MINDING THE GAPS: INFLECTIONAL DEFECTIVENESS IN A PARADIGMATIC THEORY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Andrea D. Sims, M.A. The Ohio State University 2006 Dissertation Committee: Professor Brian Joseph, Adviser Approved by Professor Daniel Collins Professor Mary Beckman ____________________________________ Adviser Linguistics Graduate Program ABSTRACT A central question within morphological theory is whether an adequate description of inflection necessitates connections between and among inflectionally related forms, i.e. paradigmatic structure. Recent research on form-meaning mismatches at the morphological and morphosyntactic levels (e.g., periphrasis, syncretism) argues that an adequate theory of inflection must be paradigmatic at its core. This work has often focused on how the lexeme (syntactic) paradigm and the stem (morphological) paradigm are related (Stump 2001a), while having less to say about the internal structure of each level. In this dissertation I argue that paradigmatic gaps support some of the same conclusions are other form-meaning mismatches (e.g., the need for the Separation Hypothesis), but more importantly, they also offer insight into the internal structure of the stem paradigm. I focus on two questions that paradigmatic gaps raise for morphological theory in general, and for Word and Paradigm approaches in particular: (1) Are paradigmatic gaps paradigmatically governed? Stump and Finkel (2006) argue that inflectional structure consists of implicational relationships whereby one or more paradigm cells serve as principal parts, from which other members of the paradigm can be predicted. Based on production/ratings experiments and distributional statistics from gaps in the genitive plural of Modern Greek nouns and the first person singular of Russian verbs, I argue for a corollary hypothesis – that paradigmatic gaps can arise in paradigm cells whose form cannot be predicted from nor are predictive of other members ii of the paradigm (i.e., cells for which there is no principal part). The distribution of these gaps can thus be adequately explained only with reference to the inflectional (stem) paradigm. This is largely consistent with the conclusions of Albright (2003) for Spanish. (2) Is there such a thing as lexically specified defectiveness? Or, stated differently, are paradigmatic cells ever stipulated as empty? Early studies generally assumed that gaps are idiosyncratic and therefore require lexical specification (Halle 1973), but more recent approaches have sought to explain at least some gaps are byproducts of the generative inflectional process, and therefore not directly marked in the lexicon (Albright 2003, Baronian 2005, Hudson 2000). I argue that historical causation is not to be confused with synchronic structure; the distributional patterns of paradigmatic gaps in Greek and Russian are consistent with the gaps-as-epiphenomena approach, but these appear to be historical remnants. Experimental data on speakers’ reactions to defective vs. non-defective morphological forms in Greek shows that the gaps have become disassociated from their original causative factors. This indicates that gaps are like any other morphological pattern in being able to undergo lexicalization. I also briefly consider the issues that lexeme-level defectiveness raises for learnability, and suggest that lexicalized defectiveness is not the learning problem it is often considered to be (e.g., McCarthy and Wolf 2005), if we allow for a concept of lexeme paradigm predictability based on usage statistics. Ultimately, paradigmatic gaps in Greek and Russian demonstrate that paradigmatic predictability is a significant force in formal morphological systems at both the lexeme level and the form level. Moreover, in many respects paradigmatic gaps are surprisingly similar to well-formed morphological structures, for example in being iii governed by paradigmatic structure and subject to covert reanalysis. This indicates that, contrary to traditional assumptions, (many examples of) paradigmatic gaps are neither idiosyncratic nor marginal to the functioning of the inflectional system. They thus deserve greater attention within morphological theory. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is not possible to thank all of the people who deserve to be thanked here. There are simply too many people, who have helped to improve this project in too many ways. But I would like to acknowledge a number of people whose influence I have particularly felt, and for whose guidance, friendship, and help I have been particularly appreciative. First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee – Brian Joseph, Mary Beckman, and Daniel Collins. For providing unique and sometimes unexpected perspectives. For challenging me. For keeping me focused on the theory, but rooted in the data at all times. And perhaps most of all for believing that I could finish this dissertation on time, when I had started to lose faith. And to Brian in particular for shepherding me through my years at Ohio State, and for the constant mantra that language is about the speakers. Without that, this dissertation would have lost its way. I would also like to thank Charles Gribble, Rich Janda, and Keith Johnson, who were gracious enough to serve on one or several of my pre-dissertation committees. Each helped to shape my thinking and my research skills at critical stages. I am lucky to have been surrounded by a varied, talented, and supportive group of graduate students at OSU. I owe something to every grad student that I have known these past seven years, but to a few I owe more. To Robin Dodsworth, Jeff Mielke, and Wes Collins. As my friends and immediate predecessors, they showed me that it could v be done, cheered me to the end, and set a high standard. To Jeff for those early, epic conversations in Oxley 225. To Tom Stewart, who with unbridled enthusiasm set me on the morphological path. To Hope Dawson, for reminding me that historical linguistics is not dead. To Grant McGuire, for fixing my Russian experiment in a moment of despair and for much needed distraction, especially during the Tour de France. To Vanessa Metcalf, for watching over my life while I wandered Croatia. To Elizabeth Smith and Craig Hilts, who made sure I didn’t go over the edge during the final three months. To all 18 of my officemates, past and present, for all manner of things big and small. A significant part of the Russian data in this dissertation was collected by a three person team that consisting of Maria Alley, Bryan Brookes, and me. Without Masha and Bryan’s ideas and their efforts, the project would have been much the poorer. Not to mention that they probably deserve medals for putting up with me and my controlling, nitpicking tendencies. A variety of people provided technical support for this work. Georgios Tserdanelis helped me to understand Greek noun usage and worked with me to develop questionnaire materials. Anton Rytting alerted me several times to resources that kept Greek data collection from becoming too burdensome. Shari Speer let me invade her lab meetings and ask methodological questions. Anastasia Smirnova and Larissa Bondarchuk translated parts of the Russian experiment on short notice. Jim Harmon went beyond the call of duty to find me cables, microphones, and all manner of other equipment. I conducted part of my research at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, in Greece. I received a very warm welcome there, and am deeply grateful to everyone from vi the Linguistics Section and the French Section. I would particularly like to thank Loukas Tsitsipis and Savas Tsohatzidis, both of whom went out of their way to ensure that my data collection was efficient and successful. And finally, there are three people who I owe so much that I hardly know where to begin. Thank you to my parents, for training me from birth to write my dissertation and supporting me at every step along the path. They were my first models of success in academia, and are still the best ones. Thank you to Jason. For being my technical consultant, my sounding board, my personal chef, a vanquisher of bad days, my best friend. For single-handedly moving us to new apartments not once but twice in the final three months of dissertation writing. For believing in me. For being my life. This dissertation was supported by a Presidential Fellowship (2005-2006) and an Alumni Grant for Graduate Research and Scholarship (2006), both awarded to me by The Ohio State University. This research was conducted under Ohio State University IRB protocol 2004B0214. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. v List of Tables .................................................................................................................... xi List of Figures ................................................................................................................. xiv Glossary .......................................................................................................................... xvi Chapters 1. What is (and is not) a paradigmatic gap? ....................................................................... 1 1.1. The term paradigmatic gap, broadly defined 1.2.