東南亞研究中心 Southeast Asia Research Centre Kyaw Yin Hlaing Political Impasse in Myanmar Working Paper Series No. 111 November 2011 The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically ©Copyright is held by the author or authors each Working Paper. SEARC Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the papers author or authors. Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong. Southeast Asia Research Centre Management Committee Professor Mark R. Thompson, Director Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Associate Director Dr Chiara Formichi Dr Nicholas Thomas Dr Bill Taylor Editor of the SEARC Working Paper Series Professor Mark R. Thompson Southeast Asia Research Centre The City University of Hong Kong 83 Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR Tel: (852 3442 6106 Fax: (852) 3442 0103 http://www.cityu.edi.hk/searc Political Impasse in Myanmar Kyaw Yin Hlaing On March 30, 2011, the ruling military council of Myanmar, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), dissolved itself after a new government that emerged out of the elections held on November 7, 2010, was sworn in. Anybody who is familiar with Myanmar politics knows that the country’s three main political forces, the military government, pro-democracy groups represented by National League for Democracy (NLD), and ethnic minority groups, desperately need to reconcile their differences and find a way to work together for the long-term political stability and economic development of the country. However, all these groups have yet to find a way to achieve the reconciliation. This paper will examine why national reconciliation did not take place under the rule of the SPDC government. In so doing, it will try to show that, regardless of their call for a national reconciliation process, none of the three political forces seriously worked on the process itself, for all the political groups talked more about what they wanted rather than how they were willing to reconcile their differences or come to a compromise. Although Aung San Suu Kyi had offered to work on the lifting of Western economic sanctions on the country in late 2009, she later called for western countries to continue to impose economic sanctions until a genuine democratization process came into being. The SPDC government, for its part, did not appear to have any plans to conduct any dialogue with NLD. SPDC’s relations with ethnic minority groups had also been tense since the SPDC generals rejected most of the proposals made by ethnic minority delegates at the National Convention (NC). This situation deteriorated further when the junta ordered armed ethnic groups that had made cease-fires with the government to turn themselves into border guard forces (BGFs). As such, the junta and ethnic armed groups did not manage to resolve their differences. Meanwhile, some concerned citizens who were known as the “third force” argued that the people must look beyond Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD to achieve democracy. Their argument was based on the assumption that the military was too strong to be toppled by force and as a result, the people must also consider fighting for political freedom by playing the political game within the institutional framework set by the military itself. In order words, they need to work for further political changes by exploiting the political space that might be opened up after the new government came into being in 2011. This paper will also consider if the suggestions of the so-called third force could be a more pragmatic alternative, in light of the failure of previous attempts at national reconciliation. At the time of completing of this paper, Myanmar has a new government. The chairman of SPDC, Senior General Than Shwe, and many other hard-line military leaders who strongly detested Aung San Suu Kyi have retired. The new president and ministers publicly noted that the door for national reconciliation is open to all political groups. However, although NLD has been calling for dialogue with the government, the new government has not been treating NLD like a dialogue partner. The government has not made its position on the BGFs plan clear either. However, the new government has been Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 111, 2011 3 more tolerant of the activities of the opposition group than its predecessor. While it has been allowing NLD to operate like an opposition party outside the parliament quite freely, the government has expressed its desire to work with ethnic civil society groups in development projects. The new government also appointed into state and regional governments some members of ethnic minority parties that contested the 2010 elections. This paper will examine if the new political landscape, which the new government claimed it would introduce in the country, would allow any reconciliation between the government and opposition groups. In so doing, the paper suggests that the new political landscape does present some opportunities for all political groups to work together. However, whether these political groups are able to use these opportunities for the betterment of the country remain to be seen. The Making of a Political Impasse1 From its independence in 1948 until 1962, the nation—then known as Burma— had a parliamentary system styled after that of its former British ruler. In March 1962, the Revolutionary Council led by General Ne Win replaced the parliamentary format with military-dominated one-party rule. The military has been governing—or rather, misgoverning—the country ever since. On August 8, 1988, a massive student-led opposition broke out against the military and its political monopoly, Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Soldiers fired at demonstrators, killing many. But the protests, which came to be known collectively as the “Four Eights” democracy movement, had already swept the country and virtually paralyzed the BSPP regime. On the verge of being overrun, the BSPP government offered to hold national elections in which multiple parties could compete. Leaders of the democracy movement called for an interim government to prepare the elections. Instead, the BSPP government allowed the commander in chief of the armed forces to take power, created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and used it to impose direct military rule. SLORC announced that it would hold multiparty elections, and asked the public to form political parties to contest them. More than two hundred such parties were formed. But activists in these parties distrusted SLORC, and vice versa. Controversies quickly arose over what the parties were permitted to do and how the elections would be held. Already fearing a repressive outcome, students began fleeing to border areas where they formed pro-democracy groups in exile. The junta amply justified the students’ fears. SLORC showed no mercy toward its challengers. When the elections were finally held in 1990, NLD emerged as the victor by a landslide, soundly defeating National Unity Party (NUP), which many thought was backed by the junta. But despite having triumphed, NLD was not allowed to rule. NLD was the biggest party, had been especially critical of the military government, and therefore received the harshest treatment at the hands of the regime. The leader of NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi, was detained in 1989. Many NLD members, too, were detained and harassed. From the very beginning of this ostensible experiment with democracy, the military regime and the civilian parties could find no basis for working together to liberalize the political system. It is no exaggeration to say that Myanmar has been politically deadlocked since 1988 when the generals took direct control. Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 111, 2011 4 Myanmar pro-democracy groups and the international community, especially the United States and the European Union countries, pressured the junta to honor the results of the 1990 elections, but to no avail. The junta promised instead to institute “disciplined democracy”. Several opposition groups also called for a three-way dialogue between the regime, NLD and the country’s ethnic minorities, the latter whose rebellions had long bedeviled the central government. But that idea, too, fell on deaf ears. Instead, bypassing NLD, the generals negotiated cease-fire agreements bilaterally with various ethnic insurgent groups.2 In the early 1990s, the junta announced that it planned to convene a NC to discuss political issues with all groups in the country. The convention was held in 1992, but the military showed not even the least inclination to surrender power. Outnumbered by delegates handpicked by the regime, representatives of the opposition parties saw most of their proposals rejected. Spokespeople for ethnic minorities and persons involved in the cease-fire agreements also found it almost impossible to get their demands accepted by the junta.3 Military leaders would not even specify a date on which the NC was expected to actually deliver a constitution. Opposition groups reasonably concluded that the junta would do everything it could to prolong the drafting of the document and thus enhance its own power relative to that of other groups while the process continued. As for the eventual outcome, it was clear that the military would settle for nothing less than a text that would guarantee its strategic political role for years to come—or, as one veteran Burmese politician put it, “eternally”.4 Yet hope sprang eternal in Myanmar. In 1995, when the generals released Aung San Suu Kyi after more than five years of house arrest, many of her supporters hoped that she and the junta would somehow end their standoff and reconcile sufficiently to be able to work together.