to the outline of NATO’s role in providing global security and crisis management outside the boundaries of Europe. The United States maintains just a token presence in the Western Balkans and has downsized and transformed its military presence in Europe to serve primarily as a logistics or staging area for activities in Central Asia and the Middle East. In short, from the perspective of strategic threats, the Western Balkans is not an imminent threat today, and even Bosnia represents, at most, an irritant, rather than a viable threat to European security.17 Despite these important improvements in the Western Balkan security situation during the past decade, it is important to note that the process is not complete, and that the reform process has not achieved a self-sustaining momentum. The nations in the region are generally far from completing the integration process; a significant number are not fully included in the EU negotiations; and some of the regional governments are still outside the collective security framework. Without a new joint engagement involving the EU, NATO, U.S. and the governments in the region, it is highly likely that the momentum towards integration will slow to a crawl, if not come to a halt and stall. It should be noted that much of the current security reform effort in the Western Balkans has been based upon decisions made at NATO summits and meetings that may be a decade old or even older; and, although it is important to have continuity, it is probably more important to reexamine periodically the premises of the decisions and make changes based upon new developments in the political and security environments. For example, the primary challenge for the multi-national forces in 1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 1999 in Kosovo was to separate and disarm the combatants, restore or establish order, and to prevent any group from amassing resources to renew the armed struggle. The security mission was narrowly tied to ending conflict and only indirectly linked to establishing peace and institutions for
16 Even the Serb minority in Kosovo supports the continuance of the KFOR arrangement as the most preferred option among those available. 17 See Rory Domm, “Next Steps on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Key Elements to a Revised EU Strategy,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, no. 1 (March 2011), pp. 53-67.
114 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential carrying out rule of law18. Today, defense security issues are still important, but security issues tied to individual security, law enforcement, transparency, and the justice system must be addressed as well. One must recall that the 1996 and 1999 NATO military missions in the Balkans were the first ever use of NATO forces in an insecure combat environment. At that time, U.S. and NATO military doctrine were developed for the contingency of full- scale land war involving the Warsaw Pact, not military operations associated with peacekeeping and nation building, and certainly not for the deployment of a police mission in the field19. It is fair to say that the U.S. and NATO ground forces were not prepared for the challenge of operating in an environment without working state institutions, and it was not until after the outbreak of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 that the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO headquarters systematically addressed the difficult challenges of military operations to establish rule of law, carry out nation building, and provide personal security in a chaotic environment. Today, security concerns in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia and Kosovo, are not about disarming combatants. Rather, a strong case can be made that security issues in the Western Balkans today center much more on governance and developing institutions that can govern and protect rule of law20. When the public in the states are queried about security, the issues of crime, police and political corruption, and dysfunctional political institutions rise to the top of public concern21. If security is to be established and if public confidence restored, these issues must be addressed and the NATO and EU missions need to be rethought with the resolution of these issues as the paramount concern. The argument is not that the U.S. and NATO armed forces should be directed towards police and law enforcement, or that civil/military relations be compromised. Soldiers are not trained to be law enforcement officials, and law enforcement needs different skills than defense. Instead, there needs to be an acceptance that the fundamentals of the missions in the Western Balkans be reexamined, and that the goals, objectives, and activities of the missions be renegotiated. More flexibility can be added to the planning and review process to institutionalize regular reassessments to determine the appropriate mix of assets and the appropriate rules of engagement. In environments where the rule of law is seriously endangered, law enforcement should have greater weight22. Defense and law enforcement assets would be co- dependent upon one another, rather than assigned to autonomous missions under
18 See the analysis by Dennis Blease, “Lessons from NATO’s Military Missions in the Western Balkans, Connections, The Quarterly Journal, Vol. 9, no. 3 (Summer 2010), pp 3-18. 19 Predrag Jurekovic, “15 years of Peace-Building Activities in the Balkans – Lessons Learnt and Current Challenges,” Policy recommendations of the 20th Workshop of the Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe, convened in Reichenau, Austria (April 23-25, 2010). 20 Amadeo Watkins, “Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia 2000-2010” Initiative for Peacebuilding: Brussels (January 2010) makes the argument for Serbia, but it can be applied to the region as a whole as well. 21 For example, see Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010 Summary of Findings, www.balkan- monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf 22 For example, the EULEX mission in Kosovo is performing a vital service, but its impact would have been much greater if the KFOR and UNMIK mission had access to these assets and had been able to coordinate them beginning in 1999.
115 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential different agencies with different command and control structures23. At regular intervals, the relative strength of each security component would be readjusted to respond to changes on the ground; and as much as practical, budgets should be assigned functionally to the security mission, rather than stovepiped structurally according to governmental ministry. In short, security issues could be better managed through a whole of government approach, and a more effective disposition of assets could be achieved by smart power decision-making. The current relaxed security environment with in the Western Balkans may be an opportune time for the U.S. and European and Western Balkan partners to reexamine their programs and objectives in the region and to build a new set of initiative and guiding principles that can complete the security mission. For its part, the U.S. can apply the principles of Smart Power and allocate more effectively its diplomatic, informational, economic, and military resources. It can tap the expertise of a wide range of governmental agencies to build a comprehensive strategic plan for security in the region in concert with the regional officials and European partners. Finally, the reassessment process can move from the current top down imposition of programs, based on strict conditionality, to a process that primarily engages regional officials and places an emphasis on developing indigenous advocacy and support for change. If the status quo continues, the concerns are that the security reform process in the Western Balkans may lose all momentum and stall, and that undesirable practices and accommodations in the region will become accepted permanent practice. With a little bit of effort and planning, however, it is possible for the United States, European Union, and the governments in the region to stand up a fresh and reinvigorated joint initiative that may realize the vision of a community in the Western Balkans that is integrated in Europe, and has the full potential to be prosperous, secure and democratic.
23 It can be argued that the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan applies the smart power, whole of government model in the assignment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that perform civil administration and economic and social development projects. With modifications, a similar process could be developed for application in the Western Balkans.
116 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 United States National Security Policy and the Western Balkans: Assessment and Future Potential
Literature:
- Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power. Public Affairs: New York (2011), pp. 207-208. - Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rule: America’s path to Permanent War, Metropolitan Books: New York (2010), - Dimitar Bechev, Constructing South East Europe: The Politics of Balkan Regional Cooperation, Palgrave Macmillan: London (2011). - Philip H. Gordon, John f. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge MA (February 17, 2010). www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/137012.htm - Executive Summary: Fiscal Year 2010 Report on U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (February 1, 2011). www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/159358.htm - Testimony of Philip H. Gordon to the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on European Affairs (May 18, 2011). www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2011/163616.htm - Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee (March 29, 2011). http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Stavridis%2003- 29-11.pdf - Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations: London (October 2010). - The Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/database/ - Rory Domm, “Next Steps on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Key Elements to a Revised EU Strategy,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, no. 1 (March 2011), pp. 53-67. - Dennis Blease, “Lessons from NATO’s Military Missions in the Western Balkans, Connections, The Quarterly Journal, Vol. 9, no. 3 (Summer 2010), pp 3-18. - Predrag Jurekovic, “15 years of Peace-Building Activities in the Balkans – Lessons Learnt and Current Challenges,” Policy recommendations of the 20th Workshop of the Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe, convened in Reichenau, Austria (April 23-25, 2010). - Amadeo Watkins, “Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia 2000-2010” Initiative for Peacebuilding: Brussels (January 2010) makes the argument for Serbia, but it can be applied to the region as a whole as well. - Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010 Summary of Findings, www.balkan- monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf
117 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Jozo Radoš1 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia
On the 20th of July of this year, the Directive of the European Commission (EC) on the safety of toys according to which the toys that are manufactured in or imported into the EU must not contain substances that may cause cancer and genetic mutations, impair reproductive capacity or cause allergies and may contain smaller amounts of other harmful substances than before, entered into force. Likewise, small toys that are sold with some food items (for example, cornflakes) will have to have special packaging to prevent the danger of being swallowed by children. The toy industry association warns that the new regulations could increase costs for about 2,000 manufacturers which employ about 100,000 workers, and such an increase in production costs could result in increased prices, reduced production, staff reductions and more. It can be assumed that this measure will have a serious impact on the toy manufacturers in China who produce 86.2% of all imported toys within the EU. This somewhat unusual introduction to safety, even about toys, serves to illustrate how EU regulations, which at first glance may seem insignificant, could have serious implications for a large amount of people. This, of course, relates to the obligations which the Republic of Croatia accepted during the process of EU accession. Since only a few areas of the negotiations were at the focus of public interest, it is interesting to carry out a more detailed analysis of other areas. One area that was opened and closed without much media attention, and thus without insight of the broad public, is security and defense. This area is mainly contained in two negotiating chapters: Chaper 31, Foreign, Security and Defense Policy and Chapter 24, Justice, Freedom and Security, and to a smaller extent in Chapter 30, Foreign Relations. Since this is a particularly important area it is necessary to determine in detail what obligations the Republic of Croatia has accepted and try to assess what the implications of these obligations may be. For the aforementioned analysis documents on the negotiations for Chapters 31, 24 and 30 were used, which are available on the website of the Croatian Government (www.vlada.hr) and they are: the Report on screening, the Croatian negotiating position and its addendum and the Report on compliance with commitments, for each of the mentioned chapters. Furthermore, annual EC Progress Reports were used in which each Chapter was treated separately. The latter can also be found on the website of the EC (www.ec.europa.eu).
1 Jozo Radoš, M.A., Observer of the Croatian Parliament in the European Parliament
118 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia
Analytical Review of the European Commission
An analytical review determines the harmonization of laws and procedures of Croatia and the EU and indicates the required process for harmonization. The expectations and demands which are made are often very general, for example "follow the objectives of the directives and political decisions of the EU" and is classed with "common EU positions, declarations, statements and demarches," but there are more concrete and, to a lesser extent, very precise requirements.
Thus, in Chapter 31 as specific requirements the following are listed: - develop readiness for "full and effective implementation of restrictive measures," - "to strengthen national legislation, management and administrative practices" for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, - "to adjust its security procedures and systems for the exchange of classified informationsecurity requirements of EU policy.˝ These types of expectations are contained in the descriptions of certain activities, such as: - the "National Strategy and Action Plan" for the control of small arms and light weapons is in progress and - "the reorganization of the Ministry of Defence and Chief of Staff with respect to future actions in the field of ESDP is in progress.˝ Precisely defined tasks within Chapter 31 are: - "increase of Croatian armed forces participating in missions abroad from the current 200 to around 600 by 2010, and to 700 members from 2011 onwards," - preparations for "participation in EU battle groups between the 2011and 2015" and - to improve "its IT infrastructure and to increase the number of professionals who deal with areas of CFSP and ESDP in its headquarters and in Brussels." While Chapter 31 deals mostly with that part of security which is related to defense policy, Chapter 24 deals with the broader areas of security, migration, border control and fight against organized crime and terrorism, respectively. Relatively specific tasks whose execution is expected in connection with Chapter 24 are: - establishment of ˝national coordination for daily exchange of information which will include all law enforcement authorities and security services involved in the fight against terrorism˝ and - "develop administrative capacity within the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime and in the Main Police Directorate." Precisely defined tasks within Chapter 24 are: - "increase the capacity of illegal migrants by building two centers - one in the southern part of the country and one in the eastern" and - raise the effectiveness of border control "by increasing the number of border guards."
119 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia
The security part of Chapter 30 applies to goods with dual use. EU´s expectations of Croatia in this area are: - "on the day of accession to the EU a common control system will be applied for dual-use goods" and - "significantly improve the administrative capacities and the ability to control in this area to ensure the rejection of dual-use good exports that do not meet the criteria."
Negotiating positions of the Republic of Croatia
The basic position of the Republic of Croatia which has been expressed in its negotiating stance is that it accepts the acquis of the EU and in the chapters relating to security and defense it does not seek permanent exemptions or transitional periods. A regular integral part of the point of view is the one stating to which international agreements, organizations and conventions the Republic of Croatia is a member, as well as the one about the activities relevant for compliance with the EU which Croatia has undertaken. After a review of the legislative and institutional framework and recent activities, planned activities are asserted and liabilities are accepted. And the negotiating positions list the concrete, but not completely precise tasks such as the one that will "ensure all technical requirements and strengthen the IT infrastructure necessary for the inclusion of Croatia in the appropriate communication systems of the EU" until the time of accession. Then, section "III. Harmonisation of the legal and institutional framework with the acquis of the EU" follows mainly concrete,and sometimes very precise tasks which the Republic of Croatia undertakes to carry out within a given period, most likely up until time of accession to the EU. In Chapter 31 functions are specified by major security issues which this chapter processes. Thus, the area "sanctions and restrictive measures" undertakes liabilities that with the ammendment of the Act on International Restrictive Measures to ensure "full and effective implementation of all sanctions and restrictive measures of the EU", while for the area of "conflict prevention" no mention of specific measures are made, but merely a continuation of existing activities and international cooperation. The Chapter on "non-proliferation and WMD Strategy/SALW" deals with the weapons of mass destruction and small arms and light weapons. And while in terms of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction only a continuation of the existing international activities is laid out, promoting regional cooperation and strengthening their own monitoring mechanisms, for small arms and light weapons concrete tasks are set out. Normatively they result from the alignment of national strategies for the control of small arms and light weapons with the EU strategy against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition, and include the "continuation of the destruction of small arms and light weapons and ammunition of the Ministry of Defence, the improvement of conditions of storage of weapons and ammunition in possession of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, and increase in
120 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia the transparency of information related to import and export of weapons." In addition, stated as a concrete measure of achievement is "the introduction of an electronic system for controlling export and import of goods to the licensing regime" which will network the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship, Ministry of Finance - Customs Administration, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry of Sea, Transport and Infrastructure and the National Nuclear Safety Administration. In the chapter "security measures and procedures for the exchange of classified information" the decisions of the EU Council, which will be directly applicable in the Republic of Croatia from the date of accession are stated, and the protection of EU classified information by government bodies of the Republic of Croatia are undertaken through "ensuring adequate space for storage of classified documents and information, technical control of cryptographic systems, carrying out regular checks and through appropriate security checks for all nationals who have access to EU classified information." The final section "III.C. ESDP – capacities for contribution "states specifically and precisely worded and very demanding tasks. Croatia is in fact bound "to fully ensure the administrative capacity to monitor all aspects of ESDP that will be needed as a member state" by the date of accession, and one of these measures is to increase the number of employees who deal with the ESDP, in both internal bodies and missions to the EU and NATO. Although it is not possible to easily assess the demands of this commitment because the number of employees is still unknown, for the obligation of the Republic of Croatia that ˝the number of members of the Armed Forces in international peacekeeping missions and operations will increase to about 600, of which up to 450 will be in EU and NATO operations, and from 2011 further increase to about 700 members" it is clear that this will require considerable efforts. To illustrate, negotiating positions allege that Croatia has 271 members in various peacekeeping missions. At the end of this chapter, the Government stated that Croatia had "conducted an internal consultation and began multilateral talks with potential partners with the goal of becoming involved in EU combat groups." As for this final chapter negotiating position for Chapter 31 and the entire negotiating position it could be said that to a large extent, and sometimes literally, the assessment and expectations of the EC screening should be followed. In the first part of and in the negotiating position for Chapter 24 the legislative and institutional framework for the harmonization with the EU is described, an overview of various international treaties of which the Republic of Croatia is a member and numerous EU directives with which Croatian legislation has been harmonized and other activities that enhance the readiness of takeover and application of the EU acquis are provided. In section "III, harmonization of the legal and institutional framework with the acquis" concrete measures which can be made or are planned are noted. Thus, in terms of migration it has been declared that the reconstruction and technical equipping of the existing reception center will continue and that two new reception centers, each with the capacity of 30-40 persons, will be established. This
121 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia activity, as well as increasing the number of police officers working on illegal migration by 23 (from 313 to 336) is planned to be completed by 2009. In terms of border surveillance, the Republic of Croatia declares that it plans to achieve the required number of border police officers at the external border by the end of 2011. With regard to the Schengen area, the goal is set out that all the conditions necessary for the implementation of the "Schengen acquis" be met by the end of 2012. In the chapter "the fight against organized crime," Croatia declares that "until it gains EU membership, it will increase the institutional capacity of specialized bodies" for this task. It plans to do so by introducing a national crime-intelligence system within the Criminal Police Bureau, formation of a national database on organized crime and the identification of "the administrative procedures for cooperation and information sharing between agencies involved in combating organized crime." In the chapter "Terrorism" Croatia announced, in the first half of 2008, its adoption of the strategy for combating terrorism that will follow the principles and objectives of the relevant policy documents of the UN and EU. Negotiating position for Chapter 30 of the Republic of Croatia accepts the EU expectations associated with dual use goods and declares that ˝on the date of accession to the EU a common system of export control for dual use goods will be applied" and that until its accession to the EU it will modify and adapt its legislation to ensure conditions for a "direct application of the acquis on export control of dual use goods." Likewise, the Republic of Croatia is committed to making the new regulation on the list of dual use goods to be compliant with its corresponding EU regulation.
Reports on the Fulfillment of Commitments
Due to the fact that they are dated just before the closure of individual chapters of the report on fulfillment of commitments, they were clearly made in line with the negotiating positions. Shortly before these reports, supplements to the negotiating positions which contain differences in relation to these positions were dated, which was created as the result of the negotiations. In the addition to the negotiating position for Chapter 31 of September 30, 2010 it is stated that only the acquis in force as of September 1, 2010 will be accepted, which means that there are no significant differences compared with the basic negotiating position of May 2008. The beginning of the report specifies the criteria for closure of Chapter 31, which reads: "Croatia needs to continue to strengthen its implementation and enforcement capabilities and transparency of information on weapons and to ensure that the national strategy for the Action Plan for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons is in line with the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and ammunition." The greatest part of this report deals with both small and light weapons. The beginning of this part of the report specifies legislative activities and notes that the Republic of Croatia "fully complies with EU regulations concerning the export, import and delivery of goods for military purposes and will in the future fully align
122 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia itself with any changes that the EU will make in this area." This alignment includes the mechanisms of internal and external reporting on this issue as well as the authorities responsible for implementing the accepted obligations of the National Commission on small arms and light weapons. Of the concrete measures stated is the one about the destruction of all cluster weapons within eight years following the accession to the UN Convention on Cluster Munitions, an action destroying 25,000 pieces of different weapons in the possession of the CAF in 2008 and an action destroying 929 Strela 2 anti-aircraft missiles from 2009. In terms of "improving the conditions of storage of weapons and ammunition," activities of centralized storage of weapons and abandonment of inadequate storage space of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are listed as is the decreasing of the number of warehouses as well as the construction of adequate storage for the Ministry of Defense, for which about 22 million kunas was allocated just for 2009 and 2010. The report cites IT operations, from the installation of a National Information System for border management, which is at most border crossings provides access to Interpol databases and computer programs that are wired to the ministries involved in the issuance of permits for the export of arms and military equipment. Given the earlier secrecy in this area, it is interesting to note that the report on issued licenses for the export, or rather the import of military goods and non-military ordinances which are adopted by the Government is published on the website of the Ministry of Economy. In the final chapter, "IV. CSDP - Capacities for contribution" on the achievement of administrative capacities are spoken about affirmatively, but generally, while the capacities to participate in various types of missions are spoken about specifically speaks. When all the Croatian citizens in various missions around the world since October 2008 to March 2009 are accounted for the total comes 480 (of which the highest number is in Afghanistan and in 123 in seven UN missions), which is a big jump compared to just 271 at the time of writing the negotiating position. Regarding the EU combat group it is reported that Croatia has been participating in its establishment with Austria, the Czech Republic, Ireland and Macedonia, and that under the leadership of Germany, the combat groups will be in ˝stand-by status" until the end of 2012 and that the Croatian contribution will be a motorized infantry company, a platoon for horizontal construction and headquarter staff. In the end, the report mentions the possibility of the involvement of Croatia into the Nordic combat group during 2011 with two transport helicopters Mi 171Sh and accompanying personnel. Finally with the Report on the fulfillment of the accepted obligations for Chapter 31 it can be stated that the Republic of Croatia, with what she has already done and what she is in the course of performing, as well as legislative and institutional measures, has to a large extent fulfilled what was stated in the negotiating positions. The report on meeting commitments for Chapter 24 describes in great detail the dynamics of the execution of the plans set out in the negotiating positions. Basically it deals with the harmonization of legislation and mechanisms of police and judicial cooperation. The increase in the number of police officers to monitor the Schengen border by about 2000, as well as sophisticated equipment as well as
123 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia connected and compatible information systems with EUROPOL and INTERPOL are the most challenging tasks. In a very short report about the fulfillment of obligations for Chapter 30 the completed alignment of regulations related to sales of dual-purpose goods is discussed and it is stated that information on administrative procedures for this area can be found on the website of the Ministry of Economy. And finally, a remark whose content has no direct security impact, but may have an impact on the development of the security policy of the Republic of Croatia. Namely, in the analytical review of the EC it is stated that Croatia shares in the objectives of the EU Common Position on the International Criminal Court and that it "repeatedly resisted pressure from the United States to sign the agreement on exemption of United States citizens," and in its negotiating position Croatia declares that "it will not sign a contract with the United States on the exemption of United States citizens."
Conclusion
Considering the impact of EU accession on the security policy of Croatia on a general level it can be said that the membership in the EU further strengthened the basic principles of security policy, one which the Republic of Croatia has already set in its strategic documents and accepted as a member of international organizations, of which the UN and NATO are the highest. This has to do with the fundamental principles of developing international cooperation and peaceful dispute resolution. In this sense, it is logical to expect, as it is stated in the analytical review for Chapter 31, that "the impact of Croatian accession to the foreign and security policy of the EU will remain limited," but this determination does not necessarily apply to the foreign and security policy of the Republic of Croatia. It is valid only in terms of unmodified strategic principles, but the framework of cooperation that allows and encourages the EU provides the Republic of Croatia an opportunity for greater development of regional cooperation in the new European Mediterranean context, in the context of European politics of the Eastern partnership, and especially in cooperation within Central Europe, Southeastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the Danube and Sava river basin. It is expected of the Republic of Croatia to give a stronger contribution to the stabilization and cooperation in its immediate neighboring region. In addition to being an immediate security interest for the Republic of Croatia, this contribution is also an opportunity for its international recognition. It is precisely in this area, due to close relationships, knowledge of regional specificities and experiences that the Republic of Croatia has, and which could be of great help to other countries in the region, that the contribution and recognition of Croatia is the most natural. Joint projects with Serbia and Montenegro for demining of border areas are concrete examples of such cooperation. It could be assumed that this cooperation and similar projects would be developed without the influence of the EU, but it is could also be assumed that the context of the future EU membership has accelerated this cooperation.
124 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia
Certainly it is useful to introduce clear procedures and availability of information on export and import of weapons. Even before these measures, Croatia largely harmonized its exports with the demands of the EU and the United States when weapons and equipment of strategic purpose were concerned. It remains to be seen to what extent stricter rules and monitoring procedures for exports will hamper operations of Croatian companies in this area. In any case, if the arms producers from countries that have similar technologies will have easier access to some markets than Croatian companies, this will reduce competition and lead them into a difficult business situation. The affairs which the Republic of Croatia has undertaken and the obligations which she has accepted in respect to small arms and light weapons are welcome. If the danger of loss of balance is excluded in the area of light weapons in comparison to neighboring countries, as these countries are in various procedures of verification, monitoring and reduction of armaments all measures have extremely beneficial effects on the internal security and contribute to the end of dissemination of these types of weapons. Such benefits could be achieved by the collection of unnecessary weapons from citizens and the destruction of surplus obsolete and especially lethal weapons, the evidence of their production and distribution, as well as their proper and controlled storage. Even though the administrative and technical adjustments are very demanding and partly require a change of mentality, the most challenging immediate task is the participation in a variety of missions outside the country with about 700 members. If EU battle groups and eventually the Nordic battle group is added to this, then this is a significant organizational and financial effort for a country the size of the Croatia. As it is an important opportunity for affirming Croatia´s security policy. Likewise, increasing the number of police officers who will monitor the external border by about 2,000 is also a very demanding financial task. The question is whether due to this the number of police officers will increase significantly or whether the mentioned increase will be achieved by reducing the number of police and customs officers on the part of the Croatian border that does not constitute an external border of EU. The positive influence of the Croatian accession to the EU can be assessed and the realistic expectation that some procedures to which we are committing in the relation to the EU will result in setting standards and procedures for similar practices within our own administrations that are not directly related to the EU (for example, security clearance and handling of classified documents and information, networking with government agencies to control imports and exports of within the dual-use goods regime, strengthening the IT infrastructure). These standards could positively affect the overall functioning of the government administration. Especially since these require work in the wider security area, in the work of police, customs and judiciary, and the same can be expected in other areas of compliance. For some undertaken obligations, those of a more general nature, it is more difficult to evaluate the mechanisms, cost, effort and time of their creation. However, it is clear that these will have to be taken care of and that it is possible that at some stage of their valuation it comes down to the particularity of requirements to meet these obligations.
125 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The impact of accession to the EU on the security and defense policy of the Republic of Croatia
Literature:
- Croatia 2009 Progress Report (www.ec.europa.eu) - Croatia 2010 Progress Report (www.ec.europa.eu) - Screening report Croatia, Chapter 24 - Judiciary and fundamental rights ( www.vlada.hr ) - Screening report Croatia, Chapter 30 - Justice, freedom and security ( www.vlada.hr ) - Screening report Croatia, Chapter 31 - Foreign, Security and Defence Policy ( www.vlada.hr ) - Croatian negotiating positions on chapter 24 - Judiciary and fundamental rights ( www.vlada.hr ) - Croatian negotiating positions on chapter 30 - Justice, freedom and security ( www.vlada.hr ) - Croatian negotiating positions on chapter 31 - Foreign, Security and Defence Policy ( www.vlada.hr ) - Report on compliance with commitments for chapter 24 - Judiciary and fundamental rights ( www.vlada.hr ) - Report on compliance with commitments for chapter 30 - Justice, freedom and security ( www.vlada.hr ) - Report on compliance with commitments for chapter 31 - Foreign, Security and Defence Policy ( www.vlada.hr )
126 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Mile Lasić1 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging
In his great book, fantastically titled: “Report from a Peripheral Country. Grammar of Geopolitics“, arguably the best BiH politicologist, Prof. Nerzuk Ćurak pledges for the consideration of the idea of BiH “as a corpus separatum of the European Union“, because “only as a separate region of the EU does BiH stand a chance of not being left out of the European Union“.2 One can assume that Dr. Ćurak asks for the impossible out of deep despair and despite his knowledge that something like that is not in accordance with the principles and criteria, i.e. concrete rules of accession to the EU. Although he is aware of the fact that no country with a status of protectorate can become member of the EU, in the key part of his appeal to exclude BiH from the usual procedures of accession to the EU, Dr. Ćurak says: “The international treatment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a real, normal, factual state before it actually becomes one, is only preventing its state-building development and its joining the European Union as a community of real states“. This way, Dr. Ćurak explicitly states that BiH is not a “real state“ and even that, without assistance, it cannot become one, nor can it survive and perform its commitments in the process of accession to the European Union. So, Dr. Ćurak argues that BiH should “be accepted into EU outside of regular procedures and demands (because it cannot fulfill them) as a “special, different state of the European Union, a new corpus separatum“, and that it would be necessary to “assure the international community that everything is better than a long-term disappearance of Bosnia and Herzegovina.“ Taking into account his extensive knowledge on European integrations, this obviously represents Dr. Ćurak's subversive strategy which he describes as “clear and naive in an organized manner“, with elements of utopian thinking, because everything is better than 'this long-term disappearance of BiH“, which can be described as “FBiH + RS“.3 With great respect for Dr. Ćurak's scientific acribia, this must be taken with reserve, since there is no possibility for such exceptions in the EU. Ultimately, there is an oversaturation by enlargement in the European public, even when it comes to the so-called normal enlargements and countries more organized than BiH. Besides, even if such thing would be possible, there are concerns that BiH – without fulfilling the Copenhagen and other criteria of the accession process – would forever remain just a semi-colonial relic unable to step into the society of equal and organized European states.
1 Dr. Mile Lasić, Professor at The University of Mostar 2 Ćurak Nerzuk, Report from a Peripheral Country. Grammar of Geopolitics, Faculty of Political Scences UNSA, Sarajevo, 2011, p. 39 3 Ćurak Nerzuk, Ibidem, p. 44
127 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging
I.
The 2010 Report on the progress of BiH on the road towards the EU – the worst one to date – states the dissatisfaction with BiH's trailing other countries in the region of South-Eastern Europe, especially the fact that nothing has been done in BiH when it comes to the implementation of the European Court for Human Rights' verdict in the “Sejdić and Finci Case “ (there is a possible suspension of the membership in the Council of Europe), as well as the lack of State Aid Law on the level of BiH and failure to establish the Agency for State Aid, since those are commitments stated in the Stabilization and Association Agreement, with a one-year deadline. Due to the failure to fulfill those, as well as 50 other commitments, this key partner agreement with BiH still has a temporary status. Also, a Law on Census still has not been adopted, so BiH will remain among the rare countries without a census in 2011 Since the war ended in 1995, the “international community“ has been present in BiH in different forms, for the longest period as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and with a mandate of the United Nations. These days, 16 years after the Dayton Accord, there are renewed speculations about the closing of OHR or its relocation to Brussels (a part would, allegedly, remain in Sarajevo), which would mark the begin of realization of the so-called pre-Brussels phase in the unstable life of BiH after the war – something that has been discussed for years by so-called patriotic media and citizens influenced by them. This is also illustrated by the definitive separation of the post of High Representative of the international community and the EU Special Representative in BiH, so BiH will have two “high representatives“ from now on (Mr. Valentin Inzko and Mr. Peter Sorensen). However, it has been known for a while that the decision on the definitive relocation or closing of OHR depends on the progress made by BiH in the fulfilling of special goals and conditions (the so-called package 5+2) adopted in 2008 by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council. It is also known that, while OHR is in the country, BiH cannot acquire the status of candidate in its relations to the European Union, formally putting it behind all countries of the West Balkans which enjoy that status (Croatia – on the threshold of EU, Macedonia – candidate status since 2005, Montenegro – since 2010, and Turkey – since 1965), or will acquire it soon (Albania, or Serbia which hopes to get the candidate status in 2011, after fulfilling “avis“). So, the European Union has finally began important preparations for its increasing activities in BiH, but this cannot be practically implemented before the closing or relocation of OHR. It is unknown when this will occur, since the political situation in BiH following the October 3 elections and especially in the spring of 2011 does not provide much reason for hope. Therefore, all possible solutions – or dissolutions, as some hope – are in play, except, unfortunately, the one which would seek a faster route to Brussels, first to NATO and then to the EU, based on political dialogue and compromise. Bearing that in mind, BiH should get benefits when joining NATO, but not the European Union.
128 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging
Due to security and necessary modernization, it would be required for all countries of the West Balkans or South-Eastern Europe to realize as soon as possible that there is no other reasonable road to the EU other than the one through NATO membership. There is a maxim which should be particularly valid in BiH: take all preparatory steps leading to this military-political alliance as soon as possible, for reasons of one's own security, but also for EU membership. Any kind of transferring of national or citizen sovereign and inalienable rights from entity or state level to Brussels only show that here, too, principles of transferred or divided sovereignty are starting to be implemented. Or, using a metaphor by the late Zoran Đinđić, if you have to swallow frogs, it is best to begin with the biggest one. Unfortunately, BiH has not learned much from this wisdom by Đinđić and the country still struggles in fabricated dilemmas or made up scandals as substitutions for establishing economic programs and actions. As an illustration – in April of last year, at an informal NATO meeting in Tallin, BiH was invited to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP), with the main condition to enter into the BiH cadastre registry 69 locations with so-called promising military real estate and for those locations to be given to the BiH Ministry of Defense. However, nothing has been done about this issue to this day. Of course, the fact that NATO is aware that BiH is a divided country represents a much bigger problem. That is why this approach recommends that BiH should be included in NATO conditionally, in order to save it from further agony, and in a manner so that if it would not speak “with one voice“ – which is, realistically, the biggest problem for NATO, given the principle of unanimous deciding – it would not have the right of co-deciding at all...
II.
During the last few years, numerous books have been written in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the European Union, including ones by the author of this text.4 Unfortunately, authors of studies and books on the EU are being ignored in BiH. If you do not belong to one of the ethno-nationalist blocks or a political block which likes calling itself civic and multi-ethnic and is considered better if it produces an equal or bigger amount of stupidity than the ethnocrats, all the books or thousands of pages about the European Union are in vain – you will be marginalized, no one will invite you to round table discussions or ask for your opinion. For the power holder, it only matters when your opinion accidentally matches theirs, when it comes to internal issues, whereby it does not even cross their minds that the issue of Euro-
4 The main part of the 2011 Šipan address offered reinterpretation of the phenomenon of national state model in times of globalization and various transnationalizations, by means of European integrations from my study „European Union: Creation, Strategic Dilemmas and Integrational Reaches (Sarajevo Publishing, 2009). Also, in late 2010, the BiH public was presented my geopolitical study „Painstaikingly to a Political Modernity“ (Udruženje građana Dijalog, Biblioteka Status, Mostar 2010). My new books „Europe Now – Europe Now or Never“ (KULT B / DEPO, Sarajevo 2011) and „Culture of Remembrance“ (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Banjaluka 2011) also deal with different aspects of European integrations. I can describe „Europe Now…“ as essentialy a pledge for a serious understanding of European integration culture, while „Culture of Remembrance“ is an appeal for building a culture of remebrance in the region of South-Eastern Europe, following the model of Germany.
129 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging
Atlantic integrations represents the most important internal issue. After all, in normal countries there is talk of “Europeanization of domestic policies“. However, BiH is anything but normal. That is why the process of accession to EU and NATO is endlessly complicated, banalized and simplified and there is not much difference between the “ethnocrats“ and the “social-democrats“ when it comes to lack of understanding of this phenomenon… Unfortunately, there is no alternative in BiH, no “good guys“ and “bad guys“. At the beginning of the new millennium, the country is still a laboratory example of pre-political community of one-dimensional people, followers and believers – “a country of a captured mind“. And it is known how authoritative ideologies and policies are basically equally dangerous and harmful to the philosophy and practice of open societies, regardless of what they think or claim about it. For example, to accept direct violation of constitutional and legal regulations on the election of municipal and federal authorities, to elect suitable “members“ by the SDP-Bosniak criteria among Croats, to form coalitions with the nationalists from SDA while demonizing their likes in HDZ, to pledge to ZAVNOBiH while sharing a table with Jurišić- and Djapić-supporting extreme rightists), majorizing Croats at every occasion, branding them “demos“, not unlike Alevis and Kurds in Turkey (oh, this intoxicating smell of “neo-Osmanism“), and eventually distributing seats to one's cousins or assistants – this all means to be completely equaled with ethnocrats and accept the suicide of a possible alternative in BiH. For all those reasons, such political harakiri is primarily an aesthetic and ethical, but also an ethnic issue, which must be said, whether someone likes it or not. Unfortunately, only a few in BiH understand this, particularly among the Bosniaks, but luckily they exist. But, other than a few honorable intellectuals among the Bosniaks, almost no one has stood up against this “great-Bosniak maneuver“ or “great-Serbian reprise“ whose results are catastrophic not only for Croats, but for Bosniaks and Serbs, and can be for the entire BiH. Criticisms of SDP and the great- Bosniak nationalism disguised as “Bosnianism“ are, therefore, forced by primarily scientific and aesthetic and ethic reasons, while ethnic reasons remain the concern of the bunch who understands only this kind of argumentation. Therefore, following one's conscience and profession, it is necessary to openly criticize the frauds by SDP – from the “Komšić phenomenon“ onwards.5
5 As a proven non-partisan, cosmopolitan (as shown both in my life and my work), supporter of ZAVNOBiH and opponent of the ethnocratic revolution and dissolution of BiH in the war and following it, when I held the side of BiH and the weaker, in 2010 and 2011 I had to stand up against the SDP jacobinist and great-Bosniak nationalism, because today they are the same what at the beginning of the war were great-Serbian, and then great-Croatian nationalism – destroyers of BiH, founded in Mrkonjić Grad and, even the one from Dayton. That is why I was „awarded“ in the media controlled by the alleged social-democrats and Bosniak nationalists, i.e. marked as a „proven Tuđman-supporter and enemy of Bosnia“, as was published these days on a Sarajevo nationalist and neo-Stalinist portal, following my statement about BANU. It included such a barrage of hate speech that half of the comments needed to be removed. All this as response to a honest open letter by eight BiH Croat intellectuals (including myself) a) against the two decades of HDZ lies and manipulations with Croats, b) against the current manipulations with BiH citizens and peoples by SDP and SDA, c) against the undignified speech by leaders of HNV, those who are receiving important awards in Sarajavo for their one-dimensional suitable speech. So, everyone is welcome to keep thinking the world about this type of
130 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging
If you step on their toes, the alleged left democrats, essentially neo-Stalinists, are de facto much worse than their ethnocratic colleagues. Both prefer followers, obedient and servant media and academic workers, which is why both equally represent “enemies of an open society“ (K. Popper)!
III.
Following this approach, all political subjects in pluralist societies must be treated equally from the start, they cannot be more or less acceptable when it comes to ideology or ethnicity. The only difference is whether they are democrats or not, they are differed by contents and methods of political struggle, which is the only way to tell whether they represent alternative or not. Unfortunately, politics in BiH is based on lies and manipulations, i.e. on the manufacturing of fears and enemies, which explains the producing of a democratory, rather than a democratic atmosphere, a situation which implies neither a political society nor rule of law.6 For example, in the endlessly ethnicized and deeply provincialized Mostar, as well as in the entire BiH, many are proclaiming themselves political Europeans, even though that is far from the truth. The best illustration of the anti-European indifference in Mostar is the fact that due to an insufficient number of participants, a seminar organized by the Direction for European Integrations on the education of personnel in public administration organs, had to be cancelled. Of course, someone is to blame for this. In this approach, it is of no importance what Zlatko Lagumdžija is like as a person, or Dragan Čović or Milorad Dodik, but sociologically viewed, they are “ideal types“ (Max Weber) for understanding the time we live in. In fact, with the help of Weber's typologization, we can understand what happened to us in the recent past or what will happen to us tomorrow. All three of them are “ideal types“ according to Weber, each of them is an ideal-typical mirror of the existing political (lack of) culture of non-alternative and no way out. Smug and arrogant authorities and the alleged alternative both essentially despise the political culture of the EU, their role models are authoritative persons and pre-political societies. Both the ethnocratic and jacobinist phony know-it-alls in BiH are “geniuses of emptiness“ (Ivan Lovrenović). Very complex Euro-Atlantic issues are being oversimplified, disqualified and marginalized by the provincialized and self-sufficient political (lack of) culture of all BiH politicians. If one adds to that the “social insensitivity“, or what was
political culture and to directly or indirectly take part in the „contests“. As far as I am concerned, this has to do with equaling BiH social-democracy with ethnocrats and the end of illusions about this kind of alternative in BiH. 6 Despite this, I feel as a „high priest of European political culture“ and „virus“ who, unfortunately, does not spread the infection of European issues quickly enough, as I recently said at a Mostar restaurant Radobolja in front of a group of 40 german social-democrats. The distinguished guests included a former advisor to Brandt, a „manager“ of the German SDP, several university professors, etc. I also said that during the first two years upon my return, everything seems in vain, except for the European studies which I was surprisingly allowed to teach at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Mostar University. When we parted, my dear German friends told me that I must not give up.
131 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging described by Raffi Gregorian as “parliamentary kleptocracy“, we are facing a road to disaster, regardless of who is in power. Therefore, the described type of political (lack of) culture does not only represent the basic of co-relations in BiH, but also the BiH relations with the world. That is why we have anti-Europeanism of a grand format in BiH, and the country faces modernization pains: acquiring the status of candidate, fulfilling approx. 400 measures (Benchmarking), as well as adopting hundreds of laws and thousands of bylaws, which is impossible to achieve with petty politicking and amateurish nepotistic public administration in a privatized, pauperized and destroyed country. With such “ideal types“, one can never reach the EU… Still, the most discouraging is the fact that in the entire BiH the previously described type of understanding of domestic and foreign policies and the BiH relation to the EU – which is none other than petty and provincial – is widely accepted. At this rate, it underestimates the freedom of a citizen and human being, since it does not entail the necessity for sincere and honest speech, for thorough knowledge about oneself and one's neighbors, including the EU. The BiH petty politicians, both nationalists and bullies dressed as alleged social-democrats, do not understand the essence of European integrations and do not wish to know how this essence is mirrored in the culture of political dialogue and compromise.7
IV.
The European Union has come about as a result of «specific and probably unrepeatable historic constellations» - this is a famous thought of the British historian of Austrian-Jewish descent Erica Hobsbawm. This resolute Marxist and leftist, now in his old age, still believes that the EU, with all of its distinctions, could remain on its own for a long time. It could, however, be brought into question due to unfavorable geopolitical circumstances and great political and economic crises. After all, we still live with the consequences of the global financial crisis, the EU itself is facing the “debt crisis“ which could influence the fate of the “Eurozone“ and the European Union. But regardless of that, one could claim that the EU has already became a “civic world power“ in a geopolitical sense, as well as an unavoidable cultural and political-historical alternative, or amendment, to creations and models such as the national state, even if to many of us the latter seems as the only certainty.
Serious European political thought and practice sought for a way to overcome the “ethno-demolishing principle“ in the model of nation-state (as formulated by Berlin professor Hagen Schulze) and have found a solution in the trans-national overcoming of the national state model. However, what we are currently witnessing in BiH is a bitter struggle for the belated establishing of nation- states, on one hand, or the abolishing of already formed BiH nations, on the other. The country is crying out for European political culture and its political elites and
7 That is why I told that social-democrat group from Germany that both Lagumdžija's and Dodik's party yet need to have their „Bad Godesberg Congress“ – in 1959, when SPD definately renounced political violence, opting for evolution, i.e. reforms …
132 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging their spin doctors are producing political fogs and political violence… At the moment when yet another country of the former Yugoslavia is getting “green light“ for joining EU, BiH is in the state of knockdown when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integrations (stand by in the process of the conditionally granted MAP, with no chance to begin with the first ANP in September, as well as total irresponsibility when it comes to fulfilling domestic obligations from the Stabilization and Association Agreement) – it is a scene of a increasingly ruthless battle from the “unfinished war“ (I. Lovrenović) with the idea of a tri-nationally constituted BiH (twice of a separatist and once of a unitaristic type). Very few understand that the European Union itself could represent the ideal paradigm for BiH. In order to understand this, one should know that the EU is not a literal negation of the national state, but an overcoming of its uglier sides, its evil temper, the so-called unsolvable conflicts which in the past could only be solved through wars. The manner of EU's organization and its development for over half a century can be in short described as a formula of overcoming conflicts by means of a partially transferred sovereignty from a member-state to its supranational level, combined with inter-state, inter-government decision-making based on political dialogue and compromise. Both principles secure the harmonization of relations between a part and a whole – a multi-level, inter-state and supranational managing of conflicts. BiH could learn a lot from this… In its essence, the European Union is a historical novum, a sui generis creation. This “otherness“ is best illustrated by unusual syntagms such as «fundamental asymmetry» and «dualism of the supranational European law and inter-state European policy», as well as “negative“ and “positive“ integration and “managing beyond the national state“, coined by scientists such as H.H.J. Weiler and distinguished European institutes like the one in Florence, which recently awarded Ivo Josipović a respectable European award, for his understanding of the very essence of the new European political culture, as well his ability to implement it, regardless of how petty so-called politicians from Sarajevo claim something completely different. In BiH, these unavoidable syntagms are hardly known outside cathedres for European studies. Although each of them deserves a more detailed explanation, at this point I will only say that they managed to encompass something between supranational and inter-state form of organizing sovereign states, which is the main characteristic of the EU. Everyone who really wants to understand the EU should pay attention to its principles, particularly the principle of subsidiarity. In brief, it implies that certain rights are transferred to higher levels of organization and decision-making only if problems can be better solved on the European, rather than national or regional level. This principle was first built into in the EU Maastricht Treaty (1992/1993) and was regulated by a special protocol on the principle of subsidiarity a few years later (1996/1997). This secured, inter alia, that the EU did not and will not become a “centristic», i.e. «centralistic” state. A higher or large entity, i.e. the EU, has competency over a certain problem only if a smaller community, i.e. national state or its province (region or local community) is not capable of solving the problem or it would be better solved on the level of the EU. Accordingly, the basis of this principle is the building of a democratic European Union from the bottom up; hence,
133 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging this principle could be inspiring for the organization of the complicated co-relation between local self-government and various administrations on the municipal, entity or state levels in BiH, only if this were a place where one seriously follows and respects the experiences of the EU and means well for one’s country.
V.
The European Union, therefore, very much represents a historical-cultural and political uniqueness, primarily by the fact that it transferred a part of sovereignty on a supranational level of decision-making thus making a step towards a community of states of transferred or divided sovereignty and “managing beyond the national state“. At the same time, it became a framework for preserving all of its participants' identities, thus creating prepositions for the emerging of a new European identity, or better put, an atmosphere where one can stay himself and be additionally enrichened. This is illustrated by the respect of all cultures and languages of member states within the EU – the Union is an almost ideal framework for alterity, a phenomenon which implies being simultaneously someone else without losing one’s identity, since they both permeate and enrichen each other. Already by definition, ethnocrats are not serious supporters of the EU, because they do not feel like learning about the “managing beyond the national state“. However, the left “jacobines“ are not supporting joining the EU in earnest, just verbally. Indeed, they do write lists of nice wishes, but they cannot and will not give up the culture of competition, which renders them unable to witness European political culture in BiH. That is their main fault and the reason why they are no alternative, they are a part of the problem, rather than its solution. At the beginning of the 21st century, our politicians – regardless of whether they are allegedly left or truly left, allegedly right or truly right – still perceive politics as political violence (that is why this essay used words such as “jacobines“ and “jacobinism“) and practice a rhetoric of ignorance, essentially of emptiness and parasitism. How can you explain to someone like that that the process of accession to the EU is nothing but a “Europeanization of domestic policies“, which is like showing pictures to the blind and singing in a deaf person's ear. It is high time that all political subjects, including OHR and Head of the EU Delegation in BiH, take a look around them and see the sad experiences from the last 16 years, and then start gravitating towards those who found a way to the European Union from similar situations. The European Union can be only reached through a painstaking process of transformation, i.e. modernization, which also entails the democratization of all political subjects with appropriate election legitimacy, including both ethno-nationalists and social-democrats. However, both are still to be made into liberal-nationals or social-democrats. This should, perhaps, be the role of future mediation by OHR and EU, rather than the easily reaching for the Bonn jurisdictions.
134 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 The Road of BiH to EU and NATO or Searching for a Credible Belonging
Literature:
- Ćurak, Nerzuk, Izvještaj iz periferne zemlje. Gramatika geopolitike, Fakultet političkih nauka UNSA, Sarajevo, 2011. - Lasić, Mile, Europska unija: nastanak, strategijske nedoumice i integracijski dometi, Sarajevo Publishing, Sarajevo, 2009.) - Lasić, Mile, Mukotrpno do političke moderne, Udruženje građana Dijalog, Biblioteka Status, Mostar, 2010. - Lasić Mile, Europe Now - Europa sada ili nikada“, KULT B / DEPO, Sarajevo, 2011. - Lasić Mile, Kultura sjećanja, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2011. - Lasić, Mile, Put BiH u EU i NATO, izlaganje 15. travnja 2011. na javnoj tribini „Bosna i Hercegovina i euroatlantske integracije“ u hotelu Ero u Mostaru, u organizaciji Atlantske inicijative BiH iz Sarajeva, vidjeti,www.hspf.info
135 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Arian Starova1 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges
1. NATO membership of Albania – result of many country’s overall democratic reforms and various committed specific transformational efforts in the defense sector (1992-2009)
Albania was among the first countries of Eastern Europe to have applied for NATO membership, in the year 1992. From that time, an intensive and large process of defense reforms began which took almost 17 years, until Albania’s accession in NATO, in April 4, 2009. Considering NATO membership as a strategic goal of Albania, this process of reforms was generally aiming at preparing Albania to meet the NATO standards or criteria of accession for new members. Those standards might be essentially assorted in two groups. The first group consisted of a number of political and democratic standards and, the second one had to do more with technical or military standards. With regard to the first group and considering that NATO is a political and military alliance founded upon some shared democratic and political values and principles of its member countries, all the countries which would ask for membership in it had to comply with the same basic values and principles not only on paper but in practice as well. Hence, for Albania like for all the other countries aspiring for NATO membership, meeting all these standards had to do with concrete issues of the democratic political organization of the country and its domestic and foreign policy. In general, meeting the standards of the first group was meaning to give a guarantee to the Alliance that Albania domestically was a functioning democracy and regionally was not only committed to peace and security but was also in good relations and had no problems with its neighbors. From 1992 until April 1999, Albania carried out many intensive democratic reforms in this direction and established itself as a consolidated democratic state embarked on its way to the Euro-Atlantic integrations. Moreover, in Albania there was and still there is a very wide public and consensual cross-party political support to the country’s NATO membership. The second group of technical or military standards was consisting of a number of other reforms and achievements which were aiming at transforming the Albanian Armed Forces into a fully professional force compatible with the NATO military standards and capable of either facing the domestic security needs or participating in international military missions. Albania and especially the Ministry
1 Dr. Arian Starova , President of the Atlantic Council of Albania, Deputy Defence Minister of the Republic of Albania,
136 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges of Defense and the Armed Forces spent a lot of energy and resources to make this transformation a reality. The following points can display the main reforms made in the Armed Forces of Albania.
Deep transformations in the philosophy of defense management and military education
The Armed Forces and their budget were placed under civilian democratic leadership and control. This important change was based on legal documents such as the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, National Security Strategy, Military Strategy, Law on Defense Policy and many other relevant laws. If during the communist period of the Cold War the guiding principle of the defense was “building a large military force at the expense of the economic resources”, after the democratic changes in Albania the new guiding principle became “establishing the armed forces the country needed and could afford by its own economic resources”. Soon, the goal was set to work for a new small and skillful professional army. Also, a new military education and training started guided by new military doctrines and concepts with an attention focused on NATO standards. These important changes were mainly motivated by the democratic changes in Albania and the end of the Cold War period in general what created related positive changes in the security environment in the Balkans and wider, except for the temporary conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.
Development of the specific legal basis for the Armed Forces
All the reforms in the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces were carried out on a respective legal basis. Besides the above mentioned law which established the democratic civil control in the Armed Forces of Albania there were a number of other important laws introduced in Albania. If before the democratic changes in Albania, the Armed Forces included the Military, Police and State Informative Service, by the new Constitution of the year 1998, the Armed Forces of Albania only are consisting of three components: Land, Naval and Air Forces. During the communist regime, there were no military ranks in the army and the supreme authority in the army were the communist party leaders who were in a hierarchy which had on top the communist party leader of the country. Under the new democratic regime, a law on the military ranks and career in the army was reintroduced in the year 1993. Other important laws on the Armed Forces were approved such as, law Nr. 8087, “On the Supplementary Social Insurance of the Militaries in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”, dated March 13, 1996, law Nr. 9210, “On the Status of the Military Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”, dated March 23, 2004, law Nr. 9183 “On the Military Discipline in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”, dated February 5, 2004, law Nr. 9363 “On the Form and Procedure of the Deployment and Transition of the Foreign Military Forces in the Territory of the Republic of Albania and the Expedition of Albanian Armed Forces Abroad’, dated March 24, 2005.
137 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges
A number of other specific documents serve as well as a legal guidance for the Armed Forces of Albania. These include various decisions of the prime Minister’s Office, the annual Defense Directive of the Minister of Defense, various specific decrees or orders of the Minister of the Defense, a number of regulations on concrete areas of activity, etc.
Establishment of an intensive cooperation with NATO and NATO member countries on the defense reform
The reforms in the Armed Forces of Albania could not be carried out without advice and support by NATO, as to them, this was the general model of transformation and the source of experience and ideas in view of a future NATO accession. From the year 1992, Albania began an intensive cooperation with the NATO Headquarters and other individual NATO member countries on defense reforms issues. Soon after, Albania was involved in Partnership for Peace program (PfP), NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP), Membership Action Plan (MAP), Adriatic Charter Initiative. All these processes were a key to achievement of the defense reforms in Albania. An important role in this cooperation was played by the offices of defense attaches of NATO member countries established in Albania. Special importance had the establishment of the Office for Defense Cooperation (ODC) with the USA in the premises of the Albanian Ministry of Defense. Also, other groups of American defense experts were very assisting such as SAIC and CUBIC by their specialized advice. Along with this very fruitful intensive process of cooperation, Albania created its own group of defense reform experts and laid the basis for the further transformations in the Albanian defense. Along with cooperation on defense reforms, Albania began its concrete contribution to the NATO’s role and military missions for the international security.
Downsize and restructuring of the armed forces
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist regime in Albania, it became a priority necessity to remove a heavy burden from the economy of the country and individual Albanians like the existing huge armed force. In a few years, they changed from a large territorial defense force of more than 100 thousand active military personnel and 400 thousand reserve force in the year 1992 into a fully professional force in December 2010. From about one thousand military facilities in the year 1992 Albania reduced them into less than 90 ones and has got ideas to plan further concentration of those facilities. In 17 years, Albania carried out two Strategic Defense Reviews, respectively in the years 2002 and 2006 which played a key role in the process of downsizing and restructuring. The entire process my be considered as well a very painful one with major sacrifices on the side of the military personnel who had to be removed from the army what speaks of the steady commitment of the Armed Forces of Albania to move on the road of its deep transformations according to the democratic standards of the military.
138 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges
New military capacities and modernization
In order to be a NATO member country, Albania had to also consider both its contribution to the domestic defense and security under the new security environment as well as its participation and contribution to various allied military missions according to the emerging international security needs. Hence, the issue of modernization was another key element for the transformation of the Albanian Armed Forces. Getting rid of excess and obsolete ammunition and weapons on one side was meaning on the other side replacing them with new modern military equipment. Until the accession in NATO, a lot was also done in this area considering the conditions of Albania as a country with small economy. In a more specific way and in full accord with NATO and its experts, Albania engaged in building a number of operational capacities to be available for Albanian security needs and NATO-led international military missions. This concrete engagement of Albania was embodied in military objective of establishing by the year 2014 of a motorized Battalion Group of about 1000 well-equipped military personnel capable of participating in allied operations. It consisted of attaining of 49 objectives, or Force Goals that were linked to personnel training, new military equipment, infrastructure, logistics, finance support, etc. To that goal, a number of new helicopters and carriers and other special equipment and military facilities were procured until the year 2009 of NATO accession. Albania gradually increased the defense budget to the level of about 2% of the GDP and expressed its commitment to maintain it at the same level until the main objectives of the defense reforms are met. Until the year of accession in NATO, Albania carried out two Strategic Defense Reviews in order to adjust and modernize its military capacities.
Standardization and interoperability
Another very important issue of the reforms in the Albanian Armed Forces is the development of standardization and interoperability in many areas such as those of doctrines, education and training, military equipment and communication- control-command systems, personnel management, administration, logistics, etc. In a way, without standardization there cannot be interoperability among the allied armed forces of different countries. And, interoperability is a key element in achieving various NATO’s international mission goals. The efforts to select and implement NATO Standard Agreements (STANAG) and Allied Publications (AP) began before Albania’s accession in NATO because of the need to support the goals of the Partnership for Peace program where Albania participated. Until the year of NATO accession, Albania implemented a list of STANAG/AP by a decision of the Chief of General Staff of the Albanian Armed Forces, but that list was not ratified in compliance with the procedure followed by the other NATO member countries.
139 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges
Demolition of excess ammunition and weapons as a process to be ended as soon as possible
Albania inherited a very big amount of varied excess ammunition which numbered about 180 thousand tons. Much of it was obsolete and stored in military facilities which were outnumbered and close to inhabited areas. In the course of many years, and especially since the year 1998 when the excess ammunition demolition was placed as a priority objective in the agenda of the Ministry of Defense, it was made possible to demolish about one third or about 90 thousand tons of them until the day of NATO accession. A big number of various weapons were also in those military facilities what presented another serious problem for Albania. The armed forces also eliminated a big number of small and light weapons of them as well as all the fixed-winged fighter aircrafts and combat navy units. Also a big number of artillery pieces and heavy tanks have been eliminated. All the process of demolition of excess ammunition and weapons was well organized and planned and largely supported by foreign partners and donators. This issue, since the beginning of the defense reforms, was considered as a very sensitive and closely connected to both, defense policies and people’s security. It was also viewed as a contribution to the regional security in the framework of the arms control processes.
2. Albania’s main defense reforms and achievements after its accession in NATO (2009-2011)
From April 4, 2009 when, after having completed the official procedure of membership Albania joined NATO, it was involved in further intensive reforms in the defense area with its responsible military and civilian elite being aware of and motivated by the idea of the actual difference between NATO membership and NATO integration. In almost two and a half years (April 2009 – December 2011), a series of other reforms and changes have been done in the defense sector resulting in a number of new achievements, including among them like achievements those to be normally completed in the coming six months until the end of this year 2011. Again, I would enumerate briefly what to me are the most important of these very recent achievements. I will do that not by ranking the achievements in a chronological order but I have tried to rank them according to their importance.
New National Security Strategy, New Military Strategy and other important military documents
As a result of the adoption of the New Security Concept in Lisbon Summit in the year 2010, Albania had to revise and adjust to the new security environment its basic documents of National Security Strategy and Military Strategy. It is being worked intensively to have both of them officially approved by the end of year 2011. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces have also prepared a specific military document like the Long-Term Development Plan until the year 2020. Based on these documents, the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces are working to
140 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges carry out another Strategic Defense Review (practically the third one) for them to be better and more efficiently adjusted in personnel and equipment to the defense and security needs. This document will be guided by the Allied “smart defense” ideas and the respective document is expected be ready by next midyear 2012. Other ideas about the need for a new strategic document on civil emergencies are also being discussed as they are foreseen to be a domestic priority of the coming years. The Training and Doctrine Command and Defense Academy of Albania are considered to be crucial actors in the preparation of the military strategic documents and various military doctrines. A special attention is being attached to their development and modernization in accordance with NATO standards. In the year 2010, e.g., the Defense Academy was included in Albania’s Higher Education System providing for master and doctorate degree studies as well. Also a center for Defense Analysis was established which works on strategic and operational research.
Significant increase of the Albanian representation in NATO HQ and other international staff positions and the respective financial contributions
The number of personnel representing Albania in international staff positions like NATO HQ, strategic commands such as SHAPE, CENTCOM, ACT, ACO, RACVIAC, SEEBRIG, etc., and other bilateral military representations has grown up to about 70 since its accession in NATO. The bureaucratic culture of communication with NATO has been improved in quality by making better selection of the military personnel to serve there. We might speak now of a military elite generation, result of their education and training, but also of their international working environment and activity in NATO HQ and its commands and agencies. Albania is considered by international impartial estimations to be among the best countries for their maintained promises and obligations to NATO. However, there is awareness in the Ministry of Defense of Albania that depending on the improvement of the global financial situation the number of military and civilian personnel might be further increased so that NATO’s intensive activity is properly covered and contributed to. Also, the financial contributions in NATO have been duly increased. During the years 2009-2011, Albania also gave its international contribution by leading the command of South East European Brigade, SEEBRIG. Besides the international representations, participation in other important activities such as international military exercises, international workshops and conferences, round table discussions, various long-term or short-term training courses, etc. have substantially contributed for the defense reforms in Albania with regard to the education of the military and civilian personnel of the Albanian Armed Forces.
Continuation of the Force Goals implementation and army modernization
The process of building new military capacities had already started before Albania’s NATO accession. Soon after the accession in NATO and in close
141 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges cooperation with it, Albanian Armed Forces continued their work for the implementation of the most necessary new military capacities to be built and be deployable for both domestic security needs and NATO’s military operations. However, the concrete engagement of establishing a motorized Battalion Group of about 1000 well-equipped military personnel capable of participating in allied operations which was already embodied in the 49 Force Goals had to be readjusted because of the global financial constraints as well as its implementation postponed by the year 2018. Implementation of the Force Goals was linked to personnel training, new military equipment, infrastructure, logistics, finance support, etc. Despite an unavoidable slow down of the process, Albania is on the right track of their implementation and many of these Force Goals have been already met and this has been assessed by the respective NATO expert teams. As a result of these achievements, the quality of Albania’s participation in the Allied military missions is further improved. The process of preparations for a new Strategic Defense Review will further contribute to the Force Goals implementation. Considering the Force Goals being implemented by Albania as well as the military capacities stated in the “NATO Pool of Forces”, the Armed Forces of Albania are aiming at developing capacities for humanitarian operations in support of civil population and local government in civil emergency situations, anti-terrorist operations in cooperation with other specialized agencies, specialized medical support operations inside and outside the country, special troops combat operations as well as “niche capabilities” like Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Military Police (MP), medical, engineering, Operation Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT), training teams, Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) capabilities Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams, etc. Integral part of modernization in process is also the provision of modern equipment such as 5 new multifunction helicopters, 4 new coastguard ships, construction of a modern national air surveillance system, computerization and automation system of information operating through the entire armed force in a classified network, new weapons, individual military equipment, communication equipment of tactical and strategic level, recognition equipment, establishment of a Center of Control and Report integrated in NATO’s recognized air picture, establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Maritime Operations Center, etc. In general, the modernization of the military is a never-ending process and it would necessarily continue after the membership of Albania in NATO as a key area of military transformations.
Beginning of the official standardization of the Armed Forces
Standardization system of the Albanian Armed Forces is viewed as one of the main ways of the enhancement of interoperability within them and with the armed forces of the other NATO member countries. After the NATO membership, Albania had to establish a comprehensive fully functional standardization system. It was done soon after by the enactment of the “Law on Military Standardization in the Albanian Armed Forces” and in accord
142 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges with NATO Policy on Standardization and other decisions of the Ministry of Defense. There are also other documents of the Ministry of Defense such as, “New Directive on Standardization”, “Standardization Manual”, “Middle-term Plan of Ratification of STANAG/AP-s 2010-2015”, “STANAG/AP Database”, “Integration Plan with the two Strategic Commands of NATO”, “Dictionary of the Standardization Terms”. There is a large number of STANAG/AP-s, but Albania prioritized and selected among them those which were more closely connected with NATO’s policies on strategic level, Albania’s obligations to NATO and the long-term plan for the development and modernization of the Albanian Armed Forces. All this process standardization is being done in close cooperation with NATO responsible standardization structures. In the Ministry of Defense, a Board of Standardization of the Armed Forces has been established which has prepared a Catalogue of STANAG/AP-s to be ratified in the period 2011-2015. It is important to note that all the standardization process is based on standardizations documents of NATO such as, NATO’s Policy on Interoperability, NATO’s Policy on Standardization and Directive on Development and preparation of NATO’s Standardization Agreements. In the meantime, the personnel responsible for the standardization have passed through a number of specific training courses. During the two years after Albania’s membership in NATO the number of STANAG/AP-s ratified by Albania until the summer of the year 2011 reached to 52 and until the end of this year 2011 it will increase up to 70.
New structure and stationing plan of the armed forces and further rearrangements and adjustments
In April 2010, the Armed Forces began another process of their reorganization, rearrangement and adjustments in view of its future full integration with NATO standards. By the year 2010, Albania had fully implemented a new Armed Forces structure and a new stationing plan of them. There are smaller numbers of military facilities now and only 25 ammunition depots all over the country, secure and far from residential areas. Other such rearrangements and adjustments are in the process now and they are expected to be soon approved and implemented by the end of the year 2011. After the full implementation of the new structure of the armed forces the overall number of military and civilian personnel will further go down to about 11 thousand. All the changes in the armed forces structure were aiming at the qualitative enhancement of its operational capacities by being more cost-effective. During this process a large number of military properties were released and restituted to the central or local government for their further administration.
Integrated reorganization of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff of the Armed forces
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In April 2010, the Ministry of Defense started a structural reorganization motivated by the idea of being more fast-acting, efficient and cost-effective. The key to of it was the establishment of an integrated structure, or the merger of some civilian and military departments which used to be traditionally separate. During the preparation process many discussions were organized and various countries experiences consulted. As a result, there were mergers for departments like those of protocol, finance, human resources, international relations, procurement, modernization, military properties, etc. Also, not only the personnel of the merged departments but other departments were reorganized so as to have civilians and militaries working together. Despite many preliminary objections, doubts and related debates over the issue which persisted even during the implementation process, the new integrated structure is now working very well and has already justified its initial motivations.
Establishment of a fully professional army
Another important achievement of the Albanian Armed Forces after Albania’s NATO accession was its establishment as a fully professional army in December of the year 2010. This proved soon to be a strong promoter for the recruitment of educated qualitative soldiers in the Armed Forces who are expected to properly inter-operate with foreign allied soldiers in various mission outside the country. A professional army would ask for more responsibility in the future with regard to the recruitment and qualification and training process so as to seriously consider individual values like initial education and moral integrity of the soldiers as well as their further qualification and education in the due working conditions. Responsibilities of the soldiers extend to their relations with the domestic civil population and their foreign allies of NATO, EU or other countries because it is with them and for them that the soldiers were to be prepared and deployed when necessary.
Beginning of the Development of an effective Human Resource Strategy and military education
Having got a fully professional army has made Albania more concentrate, first of all, on the modernization of the recruitment system. To this purpose, a draft Policy Paper is put together and after a large discussion in the respective structures is expected to be approved by the government. A new law on ranks and military career is also being prepared aiming at a better harmonization of human capacities and advancement in ranks. The human resource strategy includes multiple objectives such as development, education and training of human resources, career management and rank promotion, improvement of working conditions of the military and civilian personnel, treatment and care for the retired military personnel and their possible reintegration in the civil life and work, etc. Now, it is being worked for the digitalization of the entire information concerning human resources and for the creation of a complete database.
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Special attention is being attached to the relations with the civil community and the public in general based upon the principled idea of close links between the militaries and civilians to the benefit of their common protection and security.
Reform of the Military Intelligence Service
Reform in this service involved its organization, modernization of human capacities and modernization of equipments. It is being done with the assistance of foreign counterpart services and NATO’s Intelligence Division. The main aim of this reform is the transformation of the intelligence service into a full support to the Albanian Armed Forces inside and outside the country as well as to the NATO’s intelligence structures. A new draft law is being prepared for the Military Intelligence Service, its organization and relations with other counterpart agencies inside the country or foreign ones.
Additional legal changes which facilitate Albanian participation in missions
A number of other laws concerning the armed forces of Albania were approved in the Parliament such as Law Nr. 10341, “On the Military Standardization in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”, dated August 28, 2010, Law Nr. 8671, “On the Powers and Command Authorities for the Strategic Guidance of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”, dated October 26, 2010, which was establishing the hierarchy of command and strategic management of the Armed Forces of Albania, comprehensive Law “On the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania” to be approved in the Parliament by the year 2011. Me ligjin nr.9363, datë 24.3.2005 “Për mënyrën dhe procedurat e vendosjes dhe kalimit të forcave ushtarake të huaja në territorin e Republikës së Shqipërisë, si dhe për dërgimin e forcave ushtarake shqiptare jashtë vendit”, janë rregulluar rastet, mënyra dhe procedurat e pjesëmarrjes së Forcave të Armatosura të Republikës së Shqipërisë në bashkëpunimin ushtarak ndërkombëtar, brenda dhe jashtë vendit, duke respektuar Kushtetutën, Kartën e Kombeve të Bashkuara, parimet e Organizatës së Atlantikut të Veriut, dokumentet e sigurisë së Bashkimit Europian dhe marrëveshjet ndërkombëtare, të ratifikuara nga Kuvendi i Republikës së Shqipërisë. The Law nr.10218, dated 04.02.2010, made some changes to the above- mentioned law by facilitating the procedures of sending military missions abroad. By this law, the right to decisionmaking is given to the Council of the Ministers on the condition that previously an international agreement has been reached with regard to the status of the Albanian Armed Forces in the territory of the military deployment. In the same law, the procedures of participation of the Albanian Armed Forces in international military exercises outside the country are also facilitated. Up to the level of one company the decision to send it abroad can be taken by the Minister of Defense and, higher than that by the Coucil of the Ministers. These legal changes are so important to the agility of the Albanian Armed Forces in the framework of NATO.
Substantial increase of the demolition rate of excess ammunition
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During two and a half years after the membership of Albania in NATO, the amount of demolished excess ammunition reached the figure of about 50 thousand tons or more than half of the remained 90 thousand tons excess ammunition amount until the end of the year 2011. This highly increased rate of demolition was result of a very ambitious demolition plan on the side of the Ministry of Defense (“Excess Ammunition Disposal Plan”). The previous deadline for the completion of the excess ammunition demolition process was the year 2018, whereas the new current deadline for that process is the end of year 2013. There is established a Special Board under the guidance of one of the Vice Ministers of Defense which monitors and leads the demolition process since the beginning of the year 2010. The main financial supporters of the ammunition demolition projects have been USA, some other NATO countries and the NATO’s NAMSA Agency. It is almost certain that the calculated remained amount of about 40 thousand tons of excess ammunition will be demolished by the end of year 2013.
Improvement of the national system of operational planning and greater participation in the planning system of the NATO forces.
Development of a professional force requires professional expertise and planning. Due to the fact that military capacities cannot be built in a short time, even one year, Albania must think of the capabilities needed in the future military missions inside or outside the country, what means thinking today of what might be needed tomorrow, or planning the armed force capacities being based at least on the efforts and resources of several years. This is one of the most difficult objectives, but through the continuous close cooperation with the NATO’s experts, the Ministry of Defense and Albanian Armed Forces have improved their defense planning system. Recently, the Albanian Ministry of Defense is working to produce, through a Strategic Defense Review process, a Long Term Development Plan 2020 for the development of the military capacities of the armed forces of the year 2020, and their support with personnel, equipment, training, infrastructure, financial and logistic support, etc. One of the important directions of the future capacities for small countries like Albania, is considered the building of “niche” capabilities that are deployable and used for both national and international operations.
3. Increase of the capacities for humanitarian operations in civil emergency situations or in support of local government and communities
As it is well known, part of the security problems for a country are also those connected to domestic emergency situations because of climate, environment, terrorist attacks, grave accidents, cyber attacks, large epidemics, etc. Global changes of climate and environment are increasing the frequency and gravity of unexpected natural events like floods, snowfalls, rains, landslides, earthquakes, etc., while on the
146 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges other side, the various asymmetric terrorist threats will remain for an unforeseen period of time a global threat to peace and stability for individual countries. Under these conditions, the armed forces of any country must increasingly deal with these possible emergency situations in support of the respective populations. In view of them, the Armed Forces of Albania are further developing military capacities to address them. They have developed specific military planning for each of the possible civil emergency scenarios based upon the document of the new strategic concept of NATO and the Albanian past experience in such events. Now, a specific document on the strategy of civil emergencies is being prepared and related researches and analyses are in course. Also, trainings and exercises are being done to establish specific military capacities for humanitarian operations in support of civil population and local government or military operations to face various possible terrorist attacks. Recently, Albania has become more active in its efforts to encourage the development of a regional approach towards civil emergency situations in the framework of regional “Smart defense” efforts. The Albanian Armed Forces have been very committed to and more capable of dealing with emergency situations as it was clearly and publicly shown during the two consecutive very grave river floods in the North region of Shkodra, in December-January 2009-10 and December-January 2010-11. In those events, the Albanian Armed Forces played and outstanding role for the protection and security the local population and support to the local government. There were other emergency humanitarian operations these forces have carried out in other cases of heavy snowing in winter, fire fighting in summer, etc. Only in the two past years, there were many dozens of emergency military operations to face such situations and other similar ones. Of course, in all these emergency situation operations, the armed forces chain of command was under the respective civilian authority and compliance with the respective laws. Not only under emergency conditions, but also in normal situations the armed forces have had an active role in supporting various local governments in the construction of roads and bridges or other types of workings to the benefit of the local community. Logistics Brigade and other specific military units in close cooperation with the local authorities have developed plans for these workings to be done.
4. Progressive engagement of the Albanian Armed Forces in NATO’s military missions abroad long before and after Albania’s accession in NATO – substantial contribution to the international peace and security
Albania was making defense reforms and transformations in its Armed Forces being guided by the idea of “a force in operation and a force in transformation”. Expressed in other words and from the individual viewpoint of the essential reforms in the mindset of the military personnel was “learning by doing”. Following that logic, during the war in the former Yugoslavia, Albania made available its air and port facilities for the support of NATO air strike
147 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges operations to give an end to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later in Kosova as initial steps of its contribution for the international peace and security. In the meantime, Albania began to participate in NATO’s international military missions for the first time after the end of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1996. In this first mission, IFOR, Albanian Armed Forces contributed by 37 military personnel. Despite its limited economic resources, Albania was later directly involved in other NATO’s international military missions abroad. Besides Albania’s participation in military missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR, SFOR) for the period 1996-2007, I might mention participation in NATO’s military staffs since the year 2004, military operation in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom, ISAF) since August 2002, operation in Iraq (Iraqi Freedom) in the period 2003-2008, training mission in Iraq starting from the year 2008, training experience in the operation in Mediterranean (Active Endeavour) in the year 2006. Until the year 2009, Albania also participated in other international military missions such as UN mission and EU missions such as, EU mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Althea) since the year 2007, UN operation in Chad for the period 2008-2010, UN monitoring mission in Georgia (UNMIG) for the period 1996-2008, participation in Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) with specific military contingent since September 1999. All these military operations were considered a precious source of experience, military training and preparatory test for the new reformed armed forces of Albania in the conditions of the modern warfare. The basic idea of this participation in international NATO’s and other missions was twofold, contribution to the regional and international security and preparation for NATO’s accession. After Albania became NATO member country in April 2009, a further enlargement and enhancement in quality of its participation in NATO’s military missions followed and the Albanian military personnel began to be also deployed in combat operations. The first combat mission “Eagle 1” consisting of 44 military personnel was sent in Afghanistan in July 2010 and it will continue on a six-months rotation basis. Now, Albania is carrying out its third mission “Eagle 3”. Now, Albania has got its third mission “Eagle 3” in Afghanistan. Presently, Albania contributes altogether by 7.7 % or about 350 military personnel of its Land Force in missions in, Afghanistan (ISAF), Bosnia-Herzegovina (ALTHEA), NATO Training Mission in Iraq and Kosova (KFOR). In Afghanistan, a part of the contribution will soon be also in the form of an Operational Mentor Liaison Team, OMLT, or Police Operational Mentor Liaison Team, POMLT, of about 20 personnel which will start in the days to come by this July. In Bosnia- Herzegovina, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal, EOD, is operating in support of de- mining of ALTHEA operation. Albania is also participating in the “Active Endeavor” operation in the Mediterranean Sea by providing port support to the allied navies in operation. From the year 1996, when Albania began the deployment of its forces in NATO’s military missions abroad until now, the total number of Albanian military personnel that have participated in such missions is more than 5 thousand.
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5. Successful regional and international cooperation
After the democratic changes of the beginning of the years 1990 and like most of the countries in South East Europe, Albania began to develop a cooperative stand with the other countries of the region and beyond it in the area of defense which, especially after the end of the war in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, increased in dimensions, speed and intensity. One main principle of this defense cooperation was the idea that dialogue and cooperation among countries were important tools of peace, stability and security in the region of Western Balkans and on wider international scale. Another key principle was the idea of cooperation as an instrument of countries’ preparations for their respective Euro-Atlantic integrations. Minor principles were also in the basis of this cooperation like advancement of national interests and mutual benefit, establishment of regional mechanisms for regular consultations, definition of various partnerships, national all- comprehensiveness in the defense issues, amplitude of cooperation areas, etc. This cooperation in the defense area Albania was involved included many areas like collective defense, defense reforms and transformation, defense strategy, development of military capacities, arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, response to international terrorism, military education and training, military doctrines, joint military exercises, peace-keeping operations, standardization, border control and management, democratic control of the armed forces, air space surveillance, research and development, crisis management, civil emergencies management, etc., etc. The cooperation was shaped and developed through numerous bilateral and multilateral meetings and conferences, signature of various agreements, official visits and experience exchanges, common regional projects, establishment of various regional initiatives, regional participation in international military missions of NATO, EU and UN, membership in NATO, etc. The major regional initiatives where Albania participates and cooperates in the area of security and defense are: Adriatic Charter (A-5) established in Tirana on May 2, 2003 and aiming at enhancement of the cooperation among its participating countries for their NATO accession, South East Defense Ministerial (SEDM) also established in Tirana, in March 1996 and aiming at making common efforts by its participating countries to adapt to the new security environment, South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) established in Sofia, in 1996, as an original regional initiative aiming at strengthening peace and security in the region, Barcelona Process where Albania participated in the year 2007, etj. There are also a large number of other lower level institutions and initiatives where Albania cooperates on security and defense issues in its immediate region and South East Europe. On larger international level, the organizations with which Albania has the highest level of cooperation are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), United Nations Organization (UNO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Through this regional and international cooperation, Albania has made a lot of achievements in the recent twenty years: it enjoys NATO membership and has
149 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Albania in NATO – Reforms, Achievements and New Challenges signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU; it is internationally evaluated as a important factor of peace and stability in the Western Balkans; it has changed into a country which provides security by participating in international military missions, it has established and develops increasingly good relations with all its neighboring countries; it enjoys the Schengen visa exemption for its citizens, it enjoys a stable economic domestic development and has good growth rates, in the recent years.
6. Some lessons learnt from Albania’s experience
Lessons learnt are also part of the defense reform. An institutional lesson learnt capability is considered to help in handling key defense reform issues, especially in the operational area. Lessons learnt culture is considered essential to promoting reforms in various sectors of defense. The following might be considered as some lessons learnt from Albania’s experience in the NATO integration process.
Membership in NATO differs from the integration in it. It can be said that the membership of Albania in NATO is a success story in general, but getting membership in NATO is something different from being integrated in it, the latter taking a longer time and meeting more difficulties. The full integration into NATO is something linked to meeting higher standards which on their side require also much more national development efforts, economic resources and military training and education. Albanian authorities on country level and across politics are aware of that and the other current fact that NATO itself in the meantime is in continuous transformation in the face of rapid changes of the global security environment. Hence, in a way, Albania’s integration into NATO is a never-ending process of meeting the changing demands of the Euro-Atlantic community of nations for protection and security. By getting NATO membership, Albania has become a beneficiary country from the NATO, whereas by becoming integrated in NATO, Albania must meet the obligations of its membership like bearing the common burden of responsibilities and cost-sharing connected to the common defense and security. Therefore, for Albania, NATO membership means long-term engagement and commitment.
The popular and political support in the NATO membership process has a great importance as a major encouragement and facilitator for the necessary related procedures and political decisions to be taken by the government and approved by the Parliament. In Albania there was since the beginning of the years 1990 a cross-party political consensus for the NATO integration of the country whereas the popular support for it has always been about 95% according to several opinion polls carried out the last one being three years ago.
Albanian experience of NATO membership process proves the accuracy of the idea of “learning by doing”. The process of cooperation with NATO for ending the war in the former Yugoslavia and later the continued participation of
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Albanian armed forces in international missions while making reforms and transformation in the defense area was estimated to be very helpful to the NATO integration process. A force in operation and a force in transformation – this lesson conveyed by the US forces to Albanians turned to be so realistic and encouraging in the face of NATO membership challenges and further on. The concrete experience from the military missions abroad played an irreplaceable role in backing the defense reforms before and after NATO membership.
Albania as a small country with little resources must attach priority special importance to the manpower, or militaries and civilians in the army and, in general, the investments in soft power and, hence, education and training of the personnel is also of priority importance. For Albania the people and their professional quality are the most valuable asset in its armed forces. This is very important also for the representatives of Albania in the NATO HQ and its two strategic commands like Allied Command of Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command of Operations (ACO) so that they can properly contribute in the consultation process and consensus building.
For small countries like Albania and under the new global environment changes, the national civil emergencies and active role in the support of local government and community must be one of the main missions of the armed forces today and in the future. Every military army unit should have the capacities to contribute in the domestic civil emergency situations. Hence, special importance must be attached to training, doctrines, equipment, rearrangements, etc. connected to civil emergencies.
Albanian Armed Forces should develop civilian capacities according to the principle that war are never won by military means alone. The example of the Provisional Regional Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan must be in focus in building these capacities. Future international mission would more and more need these capacities and Albania must meet this obligation towards the North Atlantic Alliance.
Bearing in mind that Albania must think today of what it might need tomorrow, the defense review processes must be considered a continuous periodic priority of the Armed Forces of Albania. This requires a consolidation of the defense analysis centers in network cooperation with other civilian institutions outside the Ministry of Defense to provide defense reviews with new ideas. Establishment of specific personnel by training them for lessons learnt analyses is badly needed.
Experience of participation in international military missions, first of all in those of NATO, has made it necessary the improvement of the legal framework concerning the financial issues so as to be more compatible with that of other countries’ armed forces.
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The recent experience of the new professional army is more and more evidence that they have a special attachment to their military duty as they remain in their core volunteers who love their profession and their country.
Niche military capabilities are considered by the recent experience of the Armed Forces of Albania as an asset to be further developed in the future with an accent on special forces personnel, counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) unit, medical teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units and other capabilities connected to human resources.
7. Albania’s new challenges
Following the NATO concept of transformation as a continuous never- ending process and in the framework of the New Strategic Concept which reflects fast and asymmetric changes of the security environment, the reforms in the Armed Forces of Albania continue. Their complementary goal is also linked with the full integration of Albanian armed forces into NATO. This process will be long for Albania and imbued with many challenges, a part of which might be the following.
Further development of the capabilities for long-term defense planning and Strategic Defense Review (SDR). In the beginning of spring 2011, Albania started e new SDR and in parallel with it the formulation of a new Military Strategy. Based upon a NATO Defense Planning Capability Survey of the year 2010 and the required capabilities for national and international operations, a new Long-Term development Plan is being prepared for the years 2012-2020. In this framework, it is very important to improve the implementation process of this plan in terms of Albania’s capacity contribution in NATO.
Full implementation of the new force structure and stationing plan of the Albanian Armed Forces with respective changes and adjustments.
Education and training capacities development by building up an improved comprehensive strategic human resource document.
Further Modernization by “smart defense” approaches and regional “pooling and sharing” of capabilities by paying less. Acquisition of necessary military equipment such as, armored vehicles, transport helicopters, coast guard ships, equipment for operation in extremely difficulties of terrain and weather conditions, equipment for detection of Improvised Explosive Devices, fire support systems, etc., Civil emergency situation like the heavy foods of the last two years in Shkodra region proved once more the significance of a regional approach.
Completion of an Albanian Battalion Group available for deployment in NATO’s international missions.
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Completion of the demolition of excess ammunition by the year 2013 despite the current financial constraints.
Development of military capacities along with the preparation of a respective strategic document concentrated on three issues which are usability, sustainability and interoperability of the armed forces.
Development of Albanian military capabilities to be deployed as part of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force in the future, even that it seems to take a longer time then foreseen because of the present global financial crisis.
Further standardization of the Armed Forces by reaching the principal goal of a future establishment of a functional system of standardization in the Armed Forces in the framework of the preparation, revision and ratification of the NATO standard agreements (STANAG) and Allied Publications (AP-s).
New standard of cooperation with other ministries of government agencies such as, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports, etc.
Enhancement of the transparency and public communication of the Ministry of Defense based on the idea that the public opinion should always know how is the taxpayers’ money is being invested in security and defense area.
Research and development to the benefit of Albanian niche military capabilities and cost-efficiency in military capacities.
Continuation of Albania’s role to the benefit of regional peace, security and by further promoting regional cooperation in defense and security issues.
Continuation of participation in international missions of NATO, EU, UN, etc.
There a large number of smaller challenges, of course, but these are some of the main ones. They are linked to different periods of time in the future, some of them being short-termed and others long-termed, but not beyond the year 2020.
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Literature:
- Document of the National Security Strategy of Albania - NATO-s Strategic Concept, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010 - NATO Handbook, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006 - Niche capabilities of the Albanian Armed Forces – A Concept Paper, Military Review 2009 - Military Review (in Albanian), Nr. 4, December 2010 - Military Review (in Albanian), Nr. 2, June 2011 - Military Review (in Albanian), Nr. 3, September 2011 - Military Review (in Albanian), Nr. 4, December 2011
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Jasminka Simić1 Serbia between neutrality and NATO
In light of recent events, the topic Serbia Between Neutrality and NATO can be viewed from three different perspectives: Serbia and NATO, Serbia and Russia in the context of a new Russian Security Concept, and Serbia and EU missions. Namely, NATO Strategic Military Partner Conference (SMPC) entitled “After Lisbon – Implementation of Transformation” was held for the first time in Belgrade (June 2011). The conference involved group discussions and exchange of experiences on different issues (the first SMPC was held in FYR Macedonia in 2006, then in Norway in 2007, Albania in 2008 and in Finland in 2010). The conference in Belgrade was organised by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with the aim of exchanging views and experience on strategic issues of common interest. Among other participants, the conference hosted representatives of the EU Military Committee and Allied Commande Operations. Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace programme at the 2006 Riga summit, after the official decision on the accession of the PfP was adopted by the FRY Government in 2002. According to decision of National Assembly adopted 26th Decembar 2007, Serbia is neutral country in its position towards the other military alliances until a referendum which will decide othervise. In Europe, neutral countries are also Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Sweden, Austria and Moldavia. Between Serbian policy of military neutrality and it’s membership in NATO, there are still calls for a referendum in Serbia on NATO membership, which are mostly motivated not by a desire for an open and transparent debate on the issue of collective security, but by narrow political interests of some parts of political establishment.
Serbia and NATO
Bearing in mind military engagement of NATO in the former SFRY, and especially NATO bombing of FRY, which influenced the redefinition of NATO mission after the Cold War, we believe that it is necessary to analyze the modalities of relations between Serbia and NATO. This analysis is placed in the context of announced next enlargement of NATO as a key element of its new mission, including engagement beyond article 5 Treaty of Washington, and desire of the former Yugoslav republics, now independent countries, for cooperation and membership in NATO. The sequence of NATO accession by the former Yugoslav
1 Jasminka Simić, PhD in political science, Editor Journalist at the Radio Television of Serbia RTS, Belgrade, Serbia
155 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO republics shows the evolution of NATO mission - Slovenia and Croatia are NATO members, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro have expressed a desire to become members, Bosnia&Herzegovina and Serbia have completed the first phase of membership - Partnership for Peace. Why is the position of Serbia regarding the future cooperation with NATO important? All countries in the region of Southeast Europe have similar foreign policy priorities - integration in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, because it will minimize the risk of armed conflict among neighbors. Serbia has another reason - security problem in Kosovo currently protected by the international NATO forces (KFOR). Also, in Kosovo, the EU mission (EULEX) took over (December 2008) the civilian UN mission (UNMIK). Kosovo is a reason for which the cooperation with NATO and eventual membership in this organization are essential for Serbia. Membership in NATO is not only a military but also a political issue, because it implies that new member state will benefit from membership, but also contribute to the security system and take part in collective defense. Cooperation of Serbia with NATO involves two phases: Partnership for Peace phase, which ended with the admission of Serbia at the NATO Summit in Riga (2006), and full membership in NATO, which implies acquisition of rights and obligations under the Founding Treaty of NATO.2 However, there is an option for Serbia, which has been adopted - to remain neutral in relation to NATO. The fact that was bombed by NATO makes this relationship very specific and different from others, especially because Serbian public is reluctant towards NATO. It is up to Serbia to take pragmatic attitude toward NATO, based on its own interests and needs. There are a few reasons why membership in NATO can be accepted:
1. Membership in NATO guarantees the protection of member state territory; maybe not absolutly, but guaratees the protection;
2. Joining NATO will mean joining the Western community of nations;
3. NATO membership facilitates modernization and restructuring of military forces, which Serbia has already done according to NATO standards, which is especially important in the country whose military forces have obsolete weapons and low level of material security for its military officers (Serbia introduced a professional army 2010), modernize weapons and train its military on new methods of warfare;
4. NATO membership facilitates retraining of officers and military personnel, because it imposes strict submission to democracy and respects of democratic control of the military (in some communist countries in which the military was used in the past as instrument of the Communist Party, it is not accustomed to be
2 An official decision on the accession of the Partnership for Peace was adopted by the Government of the FRY in 2002. After that, the government of Serbia and Montenegro officially applied to join the program on June 19, 2003. According to military standards, Serbia was ready to join the Partnership for Peace. However, NATO has to make political decision whether Serbia has become a respectable ally.
156 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO submissive to democratic government), which Serbia has also done. NATO membership will be the first step in this direction. We should refer to several principles observed by NATO important for future members: It guarantees territorial integrity of its member states and does not allow resolution of disputes through war or threat of war (e.g. Greece and Turkey often have tense relationship; they would most likely went to war during 50's of 20th century, if they had not been members of NATO). This means that NATO is to some extent the guarantor of peace for its members, externally and internally. Its member states have formed a sustainable community with a pluralistic security, where the very idea of resolving any dispute between member states by force or threat is a priori prohibited. NATO is a very specific system – it is a military organization, but also a "state of mind." The conflict between Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian terrorists in the southern part of Serbia, in the so-called ground security zone, was resolved with the support of NATO. Since then (2000), this territory has been controlled by the Serbian police. All NATO member states from Eastern Europe were first admitted to NATO, and after that to the European Union, which confirms that political component of NATO's new mission is strengthening and making it an organization which assesses democratic and political correctness of the countries outside EU borders - future members of Euro-Atlantic integrations. Therefore, additional argument for considering Serbia's accession to NATO is the fact that if all neighboring countries become members - what choices will Serbia have? Does this mean that Serbia (which might happen to Russia as well) could be found isolated in NATO "ring", i.e. in the environment surrounded by NATO member states? However, the question of joining NATO is still a psychological issue, because it will be difficult to explain to one part of the population why is the membership in organization which bombed the country important? For them, NATO is still "a metaphor for unwanted American hegemony”.3 In Serbia, there are just opposite opinions: minority - pro NATO and majority - anti-NATO, which proves that democracy and NATO are not compatible, and that NATO means both, outward aggression and internal degradation of democracy. Something similar heard by anti- NATO groups during the NATO summit in Lisabon. This is also supported by the opinion pool results of June, 2011, showing that 15.6% of Serbian citizens support NATO membership (5% less then in 2010), whereas 66.3% are against it. The reason for this can be attributed to NATO operation in Lybia, which brings back painful memories of NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. According to the results of the same opinion pool, 59.3% of respondents support the accession of Serbia to European Union. The next opinion pools taken in August and Octobar 2011 were almost identical, showing that 15.1% of citizens think that Serbia should join NATO, whereas 67.2% are against membership. In the same period, the support for EU accession has dropped to 45%, which is the lowest level recorded so far.4 The reasons for this are difficult economic and social conditions and disappointment of citizens due to the global financial
3 For more details about the political and security issues in the Balkans, see: Miroslav Hadžić, “Hroničan manjak bezbednosti, slučaj Jugoslavije”, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 185
157 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO crisis, and the crisis in north Kosovo, currently predominantly populated by ethnic Serbs who do not accept the self-proclamed Kosovo’s institutions, as well as the Euro crisis, as the main reason. But, it would be wiser for Serbia to become engaged through a more constructive and transparent approach towards the debates on the issues and challenges of collective security, as well as in the further advancement of a Russian initiative for a new international security architecture. Any decision on future cooperation with NATO is too delicate and complex issue. Before any referendum, it is necessary to conduct concrete security and economic estimates and to achieve consensus at the national level. It also requires good will and a readiness to cope with contemporary security dynamics from a more realistic perspective and serbian national interests through already adopted national strategy. The main threat to the security of Serbia (and the entire Balkans region) in the future, are the existing hot spots on its own territory – Kosovo and Metohija, and in the neighborhood – FYR Macedonia. In addition, the threat comes from the political and criminally motivated terrorism, organized crime and corruption, characteristic of the social and economic problems of the early transition. Therefore, new threats require a new organization of the security sector, particularly military and police, as well as other state and social institutions in this field. Serbia's cooperation with neighboring countries in the field of border control, judiciary and implementation of solutions that have been in the meantime developed in Euro- Atlantic framework, should be strengthened in the future because of the connection between criminal and extremist organizations at the international level. Redefined mission of NATO in the new century, with significant political component, enables communication and cooperation to the extent necessary for the realization of Serbia's own security goals and resolution of the faced by the country on its way of closer relations with European institutions.
Serbia and new russian security concept
Current relations between Serbia and Russia should be discussed in the framework of the new post-Cold War security environment and energy security. Russia and NATO were operating together on the ground. When NATO lounged air attacks against Bosnian Serbs in B&H (1995), Russia criticized this decision, but later backed Dayton Peace Agreement. In line with this, in January 1996, Russia sent 1400 troops to the international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, led by NATO. The participation of Russian troops in peacekeeping forces in Bosnia was motivated by its interest in the resolution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, which brought back Russia to the international scene and symbolically helped it achieve the most in Europe (at the diplomatic level, Russia achieved this through its membership in the Contact Group, which placed Russia among five leading countries). The relations between NATO military forces and Russia military forces in B&H were developing without incident. This cooperation implied joint management of security problems in the future, which was the basis for setting up a NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (signed on May 27, 1997 in Paris). It represents
158 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO a statement according to which two sides will jointly facilitate development of stable, peaceful and undivided continent on the basis of cooperation and mutual interest. However, the period of successful mutual cooperation was replaced by relations “cooling down” due to NATO air attack on FR Yugoslavia. Opposing the use of force without the UN mandate, Russia suspended the cooperation under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council when NATO began air attacks against FRY (March 23, 1999). However, Russian President Yeltsin, despite the deterioration of relations with NATO during the bombing of FRY, believed that cooperation with NATO was preferable option, especially in light of the war in Chechnya and financial crisis that began in 1998. President Yeltsin appointed his representative for negotiations for termination of Kosovo conflict. After the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244, there were 3500 Russian troops (June, 1999) with the international forces in Kosovo (KFOR), led by NATO. Russia has always considered itself a significant factor of geo-strategic balance in the Balkans. A decision of Russian President Vladimir Putin to withdraw Russian peacekeepers from the region (2003) implied that Russia accepted the fact that the Balkans became a sphere of interests of NATO and western countries. Russian officials stated that the decision on withdrawal was not a sign of Russian indifference for stabilization of political situation in the region, but it meant that Russia would continue to participate in the process on bilateral level. At multilateral level, it will continue to act within the framework of UN, OSCE and other international institutions. During 2000, relations between Russia and NATO were restrained, which was partly caused by NATO plans for expansion to the East, and especially the inclusion of Baltic countries and Ukraine in NATO. The activities of Euro-Atlantic allies in the region (Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Central Asia) were often perceived by Russians as a threat to its security and interference in the area of its "legitimate" interest. Shift to the new 21st century was marked by serious negotiations between Russia and the U.S. about the plan for building a "missile shield" to protect the U.S. from possible missile attacks from "outlaw" countries. However, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, on September 11, 2001, changed the Russian-American relations. For the first time after the end of the Second World War, they were on the same side fighting against "the new global enemy” - international terrorism. Russian president Vladimir Putin announced cooperation with the U.S., by linking two intelligence networks, opening air corridors for humanitarian missions, taking part in rescue and search missions, providing more support to civilian and military opponents of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, as well as coordinating activities with its allies, the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Such cooperation with Russia facilitated the functioning and operation of NATO mission in Afghanistan. In a way, it added value to NATO by confirming its new mission, which was completely different from NATO mission during the Cold War period. 5
5 Arguments for the statement is previous paragraph can be found in the Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Members Stated and the Russian Federation, adopted at the NATO Summit in Rome on May 28, 2002. Concluding that “at the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely
159 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO
Cooperation with Russia was a confirmation that NATO has abandoned its Cold War role, and that its mission has transformed to a level that it can accept not only the countries of former Eastern bloc, but also Russia6. The overall cooperation with Russia in the post-Cold War period is a confirmation that NATO has redefined its mission, in relation to its proclaimed goal at the time of NATO founding in 1949. Cooperation with Russia has shown the evolution of NATO, and persistent fear (especially in countries of Eastern Europe) of Russian reaction about specific security issues. The reaction of Russia (August 2008) to the Georgian bombing of citizens in South Ossetia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia area inhabited by the Russian population, declared independence in late 2008), interrupted the new enlargement of NATO to the East, that is, accession of Ukraine and Georgia. For NATO, it is important that its enlargement is accompanied with renewal of peaceful relations with Russia, and provision of guarantees to its member states (Baltic countries or countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and future member states) that Article 5 of Washington Agreement on Collective Defense is observed. Possible accession of Georgia and Ukraine will continue NATO transformation through the so-called horizontal widening process, and considering that this region is strategically important because of its energy resources, political and economic component of the NATO mission would gain more importance, i.e. vertical deepening process of NATO mission will be intensified. Russia’s acknowledgement that Serbia is far away from russia’s borders more than the former countries (Georgia and Ukraine) and therefore Russia should have no reason to fear (NATO’s role or expansion), however, it’s position about Serbia in NATO is rather opposite. Russia supports Serbia on Kosovo and Metohija issue strictly opposing to recognised auto-proclamed independent of Kosovo on 17th February 2008. Russia is not willing to accept possible Serbia’s membership in NATO. Military neutrality of Serbia is more acceptable not only for the Russia’s officials, but also for a certain political parties in Serbia for whom the two countries are closely tied by common history, culture and religion. In addition, the bilateral economic relation is very important, due to import of russian oil and gas.7
interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses”, the two sides agreed to “open a new page" in their relations, in order to "enhance our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security." It is believed that this agreement marked the end of Cold War. In this context, NATO and Russia agreed to observe in good faith their obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. Based on the same document, NATO-Russia Council was established, which provides a “mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro- Atlantic region”. See: Internet: http://www.nato.int 6 Can Russia become a member of NATO? A positive answer is questionable, although Russia has been a member of NATO Partnership for Peace for more than ten years. It is more likely that Russia will not access NATO, but it is an open question whether NATO would be sincere about Russian membership.
7 On December 24, 2008, presidents of Serbia and Russia, Boris Tadić and Dmitry Medvedev have signed oil and natural gas deal under which Gazprom's oil arm Gazprom Neft gets a 51% stake in state-owned Petroleum Industry of Serbia for 400 million euros in cash and 550 million euros in investments. As a part of the deal, a 400 km (250 mi) leg of the South Stream gas pipeline will be built through Serbia, an investment valued at another 2 billion euros. In the first nine months of 2011, Serbia’s top import
160 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO
Within considerations of the future security system in the world and Europe, one should not forget the proposal of Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev (at a meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders on June 5th 2008, Berlin, Germany) to create a new security system in Europe and to sign a pan- European Security Pact, by which he called on all European countries to take part in this process; “each in line with its national capabilities, while any idea of alliances and groups of states should remain beyond this framework”. This means that NATO and the EU member states should not, at least officially, coordinate their positions in negotiations, should the process continue. The pan-European security pact should, in the spirit of the UN Charter, “finally clarify the role and the use of force in the Euro- Atlantic area”, which implies that for any NATO’s decision to be made, an approval should be sought outside the Alliance. President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated this Russian idea of transformation of the current system of security institutions and the signing of a pan-European Pact at the World Political Forum (October 8th 2008, Evian, France). 8 Otherwise, stronger cooperation between the EU and Russia is supported by most member states, particularly France, Germany and Italy.9 Serbia is between the EU mission (EULEX) and KFOR on Kosovo and the the Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Centre for Emergency Situations (administrative section opened at the Niš Constantine the Great Airport on 17 October 2011), which will be open in spring 2012 and provide shelter to about 2000 people during emergency situations. The centre will house a Russian aircraft, which will take part in alleviating emergency situations, primarily in Serbia and the rest of the Balkans, but also in EU countries that need help. It means that euro-atlantic and russian aspects of strategic guidelines of Serbia will determined the place Serbia on the international scene in the future.
Serbia and EU missions
The connection between the main topic and the European aspect of Euro- Atlantic integration is in Serbia’s intention to become a “full member” of EU (the next step for Serbia is status of the candidate state).
partner was Russia with USD 1,88 billion, while the Germany was top export partner, where Serbia exported USD 1,103 billion worth of goods, according to data of the state statistical office. See: Foreign trade exchange of Serbia, September, 2011, http://webrzs.stat.gouv.rs
8 See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, http://www.in.mid.ru/brp4.nsf/2008/06/05/html i http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/html
9 The “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020” was approved by President Dmytri Medvedev on 12 May 2009, replacing the 2000 National Security Concept and establishing a new framework for Russia’s security policy. It is based on national strategic priorities in the areas of defence, security of the state and society, and sustainable development. The main changes from the 2000 National Security Concept are a greater emphasis on the need to improve the quality of life of Russia’s citizens and a less hostile attitude towards the US and NATO. See : ARI 135/2009 – 25/9/2009
161 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO
Meanwhile, ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement by EU countries is already under way, and mostly of the countries (23 of 27) of EU has already ratified it. In light of recent events, two agreements were signed with EU in Belgrade : the first one was Agreement on the exchange of security information, signed on 26 May 2011, and the second one was a Framework agreement on Serbia's participation in EU civilian and military missions, signed on 8 June 2011. These two agreements are necessary in order for Serbia to become a part of the EU's common security and foreign policy, and (its) common defence policy, which means that the military and police will send its members, together with the militaries and police forces of member countries, to those areas that the EU considers necessary. Signing the Agreement between Serbia and EU on participating in EU mission is a step closer to EU and a sign of mutual confidence. Serbia is among 20 countries which signed this Agreement or in the process of negotiation. Current missions of EU are : 3 military missions, in Kosovo, Bosnia&Herzegovina („Althea“), in Somalia, off the coast of Somalia («Atalanta» EUTM), 10 civil missions, i.e. in Kosovo, Bosnia&Herzegovina, as well, mixed military-civil mission in Darfur. First mission of Serbia was in the EU's naval patrol mission off the coast of Somalia (anti-piracy mission “Atalanta” Somalia) at the end of 2011, after the approval of National Assembly. The soldiers went as part of a standing bilateral agreement with France. The officers participated in Atalanta's naval component on the ship of the French contingent to join the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) of Somalia personnel taking place in Uganda, in order to help train Somalia security forces. Just to mention, that serbian observers and medical teams have so far proven very good at UN missions. According to the Ministry of Defence, there are around 40 soldiers from Serbia currently deployed on UN missions. Representatives of the defence system are currently self-engaged in the UN peace missions in Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and the Ivory Coast; they are in Chad together with representatives of the Norwegian contingent, in the UN peace mission in Lebanon together with Spanish contingent, while on Cyprus they were part of Slovakian-Hungarian contingent, and then on 23 September 2011, an entire platoon departed for the first time for Cyprus. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior are engaged in UN peace missions in Liberia and Haiti (where, after the catastrophic earthquake in January 2010, they assisted in saving the injured people and clearing of demolished sites, and from the beginning of 2011 they have been engaged in prevention of cholera epidemics among local population). Serbia and UN Peace Operation signed (November 2011) a Memorandum on understanding that will improve cooperation between Serbia and UN in the field of multinational operation. By including Serbia into a system of stand-by arrangement, the procedure and time needed to deploy capacities in multinational operations will be greatly shortened, which is crucial for getting the approval of the UN for participation of serbs forces in peace cooperations.
162 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO
Conclusion
Bearing in mind that the topic Serbia Between Neutrality and NATO can be viewed from three different perspectives: Serbia and NATO, Serbia and Russia in the context of a new Russian Security Concept, and Serbia and EU missions, one can conclude that for Serbia and the Western Balkans, the EU is more acceptable. In Serbia there is support for the EU, but also an emotional bias towards NATO (the bombings). All Western Balkan countries, apart from Serbia, have adopted a Membership Action Plan and are taking part in peace-keeping missions in Afghanistan. Members of the Serbian Army, police and medical personnel, who are already taking part in UN peace-keeping missions, are also willing to participate in EU peace-keeping missions. Given the intertwining of NATO and the EU when it comes to peace- keeping, and tight joint or successive operations, it would mean that even though Serbia would not be officially taking part in NATO missions, there would be some point where these would intersect. Participation in peace-keeping operations in the world also increases the state’s foreign policy credibility, while soldiers have the opportunity to gain experience in the field and improve their capabilities and interoperability. In supporting the view that NATO is now operating in political and partly economic domain, it can be emphasized that NATO launched a research of acute problems of today, such as, environment, water protection and the prevention and remediation of consequences of natural disasters – floods, droughts, earthquakes, which may also affect the stability of the world. Since 2004, NATO has published reports on achieved results and projects for future action in these areas. If NATO successfully redefines itself as a coalition of liberal democratic countries fighting against global terrorism and wide range of other economic, migration and environmental problems, its transformation will go towards its continuation and adaptation of its mission to the new requirements and challenges of today. For Serbia, it is more important to take part in major european project.
163 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Serbia between neutrality and NATO
Literature:
- Castarede Jean, 50 Ans de Construction Européenne, Studyrama perspectives, Paris, 2007. - Miroslav Hadžić, “Hroničan manjak bezbednosti, slučaj Jugoslavije”, Belgrade, 2001. - Moens Alexander, Cohen J. Lenard, Sens G. Allen, NATO and European Security, Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Humanistic perspectives on International Relations, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, London 2003. - Ružin, Dr Nano (Ружин, Др Нано), НАТО во современите мегународни односи, Фондација „Фридрих Еберт“, канцеларија Скопје, Скопје, 2010. - Simić, Dr Jasminka, U potrazi za novom misijom – NATO i jugoslovenska kriza 1990-2001, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2010. - Issues, Quarterly published by the EU Institut for Security Studies, no 27, The European Foreign&Security Policy Institute, october, 2008., Paris, www.iss.europa.eu - Robert Walter, What future for the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements?, European Defence and NATO, Towards which developments and complementaire, European files, December-January 2011–No21, European Security and Defence Assembly of WEU, Paris, http://www.assembly-weu.eu - Smith Julianne, „La relation OTAN/Russie: moment de verite ou deja vu? Politique etrangere, 4:2008, Revue trimesrtielle publiee par L’Institut francais des relations internationales, IFRI, Paris, 2008. - Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of ESDP, Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2010. http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep20.pdf - Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, April 2009., 4100309.042.doc/2
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Aida Cvjetković1 Šipan – the Golden Island
The Elaphite Islands are situated in the South Adriatic, in near distance from Dubrovnik. They are sparated from the mainland coast by the Koločep Channel and from the open sea by the Mljet Channel. They are encircled by the island of Mljet and the Pelješac Paninsula. Velika vrata and Mali Vratnik protect the Elaphite eight islands and five islets from storms and raging winter waves. The Elaphite archipelago is comprised of: Daksa, Koločep, Sv. Andrija, Lopud, Ruda, Šipan, Mišnjak, Jakljan, Kosmeč, Goleč, Crkvina, Tajan and Olipa. The islands were first mentioned in Gaius Plinius Maior's work Naturalis historia from the 1st century AD. The Elaphite or Deer Islands stretch over some 30 square km. Only three out of the thirteen islands are inhabited: Šipan, Lopud and Koločep. They have population of some 800 inhabitants. In the past, the people made their living from maritime affairs, fishing and cultivation of vine, olives and carobs. Nowdays, the inhabitants are engaged in these activities to an extent, but their main source of income is tourism. Dense pine trees and high-growing macchia cover he Elaphite islands. Greatly indented stone coast, abounding in picturesque cliffs characterized by a wide variety of formations, washed out and hollowed out by waves and wind blows plunges steeply down into the see. The island of Šipan is the biggest an the most populated island. It is situated in the central part of the archipelago, between the islands od Lopud and Jakljan. It streches itself from the promontory Stari Brod over to the promontory Prtuša. It is separated from the mainland by the Koločep Channel, from the island of Lopud by Lopudska vrata and from the islet of Jakljan by the passage called Harpoti. It is encircled by a number of small islets, reefs and rocks: Ruda, Jakljan, Tajan, Crkvina, Goleč, Kosmeč, Mišnjak. The island of Šipan has surface area of 16.5 square km. Its geological structure is formed by limestone and dolomites. Its highest peaks are Velji vrh ( 243 m ) and Sv. Ilija ( 223 m ). In the central part of the island, stretching 5 km in length and 1 km in width, a fertile dolomite plain is situated between two limestone ridges. Its mild elevations are covered by olive groves, pine trees, laurel, myrtle and holm – oaks. The terminal, submerged parts of the valley form the well – sheltered cove of Šipanska Luka in the north – west, and the Suđurađ Cove in the south – east , which is also well – sheltered. There are many smaller settlements in the inland, which are scattered around over mild slopes and valleys: Frajga, Sutulija, Vonjevo selo, Šilovo selo, Ođak, Budim Dol, Dol and Dubrava.
1Dr. sc. Aida Cvjetković
165 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Šipan – the Golden Island
We can find different names in documents that refer to Šipan: Gypanon, Tauris, Giupana, Šipan. The Greek name Gypanon means eagle's nest. The name Tauris is of Roman origin and it means bull. The etymology of the name is derived from the shape of the island as it looks like a bull's head. In the Middle Ages, it was called Giupana and Zuppano, which was the name of district prefect ( župan in Croatian ). The island was first mentioned under its present name in 1370. Stone tumuli on the hill Sutulija, which are believed to be remnants of an Illyrian hill – fort, provide evidence of an early settlement in the island of Šipan. The remnants of villae rusticae, found in the cove of Šipanska Luka, piont to the Roman presence on the island. Tradition also has it that the battle between Pompey and Caesar in 47 BC took place in the passage of Harpoti ( also called the Gate of Pompey ), which separates the island of Šipan from Jakljan. It was through this passage that the Pompey's armada escaped from Ceasar. The Byzantine dominance in the island of Šipan left us some coins from 6th century as well as few toponyms, while an Avar bronze belt ornament was found in one if the graves. Fragments of interlacing – ribbon pattern ( pleter in Croatian ) can be found in number of places, while early – Croatian chapels and small churches are scattered all over the island. The island of Šipan fell under the dominance of the Free Republic of Dubrovnik in the 10th century and remained so until its collapse in the 19th century. We can trace first notes on organization of Ragusan administration over Šipan from 1272. The island was organized as a principality with a rector governing the island. The gothic – renaissance Rector's Palace built above Šipanska Luka in 1450 dominates over the cove, the plain of Šipan ( Šipansko polje ) and adjoining islands. There is a legend saying that Šipan gave shelter to the king of Naples Renato Anjou in the 15th century. Amongst the ruins of his palace, close to the Church of the Holy Spirit , there was a stone coat of arms found carrying the inscription Renatus rex Justus. The original was transferred to London, while the copy was built into the facade of the family house Liban in Suđurađ. Suđurađ and Šipanska Luka are two major settlements in the island. Suđurađ is situated in a small cove in the south – eastern part of the island. It was named after the Church of St. George dating from 1285. In the center of the town there is a rectangular square with a loggia. The majority of buildings in Suđurađ were built in the 16th century. At the very end of the cove, there are two summer residences of the family Skočibuha embellished by towers, gardens, belvederes and small churches. Remnants of the summer residences of the families Getaldić and Ranjina can be found on the slopes. There is another summer residence, covered in frescos, which is situated in the plain of Šipan ( Šipansko polje ). It was renovated by the Dubrovnik archbishop Lodovico Beccattelli, a native of Bologna, in the 16th century. The island of Šipan was one of the most popular summer destinations of Ragusan nobility. There they built summer residences looking over their estates in order to supervise them more easly, but also to be able to enjoy in the beauty of the landscape and in mild and pleasant Mediterranean
166 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011 Šipan – the Golden Island climate. The majority of palaces were built between the 15th and 16th century in gothic – renaissance style. From Suđurađ there are paths leading toward Šipanska Luka, Pakljena and Prtuša. Šipanska Luka is the island's largest settlement. Apart from country houses and villas built in neo – historic style in the 19th century, the late gothic parish church of St. Stephen is very significant. Some thirty churches of historic interest can be traced in the island of Šipan with several built in early Romanesque style. A unique massive church – stronghold of the Holy Spirit was built in Suđurađ in 1577 in renaissance – mannerist style and in the form of cross. It served as a refuge from pirates. It has a double entrance gate with a small room surrounded by walls and with four loop – holes. In the arch of the front gate there is an opening where two canals end. These two canals go down from the roof of the church through the wall. In the case of an attack on the church through the main gate, these canals were used for throwing rocks and hot oil. In the protected part of the plain in Pakljena, we can find the parish Church of St. Michael and the loggia. In the Church of St. Mary of Mercy there are few valuable paintings, among which the paintings of Krilo Nikolino and Flemish master Peter Coecke van Aelst are of special interest. In the Church of St. Stephen we can see the paintings of Panteleone, Saccio and Murato. The island of Šipan is abundant with small one – nave churches built on the top of evergreen hills. In these churches, liturgies were held on the days of saints, in honour of which they were erected. They were also used for strategic and intelligence purpose. In the case of danger, smoke of fire signals were sent from their bell – towers. The palaces on the island of Šipan, which resemble fortified castles, represent the most valuable examples of the Ragusan renaissance rustic architecture. The palaces of Tomo and Vice Stjepović – Skočibuha built in Suđurađ between 1529 – 1577 stand out for their remarkable beauty. Palaces, towers, gardens with promenades, shapels, pavilions and outbuildings are sorrounded by high wall and thus they dominate over the Suđurađ cove. In the palaces of Skočibuha, especially valuable are a gothic wall wash – basin ( in the palace of Tomo ), a wooden ornamental fence called balatur and the best preserved example of renaissance Ragusan garden ( in the palace of Vice ). The garden is designed in form of symmetrical geometric lines with still preserved architectural structure, encircled by promenades, pergolas and irrigation ditches. The front part serves decorative purpose while the back part is intended solely for farm activities. Apart from chapels, monasteries and archaeological sites in the Golden island, as Šipan used to be cold in ancient times, many farm buildings, entire rural and semi – urban entities are under protection. They are all silent witnesses of luxuriant and rich history of both Dubrovnik and Šipan.
167 YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović (ed.) YEARBOOK ŠIPAN 2011
Publishers The Atlantic Council of Croatia Center for International Studies Lepušićeva 6, 10 000 Zagreb Tel. 0038514642000 Fax. 0038514655316 [email protected]
For Publishers Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović Gordan Grlić Radman
Design & Typesetting Rea Poljak
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