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IT-09-92-T 81800 D81800 - D81760 01 September 2014 MB

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER

Case No. IT-09-92-T IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Presiding Judge Bakone Justice Moloto Judge Christoph Flügge

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

Date Filed: 1 September 2013

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC WITH PUBLIC ANNEXES A & B

DEFENCE MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 92TER TO ADMIT THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF TOMISLAV SAVKIĆ

The Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Dermot Groome Mr. Peter McCloskey

Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Branko Lukić Mr. Miodrag Stojanović

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ PUBLIC WITH PUBLIC ANNEXES A & B

DEFENCE MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 92TER TO ADMIT THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF TOMISLAV SAVKIĆ ______

The Accused, RATKO MLADIĆ, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully submits the instant Motion pursuant to Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to the Guidance previously expressed by the Trial Chamber, motions offering written statements under Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to be filed at least 30 days before the anticipated testimony of a given witness. Witness Tomislav Savkić is currently scheduled to testify in the next 30 days and thus the Defense hereby files the instant motion in compliance with the Chamber’s guidance, and applying for the evidence of this witness to be heard pursuant to Rule 92ter. This Motion is filed publicly, as the witness does not require protective measures.

2. Herein this application is made to tender one written witness statement of the witness, with four associated exhibits. At this time the Defense estimates that the evidence-in-chief of this witness will last up to 30 minutes.

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3. The Defense does not otherwise seek to deviate from the Chamber’s Guidelines in tendering this witness’ evidence.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

4. Under Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter “Rules”) a Trial Chamber is permitted to admit the evidence in whole or in part in the form of a witness statement or transcripts of a proceeding before the Tribunal, under the following conditions: i) the witness is present in court; ii) the witness is available for cross-examination and any questioning by the Judges; and iii) the witness attests that the written statement or transcript accurately reflects the witness’s declaration and what the witness would say if examined.1

5. A party calling a witness pursuant to Rule 92ter may seek to admit into evidence documents that have been discussed by the witness in his or her witness statement of previous testimony.2

III. DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS

A The Chamber Should Admit the Witness Statement

6. Witness Savkić’s statement is relevant, reliable and probative, as set forth in greater detail herein below.

7. The witness will be present at trial, and thus will be able to attest to the evidence and will be available to be cross-examined by the Prosecution. Thereby the

1 Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 2 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, “Decision on Prosecution’s Submission regarding Additional Transcript Pages from Momcilo Mandic’s Stanisic and Zupljanin Testimony for Admission into Evidence.” 8 September 2010, para.5.

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requirements of Rule 92ter will be fulfilled, and fairness to the Prosecution will be observed.

8. The Defense submits that due to the nature of the Witness’s testimony 45 minutes will be necessary in order to conduct a limited and focused direct examination of the witness to clarify, expand on, and contextualize aspects of his evidence directly relevant to the Defense case.

9. In 1984, after completing his compulsory military service, the witness Savkić was employed at Bokslt in Milići where he worked until the outbreak of the war. In mid-1992 the witness was appointed commander of defence of the Bokslt mine, and on 1 November 1992 was assigned as Commander of the First Infantry Battalion in Milići. On 1 November 1993, the witness became President of the Milići Municipal Assembly and no longer carried out military duties.

10. Witness Savkić’s testimony is relevant to and probative of salient and material issues pertaining to the Indictment. The Defense is confident in that it will, among other things, establish the following: a. The circumstances and ethnic composition of employees of the Bokslt company prior to the war.3 b. In late1990 inter-ethnic problems began to escalate, particularly with the establishment of the national political parties.4 c. Muslim resentment towards the intensified, as demonstrated by the attacks on Serbs when they travelled through Muslim settlements to attend the Serbian Democratic Party (hereafter “SDS”) inaugural rally in and held on 19 August 1990.5

3 Statement, para.3. 4 Statement, paras.4-5. 5 Statement, para.6.

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d. Muslims did not allow Serbs in and to publicly display their national insignia. Extremists set fire to SDS flags in the Serbian settlement of Kravica.6 e. Multiparty elections in were won by the SDS with 44.43% of votes. The Party of Democratic Action (hereafter “SDA”) won 43.8% of votes, and the remaining 12% went to minor parties. A Municipal Assembly of 60 assemblymen was established based on these results, with 27 representatives from the SDS, 26 from the SDA, and seven representatives from other parties.7 f. Agreement was reached at the republican level that the Serbs and Muslims in Vlasenica should establish government based on the fifty- fifty principle. 8 g. Staff proposed by the SDA did not have adequate qualifications for the posts as required by existing regulations, however, the proposals were accepted following interventions from the republican level.9 h. Muslim republican authorities gave instructions that only Muslims be appointed to supervisory posts.10 i. When the break-up of the JNA began in June 1991, Muslims were ordered by the SDA leadership to stop sending their conscripts to perform compulsory military service and responding to the Territorial Defence call-up. The Muslims of Vlasenica complied with these orders.11 j. Muslims began to arm themselves.12 Serbs protested to their municipal representatives and requested their safety be guaranteed. The

6 Statement, para.7. 7 Statement, para.8. 8 Statement, paras.8-9. 9 Statement, para.10. 10 Statement, para.11. 11 Statement, paras.12-14. 12 Statement, paras.15, 19.

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authorities attempted to persuade Serbs the JNA would intervene if necessary.13 k. Most operations undertaken to cut off the illegal weapons supply and stop Muslims arming themselves failed.14 l. Muslims in Vlasenica established paramilitary formations, and units and command personnel were sent to Croatia for training. The central office of the SDA instructed executive committees in municipalities to nominate Muslims for police roles so they would be sent for training in Croatia.15 m. Serbs and Muslims organized night guards around their settlements.16 n. The Serbian leadership proposed the establishment of the Birac Autonomous District and the Municipal Assembly adopted a decision that Vlasenica join the Birac Autonomous Region on 26 December 1991.17 o. Serbian members of the Vlasenica municipal authorities attempted to avoid war and find peaceful solutions with Muslims, whose representatives stated there could be no co-existence with Serbs.18 p. As the political situation deteriorated in early 1992, Serbs and Muslims began leaving Vlasenica in large numbers.19 q. Muslim paramilitary formations led by Ibrahim Ademovic set up ambushes in Muslim settlements in Milići.20 r. An Agreement on the Division of the Municipality was adopted by the Vlasenica SO on 13 April 1992.21

13 Statement, paras.15-16. 14 Statement, paras.17-18. 15 Statement, para.20. 16 Statement, para.22. 17 Statement, paras.23-24. 18 Statement, paras.25-26. 19 Statement, para.27. 20 Statement, paras.28, 39. 21 Statement, paras.29-30.

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s. The Muslim population of Vlasenica was not expelled. The SDA ordered the departure of the Muslims22 who left Vlasenica in three stages.23 t. The context of circumstances and events that took place in Vlasenica before and during April 1992.24 u. On 21 April 1992, the remaining Muslim population of Vlasenica left for and , travelling via the regular bus lines and their own vehicles. Some Muslims requested the municipal authorities provide organized transport. Such transport to Tuzla and Kladanj was organized and buses ran every day, however, there were not enough buses to transport all the Muslims within a few days.25 v. Muslims waiting for transportation were accommodated in the Territorial Defence facility in Sušica once the Serbian refugees from Goražde vacated the premises.26 w. The circumstances of the eruption of hostilities in May 1992.27 The Milići and Vlasenica municipalities were cut off from and left without electricity due to the Muslim sabotage and terrorist organizations mining roads and damaging electric power transmission lines.28 x. Muslims carried out attacks on Serbian villages in the Milići and Vlasenica municipalities. The Muslim armed forces command was located in Drum at the house owned by the father of Ferid Hodžic.29 y. When the Milići – Vlasenica – road became unsafe the leadership decided to establish a corridor to deliver

22 Statement, para.31. 23 Statement, para.38. 24 Statement, paras.30-33. 25 Statement, paras.33-34, 37. 26 Statement, paras.34-36. 27 Statement, paras.39-42, 52-54. 28 Statement, paras.43-44. 29 Statement, paras.46-48.

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food, transport injured individuals to hospital, and protect the Serbian population in .30 z. The result of hostilities in late February 2013 and entry of United Nations peacekeeping forces in Srebrenica.31 aa. Divisions of the BH Army operated in United Nations Security Council declared safe and demilitarized zones.32 bb. The military operation undertaken in July 1995 was launched to push the Srebrenica Muslim formations inside the borders of the safe area. Muslim formations suffered heavy losses.33 cc. Neither General Ratko Mladić nor members of the state leadership ordered the killing or deportation of Muslims, their detention in camps, or the destruction of their property. General Mladić stated that great care must be taken to protect Muslims and Croatian civilians, and detainees must be treated humanely.34

B) The Chamber Should Admit the Associated Exhibits

11. Each associated exhibit is directly relevant to the case, and is inseparable and indispensable to the witness’s statement, and can be contextualized and explained most effectively through this witness. They constitute an essential component of the witness’ evidence, and also are of importance to the Defense case, and therefore it is submitted that it is in the interests of justice that they be admitted.

12. There are a total of four associated exhibits to this witness statement, as set out in the table that is attached at Public Annex B.

30 Statement, paras.55-56. 31 Statement, paras.57-62. 32 Statement, paras.62-68. 33 Statement, paras.71-80. 34 Statement, paras.81-82.

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13. The associated exhibits will help assist the Chamber in understanding the evidence of this witness, as the documents relate to: a. The attack by Muslim sabotage groups in Žutica on 21 May 1992.35 b. The ambush by Muslim paramilitary forces on Bokslt’s drivers in Konjević Polje village on 27 May 1992.36 c. Orders issued by the BH Minister of Defence and the Commander of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army about the reorganization of the army in the safe area of Srebrenica.37

35 Statement, para.41. 36 Statement, para.42. 37 Statement, para.68.

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III. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing arguments, the Defense respectfully requests that the Chamber issue an order: a. Granting the Defense leave to call Tomislav Savkić as a witness pursuant to Rule 92ter. b. Granting the Defense leave to admit the proffered statement, (attached hereto as Annex A) under Rule 92ter. c. Granting the Defense leave to admit the list of associated exhibits, (attached hereto as Annex B) under Rule 92ter.

Word Count: 1626

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:

Branko Lukić Miodrag Stojanović Lead Counsel for Ratko Mladić Co-Counsel for Ratko Mladić

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC

Annex A ______

IT‐09‐92‐T 1 September 2014 11 81789 Translation

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL /HUMANITARIAN/ LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Family name: SAVKIC First name: Tomislav Father’s name: Milutin Date of birth: 1 January 1956 Ethnicity: Serb Date(s) of interview: 31 July 2014 Interviewer: Miodrag STOJANOVIĆ Language spoken during interview: Serbian

Signature of witness: /signed/

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 1 81788 Translation

1. My name is Tomislav SAVKIC, son of Milutin. I was born on 1 January 1956 in Dubnica, Milići municipality. I completed primary school in Milići and secondary school in Vlasenica, and graduated from the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Tuzla.

2. I started my first job in 1980, as a teacher at the Vlasenica secondary school. Having completed my compulsory military service, I found a job at Boksit in Milići in 1984. I worked for this company until war broke out in 1992. In mid-1992, I was appointed commander of defence of the Boksit mine. On 1 November 1992, I was assigned as the Commander of the First Infantry Battalion in Milići. I remained in this post until 1 November 1993, when I became President of the Milići Municipal Assembly. From then until the end of March 1996, I did not carry out any military duties.

3. The Boksit company employed Serbs and Muslims alike, as both blue-collar workers and managers. Before the war, in the company there were no inter-ethnic problems to speak of because the company was doing well and the salaries were good, so everybody got on well with everybody else.

4. In the latter half of 1990, when the break-up of Yugoslavia began, inter-ethnic problems started escalating on a daily basis. This could be felt particularly when the national political parties (SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ and SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/) were being established. At the party rallies, every party extolled its own people. The SDA was particularly active in this respect, extolling the Muslims but at the same time denigrating the Serbs and telling them that they had to leave Bosnia for Serbia and that it was not their homeland because it was the homeland of the Muslims.

5. The SDA was the first to be established in Vlasenica, in early 1990, and the SDS was formed six months later, in August 1990. At the inaugural rallies of the SDA in Vlasenica and other municipalities, hatred of the Serbs was poured out. The Serbian people were even threatened (with deportation from Bosnia to Serbia, because the latter was their homeland and Bosnia was the homeland of the Muslims).

6. The Muslim outpouring of hatred towards the Serbs was particularly intense during the SDS inaugural rally in Kravica and Srebrenica (19 August 1990), municipality. The Serbs who were travelling in their passenger cars or buses to the SDS inaugural rally in Kravica were pelted with stones (cars and buses were smashed and people sustained minor or severe injuries) on their way through the Muslim settlements of Potočari, , Glogova and Konjević Polje.

7. The Muslims simply did not allow the Serbs in to display their national insignia in public because it supposedly offended them, whereas they could wear the insignia of some Arab peoples and Turkey in addition to their own national insignia. The fact that Muslim extremists set fire to SDS flags in the Serbian settlement of Kravica several times best illustrates the extent to which the Muslims in these parts were intolerant of any Serbian insignia.

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 2 81787 Translation

8. The SDS won the local multiparty elections in Vlasenica, having captured 44.43% of the votes. The SDA followed with 43.38% and the remaining 12% of the votes went to some minor parties. Based on these results, a municipal assembly was established. It consisted of 60 assemblymen: 27 from the SDS, 26 from the SDA and seven representing other parties. An agreement was reached at the republican level that the Serbs and Muslims in Vlasenica should establish government based on the fifty-fifty principle.

9. At the SDS and SDA level, commissions were set up and tasked with reaching agreement on the distribution of government posts on the fifty-fifty principle. Based on this agreement, we followed this principle: if the President of the SO /Municipal Assembly/ was a Serb, then the Chairman of the Executive Committee was a Muslim; if the Chief of the SJB /Public Security Station/ was a Serb, then the Commander of the SJB was a Muslim, and so on.

10. As soon as the nomination of candidates for specific posts began, the Muslims, that is, the SDA, faced the problem of not having qualified staff. The staff they proposed did not have adequate qualifications for the specific posts as required by the current regulations. Their proposals were accepted, however, following interventions from the republican level, and so a Muslim with a secondary school diploma (a machinist) was appointed to the post of SJB commander, which required VSS /university degree/, etc.

11. The next problem that was encountered in connection with the appointment of staff was created by the Muslim republican authorities, who gave instructions down their chain of authority that exclusively Muslims be appointed to supervisory posts in these institutions. For instance, the BH MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, where the Minister was a Muslim, gave instructions to the effect that all supervisory staff apart from the SJB Chief – a Serb – had to be Muslim, and so out of a total of six posts, only the post of SJB Chief was held by a Serb, and the remaining four supervisors were Muslims.

12. In June 1991, by order of the SDA leadership, the break-up of the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/ and the TO /Territorial Defence/ began. The Muslims were ordered to stop sending their conscripts to do compulsory military service and to stop responding to the TO call-up. Following this order, the Muslims in Vlasenica stopped doing compulsory military service in the JNA. They refused to respond to the TO call-up (the meeting of IZETBEGOVIĆ, TUĐMAN and KUČAN).

13. A well-known example of the implementation of this order is the gathering of Muslims outside the municipality building in Vlasenica in early July 1991. They forced the President of the Vlasenica SO, Milenko STANIC, to provide buses to take them to Zalužani near Banja , where a TO unit was based. This unit had been mobilised in and then sent to Zalužani, and some of its members were Muslim. They wanted them to bring them back because they did not want to be in the same units with Serbs any longer.

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 3 81786 Translation

14. Under pressure, President of the Municipality Milenko STANIC provided the buses and they went to Zalužani and brought back all their fellow-Muslims who were in that unit. In Zalužani, they addressed the members of that unit, uttering a series of accusations and insults at the expense of the JNA and TO, of which the Serbs were members. It is important to add that all this was taking place under the leadership of top SDA officials from Vlasenica, in particular the chairman of the IO /Executive Committee/, Izet REDŽIC.

15. All this disagreement between Muslim representatives and ours, the withdrawal of Muslims from the TO unit that had been sent to Zalužani after mobilisation and many other things caused mutual intolerance. Fear and mutual mistrust grew every day. The Muslims started arming themselves hurriedly.

16. The fact that the Muslims were arming themselves at a fast pace indicated that they were preparing for war in BH. The Serbs protested to their representatives in the municipal authorities and requested that somebody guarantee their safety. We, the authorities, tried to persuade the Serbs that if the Muslims tried to do anything, the JNA would intervene because the JNA and the police were the only legal, that is, constitutional, guarantor of sovereignty and peace. I believed in this myself, until 4 May 1992, when 3,000 members of the Croatian army and police from the neighbouring Republic of Croatia crossed over to Bosanski Brod and the Chief of the JNA Garrison Command in Tuzla, Colonel STUBLINČEVIC, did not do anything with the JNA Military Police battalion. The following day he tried to justify himself in front of JNA commander JANKOVIC and me, saying: “I couldn’t let a single young soldier get killed.” We could not rely on police very much, either, because it had been divided ever since the establishment of national parties.

17. The Chief of the Vlasenica SJB, the late Rade BJELANOVIC, could not do much to prevent the accelerated procurement of weapons by the Vlasenica Muslims, given the current composition of the police force. Muslim policemen through their connections immediately informed the Chief of the Public Security Centre in Tuzla whenever an operation was being planned to cut off Muslim illegal weapons supply channels and so most of these operations failed.

18. Thanks to the persistence of the SJB Chief, efforts to cut off the channels of illegal weapons procurement did yield some results after all, as indicated by the statements of some Muslims who were caught carrying out this illegal activity. The /then/ Chief of the SJB, the late Rade BJELANOVIĆ, informed the Tuzla CSB /Security Services Centre/, to which his SJB belonged, about these activities. The Tuzla CSB Chief, ŠARIC, (a Muslim), then took disciplinary action against Chief BJELANOVIC on the grounds that the latter had failed to inform the Centre when the activities in question were being planned. Had the Centre been informed, these operations would have fallen through, just like many others did.

19. The following distinguished Muslims of Vlasenica figured prominently in the procurement of weapons for the Muslims: SJB Commander Fadil TURKOVIĆ, who was caught by the police as he transported weapons in an official police car; Munib AHMETOVIĆ, the hodja of Vlasenica; Bećir MEKANIC, the TO Staff Commander,

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 4 81785 Translation

who also transported weapons in an official TO Staff car (Lada); and Mehmed KAVAZBAŠIC, a deputy in the BH Assembly, who personally distributed 500 weapons, mainly automatic and semi-automatic, down the well-known SDA supply line.

20. Along with the speedy procurement of weapons, the Muslims in Vlasenica also established paramilitary formations (the Patriotic League and the HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/). They started training these paramilitary units and sending command personnel to Croatia for training. The SDA central office instructed executive committees in the municipalities where the Muslims were in the majority to nominate Muslims for policemen so that they would be sent to Croatia for training. These activities were carried out by the Muslim part of the BH MUP, through the SDA. The Serbian staff in the SJB was not informed about this at all. In this way, the Muslims established a third armed force, in addition to the above-mentioned paramilitary formations.

21. In the latter half of 1991 there was a series of incidents and open threats against the Serbian people, and some Muslims started carrying weapons practically in public. In the same period, the political goals of the Muslim leadership were being formulated.

22. The security situation was getting out of control on a daily basis and so the Serbs and the Muslims started organising night guards around their settlements for their own safety. People started leaving Vlasenica out of fear. The Serbs left for Serbia and the Muslims left for Tuzla, and Kladanj, while some went abroad.

23. Bearing in mind their very bad collective memories of their gullibility and the victims from the previous wars, and knowing that the Muslims and Croats in the BH Assembly had outvoted the Serbian representatives and adopted a decision for BH to secede from Yugoslavia and declare its sovereignty, the Serbian leadership proposed the establishment of the Birač AO /Autonomous District/.

24. On 26 December 1991, at its 11th session, the SO /Municipal Assembly/ /as printed/ and the Vlasenica Municipal Assembly adopted a decision that Vlasenica join the Birač AR /Autonomous Region/. Seven Muslims (five from the SDA) were present when this decision was being adopted. The decision said that Vlasenica municipality was joining the Birač AR, which is an inseparable part of Yugoslavia but also part of BH.

25. The Serbs who were members of the municipal authorities in Vlasenica tried everything they could to find peaceful solutions with the Muslims to all the problems, in order to avoid war. President of the municipality Milenko STANIC went to Tuzla with Muslim representatives to invite the Muslims who had fled to return to Vlasenica so that we could live together and reach agreements on all the problems. At this rally in Tuzla, the Muslim representatives who were members of the Vlasenica authorities did not show the least interest in getting the Muslims to return to Vlasenica and continue to live in it together with the Serbs. They kept saying that there could be no co-existence with the Serbs and so they had nowhere to return to.

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 5 81784 Translation

26. In addition to this attempt, we also went to the Muslim settlements in Vlasenica, Đile, Neđeljišta and some other settlements, and talked to the citizens, telling them that we could only solve all the problems in a peaceful way without consequences for both sides. We kept saying that war would bring nothing good to anyone, just evil. Ordinary people were in favour of solving the problems in a peaceful way and living together, but SDA representatives were against this and kept saying that there could be no co-existence with the Serbs.

27. In early 1992, the political and security situation in Vlasenica was deteriorating by the hour. We did not succeed in reaching any kind of agreement with Muslim representatives in the municipal authorities. Serbs and Muslims started leaving Vlasenica in large numbers. Many companies could not work properly because there were not enough employees, as people had left for Serbia, Tuzla, Kladanj, and other places.

28. Muslim paramilitary formations led by Ibrahim ADEMOVIC aka Cakura started setting up ambushes again in the Muslim settlement of Đile on the Milići – regional road. They searched buses and passengers, abducted passengers, hijacked lorries and buses. On one occasion they arrested a police patrol that came to intervene. Serbian representatives got in touch with Ibro NUHANOVIC and the leadership of Đile Local Commune and succeeded in having the abducted passengers released and getting some of the lorries and buses back.

29. Since we could not reach any agreement with Muslim representatives in the municipal authorities, we proposed that the administration and local self-government of the municipality be divided into three administrations/self-government bodies - the Serbian and Muslim municipalities of Vlasenica and the municipality of Milići - just to avoid bloodshed. A proposal was made to establish a working group consisting of six most distinguished representatives of Serbs and Muslims, who were tasked with drawing up an Agreement on the Division of the Municipality. We also drew up Protocol of the Agreement on the Division of the Municipality.

30. The Vlasenica SO adopted this Agreement at its session held on 13 April 1992 because Muslim assemblymen were also present. All six conclusions clearly show that there was concern about the situation in the municipality, indicate the manner in which any problems would be approached (Conclusion no. 6) and send out an invitation to the inhabitants who had left to return.

31. Alija IZETBEGOVIC’s order to delay this as much as possible so that as many Muslims as possible would leave Vlasenica indicated that the SDA leadership ordered the departure of the Muslims, probably because they were preparing an all-out attack on Vlasenica. This is why you cannot say that the Muslim population was expelled from Vlasenica – it was a planned departure following an SDA directive.

32. We obtained information that the Muslims were preparing an all-out attack on Vlasenica in order to take control of it and establish their own government, following a directive from the SDA central office in Sarajevo. In order to frustrate the operation

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 6 81783 Translation

planned by the Muslims, an agreement was reached that we enter the town with our units. On 20/21 April 1992, two companies of the then TO from Milići (as JNA war units), a battalion of the 216th Mountain Brigade and a TO company from Šekovići entered Vlasenica. These units were tasked with providing security to all public institutions, public and other enterprises, so that property should not be looted, as these enterprises were not operating because their employees did not come to work (as the inhabitants of Vlasenica were leaving). There was no fighting at all, no resistance in Vlasenica on that day.

33. When the TO entered Vlasenica on 21 April 1992, the remaining Muslim population (at least 50% had already left by then) set out for Tuzla and Kladanj in large numbers. Some travelled in their own vehicles, some used regular bus lines, and some started coming to the municipality and police buildings, asking to be provided with organised transport to Tuzla and Kladanj.

34. In addition to the large number of Muslims who were waiting for transportation, Serbian refugees whom the Muslims had expelled from Goražde, Kladanj, and other places started arriving. They needed accommodation. The number of Muslims requesting transportation from Vlasenica was growing. Incidents often occurred between the frustrated Serbs, who had been expelled by the Muslims without being able to take anything with them, and the Muslims who were there.

35. To defuse the situation, the Vlasenica municipal authorities decided to put up the Serbian refugees from Goražde in the TO facility in Sušica. The families accommodated there would stay until transportation to Serbia was provided. Some Muslim families who were also waiting for transportation would give the keys to their houses and flats to some Serbs who had been expelled, so that the latter could move in.

36. After a few days, some Serbian families who had been expelled were put up in houses and flats and some moved on, and so the facility in Sušica was empty. Since a large number of Muslims gathered every day in front of the municipality and police buildings and the coach station, waiting for their turn to be provided with transportation and staying there overnight as well, the municipal authorities decided to put them up in the TO facility in Sušica until transportation was provided.

37. Several families would come to the TO facility in Sušica every day in order to depart for the Muslim territory. Some would come to the facility only to spend the night; they would go back home the next morning and then return /to the facility/ in the evening because they felt safer there. Organised transport was provided to Tuzla and Kladanj every day, but there were not enough buses to transport them all within a few days. I heard that a number of Muslim soldiers, taken prisoner by our soldiers somewhere near Zelina, were also put up in this facility, and were later moved to Batković near in order to be exchanged.

38. The departure of Muslims from Vlasenica took place in three stages, as follows: the people who left in the first stage were those who did not support the war option and who saw that their extremist leadership was leading them into war. Those who

1D01771-Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav-DEF50850/ast 7 81782 Translation

were afraid of the revenge of the Serbs for what their ancestors had done to the Serbs in World Wars I and II left in the second stage. The third stage began after 21 April 1992, when the Serbian refugees who were expelled by Muslims from Goražde, Srebrenica, Kladanj and Olovo started arriving in Vlasenica in mid-May 1992. The Muslims felt unsafe then, because they were in the minority, and they were also afraid of the revenge of the expelled Serbs.

39. Along with these developments in Vlasenica, Muslim paramilitary formations carried out a series of sabotage actions and set up ambushes. On 1 May 1992, for instance, they laid an ambush in the settlement of Žutica on the Milići – Skelani regional road for the drivers of buses and lorries going to the Boksit mine. On this occasion, they captured eight drivers, seven lorries and a bus (all these vehicles were property of the Boksit mine) and cut off this road. For several days, genuine war was waged between the JNA and the Muslims paramilitary forces.

40. On 16 May 1992, our forces (army and police) carried out an all-out operation to push back Muslim forces and free the road and the captured lorries and drivers. When we pushed back the Muslim forces and liberated the road, they attacked our villages – Bukovica, Vasiljevići and Paići, killing four and wounding more than ten of our members.

41. On 21 May 1992, Muslim sabotage groups set up an ambush again in Žutica village on the same road. They attacked a TAM lorry, property of the Boksit mine, from Milići, which was carrying employees to work. On this occasion they killed eight civilians, including two women and a child. Document no. 1D4075 – Criminal Report, filed by the Milići SJB /Public Security Station/ against the perpetrators of this heinous crime, and the statements of some of the surviving passengers and some Muslims.

42. On 27 May 1992, in Konjević Polje village on the Sarajevo – Zvornik main road, Muslim paramilitary forces set up an ambush for a column of Boksit’s drivers returning in their lorries from Zvornik, where they had delivered ore. On this occasion, they killed five drivers and Boksit employees. Document no. 1D4068 – Statement given by Mirsad SULEJMANOVIC, a Muslim who was taken prisoner, in which he states who had set up the ambush in Konjević Polje and participated in other attacks on Serbian villages.

43. Muslim sabotage and terrorist organisations carried out sabotage actions on the roads: in , on the Sarajevo - Zvornik main road, they mined the metal bridge and the concrete support wall at the approach to Nova Kasaba from the direction of Milići, on the Milići - Skelani regional road, near the Muslim settlement of Đile they mined the tunnel and cut down some large trees behind it, creating a barricade – an obstacle. From that point on, Milići and Vlasenica were cut off from Serbia. Paragraphs 52, 53 and 54 of this statement make it clear that all the massacres and sabotage actions took place in the centres of their settlements, as they probably expected a response from the Serbs and wanted to provoke us to use excessive force.

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44. In the same way, the Muslims mined and damaged all electric power transmission lines (the Višegrad – Tuzla, Kladanj – Vlasenica, Zvornik – Milići bauxite mine and bauxite mine – Potočari transmission lines). In this way, the municipalities of Milići and Vlasenica were left entirely without electricity.

45. In those days, Serbian refugees from Srebrenica, Kladanj and Goražde flooded Milići and Vlasenica municipalities, bringing with them the memories of the horrific events they had survived. There were approximately 2,350 Serbian refugees in Vlasenica and approximately 1,150 Serbian refugees who sought shelter in Milići.

46. When the JNA left BH, Muslims from the direction of Srebrenica, and Kladanj started carrying out bloody attacks on all Serbian villages in Milići and Vlasenica municipalities (Bukovica, Koprivno, Metaljka, Rupovo Brdo; Rogosija, Neđeljišta, Pajići, Butkovići, Vukšići, Završje, Gake, Šadići, Kleštani, Podravanje, and other villages). They killed everyone in sight and everything that was Serbian, they torched houses and looted movable property.

47. With regard to the killing of the Muslims in Drum settlement, I can say that Ferid HODŽIC, who lived in this settlement, organised a checkpoint with paramilitary formations at the approach to this settlement from the direction of Vlasenica town immediately, in early 1992. Nobody could go through this checkpoint without being searched. Not even policemen could enter the settlement because those manning the checkpoint would not let them. On this day, almost simultaneously, members of the Cerani detachment (Muslim paramilitary formation) attacked, looted and torched the Serbian village of Metaljka and then attacked the Serbian village of Vandžići, with no success.

48. The command of the Muslim armed forces was located in the house of Ferid’s father in Drum, and their crisis staff often had sessions there.

49. While implementing the decision of the Vlasenica SO (joint assembly) of 13 April 1992 that persons in illegal possession of automatic weapons must hand them back or be disarmed, JNA and TO units encountered armed resistance and people were killed on both sides. The Muslims in Gradina were armed by Fadil TURKOVIC, Commander of the Vlasenica SJB. The original document is with MUP inspector Zoran DURMIC.

50. With regard to the Muslim casualties in the settlements of Pijuke and Gradina, I believe that the situation was the same as that in Drum. All I know is that before the war broke out, on several occasions in late 1991 and early 1992, armed Muslim extremists from Gradina fired automatic weapons on the buses carrying secondary school students from Vlasenica to Milići and Nova Kasaba, and 19 members of the Patriotic League, wearing black Ustasha uniforms and carrying automatic weapons, moved about Pijuke and its surroundings in public, and fighting broke out while /they/ were being disarmed.

51. Knowing that the Vlasenica – Šekovići – Zvornik road was the only one you could take from Milići, Vlasenica and to Serbia, Bijeljina and , Muslim

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sabotage formations laid an ambush on the pass known as Crni Vrh on 10 September 1992. On this occasion, they killed 28 passengers and drivers. Dozens were wounded, and dozens of lorries and passenger vehicles were torched.

52. With regard to the incident that occurred in Zaklopača on 16 May 1992, when a number of Muslims were killed, I can say that it was a typical incident and not a planned action thought out in advance. On that day, Muslim forces from Srebrenica and Žepa clashed with our forces along the entire line towards Srebrenica. The fighting went on until late that night, and four of our soldiers were killed and dozens wounded.

53. On that day, JNA columns were passing through Milići while withdrawing – one from Jastrebarsko, Croatia (it had been marching for approximately 600 km) and the other from Tuzla, having survived the massacre in Tuzla the previous day. While these units were resting in Milići, the dead bodies and the wounded from the fight with Srebrenica Muslims started coming in. Outraged JNA members who had survived the horrible events in Tuzla and the relatives and friends of the soldiers from Milići who had been killed that day spontaneously formed a group and, furious and embittered, took reprisals against the Muslim inhabitants of the nearest village. Some JNA soldiers said that a bullet was fired at them from Zaklopača while they were passing.

54. Zaklopača village was populated by both Muslims and Serbs. The fact that the attackers fired at the Serbian houses as well, not knowing that these were not Muslim houses, is one of the facts that indicate that most members of the group that attacked this village had come from another area (they were not from Milići).

55. As the only road that connected Milići, Vlasenica and Pale with Serbia, Bijeljina and Krajina, the Milići– Vlasenica – Zvornik road, became unsafe because the Muslim forces laid ambushes and killed passengers almost every day, the local authorities in these municipalities requested that the political and military leadership of the RS /Republika Srpska/ do something to solve this problem. The biggest problem, in addition to supplying food items for the population, was the transport of the wounded to the only hospital with surgical departments, the Zvornik hospital, and also to .

56. In order to protect the Serbian population in Podrinje and enable the delivery of basic foodstuffs, the state and army leadership decided that a vital corridor had to be established: the Vlasenica – Milići – Zvornik corridor via Konjević Polje and Drinjača. This corridor was vital not only to the Serbs in Podrinje but also for the Sarajevo – region. The only way to transport the seriously wounded from the Sarajevo – Romanija and Birač region to Belgrade was via this road. Transport by air was not an option because the air traffic was controlled by UNPROFOR.

57. In late February 1993, units of the Milići, Vlasenica and, in part, the Zovrnik and Bratunac Brigades embarked upon a decisive, life-and-death battle against the Cerani and Zvornik Detachments and the 16th Muslim Brigade, which were supported by extremely strong forces from Srebrenica and Žepa. The fierce fighting lasted more

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than 20 days, and the Muslim forces were totally smashed and forced to withdraw towards Tuzla, Kladanj and Srebrenica. When the operation started, a corridor towards Tuzla and Kladanj was left and so all the Muslims who wanted to leave Cerska via this corridor did so.

58. /?When/ the Muslim forces withdrew towards Srebrenica, both roads, Vlasenica – Milići – Konjević Polje – Zvornik and Milići – Konjević Polje – Bratunac, were finally passable again, after one year. This operation liberated some Serbian villages, for instance, Kravica, Ježestica, Magašići and Lipenovići.

59.Our army was advancing towards Srebrenica, with the intention of finally settling the accounts with the notorious Muslim units that had shrouded the Podrinje Serbs in mourning. When they arrived at elevation Ravni Buljim, which is a tri-border point among Milići, Srebrenica and Bratunac municipalities, scouts informed them that the entire Muslim army with the entire population was withdrawing towards Podravanje and Žepa.

60. Although the snow was more than one metre high, the army did not give up its intention to finally settle the accounts with the notorious Muslim units of Srebrenica. The RS state and military leadership ordered that the military operation be halted immediately because a representative of the international peacekeeping forces, General Philippe MORILLON, was to enter Srebrenica. The UN Security Council had declared Srebrenica and Žepa safe areas.

61. Srebrenica and Žepa were declared safe areas and were to be demilitarised. This meant that the Muslim units from Srebrenica had to be completely disarmed and banned from carrying out any military activities. Peacekeeping forces from the Canadian Brigade, the strength of one or two battalions, arrived in Srebrenica. This battalion tried to make the Muslim army hand over all army weapons, but the attempt failed because the military and political leadership in Sarajevo had ordered that they only hand over old and broken weapons.

62. At the beginning, when the peacekeeping forces (the Canadian battalion) arrived in Srebrenica, the Srebrenica soldiers hid their weapons, but later, when the Dutch battalion arrived, they started carrying army weapons again in public, carrying out military training, fortifying their positions, and so on. Weapons and ammunition were delivered to the Muslims by helicopter in public, but the UN forces did not react at all.

63. We knew very well, because we received intelligence to that effect, that Operations Group /OG/ 8, which was part of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army, was the first to start functioning in the “safe and demilitarised area”. Later on, following a reorganisation, the 28th Division of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army was formed, with five brigades and a number of independent units that were functioning.

64. The goal of this unit was never to defend but only to carry out active combat operations, which is clear from a series of documents that we seized and so we were able to obtain true information about the strength and intentions of the opponent. Sabotage actions throughout the war years after the “safe areas” were established

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clearly show what the plans of the 28th Division of the BH Army were. The statements of their leaders, most of all Naser ORIC, speak about this openly.

65. The BH Army leadership’s Order no. 01/KZ4954/94 of 4 October 1994 to the Command of OG 8 - Srebrenica to carry out detailed reconnaissance along the axis of the Srebrenica – Tuzla corridor, whose establishment was already being planned, best shows that the military leadership of the BH Army was preparing to carry out fresh combat operations from the safe area of Srebrenica. The document Order for Preparations to Carry Out Operation indicates the date on which they were supposed to start carrying out an all-out operation to capture entire Podrinje.

66. The orders that the military leadership of the BH Army sent to the Command of OG 8 – Srebrenica to carry out combat operations even though it was in the safe area were intended to tie down the Serbian forces around Srebrenica, which would make things easier for them on the Sarajevo front, where they were carrying out one of the fiercest offensive operations.

67. In the Milići area alone, from mid-1993 until July 1995, the Muslim forces from Srebrenica and their DTG /sabotage and terrorist groups/ carried out a large number of actions and killed many civilians and soldiers. They killed Saša GAVRILOVIC in Buljim, VESIC on the Žutica – road, five wood-cutters near Rupovo Brdo on 7 July 1995, Radenko RUŽIČIC in the Bijelo Stijenje sector, and Živan VUJADINOVIC in Višnjica on 26 June 1995, where they also wounded a woman and torched seven houses. The most horrific massacre was that of the five wood-cutters and towards the village of Višnjica.

68. Order no. 03-123/95 of 17 April 1995 issued by the BH Minister of Defence and Order no. 03/103-15 of 30 January 1995 issued by the Commander of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army on the establishment of reserve units and transforming CZ /Civilian Protection/ units into active units in Srebrenica are about the reorganisation of the army in the safe area of Srebrenica, which resulted in the establishment of the 28th Division, comprising between 14,000 and 15,000 soldiers.

69. Our military and civilian intelligence services obtained information on the reorganisation of the Muslim army in Srebrenica, its arming (how it received weapons and ammunition in military helicopters), training and speedy preparations to carry out an all-out offensive to capture all of Podrinje and join Srebrenica to Tuzla and Kladanj.

70. The leaderships of Milići, Vlasenica, Šekovići, Zvornik and Bratunac municipalities could no longer bear the pressure from the people and so they asked the state and military leadership to do something to protect the innocent Serbian people of this area from the criminals of the 28th Divison of Srebrenica and prevent the planned offensive against Podrinje.

71. The RS political and military leadership, probably unable to resist the pressure from the Podrinje Serbs and knowing that the Muslims in Srebrenica were preparing an all-out offensive to join Srebrenica to Tuzla and Kladanj, decided to carry out an

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operation to push the Srebrenica Muslim formations back within the borders of the safe area in order to separate them from Žepa and thus weaken them.

72. When our army launched the military operation to push the Muslims back inside the borders of the safe area, I was the President of Milići municipality and received information that our forces were advancing from the direction of Zeleni . The Milići Brigade was holding the previously reached positions towards Srebrenica. I think it was on 11 July that we received information that our forces had entered Srebrenica and that the Muslim soldiers, between 12,000 and 14,000 of them, started a breakthrough towards Tuzla, while the civilians left in the direction of Potočari, towards the UN base.

73. Knowing that a huge number of Muslim soldiers armed to the teeth was moving towards Tuzla, I asked the Milići Brigade Command and the Zvornik CJB /Public Security Centre/ to engage as many men as possible (army and police) to protect the civilian population of the settlements along the line of the breakthrough and the passengers on the Milići – Zvornik main road. (Because the population of the settlements along the line of the breakthrough and in Milići itself was in danger, I cancelled the work obligation in our municipality).

74. The Zvornik CJB engaged a maximum number of policemen to secure the Milići – Zvornik road from Đugum to Konjević Polje and the Milići Brigade engaged soldiers in the settlements along the axis of movement of the Muslims.

75. On 11 or 12 July 1995, I received information that the Muslim forces had broken through the 1st Milići Battalion (Bokičin Potok) and crossed the road in Kaldrmica and Zuberi villages, fighting all the time, and so there were many dead on both sides. Our forces were significantly outnumbered and so had to withdraw and stay at a distance from which they could control the passage.

76. While the Muslims were crossing the road many of them were killed in combat, especially along the Đugum – Kaldrmica – Konjević Polje road, where most of them were advancing. During the next few days, the bodies were collected and buried in several graves, along the Đugum – Kaldrmica – Konjević polje road, in order to prevent an outbreak of disease, since the weather was very warm.

77. Some time in the second half of July, an engineers officer (I do not remember whether he was from the engineers unit from Konjević Polje or from the GŠ /Main Staff/) came to see me at the municipality building, asking that I organise the implementation of hygiene and sanitation measures in the area along the Buljim – Kaldrmica road to prevent an outbreak of disease. I refused, saying that I had neither personnel nor equipment at my disposal and that it was not my job to do that.

78. Several days later, I gathered three or four soldiers from Milići who were free and went with them to Gornji Mratinjci. From the village graveyard in Gornji Mratinjci we set out in the direction in which the column of Muslim soldiers had moved. As we were moving along that route, I had a clear view of the slope towards Bokičin Potok, where I could see hundreds of Muslim bodies. In Bokičin Potok itself, a group of

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Muslim bodies was turned towards Bokičin Potok and the other from Bokičin Potok towards Dolovi and Zabrđe.

79. Along the road through Gornji Mratinjci, Bokičin Potok, above Donji Mratinjci, towards Pervani and Sandići, we saw more than 2,000 Muslim bodies. Some of them were blown up by hand grenades – their bellies (stomachs) were blown up. Most bodies were dressed in military camouflage uniforms, and some were in SMB /olive- drab/ uniforms, uniforms worn by the Civilian Protection (blue), and some were in civilian clothes. I did not have the strength to go beyond Sandići because I could no longer bear the horrific sights.

80. This information was confirmed to me as the President of the municipality in 1998 by Ms Inese MISKA /name as printed/ from Lithuania, who was an ICRC representative that was present when a federal commission worked on collecting the remains of the Muslims killed during the breakthrough. She told me that 2,600 bodies or body parts had been found and taken to a disused mine, Lipnica, near Tuzla.

81. With regard to the Commander, General Ratko MLADIC, I first heard of him in late 1991 in connection with the successful withdrawal of the JNA from Macedonia. There were no armed incidents with the Macedonian population or leadership, which was one of the reasons for most of us in BH to have him as the commander.

82. I never heard him or anyone else from the state leadership order the killing or deportation of Muslims, their detention in camps or destruction of their property. On the contrary, he used to say that great care must be taken to protect Muslim and Croatian civilians, that detainees must be treated utterly humanely, and so on.

83. Every incident that occurred at the beginning in Vlasenica and Milići municipalities was dealt with by the municipal government, police and army in the manner they believed was the best at the time. Only later, in a period that followed, did they inform the political and military leadership, following the appropriate line of reporting. This was not the case only in our municipalities – most municipalities did the same, because we were unable to get in touch with the state and military leadership immediately because the communications were down and the roads were not passable.

84. From the very beginning of the civil war in BH, revenge was unfortunately part of behaviour of individuals and groups, both Serbian and Muslim. The following cases of revenge are well-known: in Zaklopača/Žutica, Kravica/Glogova or, for instance, the destruction of the mosque in Vlasenica after the torching and massacre of Serbian civilians in the villages of Klještani and Šadići, and other places. We knew that every time we defeated the Muslim army, retribution or revenge were bound to follow a day or two later.

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WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have read this statement consisting of 13 pages and it contains all that I said, to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement of my own free will and I am aware that it may be used in proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International /Humanitarian/ Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, and that I may be called to testify in public before this Tribunal.

Signature: /signed/

Date: 11 August 2014

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC

Annex B ______

IT‐09‐92‐T 1 September 2014 12 81760

SAVKIC Tomislav Witness Statement to be admited pursuant Rule 92ter Closed Session / Statement Date 65ter Number Under seal Witness Statement of SAVKIC Tomislav 11 August 2014 1D01771 / Associated Exhibits wich the Defence seeks to tender pursuant to Rule 92ter Paragraph Description Number 65ter Number Doc ID (BCS/ENG) ABiH, Command of the 2nd Corps - Order, 68 RM 65ter 1D02321 1D08-2894 03/103-15, signed by Akif KUSLJUGIC (Karadžić EXH D02938) 1D08-2896 RBiH, Ministry of Defence - Decision, 68 RM 65ter 1D02322 1D08-2900 str.con.03-123/95, signed by Muhamed LEMES (Karadžić EXH D02939) 1D08-2902 Statement by Mirsad SULEJMANOVIC 42 RM 65ter 1D03094 (Karadžić 65ter 1D04068) RS, MUP, Milici - Criminal report signed by 41 RM 65ter 1D03095 Radomir BJELANOVIC (Karadžić 65ter 1D04075)