AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HISTQRY AND SCIENCE

Thesis Ice II“ Dogma OI M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Rolf A. George 1956

AH INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTIHUTIOH

BE JESH HISTORY AND SCIEHCE

A'EEBIS

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

HAS”ER OF ARTS

Department of PhilOSOphy

1950 15-23515

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The author wisIes to express his grateful thanks to Professors Henry 8. Leonard and Lewis K. Zerby for

their help and encouragement throughout the course of this investigation. r'1 ' "-T :‘1 ‘. ‘1 M-":? rm“ z ‘ lejr‘“ .LAULLLI (JL‘ Ubulpulo

Introductory Jote I4

he Referential Ambiguity of "History” #-

Hominai'sm and Realism Concerning "Philo- sophy of history”

Science and History

mhe Ontologies of Science and history

History and Epistemology: Preliminaries

History and Epistemology I

listory and epistemology II

History an Epistemology III p;

History

9.) nd Value

History and Unified Science

An Attempt to Define ”Statement of History"

Iindelband's Theory

Concernine 0 Subjects and Predicates

Concluding hemarhs

Footnotes

Bibliography Ah II‘EDTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTION

BBTJEEN HISTORY AND SCIENCE Introductory hote

The purpose of this paper is twofold: On the one hand, it is to discuss some attempts that have been made to find criteria for the discrimination of science from history. On the other hand, it is to offer, tentatively, one such criter- io..

The paper begins by discussing the ambiguity of the word "history," and pointing out some difficulties that have ensued from neglecting this ambiguity. The second section deals with a seeming circularity, appearing in enquiries of this type. These first two sections are mere- ly to prepare the way for the investigation that is to follow.

Section three gives a brief outline for the task which is set for the critical part of this paper. It states that a criterion for the discrimination of his- tory from science can conceivably be found through an on-

tological, an epistemological, or a formal enquiry. The (,0 ubsequent sections are to carry out the critical task and attempt to establish that none of the ontological or epistemological arguments yield the proposed criterion.

Section nine deals with a claim made by heinrich

Rickert that histories are ”value charged" while the sciences are not. This assertion is discussed in detail,

an Q. it is shown that does not hold. Section ten has to do with the theory that science and history are in fact one, a theory which has been put

forth by some logiCa 1 er piricists. This section attcwuts to show that science and history eeual each other only as

far as the observations are concerned from which they both must proceed, or, at least, that the evidence offered by the philos0phers discussed there does not allow one to con-

clude that science and history equal each otner in any fur-

the respect. In this section, the point has been reached where the formal differences between t1 e two branches of knowledge are discussed.

In the following Section the same type of enguiry is

continued, and an attempt is made to demonstrate that a

difference between science and history cannot lie in the

nature and kind of the individual statements which are

dnitted 9) in one or tie other. This being achieved, it re- mains to show that the difference between science and his-

ory lies in the way in which the statements are connected, rather than in the statements themselves.

In a concluding remark, a brief reference is made to the meta physical conse

adOption of the tentative solution that is given in the last part of the paper.

In the Opinion of the author, the theory of the log-

ical eo itivists concerning the unity of science and history

has never been criticised on formal grounds. This might be attributed to the general unwillingness of philosophers of history to engage in studies of a formal nature. But while there has been no formal criticism, there has also been no general agreement on the issue; and only too often the is- sue was dismissed with a somewhat outdated mathematicus- non-est-collega gesture. Perhaps it is needless to say that I do not wish to pass any such value judgnent on either science or history in maintaining that a difference exists between the two. As this claim issues from a formal con- sideration, no valuation can be eXpected to evolve from it. The Referential Ambiguity of "History" The word "history" possesses a referential ambiguity.

It refers, first, to a number of events, and secondly, to a body of knowledge about these events. Thus we may say that hommsen occupied a certain position in the history of mankind, and, on the other hand, that he wrote a history of Rome. Cor- responding to this ambiguity, two branches of philosOphical enquiry have been develOped, one concerning the events that are commonly called historical and the other related to the writings that have been comgosed about these events. The former is called the "material," the latter the "formal" philosOphy of history. With reference to this let us, for the time being, adept the convention of speaking about

"history in the formal sense" and "history in the material sense."1

If the following is asserted: "Charlemagne's victory at Tours is a part of the history of Charlemagne,’ ' we have an instance of "history" in its material sense. On the other hand, "'Charlemagne won the battle of Tours' is a part of a history of Charlemagne" represents an instance of "his- tory" in the formal sense.

Thus if we employ the word in its formal sense and make an assertion "a is a history," this assertion will be similar in kind to "b is a sentence.’ In both cases we are dealing with linguistic entities. The problems that arise from investigations of

sentences and histories will show some similarity: there

will have to be considerations of structure, concern, veri-

fication procedures, and probable truth. In the case of his-

tories, moreover, the interconnection of sentences will have

to be considered, as a history will commonly consist of more

than one sentence.

Much of contemporary EurOpean philosophy is character-

ized through an over-reliance upon the structures and pecul-

iarities of natural languages. In some cases, this inclina-

tion has resulted in obviously erroneous and inconsistent

statements. Especially of Martin Heidegger it is true that the natural language, in his case the German language, is thought to have an unveiling, revealing character. (Entbergungscharacter) Heidegger's Sein und Zeit2 is inter—

spersed with etymological analyses which are to show forth the "actual" meaning of one word or another. Such an approach does not permit the elimination of an ambiguity, as an ambiguity is never thought to be accidental, and be-

cause a language is thought of as conferring some information through any ambiguity. In the present context, the ambiguity of the term "history" will be treated as logically accidental.

How it came to be ambiguous, i.e. the etymological problem does not interest us here.

A brief analysis of Benedetto Croce's philOSOphy of history will best serve to demonstrate the difficulties which arise if the ambiguity in the term "history" is not elimin- ated or if it is taken as intrinsically meaningful. O\

Croce starts his book Geschichte ale Gedanke und Tat} with an attempt to determine the essential characteristics of a historical writing. What is it that makes a piece of liter- ature a history? Croce contends that it is not the style in which it is written,and he continues that not even the greater or lesser abundance and preciseness of the individual data can give a clue to the solution of the problem because:

Ausfuehrlichste und genaueste Sammlungen von Einzelangaben (liegen vor), bei denen sofort zu spueren ist, dass sie nicht Geschichte sind. Anderseits (kennen wir) Werke... von leuchtender historischer Einsicht, aber arm an Tatsachen und sogar von ungenauen, legendaeren oder erdichteten Angaben durchsetzt ...Kompilationen von Tatsachen nennt man Chroniken, Augzeichnungen, Kemoiren, Annalen, aber nicht Geschichtswerke; und selbst wenn sie kritisch gesichted warden, wenn von jeder einzelnen Angabe die Quelle angefuehrt wird oder ein gruendlich ueberprueftes Zeugnis, so koennen sie...nie auf ihrer Egene die Aeusserlichkeit der Quelle und des Zeugnisses ueberwinden...und koennen nie unsere Wahrheit werden, waehrend die Geschichte eine von uns aus unserer innersten Erfahrung geschoepfte Wahrheit erfordert."4

According to Croce, therefore, the correspondence to facts or the arrangement of data do not in any way establish a criterion as to whether a given piece of writing forms a history. A writing, in order to become a history, has to show forth a truth "that comes from our innermost self."

The meaningfulness of the passage quoted evidently depends upon a precise account of this truth. Such an account is not eXplicitly given. However, from the general context in which the quoted passage occurs, it can be Judged that Croce meant some such thing as "vital truth," or a "truth that has prac- tical bearings upon our life."

At this point there arises a peculiar difficulty. A truth, or true statement does not in itself contain a clue which allows us to ascertain its practical importance. Thus it may be of great importance to know a certain fact at a given time, but the same knowledge may be quite inconsequen- tial at another time. According to Croce, a true historical writing would then be a piece of literature that conveys truths which are of vital necessity for its time.

Croce holds that a judgement about a history should be directed toward its historicity, and he defines historicity as:

...ein Akt des Verstehens und der Einsicht..., den ein praktisches Beduerfnis ausloest, welches nicht eher innerlich geloest in die Tat einmuenden kann, bis die Schatten, die Sweifel und die Unklarheiten, gegen die as ankaempft, durch Stellun. und Loesung eines theoretischen Problems beseitigt sind.

Constitutive for a history is therefore the fact that in it be posed a resolved a theoretical problem the solution of which is a practical necessity at the time when the history is composed. Thus, a history acquires its peculiar status through the fact that it is composed in history and has practical bearings upon the latter.

From this it follows obviously that some writing may be a history say, around 1880, but cease to be one in 1920, when it no longer has any bearing upon some practical problem.

It seems that writings other than histories share the characteristics here listed. They are all composed at a cer- tain (historical) time, and it is true of many writings out- side of histories that they have practical bearings of one kind or another, and that a certain number of years later they cease to have such practical consequences. Should then their name be changed or should we resolve the apory by saying that

for the people around 1880 this was a history, but for us it

is a mere piece of literature?

So far there are three possible interpretations of

Croce's theory. One might think that Croce presupposes a

general knowledge of the term "history" on the part of his

readers. Then the passages quoted above are only to give a

criterion for the discrimination of "real" or consequential

historical writings from unimportant ones.

The second possible interpretation would put the em-

phasis on the fact that historical writings are composed in

history and that through this they acquire their peculiar

status. As this is true of all writings, here again a knowl-

edge of what histories are is already presupposed, if not a

discrimination between historical and other writings should

be doomed impossible.

The third possible interpretation would be like the

second with the exception that no knowledge of the meaning

of the term history is thought to be required. In this case

all writings would be historical writings. Surprisingly

enough, Croce eXplicitly confesses his adherence to the third

of the above listed vieWpoints. He holds that all Judgments

are in fact historical judgements. For this he gives two

different reasons. The first has to do with the subject

matter of all possible judgments. As the subject matter that

is contemplated in any judgment has its being in history, the

judgement itself is rendered a historical judgement. If he were to make a judgment about a stone that is lying before his feet, Croce holds, his judgment would in fact be a his- torical judgment, for it would be about a certain period in the stone's history.

Secondly, all judgments are historical, because they take place in a certain place in the judge's history.

Denn tatsaechlich kann kein konkretes Erkennen - ebensowenig wie ein geschicht ~ liches Urteil - davon absehen, dass es an das Leben, also an das Tun gebunden ist, als ein Moment der Unterbrechung oder Erweiterung dieses Tuns.

This hookup with life makes for the historicity of any judgment.

It is obvious that the two arguments listed above are taken from two different areas. If we call a judgment "his- torical" because its subject matter is in history, the term

"historical" is employed in its formal sense. If, on the other hand, a judgment is said to be historical, because the act of judging took place in history, the term "historical" is employed in its material sense. Consequently, the above assertions, if they are true, prove two entirely different things, which are not to be confounded.

It cannot be denied that all acts of judgment do in fact have a historical locus, but if we call a judgment his- torical because it has been made in history, we are asserting a mere pleonasm, and do not in any way contribute to a meth- odology of history.

Moreover, it is not in the nature of a logical or methodological investigation, to determine under which con- dition an assertion was made — this enterprise is up to the 10

sciences of sociology and psychology. In addition, the

assertion that all judgments are historical is not even con-

tributory to these sciences. An acceptance of Croce's theory would lead to the most

awkward consequences. Croce himself writes:

Die Theoretiker oder Wiesenschaftler selber, die ueber die physikalisch - mathematischen und Naturwissenschaften theoretisch denken, bestehen heute darauf, dass auch der Laturwissenschaft der Character einer Geschichte zuerkannt werde.7

The basis on which this assertion rests, namely the

contention that all judgements are historical, confers its

vagueness directly upon this statement about the sciences.

If the sciences are historical because they are in history,

they can be said to coincide,in this respect,with histories

'as well as with all other meaningful and meaningless sen-

tences. The author of this paper does not recognize this as

a sufficient criterion for the assumption that therefore

science and history coincide in all other respects also,

for this is what the above quotation amounhsto. Although

it may well turn out that no criterion can be found through

which to distinguish between writings of scientists and

historians, a criterion will be sought in the structure of

scientific treatises and histories, where the circumstances

of their reapective origin is left out of the question.

It appears that for the sake of clarity one must in- sist that the ambiguity of the term "history" is to be elim-

inated. Croce is only one instance for the confusion that

may arise out of the neglect of this most reasonable demand. 11

In the present approach, the investigation will be altogether divorced from considerations of "history" in the material sense and the usage will be confined to the formal sense of the term.

It will be assumed throughout this paper that events forming a history are not bestowed with certain ontological preperties which make them a history. We shall say rather that events form a history if they are envisaged under a cer- tain viewpoint. This amounts to saying that all events can conceivably be part of one history or another (the term here is taken in its material sense) just as any account of any single event can conceivably form a part of a historical writing. It may appear that this contention coincides with the first of the reasons which Croce lists in order to prove that all judgments are historical judgments. The difference lies in that Croce holds that the stone has a history in and by itself, whereas it is held here that the events of which the stone is a part form a history only if they are envisaged as such. It is the account that is given of them which makes them into a history. Thus we can pose the main problem of this paper as "Under what conditions do events permit that a history be written about them?" The conditions will be looked for not in the events but in the VieWpoint of the observer. Thus the problem can be restated as: "Under what methodological approach do events appear to form a history?"

We translate this sentence into "Under what methodoé logical approach do accounts of events form a history?" 12

In the last sentence "history" is employed in the

formal sense; in the sentence before, it is used in the mater-

ial sense.

If we assume that these two sentences are equivalent

in meaning, then we can disregard the material sense of "history" altogether, in that we can always substitute the

formal sense for it.

Ntominalism and Realism Concerning "PhilOSOphy of History"

In attempting to determine a criterion for the distinc-

tion of historical writings from all other writings, we are

compelled to deal briefly with the question of nominalism versus realism. The problem puts itself in a rather uncommon

context. The question is, should we try to determine the

characteristics of histories by investigation of actual his-

torical writings, or should we try to determine the earmarks of historical treatises a priori through the actual establish-

ment of an organon for history?

In his book, The Problem 3; Historical Knowledge,

Maurice Mandelbaum writes:

An examination of the subject matter of actual histories (which is the sole basis on which we have here a right to generalize) discloses that the his— torian is always interested in human activities...“

It is plain that Mandelbaum, at least in this quotation, adheres to a philos0phical position of extreme nominalism, in his contention that actual histories are the only basis on which a formal philosOphy of history may be based. The con-

sequences of this vieWpoint are highly interesting, for if

there is no criterion through which it can be established 13

a priori whether or not a given piece of writing forms a history, this decision will be up to the author or to pub- lic consent. However, for the public to be able to decide upon this matter, an a priori criterion is again necessary.

If no such criterion is thought to exist, the burden of the decision will be altogether up to the author. Then "history" would have to be defined as anything that has ever been called such by its author.

Speaking in the terms of Ogden and Richards: This is reminiscent of Croce's dictum with regard to the Sublime: 'the Sublime is everything that is or will be so called by those who have employed or shall employ the name.'"9

This consequence leads to the conclusion that with histories as well as with other products of human craft the problem of realism versus nominalism cannot from the begin- ning be decided in favor of philos0phical nominalism.

The writing of a history as well as the manufactur- ing of a technical product is a process which is governed by rules. Both activities have their organon which precedes them and according to which they proceed. One would be involved in‘serious difficulties if one were to attempt to abstract the organon of history from given historical writ- ings, for it is plain that a given history does not have to use all the rules, which the organon provides, nor can the name of a history be denied to a writing which, upon certain occasions, trangresses the boundaries which have been set by the organon of this branch of knowledge. 14

It is true enough that a philosopher in attempting to draw up the rules of the organon of history has to keep his eye on public consent regarding this term, and he has to see that his endevor does not fail to account for actual writings which public consensus has termed histories. At the same time, however, he has the right to include in his organon rules which have never been used, because they follow from assumptions which are agreed upon. On the other hand, the rules of his organon may fail to refer to certain parts of writings which his organon would otherwise identify as his— tories. Thus it must be permitted that the extension of the term history,as established through a nominalist position,will have to be limited in some respects and eXpanded in others.

The only standard which can be given,and according to which this limitation and eXQansion may take place,is that of the consistency of the organon itself.

Thus we are led to something like a midway position between nominalism and realism. On the one hand, there will be no clearcut relation between the rules of historical writ- ing and the historical writings themselves. This relation has to be sacrificed for the sake of the consistency of the rules with each other. From this it follows that the term "history" may or may not precisely refer, depending on whether there is a writing which does not transgress the organon. To state the foregoing sentence at all, we must be able to define the term "history" without making reference to any particular~ history. This definitibn has to read: A history is a 15

number of signs which satisfy the following rules (Follow the

rules). So far the realistic side of the matter. The nomin-

alist, on the other hand, may be satisfied with the notion

that the rules of the organon must not be drawn up in an alto-

gether arbflrary fashion, but that they have to be capable of

reference to at least some parts of any member of the species

history, where the extension of the term "history" (the species)

is at the beginning determined through public consent whereas

later the subsequently created organon redetermines the exten-

sion.

Sgience and History

I have spoken above about the ambiguity of the term "history" which is prevalent in common talk. It appears that a similar ambiguity exists with regard to the term "science."

If we speak of the science of chemistry, we may have in mind

a number of Operations or else a system or statements. Unless

we want to hold that the Operations and the statements are

really the same - which has sometimes been done - we have to

c0pe with this ambiguity somehow. Let us keet this distinc-

tion in mind, as it will have some bearing on the remainder

of this paper.

However, the body of knowledge called history and that

called science are akin to each other in many respects, and

the problem arises as to where to find a distinguishing mark

between history and science - if there should be any differ-

ence at all between the two. In the latter part of the last

'century and the first part of this one the attempt to find a 16 conclusive discrimination between history and the sciences has been the major objective of the philosophers of history.

In appealing to common sense, we see at once that there must be some sort of a difference between the two, as hardly anybody will mistake a history for a scientific treat- ise, but it can at the same time be seen that the question is hardly ever put in this way. The question usually is "What is the difference between science and history?" and the am- biguities in the two remain unexplained. ‘

Traditionally, the arguments put forth in this matter were of two kinds, one stating that the epistemological cate- gories are different in science and history, the other assign- ing different ontological realms to the two branches of knowl- edge. I do not know of any attempt to solve this problem by first eliminating the ambiguity in the term "history," and by a subsequent analysis of the formal characteristics of writings in the two fields that did or did not reveal structural dif- ferences between histories and scientific writings.

It is perhaps the case that the last alternative has never been pursued because of some unwarranted philosOph~ ical hesitation which I hepe to have proved pointless in the section on nominalism and realism. For do we not have to know, it may be argued, which writing is the history and which is the scientific study before we can compare them and sub- sequently describe their respective structures? One should be aware of the fact, however, that this type of circularity is quite frequently encountered, apparently without its lead- ing to inconsistencies. 17

Thus it appears that a comparison between science and history can conceivably follow three different lines: ontol- ogical, epistemological and formal (on a linguistic level).

The arguments from ontology and those from epistemology usually, though not always, occur Jointly, for it is argued that different realms of being necessitate different cate- gories of understanding, where the ontological argument usually has the preponderance. Thus it seems only just that we continue our discussion with the latter.

The Cntologies of Science and History

Collingwood, in his Th§_;g§a 9: History10 criticises the philosOphers of history of the German nee-idealistic school (Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Dilthey) in the follow- ing sentences:

The general problem bequeathed to posterity by the writers I have analysed may be stated by saying that it concerns the distinction between history and natural science, or historical process and natural process. It starts from the positivistic principle that natural science is the only true form of knowl- edge, which implies that all processes are natural processes... The peculiarity of an historical or spiritual process is that since the mind is that which knows itself, the historical process which is the life of the mind is a self-knowing process: a process which understands itself, critizes itself, values itself, and so forth...11

This passage presupposes a dichotomy of the universe, appar- ently following the lines of Descartes' thought. The Cartesian dualism serves as the basis for the methodological distinction between science and history. It seems to me that this part of Descartes' metaohysics has exercised great influence, even in recent years, upon the attempts to characterize the features 18 of historical subject matter. Thus Simnel's account of the object of historical study employs a verbiage which is al- most reminiscent of Descartes'. Simmel writes:

haehrend die Erkenntniskritik im Allgemeinen von der Tatsache ausgeht, dass das Erkennen eine VorsteLlung und sein Subjekt eine Seele ist, had die Kritik des historischen Erkennens die zusaetzliche Eigenschaft, dass ihre Objekte gleichfalls aus Vorstellungen, Wollungen und Gefuehlen von Personen bestehen, dass ihre Objekte See an sind.

However, much resemblance to Descartes there may be, the fact is that the definition of the subject matter of history given above has been develOped by Vice in criticism of Descartes' theory of knowledge. Vico criticised Descartes' notion of the clear and distinct ideas on very much the same grounds as later on David Hume: that belief is nothing but the vivacity of our perceptions. According to Vico, an idea, however false, may convince us on grounds of its seeming self-evidence. Thus Vico proceeds to define the necessary limits of human knowledge. The principle found by him is that "verum and factum convertuntur." In order for an ob—

ject to be prOperly understood, it has to be man made, and consequently, all of nature is intelligible only to God.

Thus man is confined to the study of human affairs, and the postulate follows that the preper object of study for man is man himself.

Vico's argument is, of course, of an epistemological nature, but it can easily be shown that it proceeds along the lines of Gartesian ontology. for nature is conceived as consisting of purely extended mechanisms created by God, while on the other hand, we have human intelligence, or 19

created spirits which Vico believes to constitute and create

the sjhere of history. Hence we have the Cartesian dualism

right in the core of Vico's philosophy of history, and it

turns out that his polemic asainst Descartes concerned matters

of epistemology only. The point of divergence between the two

thinkers was the problem of the degree to which the cosmolog-

ical spheres are accessible to human understanding.

Vico was the main channel through which the dualistic

ontology found ingress into the philosOphy of history. He

was held in high esteem by Croce, Collingwood, Troeltsch and

others, and it is after his fashion that we find history de-

fined in many a recent book on the subject. Thus Collingwook

writes:

There can be no history of nature... The only condition on which there could be a history of nature is that the events of nature are actions on the part of some thinking being or beings, and that by studying these actions we could discover what were the thoughts which they exoressed and think these thought: which they eXpressed and think these thoughts for our- selves.13

The concept develOped above meets with a rather severe dif-

ficulty when the history of a society is to be discussed.

The Sophists already knew that so many individual sheep do not make a flock, for with the merging of the sheep into a

flock a society of relations comes into existence which was not realized as long as the sheep were by themselves. The

same holds true for any humaisociety. The problem is whether

such a society can be made the subject of a historical study; for while the spiritual existence of the members is estab-

lished by postulate, the group as a whole does not have 2O spiritual existence other than as exhibited by its mem- bers.

Xost philosoChers did not conceive of the problem that lies here. Simmel, however, does have an answer.

He writes:

Wie dem obigen gemaess die individuelle Seele, so wird hier die - kurz gesagt - Sozialseele von vornherein als eine derart einheitliche vorausgestzt.ll

It seems that Simmel's point of view is the only pos- sible one which is consistent with the general theory exoli- cated in this section. At the same time, however, it exhibits quite clearly the weakness which lies in the system as a whole; for doubtlessly, the group soul would have to fall before Occam's razor.

Aside from the problem of the group soul, there are a number of other points which can be offered in criticism of the ontological approach.

1. The common consent concerning the extension of the term "history" does not preclude the formulation of a phrase like "history of the universe." On the other hand, the right to redefine the term cannot be denied to the philosOpher. The point in criticism is here that the re- definition of the term "history” issues in a rather inconven- ient convention. It should be made a rule that definitions are not to be made in an altogether arbitrary fashion. In defining the term history as denoting the body of knowledge concerning human affairs, the term is made to refer to part of what is commonly called history and to part of science; for psychology, sociology and other sciences of human affairs 21

would belong to history, whereas the histories of non-human

things would be excluded. My criticism is directed against the inexpediency of such a definition. This criticism is of a pragmatic nature and constitutes the weakest argument against the ontological approach.

2. The ontological argument is altogether too remote from the precinct of fact finding and evaluating to consti- tute a valid ground for the discrimination of science and history. It can easily be shown that an additional assump- tion is needed to make a dualistic ontology applicable for the intended purpose. Let it be acknowledged that statements of fact can be verified only if they are about physical hap- penings. How are we then to discriminate between facts that are manifestations of psychic processes and those that are not? Even if a dualistic ontology is adooted, an additional principle is needed through which members of the respective classes or beings can be recognized and discriminated. It could, for instance, be asserted that physical facts inas- much as they are manifestations of psychic events, are to be ordered teleologically, whereas all others are to be envis- aged as though they were causally related. It is plain, however, that if such a formal principle is introduced, reasoning does not start with the ascertainment that such and such a fact is of psychical nature and then eXplains the fact in a teleological manner. The direction is the

Opposite. Because a number of facts can be ordered as though they form a teleological chain, it may be asserted that they are of psychical nature. Thus it turns out that a decision 22 whether a given fact belongs in the realm of mind or in that of matter, can be made only after a certain method has been develOped. It would, therefore, be more correct to assert that all facts that can be treated after the method of his-

tory belong to the precinct of spirit, those that can be treated scientifically belong to matter. In (0 tating this, it becomes at once clear how inconsistent the results of the ontological argument are with common usage. Furthermore, no clue is given as to what the respective methods of science and history actually are.

3. Apart from the question whether or not a dualistic ontology can be applied to discriminate science from history, we may now raise the question whether it is permissible to classify the sciences with respect to the objects that they investigate. It is quite evident that this cannot be done, as one and the same object can be made subject of inquiry by various branch 3 of science. Thus for instance a plant can be made subject to a physical, chemical or biological in- vestigation. The real grounflupon which these sciences can be differentiated lies in the question which they ask and not in the nature or character of their objects?

4. It can be shown that the dualistic ontology found entrance into the theory of history through a fallacious epistemological argument. Let us reconsider Collingwood's statement that was quoted above. Collingwood said:

...It starts from the positivistic principle that science is the only true form of knowledge, which implies that all processes are natural processes.1 23

It can be told from the remainder of Collingwood's work, that the dependent clause contained in the above statement is supoosed to be a valid conclusion from a fallacious premise. Thus, "all processes are natural processes" is not part of the positivistic principle, but does, according to Collingwood, follow from it. This being granted, the above statement turns out to be an enthymeme, where the main premise has been omitted. This premise would have to read: "To all forms of knowledge there corresponds a type of proc- ess in reality."

As this premise is vague, there is a choice of sev- eral interpretations of it. If "forms of knowledge" is meant to refer to analytic and synthetic knowledge, the premise is false; for no process at all corresponds to analytic knowledge. Secondly, if "forms of knowledge" is to refer to the branches of science, the argument is like- wise false, for one and the same process can be investigated by use of different methodologies, as I pointed out above.

Finally, if "forms of knowledge" is to mean "scientific knowledge and historical knowledge," the premise is also false. For both, scientific systems and histories do have to proceed from statements of fact, and it is easily conceiv- able that the same statement of fact that forms part of a history can also appear in a scientific treatise on the same linguistic level, i.e. as a statement of fact. This point will be dealt with in greater detail later on. For now it may suffice to remark that if the same statement can appear 24

in history and in science, then the fact to which it refers

cannot be,at the same time.a member of a natural and a his- torical process. This amounts to saying that even though history and science may be termed different forms of knowl- edge, this does not furnish a sufficient reason for suppos- ing that two different types of process have to correspond to them in reality. Thus the mere existence of different forms of knowledge does not warrant the assumption of a dualistic universe.

5. As we have seen above, Collingwood's redefinition of "history" is a rather far reaching distortion of common usage. If we now, for the time being, adopt the dualistic ontology and grant that to each of the "substances" corres- ponds a form of knowledge, we are still confronted with the problem as to where to classify psychology and related sciences. As regards their method, those sciences are more closely related to physics than to history. As regards their subject matter they would, according to the vieWQoint treated in this section, belong in the same category with history, or form a part of it. It is precisely this point that has been attacked by Wilhelm Hinddband in his famous inaugural address at the University of Heidelberg in 1894.16

If all organized knowledge is to be divided into Naturwissen- schaften and Geisteswissenschaften, he says then the position of psychology is altoghether questionable. Windelband ques- tioned this whole scheme of classification, but our point is that even though we grant it, we still need an additional 25

principle to distinguish psychology from history, for other- wise they fall into the same precinct.

6. Lastly, I wish to quote Heinrich Rickert as an authority on the subject who has devoted much consideration to the point here in question. He says:

Zwei Gruopen von ijecten, die sich mit Ruecksicht auf die Art ihres Seine, d.h. in der Weiss wie Hoerper und Seele von einander unter- scheiden, sind fuer die Gliederuns der fiissen- schaften gar nicht zu finden, weil es, wenigstens in der unmittelbar zugaenglichen Welt, nichts giebtl, das einer Untersuchung von der formalen Eigenart wie die Naturwissenschaft s e fuehrt, prinzipiell entzogen werden duerfte.

Rickert holds, that a formal distinction must be found between science and history as the only feasible solution

of the problem of the classification of both.

History and Epistemology: Preliminaries

Not without hesitation did I include the following

section in this chapter on epistemology, it has to do with

the logic of explanation and should therefore appear within a section on logic. PhilosOphers of history, however, have unfortunately very seldom concerned themselves with the universal logical features of scientific and historical eXplanation. What has constantly escaped the attention of those philOSOphers is the fact that for an eXplanation to be valid it is not sufficient that certain fact finding pro- gggugeg should be obeyed, but also that such an eXplanation should have a certain logical form. The neglect of dis- cussing these logical forms has resulted in much fruitless 26

speculation concerning the validation of historical eXplana- tion, where the term "explanation" remained unclear.

Carl G. Hempel in his article The Functions 2f Gen- eral Laws in History18 gives an adequate account of the point here under consideration. He points out that in order to give an eXplanation for the occurrence of the event E,the following set of statements has to be compiled:

(l) a set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events Cl'°’Cn at certain times and places,

(2) a set of universal hypotheses,

such that

(a) the statements of both groups are reason- ably well confirmed by empirical evidence,

(b) from the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurrence of event b ‘1 can be logically deduced.19

An explanation of the event E would then consist in listing theinitial conditions Cl...Cn for the occurrence of E and also the law under which E would probably follow from these conditions.

It is very telling to observe on which grounds this schema of an explanation has been attacked by philosOphers of history. Most of their discomfort has issued from men- tioning the term "general law" or "universal hypothesis."

Thus W. H. Walsh in his £2 introduction to Philosooh g:

History2anids these terms and replaces them by "general knowledge" and similar eXpressions. Then he asks himself

What kind of general knowledge a historian should have and 27

comes forth with the answer that a historian should have some general knowledge of "human nature." After he has done this, he declares that the oositivists do not believe in such general general knowledge, but that they are of the opinion that a historian should have general knowledge appropriate to the field which he investigates, thus if someone attempts to write the history of an economic system, he must have general knowledge of economics. According to Walsh, the positivists hold that a historian must consult individual scientists in order to gain the particular general knowledge connected with his subject in order to be able to give his- torical eXglanations. But, this View is evidently mistaken, he says, for

...there are plenty of competent historians, -en whose judggent of particular historical situations can be trusted, who are largely ignorant of those sciences, their methods and results.‘

According to Walsh, this is largely due to the fact that these historians had sound knowledge of huwan nature. He continues that it might be said that this knowledge is acquired by common exgerience, but this clearly "falls short of the truth: genius is wanted too."22

Though the average historian can fulfill his function adequately enough with qualities amount- ing to no more than those of common sense, it can surely be argued that something like genius is required for really telling work in this field too.43

It is as remarkable as it is discouraging to see how the question of the logical structure of eXplanations has been taken out of its natural context and has been connected with epistemological problems which it was not meant to deal with. 28

Walsh's account is not only a misrepresentation of the posi- tivist theory, but it also reflects a gross misunderstanding of the nature of formal enquiry in general. Hempel in his article leaves no doubt that valid explanations can be given 1 without the explainer being aware of the explanatory schema ‘ that he follows. As a matter of fact, this has been done by many a scientist during the last several hundred years. L ke- wise there can be no doubt that explanations with an invalid generalization or with a suppressed part could still not be denied this name, although they would have to be called false or incomplete. It can also be the case that an explanation is given without the historian being aware of the universal hypothesis which he employs or even without the historian knowing that he tacitly assumes such an universal hypothesis. Such an explanation may still be considered a "good" one if the reader makes the same assumptions concerning the univ- ersal hypothesis. But while a good history may be produced, even though the historian made tacit assumptions of this type and even though he did not know that he made them, the philos-

Opher is not justified to believe certain epistemological faculties at work which enable the historian to write a his- tory in such a way. This, however, is exactly what Walsh did.

It is an obvious misunderstanding of the nature of logical assertions to assume that a logical argument can be disproved by making reference to historians who did not try to engage in investigations to substantiate the generalizations which they did not know they were employing. 29

It seemed advisable to engage in this consideration of

the logical form of eXplanations, as this preliminary dis-

cussion will enable us to understand the significance of the

various theories concerning historical understand.

History and Epistemology I.

Several different kinds of epistemological problems

have been conceived as being connected with history. The

variety of theories, however, which I prOpose to treat under

this heading, is partly due to the fact that I here treat the term "epistemology" in a relatively unrestricted manner.

There will be no attempt to give a precise definition of the

term, as it suffices to state with clarity the problems here

accumulated under this heading.

The first problem with which I wish to dea, is commonly known by the name "the problem of 'Verstehen' or 'emphathic-

understanding'." Since Vico, there have always been schools

of thought which regarded empathic understanding as the method

of fact finding specifically connected with history. His-

torically, this theory has its origin in Vico's dictum that "ggggm g; factum convertuntur," i.e. in order to gain an "insight" into a state of affairs, one has to be able to re-

construct the motives behind it, which, according to Vico,

is possible only if those motives can be associated to one's

own possible motivations. However, while Vico attempted to

limit the possible field of knowledge to human affairs, dis- regarding the facts of nature as essentially unintelligible, his followers did not associate themselves with so rigid a 30

claim and allowed for the possibility of valid scientific knowledge.

As to the method of empathic understanding it must be said that it is a specific way of conjecturing unknown causes - or motives - from known results. It is to produce an answer to a question of the form "Why did X occur?". If this question is thought to be answerable through a state- ment which refers to a testable fact, then the scheme of ex- planation has to contain reference to a general law - as I have pointed out above. It is at this point tlaat disagree- ment arises between the adherents of the method of emphathic understanding themselves. While some of them deny the exis- tence of general laws in the field of historical enquiry, others hold that there are such laws and that the method of empathic understanding is used for the subsumption of a given event under such a general law. In the following, I wish to deal with each of these positions separately.

Let the first group be represented by Herder. He writes in his "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur

Eildung der Rbnschheit:

Ganze Natur der Seele...um diese mitzufuehlen, antworte nicht aus dem Worte, sondern gehe in das Zeitalter, in die Himmelsgegend, die ganze ’ Geschichte, fuehle dich in alles hinein - nin allein bist du auf dem Wege das Wort zu verstehen.24 and

Wer bemerkt hat, was es fuer eine unaussprech-, liche Sache mit der Eigenheit eines Kenschen sei. These quotations are remarkable in two different respects.

They reflect Herder's attempt to conjecture from the outward 31

manifestations the state of mind that is behind them by "giv- ing up" his contemporary frame of reference and "feeling him-

self into" the object under consideration. Such a process is,

in turn.characterized by the fact that its results are not

communicable. Therefore, he; urgasthat the reader should .

imitate his contemplation of those foreign places in order

to understand the "mere shadow of a word" which is the out-

come of his investigations. Herder, it seems, was perfectly

aware of the fact that,in employing his method of "empathic understanding? he would at the same time violate the linguis-

tic universe which is the presupposition for all communication.

To assert that a past event is unique and different from all

others beyond comparison is to give up all hepe of ever

speaking about it significantly.

herder, of course, was largely unaware of the role of

language in history or science. To him,it was not a fallacy

that a history should be incommunicahle, but a fate that all histories have to share.

It would be a gross mistake to think of Herder's posi- tion as an isolated historical one. In this case it would have been hardly worth my while to treat it here. Mr. Pitt in his article on ggmological EKplanatioo i2 History26 quotes

P. Gardiner's Opinion on the subject. Gardiner writes:

Louis XIV died unpOpular...having caused France to lose...the incomparable position s-e had gained by the policy of the cardinals...

The positivist interpretationwould be that Louis XIV represented a case of the law 'Rulers are unpOQu- lar whenever their policies prove detrimental to the 32

fortunes of their countries,’ and that the explanation in question was deduced from this law taken together with the circumstances of the case.

But as an historian I would feel uneasy if it were suggested to me that my statement 'Louis XIV was unpOpular because his policy was detrimental to France,’ represented a confirmatory instance of an historical or sociological law... It is because I do not regard Louis unpOpularity as being a case of any general hypothesis at all. I regard it as the outcome of a particular complex of fac- tors, a complex which included Louis' expansionist foreign policy, and his wars, his heavy taxation, his court policy... What in fact is historically important is to bring to light the nature of the connection which existed between Louis' policy and his unpopularity and this is principally a matter of analyzing in detail the particular case before me.

It seems to me that P. Gardiner is to be classed together with Herder, although he does not explicitly adhere to a theory of empathic understanding. The reason for this lies in that Gardiner seems to rely for his historical explana- tions upon a faculty of insight which he is not able to characterize in any detail. He writes that it is historic- ally important to bring to light the "nature 2: the connection whigh existed between Louis' pplicy and his unpooularity."

Now, any eXplanation of this connection will have to make reference to some general law or another, but, as M . Pitt points out, this law does not have to have the form in which it is cited by Gardiner.28 In this particular example, as "unpOpularity" refers to a statistical event, a host of laws would have to be employed to eXplain the fact. About these laws we have to say only that they are not to be thought of as being imposed upon the state of affairs in question, but that an explanation is always plausible preportional to the 33 degree of belief that has been reached with regard to the general law which is employed here.

As Gardiner explicitly rejects such a notion, he must be regarded as believing in some other faculty of insight which I shall, for lack of power to discriminate, classify with Herder's empathic understanding. The charges which I brought against Herder will consequently have to be repeated with regard to Gardiner's theory.

fiistory apd Epistemology II.

In the previous section we discussed a theory which meant to find the determining feature of historical investi- gation in a historian's obligation to "feel himself into" an event and in his capability of eXplaining such an event in statements which are apprOpriate exclusively for the particu- lar event in question. The point to be discussed now is closely related to the one in the last section insofar as here again a theory of empathic understanding will be inves- tigated, one, however, which does not ask the historian to abstract from his own experiences.

In this theory.it is acknowledged that historical ex- planation has to take into account general laws or notions of lawful connections, but on the other hand it is held here that the lawful connections which are assumed by the histor- ian evade systematization and proof to such an extent that it may occur that two historians who are supplied with identically the same information can Justifiably arrive at 34 entirely different explanations. From this,issues the claim that every generation has to write its own history.

It cannot be denied that historians do,in fact,differ from one another in such a way; but our task is not to sub- stantiate or explain this fact; but rather to investigate if,and to what extent,these disagreements are essential to histories. Is it this fact which makes for the difference between histories and science?

Before we enter into the discussion of this point it remains to be mentioned that an inconsistency between two different eXplanations of the same facts hardly ever remains undisputed among historians. Thus, while historians attempt to eliminate such inconsistencies through further and more acute explanations, the phiIOSOphers,whom I have in mind, here regard the same inconsistencies as uneliminable and even regard their existence as a defining characteristic of his- tories. The only requirement here made.is that an explana- tion should be adequate, where the degree of adequacy is dependent upon the degree of empathic understanding of which the historian is capable. It can easily be understood that such a weak criterion should be a matter of considerable dispute, especially as it would deny to history the same claim to truth that the sciences have so successfully estab- lished for themselves.

Epistemologically, the theory here discussed is of interest as it brings with it a new status of the g priori, as we shall presently see. The best way to lead into this discussion, it seems to me, is a brief consideration of the 35

Kantian doctrine of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. Kant writes:

Indessen darf man von diesen Begriffen, wie von allem Erkenntnis wo nicht das Erinzipium ihrer Moeglichkeit doch die Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer Erzeugung in der Erfahrung aufsuchen, wo alsdann die Eindrucke der Sinne den ersten Anlass geben, die ganze Erkenntniskraft in Ansehung ihrer zu eroeffnen und Erfahrung zustande zu bringen...Ein solches Nachspueren der ersten Bestrebungen unserer Erkenntniskraft, um von einzelnen Wahrnehmungen zu allgemeinen Begriffen aufzusteigen, hat ohne Zweifel einen grossen Nutzen.2

Apparently, Kant contends that the concepts of space and time as well as the categories are not innate such that they are already existent at the first conscious contact with reality. He rather holds that they originate upon such occasions and that these contacts with reality are the

"Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer Erzeugung." An investigation of these occasions, however, will not result in a demon- stration of the universality and necessity of those concepts.

Their use can be Justified only through a transcendental enquiry. Thus Kant continues

Allein eine Deduktion der reinen Begriffe a priori kommt dadurch niemals zustande, denn sie liegt ganz und gar nicht auf diesem wege, weil in Anschauung ihres Kuenftigen Gebrauchs...sie einen ganz anderen Geburtsbrief als den der Abstammung von Erfahrungen muessen aufzuzeigen Kaben.

Diese versuchte physiologische Ableitung, die eigentlich gar nicht Deduktion heissen kann, weil sie eine ouaestionem facti betrifft, will ich daher die Erklaerung des Besitzes einer reinen Erkenntnis nennen.

The use to which these concepts are to be put, and in view of which they demand their Justification is the coordination of the raw material of eXperience. 36

It has been claimed, every so often, that the cate- gories listed by Kant, can only serve for the Justification of scientific knowledge, but do not have any explanatory force with regard to historical eXperience. Thus Dilthey,

Troeltsch and Simmel attempted to supplement the Kantian critique of knowledge in such a way that it would cover also historical knowledge. They strove for a "Critique of His- torical Reason." It must be understood that they did not consider the Kantian account incomplete or fallacious for general epistemological reasons (as for instance Peirce did), but they considered it unsatisfactory as an account of the epistemological problems of history. What was their reason for supposing this?

First of all, it must be noted that it was not the number and kind of the categories that were questioned, but it was the way in which they were deduced, and the fact that they were thought to be unalterable. For if the categories were unalterable and universally and necessarily valid,andg if they were to rule over Ell experience, then one of two contradicting histories would be false, and no one can argue that each was true for its own time.

The problem which arises here cannot be solved through a critical or transcendental investigation; for those would, by virtue of their very nature, lead to cate- gories independent of empirical change. Thus, in order to

Justify the doctrine of changing validity, one has to take 37

recourse to a generic or historical investigation. Thus

Troeltsch says:

So muss denn Jede historisch denkende Zeit von ihrem Standort aus die Sinneinheit des Ganzen als ihren eigenen Standort einschliessend oder auf ihn abziehlend deuten.31

and

Das Verstaendnis der Gegenwart aus ihrem Gewordensein, die Uebersicht ueber die noch erreichbare und in ihrem Gesamtzusammenhang verstandene Erfahrung der Gattung oder doch wenigatens unseres Kulturkreises und Volkes, die daraus erwachsende historische Erziehung unseres Denkens und die durch sie zu gewin- nenden Richtlinien fuer die Zukunft: das ist der Sinn der Historie.32

In speaking here of the "historical education of our thinking," Troeltsch takes an altogether different course than Kant did, for it is now the "Gelegenheitsursachen,"

the occasions which plan a decisive role not only for the

realization,but also for the character of the categories of understanding.

In order to understand more clearly the view that is discussed here, it is perhaps helpful to consider for a minute the use to which the term "g priori" is put by Simmel and Rickert,in distinction from the manner in which Kant employed it. For Kant.all prOpositions were g priori that did not depend for their validity upon any experience of whatever kind. Some of those g priori propositions are, according to Kant, of especial importance for the fact that they condition our eXperience. His reasoning was, that if

there is anything at all that is essential to all experience, then it must also be logically prior to any experience. For Simmel and Troeltsch, on the other hand, the meaning of "g priori" has been narrowed down to "that which conditions our experience." Hence Simmel and Rickert do not assert that the conditions for all eXperience are g priori Judgments,but, rather,that "g priori" refers to all conditions of any ex- perience. Thus we find Simmel make the assertion that it has become more and more obvious that many g prioris are

Open to empirical investigation, and very few are not. He did not see, however, that this seeming advance in philoso- phical insight was a mere redefinition of the term "a priori."33

Troeltsch frequently makesassertions of a similar sort, but he raises the significance of his theory considerably in his statement that: In Jedem anerkannten Apriori bleibt ein Stueck hagnis und Tat, ein Ergreifen des sich als notwendige Vernunft darbietenden Gedankens durch einen Willen, der es daraufhin wagt, die erfahrung nach diesem Gedanken zu ordnen und zu beurteilen. Sein endgueltiges Recht entscheidet erst die Leistung, die so zustande kommt.3

In order to interpret this passage, we must first gain some more clarity concerning the role of the g priori with Simmel and Rickert,and its relation to historical eXplanation.

I mentioned above,that,for any historical or scientific explanation.it is necessary that a general law be employed.

It is understood that in practical historical research. these general laws are frequently present only as vague notions, uncritically derived from previous eXperience.

There is a very definite sense in which it can be asserted that these general laws, whether clearly perceived or only 39 unconsciously employed, are pgigg to the eXplanation in which they serve - either Openly stated or tacitly assumed. Inas- much as general laws are uncritically admitted into eXplana- tory schemes, one can say that any generalization that a person happens to entertain may form the g oriori for some explanation that he gives. But even critically checked gen- eralizations as used in explanations are only probably, and thus the adaptation of any g priori involves a risk.

Troeltsch asserts that the g priori is Justified through "the accomplishment which issues from it." Had he asserted that the g priori is Justified to the extent to which it is sub- mitted to test, he would have stayed within the boundaries of an epistemological discussion. The reference to accom- plishment, however, tries to make a question of validity into a question Of usefulness.

As I have stated above, it was a prevailing conviction of this German School that the problem Of scientific knowl- edge was solved through Kant's Critique 2: Pure Reason, while theirs was the task of considering the foundations of historical research. If we now consider Troeltsch's last statement as relating only to history and not to a prioris in general, then it becomes at once evident how close his stand- point is connected in some respects with that of Benedetto

Croce, for here again it is thought that a piece of writ- ing should bear results for it to attain the character of a history.

It is not difficult to understand that Simmel and

Troeltsch found the critical approach suitable for a theory 40

Of scientific understanding, while they attempted to solve

the problem Of historical knowledge through the generic ‘ficpprcach: the constancy of the standards of validity in the

sciences defies any attempt to make them subject to histor-

ical relativism in the same way in which this can be done

with histories. Therefore, Troeltsch contends, the criti-

cal enterprise is Justified with respect to scientific under-

standing, whereas the generic question retains its import—

ance as regards historical reasoning.

There are a number of points that can be offered in

criticism of this theory. For one thing, the task which was

set for this epistemological theory, namely the discrimina-

tion Of histories and pieces of science, was not and cannot

be achieved through an epistemological enquiry of the kind

outlined above. For it does not allow one to discriminate between histories and scientific writings other than through

awaiting a possible change in the standards of validity

with respect to a writing under investigation. Any undis-

puted accumulation of cognitive sentences would have the

tentative status of a science. While on the other hand,

a branch of science in which occurs an inconsistency between

two different explanations would have the tentative status

of a history, for it is not clear at all, whether,or not,

one of the explanations is apprOpriate for one generation

and the other one for the next generation, or whether one,

or both.are simply false.

A reason for this awkward result seems to be that

Troeltsch and Simmel never arrimaiat an adeduate and clear 41 definition Of the term "g priori." From the context Of their writings, it seems evident that something like a group of universal hypotheses was intended whenever they used this term in connection with historical understanding. Once one of the two equations "g priori" - df "universal hypothesis" or "g priori" 3 df "group of universal hypotheses" is granted validity, the untenability of Simmel's and Troeltsch's posi- tion becomes evident. For now the only epistemological dif- ficulty with regard to histories would consist in ascertain- ing the tacitly assumed universal hypotheses in actual his- torical writings, while it can be demanded that for all future histories such assumptions should be avoided. Or else, if such a demand should be deemed undesirable, one should at least abstain from posing unnecessary epistimological prob- lems, or from bestowing the historian'with some mysterious power Of insight. In other words, histories are usually wanting in clarity of explanation; and this is the only \. difference between history and science that an epistimolog- ical enquiry like Simmel's or Troeltsch's can reveal. .

The second point of criticism can be stated only in anticipation of a terminology to be introduced later. I shall later state that both science and history proceed from statements of fact, and that they have their reduction basis in those statements. Furthermore, I shall assert that one and the same statement may appear in both a history and a scientific writing. This will be held true not only of statehents Of fact, but also of generalizations and conse- quently of explanations. Thus, a bifurcation of the 42

universe on general epistemological grounds will be held

unJustified. From this,it would follow that the case for

historical relativism cannot be established by proceeding

from the statements Of fact or their explanation, but per-

haps through the valuations which are connected with them.

Thirdly, as the g prioris which are present in any

historical explanation are thought to be dependent upon the

cultural environment Of the historian there will always be

facts that come to his knowledge for which his historical

categories are unsuitable. Thus, Troeltsch might argue that

a history Of Egypt cannot be written by a contemporary, be-

cause his cultural setting will not permit him to understand

the Egyptians. From this notion issues the general demand

that a historian should confine his research:: to his own

cultural circle, i.e. to peOple that he might be able to

understand. If the historian transcends the boundaries of

his culture, Troeltsch holds, he will not be able to unite

the scattered pieces of information which he might be able

to Obtain into a meaningful unity. He says:

Eine Sinneinheit koatinuierlicher Entwicklung Kann nur vom Standort des Betrachters und das heisst fuer den Umfang des ihn umschliessenden, in tatsaechlicher Folge und Wirkung zusammen- haengenden Kulturkreises konstruiert werden.35

There is no reason at all to believe that the difficulties with which the historian is confronted when he contemplates

events outside of his own cultural setting are in any way

theoretically insurmountable. It seems more sensible to say

that these difficulties issue either from a lack of informa- tion (and connected with it a difficulty in arriving at 43 generalizations and eXplanations).or else from a very low degree of credibility,with regard to the available infor- mation.

It must be mentioned in favor of Troeltsch that he attempted to overcome the historical relativism outlined above, and we find him also making statements like the fol- lowing:

Der Ausgangspunkt fur die Logik der Geschichte kann...nicht die Psychologie, sondern nur das erkenntnistheoretische SubJekt und das in ihm eingeschlossene log- ische a priori sein.36

Perhaps it is needless to say that in Troeltsch we find also the notion of the dualistic universe as outlined in the chapter on ontology. However, the consequences that

Troeltsch draws are quite unlike those of Collingwood, which may be due to the difference of origin that their respective dualisms had. For Troeltsch, for instance, something like the history of the universe is possible. He states his

Justification for this as follows:

Alle Erkenntnistheorie und mit ihr alle philOSOphische Begriffsbildung geht nicht vom erfahrbaren und der Erkenntniswelt angehoerigen psychologischen, menschlichpersoenlichen SubJekt, sondern von dem mit ihm verbundenen, aber begrif- flich abtrennbaren unpersoenlichen Bewusstsein ueberhaupt aus, fuer das die Welt war, und fuer das sie sein wird, wenn es gestorben sein wird, und das wir immer hinzudenken, wenn wir vcn einer Geschichte der Erde oder des Sonnensystems Sprechen, such in Zeiten wo kein menschliches Wesen existiert hat.37

This quotation, Of course, contradicts the earlier one in which the empirical subJect was said to be concerned with 44

the historical understanding. But aside from this,it is

interesting to note through what difficulties Troeltsch has

to go in order to make such a phrase as "history Of the universe" consistent with his system. He has to postulate

a supreme consciousness - an almost Berkeleian thought.

History and Epistemology III Cassirer, in his Egggy 2g Egg,writes that "ideal recon-

struction, not empirical Observation,is the first step in historical knowledge."38

While the two former epistemological theories could be

discussed without making reference to the pastness of the

subJect matter, it is necessary now,to take this into con-

sideration. It is Cassirer's contention that history and

science are differentiated through the fact that science

rests on Observation.whereas history comes about through

the interpretation of symbols. Symbols are the sole source-

of historical knowledge, it is held, due to the fact that

the events which they denote cannot be re-enacted. It seems

to be a good representation Of Cassirer's vieWpoint to say

that there are other branches of enquiry which are concerned

with symbols and still others which are concerned with the

'past, but it is the distinguishing mark of histories that in

their case both these conditions must be fulfilled.

Cassirer's vieWpoint is of especial importance as he

explicitly states that only through this epistemological

approach can histories be distinguished from scientific

treatises. He writes: 45

Most writers looked for the difference between history and science in the lggig, not in the object of history. They took the greatest pains in con- structing a new lOgic Of history. But all these attempts were doomed to failure... Historical and scientific thought are distinguishable not by their logical form but by their ObJectives and subJect matter.39

It is not too difficult, however, to show that the con- ditions stated by Cassirer are not sufficient in order to discriminate between science and history. It is not unusual that the scientist,as well as the historian.has, upon occasions,

to interpret accounts of the facts that have come down to his time - descriptions of the stellar constellations in Greek poetry, accounts of vulcano eruptions, and so forth. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that "He connects the present with the past by following backward the chain of causes and effects."40 It may be argued that a science becomes a history to the extent that accounts Of facts,rather than facts,are treated; but violence will be done to the common notion of "science" as well as to the most restrictive definition of this term if it is not permitted to include in the class of

Observation - statements, a statement concerning a past and not reproducable event. This would certainly be true for

sociology, but also for astromony and geology. Incidentally,

Cassirer lists the latter as an example for a field of en- quiry in which records Of events are supposedly not admitted as establishing evidence.

On the other hand, I cannot see any reason for deny- ing to a biography which is founded on direct Observation and written in a day by day fashion the names of a history. 46

Equally, this name could not be denied to Thukydides'

"Peloponnesian War."

It must be noted that Cassirer's position, as far as it is here described, does not allow a criticism on general metaphysical or epistemological grounds. He cannot be charged with having introduced a general dualism of the ontological or epistemological kind, as the above mentioned philos0phers did. It seems more apprOpriate that a criticism should,in this case.proceed from pragmatic considerations.

One can say that in his essay, he has given a con- textual definition Of the term "history." This definition, however, does not allow for the term to be used in contexts in which it commonly occurs, such as "history of the univ- erse," "history of mankind" (if the latter is thought to include also prehistoric times). On the other hand,

Cassirer's account makes the term rather well fit for a description Of the activities that are commonly going on in history departments. Now, it is everybody's right to define as he pleases. If, however, a classification is to be as. chieved through a definition, then it is well to consider the advantages and disadvantages of such an Operation. I shall later attempt to show that "history" can be defined in a more useful manner. The description that I shall give later purports to depict a more comprehensive but also more rigidly bounded complex of knowledge which I shall term "history." The definition to be given will also have the advantage of greater conformity with common usage. 47

Thus the criticism of Cassirer's theory, aside from the points that I made above, will be given through the con-

structive part of this paper.

For the argument's sake,I have,up to this point,

suppressed one part of Cassirer's theory, and have treated

only that part which fitted into the general course Of the discussion. In addition, Cassirer entertained some notions which move him in close neighborhood to the German school and to Collingwood. Cassirer says, for instance, that the historian

...infuses into his concepts and words his own inner feelings and thus gives them a new sound 4 and a new color - the color of a personal life. 1 and

-.-history cin live and breathe only in the human world. 2

Both of these quotations testify quite obviously to the fact that Cassirer wished to limit the subJect matter of history to human affairs, that is to say that the term "history" in the last quotation is used in its material,rather than in its formal,sense; for otherwise the dictum that history can live only in a human world would amount to saying that history is remarkable for the fact that it is not written by animals or stones.

History and Value Under this heading I prOpose to treat some attempts to articulate the meaning of "history" through reference to value Judgements which supposedly occur in the historical enterprise. The approaches to the problems of history which 48

have been dealt with above are characterized through the

fact that they attempted to describe the process Of histori-

cal enquiry by limiting the range Of "history" to human

affairs where all epistemological elaborations appear to be nothing but an ex post facto Justification of this limitation.

In Heinrich Rickert, we find this process reversed. Rickert

claims that histories deal with the world in an individual-

izing manner, 1. e. they describe facts, while the sciences

attempt to make generalizing statements about the world.

(We shall deal with this part of his theory at a later stage.)

From this position, he argues that a historian does not have

any inducement to deal with a part of the world historically, unless the subjects treated, somehow express valuations which are in some way or other related to his own valuations. This limits, in Rickert's Opinion, the range Of historical en- quiry to human affairs. He says:

dass...wir nur dann Veranlassung haben, eine Wirklichkeit individualisierend oder historisch darzustellen, wenn unter diesen seelischen Wesen sich auch solche vorfinden, die selbst zu den die Darstellung leitenden Werten Stellung nehmen, so dass es also in der Tat keine historische Darstellung ohne ein reales sselisches Zentrum gibt.43

According to this quotation, all obJects of histor— ical investigations must have "real psychical centers" (reale seedische Zentren), since there is otherwise no reason to deal.with them. In this respect, Rickert is reminiscent of

ELL the other philosOphers with whom I dealt in preceeding paragraphs. He differs from them in that this conviction is

“flikl him derived from another notion: namely that all his- tomies must, with necessity, be "value impregnated." 49

I do not wish to investigate why Rickert contends that

the belief that histories have to do with man alone must

follow from the notion that they are value impregnated. The

inference is not my concern here, only the premise. Rickert

holds that histories can be distinguished from scientific

enquiries by the fact that they have to do with values, while

the sciences do not. According to Rickert, histories have a

two-fold relation to values: the selection of subJects is

based on value Judgments; and, secondly, in the histories

themselves, value Judgments occur as an essential part. In

both these respects histories are said to differ from the

sciences.

Let us discuss the former point first. Rickert argues

as follows:

Allgmeine Bedeutung kann...ein individuelles Ereignis nur dadurch erhalten, dass es in irgen- deiner Weise mit einem allgemeinen Werte verknuepft ist, und so werden es denn immer Werte Siréfién‘t'iif:Einii’nliéité’;siléiititétl‘ifiefii‘i‘iia“ deg

The historian cannot describe all of history. He must make

selections, and these selections are made in accordance with

Value Judgments. This is supposed to distinguish the his-

torian from the scientist. There can be little doubt, how-

every that this assumption is false.

Let us consider the case Of mathematics. It can be ShOVni that, in principle, a machine can be constructed, Whldl. 18«atfle to state in an infinite time, all the true propositions 0f arithmetic and geometry. Would such a machine, if actually

Inflth, make the profession of an arithmetician or geometrician obsolete? It would not, for the machine does not have the capacity of distinguishing "interesting" mathematical prOp—

ositions from uninteresting ones. The machine might, for instance, put out for a very long time,statements like 10074101 and, lOl¢lO2, etc. The mathematician would not particularly care for such a machine, because he wants to find statements which are at the same time true and interesting.

Interestingness seems to be a value term, but perhaps there is a concise definition for it in mathemetics. It seems to be the case that mathematicians are primarily interested in more general propositions and not so much in the instances which follow from them. "Interestingness" would then be perhaps coextensive with generality." But this would not exglain the mathematician's preference for these general prOpositions over the particular ones; it would not account for the fact that the mathematician is more interested in develOping mathematics as a deductive system than in making chance discoveries of particular mathematical truths. In other words, somewhere along the line,we would find the mathematician making a value judg- ment concerning the subject matter with which he wants to concern himself. From this, it seems to follow that the historian is in no way in an exceptional position as con- cerns his choice of subject matter. Although, in a way, he has to make such choices more often than someone who pursues a more thoroughly deductive science, but he would be in no different position than a classifying biologist. 51

It has been claimed that the historian will always

choose subject matters eXpressing values which are in some- way related to his own. (See Rickenfs statement above).

From this, it supposedly follows that his account of the

subject, thus chosen, will be made in the light of these values. This position contains two assertions, namely,

that the account will necessarily contain hidden or Open value judgments, and that these judgments are identical with

or proceeding from, the value judgments which have been

guiding the selection of the material in the first place.

Above, I have shown that history does not occupy a unique position as regards value judgments, relative to the selection of materials to be investigated. The ques- tion is now whether these motives of choice do permeate through, and remain influential over, the total account.

The answer is clearly in a negative. A candidate for a doctor's degree may pick, as a subject matter for his thesis, something which has never been made subject to an enquiry, merely in order to avoid competition. This fact does not preclude objectivity or good quality of the prod- uct. Nor can it be argued that he will necessarily find avoidance of competition the main value expressed by the characters with whom he deals. Of course, the reply will always be that he did not produce a real history, but merely an inconsequential piece of writing - and, with this, we are back at Croce's position.

Nagel, in his paper on The Logic 9: Historical

Analysis45 contends that there may be value judgments 52

involved in the selection of one historical subject matter,

rather than another, but he also holds that this is true for

all other sciences. He also makes it quite clear that there

is no reason to believe that this selectivity has to termin-

ate in a suspension of the objectivity of the historian,

while it does not have the same effect in the case of the

scientist.

It seems to me that now we have established,beyond

reasonable doubt,that the value judgments which are causal

for the selection of materials do not have to continue to

exercise influence upon the enquiry which they help to

, initiate. But it remains to be decided whether value judg-

ments should be admitted at all in histories; and if they

are, whether they should not likewise hold a place in the

sciences, or whether the admission of value judgments into

histories and their exclusion from the sciences marks the

distinction between these two branches of knowledge.

It must be born in mind that there are two different

senses in which one can assert that value judgments occur

in science, depending on whether science is envisaged as a

system 93 statements or as a systematic activity. The same

holds true for history.

Let us first try to answer the question whether science

or history, as systems of statements, contain value judgments.

In answering this question, I do not attempt to decide

whether science and history do really contain judgments of

value; but rather, whether it is reasonable to hold that one

does contain them,while the other does not. Let it be agreed first, that sciences, and possibly histories, make use, at times, of analytically true state— ments. These statements do not, by definition, have any value content.

Secondly, sciences contain observation statements.

While I am willing to agree that the acceptance or rejec- tion of an observation statement is a matter of valuation,

I think that the observation statements themselves do not have any valuational content; for if they did, all synthetic statements would be, at least as far as part of their con- tents is concerned, value judgments; and a differentiation between cognitive statements and judgments of value would be impossible. If the above-stated point should be found ob- jectionable, let us, at least for the present context, agree on calling observation statements value free in the above sense.

If the observation statements do not have valuational contents, then none of the statements deducible from any set of observation statements will have valuational contents.

This assertion is susceptible to proof.

Let A, B, C,...,N be particular atomic sentences.

Let 0 be a particular atomic sentence which follows from

A, B, C,...,N. It can be shown that 0 follows from this set, if,an only if, A-O v B a 0 v C : O v...v N - 0. If 0 is not to be an atomic sentence, then it will still not con- tain any statement other than those contained in the premise.

This result is interesting in many ways. In the present 54 context, it is of importance as it shows that from a set of observation statements no sentence, atomic or molecular, can be deduced, which has value contents, if the observation statements do not have it themselves.

There are, however, the procedures of induction, which are not dealt with in the above consideration. Those procedures can be described as leading to prOportionately and universally, or indeterminately quantified statements.

In other words, they do not result in the introduction of value judgments either. If the above considerations hold, then we have established that sciences do not contain rules which allow one to derive value judgments from value free statements.

It is my claim that histories have to proceed from observation statements just as the sciences do. We have seen above that the fact that the historian does not, in most cases, make the observations himself; but that he re- ceives the observation statements through a mediator, does not amount to an essential difference between history and the sciences.

From this it follows that the claim that histories contain value judgments, while the sciences do not, amounts to saying that there are rules of historiography which allow for the derivation of value judgments from valueefiee state- ments, for otherwise the introduction of any value judgment in a history would amount to an act of caprice on the part of the historian. I do not wish to deny that "acts of caprice" 55

of this type are upon occasions useful and even desirable, but they are not exclusive with histories, nor can their chance occurrence serve as a defining feature of them.

Let this be as it may: the question remains whether there are rules of historiography which allow for the trans- ition from observation statements to value judgments.

Rickert, whose theory is still under consideration, is un- able to point out such rules; and we can safely assert that if those rules exist, they are not known to date. We can, however, not base our criterion of discrimination on the highly doubtful assertion that there are rules of this type.

Rickert himself seems to have based his theory on the fact that in history, as Opposed to the sciences, there are relatively many chance occurrences of value judgments. How- ever, the lack of demonstrable regularity and necessity defies any attempt to find here a definitive characteristic of his- tories.

Above, we have agreed upon the convention to call observation statements value free. The above considerations show, however, that if observation statements had value con- -Ma- tents, these contents would persist through any transforma- *Ar‘rw

tion that they might undergo. This would, of course, hold .‘e-uen. true for history as well as for the sciences; and, therefore, whether we think of observation statements as purely cog- nitive,or as partly value judgments, in neither case do we obtain a criterion which would allow us to discriminate his- tory from the sciences. It remains to be considered whether science and history, as systematic activities, have any relation to value judgments. I said above that the acceptance or rejection of an observation statement can be called a matter of valuation.

Regardless whether one wants to agree with this convention or not, I cannot see a difference between a historian's acceptance or rejection of an observation statement and a scientist's execution of the same act. A remarkable dif- ference between the two, however, lies in the fact that a scientist has to engage in some rather careful deliberation as to whether a given accepted observation statement should be deemed consequential in view of the system that he is about to construct. Let me give an illustration of this point.

When Galilei set out to measure the correlation be- tween weight and acceleration of falling bodies, he decided that, in all likelihood, the colors of the falling bodies would not introduce a significant variation in the relation between weight and acceleration. In other words, although he probably accepted the observation statement "The object is of such and such a color," he decided not to treat this statement as consequential in view of the experiment that he had set out to undertake.

From a modern point of view, one might argue that

Galilei would have had to take the colors of his objects into account, had he not otherwise found a significantcor- relation. This is very true. However, Galilei's advance 57

beyond his Scholastic predecessors lies exactly in the fact

that he found it feasible to disregard tentatively in the

course of a particular investigation some of the observation

statements that he might have utilized in the course of

another investigation.

It has been shown that part of the scientific inabil-

ity of the Middle Ages depended on the refusal, on the part

of the Schoolmen, to make value judgments in Galilei's fashion.

Thus Anneliese Eaier, in her book, Die Vorlaeufer Galileis lg

14. Jahrhundert, writes

...Die Neuzeit (betrachtet) die mechanischen Kraefte ausschliesslich in methodischer Abstrac- tion..., und (interessiert) sich nur fuer ihr Mass..., waehrend die Scholastik das gegenstaendliche Moment im allgemeinen in seiner ganzen Konkretheit in ihre physikalischen Betrachtungen aufnimmt, also etwa mit der Kraft rechnet, mit der Sokrates einen Stein aufhebt oder bewegt, und dabei modifizierte Neben- faktoren, die organisch oder willefigmaessig bedingt sind, durchaus mitberuecksichtigt.

In other words: rather than develOping a ballistic curve, they were too much concerned with getting Socrates' char- acter into the equation, in order to account for the fact that it was he who threw the stone.

This fact gains importance as soon as it is realized that the Schoolmen's procedure is much more reminiscent of historical than it is of scientific method. For the his- torian, in describing Socrates' throwing a stone, will not have to engage in careful deliberation as to which of the true observation statements he should call consequential, and which he should disregard. To Speak of Socrates' char- acter when telling that Socrates threw a stone,will not 58 jeOpardize his efforts of giving a narrative of this event.

In the last part of this thesis more shall be said about this point.

Professor Rudner, in his paper, The Scientist qua

Sgigntist Makes Value Judgments,47 has pointed out that the scientist, in adopting a hypothesis, makes a value judgment.

In a way, Rudolf Carnap argues the same point when he says that

The factual sciences establish synthetic state- gzgéz£itéi&:48general statements which are...used

In other words, in accepting a hypothesis, the scientist makes a value judgment; for, confronted with the inevit- able risk of error, he decides that such and such an hypothesis is best for his purpose.and best in view of the consequences. He acknowledges the inevitableness of the risk of error by saying that his hypothesis is only tenta- tive.

The historian, on the other hand, when he utilizes for an eXplanation,an hypothesis which has been established beforehand by a scientist, does already have the example of a man who has taken the risk of holding this hypothesis true, such that his chances to fail are considerably diminished.

The foregoing analysis shows that if a decision is to be made whether it is the scientist or the historian who has to make more value judgments in the pursuit of his task, the result is clearly in favor of the scientist. In making this decision, however, we have considered the activities of the scientists and historians only, and consequently have 59

not gained a formal criterion for the discrimination of his-

tories from scientific treatises.

I wish to conclude this chapter by attempting to resolve why the conviction that the historian has to make value judgments was rather prevalent in the German phil-

osophy of history of the late 19th and early 20th century.

It is a fact that,among all scholars,the historians par- ticipated most intensely in the political movements in

Germany during the 19th century. Possibly due to this fact,

the nation found it reasonable to have their plans and aspirations justified through historical considerations.

It is clear that a historical happening in itself is not a justification for any action whatsoever. It must also be decided that a historical happening was good, or worth- while in order for it to serve as a precedent. The accepted

German historians of the 19th century have generally accepted the responsibility for making decisions of this kind, and it

seems to me that this fact might have induced some philos- ophers of history to describe the task of the historian as essentially connected with making value judgments. gistory,and Unified Science

While I attempted in the preceding chapters to discuss various theories which had,as their objective,the differentiation of science from history, I now wish to draw attention to a school of thought which denies the existence of any such fundamental differentiation. I mean, of course, the logical positivists. They were not the first to deny 60

that such differences should exist; but to my knowledge,

they were the first to maintain such beliefs on tenable

grounds.

We saw above that Croce thought that all sciences were

"really histories;' ' and he cannot have been the only one,

for he claims that all thinkers who thought fundamentally

about science shared this belief. On the other hand, we.

find a man like Ottokar Lorentz, around the turn of the

century, voice the belief that history is "really" a science.49

He subsequently set out to treat world history "scientific-

ally, ie. he attempted to describe the natural laws which

govern world history. He claimed to be able to substan-

tiate the notion that in history minor changes occur every

thirtieth year, major changes every 300 years, and really

fundamental changes every 900 years. This system, he

claimed, was scientific since it allowed him to make his-

torical prodictions.

Lotentz' theory was not at all well accepted, as can be imagined. It seems that his only follower was his son,

Alfred, who wrote a history of music on the basis of his

father's theory. He conveniently terminated this work with the year 1910, about which time major changes in musical style occurred which were not due before 2050. This alone should relieve me of the obligation to state an ex- plicit refutation of Lorentz' theory.

It should be born in mind that an attempt, such as

Lorentz', must not be confounded with some systems of what 61

one could call material philosophies of history,such as

Comte's. When Comte described the history of mankind as

having taken place in three stages, he was not issueing a

hypothesis in the sense in which this term should be used.

He gave, rather, a description, not an eXplanation, of a

process that had already taken place. Consequently, on

the basis of Comte's theory of history, no predictions

could be made. It did not, unlike Lorentz' statement,

assume the status of a universal hypothesis.

Let us now turn to the discussion of the theory

of the logical positivists. Their claim is that all of

science and history has to proceed from observation state- ments or, as it is eXpressed sometimes, that all sciences and

history have their common reduction basis in observation

statements. This would then account for the fact that we

can call them parts of one universal science. Moreover,

it is argued, we should not think of the sciences as being grouped into clear cut compartments: They overlap.

This leads us to the conclusion that we may look at all sciences as dovetailed to such a degree that we may regard them parts of one science, which deals stars, Milky Ways, earth, plants, animals, human beings, forests, natural regions, tribes and nations - in short, a comprehensive cosmic history would be the result of such an agglomeration.5O

At first sight, it might seem as if Neurath employed the term "history" in the same way in which the ancients used

"historia," or in the way in which we find it in phrases such as "natural history." In this sense, the term would refer to a comprehensive description of some class of 62

objects. However, such is not Keuraths intention. He continues:

Some peOple may not object to this attempt to eXpand the sphere of history, but they may still remain doubtful whether chemistry and mechanics also fit into this same scheme. Yet surely they do, because just as we may speak of the behavior of plants and animals in a certain period at a certain place,so we may also speak...of the behavior of sodium and levers in a certain period of the cosmic aggregation. This period may be long, but why should we assign any kind of "universality to chemical and mechanical statements instead of treat- ing them as historical ones?51

To paraphrase Neurath freely: all statements about the world are historical, because the world does in fact, or may eventually, change. No part of synthetical knowledge is about something that always is, but it is altogether about that which sometime was, or that which just happens to be.

It is not my purpose to demonstrate that Neurath's argument is not scientific, but ontological. I rather wish to draw attention to the fact that his argument does not give a valid ground for assuming that there are no basic differences between science and history. Neurath would probably agree that the sentence "Charles V rode a horse on such and such a date" has a number of denotata which occupy certain temporal regions, and which have about them the peculiarity that they can no longer be actualized. This statement is, therefore, to be called a historical statement.

On the other hand, it is known that the law of levers, or golden rule of mechanics, has had denotata at least for 63

the last 1850 years, for Heron of Alexandria was already aware of it. What does it mean to say that levers may change their behavior? Apparently this: up to this time the series of instances which established the probability of the law has had a certain frequency of disconfirming instances (in our case none), but as the series has not come to an end, there is a possibility of this frequency changing. Thus, instead of having a probability of l for the law of levers, there may at one time be a probability of less than 1. How- ever, as the series does not end as long as there are levers, we can not be sure of the overall probability of this law.

In other words, we should have to wait until there are no more levers until we could ultimately assess the probability of f1/ f2 ; 82/ ex. In Neurath's sense, we should, there- fore, with precaution, as it were, call this statement historical. In the second example, "historical" obviously has a different meaning than it has in the first one, for the first statement is only indirectly connected with questions of probability. Our ground for believing that "Charles V rode a horse etc. is true," may be shaky; but not necessar- ily because of an ascertainable low probability of this truth. It is therefore not because of its probably being true that this statement is called historical. It is rather called such, because the event which is its denotatum occurred at a definite location.figtime. 0n the other hand, the law 64

of levers is called historical, exactly because it is prob- able.

One might argue, that the law of the lever can be ren- dered into a'historical statement by supplementing it with an indication of the time during which it is used to hold. I agree readily that in this case the law would becomé'a his- torical statement in the sense in which the sentence about

Charles V is a historical statement. However, this is not what the scientist does. Let us imagine a time in which levers behave in a different manner. An historian might describe the ensuing state of affairs in the following way:

"Levers usually behave according to formula A, but on such and such a date a lever behaved according for formula B."

The scientist would account for the same state of affairs by saying that the probability of formula A being true for levers is slightly less than 1.

Later on, I shall attempt to show that a historian does not attempt to arrange observation statements in the same way as the scientist, i.e. he does not try to arrange them into series which allow him to infer general hypotheses through a certain frequency of occurrence of similar events.

With Neurath, this distinction is not made, apparently on account of the fact that the term "historical" seems to lend itself for a designation of events which would otherwise be called "temporally determined" and "temporarily determined," respectively.

In the same paper, Neurath denounces what he calls "scientific pyramidism". 65

Would it not be preferable to treat all statements and all sciences as coordinated and to abandon for good the traditional hierarchy: physical sciences, biological sciences, social sciences, and similar types of "scientific pyramidism?"52

This statement shows Neurath's encyclOpedic persuasion and eXplains to some extent the stand which he took on the prob- lem of history. At the same time,it puts him in opposition to such trends of logical positivism as have been voiced

some years earlier by Rudolf Carnap. Carnap's view was then very similar to that which is denounced here as

"Pyramidism." It is of interest for our problem, as Carnap also puts forth a view according to which a thorough distinc- tion between science and history cannot be maintained.

In his paper Die Physikalische Sprache als

Universalsprache der Wissenschaft Qggnap points out: ...alle Saetze der Psychologie (lessen) sich in die physikalische Sprache uebersetzen, und zwar sowohl die singulaeren als auch die generallen ('psychologischen Gesetze') oder, was dasselbe bedeutet, die Definition jeder psychologischen Bestimmung (feuhrt) auf physikalische Bestimmungen zurueck.53

According to Carnap, the same holds true for sociology and history. History, it seems, is treated as an outgrowth of sociology: and the latter as a dependent of psychology.

With this last assumption, I am not in agreement; for it contains a determination of history via ts subject matter.

However, it may be occasionally necessary for the histor- ian to employ a psychological law; and in this case, it should be insisted that this law is derived from observation, and can therefore be "physicalized." In other words, I think that Carnap's thesis may be correct, inasmuch as it concerns 66

psychology; but it has only eventual bearings upon the pur- suit Of historical study.

Carnap's "pyramidistic" view becomes even more evident if we connect the above statement with two more quotations from a later paper:

We can endeavour to develop science more and more in the direction of a unified system Of laws onlySEecause we have already at present a unified language. and

The construction of one homogeneous system of laws for the whole of science is an aim for the future dev- elOpment of science.55

This view may or may not be sound; for the present context the only point which should be noticed is that,here, history is tacitly incorporated into the unified science.

I should be willing to agree that histories are part of the unified science if,by this phrase,it was meant that histories have to proceed from the same type of statements as sciences do. However, if we take both Of Carnap's papers together, it appears that he was of the Opinion that his- tories would be incorporated into the future system Of laws called unified science. With this I do not agree. My reasons will become Obvious in the constructive part of this paper. For now it may suffice that I refer back to my criticism of Neurath's position, which should have made obvious that the historian combines statements in a way which is entirely different from that of the scientist. an Cddmfiwd do buHch :cdmdo;sbd H LHmeu<2

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a HOHCCHcdmC cm mdmdehmsdm OH HO .zsmd dxo

OH Hum dam: drCm wHwHHumch. H mSCHH :Od mmwm COmH :Hdm who MCedeOs sew dCHm Hm dqc ammo. HHH H sHmo do mdmdm Hm fired. OCHw Hm m HHSHch

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\Vr. .36 _ .. these:x.) . \J .- i” .53 .34 . 1\. m oCchacC flJ .1 J4 -.\. cCC w. 4.. .4 ..CO. .. .13..) a E..- ocHoHrpHO m-.. 1.1 HHocdHoo J

0%. ”a ULOJHdD9. .a,SCcCc 1 LI OH 1nd Cadrchdecc.. .-l 4. ., . u. ..4. .J “a o :OCLC 1 .. I. n. mCOOCLc J, .4 . HH words I \. t Ohm Y n C:Cce . .l cLHm I.

.hfpkrunfipH C chm dmCmc WOHHOa ocmd HC HOC£9.:c5 HCme. 150 OOCHCH: 9-H..- ooHsem HS .0053 . (patterns might with mathematics the the a through parent. the then required Observation according identify, and also sum such for cording condition criterion Of other expression certain defining sense x the a fulfills perhaps Let way As Thus, two 3. In is to a to of one to hand, somehow, accordance compilation a to given demanded prime There that us (3); of prime statements. formation be defining according Fermat's the listed suggestion ”statement be the now truth true. ”statement but Goldbach's under a possible numbers, is, second number, condition consider Iifference the by under it with and however, ”statement rules, to theorem of (2). (3); inductive is Of definition, (3), the falsity (2), would to would not suggestion Of (2), whether but theorem science” If, demanded mathematics”, primitive and the identify between known that then still it except be be however, of to following it consequences would mathematics” any that this a a if the might whether for and another, the by statement statement (3), x that an terms one particular class not every ”statement is it (1). Observation two it also I which the is of is identical do it be is more of fields of Of to the even false be not of a also of such sentence human can would be this statemerts statement mathematics mathematics, possible three loose wish number of preposition becomes be fulfills said: if a with statement history” statement class experience applied n coincide to suggested is sense O\ is 22n 03-" to apply of not It 5. thus of ap- the the + Of .1- ac- On in in 1,

n'ified. The question then is, whether the total class of

id 0. (D observation statenents - poss1bly containing both, true and false, sentences, - belongs exclusiv wlr tO science or to history. Clear—

ly, this is not the case. histories, as well as scientifi 0 treatises must be p rmitte d to contain both, Observation mt te- mcnts and air inductive conse1uences. It must be noted that such a weak criterion already suffices to discredit suggestion

(3) as a possible ground for discriminating science and 1i tory.

If a stronger denard con erning the en Halo e11t of Observation

.— 4— ‘ 4 . ‘1 K 9.) statements is issu. 1d ) such as ”All sciences as wel F’ --s histories should contain nothing but observation statements and their in- ductive conseouences", then uL-1 t1e criterion is still farther from achieVinQ I‘ ‘,\ . .“I . y /fl LE“. the deSired 1 . ‘. end. ‘ f1

ua *1 n ‘_. 1 0 {'11

Suggestion (2) is e '1} reuflf d O diapese of. ne state ments identii ied M1rou 1 (2) form tne 1 subclass Of all true state— ments identiiied through . As it must be allowed that the sciences as well as history 0 ntain true Observation statements, no discrimination Of the two is pos siole through criterion (2).

Thus, suggestion (2) and (3) are not fit for establishing a criterion for the disc;‘ i‘z1inat ion of scie nce from history. It remains to discuss (1). It seems clear that for an hypothetico-deductive science §J one can give a very rigorous definition for ”A is a Stat ment of a”, which will remind one of

ne definition given under (1) above. As a mach of fact, it is one of the claims of the h1ore radical logical positivists that eventually all Observation wt t- a1ents can be demonstrated in just this fashion as being statements of physics. 131" inis de:1onstration r/O will be possible as soon as it 0511 be shown that the unity of science, which at the time is a unity only by virtue of the com— mon ”reduction basis”, is also a hypothetic co- -deductive unity.

Let us, for the eurpose of this encuir3, pretend such a unity Of science does, in fact,exist. In this unity, as des- cribed by Carnap, all statements of sociology would be a sub- class of the sta'enents of psychology; the latter would be a subclass of the statenents of physiology, etc., and all of them would be subclasses of the statements of physics. As I have pointed out, Carnap holds that the statements of history are to be conceived as a Sioclass of the statenents of psychology in this unified science. It seems that this is altogether'too re- strictive. In order to comply more closely with the common usage of the term’historyf it seems advisable to admit that any obser- vation statement may occur in some history. Accordi1g to this convention, a piece of discourse in which a staten1ent of physics

OCCL1rs 1-n1ich is not a statement of thSiOlO5 y would, for this reason, not be excluded from the class of histories.

For reasons which are to be presently e: plained, it seems advisable not only to admit all Observation statements into his- tory, but also all true universal hypotheses. This being granted, we are compelled to conclude that "st at ement of physics" must be coextensive with "statelent of history", where "physi ' is used to denote the totality of the hypothetico-deductive scientific unity, and "history” the sum total Of all possible histories.

It would be a gross error to suppose that consequently

”phys ics" and "history” must have the sa1e me aning All that is 7l asserted here is that any statement of physics (any statement of the unified science) may occur in some history.

If the above consideration holds, then history and science cannot be divided on the grounds that certain statements are ad- mitted in one, but are not admitted in the other. r11 lliS would hold, regardless which grounds we choose for the identification of statements of science.

This being the case, if there is a distinction between history and science, another fundamentum divisionis must be found.

If it is not the statements themselves, then it might be the con— nection, or selection of them, which marks the difference between science and history. hindelband's Theory

At this point, I wish to discuss Windelband's theory, as it seems to be of considerable importance for the problem indi- cated at the end of the last section. He introduced the theory of the nomothetic and idiographic. This theory evolved from a discuss ion of the distinction betwee n,turvis enschaften and

Geisteswiss ens chaften.

It appears that the way in which these names were assi ned to different branches of knowledge is due to the organization of the German universities as it happened to exist at the time when this assignment was made. At that time, for instance, the chairs for psychology and philos0phy were usually held by the sazne per- son, which resulted in grouping both these fields within the

Geisteswis enscnaften. , So far the procedure se a1s reasonable, as U

there is a sense in which one can hold the t they are both sciences 72 of the mind, and distinct from the sciences of nature. Diffi—

culties arose, however, throu3h the fact ‘1at pma the major part of 0 Hll oriented

H) hi tor 1e Geisteswissenschaften consisted 0 U)

fields of research. Lven philOSOphy itself, inasmuch as it was

conducted by professional philOSOphers, was largely considered

a ma ter of historical contemplation, in seneral, or an analysis Q

r 9 .-‘. .l c‘ '7-‘17‘ .‘n - “wt. ‘11“.7‘ OJ. ‘9111. 0909-”, 111 Pun}. lCuLLLL. .._) iv;- H‘ cf *3 *— F (D U) 0 O ka

ihis preoccupation with Vhistorical thou3ht in philOSOphy,

and the unfortunate association of psycholo3y and philos0phy, led

to attempts to set up a cozzlprehensive Igletl1odolO3ical fraz. ewor}: J. '1ich would comprise, at the saml time, history and psychology as

the t. .‘0 p1 ominent sciences of the mind. A methodolO3ical unity

was thou3ht to issue, somehow, from the common subject 12 Htt r of

these two seiences, which would, at the same time, allow distin-

guisl‘ling the two from th O natural sciences.

Dilthey, a philosopher of this school, is im. essive in his

attempt to reconcile the difficulties which arose, although his

enterprise was unsuccessful.

It was Jindelba nd's attempt to find an entirely difi erent

bas ’3‘ or a division of the sciences in their method, *ather than Ho L.) Pb

i 7' O :3 their subject matter. I sag S. (D

”Die Lr1.n1un*s*is ens chaften such an in der Erken- ntnis des "irh ichen entrre dler dcs n113e11ein in der Form des Yatur3e—setses, ode r das Linze -ne i11 der 3escnicntlich bas iz'iiten asstait sie be trachten zu eineil 1‘eil Cme.:hm1er sich "leich bicioend Form, Q— zum :ndern ieil den einmalL 3en, in sich bestimmten lnhalt des wirglic1~n Geschc hens. Die ei:en sind Gesetzasxlsssnscnaitvn, die anderen Lre'3niswissen— schaften, je,e lehren_was immer ist, diese was einmal war.“9 which which tne +T p1ooauly, psychol " reality science or gestion as ject 11, scie11ces is 'LICQS. (IL-41.11.13 the “ (J) H . C) 1 ‘1 11 ‘ y

1‘ ci‘ \‘ ’ £3 "'v Q: the - ”hot scier .3 (1' 1-1. r" opinion (a subject clas 1‘1 of .. they 4‘1" the one ‘1‘ U11 :10 ° The Acco1d ‘7 case, .1‘: If :-

..5 tific: the f and is a 3y in

d‘ (3 I and 33 ific 1 ooservation nowadays, and '. so .. I neue 10 0111311 ‘Jas O O - ' 1 are a c lassi1icat1cn env1sa*3 fa 1. i ° L . v. history”. 11.31.1131 1-"1-" observation . underst ‘3] CiuiOfl r1 LAG COnceab 4‘. P.

:3 lls _i fiiadelband history esti 1. ““1p1 som3what 1‘. r1 --.—4‘ ing i

lly. (J the ,1 .’\ " jfi‘v?‘ O L 1 v LnnstauSaraecAe selected —: u "'

(‘1 ’ O v 1:11.11} 1n

I“! ',~‘) . liSC11 . on one “\ . to clearly Q 3331scna1tlicn3 .‘L *1 . -_ J' same .7 s, fi Po ’3 1 .1. 01 .1 . A

(‘4 ~ now 4-- 1 "‘1;-'-\-1.-r-‘ Oi In ”inneleanc, Ad'windelband's I." r . \D e V H .0. must 1-~ and .11 '7. set : D . more 4-“, statements 11 'W ~- " 9-, the A3ain '1‘ 1 -. a eAp ”reality" , ,f bAC (D 0) 'w and T“ ar statements arises: ’ "\

H. 10 within more .. -. the no ~ (l 5131,1131 C1. '(jJ‘ k. lie c 1, 4'1 selences .1-3—‘2

}.— —l _-, 1,113 All (J

, nos, cautious quSuchlSSD 3ss31 I“ (b r\' 1- 1 combined q: I) "~ . 3 ',1‘., tisch I same ’ . ‘ I 1 as in n33r --) ‘1 cautious n.1,, C.) - propose ji." J. tild3n ,w ‘ the tien 11 tn1 v" I-

0" o” cience what uehhen —- that the are as of V‘- . .. 7 -.1 subject u-u v 31003333 tncss -- 'I t- is ou3h I .\1 ,1 way. realm 1i1 an s -,-\ out “One H“ .‘1s marl theciiffe selected soecial ’~ -« 0 ‘ °, A dar are entirel; is way, historical, den to m1 , distinction or lSu a ine . To :6 lve and invest nmw Cudlt31 ‘ ‘ matter fl" of reformulate the I co11side1—tio11 - the anee1 a s, ,1 , 1 - 4— this ‘0‘ y~ should '0 p-10d correctly, way in t1 the history”. . (w I ,- w31n re11ce and diffem‘ ,. ,- . . but ‘. 1 ‘, aoanioned, difie1ence " r“. 5 1 dem "\ an 1 r I theory —,—.4-, nomothetic can act 3h as in m r'\ - combined? man ~ the reformulate id— .." 5:: investi3ation. d which distin oe is irdlbldl :“ 0 -.

nt 6 ~.- 1, be .. 1 ‘- historically, this t'Ieen o way applied, ‘- he [’3 . o ‘ made would i-” 4— ways 01 Servatioa If v\% :1 ‘C' ‘- ’ be1t this is oe- 3u.isl1- - this in the su , o -“ tween sci— the o lOf in oo— '5‘ .P 1 '1.

. F!) h. it . inCelband In eet sthis particular problem in his own terms by saying that the histories are concer1ed with the singular, non—

. - , .x J. -.u'1 a, .7 s are concerned with the permanent recurrent, while the sc e1c (D L. £01m of all events. It is at this point, of course, that'flindel—

oand's theory displays considerable need of reformulation and

In order to achieve this, I now wish to turn to a consid- eration oi a more formal hind “hich is to achieve this clarifica— tion.

Concern n” subjects ', andA :11redicates -‘ ,

tic," ortrand Russell and Alfred horth flhitehead, in their

Pnhuibia Lathm x1tica, 59 speak eventually of "predicates them- selves". Such a predicate would be, in the El“lish langua Oe, for ' in . i S Lance, -c,. "beino (1‘ re" d”, or “being 811 lall 9 r t’11" 11:1 .118“ a11o l " tate these predicates . ‘ _ - as Ax. Tne 1 3 serves merely as an indica- o 1 O tion that E is, in this case, a one place predicate. Predicates interpreted in this way have consideeable importance for formal logic, as a great number of expressions in the calculus of pre- dicates can be expressed through exclusive usage of the ”predi- cates themselves”. for example, "Px implies ex” is the same as

"(x):Px implies Qx”. To give an interpretation of this exam le:

”fieing green implies being colored" is the same as to say ”It is

rue for all.x that if x is green then x is colored”.

It must be noted that the Cir umflex over the subject var-

iable is to be interprete as an abstractive binder. Unfortun— ately, the alnotation suggeS‘ed in the Principia does not exclude

certain amoi uities. Thus, for instance, from the expression:

\, 75

”(x): Px implies 92:”, an abstraction can be performed thich will

Tlelai ‘ .“AJfix implies .‘ . ix”. . ' It is o not. clear, hOUchr, A Whether ,‘. 1 _~ a con— , cretion, to be performed on this last exDression, is to yield: ”(x):Px implies ngi', or "(::)(y): Px implies Say”.

This consideration Zled to the introduction of a differ- ent annotation of the abstractive binders, in some ways similar

A o '1 o 60 y o A I to that of the quantiiiers. For Px the annotation x Px is

A

used° , g is called an ”abstractive binder”. as (D ach such abstrac- tive binder has a definite sc0pe, ambiguities as occur with the

Principia annotation are excluded.

Abstractively bound expressions form an alternate way.of stating a great number of expressions of the calculus of predi- cates, otherwise annotated with quantifiers. One example has been given above. The use of the term ”implies" is not to suggest that the same connective is supposed to be operative with ab- stractively bound expressions as well as with quantified ones.

While in the former case ”implies” is to denote inclusion, in the latter case it is to denote logical implication; the reason being that 2; stands for a sentence, while 2% or % (2;) do not.

It is my contention that scientists, inasmuch as they are engaged in establishing universal hypotheses, or hypotheses with a certain degree of probability, do, in fact, attempt to relate predicates to one another. That this is often done through the mediation of established serial orders of measurement, does not change the assumption.

In order to shed some more light upon this assertion, let me draw attention to a semantic aspect of predicates. The expres- 76 1

sion :(Px) >> can be used to denote part of the total intension

of‘y if it is true that P1. similarly, all the other predi-

cate which are true of y can be listed, such that a cluster

of pre edic ates is derived which jointly form the intension of

.y or part of it. It is not the task of science to list such

es. If, for instance, a Inea “e for acc mulations of predica cf

the surfac e tension of water is sought, then it is probably

not necessary that it be known that water quenches thirst.

Jhat is wanted is a relation betmI en a number of prc' dieates,

which, for the context of the measure of surface tensions, suf-

ficiently define water, and an e: {pression for the surf ace ten-

sion. The expression which will be derived will have the form

(Y) L 4:. doxuo r ...RxDTx, or, alternately,

/‘ A 81 x(Px.;x...Rx) A C x(Tx)

It s eems to be the case that the scientist does not commonly in-

tend to in crease the number of predicates involved in such a cor-

relation b eyond necessity. His task is quite the opposite: he

wants to r estrict the number of predicates involved in some cor-

relation t o the minimum which is consistent with the validity of

that corre lation. A Let me give an example: Let x(Sx) be any predicate. Pro—

Vided that 51 is true, we could then include §(5x) in the antece-

dent of 81 without chan ing the truth value of 81.

But take the case that §(Sx) is true of water and that the

only Signi ficant correlation which is known to exist, and in whicli

A A .X(fxfl occurs is not 81, but

A n S? x(Px.£x... IJm:.Sx) C x(Tx)

v 77

It is obvious that at such a state of scientific deveIOpment,

the truth of Bl cannot be known, for it is not yet established

that (dx) is not a critical N» predicate. while 51382 follows

from a simple law of l03ic, the converse must be experimentally

established.

It can safely be asse rted that the transition in science

from a statement e 32 to a statement like 31 constitutes gen-

uine progress. The reason for this does not lie in the truth

va ucs the respect1 e sentences, ior tley are the same, if

R x(Sx), in accoida nce with our assumption, is not a critical c - pre-

dicate. Rather, such a step is progress, bec 351 is simpler

.'

arr .LL,‘ there fore lo3iCal ly and expel imentally more eas y to handle

that one mirht even re3ard the rela- 2 Tx)" in S] as

not derived from material im plication, and diffe~ent from the

)"30 O inclusion employed in 31 at l VLAQ t in such a way that th V la'w' of

added factors does not hold. Such a elation could be terncc

”cons euence". If such a relation was thought to hold, then Sl

‘would not imply 32, and the derivation of the mos t limite set

of properties responsible for the occuri ence of some other prop—

erty would be an absolute must for the scientist.

Let me give tw examples for the importance of the demand that 1 the soientiSt o o 4‘ should restrict,- o as mucn.. 3 as conSistent n _ .L. with _g t 1

4‘ viutn ‘I‘u L". oi j tne 7 Statement 4_, v as p a whole, ., . the - -. .numeer .. '.. .- of predicates . - - con— - tr~ d'nGQ ‘. 7 in ° the 1 anUQC3‘Gflb- 4- 1 ‘ ~ 4— oi 9 a statement .1. . . line '1 01,L" or 52. - Ol

It is commonly re3arded a major advance in scientific de—

Velocuent that Galileo succeeded in establishin” “net the fact1“ of weight was not crucial for the ace leiation of fallin

or, in other words, that the W“euicace denotin3 the weisht of a

fallin3 body was not a critical predicate in the above sense for

a: expression statinc the acceleration of such a body. If we

were to state Galileo's discovery by use of the relation of in-

clusion, an addition of a predicate ex3ressin J3 i 3ht in the ante-

cedent would not render the sta enent false; if, however, we wish

to express Galileo's findin3s by use of the relation of conse-

Quence, for which the lactor-added .C“ law does not hold, then the

‘ addition of an exorsssion i for Jeight in the antecedent would

sult in a false statement.

The second example has to do with the natural philOSOphy

of the late Scholastic period. Je could represent the position

0i the Schoolmen in the following way: If we were to find an

xprcssion for the surface tension of water, we should not, ac-

cording to this view, rest with the list of predicates 3iven for the antecedent in 31, Jhich we sup mo c‘d to be the minimum set, but we should list all the predicates consistent with §(Px.£x....fix).

If we interpret the relation between antecedent and conseguent as

that of inclusion rather than conse::uence, an expression thus

3ained would still be true, but extremely difficult to handle. It

is easy to see that the fellows of herton Colle3e precluded throu3h

this theoretical dema nd the possiole divanceacnt of science on

their part.

a

4 To sum up, it seems to be the case Mlat part of the tee: (N

'3". of the scientist consists in selecting the smallest set of p V. I“; - *3 *d ties which are jointly responsible for the occunemce or me 3nitude

of some other property. 79

Turning to history, it becomes at once evident that no suce rule is operative here. It segms to 03 the task of the historian to ccumulat ejust sucn clusters of predicates which the scientist has to abstract from, if he wants to ari ivc at

iflniiicait corre latiozs. A history is always a his r3 o~ 'J s01e

./ subject, ~ . -» - andr.-~ -‘ thooioticallj -‘—1 , -.1 ~ -: r‘ " the 1.", w -.-§ e is ' noY" under 'x'“. A -a limit . ~11 . .LOlD ‘1 the ""1“ null--’.~‘ 1' '.

"- "x " D “AI-.1 .- ‘ "t f‘ 4- ‘ 1-‘ f ‘ \_ . 1,.1. 1-\ r 1 c -~ ~, -~ —‘ 34‘ a — ' ‘ ~ . 1 . ,- I‘-

ve" oi grecicates thzt hi nt o; «sse*teu f) asout Euls squeCc.

- «Lile ., ° QAn incldsion ' ~ 4 , line ~1.. ur:- deesA -. not chan m- e its ' tidufl -fi- .--1 value h or —.

j.‘ '5 3an . J‘- r‘ zfi-v' "-1 r"‘,-‘-",J' '1‘r '~. -.v \-4 ‘\~'1'- 1 >~11 t‘n ’5 #1: I. . - 'n v 4.110.}. \IC".Q\J lbo O¢M;/_L';(Al(.4 LJOJ. J *I’Ovl‘v tALL UI'LK_;'I“" A-'q CJ=\.L'\-th 101-1 OI- n01].- criciCil nreu icatc s in the ant cecen , no matter how many there

::y es aided, a history becomes more and more comprehensive the more predicates are added to it. One could even soeag of a com- plet; history of a, i.e., a lwi tory that lists all the predicates which :re true of Q. Such a comglete history, of course, would be an impos si‘o Ml ty, as the number of are ~iich it would have to celvr'sc, is infinite.

It seems to be tne case, however, that the subject mattgr

-... n1. . ,(‘J-' ..r - 1- a 1.. . ,C. -- u- an 1 union ...S .Lulfco l ated Of a his oOl ian, .L talc: deaf .111inch ‘13 ll].- vestigates it, do not themselves dictate an upper limit for the number oi predicates which should 1 oe asserted, nor do they demand

-t

a certain minimum of predicates to be 1 H. (L d. Therefore, it must (0 oe ' -~-~mJGCtiC&i - - 1 COHSldeiuLlOnS, ° ..1 — ° sucn 1 as,. 149 um f ,l, H cf L O F” ,_J cl‘ (L }.__u H) O (D C: O sons v‘ V“yULPOSB, .1. f 7" unlCfl . 1 maLes - (\I-rx the .‘IA. histo1 ..fl ian 5 settle A J—-‘ . Mltn -- W some ‘ .3 ,- numbei~ g a . .- -—.

01 " -predicates, a c“ "’ -'. iatne“ fll‘ I -1 than ‘- r_ anotne {\1, 1" , ‘1. .

fl a L...“ ,- ~-- -. I . raw - »\ n< I 7" vx ‘ (“.1 ,5 ‘44- 3 r " r 2' O BHfUHCl‘xJOJfQ, 1t LBJVCACd Ell 1L Vc‘iu'd J L1"; ’3 L148 1.713.; c1 (All-

“nose -’ z asnects (W w-v oi '0 hlStOif *1 “fi'? and h“ 1 science are conce ~11 ed 7 Jhich . rfiv ale #1 "I‘ here '1 ‘~"$ \JQ

. 1 .3 ~‘_ _ a 4 ~ p ,_ ~~1 _ _‘ -' .___I_ I C‘- ' .- ~ ~ (‘ __ W ' .u- . .. ‘1 ‘_ 1.1113 .L1.L‘)O.Lfl'u_..i10(3 OJ. 9'. )1. J‘LLLCL-i \3 45(94:) f0? (.1 rJLQUlOl-l SLICIJ. as bl ‘ is, at -* leest P in p“inchl3, A x '»\ 3Leily — r‘ v assess3d.r l-_ I) tAc ‘ - see-

I" A stitution.of'zin'*:) ' A for x\?gfl ~ . JJ ‘Xl ' enah33r ‘ tie n trwuLL'VLlue - of .I.

‘L' than . ‘ "- ‘ 3-:(rn) ‘ ~’ is . r‘ LJPOLtJut . V - . --1 -' ~'\ - or cLLth \‘1’. '. l - LoL ‘7‘ “/1-1 ul, OtnLLHLse "~ ~ ‘h'I- --: N i3’. -'-

13 unriportght, or non—CL“ _c'cL._.

l J 1 ‘ 4— ‘y' "A ' . fl . a" n". « 1 . '«\ G' ' -, '. 4" A ‘3 r1

1

*(J

I rJ (“L (1‘ l. C (J ...le ULl'Jl‘ in SL131]. :4 0:133 tLllS lJJ?JQ.LCCLUd .Lu of which x( f 0

V

important enough to he li 3a, ‘ may have to d with circumstance (Q

J

which are H

D ither dependent upon the subject of the enguiry, nor (p upon the method OflplOTBd. gone kind of valuation must be Opel: — tive, h 33v r, as the number of predicates, which can be liste‘, is of necessity limited, anr as there is no intrinsic reason why

he preferred to others.

it does not seen promising to follow this line of investi—

aatior any further, as any definite assertion concerning the kind

v e in historical selection appears to be presump- tuous. The exam le of Richert d monstrates most cle mly the futility of such an enterprise.

although the above considerations do already mark a dis- tinction between science and history, it is desirable to list

some further characteristics of history, O 9.; S aiven as— sertion that histories are clusters 0 pr H) dicates which are true (L) o: n a certain suoject holds not only 0 histories 0, but also of the Fig merely de scri tive sc'ences. f.— Additionally, one would have to re: uire of histories that in the list of predicates reference is made to the temporal order

14 of the occurence of the properties to which these predicates refe J. 81

Je thus have establish3d two ruLuirements which a writin* must fulfill if it is to be called a history. But these two charac 3ristics are only a minimum requirement, and histories have, in the majority of cases, additional features, the most

1 a important of which I shall suosequently discuss. \

A historian commonly re'a-rds it as part of his tasl: not only to list predicates, but also to explain them. Any such ex— .L 62 planation requires for its validity a universal hypothesis.

Such a universal hypoU (D es, however, can be interpreted as a re- lation bet 3en predicates. I have shown above t1 at it is the

uch relations; therefore, when :< ta-k of the U) cie 1tist to establish C) m' the historian employs a universal hypothesis, he applies science;

r4 :hen he establishes it, he acts as a scientist.

l‘his consideration le Hazs to a ratlier conseLuential modifi-

cation of one of the above assertions. I have said a- C O «:1 D. D t.) d- 9.) C1. history of‘a is an accumulation of predicates which are true of

'a. If, however, the historian is to be allowed, as h3 should be, to e:: ol ain events ratller than merely to list them, one must also allow him to include in the history ofggsentences which are true of a subject other than a. He must be permitted to do this inso- far as this procedure is required for the explanation of some pre- dicate of.a itself.

In very many cases in which a historian wishes to QVlve an explanation, he has only a very vague or even false notion of the universal hypothesis which he employs. Thus he may, for instance, employ a universal hypotheses which contains in its antecedent all the critical and some non-‘ritical predicates. I“! Lnis would be a r‘ /) UN

rather fortunate case, but it would force us to make a decision

in the following mat er: Lith- er the historian must be required

W ‘1 to articulate his universal hypothesis J and e: :CLud all non-c1i-

tical p edicates, or in the case of histories one cannot replace

the relation of inclusion in universal hypotheses by the rela-

tion of cor Lse uence, as it could be done in science. with less

fortunate cas es, such as ULe omission of critical predicates in

the antecedents of universe hypotheses, I do not wish to concern myself in this contex , as all such cases would result in invalid

explanations,r regardless which viewpoint mi3ht be taken.

It is important to note that the historian's attempt to

explain some event may have bearings upon the selection of the

predicates which are to constitute his history. If among the

total number of prediCa“ tes which constitute the complete history

A 01 ’1 , a istorian finds Ax(lx) most important, 0 tnen ~ he will,from I IE the rest of the predicates which are true of g,select -I cniefly a

those which are needed to explain the occurrence of 23. Such

selection, of course, presupposes a fairly accurate notion of

the universal hypothesis which is to be employed for the explan-

ation of Ba,

It might appear as if in the above flea %raphs we were con-

cerned only with the selection of statements of science and his-

tor . Those considerations ’ however 1 have some implications a.

concernin3 the connection of statements as well. Thus, if it was

asserted that a history ofig is a number of predicates which are

true of a, then any statement 2; may belong to this history merely

by virtue of the fact that it is about a. In other words, to be

about a connects Pa with the remainder of t1e history of.g strongly Moreover, tive what by rules thus or universal a a the enou3h in for set cal minimum science valid the the history. remainder relations of isolated. isolation, it which, _a. On Thus, to Above, rules, universal (T1 b. case ihese is product. make hypothesis, the and if set A reference the predicates 1. supposed In N 1 0 of when a history rules in which, hold of other The of I all the plain true true a it science any any occurrence such while have such the universal hypotheses. rules term the eli3ible followed, list Such number number between are: hand, to predicates of of when a predicates spoken of is 'xgression histories every denote. observation a, which be. of science, "organon" subjects is made a an may this predicates of of strictly and of followed, hypothesis as all organon, Above, of critical assure predicates to predicates the assure a consist weak the the are may part no the true throu3h other properties commonly statements we universal the hypothetico-deductive, needed statement establishment teMporal however, contain that issue criterion predicate of forming of of have than of origination a. which which logical the the science. refers to in a, listed which history sta which product hyiotheses always order is a a ex- does are if are history. history, is to ements connectives. to of these such connected of not are of occur In of an contains a is a set sudl which Q. organon suffice a eXplained good of at m'nimum in logi- of a all such a 1 with deduc- \1) are

c. The subject of a history is of the histor- ians own choosing. It is not required that the subject should be of 103ical type 0.

While these rules allow that in a history a statement may, if it

fulfills certain other requirements, occur in deductive isolation, no statement may occur thus isolated, if it is to belong to a hypothetico-deductive science. moreover, while for histories

exists no upper limit for the number of predicates which they

should contain, any scientific universal hypothesis is not to

contain any predicate other than critical ones. This in turn

imposes a restriction upon the number of predicates which may occur in the totality of hypothetical constructs contained in

any science.

Concludin3_hemarks

In the preceding chapter, the abstractive binder was in- troduced with respect to subjects, such that we gained xores-

sions like §CP11 There is no reason why this binder should be used with respect to subjects alone. If a predicate is bound

abstractively, an expression like $(Pa)w uld be gained. This expression would denote the “subject as such". Ehile eXpression with abstractively bound subjects lend themselves to alternate form.7 ations of many expressions in the calculus of predicates, no such use can be made of expressions with abstractively bound predicates. They consequently seem to have very little use.

It seems to be the case, however, that, in saying that the his- torian lists all the predicates which are true of some subject, we employ exactly such an expression. we do, in fact, say that A he lists . all the predicates ... Which -. are true of some Or(em. ._ A This result is remarkable insofar as '3 (Pa)can be in- terpreted as standing for the concept of a substance in the

Aristotelian sense. If this assumption holds, then it seems to be the case that the concept of substance plays some role in history, which it does not in science.

If we take this for granted, it turns out that the con— cepts of substance and function are not actually ontological concepts, but have to do with different ways of envisaging the world: function is related to science, substance, to history.

This View, however, must be considesably restricted. In a history, the concept of a substance can be operative only as a principium selectionis. As soon as a definite assertion is made about the substance under investigation, a predicate is em- ployed which can gain its significance only throu3h its being the member of some serial order. Thus, while the historian may make his selection as if there were substances, the concept of substance ceases to be operative as soon as he makes definite assertions about the object under investi3ation. FOOTNOTES

(The translations are my own,except for the case of Kent's Critioue 2; Pure Reason, where Norman Kemp Smith's translation has been used.)

1The distinction between formal and material philos- Ophies of history has been made by several philosOphers. Cf. Maurice Mandelbaum, Some Neglected Philosogbic Problems Re- garding History, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLIX, No. 10,

May, 1952; pp. 317 ff. Also Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Problems, Gesammelte Schriften, Ed. III, passim. W. H. "alsh calls the two branches of enquiry "critical" and "speculative" philOSOphy of history. W. H. \falsh, An Intro- duction to PhiIOSOphy of Histor , London (HutchinsoETs Univ- ersity Libraryy 1951, pp. 13 ff.

2Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tuebingen, 1953, passim.

3Eenedetto Croce, Die Geschixrhte als Gedanke und als at, Bern, 1944; translated from the Italian by Francois Bondy. The discussion of Croce is based on this German translation.

49g. cit., p. 37. Translation: "(h {e have) most de- tailed and most precise collections of individual data, where it can be felt at once that they are not history; and ‘ ' we have on the other hand works of radiant historical insight, but poor in facts and even interspersed with unprecise, legen— dary or invented assertions... Compilations of facts are called chronicals, accounts, memoirs, annals, but not histor- ies; and even though they be critically sighted or though of each individual datum the source be noted or a thoroughly checked testimony (be given), they can nevertheless never... overcome the superficiality of source and testimony... They can never become our truth, whereas history requires a truth that comes from our innermost self.

500. cit., p. 39. Translation: "An act of understand- ing and insight, which is initiated by a practical necessity, which cannot be fulfilled and issue in action until the shadows, the doubts and unclearnesses, against which it struggles, are eliminated through posing and resolving a theoretical prob- lem.‘

692. gi£., p. 61. Translatio.: "There is no con- crete understanding...which can abstract from the fact that it is bound up with life and therefore with action, as a moment of interruption or expansion of this action." 87

79p. g;;., p. 480. Translation: "The theoreticians or the scientists themselves, inasmuch as they think theoret- ically about the physioommathematical sciences, insist nowa- days that it be acknowledged that the natural sciences have the character of histories." (Literally: "of a history.“)

It is possible that Croce here thought of Neurath. Cf. below pp. 60 ff.)

8Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem 3: Historical Knowl- edge, Ne": Yorltp 1938, p. 100

90. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning 9: Mean- ing, 3rd ed. London, 1930, p. 135 10R. G. Collingwood, The Ide of History, ed. T. M. Know, Oxford, 1946. 1193. cit., p. 175. 12George Simmel, Die Probleme der GeschichtSphilosOUhie, Muenchen and Leipzig, 1922, p. 1. Translation: Jhile theory of knowledge in general proceeds from the fact that understand- ing is a representation and its subject is a soul, the theory of historical understanding has the additional characteristic that also its object consists of the representations, wills and feelings of persons, that its objects are souls." 13Collingwood, _p. cit., p. 302.

14Simmel, pp. Lit., p. 32. Translation: "The group soul is here presupposed as a uniform entity as above the individual soul." 15Collingwood, 22. cit., p. 175. 16Printed in Wilhelm Windelband, Praeludien, Tuebingen, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 136 ff.

17Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissen- schaft, Tuebingen, 1910, p. 14. Translation: "Two groups of objects...which are differentiated from one another like body and soul cannot be found with respect to the classification of the sciences; for there is nothina, at least in the immed- iately accessible world, that ought to be withdrawn from an investigation -_ which has the characteristics of a scientific one."

18Carl G. Hempel, The Functions of General Laws in His- tory, in Readings in PhiIOSOphical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, pp. E59- E71. 1992. cit., p. 460. 2Ow. H. Walsh, 92. Cl ., pp. 59 ff.

[0 1 00 -. cit. p. 66.

m 292. cit. , p. 67. 2393. _g_., p. 68.

24Johann Gottfried Herder, Auch eine Philos0phie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, reprinted in Herders Saemmtliche Lerke, ed. Bernhard Suphan, Vol. V., Berlin, 1891, pp. 575 593,pp. 503. The first edition appeared in 1774. Translation: "Entire nature of the soul...to feel it, do not answer in a word, but go into the age; the part of the world, into all of history, feel yourself into everything - only thus will you be on the way to understand the word."

259p. £13., p. 502. Translation: "He who has realized how inexpressible a matter the uniqueness of a man is, ..."

26'27Jack Pitt, Nomological Explanation Ln Histor , Ideas, Vol. 5., No. 2, January, 1956, pp. 3-15, pp. 9710. The quotation of Gardiner is said to be taken from: P. Garginer, The Nature g; Historical Explanation, Oxford, 1952, p. 75.

28The unintentional employment of universal hypotheses is treated below p. 37. 291mmanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., p. 119. Translation from Norman Kemp Smith, A Translation 9; Kent's Critioue p: Pure Reason, New York, 1950: “"Ne can, however, with regard to these concepts, as with regard to all knowledge, seek to discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, at least the occasioning causes of their production. The impressions of the senses supplying the first stimulus, the whole faculty of knowledge opens out to them, and experience is brought into existence... Such an in- estigation of the first strivings of our faculty of knowl- edge, whereby it advances from particular perceptions to universal concepts, is undoubtedly of great service." 30Loo. cit., Smith's translation: "But a deduction of the pure _priori a concepts can never be obtained in this man- ner; it is not to be looked for in any such direction. For in view of their subsequent employment...they must be in a position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from experiences. Since this attempted physiolog- ical derivation concerns a guaestio facti, it cannot strictly be called deduction; and I shall therefore entitle it the explanation of the posession of pure knowledge." .39

31? Ernst Troeltsch, Qp. cit., p. 180. Translation: "Thus, every historically thinking age must interpret the conceptual unity of the totality (of events) as including itself or as directed toward itself."

32Ernst Troeltsch, Was heisst: Wesen des Christentums? Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II, p. 425. Translation: "It is the purpose of history to understand the presence through its origins, to give a survey over the attainable comprehen- sive eXperience of the species or at least of the culture and the nation, and to thus achieve a historical education of our thinking, and arrive at measures for the future."

33cf. the beginning of Simmel's Die Problems der Geschichtsphilosoohie.

34Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus, etc., p. 180. Translation: "With every g priori is connected some risk and decision, a grasping by a will of a thought which represents itself as necessary reason. The will thereupon takes the risk of ordering and Judging experience according to this thought. It (the thought) receives its final just- ification through the achievement which is thus born out." 3592. git., p. 75. Translation: "A conseptual unity of continuous deve10pment can be constructed only from the vieWpoint of the observer, and this means only for the ex- tension of the cultural circle which surrounds him and which forms a unity of actual consequences and results." (Meant is probably a unity by virtue of common causes or origins.)

36Ernst Troeltsch, Moderne Geschichtsphilosophy, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II, p. 687. Translation: "Psychology cannot be the starting point for a logic of history, but only the epistemological subject and the logi- cal a priori that is involved in it."

3792..g;§., p. 684 f. Translation: "No part of the critique of knowledge and consequently none of the philos0phi- cal concept formation proceeds from the eXperiencable human and personal subject. They rather proceed from unpersonal consciousness which is connected with it, but can be con- ceptually separated. For this consciousness the world once existed, and will exist after it has died, and we always assume it tacitly when we speak of the history of the earth or of the solar system for times when no human being existed.

38Ernst Cassirer, fig Essay 23 Kan, New York (Doubleday)

1953' p0 2220

39Loc. cit. 409p. ci ., p. 224. 9O

4193. cit., p. 236. 42pp. cit., p. 241.

43Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 5th edition, Tuebingen 1929, p. 507. Trans- lation: that...we have reason to describe a reality indiv- idualising or historical only if under these animated beings some can be found who take a stand with regard to the values that guide the description. Consequently, there are in fact no historical writings without a real psychichal center."

4492. gi£., p. 744. Translation: "An individual event can gain universal importance only through the fact that it is in some way connected with a universal value; therefore, it will always be values, which ultimately direct the selec- tion of the essential in history."

45Ernest Nagel, The Logic 2; Historical Analysis, in Readings in the Ehllaflflnhx Di finianne, ed. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, New York, 1953, pp. 688-700. 45Anneiiese Maier, Dig Vorlaeufer Galileis is l3. Jahrhundert, Rome, 1949, p. 65. Translation: "In modern times one views the mechanical forces exclusively in method- ical abstraction and is interested only in their mesure..., while the schoolmen generally included in their considera~ tions, the factual event in its full concreteness. They considered, for instance, the force with which Socrates lifts or moves a stone, and they did not disregard modified minor factors, which are organically or volitionally deter- mined.

47Richard Rudner, The Scientist gua Scientist Makes Value Judgments. PhiIOSOphy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 1, January, 1953, PP- l ff.

48Rudolf Carnap, Formal and Factual Science, Feigl and Erodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 125—128, p. 127. 490ttokar Lorenz, Deutschlands Geschichtscuellen ip Mittelalter, 2 Vols., Berlin, 1876,77. 500tto Neurath, Foundation 2; the Social Sciences, International EncyclOpedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 9.

51 Loc. c 1 t . 5222, cit., p. 8. 53hudolf Carna p, Die phvsi Icalische Sprache als gpiversa sorache der Jissenschait. LInenntnis Vol. II, 1931, pp: ABE-n05, p. 443} 1rans1atiorz ”All statements of PS}- chology can be translated into the physical lan Duare. This includes the singular as well as the : eneral one srthe psy- chological laws). This is the same as to say that the defin- itions of all psychological determinations lead back to physical determinations.

54hudolf Carnap, Lo; ical loundations of the U11ity,p_ dcie ence, leigla nd oella Rea din; s in rhiloSOphicaIM1a1y- (\n 818, pp. h03“h23, p0 Lh4:b

\)‘1 5Loc. cit.

I 5% Cf. H. Hermes, latnenut1sC1c Lo ;ik, pt. II, Muenster 1954, p. 169, where 1e1 ere 1ce is made to 1. Goedel, Ueber for- mal u1cntoc111doer1e-aot ' dor irinc1nia nathe11etica und varwandter oyste1e; atsne fte fuer mathematik und Physik 38,

19,31,131). 1/3- 17K).

57Jilhelm Nindelband, Praeludien, Tuebingen, 1924, Vol. II, p. 145. The sciences (of expe1ience) search in their in- vestigation of reality either the general in the form of the nat11ral law, or the individual in the 1istorica11y determined "3estalt;” on the one hand they enquire the always permanent form, on the other hand the unique, in itself determinate con— tent of events. The former are law-sciences, the latter are event-sciences,t those teach what always is, these what once

‘I-IIOKS.

..—\ SUCD. Cit., p. 149. Tra1s lation: Scientific thinking is - if it be allo..ed to form neJ artificial exi>re ssions - in the former case nomethetic c, in the latter idiographic.

9“, - w - \v 1 - -1 o 1 o \n hertrand Hussel and Alfred north aniteheao, Prin- cipia Iathematica, Vol. I., 2nd 3 ., Cambridge, 1925. C\ fhe C) use ofa bstractive binders is taken frOIn lectures by Professor Henry e. Leona1d, Lida gan btate University. For this chapter of. Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, Chicago, (Dover) 1953, esp. Chapter IV, Me tion 4. -

61This state of affairs could pc eihaps be expressed by saying that the scientist does not only want to d-e scribe suf- ficient conditions responsible for the occurrence of some property, but chiefly the necessary conditions. 62. 0f. above, p. 25. 71") r1 7— ‘ *{1'I' LIrJ. JJutfi-J- :JJiL Cid-J J

Carnap, Rudolf. Formal and Factual Science in Readings in the Philosogihy oi scie1'1ce, ed. H. Feizl and11. Brodbeck, new Iork1953, pp. 123 - 12e.

Carnap, Rudolf. Die 1hfs1gclische Sprache als Universalspr ache der Hiss enschaIt, h1henntnis, Vol. II, 1931.

Carr ap, Rudolf. Lorie al Foundations of the Unityiof Science, in Hea Min s in PhiloSOphical Analysis, ed. H. Feigl and H. Sella1s, pp. #08 - 423. Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Jan, New York, (Doubleday) 1953.

assirer, Ernst. Substance and Function, Chicago, (Dover) 1953.

Collingwood, R. G. r“he Idea of History, ed. T. M. Knox, Oxford 1946.

Croce, Benedetto. Die Geschichte als Gedanke und als Tat, Bern,

1941+-

He1oec*or, Martin. Sein und Zeit, Tuebingen, 1953.

Hempel, Carl C. The Function of General Laws in History, in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, pp. h59-- 471.

Herder, Johann Gottfried. Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bilduny der Lenschheit. deprinted in Herders - . ‘ ' 1 1 N‘ W saemntlicne uerhe, ed. buphan, Vol. V, Harlin 1591, PP. 475 - 593.

Kant, Immanuel. K1itik der reinen Vernunft, ed. R. Schmidt, Hamburg, (heiner) 1952.

Liebrich, Hans. Die Historische Wahrheit bei Ernst Troeltsch, Dissertation, Giessen, 1937. - -

Lorenz, Ottokar. Deutschlands Geschichtsouellen im Hittelalter. 2 Vols., Berlin 1570, 77. -

Haier, Anneliese. Die Vorlaeufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, Home, l9h9. . . .

Mandelbaum, Maurice. The Problems of Historical Knowledge, New York, 1933. 93

Handelbaum, Maurice. Some Neglected PhilOSOphic Problems fiegardin:_fiistory, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. KLII, no. 10, 1952, pp. 317 ff.

Hegel, Erne st. The Logic of Historical Analysis in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 088 - 700.

Neurath, Otto. Foundation of the Social Sciences, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol.-II, No. I, Chicago 1939. Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A. The Heaning Of Meaning, 3rd.

Pitt, Jack. Nomological Equanations in History, Ideas, Vol. 5, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 3 - l5.

Russel, Bertrand, and Hhitehead, Alfred North. Principia Hathematica, Vol. I. 2nd. ed., Cambridge, 1925.

Rickert, Heinrich. Kulturxissenschaft und Haturwissenschaft, Tuebingen, 1910.

Rickert Heinrich. Die Grenzen der Iaturwissenschaftlichen , Segriffsbildung,- x o o 1 ptn. r— w ed., rlj iuebingen . 1929. --‘

Rudner, Richard. The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments, PhiIOSOphy of Science, Vol.-20, No. 1, Januarysl953.

Simmel, Georg. Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, Hunich and Leipzig, 1922.

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Troeltsch, urnst. 1 Has heisst: Wesen des Christentums? ue s ammelte Schriften, Vol. II, Tuebingen~1925.

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Demco-293

MICHIGAN I III STATE III UNIVERSITY II I I lllIllfilIl I ARIES U 3 1293 0306J2653