DOCSLIB.ORG

UNJLC IRAQ BULLETIN No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UNJLC IRAQ BULLETIN No www.unjlc.org UNJLC IRAQ BULLETIN No. 6 of 2004 August 27th, 2004 UNJLC Bulletins aim to provide a clear and concise regular overview of the situation as it exists in Iraq with regards to logistics matters that may affect the work of the humanitarian community. They focus on practical issues that affect the welfare of the populace and related humanitarian work such as the status of transport corridors for humanitarian supplies into Iraq, relevant administrative or commercial developments, and availability of fuels. They further seek to identify major issues for the humanitarian community and other interested parties, to provide relevant background and constructive recommendations on current issues, and to alert responsible parties to emerging issues. 1. Logistics Co-ordination Forum: Amman 2. Transport Corridors UNJLC convened on August 25th, 2004 a Logistics Co- In this bulletin, UNJLC will focus on the Southern corridor, ordination Forum in Amman, grouping those responsible for part of which provides Iraq’s only direct access from the logistics matters in the respective UN agencies and sea, following a mission by UNJLC to the Iraq-Kuwait international organisations. border at Umm Qasr. The primary purpose of the forum is to provide an informal The Turkish corridor was covered in UNJLC Bulletin 5 setting for participants to share information and (August 13th, 2004), the Syrian corridor was addressed perspectives on the challenges they face moving more fully in UNJLC Bulletin 3 of 2004 (July 16th, 2004); humanitarian aid and other goods into Iraq so that Jordan in Bulletin 2 (July 2nd); and Umm Qasr in Bulletin common approaches and solutions may be explored, if 1 (June 18th). appropriate. (a) Volumes Estimate It is clear that most agencies and international organisations have well-established logistical arrangements Overall volumes of cargo into Iraq through all means – by in place, generally using professional transporters or land, sea and air – seem to be generally steady. Capacity is forwarders. A number of these parties are still moving adjusting to the evolving situation and commercial significant humanitarian cargoes into the country; others operators in Iraq and regionally become more active. have minimal traffic but may increase volumes once the Excluding military-related and fuel cargos, it is now security environment becomes more permissive and their estimated, based on discussions with transporters and programmes may be more fully reinstated; some have very forwarders and observations at borders and ports, that specialised shipments; others are interested in the overall approximately 60,000 tonnes per day enters the country, logistical picture to assist in their contingency planning. broadly as follows: Est. tonnes The forum proved particularly useful in apprising per day participants of the relative merits of the respective Umm Qasr and other south Iraq ports 15,000 corridors into Iraq and making them aware of transport Turkey, via Silopi/Zakho borders 15,000 options that they may have been unaware of in what is a Jordan, via Karama/Trebil borders 16,000 steadily evolving logistical environment. In particular, there Syria, through both land borders 13,000 seems to be less awareness of the options available for Kuwait and others 6,000 getting goods in by air, with a trade-off between security Estimated total 65,000 costs for ground transports and the more expensive air In addition to this, it is estimated that an average of at freight rates. least 150 tonnes of air cargo enters Iraq daily. The consensus of participants at the inaugural sessions was that the forum reconvene no more frequently than (b) Southern Corridor: General Description fortnightly, but more frequently than monthly. The next session of the forum is therefore tentatively scheduled for Iraq’s main port of Umm Qasr is now managed by the Iraq mid-September. Logistics personnel from all UN agencies, Ports Authority. Owing to security constraints, the main international organisations and NGO’s operating out of stevedoring activities are now concentrated in the New Amman for Iraq are welcome to participate. Port, located in the northern part of the port complex, where management has improved security to an acceptable Should demand warrant, a similar forum may be convened level. Part of the security improvement strategy involved for logistics officers and other interested parties operating discouraging dhows calling at Umm Qasr. These smaller out of Kuwait. vessels now frequent the nearby smaller ports of Khor Al- Zubayr, north of Umm Qasr, and Abu Floos, on the Shatt Al-Arab Waterway. ABOUT UNJLC: UNJLC is an inter-agency facility reporting to the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq and generally to the Inter Agency Standing Committee. Its mandate is to coordinate and optimise logistics capabilities of humanitarian organisations in large scale emergencies. UNJLC operates under the custodianship of WFP that is responsible for the administrative and financial management of the unit. UNJLC is funded from voluntary contributions that are channelled through WFP. The UNJLC project document for Iraq can be viewed at the UNJLC website (www.unjlc.org). Bulletin 6 of 2004, August 27th, 2004 Page 2 of 6 2. Transport Corridors (cont’d) (e) The Reconstruction Levy: Improvements (b) Southern Corridor: An Overview (cont’d) The Reconstruction Levy, imposed by CPA Order 38 as amended by CPA order 70, is levied mainly on commercial Khor Al-Zubayr continues to be run by Maersk (AP Moeller) cargo going into Iraq at a rate of 5%. It will be applied at and has experienced few, if any security problems. This is least through to the end of 2005. Food, government in part due to its more isolated location, away from villages purchases and reconstruction materials are exempt, but and other facilities. During July, it saw increased traffic of collections under it provide an indication of the value of inbound food and some exports of dates and lentils. non-exempt imports into Iraq. The authorities have closed most of the smaller jetties on The Basra region, which covers the southern corridor, is the Shatt Al-Arab, causing the Abu Floos facility to receive responsible for seven entry points as noted in the graph an increased number of calls. The Shatt Al-Arab ports and below. Overall, the region has shown a steady increase in jetties can only accommodate small vessels whereas all collections of the levy in recent months, with more than larger vessels must call at Umm Qasr or Khor Al-Zubayr. US$2 million collected in July, up from less than US$1.5 million in June. (c) Volumes There has been a significant increase in collections from Abu Floos. This reflects the closure of the Shatt Al-Arab The most prominent commodity imported through Iraq’s jetties where it was more difficult to collect the levy and ports continues to be food. Umm Qasr handles about the concentration of trade on Abu Floos. This area had 10,000 tonnes per day of food with bulk grain through its been considered less manageable than the two main ports silo facility, from break-bulk vessels and containers. Khor of Umm Qasr and Khor Al-Zubayr but marked Al-Zubayr handles around 500 tons of food per day. Food improvements seem to have taken place. volumes through Abu Floos are of a much smaller order. As most of the food and reconstruction material – being All three ports handle containers in addition to food cargos, exempt from the levy yet nevertheless accounting for most with the vast majority going through Umm Qasr. imports - goes through Umm Qasr, the graph cannot give a correct indication of volumes in general. It is, however, Owing to the implementation of regulations on maximum clear that commercial trade into Iraq is increasing, and that age of imported used vehicles and saturation in the the relative freedom of Abu Floos is more appreciated by market, significantly fewer cars were imported through the traders than the two more established ports. The popularity of Abu Floos may be in part due to the onerous Inspection- ports in July than earlier in year. The trade is certainly nd continuing and is expected to do so, but at a reduced level. at-Sea regime (see UNJLC Bulletin 2 of July 2 , 2004) for containerized vessels calling at Umm Qasr and Khor Al- No military cargos seem to pass through Umm Qasr. Zubayr, which makes them less cost-competitive compared to the smaller vessels calling at Abu Floos. APRIL Basra Region Monthly Customs Levy (USD) MAY JUNE 2,500,000 JULY 2,000,000 1,500,000 $ USD 1,000,000 500,000 - S R R N Y A O A A C M FAO TAL L TO FALO MAQUIL A L SAFW Z ZUB UMM QAS A SHALA BU A A HOR K Location ABOUT UNJLC: UNJLC is an inter-agency facility reporting to the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq and generally to the Inter Agency Standing Committee. Its mandate is to coordinate and optimise logistics capabilities of humanitarian organisations in large scale emergencies. UNJLC operates under the custodianship of WFP that is responsible for the administrative and financial management of the unit. UNJLC is funded from voluntary contributions that are channelled through WFP. The UNJLC project document for Iraq can be viewed at the UNJLC website (www.unjlc.org). Bulletin 6 of 2004, August 27th, 2004 Page 3 of 6 2. Transport Corridors (cont’d) (h) Tugboats and Pilots There is general dissatisfaction among operators and (d) Rail Connections agents in Umm Qasr about the availability of tugboats and pilots. Only two tugboats are shipshape and there is a Efforts are under way to re-establish the rail link from constant lack of fuel to run them. Umm Qasr through to Baghdad. Sabotage and a lack of rolling stock have prevented resumption of a full service.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options
    CASE STUDY NO. 8 COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options John Hodgson The Pennsylvania State University KAREN GUTTIERI SERIES EDITOR Naval Postgraduate School COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and recon- struction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability opera- tions frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social well- being, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach. Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
    Order Code RL31701 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated July 15, 2007 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for Al Qaeda terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB) weapons, and no CB or nuclear weapons stockpiles or production facilities have been found. The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement and training/retaining sufficient Iraqi security forces to assume responsibility for the nations domestic security. Though initially denying that there was an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is regional/local organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.” DOD initially believed the resistance to consist primarily of former regime supporters and foreign fighters; however, it has now acknowledged that growing resentment of coalition forces and an increase in sectarian conflicts, independent of connections with the earlier regime, are contributing to the insurgency.
    [Show full text]
  • The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
    The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq By Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, Adam Mausner, and Charles Loi Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Revised: December 20, 2011 Note: This draft is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected] Chapter 6: US Strategic Competition with Iran: Competition in Iraq 2 Executive Summary "Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered that tree, pruned it, and cared for it. Ask your American friends why they're leaving now before the tree bears fruit." --Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.1 Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security. The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and the Kurds: the Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk
    IRAQ AND THE KURDS: THE BREWING BATTLE OVER KIRKUK Middle East Report N°56 – 18 July 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. COMPETING CLAIMS AND POSITIONS................................................................ 2 A. THE KURDISH NARRATIVE....................................................................................................3 B. THE TURKOMAN NARRATIVE................................................................................................4 C. THE ARAB NARRATIVE .........................................................................................................5 D. THE CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE .................................................................................................6 III. IRAQ’S POLITICAL TRANSITION AND KIRKUK ............................................... 7 A. USES OF THE KURDS’ NEW POWER .......................................................................................7 B. THE PACE OF “NORMALISATION”........................................................................................11 IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS................................................................ 16 A. THE KURDS.........................................................................................................................16 B. THE TURKOMANS ...............................................................................................................19
    [Show full text]
  • Working Paper IRAQ United Nations
    Public Disclosure Authorized Working Paper Public Disclosure Authorized IRAQ United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment Transportation & Telecommunications Public Disclosure Authorized TASK MANAGER: MOHAMMED FEGHOUL, WORLD BANK AGENCIES PARTICIPATING: UNDP & ITU Public Disclosure Authorized October 2003 Joint Iraq Needs Assessment Working Paper – Transport and Telecommunications 2 Currency Rate Currency Unit: Iraqi Dinar (ID) US$1 = ID1,500 (August 2003) TRANSPORT.................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 3 HIGHWAYS, ROADS, AND BRIDGES............................................................................. 4 Characteristics and Summary Status................................................................................................................. 4 Institutional Structure, Staffing, and Financing ................................................................................................ 5 Priority Needs and Funding Requirements........................................................................................................ 6 AIRPORTS AND CIVIL AVIATION ................................................................................. 9 Airport Characteristics and Summary Status................................................................................................... 9 Airline Services ..................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Boundary Dispute Between Kuwait and Iraq Has It Subsided?
    LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ HAS IT SUBSIDED? By MAHA ALKENAEE A thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs School of Arts and Sciences August 2011 L E B A N E S E A M E R I C A N U NIVERSITY School of Arts and Sciences - Beirut Campus Thesis Approval Form Student Name: Maha Alkenaee I.D. #: 200400150 Thesis Title The Boundary Dispute Between Kuwait and Iraq Has it Subsided? Program : Master of Arts in International Affairs Department : Social Sciences School : School of Arts and Sciences ii iii iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research would not have been possible without the help and assistance of many persons. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Sami Baroudi who has been a great support throughout all stages of my postgraduate studies. I am also deeply grateful to all of my professors in the Lebanese American University from whom I have learned an abundant amount of knowledge. v To my loving family vi THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ HAS IT SUBSIDED? Maha Kenaee Abstract This thesis attempts three related tasks. First, it surveys the historic record which provides uncontestable evidence that Kuwait was never part of the Ottoman Empire and thus never formed a single administrative or political unit with Iraq or part of it. Second, it traces the turbulent history of Kuwait‟s relationship with Iraq ever since the latter achieved independence in 1932; arguing that this turbulent relationship invited the intervention of regional and international players due to the strategic importance of Kuwait, especially since the discovery of oil.
    [Show full text]
  • Master Plan Study for Port Sector in the Republic of Iraq
    The Republic of Iraq General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI) MASTER PLAN STUDY FOR PORT SECTOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT ON SERVICE BERTH DECEMBER 2015 Japan International Cooperation Agency Ides Inc. Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. (NK) EI Oriental Consultants Global Co., Ltd. (OCG) CR(1) 15-213 MASTER PLAN STUDY FOR PORT SECTOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ December 2015 PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT ON SERVICE BERTH The Republic of Iraq General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI) MASTER PLAN STUDY FOR PORT SECTOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT ON SERVICE BERTH DECEMBER 2015 Japan International Cooperation Agency Ides Inc. Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. (NK) Oriental Consultants Global Co., Ltd. (OCG) Exchange Rates Date: June 2015 1US$ = 124.75 Japanese Yen 䝞䚷䝇䚷䝷䚷ᅜ䚷㝿䚷✵䚷 N 䝬䜻䞊䝹䠄䝞䝇䝷䠅 䜰䝤䞉䝣䝹䝇 䝞䝇䝷 䜰䝤䞉䝣䝹䝇 IRAQ 䜰䝹䝈䝧䞊䝹 SCALE 0510 20 km 䝅䝱䝖䝹䞉䜰䝷䝤Ἑ 䝞䚷䝇䚷䝷䚷ᕞ 䜲䝷䞁 䠄䜲䝷䜽䠅 N 䝁䞊䝹䞉䜰䝹䝈䝧䞊䝹 䜰䝹䞉䝣䜯䜸 Khaw Az Zubayr 䠄ᑐ㇟እ䠅 䝽䝹䝞ᓥ 䝣䜯䜸 䠄䜽䜴䜵䞊䝖䠅 䜴䞁䝮䞉䜹䝇䝹 ᪂䜰䝹䞉䝣䜯䜸 ணᐃᆅ 䜽䜴䜵䞊䝖 䝤䝡䝲䞁ᓥ 䠄䜽䜴䜵䞊䝖䠅 䜰䝷䝡䜰‴ River-2 River-1 NORTH PORT UMM QASR PORT HAJJAM ISLAND SOUTH PORT LOCATION MAP OF STUDY AREA Master Plan Study for Port Sector in the Republic of Iraq Pre-Feasibility Study Report on Service Berth Abbreviation AFGP Al-Faw Grand Port AIS Automatic Identification System C.I.I.T.I Italan Consoutium of Iraq Transport Infrastructure CMA-CGM Compagnie Maritime D'affrètement - Compagnie Générale Maritime CY Container Yard DANIDA Danish International Development Agency dB decibel D/D Detail Design DWT Dead Weight Tonnage EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIRR Economic
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Discussion Guide for Nowhere to Hide
    POV Community Engagement & Education DISCUSSION GUIDE Nowhere to Hide A Film by Zaradasht Ahmed www.pbs.org/pov LETTER FROM THE FILMMAKER Director Zaradasht Ahmed. My ambition is to let the audience reflect on the human consequences of a brutal Photo courtesy of Fouad Baqi reality where all taboos are violated. With Nowhere to Hide, I want to show that we are all part of this reality made up of war, explosions, victims, terrorism. They affect us globally, and we are all responsible, no matter our geographical whereabouts. Meanwhile, I want to show the human resistance that is growing among survivors and to show the hope of rebuilding after the breakdown of civilization. In the end, as humans, the only thing that can help us survive is to believe that the will to build will always be stronger than the desire to destroy. Zaradasht Ahmed Director, Nowhere to Hide DISCUSSION GUIDE Nowhere to Hide |2 TABLE OF CONTENTS CREDITS 2 Letter from the Filmmaker Writer 4 Introduction Faith Rogow, PhD 5 Potential Partners Insighters Educational Consulting 5 Key Issues Background Research and Reporting 5 Using This Guide Ione Barrows 6 Background Information Associate, Community Engagement and Education, POV 6 Iraq War Guide Producers, POV 7 Iraq War Casualties Alice Quinlan 8 Diyala Province Manager, Community Engagement and Education, POV 10 General Discussion Questions Rachel Friedland 11 Discussion Prompts Community Partnerships Assistant, 14 Taking Action Community Engagement and Education, POV 15 Resources Design: 16 Iraq War Timeline Rafael Jiménez 22 How to Buy the Film Copy Editor: Natalie Danford Thanks to those who reviewed this guide: Zaradasht Ahmed Director, Nowhere to Hide Mette Cheng Munthe-Kaas Producer, Nowhere to Hide The team at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) DISCUSSION GUIDE Nowhere to Hide |3 INTRODUCTION Nowhere to Hide (60 min.) follows nurse Nori Sharif in one of Nori filming in central Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kurdish Nationalist Movement and External Influences
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1980-12 The Kurdish nationalist movement and external influences Disney, Donald Bruce, Jr. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/17624 '";. Vi , *V ^y NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES by Donald Bruce Disney, Jr. December 1980 The sis Advisor: J. W. Amos, II Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited T19 «—,rob J Unclassified "wi.fy * N°* StCUHlTY CLASSIFICATION r>* THIS »>GI '•*>•« D«t Knlmrmd) READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORM •f*OAT NUMlf* 2. OOVT ACCCUION MO. J MKCl»lCNT'S CATALOG NUMBER. 4 TiTlE ,«.*Ju »mH) s. TY*e of neponT * rewoo covcncd The Kurdish Nationalist Movement Master's Thesis; and External Influences December 1980 * »I»ro»l»INQ owe. «I»OKT NUMIIR 7. AuTmO*><*> • contract o« chant HumUtnf) Donald Bruce Disney, Jr., LCDR, USN * RfBFORMINO OWOANI2ATION NAME AND >QD*tii tO. *«OG*AM CLEMENT. RBOjECT. T as* AREA * «OMK UNIT NUDUM Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 M CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME ANO ADDRESS 12. MFOUT DATE Naval Postgraduate School December, 1980 Monterey, California 93940 II. MUMBER O' WAGES 238 TT MONITORING AGENCY NAME A AOORESSfll if>'M*ml Ifmm Controlling Ottlc*) It- SICURITY CLASS. <al Iftlm report) Naval Postgraduate School Unclassified Monterey, California 93940 Im DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE l«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of Ihlt *•»•»!) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT at (»• •*•„•«( rnrnfm** In #I»c* 20, // dittfmt rrmm Mf rt) IE. SUFFLCMCNTARY NOTES '» KEY *O*0l (Continue em remem »!<*• It r\eceeeiy em* itemttty m, ilect IHMHMMP Kurds, Kurdish Nationalism, Kurdish Revolts, Kurdish Political Parties, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Sheikh Ezzedin, Abdul Rahman Qassemlu, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, UK, U.S., U.S.S.R., Israel, PLO, Armenians 20.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis
    IRAQ AND THE KURDS: RESOLVING THE KIRKUK CRISIS Middle East Report N°64 – 19 April 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: GROWING TENSIONS............................................................... 1 II. A TRAINWRECK IN THE MAKING.......................................................................... 2 A. NORMALISATION ...................................................................................................................2 B. THE ARTICLE 140 COMMITTEE ..............................................................................................4 C. THE ILL-CONSIDERED PUSH FOR A REFERENDUM IN 2007.......................................................7 D. FALL-OUT FROM FAILURE......................................................................................................9 III. THE NEED FOR A PROCESS.................................................................................... 11 IV. THE PATH TO A SETTLEMENT ............................................................................. 15 A. THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY ......................................................................................15 B. OUTLINES OF A GLOBAL SOLUTION......................................................................................17 V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 19 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ......................................................................................................................21
    [Show full text]
  • Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as CHILD POLICY a public service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION Jump down to document ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research NATIONAL SECURITY organization providing objective analysis and POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY effective solutions that address the challenges facing SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY the public and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND Support RAND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations Eric Peltz, John M. Halliday, Marc L. Robbins, Kenneth J. Girardini Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: Politics and Governance
    Iraq: Politics and Governance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs March 9, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21968 Iraq: Politics and Governance Summary Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—are fueling a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite- dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). Iraq’s Kurds are separately embroiled in political, territorial, and economic disputes with Baghdad, but those differences have been at least temporarily subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State. U.S. officials assert that the Iraqi government must work to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq’s Sunnis—and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—if an eventual defeat of the Islamic State is to result in long-term stability. Prospects for greater inter- communal unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with the current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunnis and with the KRG. However, a significant point of contention with the KRG remains the KRG’s marketing of crude oil exports separately from Baghdad.
    [Show full text]