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Stephen R. Grimm Curriculum Vitae

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Stephen R. Grimm Curriculum Vitae Stephen R. Grimm Curriculum Vitae Associate Professor Office: 718-817-3282 Philosophy Department [email protected] Fordham University http://faculty.fordham.edu/sgrimm Bronx, NY 10458 Employment Fordham University: Associate Professor (2012—), Assistant Professor (2008—2012) • Principal Investigator, Varieties of Understanding: New Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology Project. Joint Award from the John Templeton Foundation and Henry Luce Foundation. Amount: $4,240,000. Funding Period: July 2013 to June 2016. University of Montana: Assistant Professor (2006—2008) University of Notre Dame: Edward Sorin Postdoctoral Fellow (2005—2006) Education University of Notre Dame: Philosophy, Ph.D., 2005 • Dissertation Title: Understanding as an Epistemic Goal • Recipient of 2006 Eli J. and Helen Shaheen Graduate School Award for Outstanding Graduate Student in the Humanities at Notre Dame University of Toronto: Theology, M.A., 1996 Williams College: Philosophy and Art, B.A., 1993 Areas of Specialization Epistemology • Philosophy of Science Areas of Competence Ethics • Philosophy of Religion • Wittgenstein Publications Books 2 Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. Eds. Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, & Sabine Ammon. New York: Routledge. Forthcoming. Articles “How Understanding People Differs From Understanding the Natural World.” Philosophical Issues (Noûs supplement). Forthcoming. “Understanding and Transparency.” In Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. Eds. Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, & Sabine Ammon. New York: Routledge. Forthcoming. “The Logic of Mysticism.” European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. Forthcoming. [special issue on mysticism] “Wisdom in Theology.” In The Oxford Handbook for the Epistemology of Theology. Eds. William Abraham and Fred Aquino. New York: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. “The Value of Reflection.” In Performance Epistemology. Ed. Miguel Angel Fernandez. New York: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. “Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.” In Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Eds. John Greco and David Henderson. New York: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. “Wisdom.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93: 139-154. (2015) “Understanding as Knowledge of Causes.” In Virtue Scientia: Essays in Philosophy of Science and Virtue Epistemology. Ed. Abrol Fairweather. Special issue of Synthese. (2014) “Getting it Right.” (with Kristoffer Ahlstrom) Philosophical Studies 166: 329-347. (2013) “The Value of Understanding.” Philosophy Compass 7: 103-117. (2012) “What is Interesting?” Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 2: 515-542. (2011) “On Intellectualism in Epistemology.” Mind 120: 705-733. (2011) “Understanding.” In The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Eds. Duncan Pritchard and Sven Berneker. New York: Routledge. (2010) 3 “The Goal of Explanation.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 41: 337-344. (2010) “Understanding.” Oxford Bibliographies Online. New York: Oxford University Press. www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com (2010) “Epistemic Normativity.” In The Value of Knowledge. Eds. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press. (2009) • Reprinted in Virtue Epistemology: MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (2012) “Reliability and The Sense of Understanding.” In Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Understanding. Eds. Henk de Regt, Sabina Leonelli, and Kai Eigner. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. (2009) “Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 725-744. (2008) “Explanatory Inquiry and the Need for Explanation.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 481-497. (2008) “Review Essay: Kvanvig’s The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.” (with Michael DePaul). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 498-514. (2007) “Easy Cases and Value Incommensurability.” Ratio 20: 26-44. (2007) “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 515-535. (2006) “Kant’s Argument for Radical Evil.” The European Journal of Philosophy 10: 160-177. (2002) “Ernest Sosa, Knowledge, and Understanding.” (With a response by Sosa). Philosophical Studies 106: 171-191. (2001) “Cardinal Newman, Reformed Epistemologist?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75: 497-522. (2001) Encyclopedia Entries “Understanding.” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 3rd Edition. Ed. Robert Audi. New York: Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming. 4 Book Reviews Review of The Nature and Value of Knowledge, by Duncan Pritchard, Allan Millar, and Adrian Haddock. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (2011) Review of Aiming at Truth, by Nicholas Unwin. Mind, 118: 886-889. (2009) Works in Progress “Knowing How to Live Well.” In Knowledge Indeed. Eds. Stephen Hetherington and Clayton Littlejohn. Publisher TBD. New Essays in the Philosophy of Understanding. Ed. Stephen R. Grimm. Proposal in preparation for Oxford University Press. Varieties of Understanding: New Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. [Collected papers from the Varieties of Understanding Capstone Conference.] Ed. Stephen R. Grimm. Proposal in preparation for Oxford University Press. Media Interviews “Understanding Understanding.” 3AM Magazine. April 2013. “Varieties of Understanding.” Williams College Magazine. Summer 2013. Presentations June 2015. “The Nature and Value of Understanding.” Varieties of Understanding Midpoint Conference. Fordham University. March 2015. “Nothing that is Genuinely Human Fails to Find an Echo: Vatican II at 100.” Vatican II at 50: The Post-Conciliar Generation Looks at the Next Half Century. Fordham University, Center for Religion and Culture. November 2014. “How Understanding Human Beings Differs from Understanding the Natural World.” Bucknell University, Philosophy Colloquium. October 2014. “Understanding and Transparency.” University of California, Berkeley; Concepts and Cognition Lab Colloquium. October 2014. Comments on James Brent, “Aquinas’s Three Replies to the Evidentialist 5 Objection.” American Catholic Philosophical Association. Washington, D.C. May 2014. “The Logic of Mysticism.” Mysticism Conference. Moscow, Russia. Fall 2014. “Wisdom & Theology.” Faith & Culture Lecture, Villanova University March 2014. “Understanding and Transparency.” Towards an Epistemology of Understanding: Rethinking Justification Conference. University of Berne. Fall 2013—Fall 2014. “What is Wisdom?” Wake Forest University, Philosophy Colloquium; Holy Cross, Philosophy Colloquium; Middlebury College, Philosophy Colloquium; Williams College, Philosophy Colloquium; Walton Lecture on Science, Religion, and Philosophy, Fordham University August 2013. “Wisdom and Its Value” 23rd World Congress of Philosophy. Athens, Greece. February 2013. “Understanding as Knowledge of Causes.” Felician College, Philosophy Colloquium. May 2012. “The Value of Reflection.” Virtue Theory: Ethics vs. Epistemology, East vs. West Conference. Soochow University, Taiwan. May 2012. “Getting it Right” (with Kristoffer Ahlstrom). Aims of Inquiry and Cognition Conference. University of Edinburgh. May 2012. “The Value of Reflection.” Epistemology Research Group. University of Edinburgh. April 2012. “Idealization and Understanding.” Fordham Philosophical Society Spring Symposium. Fordham University. April 2012. “The Value of Reflection.” Epistemology Brown Bag Series. Northwestern University. October 2011. “Comments on Pruss and Dougherty.” Georgetown/Baylor/Notre Dame Philosophy of Religion Conference. Georgetown University. June 2011. “Understanding as Knowledge of Causes.” Knowledge, Understanding, and Wisdom Conference. Bled, Slovenia. October 2010. “Craigian Insights on Epistemic Evaluation.” The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation Conference. University of Nebraska. 6 June 2010. “Which Knowledge is of Most Worth?” Ecology of Knowledge Conference. University of Edinburgh. April 2010. “Human Cloning: Pro and Con.” Fordham President’s Spring Visit Lecture for Newly Admitted Students. March 2010. “What’s Interesting?” Society of Christian Philosophers, Eastern Division Meeting. Wake Forest University. October 2009. “The Epistemic Point of View.” Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles. October 2009. “Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.” University of Edinburgh. October 2009. “The Nature of Knowledge.” University of Edinburgh Philosophy Society. October 2009. “Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.” University of Glasgow. June 2009. “Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.” Virtue and Value in Epistemology Conference. Bled, Slovenia. March 2009. “Epistemic Normativity and Common Goods.” Normativity and Culture Conference. University of Antwerp. March 2009. “Understanding and Epistemic Goodness.” Epistemic Goodness Conference. University of Oklahoma. November 2007. “How Knowledge and Practical Interests are Related.” American Catholic Philosophical Association. Marquette University. October 2007. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.” Northwest Philosophy Conference. Lewis & Clark College. August 2007. “Pritchard on Understanding and Epistemic Value.” Value of Knowledge Conference. Free University, Amsterdam. August 2007. “The End of Orthodox Epistemology?: How Knowledge and Practical Interests are Related.” Value of Knowledge Conference. Free University,
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