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Michigan State University 1956 AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HISTQRY AND SCIENCE Thesis Ice II“ Dogma OI M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Rolf A. George 1956 AH INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTIHUTIOH BE JESH HISTORY AND SCIEHCE A'EEBIS Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of HAS”ER OF ARTS Department of PhilOSOphy 1950 15-23515 1 i,"' and"? hub." 'fj“"r"'| ‘iCAL;.CJ-4l—I‘JUIJ"~L‘J.LQ“L The author wisIes to express his grateful thanks to Professors Henry 8. Leonard and Lewis K. Zerby for their help and encouragement throughout the course of this investigation. r'1 ' "-T :‘1 ‘. ‘1 M-":? rm“ z ‘ lejr‘“ .LAULLLI (JL‘ Ubulpulo Introductory Jote I4 he Referential Ambiguity of "History” #- Hominai'sm and Realism Concerning "Philo- sophy of history” Science and History mhe Ontologies of Science and history History and Epistemology: Preliminaries History and Epistemology I listory and epistemology II History an Epistemology III p; History 9.) nd Value History and Unified Science An Attempt to Define ”Statement of History" Iindelband's Theory Concernine 0 Subjects and Predicates Concluding hemarhs Footnotes Bibliography Ah II‘EDTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTION BBTJEEN HISTORY AND SCIENCE Introductory hote The purpose of this paper is twofold: On the one hand, it is to discuss some attempts that have been made to find criteria for the discrimination of science from history. On the other hand, it is to offer, tentatively, one such criter- io.. The paper begins by discussing the ambiguity of the word "history," and pointing out some difficulties that have ensued from neglecting this ambiguity. The second section deals with a seeming circularity, appearing in enquiries of this type. These first two sections are mere- ly to prepare the way for the investigation that is to follow. Section three gives a brief outline for the task which is set for the critical part of this paper. It states that a criterion for the discrimination of his- tory from science can conceivably be found through an on- tological, an epistemological, or a formal enquiry. The (,0 ubsequent sections are to carry out the critical task and attempt to establish that none of the ontological or epistemological arguments yield the proposed criterion. Section nine deals with a claim made by heinrich Rickert that histories are ”value charged" while the sciences are not. This assertion is discussed in detail, an Q. it is shown that does not hold. Section ten has to do with the theory that science and history are in fact one, a theory which has been put forth by some logiCa 1 er piricists. This section attcwuts to show that science and history eeual each other only as far as the observations are concerned from which they both must proceed, or, at least, that the evidence offered by the philos0phers discussed there does not allow one to con- clude that science and history equal each otner in any fur- the respect. In this section, the point has been reached where the formal differences between t1 e two branches of knowledge are discussed. In the following Section the same type of enguiry is continued, and an attempt is made to demonstrate that a difference between science and history cannot lie in the nature and kind of the individual statements which are dnitted 9) in one or tie other. This being achieved, it re- mains to show that the difference between science and his- ory lies in the way in which the statements are connected, rather than in the statements themselves. In a concluding remark, a brief reference is made to the meta physical conse<uence s that would ensue from the adOption of the tentative solution that is given in the last part of the paper. In the Opinion of the author, the theory of the log- ical eo itivists concerning the unity of science and history has never been criticised on formal grounds. This might be attributed to the general unwillingness of philosophers of history to engage in studies of a formal nature. But while there has been no formal criticism, there has also been no general agreement on the issue; and only too often the is- sue was dismissed with a somewhat outdated mathematicus- non-est-collega gesture. Perhaps it is needless to say that I do not wish to pass any such value judgnent on either science or history in maintaining that a difference exists between the two. As this claim issues from a formal con- sideration, no valuation can be eXpected to evolve from it. The Referential Ambiguity of "History" The word "history" possesses a referential ambiguity. It refers, first, to a number of events, and secondly, to a body of knowledge about these events. Thus we may say that hommsen occupied a certain position in the history of mankind, and, on the other hand, that he wrote a history of Rome. Cor- responding to this ambiguity, two branches of philosOphical enquiry have been develOped, one concerning the events that are commonly called historical and the other related to the writings that have been comgosed about these events. The former is called the "material," the latter the "formal" philosOphy of history. With reference to this let us, for the time being, adept the convention of speaking about "history in the formal sense" and "history in the material sense."1 If the following is asserted: "Charlemagne's victory at Tours is a part of the history of Charlemagne,’ ' we have an instance of "history" in its material sense. On the other hand, "'Charlemagne won the battle of Tours' is a part of a history of Charlemagne" represents an instance of "his- tory" in the formal sense. Thus if we employ the word in its formal sense and make an assertion "a is a history," this assertion will be similar in kind to "b is a sentence.’ In both cases we are dealing with linguistic entities. The problems that arise from investigations of sentences and histories will show some similarity: there will have to be considerations of structure, concern, veri- fication procedures, and probable truth. In the case of his- tories, moreover, the interconnection of sentences will have to be considered, as a history will commonly consist of more than one sentence. Much of contemporary EurOpean philosophy is character- ized through an over-reliance upon the structures and pecul- iarities of natural languages. In some cases, this inclina- tion has resulted in obviously erroneous and inconsistent statements. Especially of Martin Heidegger it is true that the natural language, in his case the German language, is thought to have an unveiling, revealing character. (Entbergungscharacter) Heidegger's Sein und Zeit2 is inter— spersed with etymological analyses which are to show forth the "actual" meaning of one word or another. Such an approach does not permit the elimination of an ambiguity, as an ambiguity is never thought to be accidental, and be- cause a language is thought of as conferring some information through any ambiguity. In the present context, the ambiguity of the term "history" will be treated as logically accidental. How it came to be ambiguous, i.e. the etymological problem does not interest us here. A brief analysis of Benedetto Croce's philOSOphy of history will best serve to demonstrate the difficulties which arise if the ambiguity in the term "history" is not elimin- ated or if it is taken as intrinsically meaningful. O\ Croce starts his book Geschichte ale Gedanke und Tat} with an attempt to determine the essential characteristics of a historical writing. What is it that makes a piece of liter- ature a history? Croce contends that it is not the style in which it is written,and he continues that not even the greater or lesser abundance and preciseness of the individual data can give a clue to the solution of the problem because: Ausfuehrlichste und genaueste Sammlungen von Einzelangaben (liegen vor), bei denen sofort zu spueren ist, dass sie nicht Geschichte sind. Anderseits (kennen wir) Werke... von leuchtender historischer Einsicht, aber arm an Tatsachen und sogar von ungenauen, legendaeren oder erdichteten Angaben durchsetzt ...Kompilationen von Tatsachen nennt man Chroniken, Augzeichnungen, Kemoiren, Annalen, aber nicht Geschichtswerke; und selbst wenn sie kritisch gesichted warden, wenn von jeder einzelnen Angabe die Quelle angefuehrt wird oder ein gruendlich ueberprueftes Zeugnis, so koennen sie...nie auf ihrer Egene die Aeusserlichkeit der Quelle und des Zeugnisses ueberwinden...und koennen nie unsere Wahrheit werden, waehrend die Geschichte eine von uns aus unserer innersten Erfahrung geschoepfte Wahrheit erfordert."4 According to Croce, therefore, the correspondence to facts or the arrangement of data do not in any way establish a criterion as to whether a given piece of writing forms a history. A writing, in order to become a history, has to show forth a truth "that comes from our innermost self." The meaningfulness of the passage quoted evidently depends upon a precise account of this truth. Such an account is not eXplicitly given. However, from the general context in which the quoted passage occurs, it can be Judged that Croce meant some such thing as "vital truth," or a "truth that has prac- tical bearings upon our life." At this point there arises a peculiar difficulty. A truth, or true statement does not in itself contain a clue which allows us to ascertain its practical importance. Thus it may be of great importance to know a certain fact at a given time, but the same knowledge may be quite inconsequen- tial at another time. According to Croce, a true historical writing would then be a piece of literature that conveys truths which are of vital necessity for its time.
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