It's Only Wrong If It's Transactional: Moral Perceptions of Obfuscated
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ASRXXX10.1177/0003122418806284American Sociological ReviewSchilke and Rossman 8062842018 American Sociological Review 1 –29 It’s Only Wrong If It’s © American Sociological Association 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122418806284DOI: 10.1177/0003122418806284 Transactional: Moral journals.sagepub.com/home/asr Perceptions of Obfuscated Exchange Oliver Schilkea and Gabriel Rossmanb Abstract A wide class of economic exchanges, such as bribery and compensated adoption, are considered morally disreputable precisely because they are seen as economic exchanges. However, parties to these exchanges can structurally obfuscate them by arranging the transfers so as to obscure that a disreputable exchange is occurring at all. In this article, we propose that four obfuscation structures—bundling, brokerage, gift exchange, and pawning—will decrease the moral opprobrium of external audiences by (1) masking intentionality, (2) reducing the explicitness of the reciprocity, and (3) making the exchange appear to be a type of common practice. We report the results from four experiments assessing participants’ moral reactions to scenarios that describe either an appropriate exchange, a quid pro quo disreputable exchange, or various forms of obfuscated exchange. In support of our hypotheses, results show that structural obfuscation effectively mitigates audiences’ moral offense at disreputable exchanges and that the effects are substantially mediated by perceived attributional opacity, transactionalism, and collective validity. Keywords obfuscation, economic sociology, bribery, legitimacy, vignette experiments In the early twentieth century, the social cus- through websites such as SeekingArrange- tom of “treating” developed as an alternative ments.com, which connect “sugar babies” to to older notions of courtship and prostitution. “sugar daddies.” Just as a century ago, trans- Women who participated in treating were actional sex remains a liminal category that called “charity girls,” because they received can pass as legitimate sociability but remains entertainment or goods as a gift and gave sex discreditable because it violates proscriptions as a gift but never sold sex as a commodity. The anti-vice society that investigated this custom begrudgingly placed charity girls in aThe University of Arizona the intermediate category of “near whores” bUniversity of California-Los Angeles (Clement 2006:1). This label refers to the fact that these women had not taken money from Corresponding Author: men, and this made the offense of their behav- Gabriel Rossman, UCLA, Department of Sociology, 264 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA ior less shameful than prostitution. Similar 90095-1551 practices have been reinvigorated in this century Email: [email protected] 2 American Sociological Review 00(0) on exchange. In other words, it can be per- questions of the boundaries and distinctions ceived as either basically dating or basically between market exchange and other types of commercial sex work. For example, one exchange. Boundaries exist in terms of what “sugar baby” seemed surprised that a jealous goods are usually understood to be legitimate friend told her parents that she was a “prosti- market goods (versus items excluded from tute” (Sales 2016). The case of transactional trade) and how to distinguish when a set of sex is just one example of obfuscated transfers qualifies as market exchange (versus exchange. Similar practices can be used to other forms of exchange, such as gifts). How- obfuscate political bribery, commercial brib- ever, recent investigations have challenged ery, and human tissue markets. In all these the categorical approach to markets and mor- cases, observers may have a less unfavorable als. These studies emphasize that the line moral reaction to the exchange to the extent between market transfers and non-market that they understand it as structurally differ- transfers is often blurry, and this ambiguity ent from a quid pro quo. can be the object of obfuscation by partici- In this article, we argue that an economic pants and moral evaluation by audiences exchange, such as bribery, that would offend (Åkerström 2014; Fridman and Luscombe audiences if it were an open quid pro quo can 2017; Hoang 2018; Lainer-Vos 2013; Mears be made less offensive when it takes on a dif- 2015; Rossman 2014). ferent structure. In particular, actors can miti- The growing literature on obfuscated gate audience disapproval of disreputable exchange shows that moral perceptions are exchange by practicing structural obfusca- not only about whether a set of goods can tion—defined as arranging a set of transfers legitimately be exchanged, but whether a set so as to obscure the fact that a disreputable of transfers is understood as an exchange at exchange is occurring. Expanding upon Ross- all. This implies that participants who seek to man (2014), we articulate and experimentally retain their honor will reshape sets of trans- test the effects of four such obfuscatory fers to make them look less like exchanges. exchange structures. First, bundling occurs Consistent with this literature, our investiga- when two seemingly unrelated exchanges or tion is concerned with obfuscated disreputa- relationships cross-subsidize one another. ble exchange; however, our work differs Second, brokerage occurs when ego pays a significantly from prior investigations in its broker, who in turn pays alter, who then gives scope and methods. The extant literature a favor to ego. Third, gift exchange involves focuses on identifying actual instances of asynchronous transfers that, in principle, are obfuscation or accusations of obfuscation. voluntary and not strictly reciprocal. Finally, However, because it relies on qualitative real- pawning involves using favors to redeem a world cases, this literature cannot systemati- debt.1 Although these four structures involve cally measure the moral evaluations of different relational work, we propose that audiences nor establish the causal effect of they all can render an illicit commensuration obfuscation on these evaluations. Indeed, less explicit. In so doing, they can sublimate because obfuscation is only observable when transactionalism across a wide range of sub- it is partially or wholly unsuccessful, research stantive contexts. based on real-world cases necessarily sam- This article draws on and contributes to ples on the dependent variable. Through ran- several research streams, most notably work domized experiments in which we vary the in sociology, anthropology, economics, law, structure of exchange but keep the basic and philosophy on exchange and contested topic, we are able to complement extant qual- commodities (Bourdieu 2000; Fiske 1992; itative findings. In addition to showing that Krawiec 2009; Molm 2003; Roth 2007; San- obfuscation does occur, we also show how del 2000; Walzer 1983; Zelizer 2005). This and why it is effective through mediation cross-disciplinary literature has focused on analysis. The mechanisms highlighted in this Schilke and Rossman 3 analysis are key to understanding how obfus- differences in moral evaluations through cation works to limit the moral fallout from these three theoretical mechanisms, which exchanges that are substantively equivalent to also distinguish between structurally obfus- quid pro quos. cated and directly negotiated (i.e., quid- This article also contributes to research on pro-quo) forms of disreputable exchange. By the social psychology of morality. Sociologi- elucidating these mechanisms, we aim to cal social psychologists traditionally empha- contribute to integrating the streams of socio- size economic or belongingness needs, and logical research on cultural phenomena and moral concerns have only recently taken social psychological processes (Collett and center stage in their research (cf. Hegtvedt and Lizardo 2014). Scheuerman 2010; Lawler and Hipp 2010; Finally, this article also speaks to institu- Stets and Carter 2011). In contrast, within tional theory, which is fundamentally con- psychology, the study of morality has blos- cerned with legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan somed, uncovering individual dispositions 1977; Suchman 1995). Recently, institutional and cognitive processes in moral evaluations scholars have advocated applying this con- (Haidt and Kesebir 2010)—but ignoring social cept to the context of market exchanges and structural considerations. Research on the role studying its moral components (Anteby 2010; of exchange structure, which is central to Quinn 2008). Largely unexamined so far, sociological social psychology (Molm, however, are the micro-foundations or drivers Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Willer, Flynn, and of legitimacy (see also Bitektine and Haack Zak 2012), has yet to find its due place in the 2015; Haack et al. 2016; Lucas and Lovaglia morality literature. In this study, departing 2006). Our findings help fill this gap. We from earlier research on the social psychology show not only that the type of actor or traded of exchange structures, we follow the lead of resource matters but also that perceptions of moral psychology (Haidt and Kesebir 2010) in legitimacy are a function of the structure adopting the viewpoint of the external observer through which the resource is traded. We pro- of the exchange (rather than of a participant) vide evidence for the notion that how an to shed light on audiences’ moral perceptions. exchange is achieved can shape evaluation This perspective reflects that individuals’ above and beyond who is involved and what actions are not