Assessment of Potential Risk for Kola's Population from Radiological

Assessment of Potential Risk for Kola’s Population from Radiological Impact of Accident on Spent Nuclear Fuel Facilities

Andrey Naumov Sergey Morozov Pavel Amossov Alexander Mahura Mining Institute, Vsevolod Koshkin Kola Science Centre Yuri Federenko Alexander Baklanov Institute of Northern Ecology (Scientific Advisor) Problems, Kola Science Centre Danish Metrological Institute

Northern Studies Working Paper cerum, Centre for Regional Science No. 21:2001 se-90187 Umeå Sweden

Umeå University cerum, Centre for Regional Science Assessment of Potential Risk for Kola’s Population from Radiological Impact of Accident on Spent Nuclear Fuel Facilities

Andrey Naumov Sergey Morozov Pavel Amossov Alexander Mahura Mining Institute, Vsevolod Koshkin Kola Science Centre Yuri Federenko Institute of Northern Ecology Alexander Baklanov Problems, Kola Science Centre (Scientific Advisor), Danish Meterological Institute

cerum Northern Studies Working Paper no. 21 isbn 91-7305-105-5 issn 1400-1969

Address: Cerum, Umeå University, se-901 87 Umeå, Sweden Telephone: +46-90-786.6079, Fax: +46-90-786.5121 www.umu.se/cerum [email protected] 4 Modelling and Visualizing a Nuclear Accident’s Short Term Impact on Transportation Flows Table of Contents

Table of Contents, 5 List of Abbreviations, 7 List of Figures, 9 List of Tables, 11 The Project “Nuclear Problems, Risk Perceptions of, and Societal Responses to, Nuclear Waste in the Barents Region” - an Acknowledgement, 13 Executive Summary, 14 Introduction, 17 1Modern Approaches to the Risk Analysis, 21 1.1. Base of risk analysis, 21 1.2. Methods of realization of the risk analysis, 24 1.3. Main parameters of risk, 25 1.4. The methods of quantitative analysis of risk, 26 1.5. Mathematical models and territorial risk, 27 2 Normative Regulation of Risk at Liquidation of Radiation Accidents, 29 2.1. Main subjects of legal and normative regulation in Russia, 29 2.2. Persons responsible for decision making, 29 2.3. Normative regulation of a radiation safety, 30 2.4. Some essential problems in the local law and technical area, 32 2.5. Indemnification of nuclear injury, 33 2.6. Attitude of the state and society to radiation risk, radiation safety, 33 3 Description of Objects of Radiation Risk, 37 3.1. Database for the objects of the radiation risk, 37 3.2. Research object and initiative events, 39 3.3. Effect of economical and social problems, 42 3.4. Uncertainty of an estimation of probability of accident, 43 3.5. Time of decision making, 43 3.6. Irradiation feature of accidental brigades, 44 3.7. Climate and Population Summaries, 46 4 Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel, 49 4.1. pc cosyma: Code and partial models, 49 4.2. Accident scenario and source term assessment, 53 4.3. Results of pc cosyma calculations and discussion, 55 4.4. Analysis of uncertainties, 62 4.5. Main results, 63 5 Evaluation of the Potential Contamination, 65 5.1. Methods, Models, Software, 65 5.2. Description of the Accident Scenarios, 68 5.3. Results and Discussion, 76 5.4. Conclusion of the Study, 82 Conclusions, 85 Recommendations, 86 Acknowledgements, 87

Table of Contents 5 References, 89 Internet References, 92 Appendix A Concepts and Definitions of the Theory of the Risk Analysis, 93 Characteristic of methods of the risk analysis, 94 Appendix B List of the Federal Norms and Rules in the Field of Use of an Atomic Energy, 96 Appendix C Criteria on Limitation of Irradiation of the Population in Conditions of Radiation Accident, 99 Appendix D Population in the Settlements of the Murmansk Region, 107 Appendix E Main Equations and Relations of Closure in pc cosyma, 108 Appendix F Accumulated Activity of the Accidental Radionuclide Releases, 110 Appendix G Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Kola npp), 113 Appendix H Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Nuclear Submarine), 116 Appendix I The Probability of Exceeding of the Control Level (Nuclear Submarine and Icebreaker), 118 Northern Studies Working Paper, 119

6 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov List of Abbreviations

aca Accident Consequence Assessment ars Acute Radiation Syndrome at Act of Terrorism Chnpp Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant cosyma COde SYstem from MAria ctb Coastal Technical Base csffm Coastal Storage Facility of Fissile Material fep Features, Events and Properties fmea Failure Mode and Effects Analysis fmeca Failure Mode, Effects and Critical Analysis fsrr Factory Ships of Recharge of Reactors fta Fault Tree Analysis ftb Floating Technical Base fzk Forschungs Zentrum Karlsruhe gd Guiding Document gosatomnadzor Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority (in Rus- sian) gosgortehnadzor State Mining and Industrial Supervision (in Russian) goskomecologia State Committee on Ecology (in Russian) goskomgidromet State Committee on Hydrometeorology (in Russian) gost State Standard (in Russian) iaea International Atomic Energy Agency icpr International Commission on Protection Radiation ines International Nuclear Events Scale iol International Organization of Labour knpp Kola Nuclear Power Plant lc Level of Conditions md Ministry of Defence minatom Russian Ministry on Atomic Energy (in Russian) MinES Ministry of Emergency Situations mintrans Ministry of Transport (in Russian) minzdrav Ministry of Health Care (in Russian) mpa Maximum Projected Accident mvd Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia (in Russian) nrb Norms of Radiation Safety (in Russian) nrpb National Radiological Protection Board

List of Abbreviations 7 ns Nuclear Submarine odm Organ of Decision Making osporb-98 Basic Sanitary Rules (in Russian) pll Potential Loss of Life pwr Pressure Water Reactor sanepidnadzor State Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision (in Rus- sian) scr Spontaneous Chain Reaction sf (snf) Spent Fuel (Spent Nuclear Fuel) snfa Spent Nuclear Fuel Assembles tmi-ii Three Mile Island ii tuk Transport-Packaging Container (in Russian) vats Vessel of Atomic-Technological Service who World Health Organization

8 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov List of Figures

Figure 1, page 38 Some nuclear risk objects located within and near the Kola Peninsula. Figure 2, page 49 An example of dividing of modelled area. Figure 3, page 51 Schematic map of location of settlements. Figure 4, page 56 Distribution of mean and maximum concentration in air 137Cs in depending on distance from a fire’s epicentre. Figure 5, page 56 Distribution of mean concentration in air and on ground of some radionuclides in depending on distance from an epicentre of a fire. Figure 6, page 57 Relation of individual doses for 50 years on different organs of a body with and without countermeasures in depending on distance. Figure 7, page 57 An example of countermeasures – duration of relocation on terms: 1–7 days; 2–3 months; 3–6 months; 4–12 months; 5 – more than one year. Figure 8, page 58 Collective dose on different organs of a body with and without countermeasures. Figure 9, page 58 Relation of individual risk of incidence of different organs of a body on distance from an epicentre of a fire with and without countermeasures. Figure 10, page 59 Relation of individual risk of incidence of a bone marrow, breast, skin and all body on distance from an epicentre of a fire with and without countermeasures. Figure 11, page 59 (Left) Relations of mean individual short-term risk of mortality on distance. Figure 12, page 59 (Right) The maximum estimation, average value, 90-th and 99-th percentiles for risks of mortality of the population on set of different weather conditions. Figure 13, page 60 The probability distribution of the areas, on which one is necessary to execute a decontamination and relocation. Figure 14, page 61 Number of incidence (top figures) and mortality (bottom figures) for the population of modelled area. (The core of nuclear submarine of a second generation; without (leftmost figures) and with (rigtmost figures) countermeasures). Figure 15, page 61 Number of incidence (top figures) and mortality (bottom figures) for the population of modelled area. (The core of nuclear submarine of a first generation; without (leftmost figures) and with (rightmost figures) countermeasures). Figure 16, page 66 Probability density function (pdf) of the wind direction (left) and wind velocity (right) for Yukspor meteorological station (913 m asl). Figure 17, page 66 Autocorrelation function (left) of wind velocity module for Kandalaksha meteorological station (26 m asl), and (right) temporal source scenario. Figure 18, page 67 Gaussian (left) and original (right) 2-d probability density functions. Figure 19, page 67 2-Dimensional field of the radionuclide concentration 25 hours after the Kola npp accident (Log 10 scale is applied). 3 Figure 20, page 68 Probabilistic map of the risk, where concentration exceeds the cmax = 0.005 Bq/m . Figure 21, page 76 Studied model domain surrounding the (left) Kola Gulf and (right) Kola npp. Figure 22, page 77 The vector velocity wind field at altitude of 50 m above the surface. Figure 23, page 77 Example of 137Cs surface deposition with the presence of the (left) “clean zone” near the Kirovsk city, and (right) significant pollution of the Khibiny foothills. Figure 24, page 78 137Cs surface deposition one day after accidental release with the precipitation: included (left) and excluded (right). Figure 25, page 79 (left) Magnitude of 137Cs surface pollution, Bq/m2; (right) Magnitude of the corresponding dose rate of external exposure for the critical man organs from the underlying surface, Sv/s.

List of Figures 9 Figure 26, page 80 Probability of exceeding for the control level (in %) in the Kola npp (left) and Kola Gulf (right) regions. Figure 27, page 81 The knpp area map, probability of exceeding for the control level, and wind rose for the Yukspor weather station (in Khibiny). Figure 28, page 82 The icebreaker basing area map (Kola Gulf), probability of exceeding for the control level, and wind rose for the Murmansk weather station. Figure 29, page 113 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of precipitation and release’s duration for an accident at the Kola npp. Figure 30, page 114 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of release’s altitude for an accident at the Kola npp. Figure 31, page 115 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of release’s altitude for an accident at the Kola npp; case of extreme wind velocity. Figure 32, page 116 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of precipitation and wind velocity for an accident at the nuclear submarine; case of extreme wind velocity. Figure 33, page 117 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of precipitation and release’s altitude for an accident at the nuclear submarine. Figure 34, page 118 The probability of exceeding (in %) of the control level for the nuclear submarine and icebreaker accidents.

10 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov List of Tables

Table 1, page 25 The indications at the choice of methods of the risk analysis for different kinds of activity and stages of object operation. Following identifications here are adopted: – least eligible method of the analysis; 0 advisable method; + most eligible method. Table 2, page 34 Stand of different bodies/organs on some problematic problems of maintenance of a radiation safety and compensation of nuclear injury. A: Nilsen Th. Et al., 1996; B: gosgortehnadzor, 1996; C: gosatomnadzor, 2000; D: Ioyrysh A.I. et al., 1993; E: Government, 2000; F: Hetagurov S.V., 2000; G: duma, 1999; H: Gofman J., 1994;I: Internet, 2000b. Table 3, page 42 Matrix “probability – type of accident.” Table 4, page 44 Quality costs of time by organ responsible for decision making. Table 5, page 48 Maximum radiation risk for the population and different groups of risk. *the value in dose form is established as agreed with regional/federal supervisory authorities; **the maximum rating of a dose is established by competent organs. Table 6, page 48 Ratio of excess of a dose depending on age. Table 7, page 52 Comparison of criterions of realization of some countermeasures on Russian and international standards. Table 8, page 52 Criterions of the food prohibitions and limitations, concentration limit, Bq/l or Bq/kg. Table 9, page 54 Inventory of radionuclides (in Bq) for spent fuel of Navy ns. Table 10, page 63 Risk of incidence and mortality from irradiation during liquidation of accident. Table 11, page 73 Airborne release during the hypothetical accident. Table 12, page 76 The dose coefficients of exposure for organs from the underlying surface. Table 13, page 79 Radiation environment for the population for the average meteorological conditions by settlements (case: plain terrain). Table 14, page 79 Radiation environment for the population for the worst meteorological conditions by settlements (case: real terrain). Table 15, page 95 Matrix “probability – severity of consequences.” Table 16, page 99 Forecasting levels of irradiation, at which one the urgent intervention (Table 6.1 from [minzdrav, 1999]) is necessary. Table 17, page 100 Levels of intervention at a chronic exposure (Table 6.2 agrees [minzdrav, 1999]). Table 18, page 100 Criteria for acceptance of the urgent solutions during initial stage of radiation accident (Table 6.3 of nrb-99). Table 19, page 101 Criteria for decision making about relocation and limitation of consumption the contaminated foodstuff. Table 20, page 101 Criteria for imposing and withdrawing food bans for the first year after accident. Table 21, page 103 Tolerance levels of radiological contamination of working surfaces, skin, overalls and means of individual protection, particles/(cm2/min).

List of Tables 11 12 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov The Project “Nuclear Problems, Risk Perceptions of, and Societal Responses to, Nuclear Waste in the Barents Region” - an Acknowledgement

Since the late eighties, CERUM has developed research with a focus on the shap- ing of and development within the Barents Region. Two specific features have characterised this research. First of all our ambition has been to develop research projects in close collaboration with international and especially Russian researchers. This has materialised as an exchange of researchers at conferences both in Sweden and in Russia. Secondly, our view has been that the Barents region must be analysed by researchers that represent a broad set of competences. Especially our ambition is to develop a deeper and more integrated collaboration between researchers from social sciences and arts on one hand and natural sciences on the other. With the Swedish Board for Civil Emergency Preparedness (ÖCB) as the main finacier, CERUM has for a couple of years developed research within the project “Nuclear Problems, Risks Perceptions of, and Social Responses to, Nuclear Waste in the Barents Region”. This report is produced within the afore-mentioned project. The project deals with vulnerability as a response to the latent security questions associated with the existence of nuclear power and nuclear waste in the Barents region. Clearly there is within the project a large scoop for an analysis with its roots in natural sciences of the size and dispersion of various types of waste from the region. The project also has produced a set of such papers. Those papers raise questions that immediately lead to other papers and a discussion with its roots in social sciences, of civil emergency preparedness in a broad and spatially delimited sense as well as a discussion of the need for an enlarged concept of safety. The pattern of spatial risk dispersion, which in this case not halts at the national borders, and the associated construction of governance in the Barents region also imply that trans-border negotiation, conflict, and cooperation become key words in the discourse.

Gösta Weissglas Lars Westin Project leader Director of CERUM

The Project “Nuclear Problems, Risk Perceptions of, and Societal Responses to, Nuclear Executive Summary

The Kola Peninsula, being the nearest neighbour to the Scandinavian countries, plays a considerable role in the pollution problem in the Barents region. The existing pollution problem is related to two main sources: 1. airborne pollution from the metallurgical companies, and 2. potential risk of the radioactive pollution from the large number of the radiation risk objects.

In our study, we concentrated on the following radiation risk objects: storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel, nuclear power plant, nuclear submarines and icebreakers. It is known that these objects are the main concern for the population and environment in the Barents region. In particular, the Kola npp uses the older generation of reactors and their lifetime was extended, although they should be taken off the exploitation in the nearest feature. There are also problems with reprocessing and storage of the spent nuclear fuel. Lastly, Russia plans to build new nuclear installations – Kola npp-2 and facility for the spent nuclear fuel – on the territory of the Kola Peninsula. Due to these problems, there is a concern in the scientific and public communities about possibility of the potential accidents at these facilities and a subsequent release of radionuclides into environment. For these reasons, we have examined: 1. Available references about radioactive risk objects on the territory of the Kola Peninsula and their characteristics, and elaborated database containing this data; 2. Causes and frequency of the initialisation events as well as large spectra of the accident scenarios with the subsequent releases of radioactivity into environment; 3. Consequences and risks for the population and environment of the Barents region territories from the storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel, nuclear power plant, nuclear submarines and icebreakers as a result of an accidents.

To perform such examination we used several approaches. We applied the cosyma model to evaluate the probabilistic distribution of the radionuclide air and surface concentrations. We study a group containing major radiologically important radionuclides, and evaluated individual and collective doses and risks through the main irradiation pathways. In our study, we used also the three-dimensional mes- oscale model of the atmospheric thermodynamics and radionuclide transport to evaluate the atmospheric transport and surface deposition of 137Cs. Applying statistical tools we estimated the likelihood of deposition and doses of exposure from the underlying contaminated surface on several critical man organs. We found that magnitude of the individual and collective risks varies in the wide interval and within the acceptable limits, except for the group of liquidators. In the unfavourable meteorological conditions and release’s parameters the region’s size of the higher risk will increase and stricter countermeasures will be required for the larger areas including the neighbour countries. Meteorology and terrain have the highest influence on the potential territorial risk in comparison with other factors, and this influence is more pronounced in the Arctic regions. We assume that in the nearest feature the social and socio-economical conditions will have the significant impact on the risk of an accident and it will be mainly determined by the technical decay and increased terrorism activity. A number of recommendations we included in this report. They show importance of the information database’s development into analytical; more detail anal-

14 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov ysis of the storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel; impact of the maximum risk’s sources on the population due to changes in the economical and social conditions; study measures lowering the risk; influence of the possibility for the Kola npp reactors shutdown and accidents on the situation in the Barents region and additional load for the electric and power plants.

Executive Summary 15 16 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Introduction

In the middle of the xxth century, especially during 60s, the radioactive pollution of the environment became evident due to nuclear weapons testing as well as nuclear explosions with the “peaceful aims”. During several decades the mankind introduce into exploitation new nuclear facilities and accumulated large amounts of the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes. In the second half of the century the large nuclear accidents had been taken place. They followed by the subsequent releases of the radioactive products into environment and as a consequence they created problems of the various scale unknown in the past. As the most known we should mention the nuclear accidents at WindScale (England, in 1964), tmi-2 (usa, in 1979), Mayak (South Ural, ussr, in 1957) and Chernobyl npp (Ukraine, ussr, in 1986). It became clearly evident that the problems related to the radioactive pollution as a result of an accident became one of the main important problems in the international and Russian public and scientific communities. Recently, various research projects have been focused on the evaluation of the radioactive situation in different geographical regions. As a result, new insight into problem and new information were provided for both communities. We have had a possibility to evaluate the state of the radiation objects as well as obtain estimates of the potential risk due to accidents with the subsequent releases of the radioactive materials into environment. The quantitative analysis of the radioactive risk objects situated on the Russian territory and, in particular, at the Kola Peninsula [White Book, 1993; Bellona 1994; Bellona 1996] has been done extensively in the 90’s. Cassiopee Project considered problems related to the storage places for the radioactive materials [cassiopee, 1996]. amap researches showed an analysis of the various emission sources including the radioactive sources as well as their transport pathways within the Arctic territories [amap, 1997; amap, 1998]. Some studies evaluate the level of pollution, discuss their influence on the population, and estimate their potential danger. Izrael, 1996 showed results of the multi-year studies of the radioactive fallout after atmospheric and underground nuclear explosions and accidents. Special interest has been taken place after the series of nuclear explosions and Chernobyl npp accident. It was focused on the analysis of the meteorological aspects and modeling of the radionuclide distribution in the water, air and soil environments. Bergman & Baklanov, 1998 presented a detail analysis of the objects of the radiation risk on the Kola North. In their study they analyzed the radioactive pollution of environment in the Northwestern Europe and discussed methodology for risk’s estimation as well as showed modeling results for radioactive situation. American Physics Society’s research group analyzed models of the radionuclide emissions for the accidents at the nuclear reactors above the Maximum Pro- jected Accident [Wilson, 1985]. In 1994 magate published some recommendations [iaea, 1994], which include the study of the large accidents at depositories of the nuclear fuel. This publication suggests the widening of the initial accidental influences and detailing of the accident’s analysis. Since 1982 due to realization of the European Commission Programme – “Methods for Assessing the Radiological Impact of Accidents” (maria) – two research institutes nrpb and fzk developed complex of programs named cosyma [pc cosyma, 1991]. This complex has been used to study consequences of the large-scale above maximum projected accident at the radiation dangerous object in the territories far from the industrial ground. In 1992 a new version – pc cosyma 2 [pc cosyma, 1995] – has been released in order to consider more details in the social and economical consequences of an accident as well as more sophisticated countermeasures. This complex has database for the

Introduction 17 European territories. It includes meteorology, population, and agricultural production. In the last decade the experts’ attention is concentrated on the problems related to the accumulation of the radioactive products in the various environments, radionuclides’ migration within the atmosphere, soil and water as well as a search for a new solution in the storage and processing of the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes. Recently some issues such as evaluation of the potential risk for the territories due to possibility of the large accidents at the nuclear risk objects became an actual issue. The possibility to find a solution for some mentioned above problems for the Barents region territories lies in the basics of this study. This particular study named “Assessment of Potential Risk for Kola’s Population from Radiological Impact of Accident on the Spent Nuclear Fuel Facilities” is a part of the international research Programme “Risk and Nuclear Waste”. The main aim of this Pro- gramme is address the nuclear problems, risk reception, and societal responses to nuclear waste in the Barents region. In the first part of the study, the Mining Institute applied the cosyma model. This model is used to estimate the potential probability of the pollution for the Kola Peninsula territory as well as the impact risk on the population’s health as a result of an accident at the ground facility – depository for the spent nuclear fuel. Such accident followed by the subsequent atmospheric transport of the radioactive substances. To archive the stated aims we solved the following main tasks: 1. Study the modern methodological principles of the risk analysis for accidents at the dangerous industrial objects and production lines; 2. Analyze the modern normative and other documentation related to the questions of the radiation safety as a result of an accident; 3. Preliminary estimate the annual probability of the following possible events – terrorism act, act of war, fire, aircraft crush, and chose the type of accident (for these purposes we planned to use available information about incidents taken place at the radiation dangerous objects); 4. Prepare input data for pc cosyma: source term, meteorological conditions, population’s distribution and other; 5. Perform calculation for the chosen accident and analyze results and their uncertainties.

The second part of the study is related to the estimation of the potential risk of the territories as a result of an accidental release at the objects of the radioactive risk. This research was conducted by the Institute of the Northern Ecological Problems of the Kola Science Center, Russian Academy of Sciences. We paid our attention to the nuclear installations situated at the Kola Peninsula. In particular, we consider the nuclear reactors of the pwr-440 (design 230) at the Kola Nuclear Power Plant, reactors at the atomic icebreakers, ships for the nuclear-technological service, and nuclear submarines. In this part of the study we: 1. Estimated possible consequences from an accident at the mentioned above objects; 2. Simulated and calculated meteorological characteristics on the local scale in the areas of the radiation dangerous objects of the Kola Peninsula; 3. Adapted geographical and meteorological data in the Barents region to perform the modeling of the probabilistic risk from the radioactive releases; 4. Created the risk maps for various potential accident scenarios at the studied nuclear objects using gis technology with ArcInfo/ArcView standards; 5. Constructed the comprehensive database for the nuclear risk objects located at the Kola Peninsula; 6. Participated in the www discussion forum in the frameworks of the Pro- gramme “Risk and Nuclear Waste” (due to low data’s flow rate of the Internet channel (used by inep) the solution of the last task was complicated and often created channel’s overload).

18 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Although the mentioned above problems has been studied, it is also allowed to estimate the current state of the problem and determine main directions for future studies. As we mentioned, two research institutions participated in the realisation of this project: Institute of the Northern Ecological Problems and Mining Institute. Therefore, we applied the following structure of the report. In the Introduction section we showed underlined the current existing problems and complex of important tasks. In Chapter 1 we consider the modern approaches in the risk’s analysis, which we used in our research. In Chapter 2 we describe the existing normative documents used in the Russian and international communities. In Chapter 3 we present information about the main objects of the radiation risk on the Kola Penin- sula, geographical, climatic and demographic characteristics of the Murmansk region. In the same chapter we analysed possible situations leading to accidents at the radiation dangerous objects and consider causes of the accidents. In Chapter 4 we showed results of the estimation of the potential risk after accident at the depository of the spent nuclear fuel located in the northern part of the Kola Gulf. This part was performed using the pc cosyma complex. In the last Chapter 5 we estimated the potential territorial risk for the studied territories in the Barents region. For this purposes we applied three-dimensional model of the atmospheric thermodynamics and radionuclide transport. As studied objects we chose the Kola npp, nuclear submarines, and icebreakers nuclear reactors. The report is logically completed with several main conclusions and recommendations, which may lead to possible future research projects.

Introduction 19 20 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 1 Modern Approaches to the Risk Analysis

The methodical principles of the risk analysis of emergencies on dangerous industrial objects and productions, sub-control to gosgortehnadzor of Russia, and also terms and concepts of the risk analysis, are established in gost:s [gost, 1994a; gost, 1994b; gost, 1995a; gost 1995b] and in the Russian standard [gosgortehnadzor, 1996] (see Appendix A), at compiling which one the standards of usa, Holland, Norway etc. countries used [iec/tc, 1993]. The risk analysis is a part of system approach to acceptance of the political solutions, procedures and practical measures in problem solving of warning or reduction of the danger of industrial emergencies for life of the man, incidences or traumas, damage to property and environment [gosgortehnadzor, 1996].

1.1. Base of risk analysis

The risk analysis is founded on the collected information and it determines measures under the control of safety of industrial objects, in territory which one the emergency situations of a technogenic genesis are possible. The risk analysis should give the answers to three main problems [gosgortehnadzor, 1996]: 1. What poor can take place? (Identification of hazards); 2. How frequently it can happen? (Analysis of frequency); 3. What consequences can be? (Analysis of consequences).

According to item 1.7 of the document [gosgortehnadzor, 1996], criterions of reasonable risk and the particular requirements to the risk analysis should be regulated by the normative documents reflecting specificity of industrial objects. The criterions of a radiation safety and rendered concrete requirements for a decrease of risk from radiation accident pursuant to the modern Russian and international standards will be adduced in the following chapter of this report. The structure of activities under the risk analysis includes according to [gosgortehnadzor, 1996]: + The description of a reason of realization of risk-analysis; + Definition of a analysed system; + Guard ropes of the indispensable initiators for realization of the analysis; + Definition and description of sources of information about safety of a system; + The indicating of limitations on input data, financial resources and other capabilities determining depth, entirety and detail of risk-analysis; + Legible definition of the purpose of risk-analysis; + Selection of a methodology and methods of the risk analysis; + Definition of criterions of reasonable risk.

The purpose of risk-analysis can be following: + Perfection: / The use specifications and maintenance, / The schedules of localization of accident situations and / Operations in extraordinary situations; + Estimation of change effect of parameters of safety at perfection: / Organizational structures, / Methods of practical activity and / Maintenance;

Modern Approaches to the Risk Analysis 21 + Detection of hazards; + Estimation of consequences of emergencies; + Maintenance by the information for development the instructions: / Decommissioning, / For realization of countermeasures at limitation of consequences of accident.

Justification and determinacy of selection of criterion of reasonable risk be by the main requirements at realization of the risk analysis. The basis for determination of a reasonable level of risk from accident on nuclear object should serve: + The local law on industrial, ecological and radiation safety; + Rules, norms (standards) of safety (gost:s, the guiding document etc.) in the field of use of an atomic energy; + The padding requirements specially of authorized bodies influential in increase of safety in considered area, for example, gosatomnadzor, gossanepidnadzor, MinES and etc.; + The information about accident events and their consequences; + Experience of practical activity.

The procedure of identification of hazards is the integral part of risk-analysis, both potentially dangerous objects, and dangerous nuclear objects. For identification the study of a list of features, events and phenomena influential in safety will be used with the purpose of exception certainly less dangerous or rather infrequent for the given object. The result of identification of hazards is list of the undesirable events, which are resulting in accident. After identification of hazards pass to a stage evaluation of risk. The detected hazards should be estimated from the point of view of their conformity to criterions of reasonable risk. Thus as criterions of reasonable risk and accordingly results of an estimation of risk can be expressed as qualitatively (as the text, tables), and quantitatively by calculation of parameters of risk (see Appendix A). The authors [gosgortehnadzor, 1996] confirm that, in practice, an inaccuracy of values of probabilistic estimations of risk even in case of presence of the indispensable information, as a rule, not less than one order. In this case the results of a full quantitative assessment of risk are more useful to matching sources of hazards or different safety measures, instead of for compiling the conclusion about a degree of object safety. In practice first of all apply quality methods of the risk analysis combining special aids (forms, detail methodical manuals) and practical experience of the initiators. The estimation of risk includes: + The analysis of frequency of accident events; + The analysis of consequences of the detected events; + The analysis of uncertainties of results and + Development of the guidelines.

The analysis of frequency of accident events For the analysis and the estimations of frequency will usually be used the following approaches: + Use of the statistical data on an accident rate and reliability similar as object kind or view of activity of the potentially dangerous object; + Use of logical methods of the analysis “of a tree of events” or “of a tree of failures”; + Expert estimation by the registration of judgement of the specialists in the given field.

Maintenance by the indispensable information is a relevant condition for the analysis of an estimation of risk as a whole. The data about reasons and some features of scenario of the most known emergencies which were resulting in consequences, spread for limits of a sanitary protective zone now are accessible: emergencies on npp, nuclear submarines of fleet [Nilsen et al., 1996] etc. Owing to lack of the sta-

22 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov tistical data for a number of originating events and phenomena, in practice is enabled to use expert estimations both simplified methods of an estimation and rank- ing of risk. Thus the considered events are usually divided on value of probability, severity of consequences and risk on some groups, for example, with a high, intermediate, low or minor risk level. At such approach the high level of risk is considered, as a rule, unacceptable, intermediate level of risk requires fulfilment of the program of activities on its reduction, low it is considered reasonable and minor is not esteemed at all. According to the guideline icpr n26, in a context of other kinds of risk the level of reasonable risk from irradiation in range 10–5–10–6 year–1 should be reasonable for any person from the population. For the population of Russia the maximum of reasonable risk is received equal 5·10–5 year–1 [minzdrav, 1999], the level of minor risk for the order is lower.

The analysis of consequences of the detected events The analysis of consequences of accident on usual object includes an estimation of physical effects of fires, explosions, releases of toxic substances and other undesirable effects on the people, asset or environment. In this connection it is necessary to use models of accident processes and criterions of a defeat of studied objects of effect. The analysis of consequences of accident on object with spent fuel includes an estimation of influencing of physical effects on value and parameters of release, structure of a radioactivity, registration of representative and unfavourable weather conditions, necessity of realization both urgent, and long- lived countermeasures. In result it is necessary to use more complex models of air and other transfer of radioactivity, considerable number of pathways of irradiation and receipt of radionuclides in an organism of the man. The important result of accident is costs of realization of countermeasures, and also cost of reimbursed injury etc.

The analysis of uncertainties of results On an evaluation stage of risk it is necessary to analyse uncertainty and accuracy of results. As a rule, main sources of uncertainties are lack of the information on reliability of the equipment (high inaccuracy of values) and human errors, and also received suppositions and allowances of used models of accident process. To interpret correctly results of an estimation of risk, it is necessary to translate to uncertainty of initial parameters and suppositions utilised at an estimation of risk, in uncertainty of results. The sources of uncertainty should be identified and are presented in results. On a final stage of estimation the analysis and generalisation of risk parameters of the detected events determine the level of risk from the object.

Development of the guidelines A final stage of the risk analysis is the development of the guidelines on reduction risk (control of risk). The guidelines can recognize present risk reasonable or to indicate measures on the risk reduction or measures on its control. At an elabora- tion of measures on the risk reduction it is necessary to allow, that, owing to possible limitation of resources, first of all should be designed the elementary guidelines and bound with the minimum costs, and also measures on a perspective. According to the guidelines [gosgortehnadzor, 1996] «In all cases, where it is possible, the measures of reduction of accident probability should have priority above measures of reduction of emergency consequences”. For technical and organizational measures for a reduction of the danger the following pattern of measure’s priorities is offered: 1. Probability reduction of origin of accident situations including: / Probability reduction of failure origin; / Probability reduction of failure development in an emergency situation;

Modern Approaches to the Risk Analysis 23 2. Reduction of emergency consequence severity, which one, in turn, have following priorities: / Measures which are designed in of dangerous object (for example, binding of object on terrain); / Measures relating systems of accident protection and the control; / Acts directed to organization, equipment status and readiness of emergency services.

Generally, at an equal capability of implementation of the guidelines, prime measures of safety control are the protective measures of accident. As a result of such approach at lack, overseen per last years, material and financial resources the capability of realization of saving and protective measures by forces itself potentially dangerous object is reduced, that it is necessary to mirror in the totals of the risk analysis. For emergencies on radiation dangerous objects because of an aggra- vation of state of material base, the reasons which one will be reviewed below, the measures of liquidation of accident can become not less significant for reduction all kinds of risk.

1.2. Methods of realization of the risk analysis

The modern methodology of the risk analysis from potentially dangerous objects is similar to consideration of risk from radiation accident on nuclear object, as obeys in a general modern socially reasonable set of the requirements on observance the rights of the population on protection of health, asset and compensation of a damage. Definite specificity of radiation effect: terms, injury, the influencing of countermeasures etc. is taken out in the subsequent sections of the report. By selection of methods of realization of the risk analysis it is necessary to allow for the purposes of the analysis, criterion of reasonable risk, type of analysed system and nature of hazard, presence of resources for realization of the analysis of the indispensable information, experience both proficiency of the initiators and other factors. The method of the risk-analysis should satisfy to the following requirements: + It should be is scientific justified and to correspond to a considered system; + It should give result in a kind permitting it is better to understand nature of risk and to plan paths of its reduction; + It should be repeated and checked out.

At stage of hazard identification it is recommended to use one or several methods from presented in Table 1. The brief information on concepts and definitions in listed methods of the risk analysis are submitted in the Appendix A. The indications at the choice of the risk analysis methods for different kinds of activity and stages of operation of object are presented in Table 1. The methods can be applied is insulated or in addition to each other, and the quality methods can actuate quantitative criterions of risk (basically by expert estimations with usage, for example, matrix which rank of hazard “probability – severity of consequences”). The full quantitative analysis of risk can include all indicated methods. In Table 1 is shown the practical usefulness of method of quantitative risk analysis practically at all stages for existence potentially dangerous object. Besides the presence of a number of different parameters of risk increases capabilities of this method at probabilistic interpretation of results and obtaining of time-space relations for considered area.

24 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Table 1 The indications at the choice of methods of the risk analysis for different kinds of activity and stages of object operation. Following identifications here are adopted: – least eligible method of the analysis; 0 advisable method; + most eligible method.

Method of the analysis Type of activity arrangement commissioning designing operation reconstruction “What will be if” – + 0 + 0 Method of the check sheet – 0 0 + 0 The analysis of hazard and func- – 0 + 0 + tionality The analysis of a kind and conse- – 0 + 0 + quences of failures The analysis of a tree of events – 0 + 0 + and failures Quantitative analysis of risk + – + 0 +

1.3. Main parameters of risk

The concept of risk will be used for measurement of hazard and usually concerns to an individual or group of the people (industrial personnel and population), asset (material objects, property) or environment [gost, 1994a; gost, 1994b; gost, 1995a; gost 1995b]. One of most frequently of used characteristics of hazard is individual risk. Individual risk is frequency of a mortality or incidence of a separate individual as a result of effect of the investigated factors of hazard. The individual risk is determined by potential risk and probability of presence of the man in region where operating of the dangerous factors is possible. Thus the individual risk in many respects is determined by qualification and training standard of an individual to operations in a dangerous situation, well-timed information both measures of individual and collective protection. The individual risk depends on distribution of potential risk. Other complex measure of risk describing dangerous object (and territory) will be potential territorial risk – spatial distribution of frequency of implementation of negative effect of a definite level. The given measure of risk does not depend on the fact of the subject presence (man) in the given place of space. It is supposed, that the probability of presence of the subject of effect is equal 1 (for example, the man is in the given point of space during all considered period). The potential risk does not depend on, whether there is a dangerous object in a populous or wilderness place and can vary in a broad interval. The potential risk expresses a potential of the greatest possible risk for the particular subjects of the effect located in the given point of space. In practice it is important to know distribution of potential risk for an analysed source of hazard and for the separate scenario of accident. The potential risk appears by an intermediate measure of hazard used for an estimation of social and individual risk. The distribution of potential risk and density of population in investigated region can help to us to receive a quantitative assessment of social risk for the population. For this purpose it is necessary to calculate the number injured at each scenario from each source of hazard. Then we must define relation of frequency of events F, in which one the number of the people has injured at this or that level it is more definite N (social risk). The social risk characterizes a scale of possible accidents and is determined by a function, which one has title: an F/N-curve. Depending on problems of the analysis under N it is possible to understand both total numbers damaged, and number mortally injured or other parameter of consequence severity. Accordingly, the criterion of a reasonable level of risk will be determined by curve built for the different scenario of accident, but not value for separate event. Now prevailing approach

Modern Approaches to the Risk Analysis 25 for definition of risk acceptability is using of two curves. The F/N-curves of reasonable and unacceptable social risk of a fatal traumatizing are built in log-log coordinates, and the area between these curves determines an intermediate level of risk, which is quota in view of production specificity and local conditions by supervisory authorities and local bodies. Other quantitative integral measure of hazard is the collective risk (Potential Loss of Life (pll)), scaling anticipated consequences for the people from potential emergencies. As a matter of fact collective risk determines anticipated quantity mortally injured as a result of emergencies in considered territory for definite period of time. For the analysis of ecological safety the relation between the contaminated area and frequency of accident can serve a measure of ecological risk. For the purposes of insurance such parameter of risk, as statistically anticipated value of injury in cost expression (value calculated by product of accident frequency on injury) is relevant. At the subsequent analysis of risk from radiation accident the concept of collective and individual risk conditioned by radiation doses from the different dangerous factors through a feeding, exposure, inhalation of radionuclides will be applied. In connection to methods of risk-analysis from Appendix A, the frequency of each scenario for development of an accident situation is calculated by a frequency multiplication of the main event on probability of final event. For example, the accidents with depressurization of the vehicle with dangerous (explosion, fire) matter with depending on conditions can develop both with ignition, and without ignition of matter. The methods of trees of failures and events are labour – consuming and are applied, as a rule, to the project analysis or modernization of complex technical systems and productions. They have found a use for such nuclear objects, as npp and repository for sf.

1.4. The methods of quantitative analysis of risk

These methods are characterized by calculation of risk parameters mentioned in the Appendix A, and can include one or several discussed above methods (or to use their results). According [gost, 1994a; gost, 1994b; gost, 1995a; gost 1995b], the realization of quantitative analysis requires high qualification of the initiators, large amount of information on an accident rate, reliability of the equipment, registration of features of ambient terrain, meteorological conditions, residence time of the people in territory and near to object, density of population and other factors. The quantitative analysis of risk is most effective: + On a stage of design and arrangement of the dangerous installations and objects; + At safety assessment of objects having the one-type equipment (for example, lifting or transportation facilities); + If necessary to obtain of a integrated estimation of emergency effect on the people, material objects and ambient environment; + At development of priority measures on opening-up for extraordinary situations in region, saturated dangerous industrial objects.

Lack of quantitative analysis of risk is low-level accuracy of results, owing to what use of quantitative parameters as safe criterions for complex productions (in particular, probability of origination of accident), as a rule, is not justified. In the further risk analysis will be made in two stages. At the first stage on the basis of the known and collected reliable information the probabilities of accident originating and frequency of their occasion will be estimated in view of nuclear object specificity. On the second stage the calculation of quantitative risk parameters from suspected accident on a special computer program will be made and the results on different kinds of risk are presented.

26 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov As it was marked above, criterions translating effect in risk (irradiation in our case) and warranting for realization of countermeasures are determined by a number of the standards, major of which one are described in following section.

1.5. Mathematical models and territorial risk

As a part of the “Risk and Radioactive Waste” Project, Institute of the Northern Ecological Problems conducted the detail analysis of the potential territorial risk in the Kola North’s territories. Accordingly to [gosgortehnadzor, 1996], the definition «Potential Territorial Risk” is qualified as one of the quantitative risk’s parameter. It means the spatial distribution of the realization frequency of the negative impact for the particular level. In our study, we followed this definition and terminology. As a result, the main task was focused on the problems of the atmospheric radioactive emission’s distribution, their deposition on the underlying surface and estimation of the pollution’s probability for the studied territories. To solve these tasks we used methods of the mathematical modeling. Recently there are many different types of models, which used to analyze the radiation situation in the areas of the radiation dangerous objects’ locations. Until the recent times, the most useful models were the Gaussian models [Techniques, 1987; Methods, 1984; Gusev & Belyaev, 1986; and others]. Although these models are still in use, the new approach became developed and many problems were reconsidered. Firstly, in the last decade methods of the mathematical modeling became more sophisticated, and therefore, it permitted to simulate processes of the atmospheric thermodynamics and pollution transport more accurately. Secondly, the computer capabilities increased dramatically from the simple personal to more powerful workstations. This allowed both the development of the models and introduction of the various parameterizations, which describe different parameters influencing the atmospheric dynamics and distribution of pollution. Additionally, it showed the possibility of result’s combination with the modern visualization methods, in particular, gis technology. Thirdly, the important role is played by the accumulated expertise of the simulation and estimation of the consequences, as a result of the Chernobyl npp accident. Thus, many countries require follow the official recommendations of the governmental regulatory organs, which control safety of personal and population from the radiation impact. These organs follow the methodology and mathematical support in the calculation of the man exposure’s doses from the radioactive emissions into the atmosphere and liquid emissions into the water. Using common and stated methods and programs it is possible to solve the following tasks: 1. Identify the location of the industrial ground for the construction of the enterprise with the nuclear and nuclear-energetic facility as well as the settlement for living and safety zones; 2. Choosing the sizes of the sanitary-protective and observation zones; 3. Calculation magnitudes of acceptable emissions into atmosphere and water; 4. Evaluation of the radiation danger for the population; 5. Development of the accidental plans, evaluation of the possible evacuation zones and usage of the protective measures for the various levels of danger; 6. Operational regulation and normal provision of information for the respective structures and population about the danger in the case of an accidental releases; 7. Optimization in the placement of the radiation monitoring net.

It is important to note, that on the modern level of the computer technology and methods of the mathematical modeling for the pollution transport in the atmosphere, the most useful are the numerical models of the atmospheric transport. There are two approaches: the Eulerian approach and the Lagrangian approach. These approaches are applied in the research of the ibrae, dmi, rodos, tayfun, etc. As a result, recently to model the atmospheric transport of the radioactive

Modern Approaches to the Risk Analysis 27 emission most researches use the following three types of models. The first type is well known model of Pasquill-Gifford. This model may be applied in the 30 km zone around the object of interest and if the altitude of the release is not more than 200 m. Model is used for the operational estimates of the radiation situation in the nearest zone to the nuclear object. The second type is the atmospheric trajectory model. It performs calculation both in the nearest zone and distances up to several thousand kilometers. This model may work in the wide range of the emission’s altitudes, in particular, up to the free troposphere. Trajectory models are more universal and popular, and recently it received the widespread use in both scientific institutions and systems for support in the decision making for the radiation accidents (for example: rimpuff model from rodos Project, nostradamus Computer system from ibrae ras). For the cases of the significant spatial and temporal in-homogeneity of the wind fields the models of the expert level are used. In these models, the system of the spatial non-stationary equations describing the atmospheric processes in the Decart system of coordinates is applied [Techniques, 1987; Methods, 1992; Bak- lanov et al., 1994]. The methodology of for such models is developed in the following research institutions: Computer Center in the Siberian Department, Institute of the Numerical Mathematics in the Russian Academy of Sciences; Science Enter- prise “tayfun”; Russian State Hydro-Meteorological University; Applied Geo- physics Institute; All-Russian Science Research Institute of the Atomic Stations and others. In our study, to evaluate the potential territorial risk we used the complex of the models, which includes expert models too. Details are shown in Chapter 5 of this study. The cause why we applied these models is the complexity of the model domains. In particular, the Kola npp and northern shore of the Kola Bay are characterized by the complex terrain as well as presence of the large water objects – Lake Imandra and seashore. It should be noted that such models differs in the scale: from the micro-scale (3–5 km) to large-scale models of the global transport. In this study we limited by the model domain (less than 100 km) for both regions of the Kola npp and nuclear reactors in the Kola Gulf area.

Main result The modern methodical principles of the risk analysis of accidents on dangerous industrial objects and productions are studied. Analysis of risk is a part of system approach, which one will be used at acceptance of the political solutions, procedures and practical measures in problem solving of warning or reduction of the danger of industrial emergencies for life of the man, accidence or traumas, damage to property and environment.

28 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 2 Normative Regulation of Risk at Liquidation of Radiation Accidents

2.1. Main subjects of legal and normative regulation in Russia

In the Appendix B the List of the federal norms and rules acting “in the field of usage of an atomic energy “, approved by the Order by Government of Russian Federation from December 1, 1997 N 1511 [Government, 1997], including responsible for issue state organs. For development of normative base in the field of usage of an atomic energy the largest organizations minatom of Russian Federation are attracted, such as: + “Hydropress” Pilot Design Bureau; + “vnipiet” AII-Russian Planning and Design Research and Technological Association; + Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering (rdipe); + State Planning and Design, Research and Survey Institute: “AtomEnergo- Proekt”; + Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (ippe); + Russian Research Center “Kurchatov Institute” (rrc “Kurchatov Institute”); + Elektrogorsk Research Center for Nuclear Power Plants Safety Experimental Design Bureau For Machine Building (edmb); + AII-Russian Research Institute for Inorganic Materials (ariim) named after Academician A.A. Bochvar; + All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center (aritph (vniitph)); + AII-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center (arieph (vniieph)); + Scientific and Engineering Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (sec nrs).

2.2. Persons responsible for decision making

Referenced in the Appendix B the documents set three main organs executing regulation and the confirmation of the documents in the field of a radiation safety: gosatomnadzor, minzdrav and Headquarters of a State fire service rf mvd. In Russia it is possible qualitatively to dedicate following levels for persons responsible for decision making, and also influential on this process: Upper – statutory: its subjects – president, deputes of duma and members of Government determine policy in the field of the management with nuclear materials and radiation safety; Mean – adjusting: to it there correspond the chiefs first of all of gosatomnadzor, in a part of sanitary-hygienic aspects of a radiation safety of minzdrav and in a part of fire safety the applicable control mvd. Besides the heads of a number of bodies – State mining inspection, sanepidnadzor, goskomecologia, goskomgidromet and control military supervisional of organs different aspects of normal operation of radiation – dangerous objects and readiness on a case of accident and accidental situations; Intermediate – persons in charge of organizations of minatom, enumerated in are given above list possessing the right of arguing, development and introducing on consideration of adjusting organs of the projects of the standards and rules in

Normative Regulation of Risk at Liquidation of Radiation Accidents 29 the field of a radiation safety. Basically it is large organizations of minatom and concerned with to atomic engineering; Deliberative – faces attracted in expertises of the norms and rules, and also participating in expertise of the particular projects – specialists of nuclear branch, Russian Academy of sciences, goskomecologia and specialists in particular areas of science and engineering, local authorities; Lower – chiefs of firms minatom both other ministries and offices, chiefs of organs MinES, services of radiation safety, mvd, prosecutor’s offices, territorial government bodies and others, obliged to provide the requirements of the standards and rules by normal activity of atomic engineering objects and in case of accident radiation accidents; Public – quoters of a mass media, social movements, international and Russian ecological organizations.

2.3. Normative regulation of a radiation safety

Last two years two Russian normative documents intended for improvement safety of the person in all conditions of radiation have appeared. The norms of a radiation safety (nrb-99) of minzdrav of Russian Federation [Government, 1997] and osporb-98 [minzdrav, 1999] correspond issued in last 10 years to the federal acts of Russian Federation: «About a radiation safety of the population” (1996), «About a sanitary – epidemiological health of the population” (1999), «About use of an atomic energy” (1995) and «About preservation of an ambient environment” (1991), and also international norms of safety adopted jointly the United Nations, iaea, who and iol in 1996. The requirements and criteria on limitation of irradiation of the population both in conditions of normal exploitation of technogenic radiation sources, and in conditions of radiation accident are established in nrb-99 [Government, 1997], see the Appendix C. The standard sets high limit of life risk in conditions of normal exploitation for technogenic irradiation in the course of the year in round figures 10–3 year–1, and for the population 5·10–5 year–1. The limit between optimized and unconditionally reasonable risk is called as a level of negligible risk and equals, in conformity with nrb-99, 10–6. For the substantiation of the consumptions by optimization in nrb-99 is received, «that the irradiation in a collective effective dose in 1 men-Sv results in potential damage, equal loss 1 men-year of life” and in a money’s worth – not less 1 annual per head national incomes [Government, 1997]. The standard enters following principles of realization of protective measures (countermeasures) at both accident or detection of terrain contamination: + Countermeasure should bring to irradiated persons and community as a whole more benefit, than harm + Form, scale and duration of countermeasure should be optimized so that the clean benefit of a dose decline was max

On the other hand, the mandatory requirements are entered: + The obligatory intrusion at appearance the determined effects of irradiation suspected at a dose higher 1 Gy for all body (see Table 16 in Appendix C); + The realization of long-lived countermeasure at a chronic exposure of some organs by doses is higher 0.1–0.4 Gy (see Table 17 in Appendix C).

The analysis of the standard has shown, that the excess per the first 10 day after accident of an annual dose limit for the population in 10 times is enabled. The accident limits of irradiation of the population above normal approximately in 10 times also reach the norms of irradiation of staff of radiation – dangerous object in conditions of normal exploitation. The value 10 also will be used at installation of two control levels A and B. The level A demands a beginning of process of optimization of countermeasures, and the level B, is customary in 10 times greater, than A, demands their unconditional application. For example, for countermeasure “relo-

30 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov cation” the level A equals 50, and level – 500 mSv (see Appendix C). The conditions temporary relocation make: for the beginning – 30 mSv/month, for the end- ing temporary relocation 10 mSv/month. If is forecasted, that stored for one month the dose will be of the above indicated levels during one year, the problem about relocation of the population on a constant residence is put. The levels of intrusion concerning consumption contaminated a food stuff are: for 134Cs, 137Cs and 131I – 1 and 10 kBq/kg, accordingly; and for isotopes of uranium, plutonium – 0.01 and 0.1 kBq/kg for levels A and B, accordingly. The latitude of optimization area respectively to radiation loads determines a large role of bodies, which implement countermeasures. A condition of means and proficiency of the liquidators, other socio-economic factors also influence total damage from accident. Delay of transit of the information, delay of accident brigades, delayed warning can result in excess established of nrb-99 the upper dose limits. The experience of radiation accidents in Russia demonstrates long-lived influencing of pollutions of an environment through paths of external and internal irradiation on contaminated territories. The doses of long-lived irradiation are capable to result in considerably higher risks as contrasted to by risk conditioned by a fast phase of accident. With the purpose of a decrease of risk of long-lived consequences of radiation accident the criteria of countermeasures are entered for the long operational countermeasures – evacuation, relocation and food bans, see Ta- ble 18 and Table 19 in Appendix C. nrb-99 determine permissible concentrations and limits of reception all potentially of dangerous radionuclides in an organism of the person with nutrition, water and air for different chemical combinations and physical forms. The accident limits for the population are close to limits for staff in normal conditions. However because of constant presence of the population in conditions of irradiation (for example, through an inhalation) the obtained doses irradiation can in be some times higher. The control behind holding of the Norms is assigned to administration of object. The control behind irradiation of the population is assigned to executive bodies of the subjects of Russian Federation. At originating radiation accident: + the control behind its development, protection of staff and accident brigades implements administration; + the control behind irradiation of the population implements local government bodies and state supervision of a radiation safety.

The problems of organization of a radiation safety, including at radiation accidents, are set up in the new formal document «The main sanitary regulations of maintenance of a radiation safety” osporb-98 [minzdrav, 1998], see Appendix C. The standard establishes necessity of an avoidance for staff and population determined effects of irradiation and going to a minimum of probability of stochastic effects. At the same time, osporb-98 the mandatory recovery of the control above an accident radiation source demands. On each potentially – dangerous nuclear facility should be (see Appendix C): + list of possible accidents; + plan of measures on protection of staff and population in case of accident; + system of the warning.

Pursuant to osporb-98 the warning about accident actuates following stages: + from accident object – to local bodies; + from local bodies – to most competent specialists in the field of a radioactivity protection; + from local bodies plus specialists – to population.

At last third stage, for the population the needed measures of protection and preventive maintenance are lead up. Structure of the members of accident brigades according to osporb-98: + Persons from staff, is preferential the man is higher than 30 years; + Constant workers and service-men of accident services.

Normative Regulation of Risk at Liquidation of Radiation Accidents 31 The liquidators make out the written approval to irradiation and tolerance for regulation of scheduled heightened irradiation at a rate of up to 100 mSv. Besides in the text is mentioned a capability of obtaining of doses more than 200 mSv. During liquidation of accident the installment radiation monitoring is carried out: early, intermediate, current and total. The measures on a radiation monitoring of the contaminated territories and operational facilities are described in the Appendix C.

2.4. Some essential problems in the local law and technical area

According to the report of the chairman gosatomnadzor [gosatomnadzor, 2000], on the basis of rules, the definite Federal act “About use of an atomic energy”, gosatomnadzor of Russia together with the interested ministries and offices of Russian Federation designs a number of the normative legal acts, which one basically have formed a system of state regulation of safety at usage of an atomic energy in Russia. Nevertheless, there are some more unsolved problems: + There is a federal act rendering concrete gear of civil responsibility for average general costs and harm caused by radiation effect, in case of accident at usage of an atomic energy; + The draft federal law “About civil responsibility for causing of a nuclear harm and its financial maintenance” is adopted by State duma in the first reading in September 1998. Some organizational measures for rendition it on the second reading however are required; + The acceptance of the federal Act “About the management with a radioactive waste” (conciliatory commission of the President of Russian Federation is necessary, of State duma and Advice of Federation it has considered and has approved new edition); + It is necessary pursuant to the federal Act “About usage of an atomic energy” installation of administrative liability of organizations and faces for violations of the requirements on safety and the implementation of these measures (it will allow to execute preventive measures on warning violations of the requirements on safety); + There is no rule situation both other normative and administrative documents determining pattern and the order of operation of a federal information center on the registration of nuclear materials.

It is essential, that the developed system of the state registration and control of nuclear materials is diffused only to civil area and, thus, does not correspond to the Concept of a system of the state registration and control favoured by the Govern- mental Order from October 14, 1996 N 1205, envisioning the state registration and control of nuclear materials intended for usage, both in peace, and in the defence purposes. From problems in technical area it is possible to mark following. According to a report of chief of gosatomnadzor, in Russia is present 24 objects of storage of the completed fissile material. The indicated objects introduce vast potential hazard, and the management is connected to the Russian Academy of Science on these objects with considerable problems of safety control of regional and global scales. Capacitance of available storehouses at modern paces of receipt sf will be depleted in some years (2004–2008). At preservation of a present condition of business the owing maintenance nuclear and radiation safety on npp and in stowages sf will be considerably complicated. There are also problems, bound with maintenance of transportation sf in places of their long-time storage and processing, certification and licensing metal-concretive of the pod for transportation and dry storage of the completed fissile material of vessels of Navy (project tuk-108). The anxiety gosatomnadzor of Russia causes that the activities on creation tuk- 108 implemented with violation of the normative requirements. The manufacturing of prototypes tuk started before completion by designer organization of work ons

32 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov by engineering designs. As a result of it the prototypes do not correspond to designs that were gobed up in engineering designs.

2.5. Indemnification of nuclear injury

Agrees [Ioyrysh et al., 1993] till 1991 there were numerous standards, including closed nature, on granting of privileges and compensations for indemnification of a harm from radiation effect, in another way of nuclear injury. In 1991 the Law of Russian Federation “About a social protection of the citizens who have exposed to effect of irradiation owing to debacle on Chernobyl npp”, determining status of victims of debacle, liquidators, about residing and activity of the population in the contaminated territories has appeared; in further there was a adjusting of this (1992) Law. The privileges, statutory 1991, were then are widespread on faces falling ill a radial illnesses or becoming the invalids as a result of radiation accidents, and also in a result of tests, activities on any kinds of nuclear-power plants at liquidation of consequences of radiation accidents and radiation – dangerous situations. The main problem of definition of the status damaged is the installation of the causal connection of the arisen diseases with nuclear damages. The outcome of irradiation can be exhibited or as signs of a radial illness, or as customary diseases – crab, leukaemia, cataract. It is in case of the former on nature of weep of disease it is possible to judge a source of radiation irradiation and the nuclear nature of injury does not cause doubt. In the second case the detection of nuclear nature of injury is rather incon- venient, in this connection, faces which have aggrieved, it is not reimbursed. The law establishes liability of operating organization for the caused nuclear injury. There is a set of problems of indemnification of the demonstrated injury: + The development of diseases from accident irradiation is spread on time on 10 and more than years. To this time operator can cease to exist, to appear the bankrupt etc.; + The volume of injury can appear more financial capabilities of operator; + Nuclear injury is actuated injury caused itself operator and last also claims for its indemnification level with suffering; + Problem of the evidence of wrongful acts of operator; + Problem of a limitation of liability on a scale and on time.

Russia has joined the international Viennese convention on a civil liability for nuclear injury of 1963, but until recently still it did not ratify. There are inconsistencies during passing in duma Russian Federation of the Law, adopted in the first reading, «About civil responsibility for causing of a nuclear harm and its financial maintenance”. Let’s mark that the similar laws for a long time are adopted in countries intensively operating nuclear power engineering. Arguing in duma rf, on pages of the log-book “Atomic energy” etc. has revealed two base points of vision: minatom – on the one hand and ecologists, quoters of the liquidators of radiation accidents – with another. Some of problematic problems are adduced in following section.

2.6. Attitude of the state and society to radiation risk, radiation safety

In modern conditions misses of consensus on a number of the relevant problems in the field of a radiation safety of the population and outlooks of nuclear branch, and also methods of verification of radiation – dangerous objects (see Table 2).

Normative Regulation of Risk at Liquidation of Radiation Accidents 33 Table 2 Stand of different bodies/organs on some problematic problems of maintenance of a radiation safety and compensation of nuclear injury. A: Nilsen Th. Et al., 1996; B: gosgortehnadzor, 1996; C: gosatomnadzor, 2000; D: Ioyrysh A.I. et al., 1993; E: Government, 2000; F: Hetagurov S.V., 2000; G: duma, 1999; H: Gofman J., 1994;I: Inter- net, 2000b.

Problematic question minatom gosatom-nad- Ecological zor organizations The available radiation risk from civil objects of nuclear branch Is not present – Yes (E) introduces substantial hazard and causes injury to the population (E, F) The available radiation risk from military objects of nuclear – Yes (C) Yes (A, E) branch introduces substantial hazard and causes injury to the population The antinuclear psychosis is most dangerous to the society Yes (F, G) – No (I) The measures of decreasing of probability of originating of acci- Yes (B) – – dent situations including are priority: measures of decreasing of probability of originating failure (refusal); measures of probability decreasing of development failure into a accident The measures of accident consequence severity decreasing, which Is not present – – one, in turn are priority, have following priorities: measures, (B) which are designed in of dangerous object; measures, relating systems of accident protection and the control; the measure tangent organizations, equipment status and readiness of accident services The level of substantial radiation risk for the population of Russia Is not present – Yes (A, H) in adding up conditions is great (E, G) Condition of indemnification of nuclear injury to the population Is not present The acceptance of Yes (G) and liquidators – captured radiation dose superior a normative (D, G) the law about level nuclear injury The condition of indemnification of nuclear injury is required to Yes (G) the acceptance of is not present the liquidators of accident – evidence by court of the causal con- the law about (G, I) nection between accident irradiation and harm to health nuclear injury The further development of nuclear branch is necessary Yes (E, G) Yes No (I)

Let’s mark, that the readiness accident of services, in opinion of the writers of the standard [gost, 1994a; gost, 1994b; gost, 1995a; gost 1995b], for decreasing risk of severe accident appears on last place on a priority. The analysis of stands of state bodies and ecologists finds out absence of solid normative base and refusing such modern practice of a radiation safety ensuring as compensation of nuclear injury.

Main results Modern normative and other documents relating problems of maintenance of a radiation safety at radiation emergencies are analysed. The executed analysis has allowed to find and to formulate a number of problematic problems having a different significance: + There is not a federal act rendering concrete mechanism of civil and – legal liability for average general costs and harm caused by radiation effect, in case of accident at use of an atomic energy (the draft federal law “About civil and – legal liability for causing of a nuclear harm and its financial maintenance” is adopted by State duma in the first editing); + The acceptance of the federal Act “About the management with a radioactive waste” is necessary; + The order of functioning of a federal information center under the registration of nuclear materials requests modernization; + Discordance of the becoming outdated departmental standards with modern statutory base of Russia;

34 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov + Non-clarity and boundedness of the information about organs responsible for decision making; + Presence of delay of the information by offices and organs responsible for decision making due to complex structure of connections; + Traditional closeness of staff the organizations and faces developing norms and rules in the safety ensuring, definite departmental belonging, attempts of exception of the public control; + Existing of organizational problems concerning attraction some categories of the liquidators and compensation of risk to their health.

Normative Regulation of Risk at Liquidation of Radiation Accidents 35 36 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 3 Description of Objects of Radiation Risk

Reason of realization of risk-analysis is the experience of the severe radiation accidents, observed on nuclear objects affecting the population of neighbouring and distant regions and also presence of a significant amount of objects with the high-level sf in territory of the Kola.

3.1. Database for the objects of the radiation risk

Sources of the nuclear risk Many sources of the nuclear risk surrounding the Kola Peninsula are a cause of the great concern for the public and scientific communities. It is known that Kola territories have the greatest concentration of the nuclear reactors in comparison with the any other territory of the former Soviet Union, and perhaps the world. Approximately 180 working nuclear reactors, 140 decommissioned nuclear reactors, and more than 10 radioactive waste depositories are located in this region. Concern with the radiation problems on the Kola Peninsula has led to international scientific collaboration in the studying of this problem and finding a solution. In this study, the research area has been expanded in order to include the Scandinavia countries as well as the entire northwestern region of the Russian Federation, which includes the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk counties, Karelia Re- public, and territories of the surrounding seas. In this research area the main sources of the potential radioactive contamination are the following: + Nuclear power plants; + Russian Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines and sunken radioactive waste; + Fleet of the nuclear-powered icebreakers, known as AtomFlot and operated by the Murmansk Shipping Company; + Radioactive waste repositories and temporary storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel; + Dumped radioactive waste and sunken nuclear reactors from the power plants and ships; + Areas of the nuclear weapons testing on the Novaya Zemlya islands.

Some of them are shown in Figure 1. The possibility of radioactive contamination caused by these sources is real and could affect both the studied areas and the whole Arctic region. The main hazard in the Kola Peninsula region is a possibility of the radioactive contamination. This hazard may be related to the emissions from the nuclear power plants, nuclear power ships, and radioactive waste depositories. The objects of the management with the spent nuclear fuel on the territory of the Murmansk region are listed in the normative document “Rule about the order of time resolution issue gosatomnadzor on kinds of activity in firms mintrans, Russia and army parts under the management with a fissile material” [mintrans, 1994]: + Vessels of atomic-technological service (vats); + Floating technical bases of recharge of reactors (ftb); + Coastal technical bases of recharge of reactors (ctb); + Coastal storage facilities of a fissile material (csffm); + Factory ships of recharge of reactors (fsrr).

Description of Objects of Radiation Risk 37 Figure 1 Some nuclear risk objects located within and near the Kola Peninsula.

Using gis to assess risk To assess the contamination’s risk in the studied area we needed a qualitative analysis, which must have all appropriate accessible information about sources of the nuclear contamination. Although access to all relevant information is still limited, the amount of material published on this issue has been increasing, and especially in recent years. Our study examines the completeness and reliability of the existing and available information about the radioactive sources situated on the Kola Peninsula and in the surrounding territories. Such study has not been made yet. Moreover, there is no substantional detailed estimation on the risk’s levels associated with these nuclear objects as well as potential consequences for the region’s population and environment. Geographical Information System (gis) is the most appropriate tool, which permits systematically to work out solution to these problems.

Further gis development Currently, gis database (db) consists of information on a number of nuclear objects situated in the North of the Russian Federation and Northern Europe. This db includes geographic coordinates and attributive information, and it is used locally as a query tool to access information on nuclear objects. Although the gis’s use on a regional level for an automated response to nuclear accidents and decision making’s systems is still not prevalent, the research in the area of the radiation risk’s analysis is very important. Application of the gis is an effective tool in this type of study because most of the data – meteorological, terrain, and demographic – is spatially distributed. gis will help to visualize the relationship between the nuclear objects and geographic features in the studied region. Combi- nation of the ArcInfo’s functionality and non-gis software applications will make possible to develop tools for simulation of situations on the nuclear risk objects. This technology will also improve access to this type of information. Maps, generated during computer simulation of the nuclear reactor accidents, will show the risk of the radioactive pollution in the surrounding areas. Then, using the Internet Map Explorer these maps could be published and accessed through the Internet. The improving communication will make possible for domestic and international agencies find acceptable ways to solve the radiation problems in the region.

Software tools In order to elaborate the gis database for the objects of the radioactive risk we used the following hardware, software and initial data: 1) pc digital celebris gl

38 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 5133 with operating system (os) Windows95 and 2) dec Station 5000/200 with os Ultrix 4.2. The ftp protocol was applied for the inter-platform “pc ⇔ dec Sta- tion” interface. Initial data for database “Regional Nuclear Risk Objects” was collected from the known already published research reports and from the Internet sources (Http, Gopher). A range of tools was used to construct and describe our database: WinWord, MultiEdit, Excel, DBaseIII+, FoxPro, LviewPro, and Micro- soft Photo Editor. We used also several gis products: arc/info 7.0.2. (including built in world as a base map) for coverage design, arc Macro Language for interface to gis-database developing, ArcExplorer 1.1.488 for pc map presentation, ArcView 3.1 (including built-in world map in the shape format) for analysis and pc map presentation, and from data+ + (www.dataplus.ru): 1:1000000 map of Russian Federation, with regional division (up to rayon level), containing settlements of national map, and roads (specified by national maps).

3.2. Research object and initiative events

Choice of research object In this study an analysed system is both radiation – dangerous object, and locale, ambient it, with definite distribution of the population, natural features and intrin- sic meteorological conditions. The selection of object with potential hazard by severe radiation accident implemented on the basis of two reasons: + Choice of the under abnormal condition most dangerous category of objects, pursuant to statistics of incidents, and also in estimations of the specialists of state, scientific and ecological organizations; + Selection of a place the largest and concentrated contents of dangerous nuclear materials.

The first on the Kola there correspond fire hazard or explosion-dangerous objects of the different nature, first of all numerous old naval objects, storage and transport means of a fuel, storage of explosive etc. Have no analogies in territory of Kola on radiological hazard sites of stowage, storage or haul sf. The preliminary analysis demonstrates the greatest potential risk from following regional radiation objects, on which one is present sf (see Introduction). Places of temporary storage sf in conditions of the Kola is a side ns or Vessel of Atomic-Technological Service (vats), probably, depot ship Floating Technical Base (ftb), or Coastal Technical Base (ctb), site ctb or Coastal Storage Facility of Fissile Material (csffm), – facility, sinken in ground, or separate building. For a determinacy of research it is accepted, that the considered object is arranged in customary coast conditions near to a possible point of sf unloading from ns, intended for utilization or temporary storage pad. For choosing conditional site will be made an estimation of individual and collective risk for life (mortality) and health (incidence) of the population, and also for members of accident brigades (liquidators), concentrated near an epicentre of accident.

Probabilities of initiative events and accidents Let’s value probability of accidents on the basis of the known reliable information about already taking place incidents of a comparable scale on these objects. The obtained annual probability will be argument of further selection of the accident scenario. Besides at a final analysis of risk this probability should be entered as a multiplicand in addition to estimated risk from accident. 121 incidents with nuclear submarines of the Russian fleet have taken place since 1956 to 1991. From them as a minimum 10 had the severe consequences. Doubly there were accidents of the nuclear reactor in 1979 and 1985 [Nilsen et al., 1996]. In total for 40 years of

Description of Objects of Radiation Risk 39 ns operation as a result of incidents have perished about 500 Russian seamen (now – more than 600 men have perished). In conformity with the international and Russian norms at realization of a safety assessment of radiation dangerous object for obtaining the licence on activity it is necessary to compound and to justify fep, – a list of Features, Events and Processes determining the scenarios of going of accident [iaea, 1994]. The given research has no the status and purpose of a full scale safety assessment and limits only by some, bound with tecnogenic by effects, types of accidents presented now by more actual. The following effects are selected: act of terrorism, air or rocket accident, bombardment owing to act of war, industrial fire. For obtaining an estimation of risk of radiation effect at overprotect (hypothetical) it is necessary accidents to know about value of probability of approach of the applicable event originating such accident.

Act of war The probability of act of war most reasonably also is justified it is possible to estimate on statistics of proceeding historical periods. In particular during last thousand years Russia was at war approximately 25% of time, that is the annual probability make 25%. Last century, in view of the large international conflicts, the act of war also took 25% of times. After the Second World War the frequency of armed conflicts in Europe has decreased because of an existence of military par- ity, however recently there is a tendency to ascending their probability. In last 5–10 years, after decay of the ussr and Warsaw Agreement, repeatedly arose bat- tle operations on Balkan and in the Caucasian region, and also in other regions of Europe. Probability of such operations estimated on duration of observed ones with applying of artillery, aircraft and rockets for the south of Russia not less than 25%, and for Europe as a whole up to 30%. Thus, the decrease of probability of act of war after the Second World War is compensated by increase during last decade that speaks about a reasonableness of average on larger time periods. In Barents region for last 100 years of act of war were prolonged in 1914–1918, 1939, 1941–1944, approximately 10 years. Thus the originating role frequently was played by the all – European or world – wide processes independent from inten- tions of the population Barents region. The annual probability of act of war can be estimated in 10%. For transition to effect on smaller on the area locales and countries the probability should be reduced, as the majority of modern military campaigns are local- ized within the limits of 1% of territory of Europe or Russia. In a majority of armed conflicts the going shocks on nuclear facilities are not put, is permissible to take their fraction 10%. On the other hand, special situation – the presence of forces of nuclear con- straining in a north of the Kola can result in adding risk of armed attack. Therefore probability 0.1·0.01·0.1 = 10–4 year–1 can be left for preservation of conservatism at definition of a capability of a defeat of object. It can result, as is commented on below, to considerable release of a radioactivity in 50% of cases of a defeat. In outcome the probability of a major accident with release of a considerable fraction of radionuclides makes 5·10–5 year–1.

Act of terrorism The terrorist activity is watched even in countries that are not participating in armed conflicts. Recently frequency of acts of terrorism and attempts on them in Russia has increased and makes about 100 per year. Are watched at basically on a carrier and on the unsheltered civil objects. On military objects the acts of sabotage are occasionally watched. On fleet are known firing a cruiser of “Novorossiisk” in 1959 on inspection of Sevastopol and attempt of detonating of a torpedo room ns “Vepr” in 1998 in Olenia Bay [Nilsen T., 1999].

40 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Concerning consequences of accident (fast defeat of great many of the people) the object of temporary storage sf is not introduced of the special concern for realization of at. However in case of compact arrangement of a complex of objects it can be affected by detonating or fire from act of sabotage on any other neighbouring object. Besides as has shown a case of 1998, is not eliminated at on nuclear submarine. Thus, for period of opened lighting of incidents on nf within approximately 10 years, is captured 1 unsuccessful at and 1 finished – for 43 years on the Navy. It is possible to suspect, that on 4–5 holding, but incomplete act of sabotage or at is necessary 1 finished. The annual probability finished at on nuclear object makes, thus, approximately 2%. Not any accident of nuclear object is accompanied by considerable release of a radioactivity in atmosphere because of presence of following barriers: a shell of fuel rod, wall of the cassette, assembly, canister or vessel of the reactor. On the basis of the known information it is possible approximately to estimate a ratio of frequencies for a major accident with a release and less by considerable – without an release of a radioactivity. At first, two major accidents on industrial nuclear reactors, one of them with large release of a radioactivity that is probability of release 50% are known. Besides the accidents on ns with a release of activity are known: Chazma, Nizhni Novgorod, “Komsomolets”. According to the report “Bellona” [Nilsen T., 1999] for period 1984–1987, 26 accidents and incidents on ns of Navy, frequency 6.5 per one year are observed. Frequency of nuclear accidents with radiation effect is 10 for 1959–1996, frequency 0.21 per one year. On one radiation accident it is necessary on a crude estimate 31 accidents without release. Let’s accept probability of considerable release 0.5, as well as for the industrial reactors that have tested most considerable accidents (Chernobyl npp-iv and tmi-ii). Thus, the estimation gives annual frequency of accident with release of activity outside object because of at 0.02/31·0.5 = 3·10–4 year-1.

Aircrush or missile incident Deviation of rockets from a course, crush of airplanes are a widespread enough kind of accident that is taken into account in the safety assessment. According to the adopted approach, we shall estimate these phenomena on the basis of statistics. As on one of 500 nuclear power reactors [Mityaev, 2000] on the average for 30 years of activity of rockets or the aeroplanes did not drop, probability of this event less 3·10–5 year–1. Last number we shall accept for the upper-bound estimate of probability of originating event. The transition to large radiation consequence gives a decrease in 31·2 times that is final value of probability is no more than 5·10–7 year–1. One going bombardment of a created Iraq nuclear facility with human victims however was watched. It is possible, that such events can repeat and on objects of other type.

Fire The fire on sw storehouse of on Kamchatka in 1994 is known. Besides the fire is the most widespread reason of severe accidents on ns [Nilsen et al, 1996; Nilsen., 1999]. In [gost, 1994a; gost, 1994b; gost, 1995a; gost 1995b] the capability of fusion of the container with radioactive kept in repair and release of a radioactivity in an environment is marked as a result of a fire on the railway transportation. The conditions at a fire are most severe for the liquidators, as the operations necessary at extinguishing, require fast coming of the firemen and their close presence to an epicentre of accident. Therefore it is possible to accept conditions of a fire happening for different reasons, as most severe and simultaneously conservative for model of radiation effect. Joining of probabilities of fire by reason bombing, air-crush, terror act and industrial fire we get common relative probability of severe release by all different reasons. In the whole probability of the scenario with a fire receives by toting of annual probabilities of accidents reviewed above, that is 4·10–4. In Table 3 is shown, that all reviewed beginning events, except for act of war, result in poten-

Description of Objects of Radiation Risk 41 Table 3 Matrix “probability – type of accident.”

Reason of accident An expected frequency of originating (1/year) Act of war < 5·10–5 Air crush < 5·10–7 Act of terrorism < 3·10–4 Fire in the total of all events < 4·10–4

tially disastrous effects with probability much greater, than presented in Table 15 (see Appendix A) one of industrial catastrophes.

3.3. Effect of economical and social problems

The normative, economical and discipline problems are connected and spawn each other. Inconsistencies and the incompleteness in statutory and normative base of Russia frequently is conditioned by lack of capabilities for transition to new standards of safety, the necessity which one is realized last years. Besides the adding up practice quite often is departmental, that is close to conventional practice minatom and md. Rip-off, for example, non-ferrous metals, nuclear materials, relevant for safety of devices, conclusion out of operation communications are widespread as owing to incompetence of statutory base, including licensing of kinds of activity, and because of poverty of a part of the population. Strengthening of terrorism and the increase of its base among the population also is connected to economical, statutory problems, and also indefinite solutions of national and interethnic problems. The ascending of criminal activity and also wrongful activity on production of explosives, ammunition and weapon is watched during change of policy and laws in the field of privatization of an industry, including war plants. Thus the legal mechanisms, adjusting their activity, apparently, do not act. There was a partial destruction of adding up technical base of an industry, of a carrier etc. In a nuclear industry it concerns to facilities, equipment, transport and safety means. Besides it is possible to mark simplification and becoming obsolete of the projects relating designs of containers, storehouses on the firms – producers [Sovko, 1999]. And the updating of base is hindered for economical reasons. The condition with discipline and quality on production and in an orb of the management with sf is complicated with the following factors: + Abstraction on commercial activity of the workers; + Overlapping of working duties and commercial activity in one and too time, including working places; + Decrease of the requirements to discipline and quality of activities; + Maintenance of the skilled specialists from area of the management with waste and sf; + Practice of delay and non-disbursement in a full volume of the salary.

Representative now paths of the solution of problems: + Retrofit and repair of the equipment, that has completed resource; + The request for the help overseas; + Simplification of the rules (formal and informal).

Positive for a decrease of risk aspects exhibited recently: + Accumulation of experience and adapting to a current condition of different state organs and offices, number of non-state firms;

42 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov + Large openness both registration of the ecological requirements and judge- ments of the foreign specialists in problems of an ecology; + Obtaining of access to western know-how and training.

The quantitative assessment of increase of risk from the described factors can be conducted only in a crude approximation, for the integral approach to probability of accident.

3.4. Uncertainty of an estimation of probability of accident

Applied in Section 3.2 approaches allow executing integral assessment of probability for large periods of time at preservation of accuracy. It is possible to consider that some component risks of accident at implementation of a complex of measures could vanish. For example, it concerns a problem of terrorism. Weight this component indicated in Table 3 makes 75%, however uncertainty divisible and divisor approximately till 50% gives inaccuracy in 100% or above. The probability of a fire to some extent depends on the workers and equipment and still increases of weight of the socially significant factors. The common conclusion – is possible, that the majority of risk has a genesis in a social, economic and organizational field. Qualitatively this conclusion confirms by practice, as the social risk finds out at the analysis of reasons of the majority of debacles last years; whereas the quantitative assessment is not so reliable. But it, in view of the reduced quality remark, gives value of risk in an interval from 1.5·10–4 year–1 up to 6.0·10–4 year–1 severe radiation accident per one year on nuclear facilities of the Kola. As further increase of a number of the unfavourable factors basically is possible, also social risk of accident can increase. As a case history permanently recurring escapes the soldier of the regular military service with a use of weapons concerning military and civilians. Sometimes these incidents develop in acts of terrorism. In 1998 six armed soldiers on object on the Novaya Zemlya have trapped school with the schoolboys in a settlement Ro- gacheva, required, in particular aeroplane. As a result of a use of weapons there were victims [Nilsen, 1999]. In 1999, 19-year old sailor after killing several seamen of a command on ns of the class a Shark named “Vepr”, has trapped and attempted to blow up a torpedo compartment of this submarine [Nilsen, 1999]. On the other hand, the doctrines of antiterrorist divisions are permanently carried out. However to estimate efficiency of these divisions it is a priori inconven- ient.

3.5. Time of decision making

Most impartial assessments of time lost after accident prior to the beginning realization of indispensable operations grounded on gained experience. The looking up ns “Kursk” has begun in 6 hours after accident, authenticating by this ns after finding – in 32 hours, and first rescue operations – in 63 hours [Internet, 2000a]. On Chnpp the fire suppression began in 1 hour, identification of the broken down condition of the reactor in 6 hours. Evacuation of the population began in settlement Pripiat at Chnpp through 36 hours, and in a part of 30-km of a zone in 6–7 days [Hetagurov, 2000; Gofman, 1994; Ivanov et al., 1995]. In Andreeva Bay in 1982 the delay more than month, both on identification (severity) of accident, and on realization post-accidental of measures [Nilsen et al., 1996] was watched. In the total the minimum time of realization of the first countermeasures is val- ued at 5 hours, substantially accessible in view of remoteness of objects time and unfavourable instant at 24–30 hours and more, see Table 4. The quality standards

Description of Objects of Radiation Risk 43 costs of time by organs responsible for decision making, are listed in Table 4. The data of this table are not normative, mirroring practice, adding up per last years, both substantial material and organizational capabilities of Russian Federation.

Table 4 Quality costs of time by organ responsible for decision making.

Phases Time period, hour Detection of accident. Fire, large air release of radiation < 1 Detection of accident. Marine incident (Internet, 1997) 6–24 Passing of the applicable information up to odm 0.5–1 Qualification of accident 0.5–5 Conducting of the analysis of a course of accident, development 1–6 both transmission of the inquiries and indications Coordination with state organs 3–24 Creation of headquarters of accident 6–24 Passing of the indispensable information up to odm 6–24 Conducting of the analysis, information inquiry and issue of the – indications

The operations located in the competence of organization, enabling accident, can be conducted from the moment of its beginning. However large radiation accident, put in consideration and leaving for limits of a sanitary-protective zone, requires informing out legal organs, local authorities of competent organizations, creation of accident staff etc. time for the collecting, transfer and the analysis of the information usually creates latent period from 1 to about several days. Especially it concerns radiation accidents, as according to the standards nrb etc., there is an area of optimization of dose loads and the time for realization of the applicable estimations, collecting and expertise of the data and etc. is necessary. Let’s mark, that in nrb-99 instantaneous realization of countermeasures after achievement of dose criteria for the population as a matter of fact is accepted, that in practice is not guaranteed.

3.6. Irradiation feature of accidental brigades

Pattern of organs, services and formations participating in liquidation of accidents The experience of liquidation of accident on Chnpp has shown, that the terms of accident brigades can subject to the greatest risk from accident irradiation. Directly during accident to acute radiation effect 300 men from staff of npp and firemen have exposed more than. From them 237 the primary diagnosis “acute radiation syndrome” was put. Is most severe damaged, and it is 31 men, to salvage it was not possible. After accident, to activities on liquidation of its consequences were attracted hundred thousand citizens ussr, including – of 200 thousand from Russia. Despite of adopted measures on limitation of irradiation of the participants of activities on liquidation of consequences of accident, the considerable proportion from them has exposed to irradiation in doses about marginal (250 mSv in 1986) [Hetagurov, 2000; Ivanov et al., 1995]. The methods of liquidation accident have common features with countermeasures at accident on a railway transport (including accidents with radioactive freights), set up in [Pendyuhov et al., 1992].

44 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov At liquidation of accident consequences the sanitary – epidemiological service should execute: + Control behind secure management of activities, + To take samples of water, air, soil and outwashes from a motor vehicle transport. + Head physician of local sanitary organ: / Participates in development of the schedule of accident liquidation, / Organizes reconnaissance and determines scales and rate of fouling, and also / Gives the guidelines to the chief of activities on liquidation of accident consequences.

During activities on liquidation of accident the day-night duty of medical staff is organized. If necessary in region the crews of an accident medical care of minzdrav (Health Ministry) are put forward. For definition of means of individual protection and mode of behaviour of the people in a contamination zone the specialists of territorial separations of specialized organization “Isotope” are attracted. The fire-fighting crews, mine rescue gas-saving, special railway services of neighbouring settlements and firms are if necessary attracted. In indispensable cases the militarized units and military divisions of Civil of Defence, and also division of military districts are attracted. Usually they execute following problems: + Chemical reconnaissance; + Cordon; + Commandant’s service; + Sanitary treatment of the people; + Area decontamination and transportation facilities; + Earth moving + and etc.

In operating group of militia enter: + The group of guards of a social order provides a cordon of a crash scene, guards of the property in place accidents; + The investigation – operating group together with the representatives of prosecutor’s office and Ministry of Safety carries out operative-investigatory operations; + The group of the registration perished, damaged and living, fallen in accident carries out find-reference activity, authenticating, identification and registration perished; + The group of the collecting, analysis both data processing determines nature and region of accident, operating situation, the degree of contamination of terrain and elaborates the proposals on maintenance of the law order and safety prepares an information material for a mass media.

Thus, on a place and in region of accident the different accident brigades are routed, the number that one depends on a scale and severity of consequences of accident suspected by headquarters on liquidation of accident. On data acquisition, the warning and delivery of accident brigades (liquidators) is required definite time. Apparently, that for this time the radiation can render the main effect on the population of neighbouring settlements because of high concentration in plume of primary release. The subsequent evacuation can reduce in some cases insignifi- cantly a received dose, but to bring additional damage to the population and state as a whole. A preliminary assessment of conditions of possible irradiation and efficiency of countermeasure, especially on an evacuation and resettlement therefore is needed.

Description of Objects of Radiation Risk 45 Time of irradiation and countermeasures As against the population, the members of accident brigades are near to a crash scene during small time. The main paths of irradiation – inhalation, external irradiation from a radioactive cloud, contaminated ground, clothes and etc. The working in shifts of the liquidators at Chernobyl made approximately two months [Ivanov et al., 1995]. The radiation conditions of considered accident would demand smaller quantity of the people and softer modes of irradiation. Let’s far suspect, that the liquidators will be subjected to an acute exposure within 7 days and in further will not live at the contaminated region.The dose load on the workers conductive area decontamination, are leave out, as it is supposed to conduct it in one half-year after accident.

3.7. Climate and Population Summaries

Murmansk Region is one of the northwestern largest and economically developed regions of the Russian Federation. It covers territories of the Kola Peninsula between 66°03’–69°57’ N and 28°25’–41°26’ E, and the total area is equal to144900 km2. Its maximum spatial extension from north to south is 400 km, and from west to east is 500 km. The major part of the Kola Peninsula lies above the Arctic Cir- cle. The Barents Sea washed peninsula in the north, and the White Sea – in the south. Murmansk region has borders with Finland and Norway in the west. The Kola Peninsula terrain is rather complex and diverse. The mountainous re- lief (altitudes of up to 1200 m asl) is characteristics of the western and central areas of the peninsula. In the central parts there are concentrated Chuna, Khibiny and Lovozero mountain massifs. The main feature of the northeastern part is a hill terrain and a great number of lakes.

Climate The climate of the region is inclement and changeable. From one side, the climate is formed due to influence of the Arctic cold air masses. From another side, it is under influence of the moist warm Atlantic air arriving along the Gulfstream. The most typical events in the region are the frequent and sudden air temperature and atmosphere pressure drops, strong winds, overcast, rainy days, and long-term snow cover. Due to this snow cover the heating season continues almost 10 months. Most peculiar feature of the weather in the Kola Peninsula is its instability and sharp changeability. It is stipulated by frequent changes in the air masses, cyclone and anticyclone activity, and frequent fronts’ travel. As a whole the weather is het- erogeneous and mainly depends on the distance from the seas. In the mountains, the thermal regime drops by 0.5 °C per each 100 m of altitude. The average annual temperature is –2.0 °C. The precipitation amount ranges from 340 to 640 mm. The rain is predominant type of precipitation during summer. Average amount of snow pack thickness in the plain terrain is 25–70 cm, and in the mountains – 150 cm. In some places it reaches 400 cm. Although spring arrives at the late April – early May, but sometimes warm weather changes to cold and it often snows. Summer time is relatively short (2.5 months), cool and wet. Autumn usually comes early and with a rain. For the Kola Peninsula latitude the Sun’s low position is characteristics, i.e. light days and nights in summer, and long nights and short twilight in winter. We should note that amount of radiation substantially decreases due to usual for the peninsula heavy cloudiness, fogs and relatively high humidity. The polar night arrives from November 22 and it stays until January 15. During winter the direct solar radiation is very low or almost zero.

46 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Population The population of the Murmansk region is 1065.9 thousand of inhabitants (see details in Appendix D). Among them 91.8% are urban, and 8.2% are villagers. The population’s average age is 33 years. The extreme natural and climatic conditions cause the increased cost of production, habitation and reproduction of the labor power cost as well as ill effect on the population’s health. The population vital functions conditions and the location of the mineral resources caused local nature in the development of the region territory.

Groups of risk Representative groups of heightened risk for radiation effect are: children and woman up to 45 years old, and also groups of the people by reason of habits or owing to a habitual, in the greater degree subject to separate kinds of radiation effect [minzdrav, 1999]. The liquidators of accident also are included into the risk group, as for them a permissible limit of irradiation is about it, as for staff of radiation-dangerous object and in some times higher, than for the population in normal conditions. The indicated groups are sensitive namely to the short-termed exposure. In case of long-term radiation effect through food and others the paths by most sensitive will be groups of the people consuming in more high scale the products, the pollution which one descends as a result of radioactive fallouts, and also population living in contaminated territories. It can be the same people, but can be and other. The experience, stored after Chernobyl and other catastrophes demonstrates on heightened contamination of wild plants: a moss, berries of undershrubs, mushrooms. These plants in adding up arctic and tundra biocenoses are nutrition for the wildings, and some also constitute of a ration of the man. The strong contamination of reindeer meat, meat and, specially, eggs of wild birds, less strong – freshwater fish is marked. The estimations demonstrate, that for a large part of the population the listed above kinds of nutrition are below than limit of 10 kg annually per capita, that is are rare. But there are groups of the people, in a ration which one the given nutrition can dominate. For example, the natives of region – the saami, feeding in the greater degree meat of the reindeer, at residing on the contaminated ground receive a dose both external, and internal irradiation. The fishermen living on uncontaminated ground, can feed “dirty” fish migrating in the rivers and lakes. Besides the fishermen can be engaged in a field in “dirty” places, and live – in “clean” ones. Approximate structure of different risks, enabled on the modern standards at normal exploitation and at accidents on nuclear facilities, is listed in Table 5. The maximum value for short-term risk (500) for population is conditioned by application of top level of risk optimization “B” according to the Russian rules nrb-99 [minzdrav, 1999]. According to Handbook [Gusev, 1991], for children the dose at reception of unit activity in an organism is higher, than for the received “conditional” person in the age of 20 years and more. As it is visible from Table 6, for the most relevant isotopes, – 131I and 137Cs, the maximum ratio of excess of a dose per unit of acting activity equals 8.6 for age 1–8 years at inhalation, and for ingestion – 7.4. However absolute values of doses depend on quantity of inhaled air, quantitative and qualitative parameters of a ration, features of a metabolism of a breathing system etc. Under the data of the reference book [Gusev, 1991], daily volume of inhaled air for children of 10 years in 1.5 times, and in the age of 1 year – in 6 times it is less, than for adult. Partly this decreasing compensates the excess of a dose for children per unit of activity. Let’s mark that the preventive protective measures first of all should be diffused to children, and also on the women up to 45 years old. Whole, the solution of a problem of age relation dose characteristics, personal sensibility and other yet is not finished. Therefore now many methodologies allow for radiation effect only on the conditional adult person. So we shell act hereinaf- ter namely such way.

Description of Objects of Radiation Risk 47 Table 5 Maximum radiation risk for the population and different groups of risk. *the value in dose form is established as agreed with regional/federal supervisory authorities; **the maximum rating of a dose is established by competent organs.

Population and groups of risk Risk in relative units Short-term or long-term annual Population in normal conditions 1 70 Population undo short-termed irradiation, among them: 50- (500) 70 Children 50–70 ~70 Women 50–70 ~70 Population living on contaminate territory: 50 200 Reindeer farmer (their children) >50 (>70) >200 (>200) Hunters and ______(their children) >50 (>70) >200 (>200) Fishermen (their children) >50 (>70) >200 (>200) Staff of radiation objects 100/200* 1000 The liquidators 100 ->100** 100–1000

Table 6 Ratio of excess of a dose depending on age.

Nuclide Path of reception Age, years 1–8 8–12 12–20 131I Inhalation 8.6 3.0 2.2 Ingestion 7.4 3.4 2.2 137Cs Inhalation 2.7 2.2 1.5 Ingestion 2.3 2.0 1.5

Main results On the basis of the analysis of the known information about past incidents on radiation- dangerous objects the estimation of annual probability of possible events (act of terrorism, act of war, fire, fall of flight vehicles) is executed. In opinion of the authors, the greatest probability of accident on a site of temporary storage of the spent fissile material of nuclear submarine has the scenario resulting in to a fire.

48 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 4 Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel

4.1. pc cosyma: Code and partial models

Computing model As the main tool of realization of quantitative analysis of risk of severe radiation accident on the Kola peninsula the complex of the programs pc cosyma (Version 2), specially intended for an estimation of radiation risk by faces making the deci- sions [pc cosyma, 1995; pc cosyma, 1991] is selected. cosyma (COde SYstem from MAria) is a computer program package widely used in the European Com- munity for assessing the off-site radiological and ecological consequences of accidental atmospheric releases of radioactive material. It was developed jointly by fzk (Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Germany) and nrpb (National Radiologi- cal Protection Board, uk) as part of the European Commission’s maria project (Methods for Assessing the Radiological Impact of Accidents) during the late 1980’s.

Instruments of assessment consequences of radionuclide propagation and fallout pc cosyma is a probabilistic Accident Consequence Assessment (aca) system, for use in calculating the risk posed by potential nuclear accidents giving rise to releases to atmosphere (see Figure 2). It takes into account the range of conditions which may prevail should an accident occur. cosyma was developed with partial support from the ec Radiation Protection Research Program. The code system was principally developed by fzk [pc cosyma, 1991] and nrpb but with significant inputs from a number of other contractors within the ec maria research program. cosyma provides a flexible package that will allow users in different countries to investigate a variety of special problems, and also to investigate and

Figure 2 An example of dividing of modelled area.

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 49 understand detailed aspects of the results obtained. It was also intended for use in standard applications. A version of cosyma for use on mainframe computers was made available in 1990. A pc version of cosyma, with user-friendly input and results interfaces, was developed by nrpb and fzk, and is available through the ec. The first version of the system was released in 1993; a revised and extended version is available. The pc system has been developed mainly to provide access for a much wider number of users than earlier. Some of the flexibility of the models in the mainframe version has been removed, but for the great majority of users, this should not be an undue hindrance. In particular, considerable flexibility has been maintained in the modelling of countermeasures, because of differences in national arrangements and the general interest in assessing the impact of different countermeasures’ strategies. The system is described in more detail in eur-16239 [pc cosyma, 1995]. The endpoints calculated by the code are: + air concentrations and depositions, both at specific locations and as a function of distance from the site; + numbers of people and areas affected by countermeasures, and their time inte- grals; + amounts of food banned; + the duration of countermeasures at particular locations; + probability of implementing countermeasures, both at specific locations and as a function of distance from the site; + doses received in selected time periods, both at specific locations and as a function of distance from the site; + individual risk of early and late fatal and non-fatal health effects, both at specific locations and as a function of distance from the site; + numbers of early and late fatal and non-fatal health effects; + economic costs of the off site consequences of an accident.

pc cosyma can be used for deterministic or probabilistic assessments. Determinis- tic assessments give detailed results for a release in a single set of atmospheric conditions, probabilistic assessments give results taking account of the full range of atmospheric conditions that may be experienced and their respective frequencies of occurrence. The input is menu driven, and sub-divided according to the steps of an aca calculation. The user must provide information on the characteristics of the released material, the location where the release occurs, details of the countermeasures’ strategy adopted, and the endpoints required. The user may also change the values of some of the parameters used in the models. Default values are provided for all parameters. An example of an input menu is available. The system includes data libraries for many of the quantities required, such as dose per unit intake or food chain concentrations per unit deposit. Gridded data of population and agricultural for the whole of Europe, and two example sets of atmospheric conditions are also provided. The user can include detailed information on the population distribution near the site and specific atmospheric conditions on site if available. In particular,

50 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov in Figure 3 the schematic map of location of settlements near to a site of considered accident is shown (also see Appendix D). Results are presented on the screen in tabular and graphical form. Both the table and the graph may be printed in graphical or tabular form also. The system writes a file that the user can input to a spreadsheet to allow further processing if required. pc cosyma is provided as a software package that includes the disks containing the system together with a user guide, which gives further details of the various parameters for which values are to be specified by the user through the menu system. It also gives guidance on the likely applicability of the default values and on the choice of alternative values. pc cosyma can only be run once the programs and data libraries have been in- stalled onto the user’s hard disk. The installation requires 14 Mb of space on the disk. Running the programs requires more space on the hard disk to store the files produced during the run. The amount of space needed for this depends on the application that is being undertaken. Deterministic runs need a few hundred Kbytes, while probabilistic runs take several tens of Mbytes. The computer time needed depends on the application that is being undertaken and the processor speed. De- terministic runs typically take a few minutes of computer run-times, probabilistic runs can take up to a few hours of computer time. These times do not include the time required to work through the interface and assign values for the parameters. Two versions of pc cosyma have been issued each providing the user with different degrees of flexibility in specifying the values of model parameters. These are referred to as the “standard” and the “constrained” versions of pc cosyma. In the standard version, the user is provided with considerable flexibility in terms of modifying the values of many model parameters. In the constrained version, the user is more limited to the use of default values for model parameters. However, both versions contain the same set of models and allow the same set of endpoints to be calculated; they can therefore be used for the same applications. They also provide the user with the same options for describing the source term and the countermeasures’ strategy. The version of the system to be provided, i.e. the standard or the constrained version, will be determined by the ec in consultation with the applicant, taking account of their experience and knowledge in this area and their intended use of the system.

Figure 3 Schematic map of location of settlements.

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 51 Atmospheric dispersion Our instrument for assessment is the second version of pc cosyma software [pc cosyma, 1995] developed as computer version on the base of European Commis- sion’s program maria.pc cosyma has a atmospheric dispersion model based on Gaussian plume model which allows for hourly changes in the wind speed and direction, stability category, and rainfall rate affecting the dispersing radionuclides. Main equations and relations of closure are presented in Appendix E.

Countermeasures The realization of countermeasures at large radiation accidents is mandatory as on Russian (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4), and according to international regulation, for example, see publications icpr nn 26, 40 and 43 [icrp, 1987]. The generally accepted measures are a shelter, iodine preventive measures, evacuation, relocation and limitation of consumption of food and drinking water. Urgent and long-term countermeasures distinguish. As was set up above, adopted in Russia (or in former ussr) criterion of intervention [icrp, 1987; pc cosyma, 1991; Romanov, 1993; nkrz, 1994; pc cosyma, 1995; MinES of Belarus Republic, 1997; minzdrav, 1998; minzdrav, 1999] have area of uncertainty or optimization, top and bottom limits by which one (levels A and B, accordingly) differ practically in 10 times. For this reason, the definition of the moment of realization of countermeasures takes place under the solution of a organ making a decision: headquarters of liquidation of accident, organ of state supervision behind a radiation safety, management of accident object. The comparison of some criterions of intervention is conducted for parameters received by default in the program cosyma pursuant to the guidelines icpr and in nrb-99 is made in Table 7 and Table 8.

Table 7 Comparison of criterions of realization of some countermeasures on Russian and international standards.

Measures An effective dose on all body, Sv icpr and cosyma nrb-96/99 Level A Level B Sheltering 0.005 0.005 0.05 Sheltering and evacu- 0.05 0.005 per month 0.03 per month ation Relocation 0.05 more than 0.03 for one month and approximately 0.2 per the first year under the preliminary forecast Return from reloca- 0.025 0.01 for the first month after returning under tion or evacuation the forecast

Table 8 Criterions of the food prohibitions and limitations, concentration limit, Bq/l or Bq/kg.

Elements cosyma nrb-96/99 other products (frequently used) milk other products (fre- Level A Level B quently used) Sr 125 750 100 1000 I 500 2000 1000 10000 Alfa-emitters 20 80 10 100 Cs 1000 1250 1000 10000

52 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Note that icpr recommends in case of the conditionality of a radiation dose by food to establish an effective dose limit 0.005 Sv. The given quota as determines a level of permissible contamination of the concrete product depending on assimi- lating a concrete radionuclide by organs of the man and from an adopted standard ration. The annual consumption of 210 kg of milk, 100 kg of different kinds of meat, 200 kg of potatoes, 230 kg of vegetables and fruit and 170 kg of a grain is proposed in this ration. In practice there is a great many of possible additional countermeasures which were checked in during liquidation with consequences of radiation emergencies, especially accident on Chernobyl npp. Soft norms act after accident immediately. Then strong standards act under the contents of radionuclides in food production [MinES of Belarus Republic, 1997]. The forage for the domestic animals, timber for manufacturing of furniture and on fire wood, the wild plants, the mushrooms and berries, the fish, the game and another are regulated depending on a level and pattern adding up dose loading on the population. The protectors lowering accumulation the main radionuclides are entered in the forage to cattle. Besides the guidelines on ways of cooking are propose. These recipes allow decreasing of radioactivity content in food. The meat products are maintained for a decrease of the content of radionuclides to a acceptable level by decay. The milk products are processed and diluted with more clean products. In conditions of the Kola Peninsula at radiation accident in the contaminated territories the strong accumulation of a radioactivity in such popular products, as mushrooms and berries, fish of freshwater reservoir, meat of deer and game is possible. The concrete countermeasures in case of accident can be entered at excess of dose quota from certain pathways of receipt of radionuclides by organs of sanepidnadzor.

4.2. Accident scenario and source term assessment

Accident scenario and site of radioactive release In the present research for a quantitative assessment of individual and collective risk the radiation ground contamination is considered as a result of a fire happening on the territory of a storage pad of one of objects of fleet. It is supposed that in this site there is a spent fuel in quantity of one core of nuclear submarine. In Fig- ure 3 the fragment of modelled area is shown, where an epicentre of concentric circumferences is a storage pad – conditional source of a fire and accidental release into atmosphere.

Assessment of accidental source term Source term it is usually used technical term for propagation and risk evaluation from accidental object to men or biosphere. In our case it is fusion products, acti- nides that accumulated in one core or about 220 assemblies of nuclear submarines reactor. So most inventory of the core we suggest is going to atmosphere. Such complete release sometimes is suggested in hypothetical scenarios of accident influence. We based on possibility of men’s intrusion not only in preparation of incident, but also during fire. Second way to such release may be nature or by ter- rorists great explosion near containers with sf assemblies. Far, individual inventories of concrete radionuclides in sf were taken into account. There are: 137Cs, 134Cs, 90Sr, 144Ce, 106Ru, 241Pu, which have most significant activities, great long life-times and sufficient influences on the health, see Table 9. The importance of cooling duration is in decreasing of inventory and source term versus time. Naturally cooling for sf of first generation ns [Naumov, 1999] is more then to one of typical sf latest generations [Ganul et al., 1996]. Conservatively, we suggest minimal value 10 years in first case and 1 year in the second. From others important details of scenarios are site of accident: We based on published information about possible places sf repaired from decommissioned ns.

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 53 Table 9 Inventory of radionuclides (in Bq) for spent fuel of Navy ns.

Radionuclides Life-time Ganul et al., 1996 for Naumov, 1999 for 10 1 year cooling years cooling 85Kr 10.7 y 2.0·1014 9.3·1013 90Sr 28 y 2.1·1015 1.1·1015 106Ru 66 d 3.2·1014 – 134Cs 2.06 y 8.9·1014 – 137Cs 30.1 y 2.1·1015 1.2·1015 144Ce 168 d 4.4·1015 – 241Pu 14.3 y 3.1·1014 1.6·1014

One of them is shown on Figure 3 without distinct connection with real object in reason of safety. At the same time near this place in June of 1998 may be realized real accidental scenario on the ns’s board by seamen-terrorist, who tried to ex- plode weapon usual type and killed eight seamen. For time after release we suggested timing of the release – 5 hours, amount released in each released phase linearly decreasing during fire, thermal energy according 1 ton of oil, height of release 1 km. In far scenarios there are details of part of countermeasures accepted iaea and Russian Authorities: times and conditions of evacuation, restricts any kinds, besides that behaviour of population and so on.

Description peculiarity of weather conditions The most interest for quantitative analysis of risk presents a capability of comparison of weep of accident effect in different weather conditions having a place in region of release of a radioactivity. Features of a variation of weather in conditions of Arctic region is more smoothly varying effect on a category of a weather of daily change of a light mode. Apparently, that it is strongest in the winter and summer. So, if in middle latitudes there is a daily cyclical change of categories from A and B (day) to D (night) on Pasquill’s classification, on the Kola this mode acts basically in spring and autumn periods. In the Kola the change of weather in the greater degree depends on from passing of cyclones. The passing of cyclones establishes large periodicity of change of weather. This phenomenon acts similarly to change of “day-night”. It increases a fraction of weather time of a category D. Therefore decreasing of mixing a layer hinders of release rising on a considerable altitude, if its energy and speed about such, as for releases from standard industrial tubes, that is are not too large. In result the released aerosols and the gases tend to be spread at lower altitude and to save higher concentration in plume of release. At identical wind speed it is possible to expect the greater contamination of a neighbouring zone in locations of the Kola or Barents region. On the other hand, the wind speeds on the Kola are higher, than, for example, in Germany and Hungary [pc cosyma, 1995]. Therefore, during a deposition a cloud (plume of release) will pass greater distance interval and on the average contamination of a surface will decrease. Other feature of region consists in fall out of the greater fraction of precipitation in kind of snow. The snow has the greater capacity to adsorption of radioactive aerosols from air as contrasted to by their capture by drips of a rain, however in the same proportion representative quantity of falling out snow is less, than rainwater. Therefore it is possible to consider levels of contamination of a surface of the earth, both in warm, and in cold period are closed. Thus, it is integrally operating local features of weather in Polar region and in Europe is compensated and results in similar results. However, the fluctuations of an atmospheric pollution and surface in different versions of a precipitation, change of wind directions and other parameters of

54 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov weather conditions present of interest. What scenario appears by most unfavourable in a spectrum possible for region? The answer gives the modelling all sets of weather by a method of random numbers in algorithm of the program pc cosyma. The results of calculation of fields of radionuclide concentrations in air and on a surface, the potential, individual and collective doses of each version will form the sets of contamination risks, realization of countermeasures, incidences and moralities on given population distribution in modelled area. The most dangerous weather sequences and applicable to them the risk structure are selected. For our practical purpose, the results were received from probabilistic calculations on the base of two typical annual weather Europe’s conditions. Changing of weather characteristics occur every each hour.

Assumptions about countermeasures In calculations the criterions of a beginning of applying of countermeasures and criterions are adopted in correspondence to the installations of the program pc cosyma, so far as: + They are more definite; + As more conservative for definition of injury and risk in case of countermeasure absence; + Contain more full set of the applicable irradiation parameters of different organs on various paths and for the greater number of groups of food, kinds of incidence etc.

4.3. Results of pc cosyma calculations and discussion

Concentration of radionuclides in air and on ground Some next figures show the results of dispersion a few important radionuclides mainly in the air and surface on chosen site. Figure 4 gives a representation about distribution of mean and maximum concentration in air 137Cs in depending on distance from the site. In Figure 5, the distribution of mean concentration in air and on ground 241Pu, 144Ce and 137Cs is shown in depending on distance from an epicentre of a fire. The location of the largest settlements in area of simulation is shown on an abscissa axis of Figure 4 for visualization and better orientation. The curve of maximum concentration of caesium in air in Figure 4 corresponds to the most unfavourable version of weather conditions by criterion of severity of consequences for the population. This curve has a small local maximum on distance about 30 km, whereas the curve of mean concentration monotonically is decreased depending on distance from an epicentre. The relations of mean concentration of other relevant isotopes are similar. For example, in Figure 5 the relations of mean concentration for cerium and plutonium are shown. Let’s remark that the absolute value of concentrations of these elements is lower, than for caesium. The maximum concentration of these isotopes is higher than mean concentration, as well as for caesium almost two order As for an estimation of potential risk the average parameters more approach, in further its will be presented. At the same time, it is neces sary to remember about probability of the most unfavourable scenario. At its implementation the maxima of unfavourable consequences can locally be appeared in any location of the Kola and Barents region. Unconditionally an air and ground are most contaminated near of a point of release at any development of accident. There is very sufficient decreasing of the concentrations near epicenter. Popu- lation at this place is absent, but accident brigades operate in rather duty zone: up to 50 m from fire.

Potential radiation doses Individual and collective mean doses, which are accumulated by population during 50 years of life after accident, are shown on the next figures. In particular, in a

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 55 Figure 4 Distribution of mean and maximum concentration in air 137Cs in depending on distance from a fire’s epicentre.

Figure 5 Distribution of mean concentration in air and on ground of some radionuclides in depending on distance from an epicentre of a fire.

Figure 6, the individual doses for 50 years on different organs of a body (bone marrow, breast, skin and effective) with and without countermeasures are shown in depending on distance from a place of a fire. The presented doses can be compared to the norms on irradiation of all body and separate organs (the norms are shown in the Chapter 2 and Appendix C). Based on the comparison we can make conclusion about potential hazard of the population residing in towns Snezhnogorsk and Polarnyi after accident independent of weather conditions, having a place. Let’s mark, that the unfavourable meteorological conditions can promote hazard and for more distant regions, for example, for Murmansk or ever territories of contiguous countries.

56 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Figure 6 Relation of individual doses for 50 years on different organs of a body with and without countermeasures in depending on distance.

It is possible to note that the countermeasures allow decrease a dose more than on one the order in an epicentre of event and to a lesser degree on more remote distances. And on distance about 15 km the difference in a dose with and without countermeasures are small. Besides in this figure we can see non-standard behaviour of relation of a dose on a skin on distance up to 7 km from an epicentre. A kind of countermeasures calculated by the pc cosyma (the relocation of the people on terms of different duration with contaminated territories) is shown in Figure 7. More strong countermeasures are needed near epicentre. These countermeasures are needed in southern distance bands and its are shown on this figure by symbols: 3, 4 and 5. At other bands serious countermeasures are not required. For transition from individual to collective effect the distribution of an individual dose is integrated in pc cosyma on the considered area with a density function

Figure 7 An example of countermeasures – duration of relocation on terms: 1–7 days; 2–3 months; 3–6 months; 4–12 months; 5 – more than one year.

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 57 Figure 8 Collective dose on different organs of a body with and without countermeasures.

of the population distribution as a weight function. In Figure 8 the collective dose on separate organs for the population of modelled area for 50 years with and without countermeasures is shown. We can see on figure that countermeasures allow reducing value of a collective dose practically twice.

Risks Received dose is the reason for risk of incidences and mortal cases. For example, Figure 9, would allow receive representation about value of individual risk of incidence of different organs of a body in depending on distance from an epicentre of a fire with and without countermeasures, accordingly. The Figure 10, would be clones of Figure 9. The relations of individual risk of incidence only for born marrow, breast, skin and all body are placed. Remind that countermeasures con-

Figure 9 Relation of individual risk of incidence of different organs of a body on distance from an epicentre of a fire with and without countermeasures.

58 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Figure 10 Relation of individual risk of incidence of a bone marrow, breast, skin and all body on distance from an epicentre of a fire with and without countermeasures.

sist of relocation after exceeding dose limit, decontamination, food restrictions and decontamination of land. The analysis of results allows making some conclusions. For example, the values may be compared with level of acceptable annual risk for person from population according to Russian rules – 5.0·10–5 year–1. In the boundaries of 10 km it may be exceeded even with countermeasures. Besides population of Snezhnogorsk and Polyarnyi is needed in these countermeasures, in contrary of far settlements and towns. Figure 11 shows individual risk from short effects dependence versus distance from accident point. This data for distances 50–500 m may be implemented to risk evaluation for members of accidental brigades. The value 3% for 100 m and 1 day integration is rather high for case sf second generation. Comparison two type of source term gives radiological effect of sf cooling.

Figure 11 (Left) Relations of mean individual short-term risk of mortality on distance. Figure 12 (Right) The maximum estimation, average value, 90-th and 99-th percentiles for risks of mortality of the population on set of different weather conditions.

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 59 Figure 13 The probability distribution of the areas, on which one is necessary to execute a decontamination and relocation.

Long term individual risk with countermeasures is shown on Figure 12. Proba- bilistic calculations for large set of weather conditions appear an essential difference in shown risk characteristics. Often pc cosyma presents results in form of the probability distribution that is Complimentary Cumulative Distribution Function (ccdf). ccdf is the probability of exceeding particular levels of consequence. ccdf for individual long-term fatal risk of the population on distance with countermeasures are presented in Figure 13. Adopted probability of the considered major accident is 4·10–4 year–1. The representative mean fatal risk (see lower curve) in case of accident is 10–2 year–1. Thus, the resultant risk for the population is 4·10–6 year–1, that is this value is in the field of optimization by adjusting Authorities, not introducing (on nrb-99 or icpr-26) special social danger. The Figure 13 characterized in special pc cosyma’s form what area may be needed into relocation of population and decontamination of land on the base of probable calculations. Almost 1 km2 will need in this in any whether conditions. Maximal vales of the area are near 15 and 12 km2 for decontamination and relocation, respectively. This area may be divided on some different contaminated zones. Figure 14 and Figure 15 give presentation about quantities of incidence and mortality for the population of modelled area, that is total effect of radiation accident. First of all the increase of cases of lung illnesses is forecast among incidences of organs. The Chapter 2 we shown, that the connection of such incidences with irradiation under the Russian norms is not set and, therefore, injury, caused to the population, will not be compensated. In these figures large hazard of unfavourable meteorological conditions as contrasted to by mean meteorological conditions also is noticeable. The unfavourable conditions promote more long-termed presence of release near to an epicentre, instead of dispersion on the large areas, for example of countries of Barents region, and also outwashing of radionuclides on ground by precipitation. In this case residing in the contaminated territories results in noticeable additional risk. The accident of such type can happen with different sf, as all its types are partially left in Kola. It can be fuel of ns of a first generation, long time waiting dis- patch for processing, and becoming defective. It can be fuel of following generations with smaller cooling and greater content of fission products. We make assumption that core of nuclear submarine of second (Figure 14) and first (Figure 15) generation acts as source term with and without countermeasures. The analysis of the built curves allows approving that the fire on a storage pad with

60 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov a sf of a second generation is more dangerous and the implementation of countermeasures gives noticeable effect.

Figure 14 Number of incidence (top figures) and mortality (bottom figures) for the population of modelled area. (The core of nuclear submarine of a second generation; without (leftmost figures) and with (rigtmost figures) countermeasures).

Figure 15 Number of incidence (top figures) and mortality (bottom figures) for the population of modelled area. (The core of nuclear submarine of a first generation; without (leftmost figures) and with (rightmost figures) countermeasures).

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 61 Apparently, in case of long-termed effect (within 50 years) the most useful and necessary countermeasure will be the limitation of consumption of the contaminated food.

4.4. Analysis of uncertainties

Till now presentation of results based on calculations with alternate selection of parameters of the best estimation: with and without countermeasures, with more cooled spent fuel and more fresh. In the stochastic analysis of uncertainties at simulation the uncertainty of one or more parameters is simultaneously allowed. Such simulation results in uncertainty of concentrations and doses. As a whole, the predictable values of doses are resulted in the terms of their expected value, 90-th and 99-th percentiles. The stochastic analysis of uncertainty is executed with the help of repeated start of model of different annual weather conditions or with change of other parameters.

Selection of analysed functional and independent parameters The main studied groups are population and liquidators. The results demonstrate that of the main risk from radiation accident for the population of region is conditioned by sources of long-term irradiation. Therefore it is possible to select collective or social risk of all population of region as quantity, for example, additional fatal cases. The same risk can be expressed through mean individual risk of additional incidence or mortality, so far as the difference on age, sex etc. were leave out of account. The variant with countermeasures on an evacuation, shelter and decontamination for the subsequent returning of the population will be used in further for a determinacy. Except for risk to health, it is useful to define parameters of uncertainties of probability of an evacuation and realization of activities on decontamination. The liquidators are subjected more to great risk from short-term effects during liquidation of a fire and other operations near to an epicentre. If the result of short- term effect is much higher than risk of long-term irradiation outside a sanitary – protective zone, it is possible to limit by short-term risk. For a determinacy and in accordance with practice we shall suspect that after accident the sanitary – protective zone will be established in 5 km from an accident place. Mentioned above results demonstrate considerable influencing of weather conditions during accident and for all region, and for distribution of relative risk on territory. Therefore probabilistic set of weather sequences will be that parameter, on which the sensitivity and uncertainty of risk for the population and liquidators is determined.

Uncertainty of long-term individual risk for the population of region Probabilistic parameters for individual fatal risk (with countermeasures) of the population and depending on distance are shown in Figure 12. The data on mean and maximum risk are very different – approximately on two orders. The worst weather sequences introduce the small specific contribution because of small recurrence of such conditions, bound with an intensive precipitation at once after accident. The precipitation in different segments of a grid results in uneven relation of risk from distance and increases the uncertainty of results. Mean on an ensemble of possible weather conditions the risk is represented by more even relation. This relation is reduced on the distance 30 km up to a level that is permissible for staff of radiation object (on nrb-99: 10–3 per year).

Individual risk for the liquidators The Factor operating in an initial stage of emergencies can induce of risk of incidence and mortality only near to the accident epicenter. In Table 10 are shown

62 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov calculated on to the program cosyma maximum and mean risk on set of weather conditions (for calculation f percentiles the statistical reliability is poor). The short-term risk is noticeable up to distance about 100 m, where it is less permissible for staff on the average. The constant presence of the liquidator can result in to an overexposure and obtaining of risk of the above-adopted standards at smaller distances. Note that in according with [Pendyuhov et al., 1992], at accident on a railway transportation the cordon is exhibited on the distance 50 m from a emergence place, and fire and other brigades can be even closer.

Table 10 Risk of incidence and mortality from irradiation during liquidation of accident.

Distance, m Kind of risk Maximum Mean 100 Fatal 0.40·10–2 0.67·10–5 100 Incidence 1.17·10–2 1.93·10–5 230 Fatal 0 0 230 Incidence 0 0

Influence of uncertainty on reliability of the risk-analysis In the given research the undifferentiated risk, identical to the men and women, together with for different age categories of the population is adopted. However it is known, that the risk for children is in some times higher, than for adult, and for the women of reproductive age approximately in 1.5 times is higher, than for the men [Romanov, 1993; Gofman, 1994]. The given uncertainty is analysed with the help of more complex methods. These methods are disputable now, in many respects, and leaving for a framework of our problem – the analysis of risk for all population of selected region of the Kola Peninsula. The adopted conversion factors of a dose in risk correspond for the men middle-aged better. Risk for the usual population of Snezhnogorsk is on the order above professional on the average, that in case of accident of the considered type (modern low cooling the spent fuel of nuclear submarine practically completely is destroyed during a high temperature fire) will demand the considered and additional countermeasures. So far as the distance to Snezhnogorsk less than 5 km is possible it’s closing. The population of Polarnyi will be subjected the risk also of order 10–2 and higher in case of unfavourable weather conditions. For the population of Severo- morks the risk is approximately twice smaller. For the population of Murmansk the risk is about professional. The situation can be severe is complicated by unfavourable weather conditions for all settlements, see Figure 12. This can be referred to the population of more removed regions.

4.5. Main results

A programmatic complex pc cosyma executes an estimation of potential risk for the population of region of the center of a fire at air transport and deposition of a radioactivity for this incident. The analysis of results of executed calculations allows making following conclusions: 1. Values of individual mortality risk for inhabitants of nearest settlements are comparable with mortality risk in result of car crash; 2. The accidents result to additional mortality and incidence risk for population of Murmansk district; 3. The effectiveness of considered countermeasures (relocation and decontamination) is observed in district with radius about 12 km (Gadzhievo, Polyarnyi, Snezhnogorsk, Olen’ya);

Assessment of Potential Risk for Storage Facility of Spent Fuel 63 4. There is danger for life of accidental brigade members and naval yard workers during the accident; 5. There is considerable influence of meteorological conditions on maximal effects of irradiation; 6. Main affected organs are: bone marrow, skin and lung; 7. The calculated risk integrates of a harm to health, both recognized, and not recognized by the state in practice. The first category is radiation incidence, radiation burn, the causal connection with accident for which can be established. The second category is a cancer, cataract, leukaemia, idiocy and removed genetic consequences. The incidences of this type can arise without irradiation and in practice of remedial with it are not linked. Therefore presented estimations including both categories, are more full and realistic, than based on official statistics; 8. Social risks of the removed consequences on the order of above short-term consequences and is conditioned in the main incidences of the second category. Therefore, the majority of risk remains not estimated and uncompen- sated; 9. The area size of heightened risk from reviewed type accident at unfavourable meteorological conditions is spread to territory contiguous countries in case of release of radionuclides from objects placed closer to boundary.

64 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 5 Evaluation of the Potential Contamination

5.1. Methods, Models, Software

To evaluate the potential pollution of the studied territories we used the method of mathematical modeling. For the simulation of the atmospheric transport and deposition of radionuclides on the local- and meso-scale a 3d modelling system [Aloyan & Baklanov, 1985; Baklanov, 1986; Baklanov, 1988; Baklanov et al., 1994] was applied. This system, developed by the Institute of Northern Ecological Prob- lems (inep) at the Kola Science Centre and the Computer Centre of the Siberian Division of ras, includes a numerical meso-meteorological model over a complex terrain [Aloyan & Baklanov, 1985; Baklanov, 1988] and an Eulerian model for transport, diffusion and deposition of multi-component radioactive pollutants [Baklanov, 1988; Rigina, 1993; Baklanov et al., 1994]. Some individual blocks of the model which describe the specificity of the atmospheric transport of the radionuclides, as well as calculation of the dose loads on the critical organs are corresponded to commonly chosen approaches mentioned in the Russian and international documents [Techniques and decision, 1987; Methods, 1984; Kozlov, 1991; Moiseev & Ivanov, 1990; Standards, 1999; Gusev & Belyaev, 1986]. The model has been verified for the Chernobyl area against the data from the Chernobyl accident and, in particular, was presented and discussed by specialists in 1992. Later it was included in the document of technical standards “Methods to calculate the distribution of the radioactive substances in the environment and doses of the population’s irradiation” [Methods, 1992]. In this document the similar models are considered as the models of the third level – “expert models”. Such models are more appropriate to use if you want to evaluate the distribution of the radioactive pollution from the nuclear sites in the conditions of the complex temporal and spatial innhomogeneity of the wind field. For example, it may a complex terrain surrounding the nuclear site. Or it may be a breeze circulation as a result of an adjacent sea, large lake, or cooling pond activities. All numerical models are divided based on the characteristic scale. They ranged from the micro-scale (3–5 km) to trans-boundary (several thousand km) and global scale models, which describe completely the planetary atmosphere. In the following sections we will present results of several numerical experiments in order to analyze the potential risk of pollution in the studied regions. To perform these experiments we elaborated the software package. This package includes the following main models: 1) simulation of the spatial and temporal fields for wind’s velocity and direction, 2) atmospheric transport of radionuclides, and 3) probabilistic evaluation of the surface’s pollution.

Probability density functions and risk maps Additionally, in our model we included a block, which is responsible to calculate the probability of pollution in the studied regions. Below we show the description of this block on the example of the northeast sector of the Kola npp energy units’ location. In order to estimate the expected contamination of the surrounding area due to

possible accident scenario the probability P to exceed some control level cmax of precipitation (or radionuclide concentration) at any point (x, y) – P(c > cmax; x, y) has to be evaluated. The main meteorological factors that govern the radionuclide

transport are the horizontal wind velocity components vx(t) and vy(t) at the upper

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 65 N

W E

S 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Wind velocity, m/s

Figure 16 Probability density function (pdf) of the wind direction (left) and wind velocity (right) for Yukspor meteorological station (913 m asl).

boundary. These parameters are random, and their values must conform to proba-

bility density functions (pdf) – pϕ(x) and pν(x) – which are shown in Figure 16. Temporal variation of is described by autocorrelation function R(t) (Figure 17, left). The source time history, chosen for calculation, is shown in Figure 17, right. For simplicity, we performed our calculation for the normalized source.

Given pϕ and pν cannot be used explicitly in simulations. These functions ν ϕ should be transformed into two-dimensional pdf – p(vx, vy), where vx = ·cos , ν ϕ vy = ·sin , and then two dependent random processes vx(t) and vy(t) with a given autocorrelation function R(t) have to be built. In general case it is a complex problem. So, in our study, at this step we ap-

proximated actual pdf p(vx, vy) by Gaussian pdf g(vx, vy). The Gaussian pdf has the virtue to remain unchanged after a linear transformation. Figure 18 displays the real pdf and its approximation by Gaussian pdf. The latter has been used in our simulation to estimate the risk.

In order to construct the field P(c > cmax; x, y) we used the probabilistic approach, which is based on the Monte-Carlo method in the combination with the deterministic transport models. Our numerical scheme consists of the following steps: 1. The vicinity of the nuclear risk’s object covers by the mesh with terrain data. The size of each mesh is selected according to the peculiarities of a chosen problem. In our study we used a grid domain of about 100 x 100 km with the horizontal mesh size of 2 km, and vertical of 50 m. 2. The sequence of delta-correlated random deviates conforming to probability

density function g(vx, vy) is generated using rejection method. The correspond-

0.8

0.4

0.0 0 24 48 72 0 24 48 72 [hours]

Figure 17 Autocorrelation function (left) of wind velocity module for Kandalaksha meteorological station (26 m asl), and (right) temporal source scenario.

66 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Gaussian p.d.f. Real p.d.f

0.001 8 0.001

6 0.002 0.002 4 2

0.002 0

0.002 0.005 -2 0.005 -4

-6 0.001 0.001 -8 South-North Wind Velocity, m/s Velocity, Wind South-North -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 West-East Wind Velocity, m/s

Figure 18 Gaussian (left) and original (right) 2-d probability density functions.

ent Cartesian components vx(t) and vy(t) are evaluated, and a time step is chosen according to the transport model requirements. 3. These components are smoothed accordingly to autocorrelation function R(t).

After smoothing the resulting time series vx(t) and vy(t) possess properties of the autocorrelation function R(t) and pdf g(vx, vy) that is not differ much from the real pdf p(vx, vy) as shown in Figure 18. In our simulation we used the time series as long as 7 days of duration.

Radioactive source intensity and configuration defined by accident scenario and

obtained random time series vx(t) and vy(t) are used as input data in the transport model. Then, using transport equation (5.1.11), the concentration c is calculated at each node of a mesh as shown in Figure 19. It is important to note the influence of to- pography on the distribution of contaminant. In order to estimate the p(c; x, y) field at each mesh node, the steps (2) and (3) mentioned above should be repeated N times (where N must be chosen large

Figure 19 2-Dimensional field of the radionuclide concentration 25 hours after the Kola npp accident (Log 10 scale is applied).

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 67 3 Figure 20 Probabilistic map of the risk, where concentration exceeds the cmax = 0.005 Bq/m .

enough to gain the reasonably stable results; for example N =2000. Using the cal-

culated p(c; x, y) field the target field of probability for exceeded cmax is estimated:

∞ ∫ pcxy(); , dc (1)

cmax

3 Figure 20 shows the risk map for cmax = 0.005 Bq/m . These results demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method using simplified source and transport models. Shown in this figure result is for a limited part of the Kola Peninsula. More realistic and complex results are presented in the Section 5.3 of this report.

Software tools In order to elaborate the numerical model we used the following technical and software products: 1) Fortran PowerStation 4.0 (Microsoft Developer Studio) and 2) C++ (Linux). For the treatment of the input and output data we used: 1) Surfer (Win32) Version 6.04 (Surfer Mapping System, Golden Software Inc.) and Generic Mapping Tools (gmt), version 3 software.

5.2. Description of the Accident Scenarios

According to the Project work-plan, among a variety of the radiation risk objects situated on the Kola Peninsula, we choose for detail study only the following objects: + Kola Nuclear Power Plant (Kola npp or knpp); + Ice-breakers Fleet of the Murmansk Sea Shipping Company; + Service and storage vessels for nuclear fuel and Spent Nuclear Fuel (snf) of the service and supply enterprise “Atomflot”; + Nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet of the Russia.

68 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Kola nuclear power plant The Kola Nuclear Power Plant has 4 reactors of the pwr-440 type. Each reactor of this type has electrical capacity of 440 mw. Two of them (Unit 1) are reactors of the older generation (pwr-440/230 design), and two of them (Unit 2) are more recent design (pwr-440/213). The first reactor started to operate in June 1973, the second – December 1974, the third – March 1981, and the fourth – October 1984. The projected lifetime of each reactor is about 30 years. The reactor core has 2.88 m in diameter and 2.5 m in height. The reactor hull has 4.27 m in diameter and 11.8 m in height. The total weight of reactor is about 200 tons. The reactor core contains of 312 cassettes, where each cassette has 126 fuel elements. Each fuel element uses 110Zr cladding-alloy (with admixture of 1% Nb). The fuel tablets consist of uranium dioxide (3.6% enrichment). The initial load of the reactor core is 45.7 tons. Every year ; of the reactor core is renewed. Thus, 4 blocks together give an annual average of about 170 spent fuel assemblies. Two reactors of the Unit 1 (pwr-440/230) are reactors of the first generation of pwr. These reactors were developed in the 1960s. This design has many problems. In particular, there is no containment, reactor has a limited emergency core cooling capability, it has almost no redundancy and separation of safety equipment, deficient instrumentation and control systems, as well as serious deficiencies in the fire protection [iaea, 1993]. Certain upgrades have been taken place in the last few years. They include the fire-fighting protection, better separation of the safety systems, and better personnel selection, training and management. The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) asset mission visited Kola npp in 1991 and inspected the first two pwr- 440/230 reactors. The same mission analysed the safety of 10 similar reactors, which were in operation. Mission inspected 100 safety aspects related to plants’ design and operation. It had found that more than 60% of these aspects are aspects of the great importance regarding to the reactor’s safety. The main problems concerning the design of this type of the reactor are the following [iaea, 1993]: + The lack of safety containment surrounding the core; + The deficiencies in the construction concerning the limitation of discharges to the surroundings (in the case of the breaches in the pipes of more than 32 mm in the primary circuit); + The limited capacity of the cooling system; + The insufficient “backup” of the cooling and safety systems; + The lack of distinction between the control systems and safety precautions concerning fire; + The out-dated control room’s technology. iaea determined that the risk of the reactor meltdown at two oldest pwr reactors at knpp is significant in the coming years. Norway had claimed that Kola npp is “one of the four or five most dangerous plants in the world” [ap Newswire, 1994]. Follow-up asset missions took place during 1993 and 1994. They had missions to assess improvements in the incident prevention as a result of implementation of the asset recommendations. During May 29 – June 2, 1995 the Command and Headquarters Training “Polyarnye Zori – 95” was organised in Apatity, Murmansk region. The responsibility for this training exercise took the Ministry of the Rus- sian Federation for civilian defence affairs, emergencies, and elimination of consequences of natural disasters (emercom) and the un Department of Humanitar- ian Affairs [PolZori ’95]. The main aim of the training exercises was co-ordination of actions in the case of an accident at the Kola npp. Two reactors of the pwr-440/213 design are reactors of the second generation of pwr:s. They were designed in the 1970s. The design deficiencies of the 230s were addressed in the second generation of pwr:s – 213s. In particular, the containment was upgraded and improved as well as emergency core-cooling systems were enhanced. However, the plant instrumentation and controls still do not meet modern international standards.

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 69 It is known, that normal operation of Nuclear Power Plant (npp) may bring about three kinds of discharges. They are the thermal discharges of cooling water, discharges of liquid unbalance water, and gaseous emissions. The first mentioned kind is the heat discharge by npp into the environment. It takes place through its water-cooled condensation system. The second kind of discharges is liquid unbalance water from which radionuclides are removed prior to its discharge into the channel. The third kind is emission of radioactive inert gases characterized by the half-life period of less than 10 minutes. The concentration of gaseous isotopes in the atmosphere is significantly below the regulating allowable level. Radioactive releases from the Kola npp during the normal exploitation are: noble gases – 488 GBq/day, long-lived nuclides – 9 MBq/day, 131I – 15 MBq/day. There are plans to build new Kola npp-2, which will have three new pwr-640 reactors. These reactors will have the enhanced safety features. The proposed location of the site is approximately 11 km to the west of the Kola npp-1. The first unit of knpp-2 has been scheduled to start operation when the first and second units at knpp-1 will be decommissioned (2003 and 2004). However, due to economical problems in Russia the construction of knpp-2 is postponed. Therefore, it is considered a variant to continue the exploitation of the first reactors after the mentioned above terms. For this purpose a conception of safety increase has been carried out for the first knpp’s unit (The Conception, 1992). This conception considers the following issues: 1. Decision’s ways for the most important problems in the project and safety operation, which include: / Analysis and approaches to study the safety problems of the pwr-440/230 reactors; / Expert estimation of the principal factors which may decrease an efficacy of the deep-echelon safety; / Project bases to increase the safety level; 2. The technical actions to increase the safety of the first knpp unit, which include the following measures regarding to: / Diagnosis of the main equipment and pipelines; / Increase of the reliability in the safety systems and its reconstruction; / Creation of the localizing safety system; / Decrease in the possibility of breakdowns due to common reasons; / Substitution to out of date systems and separate equipment.

Expert estimations indicate several main possible factors, which could lead to decrease in the deep safety. These factors are the following with the respect to the concern of the: 1. Fuel matrix and fuel element cladding: / Effective system of measurements inside the reactor is absent; / The degree of physical separation of the Control System channels of neu- tron flows is not sufficient; / The morale and physical wear of the Control and Protection System apparatus; / Important alarms (signals) for snap into action of Accidental Protection is absent; / The are a lot of keys to block the signals of Accidental Protection; / The independence of Safety System channels is not provided; / The Safety Systems is intended for the localization of accident with leakage at conditional diameter of 32 mm; / The Safety Systems is not intended to extreme natural and man-caused impacts. 2. Bounds of the active heat carrier circuit which cools an active zone of reactor: / The strength of the reactor frame is fragile; / The control of the metal’s conditions in the equipment and pipelines of the first circuit is not complete; / The equipment and pipelines of the first circuit is not intended for an extreme nature impacts;

70 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov / There is physical wear of the equipment and pipelines; 3. Safety of sealed spaces in the Localizing Safety System: / The Safety Systems is intended for the localization of accident with leakage at conditional diameter of 32 mm; / There are no any means for the control and removing of hydrogen from the sealed spaces; / The independence of Sprinkler System channels is not provided; / The density of the sealed spaces is not sufficient.

According the factors mentioned above the increase in the safety corresponds to the following directions: + Preventive measures of the accidents; + Overcome of the projected accidents; + Management of the hypothetical accidents.

It is necessary to indicate that the conception does not suppose to reach the international modern demands in safety for the first and second knpp’s blocks. The incidents, which took place at the Kola npp has been already described and analyzed [Bergman & Baklanov, 1998]. In the frameworks of the intas Project we analyzed also the entire spectra of the possible accidents at the reactors of the Kola npp. This analysis included the pwr:s nuclear reactors of 440/230 and 440/213 design as well as reactors of the new generation of pwr:s-640 reactors, which planned to be used at the Kola npp-2. In particular, we consider the scenarios from the maximum projected to hypothetical with the maximum possible emission of radionuclides. It should be noted that we used the large variety of the reference sources, which were published during the last decade [Konukhin and Komlev, 1995; Slaper et al., 1994; us nrc, 1975; Dubkov et al., 1995; Naumov et al., 1987; Pol.Zori, 1995; Tveten, 1993; Thaning, 1994; Rantalainen, 1995; Bergman et al., 1996]. So, as a result, in our study we choose only one scenario of the possible accident presented below. There are several causes, why we selected this scenario. First, the older knpp-1 reactors (pwr-440, design 230) have the greatest risk in the comparison with the others reactors, i.e. pwr-440, design 213 and planned pwr- 640. Second, knpp-2 will not be constructed to the required 2003–2005 years. Therefore, the service life of the older knpp-1 reactors will be prolonged. In addition, this scenario is one of the complete and detailed studies for such type of reactors, and it is more corresponded to the real possible accident scenario for the pwr-440 (design 230) reactors.

The short description of the scenario The hypothetical accident’s scenario at knpp has been developed on a basis of the estimations conducted by the Kurchatov’s Institute. The primary pipeline (diameter of 200 mm) break as the Loss Of Coolant’s Accident (loca) and simultaneous loss of power in the Unit 1 of the pwr-440/230 reactor are assumed to be the beyond-design-basis reference accident at knpp [Dubkov et al., 1995]. Initial position before the accident is a nominal state of the Unit 1. It is supposed that at the nominal power the break in the main circulation pump at the reactor’s inlet (equivalent diameter of 200 mm) and simultaneous “switch-off’ of the block will take place. According to calculation, during the first 20 minutes will occur the depressuri- sation of the fuel assemblies and partial temperature increase up to 1200 °C in the fuel. Depending on the concrete scenario for the localisation of an accident, the magnitude of these releases into the environment from the hermetic zone could be different. An accident like this would be rated as “Level 6” on the International Nuclear Event Scale (ines). It is assumed that the fission products will be released from the fuel practically momentary after reaching a certain temperature. In this case, iodine comes in two forms: molecular (99%) and organic (1%), while caesium comes as an aerosol.

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 71 A leak of the air-steam mixture from the hermetic zone into the atmosphere could follow by two ways: 1) through valves, and 2) through faulty sealing of the hermetic zone. The fission products’ release occurs during the first hour after an accident. The total release into atmosphere includes no more then 3% of the volatile products and 7% of gases contained in the core. The total value of the accidental release was assumed equal to 5.1·1017 PBq. In our model we used also the altitude of the accidental release in the range from 50 to 1000 m, and the duration of the release as equal to 3600 s [Dubkov et al., 1995].

Icebreakers and ships for the nuclear-technological service For this type of the radioactive risk objects we analyzed possible scenarios of accidents and corresponding magnitudes of the accidental releases. Main Russian and international documents, which regulate the common question in the production of the ships with the nuclear reactors and the radiation-hygiene requirements for their projection, mentioned four classes. We named them as the Levels of Conditions (lc). Each level describes the conditions of each ship as well as the conditions of the reactor, i.e. steam generating facility. In this case, for each level we describe the spectra of events including those leading to the radiation accidents. Below we will present every lc [The maximum, 1995b]. lc-1 – is a class of the normal exploitation. The hermetic problems in the first circuit may take place during the early planned operations. For example, it may happen during sampling, reloading of the sorbent from the active filters, or current plan-prophylactic repair. The reloading of the reactor’s active zone is operation in this class too. lc-2 – includes the regimes of the reactor’s exploitation under the accidental failure in the equipment. From the radiation point of view, the insignificant leak of the heat-transfer agent from the circulation system in the first circuit is an example. Traditionally, it is assumed that the maximum magnitude of the leak speed does not reach 100 liter per hour. The events of this class do not occur often, but they may take place a few times during the ship’s lifetime (25–30 years). There- fore, it is assumed that on the ship on average such event may take place only once during 5–10 years. lc-3 – is an accidental state. In this case, the long-term shutdown of the reactor may be required. The changes in the radiation situation at the ship could be re- corded. In this class we could mention the situation connected with the significant leakage of the heat-transfer agent from the first circuit into the protective containment, or leak into the second or third circuits, which leads to pressure decrease in the system of the primary circuit. It will require application of the following measures: 1) cutting off the protective containment, 2) replenishment of the first circuit, and 3) shutdown of the reactor. In this class, the maximum speed of coolant’s leakage depends on the capacity of the replenishment pumps in the first circuit. Such speed at the existing icebreakers is not more than 1–1.2 tons per hour. Although such event is rare (i.e. it does not happen during the ship’s life time exploitation) it may happen on some ships. We estimate that events of such class may occur in the atomic ship’s fleet industry. For example, fleet, which contains of 10 ships may have it once per 50–100 years. lc-4 – is highly difficult accident state. It will require the emergency shutdown of the nuclear reactor. The Maximum Projected Accident (mpa) is a case of the lc- 4. For mpa, to stop the melting of the active zone due to loss of the coolant in the primary circuit it will require to start the system of the accidental cooling. Also, to reduce the radioactive emission the full activity functions of the protective shell will be required. I.e. the full sealing of the apparatus compartment is an important step. In this case, the system of accidental cooling of the reactor core will support as much as possible the unity of the fuel elements during the mpa and consequent shutdown of the reactor. Then it should be safely functional until the devices to remove the last heat emission will be capable to remove the long-term heat emissions of the reactor core.

72 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov It is important to note that for the nuclear ships the mpa does not include the accident with the consequent melting of the reactor core. This event is more related to the higher order of the accidents. Events in this class are very rare, i.e. it may not happen during lifetime of the ship. According to this definition the accident of the lc-4 may happen on the atomic fleet once during 100–150 years, and mpa may occur more rarely. The accidental release is equivalent to 2.92·1015 PBq. The output channel height above sea level for the icebreakers is equal to 39 m, and for the container ship is equal to 26 m. The duration of release is assumed approximately 20 seconds, according to [The maximum, 1995b].

Ships for the nuclear-technological service We will consider this type of the ships on the example of the floating technological bases (ftb) “Imandra” and “Lotta”. These ships are in the exploitation since 1981 and 1984, respectively. Currently, “Imandra” is the main ship, which is responsible for the basic technological service of the nuclear icebreakers. This ship is used to recharge the reactors of the nuclear powered facilities of the icebreakers and ships. It could be used near the mooring line of the shore base on the “smooth water” during any time of the year and day. The maximum possible negative temperature is about 25 °C, and list and different is 1 degree [The maximum, 1995a]. The main operation, performed at the ship, is the relocation of the Spent Nu- clear Fuel Assembles (snfa). This operation is one of the radiationally dangerous operations at the ftb “Imandra”. The magnitude of the possible accidental release is shown in Table 11. The altitude of the accidental release is equal to the ventila-

Table 11 Airborne release during the hypothetical accident.

Risk objects Activity of the Radionuclide Release (in Bq) Groups In Groups Total Kola npp-1 Kr+Xe 3.26·1017 I 1.77·1017 Aerosols 7.10·1015 5.10·1017 Kola npp-2 I 1.90·1014 Aerosols 1.40·1011 1.90·1014 Icebreakers Kr+Xe 2.92·1015 I 9.55·1010 Aerosols 5.19·1011 2.92·1015 “Imandra” Kr+Xe 3.80·1012 Aerosols 1.87·1011 3.99·1012 “Lotta” Kr+Xe 4.20·1013 Aerosols 1.42·1011 4.21·1013 Nuclear Heat Transfer Agent Kr+Xe 3.99·1013 Submarines Loss I 6.69·1012 Aerosols 4.59·1011 4.70·1013 Fire Aerosols 2.50·1013 2.50·1013 Spontaneous Chain Kr+Xe 1.78·1015 Reaction I 1.29·1014 Aerosols 8.48·1014 2.76·1015

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 73 tion mast height above sea level (for “Imandra” – 22 m). Although the optimum duration of the snf loading in storage facility equals to 96 hours, for our calculation we could assume 4–5 minutes. It is equivalent to the duration of mentioned operation from the moment of occurrence of the transport container with spent fuel assembles to the moment of accent after loading. snfa ship-depository “Lotta” is used for [The maximum, 1995a]: + Receiving after six months the snfa and their storage; + Relocation of the snfa into the transport containers and issue of them to the shore; + Accumulation, storage, and issue of the solid and liquid radioactive wastes accumulated during the main technological operations and de-activation of the instrumentations and compartments.

Similar as in the case with “Imandra” the main dangerous operations, which may lead to the radioactive pollution, are related to the relocation of the snfa containers, which include the relocation from “Imandra” to “Lotta” and issue of the transport container with the snfa to the shore. The “Lotta “ventilation mast height equals to 18 m above sea level (12 m from the middle cabin deck). The magnitude of the accidental release is shown in Table 11.

Nuclear submarines Using available information about nuclear submarines [us nrc, 1975; Dovgusha et al., 1998; Lisovsky et al., 1998] we choose several possible scenarios of the accidents. We believe that these chosen scenarios are more appropriate to use for estimation of the potential territorial risk in the regions of their location. It is evi- dently that the development of the possible events will differ depending on the location of the nuclear submarine as well as its condition.

a) Nuclear submarines in the operation and bases. The possible reasons of the accidental situation may be the following: + The leakage in the primary circuit; + The complete long-term de-energize of the reactor installation and the simultaneous switch-off of the emergency cooling system of the reactor; + The failure of the coolant loss, accompanied by an emergency system’s refusal and/or personnel errors; + The fire in the reactor compartment. In these cases, the altitude of the potential emission will not reach 30 m. as a rule, and meteorological conditions are eqivalent to situation in the nuclear submarine’s location.

b) Dismantling nuclear submarines. As example of the possible reasons for accidents at the dismantling nuclear submarines we may consider, in general, the external impact. In particular, it could be a terrorism act, early planned explosion, direct impact of the falling aircraft, or large scale fair [Lisovsky et al., 1998].

c) Nuclear submarines under repair. The highest danger for this type is an operation to relocate the nuclear submarine reactors. Accident could happen as a result of the violation in the technological process or personnel’s mistakes during relocation operation. It could be a result of the spontaneous chain reaction due to violation in the technological process or personal errors during loading and reactor’s start up. Furthermore, the danger is related to long-term problems in the electricity supply or terrorism activity. In this scenario the potential altitude of emission could be from 50 to 100 m.

d) Nuclear submarines decommissioning. This type of nuclear submarines has some danger factor, especially, in the cases of the relocating of the spent nuclear fuel or in the situations with the electric support problems. Additionally, there is a danger of the explosion connected to the terrorism act [Lisovsky et al., 1998]. The

74 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov potential altitude of emission is similar to the nuclear submarines under repair type. The total magnitudes of the accumulated activity for the radionuclide’s group accidental releases for the studied objects of the radioactive risk are shown in Ta- ble 11. More detail information, i.e. for each radionuclide in the group, is shown in the Appendix F. Analyzing all possible events on the considered radioactive risk objects we choose for further detail studies and numerical calculation the following objects: + The reactor pwr-440/230 of the Unit 1 at the Kola npp and corresponding accident scenario [Dubkov et al., 1995]; + The nuclear icebreaker located at the base of the “Atomflot”, Murmansk Sea Shipping Company [The maximum, 1995b]; + The nuclear submarines in the various places of location (Severomorsk, Sayda Bay, Ura Bay, Bol’shaya Lopatka). The scenario of the Spontaneous Chain Reaction (scr) with the corresponding radionuclide’s emission into the atmosphere is considered [Lisovsky et al., 1998].

We did not consider an accident at the ships of the nuclear-technological service due to their smaller significance in comparison with the icebreakers as well as we know that locations for both types of the ships are practically same. To choose the source terms in the model we took into account the following aspects: + Mentioned objects have maximum accidental radioactive releases, including scr at the nuclear submarine with respect to other scenarios which are possible for the particular object; + Studied regions (50 km zone of the Kola npp and the northern shore of the Kola Peninsula) are characterized by the higher local density of the population due to presence of the large cities or concentration of the population in the direct nearness to the considered objects.

The main aim of our study is evaluation of the potential risk of the pollution in the considered territories. In the correspondence with the accepted terminology we estimated the “spatial distribution of the frequency of the negative impact’s realization for the certain level”. Therefore, in the numerical experiments, discussed in this chapter, the total summary emission of the radionuclides is limited by the consideration of 137Cs for the studied accidental scenarios. For the complete estimation of the risk it will be necessary to take into account: + the entire spectra of the radionuclides accumulated in the active zone of the considered radioactive risk object; + all types of exposure and all pathways of radionuclide transfer in the man’s organism, including estimates during the early and remote consequences.

This complete integral evaluation of the risk is more appropriate to perform using the special methods and mathematical models such as maccs [maccs, 1990] or cosyma [pc cosyma, 1995]. The results of the integral evaluation are considered in Chapter 4 for one of the regions of the Kola Peninsula. In the current chapter we will present the results about the magnitude and probability of the pollution of the underlying surface. Additionally, we obtained the estimates of the man critical organs’ exposure as a result of the exposure from the contaminated surface. These estimates could be obtained based on the following equations [Gusev & Belyaev, 1986; Methods, 1984; Kozlov, 1991]:

D = As · Kd · T, (2)

2 where D is th dose of exposure, Sv; As is surface pollution of the soil, Bq/m ; Kd is dose coefficient of exposure from the polluted underlying surface, Sv·m / (Bq·s); and T is time interval of exposure, s. In the correspondence with the used document [gosgortehnadzor, 1996], for the estimation of the potential risk it is assumed that the probability of the person’s location in the impact zone is equal 1. I.e. person is situated in the particular loca-

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 75 tion during the entire considered interval of time. The magnitudes of the dose coefficients are shown in Table 12.

Table 12 The dose coefficients of exposure for organs from the underlying surface.

Organ Dose coefficient, Sv·m2/(Bq·s) Bone marrow 0.61·10–15 Higher part of the large intestine 0.47·10–15 Skin 0.69·10–15 Lungs 0.52·10–15

For the considered scenarios of accidents the calculated magnitudes of the individual doses we interpreted as maximum possible doses determined by the exposure of the critical organs by 137Cs. The value of the soil’s surface pollution, cor-

responded to the dose, was used as the control level cmax for the calculation of the probability fields.

5.3. Results and Discussion

In this Section we will discuss some results, which we received considering the accidents at the Kola npp, icebreaker and nuclear submarine. For the chosen model domains (show Figure 21) we conducted the series of calculation to evaluate the radioactive pollution of the surrounding territories. The complex terrain is characteristic for our model domains. The complex configuration of the Kola Gulf and presence of the large water object such as lake Imandra influence the formation of the wind field over the studied regions. More- over, the numerous hills (Figure 21, left) and mountains massifs of Khibiny and Moncha Tundra (Figure 21, right) reaching 1200 m asl have significant impact on the wind field too. As a result, the non-homogeneity of the velocity wind field has take place in the studied regions (Figure 22). In particular, we could observe the characteristic flow above the surface and in some areas of the model domain we could observe the zones of the “aerodynamic shadow”. Spatial non-homogeneity of the wind velocity field is observed by the

Figure 21 Studied model domain surrounding the (left) Kola Gulf and (right) Kola npp.

76 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Figure 22 The vector velocity wind field at altitude of 50 m above the surface.

absolute value. In the same time, the wind flows lead to non-homogeneity of the surface pollution. Depending on initial conditions of emission and meteorological conditions we may observe situations when in the particular settlements, situated in the model domain, there is a zone of high pollution level or opposite, there is a zone of low pollution level (“clean zone”) although the surrounding areas are highly polluted. Such results we obtained for the city of Kirovsk located in 54 km from the Kola npp. Figure 23 shows the results of 137Cs deposition calculation in the case of an accident at the Kola npp. In particular, the left map shows the existence of the “clean zone” in the Kirovsk city area, although near Apatity we observe the high levels of cesium deposition. The right map shows the significant pollution of the Khibiny massif and, in particular, near Kirovsk. This effect is less pronounced if the calculation is performed for the region of the Kola Gulf. This effect is probably related to the differences in the emission sources, meteorological conditions, as well as less complex terrain. However, and

20,000,000 5,000,000 375,000 15,000 2,000 1,000

Figure 23 Example of 137Cs surface deposition with the presence of the (left) “clean zone” near the Kirovsk city, and (right) significant pollution of the Khibiny foothills.

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 77 150,000 80,000 40,000 20,000 2,000 1,000

Figure 24 137Cs surface deposition one day after accidental release with the precipitation: included (left) and excluded (right).

for the simple terrain we could observe the spatial non-homogeneity of 137Cs surface deposition. As an example we show results of the cesium deposition in the case of an accident (in particular, scr) at the nuclear submarine located in Severo- morsk (Figure 24). The main parameters of this scr accident are: 1) total 137Cs release – 3.26·1014 Bq, 2) duration of release – 120 seconds, 3) wind velocity – 5.3 m/s, 4) there is no precipitation. For this scenario, we choose the main wind direction toward Murmansk as a city with the highest population density. In this study we conducted calculation for the considered territories and objects of the radioactive risk for various scenarios where we manipulated by meteorological conditions and parameters of accident which include duration, height and amount of release. This approach helped us to obtain significant number of possible situations for the estimation of the potential territorial risk as well as study the sensitivity of model to input parameters. This part of work is part of the intas Project tasks as well. In particular, for the Kola npp accident we calculated several situations with various duration and height of release as well as radionuclide’s re- moval from the radioactive cloud due to precipitation. These results are shown in Appendix G. Similar calculation series we performed for the nuclear submarine (see Appendix H). Figure 25 shows for the Kola npp accident the magnitudes of the (left) 137Cs surface pollution and (right) corresponding dose rate of external exposure for the critical man organs from the underlying surface. The results are calculated for the main axis connecting the location of Kola npp and Kirovsk-Apatity cities. It is assumed that the radioactive cloud is transported along this axis. In Table 13 we present the magnitudes of the individual dose of external exposure for skin from the underlying surface. The values were calculated for the interval of time equal to 1 year. The calculated doses do not reach the critical threshold by the absolute value. Otherwise, it will require the immediate performance of the anti-accidental measures. Although using only this parameter obtained for one radionuclide it is not correct to talk about usage of the countermeasures, but using these data it is possible to estimate 137Cs contribution in the common figure of the risk. In particular, it could be done using analysis of 137Cs surface deposition and doses of exposure. These results are shown in Chapter 4 of this report. Table 13 and Table 14 show two main parameters: 1) the minimum and maximum magnitudes of the surface deposition and 2) doses of external exposure for skin from the contaminated surface. In general, the calculation has been done to show differences in parameters, reflecting the radiation environment for the population, for average and worst meteorological conditions for the relatively remote

78 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Table 13 Radiation environment for the population for the average meteorological conditions by settlements (case: plain terrain).

Settlement Distance Surface deposition, Dose of external exposure of skin from from (minimum – maxi- the contaminated surface knpp, km mum), Bq/m2 Average (Sv/s) Annual (Sv/year) Zasheek 10 2,000–375,000 1.3·10–9 4.2·10–2 Afrikanda 18 2,000–375,000 0.6·10–9 2.1·10–2 Apatity 42 375,000–5,000,000 2.0·10–10 6.4·10–3 Kirovsk 55 1,000–375,000 1.3·10–10 4.0·10–3

and most populated cities of Kirovsk and Apatity. Zasheek and Afrikanda are small settlements located in the relative closeness to the Kola npp as shown in the tables.

Table 14 Radiation environment for the population for the worst meteorological conditions by settlements (case: real terrain).

Settlement Distance Surface deposition, Dose of external exposure of skin from from (minimum – maxi- the contaminated surface knpp, km mum), Bq/m2 Average (Sv/s) Annual (Sv/year) Zasheek 10 2000–375000 1.3·10–10 4.0·10–3 Afrikanda 18 2000–375000 1.3·10–10 4.0·10–3 Apatity 42 375000–5000000 1.8·10–9 5.6·10–2 Kirovsk 55 1000–375000 1.3·10–10 4.0·10–3

All presented results demonstrate the effect of the complex terrain influence on the character of the accidental radionuclide emission’s distribution as well as corresponded deposition of radionuclides on the underlying surface. If we do not consider the concrete location of the settlement and operate only using the distance

Figure 25 (left) Magnitude of 137Cs surface pollution, Bq/m2; (right) Magnitude of the corresponding dose rate of external exposure for the critical man organs from the underlying surface, Sv/s.

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 79 from the emission source (as shown in Table 13 and Table 14) than the value of deposition and corresponded doses of external exposure will decrease with distance. These values are related to the magnitudes characteristic for the axis of the accidental cloud transportation. If we conduct calculations for the complex terrain (as shown in Table 14) than the situation for Apatity will be more complicated and radiation situation will be larger by order, although for Kirovsk it remains practically the same. The formed wind field will provide the minimal influence on the Kirovsk in comparison with Apatity. In this case the significant deposition will be observed near Apatity and in the foothills of the Khibiny massif. For the case of the worst meteorological conditions (our interest is related to Kirovsk and Apatity cities), according to the documents of standards [minzdrav, 1999] it will be required the usage of the anti-accidental countermeasures in Apatity, which may decrease the exposure of the population. It is only a possible case, which may be realized in reality with a certain probability. The concluded step to estimate the potential territorial risk is the construction of the probability fields for pollution in the studied regions. Figure 26 illustrate the probabilistic distribution of pollution in the Kola npp and Kola Gulf regions, respectively. These figures show the probability of exceeding for the control level in both regions measured in percentage. Our estimations of the probability of exceeding for the control level for the nuclear submarine and icebreaker’s accident are presented in Appendix I. In our calculation of the probability fields we used the average multi-year meteorological data [Reference Book on Climate, 1988]. Analysis of the results let us conclude that, independent of the absolute magnitude of the accidental releases, for the local scale the common character of the spatial distribution of deposition will depend on the three main factors. The first factor is the characteristics of the emissions into the atmosphere or the scenario of the accidental release. The second factor is the probabilistic distribution of the wind direction or “wind rose”. And the last third factor is the surrounding terrain. Especially it is well pronounced in the left map of Figure 26. As we see a large number of settlements within the 30-km zone of the Kola npp is situated in the zone of the higher risk of the potential pollution with the probabilities of 50 and more percent. However, due to typical distribution of the wind direction, which is characteristic for this region, several cities such as Kandalaksha, Apatity and Kirovsk may be involved in the zone of the high potential risk. In this study we also incorporated some calculation results into the database for the objects of the radiation risk. In particular, Figure 27 shows the results of the

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Figure 26 Probability of exceeding for the control level (in %) in the Kola npp (left) and Kola Gulf (right) regions.

80 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov territorial potential risk’s evaluation for the considered geographical areas. It is important to pay attention to the fact that practically all transport ways – automo- bile and railway – are in the zone of the potential pollution in the case of an accident. Therefore, in the case of accident when the introduction of the anti-accidental measures (for example, evacuation and relocation of population) will be required, it will important to know that these measures will be conducted on the polluted territories. This issue is characteristic for the Russian North as well as for the northern regions of other countries, and it is due to absence of developed transportation net. Analysis of the results for the area of the Kola Gulf (Figure 28) shows the prevailing dependence in the distribution of the potential risk from the local meteorological characteristics at the gulf’s shore. The character of the potential pollution in the higher order depends on the prevailing wind direction. Our estimates show that several large cities on the Kola North – Murmansk, Kola, Severomorsk – could be inside the risk zone. In this case, although the possible low individual doses of exposure will take place, the collective doses of exposure and, respectively, the collective risk will be higher. Additionally, the specificity of the northern regions consists of the compact distribution of the main life support services – production of the electrical and heat energy – in the places of the compact man set- tling. We should mention that currently the estimation of the secondary consequences of the radioactive accidents at the enterprises of the life support is not well studied. However, these problems are significantly important from the point of view of the population safety, and it is a priority task. In particular, it is also important problem from the point of view of the estimation of the secondary consequences of accidents due to additional influence of the social and socio-economical reasons of accidents.

Figure 27 The knpp area map, probability of exceeding for the control level, and wind rose for the Yukspor weather station (in Khibiny).

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 81 Figure 28 The icebreaker basing area map (Kola Gulf), probability of exceeding for the control level, and wind rose for the Murmansk weather station.

In general, our study permits us to say about the existing potential risk and necessity of more detail investigation of this issue for both local territories of the Kola North and the entire Barents region.

5.4. Conclusion of the Study

In this part of the study we evaluated the potential territorial risk of the radioactive pollution of environment. We calculated individual doses and risks as well as estimated probabilistic spatial and temporal distribution of the radionuclide concentrations as a result of the accidental releases on the objects of the radioactive risk. In particular, in this part of the study we considered the following objects: the nuclear power plant, nuclear submarine, and icebreaker. For these purposes we used three-dimensional local scale model to evaluate the atmospheric transport of 137Cs and its deposition on the underlying surface. We estimated the probabilistic distribution of the deposition and doses of exposure from the contaminated surface for several critical man organs. In our model, as input meteorological data we applied the yearly averaged data.

The main results of this part of the study are the following: 1. In our study we presented the quantitative analysis of the radiationally dangerous objects situated on the territories of the Barents region, and, in particular, on the territory of the Kola Peninsula. We found that the main problem is related to the potential risk of the nuclear accidents, spent nuclear fuel, and radioactive wastes. In the case of an accident the significant emission of the radioactive materials may be released into the atmosphere. 2. Using available already published data we analyzed the state and events, which have been taken place at these objects and are connected with the radia-

82 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov tion emissions into the atmosphere. We should mention that for the large number of these objects there is increase in the difficulties of the normal exploitation due to the equipment’s state, personnel’s errors as well as other external man’s interruption. 3. We elaborated the basics for the gis database. This database includes information about the radiation objects and problems of the Kola North as well as surrounding territories. We suggested a future direction in the database development. This direction is related to the research and expert-analytical functions. 4. Analyzing research, technical and projected documentation we estimated the potential scenarios of accidents and corresponding emissions for the studied objects. This analysis showed us that in the majority of the cases, the scenario with the “mild” conditions of the radionuclide releases into the environment is mostly acceptable and usable. 5. We determined that main issues are state of the nuclear and nuclear-energetic facilities (age as the first issue) as well as increasing trend of the external interruption in the normal exploitation of these objects (sabotage, terrorism, social and socio-economical difficulties). We assume that these issues will be important in the up-coming future and they will determine the risk. 6. In this study we evaluated typical meteorological and demographical characteristics in the regions of the nuclear risk objects locations. These characteristics have significant influence on the radioactive cloud distribution and subsequent estimation of the radioactive pollution and risk. 7. We elaborated the complex of the mathematical models and software to calculate the atmospheric transport of the radionuclides, their deposition on the underlying surface, estimates of the territorial potential risk, and doses of the population’s exposure in the regions of the radiationally dangerous objects’ impact. 8. We estimated the potential radiation pollution of the studies regions. We found that northern climatical and meteorological conditions will determine in the main degree the probability of the possible pollution as a result of an accident. 9. The considered spectra of the accidental scenario of the studied objects and analysis of their consequences let us conclude the dominance of the local character in the possible radioactive pollution of environment.

Evaluation of the Potential Contamination 83 84 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Conclusions

In this study we analyzed the potential territorial risk of the radioactive pollution of environment, individual and collective doses and risks, probabilistic spatial and temporal distribution of the radionuclide concentrations as a result of the accidental releases on the objects of the radioactive risk. In particular, the objects, considered in our study, are nuclear power plant, nuclear submarine, icebreaker, and nuclear fuel’s storage. For these purposes we used cosyma model to evaluate the spatial and temporal probabilistic distribution of the air and surface concentrations for the main 16 radiologically important radionuclides, individual and collective doses and risks through the main irradiation pathways, as well as the schemes of typical countermeasures performed by the accidental brigades. We analyzed the frequency of the accidental releases with the severe consequences on the storage facility for the spent nuclear fuel. An hourly averaged data has been used as input meteorological data. In our study, we used also the three-dimensional regional scale model to evaluate the atmospheric transport of 137Cs and its deposition on the underlying surface. We estimated the probabilistic distribution of the deposition and doses of irradiation from the polluted surface for several critical organs. The yearly averaged data has been applied as input meteorological data. The main results of this study are the following: 1. Our calculation showed that the magnitude of the individual and collective risks varies in the wide interval and it is within the acceptable limits, except for the group of liquidators; 2. For the unfavourable meteorological conditions and release’s parameters the region’s size of the higher risk will increase and stricter countermeasures will be required for the larger areas including neighbour countries; 3. In comparison with other factors, the meteorological and terrain factors have the highest influence on the potential territorial risk in the regions of the accidental releases, and this influence is more pronounced in the arctic regions; 4. We found that in the entire considered spectra of the accident’s scenarios the local character (i.e. in the adjacent areas to the release’s location) of the possible radioactive pollution is dominant; 5. The long-range transport from the release’s location is possible, and it is reflected in the spotted structure of the radioactive deposition (i.e. in the remote areas to the release’s location) on the territories of the Barents region; 6. We elaborated the information database, which includes characteristics of the radioactive risk objects in the Barents region; 7. The preliminary evaluation of the socio-economical and political components of the risk for the accident occurrence showed that these components’ contribution is one of the largest, and in the recent years the technical decay and increase in the terrorism activity may became the prevailing factors.

Conclusions 85 Recommendations

We know that the objects of the radioactive risk shown in our elaborated information database are the major concern for the population and environment of the Barents region. In particular, the Kola npp, which produces more than 60% of the electric energy supply required by the industry, still has in exploitation the older generations of the nuclear reactors (pwr-440/230). These reactors were upgraded in safety and their lifetime was extended up next 10 years. The plans to build several new pwr-640 reactors were postponed. It is well known, that at the current moment the spent nuclear fuel is stored in the special storage facilities, and partially in the nuclear submarines. Due to problems with the re-processing of the spent fuel the new portions are accumulated. In the same time, MinAtom has plans to build a new facility to store the spent nuclear fuel on the territory of the Kola Peninsula. We may assume that the continuous usage of the Kola npp reactors over the recommended lifetime as well as the problems with the storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel could lead to the higher probability of the accidental releases and, therefore, we recommend to: 1. Modify the original information database into the information-analytical database, which will include the estimates of the radioactive risk for the population of the Barents region; 2. Compare the safety of the long-term storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel (accumulated by military and civic fleets) taking into account various types of the storage facilities, terrain, and specificity of the local food supply; 3. Evaluate the sources of the maximum risk for the population of the Barents region due to radioactive releases on the Kola Peninsula, and study the frequency of such releases due to changes in the economical and social conditions; 4. Study the required regulatory and organizational measures in order to lower or to minimise the risk of the high level accidental release for the population of the Barents region. 5. Analyze the electricity deficit in the industrial sector and consequences for the social and socio-economical situations in the Barents region in the case of the Kola npp nuclear reactors of older generation shutdown; 6. Estimate the influence of these nuclear reactors shutdown and radioactive releases on the two other important types of the electricity production – electric and heat power plants.

86 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Acknowledgements

The authors are very grateful for collaboration with many colleagues, especially: + Academician Melnikov N.N., mik – for a general management from the party mik ksc ras + Prof. Konukhin V.P., mik – for support during fulfilment of researches + Dr. Naumov V.A., mik – for valuable advises at discussion of project + Dr. Gussak S.A., mik – for a number of the useful remarks under the report + Dr. van der Steen, nrg, Netherlands, – for a capability of activity with pc cosyma + Dr. J.A. Jones, nrpb, uk – for training and granting of the program pc cosyma + Dr. E. van Wonderen, nrg, Netherlands – for assistance and materials + Prof. Alexander Gavrilov, rggmi – for useful discussion and remarks + Alexander Perlikov inep – for technical support and decision + Dr. Anatoly Korchak, Institute for Economical Problems, ksc ras, Apatity – for materials + Prof. Artash Aloyan, Institute of Numerical Mathematics ras – for useful discussion + Governing body and experts of jsc data+, Moscow – for technical support, advises in gis, and digital map of the Russia + Prof. Igor Lisovsky, St.-Petersburg State University – for useful discussion + Dr. Leonid Krivorutsky – Institute for Physical and Technological problems of Energy in Northern Areas – for discussion + Michail Filippov, Murmansk Shipping Company – for discussion + Dr. Olga Rigina, inep – for sharing results and for useful discussion and remarks + Prof. Ronny Bergman, foa, Sweden – for valuable advises and constructive discussions + Vladimir Bashlaev, knpp-2 – for discussion and informational support.

This research study was supported by the Swedish öcb (Överstyrelsen för Civil Beredskap) in the bounds of the Research Program ‘Risk and Nuclear Waste: Nu- clear problems, risk receptions of, and societal responses to nuclear waste in the Barents Region. A Multi-Disciplinary Nuclear Waste Risk Study’, coordinated by cerum, University of Umeå.

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92 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Appendix A Concepts and Definitions of the Theory of the Risk Analysis

This information are borrowed from document with title “The methodical indications on realization of the risk analysis of dangerous industrial objects” [gosgortehnadzor, 1996]. 1. Control of hazard – system approach to acceptance of the political solutions, procedures and practical measures in problem solving of warning or reduction of the danger of industrial emergencies for life of the man, incidences or traumas, injury to property and environment. 2. Risk analysis, or risk-analysis – process of identification of hazards and estimation of risk for the separate persons or groups of the population, property or environment. The risk analysis consists of use of the accessible information for identification of hazards and risk estimation of the predetermined event (in our case – accident and connected with it of situations), conditional by these hazards. 3. Hazard – source of potential injury, harm or situation with a capability of damaging. 4. Dangerous industrial object – object or production, on which use, make, process, store or transport the fire- and explosion dangerous and/or dangerous chemical substances creating real threat of origin of accident. 5. The risk, or risk level is a combination of frequency (or probability) and consequences of definite dangerous event. The risk concept always includes two elements: frequency, with which the dangerous event and consequence of this event is implemented.

Quantitative parameters of risk 1. Individual risk – frequency of a injury of separate individual as a result of effect of the investigated factors of hazard. 2. Collective risk – expected quantity fatally injured as a result of possible emergencies for definite period of time. 3. Potential territorial risk – spatial distribution of frequency of implementation of negative effect of a definite level. 4. The social risk – relation of frequency of events F, in which one the number of the people has injured at this or that level, it is more definite N. 5. The identification of hazard – process of detection and recognition, that hazard exists, and definition of its characteristics. 6. Failure – event concluded in disturbance of a up state of the equipment, object. 7. Risk estimation – process used for definition of a risk level of a analysed health hazard of the man, property or environment. The risk estimation includes the analysis of frequency, analysis of consequences and their combination. 8. Acceptable risk – risk level that is acceptable and well founded from economic and social reasons. The exploitation risk of industrial object is acceptable, if its value is so insignificant, that for the sake of profit received from object exploitation, the society is ready to go on this risk.

Process the risk-analysis should contain sequence of following main procedures: + Planning and organization of activities; + Identification of hazards; + Risk estimation.

Concepts and Definitions of the Theory of the Risk Analysis 93 Characteristic of methods of the risk analysis

For the substantiation of further selection of a method of the analysis we will present more full information on features all above-mentioned methods of the risk analysis from potentially dangerous object.

Methods of check sheet (Check-List) and “That will be, if…?” (What–It) Methods of the check sheet (Check-List) and “That will be, if…?” (What – It) or their combination are related to group of qualitative methods of danger assessment, based on studying the conformity of the operation conditions of object or project to the operational requirements of industrial safety. The result of the check sheet is list of problems and answers about conformity of object to safety requirements and indications on safety control. The method of the check sheet differs from a method “That will be, if…?” by more vast presentation of an input information and results about consequences of disturbances of safety. The method is most effective at research of safety of the well-studied objects with known technology or objects with minor risk of a major accident.

The analysis of a kind and consequences of failures The analysis of a kind and consequences of failures (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – fmea) is applied to quality standard of safety of technical systems. Essential feature of this method is the consideration of each vehicle (installation, unit, product) or constituent of a system (element), how it became faulty (kind and reason of failure) and as this failure affects a technical system (consequence of failure). The analysis of a kind and consequences of failure can be extended to quantitative analysis of a kind, consequences and criticality of failure (Failure Mode, Effects and Critical Analysis – fmeca). In this case each failure mode is ranked in view of two component of criticality – probability (or frequency) and severity of consequences of failure. The concept of criticality is close to concept of risk and can be used at more detail quantitative analysis of risk of accident. The definition of parameters of criticality is necessary for development of the indications and priority of safety measures. The results of the analysis are presented as the tables with an equipment list, kind and reasons of possible failures, frequency, consequences, criticality, means of detection (warning indicators, monitoring instruments and etc.) and guidelines on a reduction of the danger. In Table 15 the criterions of failures on severity of consequences are presented: + Disastrous failure results in mortality of the people, puts essential injury to object and irreplaceable injury to an environment; the high scale of risk requires mandatory realization of in-depth study of risk; the special safety measures for a reduction of risk are required; + Critical failure threatens to life of the people, environment; and also is fraught with loss of object; the in-depth study of risk is advisable, the safety measures are required; + Uncritical failure does not threaten to life of the people, environment; does not threaten with loss of object; the realization of the analysis of risk and acceptance of safety measures is recommended; + With negligibly small consequences – not relating on the consequences to one of the first three categories; analysis and acceptance of safety measures are not required.

The method of the analysis of hazard and functionality In a method of the analysis of hazard and functionality (Hazard and Operability Study – hazop) influencing deviations of technological parameters (temperature, pressure etc.) from regulated modes is investigated from the point of view of originating hazard. hazop on complexity and quality of outcomes corresponds to a level fmea, fmeca. During the analysis for each industrial line and unit the possi-

94 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov ble deviations, reason and indication on their non-admission are determined. At the characteristic of deviation the keywords will be used: “is not present”, “more”, “”less”, “the same as”, “another”, “differently, than “, “return” etc. The results of the analysis are introduced on special technological sheets (tables). Probability and severity of consequences for a considered situation can determine the degree of hazard of deviations. In this situation researchers can use the criterions of criticality, which are similar to method fmeca (Table 15).

Table 15 Matrix “probability – severity of consequences.”

Expected frequency of originating Severity of consequences (1/year) <10–5 disastrous failure 10–5 critical failure 10–4–10–3 uncritical failure 10–3–10–2 failure with negligibly small consequences 10–2–1 probable failure >1 often failure

Logical-graphic methods of the analysis “of trees of failures and events” The practice demonstrates, that the originating and development of major accidents, as a rule, is characterized by a combination of random local events arising with different frequency at miscellaneous stages of accident (equipment failures, human errors, exposures, destruction, release, channel of matter, dissipation of matters, ignition, explosion, intoxication etc.). For detection of relationships of cause and effect between these events will use logical-graphic methods of the analysis “of trees of failures and events”. At the analysis of trees of failures (Fault Tree Analysis – fta) the combination of equipment failures, errors of staff and external (technogenic, natural) effects resulting in to the main event (accident situation) are determined. The method will be used for the analysis of possible reasons of origination of an emergency situation and calculation of its frequency (on the basis of knowledge of frequencies of initial events). The frequency of each scenario of development of an accident situation is calculated by a frequency multiplication of the main event on probability of final event. For example, the emergencies with depressurization of the vehicle with dangerous (explosion, fire) matter with depending on conditions can develop both with ignition, and without ignition of matter. The methods of trees of failures and events are labour-consuming and are applied, as a rule, to the analysis of the projects or modernization of complex technical systems and productions. They have found a use for such nuclear objects, as npp and repository for sf.

Concepts and Definitions of the Theory of the Risk Analysis 95 Appendix B List of the Federal Norms and Rules in the Field of Use of an Atomic Energy

(Approved by the Governmental Order of Russian Federation Organ of state regulation from December 1, 1997. N1511) of safety stating the federal norms and rules I. Federal norms and rules on nuclear and radiation (technical aspects) safety 1. General provisions of safety control of npp gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 2. General provisions of maintenance of Russia of safety of research reactors gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 3. Requirement to the contents of the report under the substantiation of safety of npp gosatomnadzor (Rus- with the reactor of a type vver sia) 4. Requirement to the program of quality assurance for npp gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 5. Arrangement of npp. Main criteria and requirements on safety control gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 6. Norms of designing of seismic stable npp gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 7. Rule of nuclear safety of the reactor installations of npp gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 8. Rule of safety at storage and transporting of nuclear fuel on objects of atomic engi- gosatomnadzor (Rus- neering sia) 9. Rule of nuclear safety of ship nuclear engine installations gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 10. Rule of the device and maintenance of localizing security systems of npp gosatomnadzor (Rus- sia) 11. General provisions on the device and exploitation of systems of accident power sup- gosatomnadzor (Rus- ply of npp sia) 12. Rule of the device both safe maintenance of the equipment and pipilines of nuclear gosatomnadzor (Rus- power installations sia) 13. Rule of the device and safe exploitation of actuators of organs of effect on a reactiv- gosatomnadzor (Rus- ity sia) 14. Norms of calculation on strength of the equipment and pipelines of nuclear power gosatomnadzor (Rus- installations sia) 15. Equipment and pipelines of nuclear power installations. Welding and surfacing. gosatomnadzor (Rus- Main rules sia) 16. Equipment and pipelines nuclear power installations. Welded joints and surfacings. gosatomnadzor (Rus- Control rules sia) 17. Rule about the order of investigation and registration of disturbance in activity of gosatomnadzor (Rus- npp sia) 18. Rule about the order of the declaration of accident situation, efficient transmission gosatomnadzor, mvd, of information and organization of the urgent help to npp in a case of radiation-dan- and minzdrav (Russia) gerous situations

96 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov (Approved by the Governmental Order of Russian Federation Organ of state regulation from December 1, 1997. N1511) of safety stating the federal norms and rules 19. Standard content of the schedule of measures on protection of staff in case of acci- gosatomnadzor (Rus- dent on npp sia) 20. Registration of external effects of natural and tecgnogenic origin on nuclear- and gosatomnadzor (Rus- radiation-dangerous objects sia) ii. Federal norms and rules on a radiation safety (sanitary – hygienic aspects) 21. Norm of a radiation safety minzdrav (Russia) 22. Main sanitary rules of activity with radioactive substances and other sources of ion- minzdrav (Russia) izing radiation 23. Criterions for decision marking about measures of protection of the population in minzdrav (Russia) case of accident of the nuclear reactor 24. Sanitary rules of the radioactive waste management minzdrav (Russia) 25. Sanitary rules of designing and exploitation of npp minzdrav (Russia) 26. Sanitary requirements to designing and exploitation of systems of district heating minzdrav (Russia) 27. Rule of a radiation safety at exploitation of npp minzdrav (Russia) 28. Sanitary rules of designing and exploitation of nuclear reactors of research assign- minzdrav (Russia) ment 29. Sanitary rules of designing and exploitation of critical benches minzdrav (Russia) 30. Sanitary rules of arrangement and exploitation of accelerators of protons with minzdrav (Russia) energy more than 100 MeV 31. Sanitary rules of arrangement and exploitation of accelerators of electrons with minzdrav (Russia) energy up to 100 MeV 32. Sanitary rules of the device and exploitation of radiation contours at nuclear reactors minzdrav (Russia) 33. Sanitary rules of the device and exploitation a powerful isotope beta-installations minzdrav (Russia) 34. Sanitary rules of the device and exploitation a powerful isotope gamma-installations minzdrav (Russia) 35. Main rules of safety and physical protection by transport of nuclear materials minzdrav (Russia) 36. Rule of safety at transport of radioactive substances minzdrav (Russia) 37. Rule of maintenance of a radiation safety at transport of tspent fuel from npp by rail- minzdrav (Russia) way

List of the Federal Norms and Rules in the Field of Use of an Atomic Energy 97 (Approved by the Governmental Order of Russian Federation Organ of state regulation from December 1, 1997. N1511) of safety stating the federal norms and rules 38. Rule of designing regional repositories of radioactive waste minzdrav (Russia) 39. Radiation hygienic requirements to nuclear ships minzdrav (Russia) 40. Special sanitary rules of designing, construction and exploitation of ships of minzdrav (Russia) nuclear-technological service 41. Sanitary rules of exploitation of uranium mines minzdrav (Russia) 42. Sanitary rules of liquidation, conservation and modernization of firms on a mining minzdrav (Russia) and processing of radioactive ores 43. Sanitary rules on the device and exploitation of tailing dumps of hydrometallurgical minzdrav (Russia) plants and enriching factories processing ores and concentrates containing radioactive and high toxic of substance 44. Sanitary rules of designing of firms and installations of a nuclear industry minzdrav (Russia) iii. Federal norms and rules on fire-safety 45. Fire-safety in Russian Federation Headquarters of a State fire service mvd (Russia) 46. Fire-security of firms. The general requirements Headquarters of a State fire service mvd (Russia)

98 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Appendix C Criteria on Limitation of Irradiation of the Population in Conditions of Radiation Accident

The requirements and criteria on limitation of irradiation of the population in conditions of radiation accident are established in nrb-99 [minzdrav, 1999]. Accord- ing to item 6.1 of this document, in case of accident the practical measures for renewal of the control above a accidental object and reducing to a minimum of radiation doses, quantity of the irradiated persons, radioactive contamination of an environment, economical and social losses called by radioactive contamination should be undertaken. The principles of intervention (realization of countermeasures) also are established in nrb-99. At accident or detection of radioactive contamination the limitation of irradiation implements protective measures applicable, as a rule, to an environment and (or) to the man. These measures can result in to violation of normal habitability of the population, economic and social operation of territory, i.e. are intervention attracting behind self not only economical damage, but also unfavourable effect on health of the population, psychological effect on the population and negative state changing of ecosystems. Therefore at decision – making about kind of intervetion (protective measures) it is necessary to be guided by following principles: + The tendered intervention should bring to the society and, first of all, to irradiated persons more benefit, than harm, i.e. the reduction of damage as a result of a dose decline should be sufficient to justify of a harm and cost of intervention, including its social cost (principle of the substantiation of intervention); + The kind, scale and duration of intervention should be optimized so that clean benefit of a dose decline, i.e. the benefit of a decrease of radiation damage minus damage, connected with intervention, would be maximum (principle of intervention optimization).

If the suspected dose of radiation for the short term (2 day) reaches levels, at exceeding which one are possible determined work-up effects, see Table 16, the ur-

Table 16 Forecasting levels of irradiation, at which one the urgent intervention (Table 6.1 from [minzdrav, 1999]) is necessary.

Organ or tissue Absorbed dose in a organ or tissue for 2 day, Gr

All body 1 Lung 6 Skin 3 Thyroid 5 Eye-lens 2 Gonads 3 Foetus 0.1

gent intervention (measure of protection) is necessary. Thus of a harm to health from measures of protection should not exceed benefit to health damaged from irradiation.

Criteria on Limitation of Irradiation of the Population in Conditions of Radiation At a chronic exposure during life the protective measures become mandatory, if the annual absorbed doses exceed values, are given in Table 17. The exceeding

Table 17 Levels of intervention at a chronic exposure (Table 6.2 agrees [minzdrav, 1999]).

Organ or tissue An annual absorbed dose, Gr

Gonads 0.2 Eye-lens 0.1 Bone marrow 0.4

of these doses results in the severe determined effects. The conditions temporary relocation or evacuation make: for the beginning – 30 mSv per one month, for the return from relocation or evacuation 10 mSv per one month. If is forecasted, that the dose, accumulated for one month, will be of the mentioned above levels during one year, the problem about relocation of the population on the constant habitation is put. nrb-99 establishes, in particular, main limits of an effective dose for the population 5 mSv/year and for individual (or liquidators during accident) – 50 mSv/year, (see Table 16 [minzdrav, 1999]). However at realization of countermeasures the limits of doses are not applied and at planning of protective measures on a case of radiation accident the organs of gossanepidnadzor set criteria of intervention (dose of irradiation and levels of radiological contamination) with reference to particular radiation object, accidental scenario and radiation situation. At the accident which has entailed radioactive contamination of large territory, on the basis of the control and forecast of radiation situation the zone of radiation accident is established, where the control of radiation situation is carried out and the measures on a decrease of levels of irradiation of the population implement. The decision making about measures of protection of the population in case of large radiation accident with radiological contamination of territory is carried out on the basis of comparison a predictable dose, adverted by protective measure, and levels of contaminations – with levels “A” and “B”, are given in Table 18.

Table 18 Criteria for acceptance of the urgent solutions during initial stage of radiation accident (Table 6.3 of nrb-99).

Measures of protection An adverted dose for the first 10 day, mGy (countermeasures) on whole body thyroid, lung, skin Level A Level B Level A Level B Shelter 5 50 50 500 Iodine preventive measures (only for a tyfoid): Adult — — 250* 2500* Children — — 100* 1000* Evacuation 50 500 500 5000 * Only for a thyroid

If the level of irradiation adverted by countermeasure, does not exceed a level “A”, there is no necessity for fulfilment of measures of protection, bound with disturbance of normal habitability of the population, and also economic and social operation of territory. If the adverted irradiation exceeds a level “_”, but would not reach a level “B”, the solution on fulfilment of measures of protection is received in view of particular situation and local conditions. If the level of irradiation pre-

100 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov vented by countermeasure, reaches and would surpass a level “B”, the imposing of the applicable countermeasures of protection is necessary, even if they are connected to disturbance of normal habitability of the population, economic and social operation of territory. At late stages of the radiation accident, which has entailed impurity of vast territories by long-lived radionuclides of the solution on protective measures are received in view of adding up radiation situation and particular social and economic conditions. Thus, for the first 10 day of radiation accident the exceeding of the main annual limit of a dose on all body in 10 times, both for individual, and for the population is enabled. The experience of radiation accidents happened in Russia demonstrates long-lived influencing of contaminations of an environment through paths of external and internal irradiation on men on these territories. The doses of long-lived irradiation are capable to result in considerably higher risks as contrasted to by risk conditioned by a fast phase of accident. With the purpose of a decrease of risk of long-lived consequences of radiation accident are entered the criteria of according durable countermeasures – evacuation, relocation and food bans, see Table 19 and Table 20.

Table 19 Criteria for decision making about relocation and limitation of consumption the contaminated foodstuff.

Measures of protection Prevented effective dose, mSv Level A Level B

Limitation of consumption of the 5 for the first year, 1 /year 50 for the first year, 10 contaminated food and potable for the subsequent years /years for the subsequent waters years Relocation 50 for the first year 500 for the first year 1000 for all time relocation

Table 20 Criteria for imposing and withdrawing food bans for the first year after accident.

Radionuclides Specific activity of a radionuclide in foodstuff, kBq/kg Level A Level B 131I, 134Cs, 137Cs 1 10 90Sr 0.1 1.0 238Pu, 239Pu, 241Am 0.01 0.1

The criteria of decision making and derivative levels for restraining measures at accidents with a dispersion predominantly of uranium, plutonium, other transu- ranium elements are set by the special normative document.

The requirements to the control behind fulfilment of the Norm The control behind holding of the Norms is laid to operator of object. The control behind irradiation of the population is laid to executive bodies of the subjects of Russian Federation. In case of radiation accident: + The control behind its development, protection of individual in organization and accident brigades implements management of this organization; + The control behind irradiation of the population implements local government bodies and state supervision of a radiation safety.

Criteria on Limitation of Irradiation of the Population in Conditions of Radiation Values of tolerance levels of radiation effect For each category of irradiated persons the value of a tolerance level of radiation effect for the given path of irradiation is determined so that at such level of effect only of one given factor of irradiation within one year the value of a dose equalled to value of the applicable annual limit. The values of tolerance levels for all paths of irradiation are determined for reference conditions, which one are characterized in following parameters: + By volume of inhaled air V, with which one the radionuclide enters in an organism during a calendar year; + By radiation time t during a calendar year; + In weight of potable water of M, with which one the radionuclide enters in an organism during a calendar year; by geometry of external irradiation by fluxes of ionizing radiation.

For individual the following values of standard parameters are established: Vstaff = 3 2.4103 m /year: tstaff = 1700 h/year; Mstaff = 0. For the population the following values of standard parameters are established:

tpop = 8800 h per one year; Mpop = 730 kg/year for adult. The annual volume of inhaled air is established depending on age – from 1 for age about one year up to 8.100 m3/year for 18 and more than years. For the purposes of a rating of entry of radionuclides through bodies of breathing in the form of radioactive aerosols of their chemical combination are parted into three types in velocity function of transition of a radionuclide from lung in a blood: + The “M” type – slowly dissoluble connections; + The “P” type – connection, dissoluble with intermediate speed; + The “B” type – fast dissoluble connections.

For the purposes of a rating of entry of radionuclides through bodies of breathing in the form of radioactive gases the types “G” of gases and vapours of connections of some members are selected. The distribution of connections of members for types at an inhalation is supposed standard. Are given in the appendices to nrb-99 of value of dose factors, and also values paestaff, paestaff, dvastaff and dvapop for air are counted for aerosols with log- normal distribution of particles on activity at median aerodynamic diameter 1 mi- cron and standard geometrical deviation, equal 2.5. In calculations the model of breathing organs, advised by the Publication 66 iaea utilised. Besides for individual for a case of receipt of radionuclides with inhaled air the values of a dose factor permissible annual receipt paestaff, permissible annual of volumetric activity dvastaff without inert gases are adduced, as they are sources of external irradiation, and also isotopes of a radon with products of their decay. The natural radionuclides 87Rb, 115In, 144Nd, 147Sm and 187Re are not included in the table, as they are set norms on their chemical toxicity. Because of chemical toxicity of uranium the receipt (entry) through bodies of breathing of its connections of types or Π should not exceed 2.5 mg per day and 500 mg per one year. If the chemical form of connection of the given radionuclide is obscure, it is necessary to use the data for connection with the greatest value of value of a dose factor and least values paestaff and dvastaff. In nrb-99 for the population are adduced: 1. For a case of receipt of radionuclides with inhaled air – critical age group, and also value of a dose factor and limit of annual receipt paepop for same age group and such as connections, for which one permissible the annual volumetric activity dvapop has appeared least; 2. For a case of receipt of radionuclides with water and nutrition – critical age group, value of a dose factor and limit of annual receipt paepop for same group, where paepop least, and also level of intervention on annual of specific activity in potable water sapop, counted according to a normative technique. sa in foodstuff are not resulted and should be determined under the special

102 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov methodical indicatings in view of local features of internal and external irradiation of the population and with maintenance non-exceeding of the main limits of doses in normal conditions and criteria from Table 1 and Table 15 at accident irradiation.

Minimally significant specific activity (mssa) and activity in putting or on a work- station (msa) also are set norms and are adduced in nrb-99. In an accident conditions of the norm of irradiation of the population are close to limits of irradiation of individual of radiation – dangerous objects, and for the participants of accident brigades exceed these limits in 10 times. The norms of impurity are listed in Table 21.

Table 21 Tolerance levels of radiological contamination of working surfaces, skin, overalls and means of individual protection, particles/(cm2/min).

Object of impurity alfa-emitter nuclidesa Beta-emitter nuclides Separate b other Unimpaired skin, towel, internal surface of facing 2 2 200c parts of means of individual protection Outside surface of padding means of individual pro- 50 200 10000 tection removed in sanitary rooms a. Is set norms general (removed and not removed) impurity. b. The alfa-emitter nuclides, annual permissible volumetric activity which one in air of workrooms dva < 0.3 Bq/m3 concern to separate. c. The following values of tolerance levels of impurity of a skin and internal surface of facing parts of means of individual protection for separate radionuclides are established: for 90Sr + 90Y it is 40 particles/(cm2/min); for non-volatile species of hyzone it is 10,000 particles/(cm2/min).

Radiation safety at radiation accidents pursuant to osporb-98

The problems of a radiation safety at radiation accidents are particularized enough in the new formal document “the Main sanitary regulations of maintenance of a radiation safety” osporb-98 [minzdrav, 1998]. The document states that the system of a radiation safety of individual and population at radiation accident should provide the item of information to a minimum of negative consequences of accident, first of all – preventing of originating of the determined effects and minimization of probability of stochastic effects. Thus the indicated purpose is reached by recovery of the control above a stimulus source, decrease of radiation doses, quantity of irradiated faces, and also radiological contamination of an environment. In the design documentation of each radiation object the possible accidents arising owing to equipment malfunction, mishandlings of individual, natural disasters or diverse reasons should be determined, which one can result in loss of the control above stimulus sources and unplanned irradiation of the people and (or) radiological contamination of an environment. The list of possible accidents for particular operation conditions with stimulus sources agrees with organs of state supervision behind a radiation safety. In the design documentation of radiation objects of i-ii category there should be a section “Technical-engineer measures of a civil defence. Measures on warning extraordinary situations”. This section should actuate the nomenclature, volume and stowages of means of individual protection, medicines, accident reserve radiometric and radiation meters, means of a decontamination and cleansing, tools and stock indispensable for realization of pressing activities on liquidation of consequences for radiation accident. The management of such objects is obliged to elaborate, to approve and to agree territorial organs of state supervision behind a radiation safety“Plan of measures on protection of individual and population in

Criteria on Limitation of Irradiation of the Population in Conditions of Radiation case of radiation accident”. This schedule, which one is periodically corrected and new approves, should contain following main sections: + The forecast of possible accidents on radiation object in view of possible reasons, types and scenarios of development of accident, and also predictable radiation situation at accidents of a miscellaneous type; + Criteria for decision making about realization of protective measures; + The list of organizations, with which one implements interplay at liquidation of accident and its consequences; + Organization of an accident radiation monitoring; + Estimation of nature and sizes of radiation accident; + The order of the introducing of a contingency plan in operating; + The order of the warning; + Behaviour of individual at accident; + Duties of the officials at realization of accident activities;Measures of protection of individual at realization of accident activities; + Fire preventions; + Measures on protection of the population and environment; + Rendering of a medical care damaged; + Measures on localization and liquidation of the sites of radiological contamination; + Opening-up and training of individual to operations in case of accident.

In each organization, in which one the radiation accident is possible, the system of the accident warning about the arisen accident should be stipulated, on signals by which one the individual should act pursuant to a plan of measures on liquidation of radiation accident and duty regulations. In all cases of finding of fact of radiation accident the management of organization is obliged immediately to inform: + Management of territory; + Territorial organs of state supervision behind a radiation safety; + Higher organization or office.

Further management of territories should ensure fast entry of the data about radiation accident to the most competent specialists in the field of a radioactivity protection and their joint with management the information of the population on radiation accident, necessity of protective actions on the part of the population advisable ways both means of protection and preventive measures. Thus the terms of specialized accident brigades should, first of all, be attracted in realization of activities on liquidation of accident and its consequences. In indispensable cases for fulfilment of these activities the faces can be attracted is preferential from individual is higher than 30 years which are not having of medical contraindications, at their voluntary written approval after leaving out on possible radiation doses and risk for health. The women can be allowed to par- ticipation in accident activities only in exceptional cases. The activities on liquidation of consequences of accident and fulfilment of other measures, bound with a possible overexposure of individual, should be conducted under a radiation monitoring under the special sanction. In the sanction are determined a limiting uptime, the adding means of protection, surname of the participants and face, accountable for fulfilment of activities. The regulation of scheduled heightened irradiation of individual at liquidation of accident is determined nrb-96/99. The scheduled heightened irradiation is enabled for individual of radiation object participating in realization of under abnormal condition – refur- bishment work and the specialists of salvage and rescue services and formations. For accident preventing of development of accident, if there is a threat to life of the people, face, operatively accountable for radiation object, the sanction to heightened irradiation up to 100 mSv of the separate persons from individual can be issued. The document envisions realization of a radiation monitoring on miscellaneous phases of accident (early, intermediate and late). This control actuates the control of radiation situation and individual control of doses of external and internal

104 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov irradiation of individual and population. The radiation monitoring is subdivided on preliminary, current and total. The pre-clearance (radiation survey) should be conducted before a start of realization of accident and protective measures with the purpose of their planning and limitation of radiation doses. The monitoring should be executed during fulfilment of accident activities in the center of accident and in the contaminated territories with the purpose of well- timed obtaining of the information about formation of radiation doses of faces involved in accident. The total radiation monitoring is intended for an estimation of observance accident of dose limits. The people with traumatic damages, chemical poisonings or exposed irradiation in a dose above 0.2 Sv it is necessary to route on medical examination and treatment. At radiological contamination the cleaning of the people and decontamination of the contaminated clothes should be conducted. At radiation accident with let of radionuclides in the environment which has entailed radiological contamination of vast territories, the protection of the population implements pursuant to criteria for decision making, are given in nrb-96/99. The liquidation of consequences of accident and fact-finding of its reasons is carried out by management of organization under the control of organs of state supervision behind a radiation safety, the specialists render which one methodical, and if necessary and practical help. In case of originating radiation accidents with radiological contamination of vast territories the liquidation of consequences of accident is carried out by the Ministry on extraordinary situations together with management of the involved territory both other interested ministries and offices. The organs of state sanitary – epidemiological supervision should share in fulfilment of following problems at fact-finding and liquidation of consequences of radiation accident: + Realization of a preliminary radiation monitoring; + Detection of faces, which one could expose to accident irradiation; + The control behind maintenance of a radiation safety of faces sharing in fact- finding and liquidation of accident; + The control behind levels of radiological contamination manufacturing and environment, sources of water facilities, food; + Hygienic assessment of the radiological situation both individual radiation doses of individual and separate groups of the population, and also faces which were taking part in accident activities; + Estimation of efficiency of a decontamination and cleansing; + Mining of the proposals for management of territories, organizations on protection of individual and population with the forecast of radiation situation; + The control behind the collecting, deleting and burial of radioactive waste.

The termination of fact-finding and realization of activities on liquidation of consequences of accident can be carried out only as agreed with organs of state supervision behind a radiation safety and internal business. The document determines that the liability for liquidation of consequences of accident is born with management of organization, in which one there was an accident. The liability for implementation of measures on protection of the population in case of radiation accident is born with management of territory. The organization, in which one has taken place accident, bears responsibility for injury caused by accident. The persons guilty of accident originating are attracted to discipline, administrative or criminal responsibility pursuant to the current legisla- tion. The living conditions, economic activities, volume and nature of a radiation monitoring in the territories which have exposed to radiological contamination, are established by management of territory under the guidelines of territorial organs of state sanitary – epidemiological supervision pursuant to local conditions and guidelines, are given in nrb-96/99. In the territories which have exposed to radiological contamination as a result of radiation accident, should implement:

Criteria on Limitation of Irradiation of the Population in Conditions of Radiation + Radiation monitoring with an estimation of radiation doses of the population at the expense of radiological contamination of territory, if this dose can exceed 10 mSv/years; + Radiation monitoring behind other main kinds of irradiation of the population; + The optimized decrease of doses on all main kinds of irradiation, if the radiation dose of the population at the expense of atomic irradiation of territory exceeds 1.0 mSv/years; + The optimized protective measures, without disturbance of adding up living environments and food staff of the population, if the radiation dose at the expense of radiological contamination of territory exceeds 0.1 mSv/year, but no more than 1.0 mSv/year.

The management of organization executing customary economic activities in territory, exposed to radioactive contamination, is obliged to ensure operation conditions, at which one the irradiation of the workers at the expense of radioactive contamination will not exceed 5 mSv/years. In organizations, where the irradiation of the workers at the expense of accident impurity exceeds 1 mSv/year, the service of a radiation safety should be created, which one executes a radiation monitoring and carries out measures on a decrease of irradiation of the workers pursuant to a principle of optimization. The volume and nature of a radiation monitoring should be matched to territorial organs of gossanepidnadzor.

106 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Appendix D Population in the Settlements of the Murmansk Region

Settlement Population Settlement Population (estimated 1995) (estimated 1995) Murmansk 406,088 Nivsky 1,484 Apatity 74,500 Roslyakovo 11,500 Kandalaksha 49,100 Safonovo 7,500 Kirovsk 37,400 Teriberka 2,080 Monchegorsk 63,200 Verkhnetulomsky 2,500 Olenegorsk 31,600 Kildinstroy 3,400 Polyarnye Zori 18,200 Molochny 6,000 Severomorsk 59,600 Murmashi 14,500 Kovdor 25,500 Tumanny 1,800 Kola 12,200 Shonguy 1,700 Zapolyarny 21,200 Revda 10,800 Afrikanda 3,225 Nikel 18,800 Zasheek 1,295 Pechenga 2,500 Zelenoborsky 9,305

Reference: The age structure of the population in the Murmansk region, 1995 (1996). Statistical Reference Book. The Governmental Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics. Murmansk Regional Committee on Statistics, Mur- mansk, 56 p.

Population in the Settlements of the Murmansk Region 107 Appendix E Main Equations and Relations of Closure in pc cosyma

Equation for concentration: C(x, y, z, t) =

2 V ⋅ x zh– + ------g - Q ⋅⋅y2 u ()α ------exp– ------– ------1 + 0()xg (3) π σ σ 2 2 2 u y z 2σ 2σ y z

where reflection from surface factor is seem as:

α 2 d 0()x = 1– ------(4) ()uh– V ⋅ x ∂σ V ++V ------g ⋅ z g d σ ∂ z x washout rate:

ΛQ y2 w = ------⋅ exp –------(5) σ π σ2 u y 2 2 Form for plume standard deviation is:

σ = a·xb (6)

Taylor, turbulence parameters:

σ2 = 2σ2 ⋅⋅T2 t + exp– t – 1 , yz, vw, l ---- ---- (7) Tl Tl σ2 where vw, is the standard deviation of wind speed; Tl the time scale of fluc- σ tuations; t the travel-time; v,w the dividable in turbulent part and non-turbulent σ σ part; and y,z is the deriving continuously. The values of y,z are derived using autocorrelation and iterative procedure. Wind shear influence on plume travelling direction change and plume defor- mation. Equilibrium in horizontal plane of pressure, friction and Coriolis force gives solving a set of linear differential equations:

2 ∂ u 0 = –f ⋅ V ++f ⋅ v K (8) C G C mz ∂z2

2 ∂ v 0 = –f ⋅ U ++f ⋅ u K (9) C G C mz ∂z2

The solution is known as the Ekman spiral:

108 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov uG= ()1 – e–γz ⋅ cos()γz and (10)

vGe= ()–γz ⋅ sin()γz , (11)

with

f γ = ------C - . (12) 2Kmz

The angle between wind and geotrophic wind for any height:

1 – e–γz ⋅ cos()γz α = atan------(13) e–γz ⋅ sin()γz

The concerning horizontal dispersion:

σ2 σ2 σ2 y, total = y, turbulence + y, windshear and (14)

σ2 α2 ⋅⋅2 ()∆θ 2 y, windshear = x , (15)

with α a constant, x the travelling distance, and ∆θ the angle difference at plume height and surface wind.

Main Equations and Relations of Closure in pc cosyma 109 Appendix F Accumulated Activity of the Accidental Radionuclide Releases

Accumulated activity of the accidental radionuclide releases (in Bq).

N Radio- Object of the Radioactive Risk nuclide Kola npp ftb “Iman- ftb “Lotta” Nuclear Submarine Icebreaker dra” Heat Trans- Fire scr fer Agent Loss 1 Kr&Xe 85mKr 1,90E+16 1,11E+13 3,63E+12 85Kr 3,80E+12 4,20E+13 7,86E+13 87Kr 3,40E+16 1,18E+13 3,33E+13 88Kr 5,20E+16 1,70E+13 2,08E+13 89Kr 6,66E+14 133Xe 1,70E+17 1,47E+14 135Xe 5,10E+16 1,41E+12 137Xe 5,66E+14 138Xe 2,62E+14 Total 3,26E+17 3,80E+12 4,20E+13 3,99E+13 1,78E+15 2,92E+15 2 I 131I 3,68E+16 1,04E+11 8,88E+13 132I 1,30E+12 3,70E+12 133I 7,16E+16 8,88E+11 1,15E+12 134I 2,70E+12 2,85E+13 135I 6,85E+16 1,70E+12 7,03E+12 Total 1,77E+17 6,69E+12 1,29E+14 9,55E+10 3 Cs&Rb 134Cs 4,00E+15 5,20E+08 1,60E+08 7,40E+08 137Cs 3,10E+15 9,00E+09 6,40E+09 9,25E+08 2,40E+13 3,26E+14 138Cs 2,66E+11 4,74E+13 139Cs 1,58E+14 88Rb 1,70E+11 7,66E+12 89Rb 9,62E+13 Total 7,10E+15 9,52E+09 6,56E+09 4,38E+11 2,40E+13 6,35E+14 4 Ba&Sr 139Ba 1,85E+10 3,30E+13 140Ba 7,03E+08 2,07E+12 89Sr 1,11E+14 90Sr 4,50E+08 3,00E+08 4,40E+11 4,07E+13 91Sr 2,96E+08

110 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov N Radio- Object of the Radioactive Risk nuclide Kola npp ftb “Iman- ftb “Lotta” Nuclear Submarine Icebreaker dra” Heat Trans- Fire scr fer Agent Loss 92Sr 5,92E+07 Total 4,50E+08 3,00E+08 1,96E+10 4,40E+11 1,87E+14 5 Ru 103Ru 1,10E+09 1,60E+07 4,81E+08 1,89E+13 103Ru 0,00E+00 9,70E+09 7,03E+08 3,07E+12 Total 1,10E+09 9,72E+09 1,18E+09 2,20E+13 6 40K 54Mn 7,30E+08 3,80E+06 2,20E+11 58Co 6,00E+08 5,40E+06 60Co 8,80E+08 2,90E+06 3,10E+11 95Zr 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 95Nb 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 95Zr, Nb 4,07E+08 125Sb 0,00E+00 6,10E+07 141Ce 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 3,44E+11 143Ce 4,81E+09 144Ce 6,10E+10 4,40E+10 4,63E+12 152Eu 5,50E+09 1,40E+09 154Eu 4,00E+10 2,80E+09 153Gd 2,10E+10 0,00E+00 160Tb 7,20E+09 0,00E+00 241Pu 3,60E+10 2,60E+10 Rest Total 1,73E+11 7,70E+10 4,07E+08 5,30E+11 4,98E+12 All Total 5,10E+17 3,99E+12 4,21E+13 4,71E+13 2,50E+13 2,76E+15 2,92E+15

Remarks: + Example of the scale: “E+16” 1016 + Empty spaces – the information was not available + ftb – Floating technical bases of recharge of reactors + scr – Spontaneous Chain Reaction

References: Dubkov, A. P., Kozlov, V. F. Guravlev, I.B. et al. (1995). Scenario for severe beyond design basic reference accident at the Kola npp and its radiological consequences. In: Environmental Radioactivity in the Arctic. Oslo, Norway, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, pp. 373–376. The maximum permitted norms of radioactive gas-aerosol releases from ships of nuclear technological service. (1995a). Sankt-Petersburg, 52 p. The maximum permitted norms of radioactive gas-aerosol releases from npp. (1995b). Sankt-Petersburg, 59 p.

Accumulated Activity of the Accidental Radionuclide Releases 111 Lisovsky I., Baburkin E., Lobyntsev V. et al. (1998). Assessment of potential risk of environmental radioactive contamination in Northern Europe from terrestrial nuclear units in North-West Russia. intas Project 96–1802.

112 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Appendix G Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Kola npp)

Release duration: 1 h No wet deposition: Wet deposition:

20,000,000 5,000,000 375,000 15,000 2,000 1,000

Release duration: 4 minutes No wet deposition: Wet deposition:

Figure 29 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of precipitation and release’s duration for an accident at the Kola npp.

Parameters:

Source Kola Nuclear Power Plant Total release 3.1·1015 Bq Release height 75–150 m Wind velocity 4 m/s

Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Kola npp) 113 75 m: 75–150 m:

20,000,000 5,000,000 375,000 15,000 2,000 1,000

75–300 m: 75–1000 m:

Figure 30 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of release’s altitude for an accident at the Kola npp.

Parameters:

Source Kola Nuclear Power Plant Total release 3.1·1015 Bq Release height 75–150 m Wind velocity 4 m/s Precipitation Yes

114 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 75 m: 75–150 m:

20,000,000 5,000,000 375,000 15,000 2,000 1,000

75–300 m: 75–1000 m:

Figure 31 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of release’s altitude for an accident at the Kola npp; case of extreme wind velocity.

Parameters:

Source Kola Nuclear Power Plant Total release 3.1·1015 Bq Release duration 4 minutes Wind velocity 15 m/s Precipitation Yes

Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Kola npp) 115 Appendix H Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Nuclear Submarine)

Wind velocity: 5.3 m/s No wet deposition: Wet deposition:

20,000,000 5,000,000 375,000 15,000 2,000 1,000

Maximal wind velocity No wet deposition: Wet deposition:

Figure 32 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of precipitation and wind velocity for an accident at the nuclear submarine; case of extreme wind velocity.

Parameters:

Source Nuclear submarine (scenario of spontaneous chain reaction) Total release 3.26·1014 Bq Release duration 2 minutes Release height 75 m

116 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 75 m and wet deposition: 75–150 m and wet deposition:

20,000,000 5,000,000 375,000 15,000 2,000 1,000

75–300 m and wet deposition: 75–300 m and no wet deposition:

Figure 33 Deposition of 137Cs (in Bq/m2) as a function of precipitation and release’s altitude for an accident at the nuclear submarine.

Parameters:

Source Nuclear submarine (scenario of spontaneous chain reaction) Total release 3.26·1014 Bq Release duration 2 minutes Wind velocity 4 m/s

Deposition of 137Cs by Precipitation, Release Duration and Altitude (Nuclear Submarine) Appendix I The Probability of Exceeding of the Control Level (Nuclear Submarine and Icebreaker)

a. Bols’haya Lopatka (accident at the nuclear b. Skalisty (accident at the nuclear subma- submarine): rine):

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

c. Icebreaker Base (accident at the ice- d. Severomorsk (accident at the nuclear sub- breaker): marine):

Figure 34 The probability of exceeding (in %) of the control level for the nuclear submarine and icebreaker accidents.

118 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov Northern Studies Working Paper

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The Probability of Exceeding of the Control Level (Nuclear Submarine and Icebreaker) Scientific Nuclear Waste Risk Assessment in the Barents Region. 21 Morozov, Sergey and Naumov, Andrey (2001). Assessment of Potential Risk for Kola’s Population from Radiological Impact of Accident on Spent Nuclear Fuel Facilities. 22 Lundström, Christoffer (2001). Simulering av radioaktiv beläggning vid utsläpp på Kolahalvön. 23 Baklanov, A.; Bergman, R.; Lundström, C. and Thaning, L. (2001). Modelling of Episodes of Atmospheric Transport and Deposition from Hypothetical Nuclear Accidents on the Kola Peninsula. 24 Mahura, Alexander; Andres, Robert; Jaffe, Daniel (2001). Atmospheric Transport Patterns from the Kola Nuclear Reactors. 25 Hedkvist, Fred; Weissglas, Gösta (2001). Regionalisation in North-West- ern Europe: Spatial Planning or Building a Frame for Development Coop- eration. The Case of the Barents Region.

120 Sergey Morozov and Andrey Naumov 121 The Centre for Regional Science, cerum, initiates and accomplishes research on regional development, carries out multidisciplinary research, and distributes the results to various public organizations. One major area of research is the sustainable development in the arctic and sub-arctic political, socio-economic and cultural systems. Studies are often conducted in collaboration with Northern Studies research institutes in other countries. The Working Papers in the Northern Studies series are interim reports presenting work in progress and papers that have been submitted for publication elsewhere. These reports have received only limited review and are primarily used for in-house circulation.

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