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11/08/2017 OHCHR | Statement of the High Commissioner to the Interactive dialogue on the DeICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxAmocratic Republic of the Congo, 3 5 11-08-2017th session of t h2/76e H… NM T
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Statement of the High Commissioner to the Interactive dialogue on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 35th session of the Human Rights Council
20 June 2017
Excellencies,
Just three months ago, my Office reported to this Council serious concerns about the human rights violations and abuses committed by the Congolese army and police, and the Kamuina Nsapu militia, in Kasai, Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental. Subsequently, when the two UN experts were killed, the Minister for Human Rights of the Democratic Republic of the Congo called for a joint investigation to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses to justice.
Since then the humanitarian and human rights situation has deteriorated dramatically and various actors are fuelling ethnic hatred, resulting in extremely grave, widespread and apparently planned attacks against the civilian population in the Kasais. Last week, given the gravity of the allegations received and restricted access to parts of the greater Kasai area, and in line with my statement to this Council on 6 June, I deployed a team of OHCHR investigators to interview recent refugees from the Kasais.
Their reports are harrowing, and indicate the situation in the Kasais has not only escalated but has also become much more complex.
I am appalled by the creation and arming of a militia, the Bana Mura – allegedly to support the authorities in fighting the Kamuina Nsapu, but which has carried out horrific attacks against civilians from the Luba and Lulua ethnic groups. Refugees from multiple villages in the Kamonya territory indicated that the Bana Mura have in the past two months shot dead, hacked or burned to death, and mutilated, hundreds of villagers, as well as destroying entire villages. My team saw children as young as two whose limbs had been chopped off; many babies had machete wounds and severe burns. One two-month-old baby seen by my team had been hit by two bullets four hours after birth; the mother was also wounded. At least two pregnant women were sliced open and their foetuses mutilated.
In the village of Cinq, dozens of men, women and children of the Luba and Lulua communities were reportedly killed with firearms or machetes, or burnt to death, on 24 April. Hundreds of assailants also allegedly attacked the main health centre in the village and killed some 90 patients, medical personnel and others. The Bana Mura militia in Cinq was reportedly organised by a well-known local leader, who provided machetes, hunting rifles and fuel. Similar attacks appear to have occurred in more than 20 villages in Kamonya over the past two months, and numerous victims and witnesses said the militia is organised and armed by local authorities.
Victims also reported that members of local units of the Congolese army and police, as well as some traditional chiefs, have accompanied some Bana Mura attacks, and said some State agents are involved in arming and directing the militia.
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Serious human rights violations by members of the security forces themselves -- including summary executions and rape – have been reported during several operations against villages allegedly controlled by the Kamuina Nsapu militia.
In recent months my Office has reported serious abuses committed by the Kamuina Nsapu militia. This has been further documented by my staff and other very credible sources. In several villages in Kamonya, Kamuina Nsapu has allegedly carried out targeted killings, including members of the armed forces, police, public officials and civilians perceived to cooperate with them, as well as alleged sorcerers. Witnesses indicated that the Kamuina Nsapu militia comprises many children, some as young as seven, many of them under the influence of drugs.
Some 1.3 million internally displaced people have fled this landscape of horror. I condemn, unreservedly, the multiple violations they have experienced, and deplore the lack of international attention to their situation. Over 30,000 refugees have been registered in Angola, and hundreds of refugees are currently arriving every week, indicating that atrocities have not abated. I take this opportunity to thank the authorities for their assistance, in particular, Angolan doctors and nurses who have worked many long hours to save gravely injured people from death.
Forty-two mass graves have been documented by the Joint Human Rights Office in the Kasais. There may be more. Several refugees have told my staff they were forced to bury victims in additional mass graves. We believe these grave sites were being investigated by the UN experts killed in March 2017. Their killings must also be fully investigated, and I remain in close touch with their families.
Excellencies,
It is the duty of the Congolese authorities, army and police to protect the people, to act in accordance with human rights principles and to bring perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses to justice. Accountability for these shocking incidents must be assured. I regret that to date the Congolese Government has not fulfilled these obligations of protection and accountability. Although my Office has shared information and offered support to investigations in line with the Government’s call for a joint investigation, the authorities then sought to limit the UN and AU to a supporting role. As a result, progress has clearly been insufficient in view of the massive scale and horrific nature of the crimes that have taken place and, sadly, continue.
In other parts of the country, there has been some progress towards bringing a number of perpetrators to account. However, that political will has not been manifest in the Kasais. Moreover, not one person has been held accountable for the killings of dozens of people during demonstrations in Kinshasa and across the country last September and December. The DRC cannot be permitted to become a free-fire zone, where members of the security forces, armed groups and militias can kill with impunity. May I recall that last year, of more than 5,190 human rights violations and abuses recorded, 64% were committed by the Congolese army and police. Several FARDC officers active in the Kasais were suspected of involvement in previous massacres committed in eastern DRC from 1998 to 2013.
I urge this Council to deploy an independent international investigation on the human rights situation in the Kasais, in cooperation with the authorities, my Office and other parts of the UN system. I will also remain in touch with the International Criminal Court. This international investigation can establish the facts and determine individual responsibilities.
This will also send a strong signal about the need to uphold human rights in the rest of the country, where lack of progress in implementing the 31 December Agreement, and continued restrictions on political rights and freedoms, are generating frustration and deepening grievances. By bringing justice to the Kasais we may be able to prevent further crimes elsewhere in the DRC.
I take this occasion to repeat the full availability of my Office to assist the Government and my utmost support to the people of the DRC, especially victims of human rights violations and abuses.
Thank you.
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UN rights chief calls for investigation into 'landscape of horror' in DR Congo's Kasai provinces
An aerial view of the town of Kananga in DRC’s Kasaï-Central province outside which the remains of the two experts were found. (File) Photo: MONUSCO/Myriam Asmani
20 June 2017 – Detailing “harrowing reports” of killings, mutilation and entire villages Tweet destroyed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's restive Kasai provinces, the top United Nations human rights official today called on the UN Human Rights Council to 57 establish an independent international investigation into the widespread rights violations Like and abuses there.
“The humanitarian and human rights situation has deteriorated dramatically [over the last 31Share three months] and various actors are fuelling ethnic hatred, resulting in extremely grave , widespread and apparently planned attacks against the civilian population in the Kasais,” Print UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein told the Council – the highest UN intergovernmental forum on human rights issues.
Most concerning, the High Commissioner said, was the arming of a militia – the Bana Mura – allegedly to support authorities in fighting the Kamuina Nsapu, and which has carried out horrific attacks against civilians from the Luba and Lulua ethnic groups.
“Refugees from multiple villages […] indicated that the Bana Mura have in the past two months shot dead, hacked or burned to death, and mutilated, hundreds of villagers, as well as destroying entire villages,” said Mr. Zeid. He added that teams deployed by his Office ( OHCHR ) witnessed children as young as two, whose limbs had been chopped off, and babies with machete wounds and severe wounds.
“One two-month-old baby seen by my team had been hit by two bullets four hours after birth; the mother was also wounded. At least two pregnant women were sliced open and their foetuses mutilated.”
Allegations of widespread human rights violations and abuses
Mr. Zeid also spoke of allegations of rights violations by members of the security forces, including summary executions and rape during operations against villages allegedly controlled by the Kamuina
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Nsapu militia. He also recounted reports of human rights abuses by the militia, including targeted killings of the armed forces, police, public officials and civilians perceived to cooperate with them, as well as individuals whom they accused of practicing “sorcery.”
Violence flared up in the DRC's Kasai regions in August 2016, when a customary chief was killed by Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), as DRC's armed forces are known. The Kamuina Nsapu militia (named after the chief) then set about avenging the killing, committing widespread atrocities as well as recruiting children into its ranks. The gravity of the situation was further underscored by the discovery (in April, this year) of forty-two mass graves by OHCHR and the UN mission in the country (known by its French acronym, MONUSCO).
More than 1.3 million people have since been displaced within the country as well as thousands forced to flee across its borders.
In his remarks, Mr. Zeid recalled the killing of two UN experts who were found dead after being abducted while investigating the situation in the country. “Their killings must also be fully investigated, and I remain in close touch with their families,” he stressed.
'By bringing justice to the Kasais, we may be able to prevent further crimes elsewhere in the DRC'
Also in his remarks, Mr. Zeid noted that while there has been some progress in ensuring accountability in other parts of the DRC, the severity of the allegations in the Kasais and lack of action on part of the Government to investigate and bring perpetrators to justice has necessitated the need to establish an independent investigation mechanism that can establish the facts and determine individual responsibilities. “This will also send a strong signal about the need to uphold human rights in the rest of the country, where lack of progress in implementing the 31 December Agreement, and continued restrictions on political rights and freedoms, are generating frustration and deepening grievances,” said the High Commissioner, noting that he would also remain in touch with the International Criminal Court ( ICC ).
“By bringing justice to the Kasais we may be able to prevent further crimes elsewhere in the DRC,” he added.
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Freedom in the World 2017 Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) Profile
FREEDOM STATUS: NOT FREE
Freedom in the World Scores Aggregate Score 19/100
(0=Least Free, 100=Most Free)
Freedom Rating: 6.5/7
Political Rights 7/7 Civil Liberties 6/7 (1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)
Quick Facts
Population: 79,800,000
Capital: Kinshasa
GDP/capita: $456
Press Freedom Status: Not Free
Ratings Change:
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The Democratic Republic of Congo’s political rights rating declined from 6 to 7 due to the authorities’ failure to hold constitutionally mandated elections before President Joseph Kabila’s term expired in December, a flawed “consensus” deal to extend Kabila’s term, and human rights violations perpetrated by security forces while putting down opposition protests. Overview: Civilians and opposition politicians are increasingly unable to influence politics by participating in elections. Civil liberties are limited, but the population continues to exercise rights to association and freedom of expression despite growing state repression. Armed groups and insecurity are prominent in the country’s east, and state security forces have also been implicated in abuses.
Key Developments in 2016: • Constitutionally mandated national elections were not held, and President Joseph Kabila overstayed his term limit.
• In December, Kabila’s administration and the opposition came to a fragile agreement that revised the expected date for elections to December 2017.
• There were several fatal attacks by state security forces against civilian protesters.
• Various militia groups carried out acts of violence against civilians in the eastern part of the country. Security forces were also implicated in abuses.
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Executive Summary: Political rights constricted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2016, as authorities failed to hold constitutionally mandated national elections and President Kabila overstayed his term limit. Civilian influence in politics declined as the government cracked down on Kabila’s political opponents and antigovernment demonstrators. Journalists and human rights advocates faced escalating harassment, abuse, and unlawful detention at the hands of state security forces. In December, Kabila’s administration and the opposition came to a fragile agreement that revised the expected date for elections to December 2017.
Armed groups remained active in the country’s eastern provinces, committing human rights abuses and contributing to large-scale internal displacement. Officers affiliated with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) remained implicated in human rights violations, with little effective civilian control over their activities. Political Rights
Political Rights 4 / 40 (–5)
A. Electoral Process 0 / 12 (–3)
A1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? A2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair
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elections? A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair?
Article 70 of the DRC’s 2006 constitution stipulates that the president is elected for up to two five-year terms, and Article 220 prohibits amendments to key elements of the state’s political framework, including the number and length of presidential terms.
Joseph Kabila was declared the winner of the 2011 presidential election amid widespread criticism of the poll by international observers; he defeated Étienne Tshisekedi, 49 percent to 32 percent, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). Elections to the 500-seat National Assembly, held concurrently, were also criticized as deeply flawed. Kabila’s People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) won 62 seats, down from the 111 seats it held previously, while Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) took 41. The AMP, Kabila’s parliamentary coalition, took a total of 260 seats.
The subsequent presidential election was scheduled for November 2016, and while Kabila was constitutionally barred from seeking a third term in office, many suspected that he would attempt to extend his rule. In August, the CENI announced that the presidential election would be postponed due to a lack of necessary funding, and due to difficulties in registering new voters.
The move sparked outrage from Kabila’s opponents, and the government agreed to engage in a national dialogue with a group of opposition parties, which lasted from September to October 2016 under the mediation of the African Union. The parties initially agreed to postpone the election until April 2018; however, few mainstream opposition forces had participated in the dialogue. Most chose to boycott the proceedings and formed a joint bloc to
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et Politiques Acquises au Changement—led by longtime opposition figure Tshisekedi. Under the mediation of the Roman Catholic Church, representatives of the government agreed to a new round of negotiations with the Rassemblement bloc and reached an agreement in December that revised the expected date for elections to December 2017. Under the deal, Kabila would remain president until that date while sharing power with the opposition, though critics were skeptical of his level of commitment to genuinely inclusive government.
Normally, the president nominates a prime minister from the leading party or coalition in the National Assembly, whose members are popularly elected to serve five-year terms. However, under the terms of the new power-sharing arrangement, the Rassemblement will choose a prime minister to serve until a new president is elected in 2017. Provincial assemblies elect the 108- seat Senate, as well as provincial governors, for five-year terms. A long-neglected decentralization program was implemented in 2015, splitting the DRC’s 11 provinces into 26, and the CENI scheduled local and provincial elections to take place between late 2015 and early 2016. However, those elections were seriously delayed. In March 2016, the government held unusual direct gubernatorial elections to select interim governors until provincial elections take place, and the assemblies are seated and able to choose permanent governors. Supporters of Kabila won elections in 14 out of the 19 seats up for election.
The country’s electoral framework does not ensure transparent conduct of elections, and opposition parties and civil society groups frequently criticize the CENI for lacking independence.
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B. Political Pluralism and Participation 3 / 16 (–1)
B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? B2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? B3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? B4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?
People have the right to organize political parties. Hundreds of parties exist, with many organized along ethnic, communal, or regional lines; most lack national reach. In addition to the PPRD and UDPS, other key parties in the country include the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). Nearly 100 parties and many independent candidates hold seats in the parliament.
Despite the existence of numerous parties, political pluralism remains limited in practice, and opposition members do not have a realistic opportunity to increase support through elections. A new transitional government, headed by Prime Minister Samy Badibanga and intended to serve through the remainder of Kabila’s presidency, was announced in late December 2016 with an expansive cabinet of 67 ministers that incorporated some opposition members. However, aspects of the consensus government deal had yet to be implemented at year’s end, and it remained to be seen how much influence the opposition had within the interim administration.
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2016 made efforts to interfere with the activities of the Rassemblement bloc and others. In August, police prevented a meeting of the bloc in Lubumbashi. In October, police used tear gas to break up a meeting at the home of opposition leader Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza, in Lubumbashi, that was comprised largely of members of Tshisekedi’s opposition party and the Rassemblement platform.
Congo’s most popular opposition figure—Moïse Katumbi, a businessman and former governor of Katanga Province who left Kabila’s majority coalition in 2015—left Congo in May 2016. Katumbi, who was widely expected to run for the presidency, said he was seeking medical treatment abroad, but left shortly after being formally charged with illegally hiring mercenaries. C. Functioning of Government 1 / 12 (–1)
C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? C2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? C3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?
Due to the political crisis, there was no freely elected government to determine state policies at the end of 2016.
Massive corruption in the government, security forces, and mineral extraction industries continues to paralyze the functioning of the government and development efforts intended to raise living standards. Recruitment for government posts is
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minerals and other natural resources by rebels and elements of the FARDC helps finance violence and depletes government revenues. In October 2016, a former banker provided evidence that state authorities close to Kabila had embezzled millions of dollars from the public treasury. The national electoral commission, CENI, is implicated in the corruption. The same documents provided by the whistleblower indicated that the Central Bank also diverted millions of dollars to the state-owned mining company, Gecamines, which is run by individuals close to President Kabila.
Despite previous incremental improvements in revenue reporting, there is little transparency in the state’s financial affairs. The law does not provide for public access to government information, and citizens often lack the practical ability to obtain information about state operations. Civil Liberties
Civil Liberties 15 / 60 (–1)
D. Freedom of Expression and Belief 8 / 16
D1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? D2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private? D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of
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extensive political indoctrination? D4. Is there open and free private discussion?
Although constitutionally guaranteed, freedoms of speech and the press are limited. Radio is the dominant medium in the country, and newspapers are found mainly in large cities. While the media frequently criticize Kabila and his government, political harassment of outlets and reporters is common, and outlets face pressure to carry progovernment content. Journalists risk criminal defamation suits as well as threats, detentions, arbitrary arrests, and attacks.
In recent years, the government has closed media outlets linked to the political opposition. In January 2016, two outlets owned by Katumbi—Nyota TV and Radiotélévision Mapendo— were abruptly shuttered for alleged nonpayment of taxes. And in March, the radio and television outlet La Voix du Katanga, owned by Kyungu wa Kumwanza, was closed after it allegedly failed to pay its annual fee and renew its operating license, a charge rejected by its management. Separately, a number of Congolese and foreign reporters were detained during the September 2016 street protests in Kinshasa.
The constitution guarantees freedom of religion, and authorities generally respect this right in practice. Although religious groups must register with the government to be recognized, unregistered groups operate unhindered.
There are no formal restrictions on academic freedom. Primary and secondary school curriculums are regulated but not strongly politicized.
Private discussion of politically sensitive topics can be open among close associates, though discussions of such topics in public places are sometimes limited by fears of potential reprisal.
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Social media usage is expanding among urban youth. The government does not frequently restrict internet access or monitor online communications, but has suspended internet access and text messaging temporarily during times of political unrest. E. Associational and Organizational Rights 3 / 12
E1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? E2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? E3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?
The constitution guarantees freedoms of assembly and association. Demonstrations are held regularly despite limits on these rights in practice, including the violent dispersal of protests, including through the use of deadly force, as well as the arbitrary arrest of participants. In the second half of 2016, there was a wave of arrests and fatalities in the capital as demonstrators protested Kabila’s move to delay elections. At least 48 street protesters were killed by state agents during one three-day protest in September organized by the Rassemblement opposition coalition, and many others were arrested. According to Human Rights Watch, police removed some of the bodies of protestors killed to eliminate evidence of political repression. The UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), in its assessment of the violence, documented human rights abuses by state agents against 422 civilians, including the arbitrary arrests of at least 299 individuals, and counted 143 persons injured. According to the UNJHRO, the human rights violations during this three-day period of protest in the capital
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demonstrations in Kinshasa, but street actions continued. In December, 26 people were shot dead by security forces at a protest in the capital marking what should have been the end of Kabila’s constitutional mandate.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and professional organizations are generally able to operate, though domestic human rights advocates are subject to harassment, arbitrary arrest, and detention. There are approximately 5,000 registered NGOs in the DRC, though many have narrow scopes devoted to ethnic, partisan, and local concerns.
Congolese who fulfill a residency requirement of 20 years can form and join trade unions, though government employees and members of state security forces are not permitted to unionize. It is against the law for employers to retaliate against strikers. Unions organize strikes regularly. Some labor leaders and activists face harassment. F. Rule of Law 0 / 16
F1. Is there an independent judiciary? F2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control? F3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?
President Kabila appoints members of the judiciary, which remains corrupt and subject to political manipulation. Courts are concentrated in urban areas; the majority of the country relies on
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personnel. The judiciary often exhibits bias against opposition and civil society members, while government and government-allied forces often enjoy impunity for even the most heinous crimes. Prison conditions are life-threatening, and long periods of pretrial detention are common.
Civilian authorities do not maintain effective control of security forces. The FARDC are largely undisciplined, and soldiers and police regularly commit serious human rights abuses, including rape and torture. Low pay and inadequate provisions commonly lead soldiers to seize goods from civilians. In September 2016, the United States announced sanctions against Gabriel Amisi, the army commander for the country’s western region, and the former national police inspector, John Numbi, over their involvement in a series of human rights abuses. This followed similar sanctions imposed in June on Célestin Kanyama, Kinshasa’s police commissioner, on similar grounds.
Peace and the rule of law remain obstructed by active rebel groups, primarily concentrated in the country’s eastern and southern provinces. Although armed group activity declined slightly in 2016, civilian security did not improve. The impact of years of fighting on civilians has been catastrophic, with over five million conflict- related deaths since 1998. The population of the affected regions is subject to displacement and violence due to rebel activity and poor discipline among members of the armed forces. Continuing fragmentation and changing coalitions among armed groups, as well as between armed groups and the FARDC, obstruct the deescalation of conflict.
A wave of brutal mass killings in Beni territory of North Kivu begun in October 2014 and continued in 2016; Human Rights
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killed in the conflict since it began. The DRC government attributed the attacks to the Uganda-based Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group, but local human rights organizations and other researchers report that local militias as well as members of the Congolese armed forces have also facilitated the violence. In August, at least 40 people were killed and multiple dwellings were set on fire by militants in the town of Beni, despite the heavy presence of Congolese and international peacekeeping forces.
Ongoing clashes between ethnic Luba fighters and the ethnic Twa continued in 2016 in Katanga province, resulting in over a dozen deaths in October. Clashes in southern Lubero Territory of North Kivu province in January also deepened displacement, with more than 21,000 people forced to flee from Miriki village following a raid by militants thought to belong to the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR).
Kidnappings for ransom are common, particularly in the Rutshuru and Lubero Territories of North Kivu province, where 22 abductions were reported in just the two months leading into October.
Ethnic discrimination, including against Kinyarwanda-speaking minority populations, remains a significant problem in some areas of the country. The constitution prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities, but they often find it difficult to find employment, attend school, or access government services. Although discrimination based on HIV status is also prohibited, people with HIV face stigma as well as difficulty accessing health care and education. No law specifically prohibits same-sex sexual relations, but legislators have made efforts to criminalize same-sex sexual activity, and individuals can still be prosecuted for such activity under public decency laws.
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Individual Rights 4 / 16 (–1)
G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education? G2. Do individuals have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime? G3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family? G4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
Freedom of movement is protected by law, but is frequently restricted in practice. Armed conflict, primarily concentrated in Beni territory of North Kivu and in Central Kasai, has resulted in 1.7 million internally displaced persons in eastern Congo who are unable to return to their homes. Additionally, UNJHRO investigators were repeatedly denied access to sites of interest in 2016, as they attempted to investigate rights abuses. In April, American researcher Jason Stearns was deported after publishing a report that challenged the government’s narrative of ADF rebels behind massacres in Beni and suggesting a broader range of perpetrators including military officers. In August, Human Rights Watch researcher Ida Sawyer was denied a renewed work permit and forced to leave the country.
Individuals have the right to own property and establish private businesses. In conflict zones, armed groups and FARDC soldiers have seized private property and destroyed homes. The country’s economy, reliant on the extraction of natural resources, has grown in recent years, though most Congolese are not employed in the formal economy. Minerals, timber, and gold are components of a
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of taxation and regulation has made bribery a regular aspect of business dealings, and embezzlement is pervasive. The country was recognized as a compliant member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2014. Some progress has been made in the internal management of natural resources, but tracking systems remain inefficient.
Women face discrimination in nearly every aspect of their lives, especially in rural areas. Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination against women in any domain, the Family Code prescribes more restrictive roles, requiring that women obey their husbands and obtain their permission to seek employment and engage in legal transactions. Nevertheless, young women are increasingly seeking professional work outside the home and engaging in commercial activities, particularly in towns and urban centers. Women are greatly underrepresented in government, making up only 9 percent of the National Assembly and 6 percent of the Senate.
Violence against women and girls, including sexual and gender- based violence, has soared since fighting began in 1994; sex crimes often affect men and boys as well. Rebels and FARDC soldiers have been implicated in kidnappings, killings, and rape. Convictions for offenses such as mass rape remain rare. Abortion is prohibited, and women’s access to contraception is extremely low; many health care providers require that women obtain permission from their husbands to access family planning services.
The DRC is both a source and destination country for the trafficking of men, women, and children for the purposes of labor and sexual exploitation. Although the law prohibits all forced or compulsory labor, the practice remains common and includes
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and at times impose tolls on vehicles passing through territory held by the groups. The recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed groups is widespread.
Scoring Key: X / Y (Z) X = Score Received Y = Best Possible Score Z = Change from Previous Year
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Query
What is the present corruption situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo? Please provide an overview of recent evolution in national anti-corruption measures and structures.
Purpose administration, as well as in the management of state- run companies, undermines the state’s capacity to Our agency is currently reviewing its development collect revenues and escape the trap of cooperation programme with the DRC. mismanagement, conflict and poverty.
Content Against this backdrop, the country has limited capacity to address the governance and corruption challenges it 1. Overview of corruption in the DRC faces. There is neither indication of firm political will to 2. Anti-corruption efforts in the DRC address corruption, nor evidence of progress made in 3. References anti-corruption in the post-conflict era. While a strong legal framework to address corruption has recently Summary been established under the pressure of the international community, it remains largely ineffective to curb As the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) emerges corruption. The judiciary is plagued by a lack of from a long period of violence and instability, it resources and capacity, and faces major challenges of struggles with a legacy of entrenched corruption at all independence, political interference and corruption. levels of society, threatening social and political Other governance institutions are weak or non-existent. institutions with failure. Repeated political crises, poor The media and civil society operate in a restrictive infrastructure, an underdeveloped regulatory environment, running a high risk of intimidation, arrest environment, lack of institutional capacity and weak rule and harassment when denouncing public sector of law fuel the country’s persistent governance crisis. corruption. Petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as a complex web of political patronage permeate all sectors of the economy, undermining development prospects and compromising the fragile post-conflict equilibrium. Despite being endowed with considerable mineral wealth, extraction of natural resources continues to be combined with widespread corruption, including within the armed forces, fuelling violence, insecurity and public discontent. Corruption in tax and customs Author(s): Marie Chêne , Transparency International, [email protected] Reviewed by: Dieter Zinnbauer, Ph.D., Transparency International, [email protected] Date: 08 October 2010 Number: 257
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
1. Overview of Corruption in and country reports indicate persistent, widespread and endemic forms of corruption in the DRC, permeating all DRC levels of society. As the country emerges from a long period of violence and instability, there is little evidence Background of progress in anti-corruption work. Repeated political The recent history of the Democratic Republic of Congo crises, poor infrastructure, an underdeveloped (DRC) has been marred by civil war and corruption. regulatory environment, a lack of institutional capacity After Laurent Kabila overthrew the corrupt regime of and weak rule of law continue to hinder economic Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, the DRC endured five development prospects and create fertile ground for years of conflict between government forces supported corruption. by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and rebels backed This situation is reflected in the major worldwide by Rwanda and Uganda. Joseph Kabila assumed governance indicators. In 2009, the country ranked power after his father was assassinated in 2001 and 162nd of 180 countries assessed by Transparency won the first multiparty elections since independence in International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 2006, raising hopes that peace and stability would be scoring 1,9 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly restored. The war had claimed an estimated three clean). These findings are consistent with the World million lives, and left the country in a fragile Bank 2009 Worldwide Governance Indicators which humanitarian, economic and political state. This confirm the DRC’s extremely poor performance on all situation further fuelled continuing violence, insecurity, six dimensions of governance assessed. While the human right abuses, poor governance and corruption. country has slightly improved its performance in terms Most observers agree the war was driven by both of voice and accountability (from 3,8 in 2004 to 8,5 in economic and political factors. The role of natural 2009 on a scale of 0 to 100), it scores below 5 in all resources in conflict in the country has been well- other areas of governance, including political stability, documented, with all sides taking advantage of the regulatory quality and rule of law. The situation even fragile situation to gain control over and plunder the seems to be deteriorating in terms of government country’s mineral wealth (Global Witness, 2004, 2009 effectiveness (from 4,9 in 2004 to 1,9 in 2009) and and BBC, 2010). Some authors also attribute the control of corruption (3,9 in 2004 compared to 2,9 in underlying causes of the conflict to decades of poor 2009). governance that resulted in inequitable distribution of DRC does not perform better on the 2010 Heritage resources, corruption and human rights violations under Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. The successive authoritarian regimes, and bred public country ranks 44th out of the 46 countries in the Sub- discontent, violence and instability (Shekhawat, S., Saharan Africa region in terms of economic freedom, 2009). scoring far below the regional average. In particular, the Far from addressing this governance crisis, the fragile country performed extremely poorly in terms of freedom 2003 peace agreement and the political transition from corruption, with a score of 17 on a scale from 0 to period that followed brought new governance and 100. Against this background, the report points to corruption challenges to light. Political actors regularly mismanagement and rampant corruption as major interfered in the administration, customs, army and obstacles to doing business in the country, which natural resource sectors for private gain, giving rise to a contribute to driving much economic activity into the predatory system of governance. Some reports informal sector. estimate that as much as 60 to 80 % of custom revenues could have been embezzled, while close to a Forms of Corruption quarter of the national budget was not properly accounted for in the transition period (International Both street-level and grand forms of corruption are Crisis Group, 2006). Mining, state-run companies and present in DRC, involving a wide range of state officials the military remain sectors that are particularly prone to from low ranking civil servants to the highest members of government. corruption. Inefficient government structures, weak administrative Extent of Corruption capacity, and low salaries combined with an absence of Corruption continues to undermine the economy and oversight, provide civil servants with both opportunities administration in the post-conflict era. All available data and incentives for extorting money from the population (Global Integrity, 2008). Reflecting this reality,
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) bureaucratic and administrative forms of corruption on most indicators of human development (UNDP, are widespread across all public services and 2009). departments. For example, more than 80% of firms interviewed in the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Many reports have documented the long tradition of Survey report expected to make informal payments to predatory management of natural resources. Global get things done or secure a government contract. Close Witness in particular have reported how the DRC’s to 70% expected to make gifts to get an operating considerable natural wealth was originally exploited for license. the commercial benefit of a small number of business and political actors to the detriment of the population The lack of transparency and oversight is especially (Global Witness, 2004). Global Witness reports also manifest in public financial management. Auditing denounced other problems in the natural resource and expenditure tracking are rare and the DRC ranks at sector, including extensive corruption, a lack of the bottom of the 2008 Open Budget Index, with a transparency and life-threatening labour conditions. score of 0%. The government provides no information to the public on the central government’s budget and Global Witness’ most recent report on the DRC financial activity during the budget year, making it documents the militarisation of mining in conflict- impossible for citizens to hold government accountable affected eastern areas of the country. The report for its management of public funds. As a result, state describes how all warring parties have used the illicit resources can be easily siphoned off for private or exploitation of natural resources to consolidate their political purposes. One of the few audits published in economic base and plunder the country’s mineral 2008 claimed that various state agencies and wealth at the expense of the population (Global parastatals had embezzled $1,8 billion (Bertelsmann Witness, 2009). According to a 2001 UN expert panel Foundation, 2010a). report, warring factions sold minerals and signed contracts with multinational corporations and other At another level, the political legacy of previous regimes mining companies to raise money for the war. This in which public resources were siphoned off to sustain a involved a wide range of practices such as offering web of patronage networks continues to overshadow monopolies in exchange for kickbacks, embezzling the current political landscape. Various forms of money from state-run companies, creating joint political patronage and clientelism are persisting ventures in which politicians were shareholders, and across the political system, as reflected by the accepting unfavourable contract terms for the state in overrepresentation of cabinet members close to the exchange for kickbacks (International Crisis Group, President. President Kabila also replaced the heads of 2006). In the process, the Congolese army and rebel thirty seven state enterprises with his own connections, groups have resorted extensively to forced labour and tightening his grips on economic and political power extortion, and have imposed illicit taxes on the civilian (Matti, S. A., 2010). Key positions in the administration population. are also allocated on the basis of cronyism and patronage politics rather than on merit. This is likely to Following the 2002 peace agreement, a commission led undermine democratic processes and the by an opposition parliamentarian, Christophe establishment of transparent institutions, as rent- Lutundula, produced an incriminating report of mining seeking and accessing power become the major sector management. In 2002, the World Bank helped incentives for entering politics. draft new mining and investment codes, and in 2007 the Minister of Mines announced the creation of a Sectors Most Affected by governmental commission to review mining contracts that led to the cancellation of 61 contracts and the Corruption in the DRC renegotiation of numerous deals (Freedom House, Mining 2010a). On this occasion, Global Witness published a The DRC is endowed with considerable mineral wealth, report expressing concern over the lack of transparency including rich reserves of diamonds, copper, cobalt, and clarity of the review process, over inadequate gold and uranium. But this vast natural wealth has safeguards to protect the independence of the review failed to bring economic dividends to ordinary citizens. commission, and over the limited involvement of civil This is documented in UNDP’s 2009 Human society (Global Witness, 2007). Development Report where DRC performs very poorly
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Smuggling of minerals also deprives the state of • The 2002 forest code and accompanying valuable resources. The 2006 International Crisis presidential decree have been largely unsuccessful Group report estimated that close to $80 million in in improving industrial logging’s governance; diamonds were believed to be smuggled out of the country each year. In the Eastern part of the country, • The new legal framework requiring increased casserite from artisanal mines controlled by former public consultation has reinforced social DRC rebels were transported to Rwanda via Goma for imbalances with limited voice for women and refining. Gold smuggling has equally been an area of indigenous people; concern and a source of insecurity on the Ugandan border. According to the International Crisis Group, • The administrative, logistical and institutional Congolese armed groups, supported by Ugandan control mechanisms envisaged for forest officers and traders, have used gold mines as an management are either weak or non-existent. important funding source for their operations in the north eastern Congo. Reportedly, the Congolese army According to the brief, the limited impact of forest has also been involved in gold smuggling (International governance reforms can mainly be attributed to a lack Crisis Group, 2006). of incentives for various stakeholders to reform a system from which they benefit in its present form. In Forestry addition, the general context of weak institutional and The Democratic Republic of Congo is part of the world’s governance structures create favourable conditions for second largest tropical forest area after the Amazon corruption, predation and illegal exploitation of Basin: the Congo Basin (U4, 2010). Industrial logging resources. has great potential to generate state revenues but challenges of illegal logging and smuggling prevent this Tax and Customs Administration potential from being translated into economic growth. Corruption in the tax and customs systems undermines According to a U4 policy brief, industrial logging the government’s capacity to generate revenues. companies contribute less than 1% of GNP and there According to the 2006 International Crisis Group report, are indications that actual timber exports could be as the DRC has one of Africa’s weakest collection much as seven times higher than official figures capacities. Customs administration generates the (International Crisis Group, 2006). largest share of fiscal income, but is also the greatest source of revenue loss, with between 60 to 80% of There have been several attempts to reform forest custom duties uncollected. This is seen as one of the governance with support from the international factors fuelling the conflict in the eastern part of the community. But success has been limited so far. In country: armed groups finance their operations from the 2002, President Kabila declared a moratorium on new taxes they collect at border crossings (International forest concessions, cancelled 163 existing ones, and Crisis Group, 2006). promulgated a forestry code. However, subsequent studies found that new concessions had been granted More generally, customs administration is poorly and 2.4 million hectares reinstated. Seven companies structured and suffers from a lack of resources, with concessions totalling over one million hectares infrastructure and equipment, but also from red tape, were operating under fictitious contact details the overstaffing of posts and widespread corruption. In (International Crisis Group, 2006). Concerns have also its 2008 report, Global Witness provides examples of a been expressed by local NGOs over the legal review wide range of malpractices, such as underestimating process of all logging contracts, especially with respect the volume of goods, colluding with customs officers to to the limited involvement of civil society and local declare goods that are taxed at a lower rate than the community representatives. A review process finally good was actually imported, or bribery to evade resulted in October 2008 with the announcement that customs fees (Global Witness, 2008). numerous deals would be cancelled, and that there would be an ongoing moratorium on new concessions Taxation is another dysfunctional area of the DRC’s (Freedom House, 2010a). administration. According to Freedom House, citizens are poorly informed of which fees are legal, and remain The U4 brief on forest governance in the DRC largely unaware of their rights in this regard. Taxes are concludes that: (U4, 2010). mostly collected informally and illegally, undermining development of a relationship of accountability between
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) citizens and the state. At another level, mining development of lucrative embezzlement schemes within companies take advantage of the tax administration‘s the army. In particular, there have been widespread lack of resources and capacity to develop tax examples of embezzlement of soldiers’ salaries, avoidance schemes. When mining revenues reach the possibly representing close to half of the funds state, opaque revenue distribution facilitates conflict allocated to soldiers’ maintenance and salary costs. between the local and national levels, providing local There have also been concerns raised about bloating authorities with incentives to circumvent the revenue the payroll with ghost soldiers (International Crisis administration system (Freedom House, 2010a). Group, 2006).
State-Run Enterprises The International Crisis Group report documents how The management of state-run companies remains an corruption further erodes soldiers’ living condition, as area of concern. In the transition period, the troops are irregularly paid, and, in some places, receive management of these companies was allocated to the less than half of what they are owed. Deprived of signatories of the peace agreement. Managers decent salaries they have incentives to harass and appointed former warlords to run the companies, who extort civilians, as well as loot villages for survival. routinely abused their position for private gain, leading Soldiers thus become a major threat to local to considerable losses to the budget. As a result of populations. Embezzlement has decreased since 2006 corruption and mismanagement, the contribution of due to introduction of a more independent payroll state enterprises to the state budget dropped from 10% mechanism and better surveillance by the Congolese in the late 1960s, to about 1% in the early 1990s, and authorities. It is, however, unclear how successful these to almost nothing towards the end of the transition efforts are, given that the armed forces continue to face period (Kodi, M., 2008). major challenges of lack of discipline in many parts of the country (International Crisis Group, 2006). The Under pressure from the international community, government is showing signs of addressing the President Kabila requested the audit of about 20 state- situation, as reflected in the 2010 national budget which owned enterprises. This uncovered massive looting by gives priority to the salaries of police, military, civil the management and governing boards appointed by servants and teachers (U4, 2010). former warlords. The findings of the audit were debated at the National Assembly in 2005. This debate indicated that, of the 20 companies audited, only 12 had a board 2. Anti-corruption Efforts in the of directors, and most had kept no accounts for a period DRC of between two to seven years, making a proper audit Addressing corruption and governance challenges is a impossible. Management teams routinely decided on prerequisite to prevent the DRC from sliding back into their own benefits or granted themselves “loans” that conflict. Yet the country has weak legal and institutional were never paid back. None of the companies reviewed mechanisms in place to ensure accountability, as well had internal auditors (Kodi, M., 2008). Following the as limited capacity to respond to its governance publicity given to the report, the President suspended challenges. High levels of patronage have undermined six ministers who had allegedly participated in the the establishment of transparent, accountable plundering of state enterprises. institutions, and rent-seeking elites generally lack the The Helpdesk has found no recent account of the incentives and political will to build strong institutions to situation in the post-transition era and little indication of curb corruption (Matti, S. A., 2010). major progress made in the management of state- enterprises since Kabila appointed his own people at Legal Framework the head of many parastatals. Anti-corruption interventions were initiated during the transition period, mainly as a result of pressure from the Army international community and with little ownership by the There have been many concerns raised about Congolese government. An anti-corruption law enacted corruption in the armed forces, and it is noted that such in 2005 brought provisions of the UNCAC and African corruption often has a direct impact on the population. Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Soldiers endure terrible living conditions, are very Corruption into the national context and is largely poorly paid and live below the poverty line. Low wages perceived as providing an adequate legal framework to and poor internal control mechanisms facilitate the fight corruption (Freedom House, 2010a). Global
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Integrity even rated the anti-corruption law as “very Institutional Framework strong” on the DRC’s 2006 scorecard. According to most reports, however, there is little indication of strong Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission political will to effectively address corruption and The Commission de l’Ethique et de la Lutte contre la enforce legal anti-corruption provisions. The strong Corruption (CELC) was created in 2003 as one of the legal framework has so far not resulted in effective five “citizen” institutions mandated by the transitional prosecutions of corruption, even in cases where there is constitution. From its establishment, it faced major solid evidence of abuse (Kodi, M., 2007). resource and logistical problems that the international community has sought to help tackle. As with other Other anti-corruption related legal provisions are transition bodies, its Board was composed of included in the 2006 Constitution and the Code of representatives of all signatories to the Peace Ethics of Public Officials, which require the head of Agreement, which resulted in bloated staffing, difficult state, government officials and civil servants to submit decision-making processes and the lack of a common asset declarations to the constitutional court. However, vision and coherent strategy (Kodi, M., 2007). The work these provisions are poorly implemented. The lack of of the CELC was further hampered by weak leadership, public access to declarations hinders the effective insufficient technical expertise and lack of monitoring of public officials’ assets and limits the independence. Paralysed by these various challenges, impact of such measures. the CELC was finally not carried over into the new constitution (Freedom House, 2010a). There is neither a freedom of information law, nor comprehensive laws regulating access to government Financial Intelligence Unit data. In addition, as information dissemination is poorly In order to enforce anti-corruption laws among civil developed, many citizens don’t know the laws and servants and members of the government, President regulations that affect their lives and remain largely Kabila launched a “zero-tolerance” campaign in unaware of their rights and obligations (Freedom September 2009. Within this framework, he established House, 2010a). the DRC Financial Intelligence Unit in October 2009 to combat money laundering and misappropriation of In the area of public finance management, the country public funds (US Department of State, 2010). The has been working with the World Bank to adopt a new effectiveness of this institution has yet to be procurement code (Freedom House 2010a). ascertained. In terms of its international commitments, the DRC has signed 1 the African Union Convention on Preventing The State Auditor and Combating Corruption. In September 2010, the The state auditor is responsible for reviewing public country also acceded to the UNCAC and is legally expenditures and audit state-run companies. Freedom bound by the terms of the convention. Additional House considers the DRC’s audit body to be largely legislation includes the 2004 Money Laundering Act, ineffective (Freedom House, 2010a). under which the DRC cooperates with African and European crime-fighting organisations. In September The Judiciary 2007, the DRC also ratified the protocol agreement with The judiciary faces many challenges that undermine its the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ability to effectively prosecute corruption. The judiciary on Fighting Corruption. Since 2008, the DRC is a has been subordinated to the executive since the candidate within the Extractive Industry Transparency Mobutu era. The new administration is not believed to Initiative (EITI), but must implement numerous steps to have brought effective change and there has been very promote transparency before becoming a compliant little progress made in terms of judicial reform. The EITI country (Freedom House 2010a). judiciary lacks independence and suffers from widespread political interference and generalised corruption (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010). A 2004 audit of the judicial system revealed that only 20% of the population had access to justice services, especially outside Kinshasa (Matti, S. A., 2010).
1 But not ratified as of 06.08.2010.
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
The 2006 constitution transferred the power to appoint 2009). Consistent with these findings, Reporters sans judges and magistrates from the executive to the Frontières ranked the DRC 146 out of 175 countries Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM), assessed in its 2009 Freedom of the Press Index institutionalising the principle of judicial independence. (Reporters Sans Frontières, 2009). However, the CSM was only created in 2008 and remained largely non-functioning as of mid-2009 Critical journalists and broadcasters are frequently (Freedom House, 2010a). In practice, judges remain harassed, intimidated, arrested or imprisoned. subject to undue influence from government officials. In Broadcasting institutions can also be banned from February 2008, President Kabila forced 89 judges into operating and the contents of their broadcasts retirement, including the President of the Supreme censored. In 2007, for example, the government Court and the Prosecutor General, and replaced them banned 40 TV and radio stations due to allegedly with 28 new and largely unqualified magistrates. While improper licenses. More recently, in March 2009, the he justified his decision as a corruption purge, most mayor of Likasi ordered the closure of one local radio analysts considered it to constitute undue interference and one TV channel for alleged defamation. In July of with the judiciary (Freedom House, 2010a). the same year, the government banned transmission of the French public radio, Radio France International or In addition to widespread political interference in the RFI (Freedom House, 2010b). In spite of these administration of justice, the judiciary is poorly equipped constraints and restrictions, however, the media and under-financed. It has under-paid staff and poor provides a space for lively debate on social and political infrastructure, and lacks basic resources and capacity, issues (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010). including legal texts. As a result, in spite of a strong anti-corruption legal framework, very few office holders Civil Society have been prosecuted and convicted for corruption- Governance challenges combined with the near related offences fuelling a culture of impunity and collapse of state institutions have served as a catalyst cynicism among the population (Kodi, M., 2007). for civil society, with a myriad of NGOs emerging to provide basic services to fill gaps left by government. Other Institutions However, freedom of assembly and association are The DRC lacks a national ombudsman and an effective limited by public order-related provisions and groups complaint mechanism to empower citizens to report organising public events must inform local authorities in corruption cases (Freedom House 2010a). advance (Freedom House, 2010b).
Within the framework of a protocol cooperation When they are politically active, civil society agreement on fighting corruption with South Africa and organisations run a high risk of intimidation, arrest and UNODC signed in 2008, the DRC organised a Forum harassment. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation, National sur la Lutte Contre la Corruption (National the government has intensified repressive measures Forum on the Fight against Corruption) in December against opposition groups since the 2006 elections, 2009. The Forum recommended creation of a number contributing to restrictions on the country’s political of anti-corruption institutions, including a consultative space (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010). In particular, a body, the National Council of Ethics, an Independent 2008 Human Rights Watch report also documented the Commission of Ethics and Fight against Corruption, a government’s increased use of violence and government anti-corruption agency and an intimidation to eliminate political opposition, with Ombudsman (FONALC, 2009). President Kabila himself setting the tone and ordering to "crush" or "neutralise" the "enemies of democracy," Other Stakeholders (Human Right Watch, 2008). Media When tackling corruption issues, civil society faces Freedom of speech and of the press is guaranteed by considerable pressure from the government and the 2006 Constitution. However, in practice, the powerful vested interests. A 2010 report by Freedom effectiveness of the media as a watchdog is hampered House provides numerous examples of human rights by considerable government control and restrictions. activists being arrested, harassed and imprisoned when Government has used a wide range of licensing dealing with corruption. In 2009, for example, the requirements, as well as security and criminal libel President of the human rights group ASADHO-Katanga laws, to restrict freedom of the press (Freedom House, was sentenced to one year in prison after publishing a
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) report alleging official kickbacks from illegal mining. In International Crisis Group, 2006, Escaping the conflict t he same year, a trade union leader was arrested after trap: promoting good governance in the Congo, Africa writing a memorandum alleging the embezzlement of Report Nr 114, public money by the Minister of National Economy and http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central- trade (Freedom House, 2010a). In spite of these africa/dr-congo/114-escaping-the-conflict-trap- various challenges, the Bertelsmann Foundation promoting-good-governance-in-the-congo.aspx reports that an increasing number of civil society organisations engage in budget tracking issues and are Transparency International, 2009 Corruption raising awareness of high level corruption in the Perceptions Index, population (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010). http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_i ndices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table The International Community The DRC is a heavily indebted country, whose budget World Bank Institute, World Wide Governance is constrained by a debt load amounting to a quarter of Indicators, the country’s total annual expenditures (U4, 2010). As http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.as a result and given DRC’s low revenue collection p capacity, the country is heavily dependent on aid, which Heritage Foundation, 2010, Index of Economic accounts for about half of the budget (U4, 2010). Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/DemocraticRepu International pressure has played an important role in blicCongo driving past and current governance reforms. However, analysts also consider that international partners have World Bank, 2006, Enterprise surveys, an important responsibility in the government’s failure to http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ deliver meaningful change. In the transition period, some authors argue that the international community Global Integrity, 2008, Democratic Republic of Congo turned a blind eye to increasing levels of corruption in country report, order not to undermine the fragile electoral process, while both international partners and the government Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010, BTI 2010 Democratic paid lip service to the anti-corruption agenda (Kodi, M., Republic of Congo country report, 2007). Beyond the transition process, the lack of http://www.bertelsmann-transformation- ownership is seen as a major obstacle to the success of index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI2010/WCA/Cong anti-corruption reforms (U4, 2010). o__Republic_of_the.pdf
Open Budget Initiative, Open Budget Index 2008 3. References Democratic Republic of Congo country report, Global Witness, 2004, The same old story: a http://openbudgetindex.org/files/cs_democraticrepublico background study on natural resources in the fcongo.pdf Democratic Republic of Congo, Matti, S. A., 2010, The Democratic Republic of Congo? http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/8a6 Corruption, patronage and competitive authoritarianism bac4cbe4f056785256eca00130ff8 in the DRC, Africa Today, Summer 2010, Vol. 56, No. 4, Pages 42-61 BBC News, 2010, Democratic Republic of Congo country profile, UNDP, 2009, Human Development Report, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/10763 http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 99.stm Global Witness, 2009, Faced with a gun, what can you Shekhawat, S., 2009, Governance crisis and conflict in do? War and the militarisation of mining in Eastern the Democratic Republic of Congo, Centre for African Congo, Studies, University of Mumbai, http://www.globalwitness.org/fwag/ http://www.mu.ac.in/arts/social_science/african_studies/ seemawp6.pdf
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Freedom House, 2010a, Countries at crossroads - DRC country report, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140 &edition=9&ccrpage=43&ccrcountry=181
Freedom House, 2010b, Freedom in the world, Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&y ear=2010&country=7954
Global Witness, 2007, The Congolese sector in the balance: lack of transparency risks undermining review of mining contracts.
U4, Forest governance in Congo: corruption rules?, U4 Brief, http://www.u4.no/document/publication.cfm?3776=fores t-governance-in-congo-corruption-rules
Global Witness, 2008, Global Integrity report – Republic Democratic of Congo, http://report.globalintegrity.org/
Global Integrity, 2006 and 2008, DRC country report.
Kodi, M., 2007, Anti-corruption challenges in post election Democratic Republic of Congo, Chatham House, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3388_drc0107.pd f
Kodi, M., 2008, Corruption and Governance in the DRC during the Transition Period (2003-2006), Chatham House, http://www.illegal- logging.info/uploads/MuzongKodiCorruptionGovernanc einDRCSept08.pdf
US Department of State, 2010, Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138056.htm
Forum National sur La Lutte Contre la Corruption (FONALC), 2009, Rapport synthèse du Forum National sur La Lutte Contre la Corruption en RDC, FONALC/ Ministère de la Fonction Publique
Reporters Sans Frontières, 2009, Press Freedom Index, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html
Human Rights Watch, 2008, We will crush you, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/25/we-will-crush- you-0
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DR Congo Corruption Report Page 1 of 9 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 31/76 NM T
Democratic Republic of the Congo
DR Congo Corruption Report
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Snapshot
Corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is an endemic problem, and seriously hinders businesses operating in the country. It permeates all levels of government and all sectors of the economy, rendering the country’s investment climate as one of the least competitive in the world. Clientelism, rent-seeking and patronage have decimated fair competition, particularly in the sectors of public procurement and extractive industries. Corruption has also impeded efforts to increase the transparency of government institutions. The ruling elite has a direct stake in the country's economy, and often steer economic activities in accordance to their own personal opportunities. The Penal Code (in French) makes up the country's anti-corruption legislation, yet the relevant laws are very poorly implemented, and government officials engaged in corruption with total impunity. The dysfunctional institutional framework has contributed to the spread of corruption, as well as inflating the country’s informal economy, further impairing competitiveness. Bribery is
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widespread, to the extent that businesses consider it a routine when carrying out operations.
Last updated: August 2016 GAN Integrity
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Judicial System
The judicial institutions suffer from widespread corruption, and poses a high risks for companies ( HRR 2015 ). Approximately a third of all surveyed companies identified the courts as a constraint to doing business in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ( ES 2013 ). The Congolese judiciary is severely under-financed, and lacks the most basic infrastructure ( BTI 2016 ). Furthermore, the courts are inefficient, subject to political influence, and restricted to only a few major cities (BTI 2016). An overwhelming majority of surveyed households believe that corruption is widespread in the judicial institution ( GCB 2013 ).
The country’s dispute settlement policies are inoperative in practice, ( ICS 2016 ) and such processes frequently involve bribery ( HRR 2014 ). Congolese business contracts usually provide external arbitration clauses; nonetheless, these are not useful in resolving day-to-day business problems, due to cost and time constraints (ICS 2016). Both foreigners and nationals are subject to selective application of a complex legal code, (ICS 2016) and when obtained, court orders are often not respected (HRR 2015).
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has ratified the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the New York Convention 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
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Police
Corruption risks are very high within the Congolese security apparatus. Corruption is widespread among the State Security Forces (SSR), the national police (PNC), and the national army (FARDC) (BTI 2016). Police impunity has been reinforced by the reshuffling of the country’s security forces, and the replacement of officers with notoriously corrupt ones who have close ties with the president (BTI 2016). A sweeping majority of surveyed Congolese households perceive the police to be corrupt (GCB 2013). In fact, almost half of all surveyed firms operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo pay for security, and more than a quarter identify crime as an obstacle to doing business (ES 2013).
Public Services
Corruption in the public services sector presents a very high risk for companies. One quarter of companies identify that business licenses and permits as a major constraint to doing business (ES 2013). Half of businesses believe that offering gifts to officials is part of the process of 'getting things done', and expect the same when applying for a water or electrical connection (ES 2013). Likewise, companies starting up a business may encounter demands for bribes disguised as dubious payments, non- existent taxes, or fees (BTI 2016). The high levels of petty corruption can be attributed to a weak administrative capacity and a shortage of resources, combined with low-salaries or unpaid staff (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). In fact, reports suggest that petty corruption is often the only means of survival for employees of the public administration (BTI 2016).
The state administration is almost non-existent outside major Congolese major cities (BTI 2016). Several parts of the country are subject to two parallel administrations; one is operated by the state, the other by armed groups (BTI 2016). These major dysfunctionalities in the public administration, coupled with pervasive corruption, ambiguous and unfair economic policies have served as a breeding ground for the country’s large informal sector (BTI 2016).
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The government established the one-stop window, which has successfully speed up the process of starting a business in the country (ICS 2016). The registration process has been simplified, and the minimum capital has been reduced, bringing the average cost and time-required to start a business in the Democratic Republic of Congo below the regional average ( DB 2016 ).
Land Administration
Land administration carries a high corruption risk for business. Almost six out of every ten surveyed companies expected to give gifts to officials when applying for a construction permit (ES 2013).
Property rights are recognized under the Congolese constitution; however, rampant corruption, a weak judiciary, and a dysfunctional public administration have rendered inconsistent enforcement of these rights (BTI 2016). Private properties are frequently expropriated, particularly by people close to the President (BTI 2016). Acquired land titles are usually revised by a competing authority. The aim is to clarify uncertainties involving land ownership that arise due to competition between statutory and customary laws (BTI 2016). Registering property takes businesses 44 days, an average that is lower compared to neighboring countries; however, the process is costlier than the regional average (DB 2016).
Tax Administration
Corruption is rampant in the tax administration, and presents a very high risk for business. Corrupt tax officials and the complexity of the tax system has resulted in frequent practices of bribery ( FitW 2015 ). More than half of all surveyed companies expect to give gifts when meeting with tax officials (ES 2013). Dealing with tax payments is costlier and more time-consuming in the Democratic Republic of Congo compared to the rest of the region (DB 2016).
An example of actions taken against whistleblowers include one who worked within the national tax agency. He was dismissed after he attempted to denounce a suspected large-scale tax evasion scheme by a multinational company operating in the country in 2010 ( CatC 2012 ).
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Customs Administration
The customs administration carries a very high risk for business. More than one quarter of all surveyed companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo perceive trade regulations as an obstacle to doing business, and over half expect to give gifts to officials in order to obtain import licenses (ES 2013). Trading across borders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is significantly more time-consuming and costlier compared to regional average. For instance, documentary compliance in connection to exports costs USD 2,500 compared to the Sub-Saharan Africa average of USD 246 (DB 2016).
In an effort to curb corruption in the customs sector, the government initiated in 2014, a new single window declaration system on the Zambian border, which automatically transmits forms electronically to the capital Kinshasa. Nonetheless, enforcement remains dependent on the integrity of local officials (FitW 2015).
Public Procurement
Companies face very high corruption risks when dealing with the Congolese public procurement sector. There is an absence of transparency of governmental decisions, and accountability when it comes to public contracting (BTI 2016). In fact, public procurement decisions and privatization deals are generally based on political considerations, rather than economic ones (BTI 2016). Over half of all surveyed business executives expected to give gifts to officials to secure government contracts (ES 2013). Monopolies and cartels dominate the market, and are generally associated with people from the president's inner circle, rendering fair competition nonexistent (BTI 2016).
Natural Resources
The natural resources sector is plagued by corruption, and the government's management of the country's natural wealth lacks transparency ( Transparency International, Mar. 2014 ). State-owned companies dominate the extractive industries sector, and the process of
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allocating exploration and exploitation licenses is arbitrary and lacks transparency ( ICS 2015 ). Revenue from the natural resources sector has generally been siphoned by the ruling elite to the detriment of both the population and the environment (BTI 2016). The mining and the oil sector in particular, suffers from rampant corruption, and a culture of secrecy and informal dealings, which has in turn allowed for the embezzlement of public resources (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). Likewise, illegal and informal logging in the country account for almost 90 percent of all logging activities, and 94 percent of licensed forest land was issued illegally to a company instead of individuals between 2010 and 2012 ( U4, Apr. 2015 ). Several of these logging permits were issued to the benefit of the Congolese political elite (U4, Apr. 2015).
Secrecy surrounding mining contracts has led to banks cancelling loans accorded to state-owned mining companies, including the African Development Bank and the World Bank (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). In one instance, the IMF completely withdrew a loan worth USD 532 million in 2013, as the Congolese government at the time refused to disclose details surrounding the dubious sale of 25 percent of a state-owned copper project (BTI 2016). The government in power between 2008 and 2011 were accused of selling mining concessions for USD five billion under market price in return for kickbacks (CatC 2012). While the national assembly commission found that government officials pocketed USD 23 million in kickbacks from a USD six billion mining-for-infrastructure deal with China (CatC 2012). It should also be mentioned that the current Congolese civil war is reflected in the natural resources sector; rivalries over the control of resources have escalated, as warring groups have used the country's natural wealth to consolidate economic bases and trading networks (Transparency International, Mar. 2014).
The Democratic Republic of the Congo was accepted back as a candidate for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2008; however, the country failed to accomplish all validation requirements, particularly full disclosure and reliability of figures (HRR 2014). Nonetheless, the government stepped up its efforts on reporting in the mining and oil industries which gained the country compliant status in 2014 (HRR 2014).
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Legislation
The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo has established a legal anti-corruption framework; however, its enforcement is very weak (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). The Congolese Penal Code (in French) criminalizes most forms of corruption by public officials, including abuse of office. The latter offense can be punished by up to 15 years' imprisonment. Money laundering is also criminalized under the Money Laundering Act. The president and government officials are subject to financial disclosure laws, and reportedly the president, and his cabinet ministers disclosed their assets to a government committee; however, the information was not made public (HRR 2014). The government has established a code of conduct to promote transparency and integrity in the public and the private sector, as well as civil society organization. However, the code is not implemented in practice (BTI 2016). Whistleblowers are not protected under Congolese law. There are no mechanisms in place to monitor, evaluate and/or audit the public administration, which has in turn contributed to the continuous degradation of the country's institutions (BTI 2016). Furthermore, audits and tracking of government expenditure almost never take place (BTI 2016). Evidence also suggests that non-discretionary spending is high (BTI 2016). Recruitment is plagued by high levels of patronage, as key administrative and governmental positions are offered on the basis of complex patronage networks (Transparency International, Mar. 2014).
Political motives often drive the anti-corruption agenda in the country (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). Programs initiated to curb corruption include: 'Zero Tolerance against Corruption' and the 'Mining Sector Free of Corruption'. However, these have mainly served as a tool to secure foreign funding for the government (BTI 2016).
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has ratified: the UN Convention against Corruption , the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption , the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption , and the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in the Area of Anti-Corruption between the DRC, South Africa, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
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Civil Society
Freedoms of speech and press are guaranteed under the constitution; however, authorities have strictly limited these freedoms in practice through a range of security and libel laws (BTI 2016), (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). Reporting on issues, such as public criticism or corruption result in reprisal, particularly on behalf of the Congolese National Intelligence Agency (HRR 2014). Journalists criticizing the government are frequently killed (BTI 2016). The media is perceived as biased, and reporting generally favors President Kabila's party ( FotP 2015 ). Media outlets that deviate from this type of reporting are shut down by authorities (FotP 2015). Since mid-2014 the press was prohibited from initiating or sharing political administrative declarations and information about mining companies, without prior approval (FotP 2015). Corruption and political manipulation within the ranks of journalists is a risk, due to poor training and pay (FotP 2015). The internet is not monitored by the government; however, only a very small percentage of the population have access (BTI 2016). There are no laws that allow for public access to government information (FitW 2015). The media environment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is described as 'not free' (FotP 2015).
Civil society rights are frequently violated by the Congolese authorities; despite being guaranteed under the law (BTI 2016). Civil society activists are often the victims of intimidation, harassment, and assassinations (BTI 2016). Only non-political NGOs are able to operate without government interference (Transparency International, Mar. 2014). NGOs often distance themselves from engaging in anti-corruption activities for fear of reprisal (BTI 2016). Civil society are generally not involved in political-decision making (BTI 2016).
Sources
World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2016 . Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2016 . US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo 2016 .
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US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015 . US Department of State: Human Rights Practices Report - Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015 . Freedom House: Freedom in the World - The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015 . Freedom House: Freedom of the Press - The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015 . U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center: National-level corruption risks and mitigation strategies in the implementation of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An overview of the current situation , April 2015 US Department of State: Human Rights Practices Report - Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014 . Transparency International: Overview of Corruption and Anti- Corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) , 11 March 2014. Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2013 . World Bank Group: Enterprise Surveys - Democratic Republic of the Congo 2013 . Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads - Democratic Republic of the Congo 2012 .
Topics: Sub-Saharan Africa
© 2017 GAN INTEGRITY INC.
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Human Rights Battle for control of the DRC: Who are the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI)?
The FRPI and its off-shoot FPJC have been an active armed militia and political party in DRC's north-eastern region.
By Elsa Buchanan Updated
The Ituri district has been the home to inter-ethnic clashes between the Lendu and Hema communities since 1999, a conflict that became one of the deadliest within the larger 1998-2003 Second Congo War.
The clashes pushed the UN Security Council to launch an international intervention to contain the bloodshed in 2003, and while violence and civilian displacement have somewhat declined sharply, the situation remains very fragile.
FRPI: the Lendu militia
The FRPI (Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri) and its off-shoot FPJC have been an active armed militia and political party in DRC's north-eastern region of Ituri, a district that "manifests all of the Congo's main challenges to stabilization", Henning Tamm, of the International Relations department at St Antony's College, Oxford. Why advertise with us
A similar Front des nationalistes intégrationnistes (FNI, Front of Integrationist Nationalists), largely morphed into a political party in 2005, but the FRPI continues to resist army integration to this day.
Both militias were born out of local fighting over land as well as the proxy wars ɔ between DRC, Uganda and Rwanda. Between 2002 and 2003, both FNI and FRPI
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received support from Congolese and Ugandan armies, to fight warlord Thomas Lubanga's Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). By the tail end of 2007, most FNI and FRPI commanders and troops had integrated the Congolese army, but the FRPI/FPJC remain a disruptive force in Ituri district.
While analysts have described the FRPI/FPJC as "residual", rights campaigners say its toll is high, as analysts say the government never fully addressed the local roots of the conflict.
The government army FARDC has recently launched search operations - supported by the $1.3bn MONUSCO force - against the FRPI. These operations "are the most effective since the fall of the M23", according to UN envoy Martin Kobler.
Accused of mass murder
Bunia-based FRPI's former commander Germain Katanga was sentenced to 12 years in prison for aiding and abetting war crimes during his ICC trial in May 2014. Known to his supporters as Simba, or "the lion", Katanga was behind the 2003 massacre of hundreds of villagers in Ituri, when he planned the ambush on the village of Bogoro in the gold-rich province.
He was on trial with two other Ituri militia leaders for crimes against humanity, including the recruitment of child soldiers, mass murder and rape.
This article was first published on October 29, 2015
Related topics : DRC
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United Nations S/2017/206
Security Council Distr.: General 10 March 2017
Original: English
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 50 and 52 of Security Council resolution 2277 (2016). It covers major developments that have occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since my report of 29 December 2016 (S/2016/1130). The present report describes progress in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and provides an update and makes recommendations on adjustments to the Mission in support of the political transition and its preparedness to address security risks and monitor and report on human rights violations and abuses.
II. Major developments
A. Political situation
2. On 19 December 2016, the second and final constitutional term of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila, expired. The political tensions that had been rising steadily throughout 2016 erupted again, as many demonstrations across the country turned violent. On 31 December, mediation efforts led by the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo (CENCO) culminated in the conclusion of a new political agreement to govern the transitional period until the holding of elections. The agreement, which was signed by representatives of the signatories and non-signatories of the political agreement signed on 18 October 2016, helped defuse political tensions, most notably in Kinshasa. 3. More than two months after its signing, however, implementation of the new political agreement remains stalled. On 10 January 2017, CENCO launched a new round of negotiations to achieve a compromise on the special provisions governing the implementation of the political agreement. Consensus was reached on a non-hierarchical vice-presidency of the Conseil national de suivi de l’accord (CNSA) and its composition, designating Étienne Tshisekedi, the former leader of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) and the Rassemblement des forces politiques et sociales de la République démocratique du Congo acquises au changement, as its head. The signatories also agreed on a timeline to implement
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the political agreement, which envisages the operationalization of CNSA, the submission of lists for the reshuffling of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the publication of the electoral calendar by 15 April. 4. The continued lack of agreement among the signatories on the modalities to designate the Prime Minister remains a major obstacle to progress. In a meeting with the CENCO leadership on 20 February, the President reiterated his request for three names to be put forward for the position of Prime Minister and called for a shift in focus from power-sharing arrangements to the organization of elections. The Rassemblement, for its part, continues to insist on a sole candidate, in accordance with the political agreement of 31 December 2016. Disagreement also persists between the ruling majority and the Rassemblement on the allocation of the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence and Justice in the transitional government. 5. The passing on 1 February of Mr. Tshisekedi has also hampered the nomination of the Prime Minister and the establishment of CNSA. The ruling majority and the Rassemblement also disagree on the future role of CENCO, with the former opposed to CENCO continuing its mediation role beyond the negotiation of the special provisions. In February, Catholic parishes and seminaries in Kananga, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi were attacked, possibly as a result of growing frustration among segments of the population with delays in the CENCO-led negotiations on the special provisions. On 2 March, Félix Tshisekedi, the son of Étienne Tshisekedi and a Deputy Secretary-General of UDPS, became president of the Rassemblement, and Pierre Lumbi from the Groupe des sept opposition coalition took over leadership of the Conseil des sages of the Rassemblement. 6. Meanwhile, the voter registration process continued, following the completion of a pilot phase on 29 November 2016. In mid-December, the Independent National Electoral Commission launched voter registration in 2 of the 4 operational areas (covering 13 provinces). On 23 February 2017, the Commission reported that 15 million people had been registered. Registration is expected to begin in the remaining 2 areas (covering the remaining 13 provinces) in March and April. MONUSCO continued to support voter registration. As at 28 February, MONUSCO had transported, mostly by air, more than 2,000 tons of voter registration materials to locations throughout the country. The Mission is expected to complete the transportation of registration materials by the end of March. 7. The funding of the elections continues to be an issue. On 15 February, Budget Minister Pierre Kangudia announced that it would be challenging for the Government to raise the estimated $1.8 billion required to hold elections. On the same day, the Minister of Communications and Media and Spokesperson for the Government, Lambert Mende, indicated that Mr. Kangudia had been misunderstood and that the Government was committed to holding presidential elections in 2017. The President of the Independent National Electoral Commission subsequently stated that the Commission’s updated budget for the electoral cycle was $1.3 billion, covering all elections. As at 24 February, the Government had reportedly disbursed to the Commission $180 million of the $300 million it had pledged in 2016 to organize the elections. 8. The multipartner basket fund for the Projet d’ appui au cycle électoral au Congo (PACEC) to support the electoral cycle, managed by the United Nations Development Programme, remains funded at 6 per cent of the required amount of $123.3 million, partly due to donor concerns regarding uncertainties surrounding arrangements for the political transition. Lack of funding for PACEC is limiting civic education, the deployment of election monitors and other important types of support for the electoral process.
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B. Security situation
9. There have been major shifts in the security landscape in the country during the reporting period. Violence and threats to civilians are no longer concentrated in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as community-based violence and inter-ethnic clashes have spread from areas already affected by armed conflict, such as in North and South Kivu provinces, to Tanganyika, the three Kasai provinces and Kongo Central. Armed group activity in the east has increased, particularly with the resurfacing of the former Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). The resurgence of violence across the country has been exacerbated by the current uncertain political situation, as well as by the manipulation of grievances for political ends and support to armed militias by some political actors. The increasing use of self-defence militia, acting along ethnic lines, points to a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty. The risk of violence related to elections, mainly in urban areas, is also increasing, and is expected to rise further the longer the implementation of the political agreement remains stalled, prolonging the current political uncertainty.
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
10. Civilians continue to be seriously affected by the ongoing activities of armed groups in North and South Kivu, Ituri and Haut-Uélé provinces, resulting in continued operations by the Congolese armed forces and MONUSCO. Although under military pressure, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri (FRPI) have managed to retain the capacity to conduct destabilizing activities. 11. In North Kivu, 42 people were killed between 24 and 31 December 2016 in a series of attacks by presumed ADF forces, or their affiliates, around Eringeti, in Beni territory. Clashes among FDLR and its splinter group, the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie-Ubwiyunge (CNRD), the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and Mai-Mai groups, caused significant population displacement. Intercommunal conflict, particularly between the Hutu and Nande communities, also intensified during the reporting period. 12. Coordinated operations by FARDC and MONUSCO in January helped disrupt the activities of ADF and other armed groups. The Mission deployed forward bases on the border with Ituri province, near Beni town, and in Mamudioma, near the ADF stronghold known as the “triangle” area. It also reinforced its presence in Itebero, Walikale territory, to investigate allegations of human rights violations and increased patrolling in Nyanzalé in response to rumours of an attack by armed groups on the civilian population. A forward base was extended in Luhanga to protect the site of internally displaced persons from the Hutu community that had been attacked by Mai-Mai elements in November. 13. MONUSCO continued to support FARDC military operations against FDLR and undertook unilateral operations to maintain military pressure on the armed group by targeting its leadership and its key sources of income, including the charcoal trade. In late December, a number of FDLR camps and charcoal taxation checkpoints were dismantled during such operations. In late December and in January 2017, a significant amount of FDLR communications equipment and a number of FDLR internal documents were recovered near Virunga National Park. 14. On 27 January 2017, following reports that a group of former M23 elements had entered North Kivu from Uganda and were in North Kivu, two FARDC attack helicopters involved in an operation against the former M23 elements crashed near the Mikeno and Karisimbi mountains in Rutshuru territory, close to the Rwandan
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border. MONUSCO helped rescue five crew members and FARDC soldiers from the crash site during subsequent ground operations against suspected former M23 elements. MONUSCO recovered seven bodies (two crew members, an FARDC colonel and four alleged former M23 elements) and FARDC detained one former M23 element. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo subsequently deployed 700 additional FARDC troops to North Kivu to reinforce its presence on the ground. MONUSCO is conducting regular reconnaissance missions in North Kivu, in close coordination with FARDC and the Congolese authorities, to monitor the movements of former M23 elements into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 15. In Ituri, during the month of January, MONUSCO documented 40 human rights violations involving the FRPI. MONUSCO and FARDC conducted seven coordinated operations against FRPI, during which 27 of their fighters were killed, 1 was wounded and 2 were apprehended. Intercommunal violence between the Hema and Lendu communities subsided, following an intercommunity dialogue launched in Irumu territory by the provincial authorities, with MONUSCO support. 16. In South Kivu, movements by armed groups were reported, particularly in Fizi, Shabunda and Uvira territories. Significant FDLR movements were also reported in Mwenga territory. In the Ruzizi plains, FARDC blocked cross-border movements by Burundian armed elements into Uvira territory, with some Forces nationales de libération (FNL) elements killed during an operation. MONUSCO also conducted operations with FARDC, targeting FNL camps around Sange, Uvira territory, with the aim to restrict their freedom of movement and access to resources. 17. In Haut-Uélé, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued to attack civilians in north-western Dungu territory and along the Bangadi-Niangara axis, pillaging food supplies and abducting civilians. Furthermore, cross-border movement by armed elements from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army continued. South Sudanese combatants have also reportedly infiltrated some refugee camps in Haut-Uélé. MONUSCO extended the deployment of a forward base in Doruma, on the border with South Sudan, to reinforce its presence in the area and support the operations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as needed. The Mission has also contributed to strengthening community-based protection of civilian mechanisms in villages along the border with South Sudan t o improve early warning and response. 18. Against the backdrop of continued activity of armed groups in the east, members of some armed groups continue to surrender, with new combatants entering the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which is supported by MONUSCO. Under the programme, the Government has completed the return of 3,763 former combatants from the Kitona and Kamina camps to their communities in eight provinces, mainly in the eastern part of the country, while some 150 former combatants in Kamina and 514 in Kitona started the first stage of reinsertion in January. MONUSCO continued its community-violence reduction activities, launching 20 projects in the eastern provinces during the reporting period. 19. Both Congolese and foreign combatants have presented themselves to MONUSCO to enter disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation processes, respectively. That includes 42 Congolese combatants, of whom half were from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes Abacunguzi (FLDR-FOCA) group; 12 from various Mai-Mai groups; 8 Nyatura; and 2 from CNRD; as well as 32 foreign combatants, the majority of whom were
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FDLR-FOCA and have been repatriated to Rwanda. The Mission continues to provide support to 298 disarmed FDLR and 1,050 dependants who were part of the incomplete voluntary disarmament process in Kanyobagonga, Kisangani and Walungu camps, and to 628 SPLM/A-IO elements, including 28 minors, accommodated on MONUSCO premises in Dungu and Goma.
Emerging areas of violence
20. The resurgence of violence in areas that were, up until recently, relatively calm has taken a heavy toll on civilians in a number of areas where MONUSCO has a minimal presence. 21. In Tanganyika, fighting between the Twa and Luba communities spread into five of its six territories, claiming the lives of nearly 150 people and displacing 433,777 as at 28 February 2017. In mid-January, clashes between Twa and Luba youth in Moba resulted in the death of five civilians and significant population displacement. MONUSCO reinforced its presence in Manono and facilitated the deployment of FARDC to Moba, Monde and Nyunzu to disperse various militia elements occupying those areas. The Mission also supported community-based conflict resolution initiatives in the territories affected by conflict. 22. Violence escalated sharply in the Kasai provinces and Lomami province, due to clashes between national security forces and members of the Kamuina Nsapu militia. In January, at least 40 people were killed, mostly by militia members, in clashes with Congolese security forces in Dibaya territory, Kasai Central. Between 25 January and 5 February, clashes with the Congolese security forces reportedly resulted in the death of at least 22 militia members. From 6 to 8 February, in Nguema, in Kasai Central, at least 47 people, including militia members and civilians, were reportedly killed during a military operation led by FARDC. From 9 to 13 February, further military action by FARDC against the militia resulted in the alleged killing of at least 84 presumed militia elements in and around Tshimbulu, Kasai Central. The militia reportedly killed two local chiefs for not cooperating with them and increased the recruitment and use of children in the militia. The Government has launched investigations into allegations of human rights violations in the Kasai provinces. 23. The Mission deployed interdisciplinary mobile monitoring and response teams, which are specifically designed to deploy to areas where MONUSCO no longer has a presence or its presence is limited, to several areas affected by the violence in the Kasai provinces. The aims of the teams are to verify reports of serious human rights violations, improve the Mission’s situational awareness and engage with local and provincial authorities, communities and civil society. A company from the rapidly deployable battalion in South Kivu was deployed to Kananga on 23 December 2016 and relieved by a company of MONUSCO Force reserves from Kinshasa on 20 January 2017. On 22 February, an additional company was deployed to Kananga in order to establish additional forward bases and early warning systems in key areas of the Kasai provinces. MONUSCO used its reinforced presence to support local conflict-resolution initiatives, including initial disarmament discussions with the Kamuina Nsapu militia. Provisional authorities in Kasai Oriental engaged in efforts, supported by MONUSCO, to enlist the support of community leaders in defusing tensions in their areas and persuading local youth not to join the Kamuina Nsapu militia. 24. In Kongo Central, political tensions rose sharply in the lead up to and immediately after the expiration of the President’s mandate. In January, in Kimpese, the residence of the Vice-President of the Bundu Dia Mayala (BDM) political party, who was recently appointed as Vice-Minister of Infrastructure, Public Works and
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Reconstruction was burned and looted by supporters of the President of BDM. Subsequent clashes between BDM supporters, the national police and FARDC resulted in the death of two presumed BDM supporters and one police officer. In February, nine civilians were reportedly shot dead by the police as a crowd attempted to recover the bodies of the dead BDM supporters from a local mortuary. The national police also clashed with sympathizers of BDM in Kinshasa and surrounded the residence of the leader of BDM supporter and a member of Parliament, Ne Muanda Nsemi, who is wanted by the judiciary for sedition, resulting in 2 BDM elements killed, a number of civilians injured and 22 people arrested. On 4 March, in Kinshasa, the police arrested Mr. Nsemi and his wife in an operation during which one police officer and three BDM elements were killed. The police also seized three firearms and arrested 307 people, 170 of whom were released the same day. 25. In Kinshasa, in the lead-up to the end of the President’s term on 19 December 2016, MONUSCO reinforced its presence with two additional companies, bringing its strength in the city to one battalion, until one company was redeplo yed to Kananga. The Mission also strengthened its tactical operations centre in Kinshasa to facilitate a coordinated Mission response to electoral violence by the Mission’s police, military and human rights components. MONUSCO also trained 133 national police audit inspectors on human rights monitoring to strengthen oversight of the actions of the national police.
Regional developments
26. Efforts continued at the regional level to address the continued threat of armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In January 2017, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Kinshasa to urge the resumption of efforts to implement the Nairobi Declarations in order to address the return of ex-M23 elements. They also met with the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to discuss, inter alia, the issue of the former M23 elements. They also attended a meeting of the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region on the margins of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa. In their final communiqué, the guarantors expressed concern regarding the continued activities of armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the reported incursion by former M23 elements into the country and the prolonged presence of SPLM/A-IO elements on Congolese soil. Further developments in relation to the Framework are provided in my report on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2017/208). 27. My Special Representative and my Special Envoy also carried out joint démarches in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a view to addressing the presence of SPLM/A-IO elements on Congolese territory and concerns related to the negative impact of the conflict in South Sudan in the north-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In their exchanges on 12 and 13 January 2017 with national and provincial authorities, including the Chief of Staff of the President, the Vice-Prime Minister for the Interior, the Vice-Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs and representatives of the SPLM/A-IO, they emphasized the need to seek a durable political solution, supported by regional actors. My Special Representative and my Special Envoy also discussed the matter with the President of Uganda.
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C. Human rights situation
28. The human rights situation continued to deteriorate amid rising violence and political turmoil. In 2016, MONUSCO documented 5,190 human rights violations throughout the country, which represents an increase of 30 per cent compared with 2015. The activities of several armed groups in conflict-affected provinces also increased, resulting in many human rights violations, particularly in North Kivu (1,910 violations), Ituri (749 violations) and Haut-Katanga (328 violations). 29. In 2016, State agents were responsible for 64 per cent of the total number of documented violations, including the extrajudicial killing of 480 civilians. The national police remained the main perpetrators of human rights violations, totalling 1,553 abuses, representing 30 per cent of the total number of documented cases in 2016. That represents an increase of 65 per cent compared with 2015. 30. Throughout 2016, armed groups accounted for 36 per cent of the total number of violations, which included the killing of 718 civilians. Of the 1,871 human rights abuses attributable to armed groups, FRPI elements were responsible for most human rights abuses, with 516 incidents documented, mostly looting. FDLR elements remained particularly active in the territory of Rutshuru, North Kivu, and were responsible for a large number of summary executions (150 victims), and violations of the right to the liberty and security of person (225 victims). ADF and suspected affiliated groups were the main perpetrators of summary executions, with at least 230 victims. 31. In 2016, the Mission recorded 1,102 violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms linked to restrictions of democratic space, a fourfold increase compared with 2015. Particularly violent incidents were recorded during the political unrest around 19 December. Between 15 and 31 December, the Mission documented the killing by State agents of at least 40 civilians, including 5 women and 2 children, and the wounding of 147 individuals, including 14 women and 18 children. During the same period, at least 917 individuals, including 30 women and 95 children, were arrested by State agents throughout the country. Although most of those individuals were later released, more than 70 have reportedly been charged with a felony, including spiteful destruction, looting, rebellion or participation in an insurrectional movement. Many of the individuals were reportedly subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment at the time of arrest or during detention. 32. There were also several cases of violence by demonstrators on 19 December. One national police officer was killed by demonstrators in Kinshasa and another was slightly injured by protestors in Lubumbashi, Haut-Katanga. Demonstrators also looted and destroyed public and private property in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Luebo (Kasai), Boma and Matadi (Kongo Central).
Child protection
33. MONUSCO documented 114 grave violations against children, a slight decrease from the 120 cases documented during the previous reporting period. Children continued to be recruited and used by armed groups. The main armed groups that recruited and used children were Mai-Mai Mazembe/Union des patriotes pour la défense des innocents (14), Nyatura (12), Nduma défense du Congo - Rénové/Guidon (8), FDLR (8), Mai-Mai Raia Mutomboki (7) and Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (6). Some 7 children were killed and maimed, while 9 were abducted and 25, including 2 boys, were victims of sexual violence. In total, 61 boys and 9 girls were separated or escaped from armed groups. Two boys allegedly associated with armed groups were released from FARDC custody and handed over to MONUSCO, while 13 boys, including 2 Rwandans,
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remained in FARDC detention. In 2017, as at 23 February, joint advocacy by MONUSCO and the United Nations Children’s Fund has led to the release of 37 minors, ages 15 to 17, who had been detained in Kananga prison since August 2016 for alleged association with Kamuina Nsapu militia activities. Armed groups also carried out two documented attacks against schools and one against a health-care centre.
Sexual violence
34. MONUSCO recorded a sharp increase in conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated in the context of intensifying inter-ethnic conflict in Kalemie territory, Tanganyika province. Following an investigation mission from 23 to 25 January 2017, MONUSCO confirmed the rape of 30 women and 6 girls. Nineteen of the 36 victims, including the 6 minors, belong to the Twa community, while 3 Luba women perceived as supporting the Twa community were raped by Luba men. The remaining 14 women, all internally displaced persons from the Luba community, were all reportedly raped by men from the Twa community during attacks in November 2016 and January 2017.
D. Humanitarian and economic situation
35. The humanitarian situation deteriorated owing to intensifying intercommunal violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. A total of 2.2 million persons had been forcibly displaced as at 31 December 2016. In Tanganyika, the spread of violence in several areas of the province forced some 102,000 people into new displacement in the final quarter of 2016, including an estimated 46,000 people into neighbouring Haut-Lomami and Haut-Katanga provinces. Similarly, in Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental provinces, clashes between FARDC and local militia displaced more than 225,000 people by the end of January 2017. As at 31 December 2016, there were 451,956 refugees and asylum seekers in the country, mostly from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan. By early January 2017, UNHCR had registered 28,000 South Sudanese refugees, with the majority settled close to the border with South Sudan in the territories of Dungu and Faradje, in Haut-Uélé. 36. Humanitarian access continued to be obstructed by insecurity in some areas in the eastern provinces. Funding for humanitarian aid failed to keep pace with growing humanitarian need. The Humanitarian Response Plan was funded at a little more than 60 per cent ($412 million of $690 million) at the end of 2016. On 10 February 2017, the humanitarian community and Congolese authorities launched an appeal for $748 million to assist 6.7 million people in need for 2017. 37. The downward macroeconomic trend, due to a large extent to the decline in global commodity prices, continued. The Congolese franc has depreciated by more than 30 per cent since January 2016, despite efforts by the Central Bank to curb inflation. On 13 January 2017, the Central Bank doubled its prime rate from 7 to 14 per cent, and on 24 January it injected $50 million into the interbank exchange market in an effort to support the Congolese franc. The deteriorating socioeconomic situation risks fuelling popular frustration in an already tense political environment.
III. Proposed adjustment of MONUSCO and implementation of key reporting obligations
38. The political agreement of 31 December 2016 provides a clear path towards the holding of elections and offers the best chance of a peaceful transfer of power,
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which would set the stage for the eventual drawdown and exit of MONUSCO. The Mission’s main strategic objective during the next 12 to 18 months, therefore, will be to help create an environment conducive to the timely holding of peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in accordance with the provisions of the political agreement. The achievement of that objective will depend on the political will of the signatories. The Mission is adjusting its priorities, posture and presence to ensure that it is well positioned to use the full range of tools at its disposal to support the political and electoral process, contribute to the protection of civilians, reduce the threat posed by armed groups and assist with stabilization efforts.
Political and electoral process
39. Swift implementation of the political agreement, beginning with the finalization of the special provisions, remains critical in order to maintain the momentum towards elections and prevent a further deterioration of the security and human rights situation in the country. MONUSCO will, in particular, support that process through the sustained good offices, political facilitation and engagement of my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo with all national stakeholders, as well as regional and international partners. MONUSCO is also ready to support the work of CNSA, as requested, in order to help ensure that that key body is able to fully exercise its critical role in overseeing the implementation of the political agreement. That is fundamental to achieving the overarching strategic objective. Alongside those efforts, MONUSCO will continue to provide technical and logistical support to the Independent National Electoral Commission to conclude the updating of the voter registry and, if mandated by the Security Council, support the organization and conduct of the elections.
Civilian staffing
40. MONUSCO is recalibrating its civilian staffing to ensure that it is well positioned to support its main strategic objective during the transition period and the upcoming elections. To that end, civilian staff members in key leadership and management roles are being moved from Goma to reinforce MONUSCO headquarters in Kinshasa, which will enable Mission leadership to increase engagement with the host country authorities.
Human rights
41. As part of its efforts to create an environment conducive to the holding of peaceful, inclusive and credible elections, MONUSCO will maintain a strong focus on the promotion of human rights, the preservation of political space and the promotion of confidence-building measures. Rigorous human rights monitoring, reporting, investigation and advocacy will be a critical part of the Mission’s efforts to reduce political violence during the transition period and the upcoming elections. The Mission will intensify its engagement with national authorities at all levels, security actors and all relevant stakeholders to urge respect for fundamental political freedoms. It will also work closely with the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel et de la communication to contribute to the promotion and respect for freedom of the press. MONUSCO will make use of its prosecution support cells to help Congolese authorities ensure that perpetrators of serious human rights violations are held accountable.
Protection of civilians
42. MONUSCO will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians that emphasizes the use of its good offices and political facilitation at the local, provincial and national levels, as well as human rights
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monitoring and reporting to prevent and de-escalate intercommunal conflicts, which are likely to become increasingly politicized in the run-up to the elections. To that end, the Mission is taking steps to strengthen its information collection and analysis in order to address the root causes of conflict through a better understanding of the linkages between local and national political dynamics, connections between armed groups, weapons flows and criminal networks. The Mission is also enhancing its analytical and early warning capacities in key hotspots, including through the strengthening of its information architecture and community alert networks.
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo force
43. The MONUSCO force continues to adopt a more flexible, mobile and agile posture in support of the Mission’s main strategic objective, which would enable it to concentrate its forces where they are most needed to protect civilians under threat of physical violence. Enhanced capabilities, including intelligence assets and specialized infantry, used in conjunction with the Mission’s existing analytical mechanisms and aviation assets, would allow MONUSCO to better address the rapidly increasing range of challenges during the upcoming period. Adjustments to the force would be done within existing resources by replacing existing units with more specialized capabilities, assuming they can be generated in a timely fashion. Those adjustments will not result in any increase in personnel. 44. Adjusting the MONUSCO force to be more flexible, mobile and agile will also require commensurate efforts to remove any caveats limiting the use of the force in different areas, including the rapidly deployable battalions. The force will also enhance accountability through more robust monitoring of performance, as requested by the Security Council. In addition, adjustments will be made to the force’s sector boundaries in order to respond to new and evolving threats. 45. MONUSCO continued to undertake efforts to transform the force, namely through the deployment of rapidly deployable battalions, which are essential to support greater mobility. The deployment of one company-sized reinforcement of such a battalion into the Katanga Sector from December 2016 to 20 January 2017 was a key component of the Mission’s response to the escalating violence in that area. The second such battalion is due to arrive in the Mission area in April 2017.
Police component
46. MONUSCO has seven formed police units currently deployed in Beni, Bukaku, Bunia, Goma and Kinshasa, which will continue to conduct frequent patrolling to prevent and deter human rights violations, facilitate deployment and monitoring by human rights and police teams, and intervene rapidly when necessary. In the light of the increasing threat of violence related to the elections and the political situation, two additional formed police units would be required for Lubumbashi and Kananga, which are likely to be electoral hotspots and currently lack a formed police unit presence. Such rapid intervention capabilities in those key urban areas would enhance the Mission’s capacity to protect civilians, as well as United Nations personnel and premises, in the case of an outbreak of election- related violence. An additional 36 armoured personnel carriers would be required to enhance the mobility of existing and new formed police units.
Support to national security agencies
47. The Mission will also deepen its engagement with the national security forces to promote a secure environment in which all citizens peacefully participate in the democratic process. Support to the national security forces, whether related to
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capacity-building or operations, will be provided in strict compliance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, with an emphasis on the potential impact of the Mission’s support in terms of respect for political rights and freedoms. MONUSCO police, with the support of the Human Rights Division, will continue to support the national police, in particular, through training on human rights and public order management, while closely monitoring their conduct and operations. The Mission plans to enhance direct tactical cooperation with FARDC in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including through combat liaison support teams.
Stabilization
48. MONUSCO will focus its stabilization efforts on ensuring that the gains made to date are preserved and can be built on after the elections in the context of the Mission’s exit strategy. Specifically, the Mission will use its good offices to support key stabilization efforts, including key reforms to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, engage with the United Nations country team and bilateral donors to address the impact of the deteriorating socioeconomic situation and maintain its support to area-based approaches to stabilization in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by providing coordination for and support to the multi-donor International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy and efforts to reduce community violence.
Presence
49. The Mission is developing plans to strengthen its civilian, police, and/or force presence by shifting resources to a limited number of locations, including Beni and Kananga, where high tensions are expected to continue throughout the transition period, or where its presence is currently limited or non-existent. Since MONUSCO cannot establish a sufficient presence in all high-risk areas at once within its existing resources, efforts to improve the Mission’s ability to respond quickly to emerging threats, with a focus on prevention and mitigation, will continue. 50. Given the Mission’s limited presence in most of the country, the ability to quickly move civilian and military personnel to trouble spots, as they emerge, will be critical throughout the transition period, including for the transformation of the force. As demonstrated by the Mission’s recent experience in the Kasai provinces, mobile monitoring and response teams, which are specifically designed to deploy rapidly to areas of potential or emerging violence with little or no MONUSCO presence, have proven valuable in providing the Mission with situational awareness and analysis, as well as a means of monitoring and reporting on human rights violations in areas where the Mission is not present. The teams also help guide the Mission’s engagement with provincial and national authorities to de-escalate tensions and address the root causes of violence. Mobility and flexibility will remain critical.
IV. Safety and security of United Nations personnel
51. Some 75 security- and safety-related incidents affecting United Nations personnel were reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period under review. Those included 38 criminal incidents targeting mainly national staff, 7 cases linked to civil unrest, 26 hazards-related cases and 4 incidents related to armed conflict. MONUSCO has made the assessment that its support to FARDC-led operations against armed groups and the volatile transition context may lead to threats to United Nations personnel and installations, and has reviewed its
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operations and procedures and taken relevant risk mitigating measures to address changes in the security situation.
V. Serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse
52. MONUSCO continued to vigorously enforce my policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse among all personnel, resulting in a reduction from six incidents to two, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to take preventive action, such as conducting training and awareness- raising activities and risk assessment and monitoring visits, establishing community-based complaint networks, conducting regular deterrent patrols by MONUSCO formed police units and military police and implementing out-of-bound areas and curfew regimes. The community-based complaint networks implemented over the past six months have proven effective, with no new allegations received by the networks in their areas of operation. MONUSCO, in coordination with other United Nations entities, provided assistance to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. Moreover, the Mission continued to encourage more engagement of relevant national authorities in prevention efforts and sustainable victim support.
VI. Financial aspects
53. The General Assembly, in its resolution 70/274, appropriated the amount of $1,235.7 million for the maintenance of MONUSCO for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. My proposed budget in the amount of $1,234.6 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 has been submitted to the Assembly for its consideration during the second part of its resumed seventy-first session. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUSCO beyond 31 March 2017, the cost for maintaining the Mission would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.
VII. Observations and recommendations
54. The Democratic Republic of the Congo once again finds itself at a crossroads. I commend the spirit of compromise demonstrated by Congolese stakeholders from across the political spectrum and the mediation efforts of CENCO, which resulted in the signing of the political agreement of 31 December 2016. The political agreement offers a viable path towards the holding of peaceful, credible and inclusive elections, which will allow the country to move forward towards a more stable future where peacekeepers are no longer required. Significant political, logistical and financial obstacles will need to be overcome to attain that goal. I therefore call upon all concerned Congolese stakeholders to work in the same spirit of collaboration and good faith, and with the same sense of responsibility, towards t he establishment of the special provisions and the speedy implementation of the transitional arrangements, starting with the appointment of the Prime Minister and the establishment of CNSA. Further delays will only serve to inflame tensions and fuel the violence that is now spreading across the country. 55. The enthusiasm generated by the political agreement of 31 December has given way to brinkmanship and manipulations by Congolese stakeholders from across the political spectrum. The most pressing task now for the United Nations, working closely with its key regional and international partners, is to support the establishment of the transitional arrangements envisaged in the political agreement and help create an environment conducive to the holding of peaceful, credible and
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inclusive elections and a peaceful transfer of power in the shortest possible time frame. The coming months will be critical in that regard. Every effort must, therefore, be made at the national, regional and international levels to keep the process moving forward, as called for in the joint statement of the United Nations, African Union, European Union and International Organization of la Francophonie issued on 16 February 2017. I therefore call upon the Security Council to put its full weight behind the political agreement and the efforts of MONUSCO to support its swift implementation. To that end, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to exercise his good offices to support the political transition, including the establishment and smooth functioning of the transitional institutions, the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the preservation of political space. 56. I would also encourage the Security Council to ensure that MONUSCO is mandated and appropriately resourced to support the electoral cycle, beyond the completion of the revision of the voter registry, through the provision of logistical and technical support to the other phases of the electoral process that must be completed to ensure the timely holding of credible presidential, national and provincial legislative elections. Such support would certainly entail a degree of risk. However, with the signing of the political agreement of 31 December, the placing of stringent conditions on the Mission’s ability to act would contribute to prolonging the current political uncertainty and creating further delays in the implementation of the political agreement and the electoral process. 57. There will be many challenges in the transition period ahead. I am concerned by the slow pace of negotiations on the implementation modalities of the political agreement of 31 December and the rapidly deteriorating security situation across the country, which is exacerbated by the prevailing political uncertainty. Insecurity is no longer limited to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where violence and threats to civilians by armed groups persist and where the majority of MONUSCO forces are deployed. It has spread to other areas, such as the three Kasai provinces, Kongo Central and Tanganyika, where intercommunal violence and challenges to State authority are mounting. Major urban areas are also at risk of increasing violence in the electoral context. The Mission has done its utmost to adapt to that new environment, within existing resources, but will be hard-pressed to satisfactorily fulfil its mandate across the country if current trends continue. 58. The current political and security challenges facing the Democratic Republic of the Congo require a political solution, backed, where necessary, by a credible and effective security response. The primary responsibility for that rests with the national authorities, and MONUSCO will continue working with them to address specific threats to the civilian population within its existing mandate and resources and in strict compliance with its human rights due diligence policy. 59. I intend to ensure that MONUSCO fulfils its mandate to protect civilians by, inter alia, improving the performance of its military and police components. All MONUSCO troops must be ready and willing to use force against armed groups that pose a threat to the civilian population, and to do so pre-emptively. The conduct of targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups should remain the priority task of the force Intervention Brigade units; however, the framework brigades must contribute actively in a supporting role to the neutralization of armed groups. I count on the support and cooperation of troop- and police-contributing countries to do their utmost to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of MONUSCO, and will continue to engage them in that regard. I will also report to the Security Council, as requested, on any cases of non-performance.
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60. Enhanced mobility, flexibility and agility of MONUSCO troops will be even more necessary to effectively support the realization of the Mission’s political strategy, particularly during the upcoming period. I am therefore exploring the possible deployment of additional specialized capabilities, including intelligence assets and specialized infantry, which would be accomplished by reducing other MONUSCO troops, resulting in no increase in the number of troops on the ground. 61. Priority will also continue to be given to deterrence and prevention in dealing with election-related violence. I would therefore encourage the Security Council to consider authorizing the deployment of two additional formed police units and associated enablers to increase the readiness of MONUSCO to protect civilians, monitor the human rights situation and assist national authorities in public order management, especially in Kananga and Lubumbashi, where there is a high risk of urban violence in the upcoming electoral period. The need for those additional formed police units would be reviewed as soon as the elections are concluded with a view to phasing them out. 62. I am deeply disturbed by the sharp increase in human rights violations, including the continued shrinking of political space. I urge the Congolese authorities to take appropriate measures to hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable. I also call for timely and credible investigations into the serious violations committed during the September and December 2016 events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which led to the killing of some 100 civilians mainly by the national security forces. I urge the Government to swiftly investigate allegations of human rights violations in the context of clashes between the national security forces and Kamuina Nsapu militia forces in the Kasai provinces. I welcome the release of some prisoners who had links with or were close to political parties and the reopening of some media outlets affiliated with the opposition, which are important confidence-building measures to support the political transition. I encourage the Congolese authorities to pursue further confidence-building measures and uphold the free exercise of political and civil rights. 63. I am deeply concerned by recent reports of cross-border movements of former M23 elements, and the negative impact of the conflict in South Sudan and the situation in Burundi on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also remain concerned that many of the commitments in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework remain outstanding. I call upon all signatories of the Framework to redouble their efforts to reinvigorate its implementation and to realize the commitments made. I also encourage key regional leaders to remain engaged in efforts to keep the political process moving forward. I welcome the establishment of the joint technical committee between MONUSCO and the Government focusing on options for the relocation of the SPLM/A-IO elements and encourage the Government to continue its engagement with national and regional stakeholders to identify a sustainable solution to that particular issue. 64. The year 2017 will be crucial for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The presence of MONUSCO in the country therefore remains essential to help keep the political process on track, preserve the gains made and shore up the prospects for stability in the country. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MONUSCO for a period of one year, until 31 March 2018, taking into account the recommendations regarding MONUSCO support to the electoral process and adjustments to the force, and increase the authorized ceiling for the police component from 1,050 to 1,370 personnel. In the meantime, MONUSCO will continue to make adjustments to its priorities, posture and presence, as outlined in paragraphs 38 to 50 of the present report.
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65. I would like to thank my Special Representative, Maman Sidikou, and all the women and men of MONUSCO and the United Nations country team for their service, often under difficult conditions. Their determination and dedication have been instrumental in helping to stabilize the security situation and consolidate the gains achieved thus far. My appreciation also goes to troop- and police-contributing countries and to the donors, the regional and multilateral organizations and the non-governmental organizations that have continued to provide invaluable support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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(FRPI) Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri -The Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 1 of 7 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 58/76 NM T
See all Terrorist Groups Methodology Share
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri (FRPI) Founded 2005 in The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri , abbreviated as FRPI , is a terrorist organization that was founded in 2005 in The Democratic Republic of the Congo . • This group has been active for 11 years years, from 2005 to present. • This group is also known as Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front. • This group is responsible for at least 26 attacks. • This group is responsible for the deaths of at least 9 people. • None of those killed by this group were United States citizens.
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Overview Share
Summary
Statistics
Country of Group Attacks Total Killed Total Wounded U.S. Killed Origin Active In
• The The Democratic Democratic 26 Republic of the Republic 9 36 0 Congo of the Congo
Groups Similar to Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri The carousel below shows groups that have a similar attack profile, based on the number of attacks and casualties, to Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri. Click on a group to learn more.
Taliban - Attacks Shining Path - Attacks Islamic State of Iraq Farabundo Marti and the Levant - National Liberation Attacks Front - Attacks See Details › See Details › See Details › See Details ›
http://terrorist -groups.insidegov.com/l/7463/Patriotic -Resistance -Front -In -Ituri 04/ 08/ 2017 (FRPI) Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri -The Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 2 of 7 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 59/76 NM T
The visualization below shows Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri attacks over time that the group has been active. For comparison, Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri averages 0 more attacks per year than the average minor group in The Democratic Republic of the Congo. (2 attacks vs 2.5)
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Attacks Over Time
14 Number of Attacks
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8
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2
0 2005 2005 Number of Attacks 1
The visualization below shows Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri casualties over time that the group has been active. For comparison, Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri averages 11 fewer casualties per year than the average minor group in The Democratic Republic of the Congo. (4 casualties vs 15.6)
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Casualties Over Time
Victims Killed Victims Wounded
25 Total Casualties
20
15
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0 2014
The deadliest attack carried out by Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri was on March 8, 2015 in Ituri district, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other were the primary target of this attack and Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident) was used. For comparison, the deadliest attack in this groups founding country, was carried out by Lords Resistance Army on January 17, 2009 in , Democratic Republic of the Congo. Religious Figures/Institutions was the primary target of this attack, which was carried out by Facility/Infrastructure Attack. This attack resulted in 387 more casualties than the deadliest attack by FRPI.
Deadliest Attacks to Date
Victims Killed Victims Wounded
May 12, 2005 in Geti, Democratic Republic of the…
http://terrorist -groups.insidegov.com/l/7463/Patriotic -Resistance -Front -In -Ituri 04/ 08/ 2017 (FRPI) Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri -The Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 3 of 7 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 60/76 NM T
August 10, 2014 in Kisenge, Democratic Republic…
June 6, 2014 in Chai, Democratic Republic of the…
October 27, 2015 in Bunga, Democratic Republic…
0 2 4 6 Total Casualties
Comparing Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Activity to Other Groups
The visualizations below compare the activity of Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri against the average of all Minor Groups founded in The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the average of all Minor Groups.
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Attacks vs. Other Groups Casualties vs. Other Groups
Patriotic Resistance Fr … Patriotic Resistance Fr…
Avg. of Minor Groups … Avg. of Minor Groups …
Avg. of All Minor Groups Avg. of All Minor Groups
0 20 0 100 200 Number of Attacks Total Victims
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Areas of Operation Share
This visualization shows the different cities that have been attacked by Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri. Hover over a bubble to see the name of the city and the total number of casualties.
Casualties in Each City Attacked by Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri
http://terrorist -groups.insidegov.com/l/7463/Patriotic -Resistance -Front -In -Ituri 04/ 08/ 2017 (FRPI) Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri -The Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 4 of 7 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 61/76 NM T
Total Casualties 0 13
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri Attacks per Country Casualties per Country
Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri to Other Groups
Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founde…
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups
0 Countries Attacked
http://terrorist -groups.insidegov.com/l/7463/Patriotic -Resistance -Front -In -Ituri 04/ 08/ 2017 (FRPI) Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri -The Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 5 of 7 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 62/76 NM T
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FRPI Targets Share
The visualizations below shows the total casualties, the sum of victims killed or wounded, by Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri for each year. The number of casualties per target is indicative of the success of attacks against this target. This may contrast with the number of attacks per target, seen below, which tends to be more indicative of this groups intent to attack a certain target. Changes in attack targets over time may indicate a shift in organization priorities, as attacks against certain groups like the military and police may be driven by different motives than attacks against other targets.
Casualties by Victim Type Over Time
Other Private Citizens & Property Government (Diplomatic) Government (General)
20 Number of Casualties
15
10
5
0 2005 2014 2015
Total Casualties by Victim Type
Victims Killed Victims Wounded
Private Citizens & Property Private Citizens & Property Victims Killed 6 Victims Wounded 16
0 5 10 15 20 Total Casualties
Attacks per Victim Type Over Time
http://terrorist -groups.insidegov.com/l/7463/Patriotic -Resistance -Front -In -Ituri 04/ 08/ 2017 (FRPI) Patriotic Resistance Front In Ituri -The Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 6 of 7 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 63/76 NM T
Private Citizens & Property Other
5 Number of Attacks
4
3 2015 Private Citizens & Property 3 Other 1 2
1
0 2015
Total Attacks by Victim Type
Private Citizens & Property
Government (General)
Government (Diplomatic)
Other
0 5 10 15 20 Number of Attacks
Percentage of Attacks by Target
Private Citizens & Property Other
Government (General)
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http://terrorist -groups.insidegov.com/l/7463/Patriotic -Resistance -Front -In -Ituri 04/ 08/ 2017 DR Congo's Ntaganda to testify at ICC - Daily Nation Page 1 of 4 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 65/76 NM T
DR Congo's 'The Terminator' to testify in war crimes trial
MONDAY JUNE 12 2017
Bosco Ntaganda. He faces 13 charges of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity committed by his Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC). PHOTO | FILE | AFP
THE HAGUE,
Congolese ex-rebel commander Bosco Ntaganda will finally testify Wednesday in his trial at the International Criminal Court, fending off accusations of using child soldiers and capturing sex slaves for his rebel army.
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Bosco -Ntaganda -to -testify -in -war -crimes -trial/10 ... 04/ 08/ 2017 DR Congo's Ntaganda to testify at ICC - Daily Nation Page 2 of 4 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 66/76 NM T
Almost two years after the trial opened, the man once dubbed "The Terminator" will take the stand to recall events in 2002 to 2003, when his rebel forces rampaged through the vast central African country's gold-rich Ituri Province, murdering and raping civilians and plundering their possessions.
13 CHARGES
Ntaganda, 43, has denied 13 charges of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity committed by his Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), a Hema militia which according to prosecutors targeted the Lendu and other non-Hema groups.
Fighting in Ituri has left some 60,000 dead since 1999 according to rights groups, in a conflict exacerbated by the wealth of regional resources including gold and other minerals used in electronic products.
Ntaganda has been charged with ordering hundreds of deaths through savage ethnic attacks by the FPLC, which was then the armed wing of the Union of Congolese Patriots.
During the prosecution's case, which took 64 days to complete, a witness told the tribunal in The Hague of seeing "tied-up bodies" left in their underwear, "their heads crushed."
"People were beheaded and women were disemboweled," the witness said.
SEX SLAVES
Ntaganda "personally recruited children," said prosecutor Nicole Samson.
Girls became "commandants' wives," added Sarah Pellet, a legal representative for 283 child soldiers.
They were "kept in sexual slavery or simply given to
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Bosco -Ntaganda -to -testify -in -war -crimes -trial/10 ... 04/ 08/ 2017 DR Congo's Ntaganda to testify at ICC - Daily Nation Page 3 of 4 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 67/76 NM T
the militia members," Pellet said.
Ntaganda "was one of the most important commanders" involved in the savage ethic attacks carried out by the FPLC, said ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at the opening of the trial in September 2015.
The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has been mired for two decades in ethnically charged wars, as rebels battle for control of mineral resources.
The unrest spiralled to encompass armies from at least six African nations, claiming an estimated three million lives in one of the world's most deadly recent conflicts.
WARRANTS
The ICC, the world's only permanent war crimes tribunal, issued a first arrest warrant against Ntaganda in 2006, followed by a second with additional charges in 2012.
He was wanted in particular for a November 2002 attack on the gold-mining town of Mongbwalu that lasted six days and left some 200 villagers dead.
Despite the warrants, he managed to evade capture until he unexpectedly walked into the US embassy in Kigali in 2013 and turned himself in.
It is believed dissension within rebel ranks caused him to surrender.
At the start of his trial Ntaganda, known for his trade- mark pencil moustache, penchant for cowboy hats and fine dining, told the judges he rejected being called "The Terminator".
"That is not me. I am a soldier," he said.
109 WITNESSES
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Bosco -Ntaganda -to -testify -in -war -crimes -trial/10 ... 04/ 08/ 2017 DR Congo's Ntaganda to testify at ICC - Daily Nation Page 4 of 4 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 68/76 NM T
Ntaganda's defence team plans to call 109 witnesses and four experts, seeking to overturn his image as a merciless warlord.
The former rebel went on a two-week hunger strike last year after judges slapped tight restrictions on him when prosecutors accused him of bribing witnesses.
At the time, Ntaganda told judges he was "ready to die" and his lawyer Stephane Bourgon said those accusations had not been proven.
If convicted he could face up to 30 years behind bars, or life if such a sentence is "justified by the extreme gravity of the crime," under ICC rules.
Ntaganda's case follows that of his former boss, warlord Thomas Lubanga, who was sentenced to 14 years in jail in 2012 on similar charges, the court's first conviction since it opened in 2002.
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Bosco -Ntaganda -to -testify -in -war -crimes -trial/10 ... 04/ 08/ 2017 11/08/2017 Trial of "Terminator Tango" brings back bitter memoICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxAries of Rwanda genocide 11-08-2017 69/76 NM T
News (/) World News (/world) Trial of "Terminator Tango" brings back bitter memories of Rwanda genocide
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(https://w(hwttwp.sf:a//ct(ewhbtiottpoe:k/r./.ccwo(wmhwt/t/.pislnishnt:eak//nrepetd/lrui/tnws.h.cegaoeormtoe?rg/.spleh.acpro?emA/rtsihclaer?e? u=http://twexwtw=T.wriiaosln%ceo2wp0eso=.fc%wou2_mrs0l=h/%hwa2trot2epr&Tl:d/eu//rrwtmlr=wiaihnwlt-at.ptwo:/ir/o%wn2ew0wwTs.aw.nciogoomn%e/w22so%.rcl2do0/mtbr/irawinl-ogrsld%/2tr0ibala-ck%20bitter%20memories%20of%20Rwanda%20genocide%20http%3A//www.wionews.com/world/trial- of- of- of- of- terminattoerr-minattoerr-minattoerr-minator- tango- tango- tango- tango- brings- brings- brings- brings- back- back- back- back- bitter- bitter- bitter- bitter- memoriems-emoriems-emoriems-emories- of- of- of- of- rwanda- rwanda- rwanda- rwanda- g(/e)nocideg-enocideg-enocideg-enocide- 17007&d1e7s0c0ri7p%ti2o10n7v=0iBa0o%7s&2cm01o@7i%n0w2i=00it7oNr&nutedaw&egstasictn)lredip=atT%ior2ina0=lA%BK2oA0so%cfo2%%02T20e0%rNm2t2ainTgaeatrnomdr%ain%2a02toT0raA%nK2gA0o%T%a22n00gTvoeo%rwm2si2%n%a2t20o0trob%%r2in20g0TsIaC%nC2g%0ob2%a02ct0okv%o2w0spb%riet2tve0ertn%ot%2%022m00IaeCmnCy%othr2iie0nsgto%%%222000ospfi%mre2ivl0aeRrn%wt%2a02nt0doaa%n%2y20th0thigneg%n%o22c00igdseeimn&orilocai=rd%fea2%ls02et0o&i%snu%2m02t0mhReaw%rya2=n0Bdgoaes&nctooitc%lied2=e0T%Nri2at0al%gina2%n02do0af%R%w220a0%nAd2Ka2A&T%tei2rtlm0eT=ineTarrmitaoilrn%%a22t0o0orT%fa%2n20g0To%a%n22g22oT%%e2r2m00bvinroianwtgossr%%2200tbToa%cn2kg0%oIC%20C2b%2i%t2t02et0ro%b%2ri20n0mgpser%em2voe0rnbieta%sc%2k0%2a02no0yfbt%iht2tine0grR%%w22a00nmsdiemam%il2oa0r%ige2es0%not2oc0%iod2fe0%&t2ph0iecR%twu2ra0eng=dehnatt%opc2:/i0/dsge.e%wn2io0cninied%we2s&0.pcRiocwmtua/rnped=haho&ttoppsi:c/t/uusnr.weti=tilohentdte%pw:2//s5s.2c.w0odmioe/nspeighwnos%t.oc2so5/m2un0/pt(i9htl)oe-2tdo0%s12/7u50n26t01itd9le1ds0%ig32n35%42820.5jdp2eg0s)(i9g)n-2%021572006(199)-12031374086.1jp9g1)03348.jpg)
Bitter memories of Rwanda genocide Photograph: (Others) FOLLOW US
Delhi, India Jun 19, 2017, 04.14 PM (IST)
Inga Mzileni (/authors/149)
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
Bosco Ntaganda AKA Terminator Tango vows to ICC to prevent anything similar to the genocide in Rwanda
Bosco Ntaganda AKA Terminator Tango as he is known to his victims and supporters is seeking to convince the International Criminal Court that he is an innocent warlord. In his testimony at the ICC in Hague, Netherlands, the 43- year-old, Rwandan-born Bosco ruled the country's war-torn eastern parts for years with his iron fist. He is intimately associated with what would become the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which left 80,000 dead, displaced thousands more and left a deep wound that still torments the victims of his crimes.
He reportedly said to the ICC that the Rwanda genocide has left a deep impact on him and he has vowed to do everything he could to prevent "it happening again".
In almost 2 years after his trial opened, Bosco Ntaganda took stand for the first time to talk about the events of 2002 and 2003 when his rebel forces rampaged through neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo's gold-rich Ituri province, murdering and raping civilians and plundering their possessions. In his defense, Ntaganga told the International Criminal Court that he was a young soldier in the Ugandan-backed Rwandan army during the country's genocide.
"I was young, but was already in the Army and was a soldier."
He claims to have lost members of his family during the horrific events of genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group. http://www.wionews.com/world/trial-of-terminator-tango-brings-back-bitter-memories-of-rwanda-genocide-17007 1/2 11/08/2017 Trial of "Terminator Tango" brings back bitter memoICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxAries of Rwanda genocide 11-08-2017 70/76 NM T
The Terminator Tango is facing 13 charges of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity committed by his Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC). This militia was drawn from the Hema ethnic group, which according to ICC prosecutors was targeted at the Lendu and other non-Hema groups.
ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda during the first trial in 2015 said that Ntaganda was one of the most important commanders involved in the savage ethnic attacks. The ex-rebel leader is charged with ordering hundreds of those deaths.
For a man charged with leading an ethnic war that engulfed the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo for two decades and spiraled to encompass armies from 6 African nations, his defense team claims to have 109 witnesses and four experts who could turn around his image as a merciless warlord.
Accusing Bosco of bribing witnesses, prosecutors have imposed tight restrictions on him. In response to that Ntaganda went on a two-week hunger strike last year. He had been evading arrest by the International Criminal Court until eventually turning himself over to the US embassy in Kigali in 2013.
Bosco's case follows that of his former rebel leader, warlord Thomas Lubanga who was sentenced to 14 years in jail in 2012 on similar charges in the International Criminal Court's first conviction since it opened in 2002.
Bosco's trial is significant not only for thousands of victims who await justice for their families, the outcome of his trial is significant also to other active war criminals group in Congo and around the world.
(/authors/149) Inga Mzileni (/authors/149) Inga is a correspondent with WION and covers African stories.
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© 1998-2016 Zee Media Corporation Ltd (An Essel Group Company), All rights reserved. http://www.wionews.com/world/trial-of-terminator-tango-brings-back-bitter-memories-of-rwanda-genocide-17007 2/2 Bunia : vive tension après le décès de deux jeunes Hema | Radio Okapi Page 1 of 6 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 71/76 NM T
Chercher Bunia : vive tension après le décès de deux jeunes Hema
Publié le sam, 24/06/2017 - 12:30 | Modifié le lun, 26/06/2017 - 21:58 Sondage Rubriques :tension (/mot-cle/tension), Bunia(/mot-cle/bunia), Décès (/mot-cle/deces), jeunes Hema (/mot-cle/jeunes-hema), Jefferson Abdalah (/mot-cle/jefferson-abdalah), Société (/societe), Une année après le lancement de Actualité (/actualite), National (/region/national) l’enrôlement des électeurs en RDC, la CENI a estimé avoir enregistré plus de 37 millions d’électeurs sur 42 millions prévus sur l’ensemble du pays. A quelques semaines de la clôture de cette opération, vous estimez que : (/2017/08/04/poll/une-annee- apres-le-lancement-de- lenrolement-des-electeurs-en-rdc- la-ceni-estime)
la CENI va enrôler les 42 millions d’enrôlés la CENI va dépasser les 42 millions d’enrôlés Bld de libération, principale artère de Bunia. Photo José des Chartes le plus important est Menga, Radio Okapi/Ph.José des Chartes Menga d’achever l’opération dans les bonnes conditions Une vive tension règne depuis la soirée du vendredi 23 Voter juin à Bunia, chef-lieu de la province de l’Ituri. D’après des sources locales, plusieurs jeunes de la communauté Dans la même catégorie Hema en provenance de kasenyi ont manifesté sur le boulevard de libération à Bunia suite à la découverte, la Protestation dans les rues de veille, des corps de deux membres de leur communauté Mbandaka contre le dans la rivière Mpoyi. retour annoncé du gouverneur Les manifestants qui parlent de « meurtres » accusent les Bolamba miliciens de la Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri (/2017/08/04/actualite/societe/protestation- dans-les-rues-de-mbandaka-contre- (FRPI) d’en être les auteurs. le-retour-annonce-du)
http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/06/26/actualite/societe/bunia -vive -tension -apres -le -d... 04/ 08/ 2017 Bunia : vive tension après le décès de deux jeunes Hema | Radio Okapi Page 2 of 6 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 72/76 NM T
Pour protester contre ces présumés assassinats, ils ont 04/08/2017 - 12:53 Société (/societe), Actualité encore fait promener les corps des victimes ce samdedi (/actualite) / protestation 24 juin vers 8h heures (heure locale), sur des motos à (/mot-cle/protestation), Tony travers les artères principales de la ville. Bolamba (/mot-cle/tony- bolamba) Des éléments de la police déployés pour empêcher tout débordement ont tiré en l’air, provoquant la panique RDC: l’ONU recense dans la ville. Dans la foulée, la plupart des maisons de 250 exécutions extrajudiciaires et commerce qui étaient ouvertes ont dû fermer et les rues assassinats ciblés désertées. aux Kasaï (/2017/08/04/actualite/societe/rdc- Le Gouverneur de la province de l’Ituri Jefferson Abdalah lonu-recense-250-executions- Pene Mbaka a appelé à la « retenu ». extrajudiciaires-et-assassinats- cibles) 04/08/2017 - 12:30 Société (/societe), Actualité Lire aussi sur radiookapi.net: (/actualite) / Kasaï (/mot- ♦ Tension à Bunia après le meurtre d’un jeune la nuit de cle/kasai), assassinats ciblés (/mot-cle/assassinats-cibles), la St-Sylvestre exécutions sommaires (http://www.radiookapi.net/2016/01/01/actualite/societe/tension-(/mot-cle/executions- sommaires) bunia-apres-le-meurtre-dun-jeune-la-nuit-de-la-st- sylvestre) Affrontements à ♦ Ituri: vive tension après la mort d’un jeune homme à Lubero : les Maï-Maï Kafe Mazembe et les NDC (http://www.radiookapi.net/2016/07/02/actualite/securite/ituri- veulent parvenir à un cessez-le-feu vive-tension-apres-la-mort-dun-jeune-homme-kafe) (/2017/08/04/actualite/societe/affrontements- lubero-les-mai-mai-mazembe-et- les-ndc-veulent-parvenir-un) 04/08/2017 - 11:51 Recevez Radio Okapi par email Société (/societe), Actualité (/actualite) / Maï-Maï Donnez votre adresse email dans ce formulaire afin de recevoir Mazembe (/mot-cle/mai-mai- tous nos articles dans votre boîte email. Vous recevrez un mazembe), cessez-le feu message de confirmation avec un lien sur lequel il vous faudra (/mot-cle/cessez-le-feu-0), cliquer afin que l'envoi d'emails devienne effectif. Lubero (/mot-cle/lubero), Si vous ne voyez pas l'email de confirmation dans votre boîte Armée (/mot-cle/armee) de réception, allez chercher dans vos spams et marquez le message comme "non spam". Nord-Kivu: les Votre adresse email : déplacés sommés de quitter les écoles d’Oïcha M'inscrire (/2017/08/03/actualite/societe/nord- kivu-les-deplaces-sommes-de- Service offert par FeedBurner (https://feedburner.google.com) quitter-les-ecoles-doicha)
http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/06/26/actualite/societe/bunia -vive -tension -apres -le -d... 04/ 08/ 2017 RDC : La Lucha met en garde contre une nouvelle guerre en Ituri — La Libre Afrique Page 1 of 4 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 73/76 NM T
https://afrique.lalibre.be/5416/rdc -la -lucha -met -en -garde -contre -une -nouvelle -guerre -... 04/ 08/ 2017 RDC : La Lucha met en garde contre une nouvelle guerre en Ituri — La Libre Afrique Page 2 of 4 ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxA 11-08-2017 74/76 NM T
https://afrique.lalibre.be/5416/rdc -la -lucha -met -en -garde -contre -une -nouvelle -guerre -... 04/ 08/ 2017 11/08/2017 Ituri : la FRPI à la base du regain d’insécurité au SICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxAud d’Irumu | Radio Okapi 11-08-2017 75/76 NM T
Chercher Ituri : la FRPI à la base du regain d’insécurité au Sud d’Irumu
Publié le mer, 02/08/2017 - 17:20 | Modifié le mer, 02/08/2017 - 17:20
Rubriques :Insécurité (/mot-cle/insecurite), Irumu (/mot-cle/irumu), FRPI (/mot-cle/frpi), Sondage FARDC (/mot-cle/fardc), Société (/societe), Actualité (/actualite), National (/region/national)
L’homme d’a aires congolais et gendre du président
angolais José Eduardo dos Santos, Sindika Dokolo a lancé jeudi à Londres un nouveau mouvement citoyen dénommé « Les Congolais débout » pour obtenir à l’alternance du pouvoir en 2017 en RDC. Selon vous : (/2017/08/11/poll/lhomme-da aires-congolais-et- gendre-du-president-angolais-jose-eduardo-dos- santos)
C’est une bonne initiative C’est un mouvement citoyen de trop Les initiateurs devraient clairement s’engager dans la politique
Voter
Dans la même catégorie Carte du district de l'Ituri en Province Orientale. Nord-Kivu : l’administrateur de Lubero lance un appel à l’aide humanitaire pour Dimanche dernier, un militaire des forces armées de la RDC (FARDC) a été enlevé les déplacés dans la localité de Boga situé à environ 20 km de Bukiringi, alors qu’il regagnait sa (/2017/08/11/actualite/societe/nord- base. Il a été relâché lundi dernier grâce à l’intervention des notables locaux. Selon kivu-ladministrateur-de-lubero-lance-un-appel-laide- humanitaire) des sources locales, cet incident est l’œuvre des miliciens de la Force de résistance 11/08/2017 - 13:58 patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI). Société (/societe), Actualité (/actualite) / Lubero (/mot-cle/lubero), déplacés (/mot- cle/deplaces), Aide humanitaire (/mot- D’après les mêmes sources, ces miliciens ont tué le même dimanche deux personnes cle/aide-humanitaire), Joy Bokele (/mot- à Kalyabugongo, sur la plaine du lac Albert. Egalement mis à leur actif, le kidnapping cle/joy-bokele), l'administrateur du territoire de Lubero (/mot-cle/ladministrateur-du- la semaine dernière de sept creuseurs d’or près de la rivière Talolo en chefferie des territoire-de-lubero) Andisoma et l’attaque des villages de Kamatsi et Mudogo vendredi dernier.
Bukama : plus de 130 fonctionnaires Le porte-parole des FARDC explique que ces miliciens sont en débandade depuis le victimes d’arnaque à Lwena lancement des opérations militaires contre eux dans la région. Et dans leur fuite, a-t-il précisé, ils opèrent en petit groupe en attaquant certains villages. (/2017/08/11/actualite/societe/bukama-plus-de-130- fonctionnaires-victimes-darnaque-lwena) Lire aussi sur radiookapi.net: 11/08/2017 - 13:50 ♦ Traque de la FRPI à Irumu: la société civile et des notables déconseillent l’option Société (/societe), Actualité (/actualite) / Fonctionnaires (/mot-cle/fonctionnaires), militaire (http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/07/19/actualite/securite/traque-de-la- Haut-Lomami (/mot-cle/haut-lomami-0), frpi-irumu-la-societe-civile-et-des-notables) Bukama (/mot-cle/bukama), Lwena (/mot- cle/lwena), arnaque (/mot-cle/arnaque) ♦ Ituri: les députés appellent la milice FRPI à saisir la main tendue par les autorités (http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/07/10/actualite/securite/ituri-les-deputes-
Le gouverneur du Kasaï souhaite la
http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/08/02/actualite/societe/ituri-la-frpi-la-base-du-regain-dinsecurite-au-sud-dirumu 1/4 11/08/2017 Irumu : des jeunes réclament l’éradication de ICC-01/04-02/06-2008-AnxAla FRPI | Radio Okapi 11-08-2017 76/76 NM T
Chercher Irumu : des jeunes réclament l’éradication de la FRPI
Publié le ven, 04/08/2017 - 12:03 | Modifié le ven, 04/08/2017 - 12:03
Rubriques :jeunes (/mot-cle/jeunes), FRPI (/mot-cle/frpi), En bref (/en-bref), Actualité (/actualite), Sondage National (/region/national)
L’homme d’a aires congolais et gendre du président
angolais José Eduardo dos Santos, Sindika Dokolo a lancé jeudi à Londres un nouveau mouvement citoyen dénommé « Les Congolais débout » pour obtenir à l’alternance du pouvoir en 2017 en RDC. Selon vous : (/2017/08/11/poll/lhomme-da aires-congolais-et- gendre-du-president-angolais-jose-eduardo-dos- santos)
C’est une bonne initiative C’est un mouvement citoyen de trop Les initiateurs devraient clairement s’engager dans la politique
Voter
Dans la même catégorie Ituri, en province orientale, marqué en rouge sur la carte. Résolution de la crise politique et sécuritaire en RDC : le parti Liberté Plusieurs jeunes de la collectivité secteur de Bahema Sud dans le territoire d’Irumu recommande le dialogue (Ituri) demandent à l’armée d’intervenir pour éradiquer les miliciens de la Force de (/2017/08/11/actualite/en- résistance patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI) dans la zone. bref/resolution-de-la-crise-politique-et-securitaire-en- rdc-le-parti-liberte) Justin Mabara, leur porte-parole, fait état des attaques répétées de cette milice dans 11/08/2017 - 13:43 En bref (/en-bref), Actualité (/actualite) / parti plusieurs localités d’Irumu et demande aux autorités provinciales de prendre ses Liberté (/mot-cle/parti-liberte), Germain responsabilités en sécurisant la population. Kambinga (/mot-cle/germain-kambinga), Tony Eholo (/mot-cle/tony-eholo)
Kinshasa : l’Ecole de formation électorale d’Afrique centrale ouvre ses portes en septembre (/2017/08/10/actualite/en- Recevez Radio Okapi par email bref/kinshasa-lecole-de-formation- electorale-dafrique-centrale-ouvre-ses) Donnez votre adresse email dans ce formulaire afin de recevoir tous nos articles dans votre boîte 10/08/2017 - 18:34 email. Vous recevrez un message de confirmation avec un lien sur lequel il vous faudra cliquer En bref (/en-bref), Actualité (/actualite) / école afin que l'envoi d'emails devienne effectif. (/mot-cle/ecole), Ceni (/mot-cle/ceni) Si vous ne voyez pas l'email de confirmation dans votre boîte de réception, allez chercher dans vos spams et marquez le message comme "non spam". Kwango : les agents de la CENI bloquent Votre adresse email : les résultats de l’enrôlement pour réclamer leurs salaires (/2017/08/10/actualite/en-bref/kwango- M'inscrire les-agents-de-la-ceni-bloquent-les-resultats-de- Service offert par FeedBurner (https://feedburner.google.com) lenrolement-pour) 10/08/2017 - 18:27 En bref (/en-bref), Actualité (/actualite) / Ceni (/mot-cle/ceni), Grève (/mot-cle/greve), Enrôlement (/mot-cle/enrolement)
http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/08/04/actualite/en-bref/irumu-des-jeunes-reclament-leradication-de-la-frpi 1/4