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State of Iowa Transportation Compendium of Law

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State of Iowa Transportation Compendium of Law STATE OF IOWA TRANSPORTATION COMPENDIUM OF LAW Mark J. Herzberger Michael McDonough Simmons, Perrine, Moyer & Bergman, P.L.C. 115 Third Street SE Suite 1200 Cedar Rapids, IA 52401 Tel: (319) 366-7641 Internet: www.simmonsperrine.com Email: [email protected] [email protected] Revised 2014 A. Liability of Employer for Negligence involving Employees. In Iowa, there are several theories by which an employer might be held liable for negligence involving its employees. Some of the claims are derivative, which means that liability can only be imposed on the employer if the employee is found to be at fault for causing injury to a third party and some are direct, which imposes liability on the employer for its own acts, and does not depend on whether the employee is found at fault. 1. Respondeat Superior In Iowa, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment. Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Iowa 1986); Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 566, 154 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1967). A claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior rests on two elements, 1) proof of an employer/employee relationship, and 2) proof that the injury occurred within the scope of that employment. Biddle v. Satori Mem’l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994). For an act to be within the scope of employment the conduct complained of “must be of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized.” Sandman, 261 Iowa at 567, 154 N.W.2d at 117. Thus, an act is deemed to be within the scope of one's employment “where such act is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the employment and is intended for such purpose.” Id. The question becomes whether the employer’s conduct is so unlike that authorized it is substantially different. In other words, a deviation from the employers business to pursue the employees’ own business must be substantial in nature to relieve the employer from liability. Id. 2. Iowa Code section 321.493. Owner Liability. Iowa Code section 321.493provides: (1) For purposes of this section: a. “Owner” means the person to whom the certificate of title for the vehicle has been issued or assigned or to whom a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin for the vehicle has been delivered or assigned. However, if the vehicle is leased, “owner” means the person to whom the vehicle is leased, not the person to whom the certificate of title for the vehicle has been issued or assigned or to whom the manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin for the vehicle has been delivered or assigned. b. “Leased” means the transfer of the possession or right to possession of a vehicle to a lessee for a valuable consideration for a continuous period of twelve months or more, pursuant to a written agreement. 2 Revised 2014 (2) a. Subject to paragraph “b”, in all cases where damage is done by any motor vehicle by reason of negligence of the driver, and driven with the consent of the owner, the owner of the motor vehicle shall be liable for such damage. b. The owner of a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of seven thousand five hundred pounds or more who rents the vehicle for less than a year under an agreement which requires an insurance policy covering at least the minimum levels of financial responsibility prescribed by law, shall not be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for the operation of the vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection with the vehicle’s operation. (3) A person who has made a bona fide sale or transfer of the person’s right, title, or interest in or to a motor vehicle and who has delivered possession of the motor vehicle to the purchaser or transferee shall not be liable for any damage thereafter resulting from negligent operation of the motor vehicle by another, but the purchaser or transferee to whom possession was delivered shall be deemed the owner. The provisions of section 321.45, subsection 2, shall not apply in determining, for the purpose of fixing liability under this subjection, whether such sale or transfer was made. Under this statute a lessee motor carrier is liable for the negligent acts of its driver. The purpose of the statute is to protect an innocent third party from the careless operation of a motor vehicle and to make the owner responsible for the negligence of one to whom the owner entrusted its operation. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 1983). The statute provides two definitions of owner, the titleholder or a lessee. The statutory definition of “leased” requires four elements: a) a transfer of possession or right of possession; b) there must be valuable consideration paid for that possession; c) the lease must be for a period of 12 continuous months or more; and d) there must be a written lease agreement. Carton v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 639 F.Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. IA 2009) indicates that it is the actual possession, not the right to possession which may be the determinative factor. In Carton a vehicle lessor defaulted on the lease. The titleholder had obtained a replevin decree ordering possession be given back to the titleholder, however, this had not occurred at the time of the accident in question. The court noted that while the driver/leasor no longer had the right to possession, she still had actual possession and under the plain language of the statute was deemed to be the owner at the time of the accident, not the titleholder. Id. At 993. To reach this result, the court held that the replevin order did not terminate the lease. The replevin only dealt with the right to possession and in all other respects the lease was still in effect. Id. 321.493 also carves out another exception to a title owner’s liability. Under subparagraph 2, the title owner of a vehicle is exempt from liability where a bona fide sale or transfer has been made and possession delivered to the purchaser. The Iowa Supreme Court has noted when an owner has departed with possession and control of a vehicle under a conditional contract for sale, 3 Revised 2014 the rationale for imposing vicarious liability on a consent owner dissipates. It would be unfair to impose liability on an owner who simply holds title after the sale to secure payment but not to exercise control over the vehicle. Beganovic v. Musfeldt, 775 N.W.2d 313, 319 (2009). 3. Negligent Entrustment. Iowa courts have recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment in a variety of circumstances. The owners liability is based on his own separate negligence in permitting the vehicle’ use by an incompetent or inexperienced person with knowledge of the probable consequences. Krausnick v. Hoegg Roofing, 20 N.W.2d 432, 236 (Iowa 985), 163 ALR 1413 (1945). While section 321.493(1) imposes liability on owners without a showing of negligence on the part of the owner in entrusting the vehicle to another, this theory of recovery is recognized as a separate basis for liability and has not been supplanted by the owner liability statute. This theory may still, therefore, have relevance to a claim for punitive damages against the owner for entrustment where egregious circumstances exist. No cases in Iowa have yet dealt with such a situation. 4. Negligent Hiring. The following elements must be proven to sustain a cause of action for negligent hiring: (1) the employer knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of its employee’s unfitness at the time of hiring; (2) through the negligent hiring of the employee, the employee’s incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics proximately caused the resulting injuries; and (3) there is some employment or agency relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant employer. Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 708-09 (Iowa 1999). Relevant inquiries with respect to a negligent hiring claim include what the employer knew about the individual at the time of hiring, what pre-employment investigations the employer performed, whether the employer followed its usual pre-employment procedure, how do the employer’s pre-employment procedure compare to efforts made by other similar employers, and the specifics of the employer’s policy or procedure in making new hires. See also Wilson v. Darr, 553 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Iowa 1996). 5. Negligent Retention, Supervision or Training. In order to establish a cause of action for negligent retention, supervision or training, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the employer knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of its employee’s unfitness at the time the employee engaged in wrongful or tortuous conduct; 4 Revised 2014 (2) through the negligent supervision of the employee, the negligent employee’s incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff; and (3) there is some employment or agency relationship between the employee and the defendant employer. Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673 (Iowa 2004). A claim of negligent supervision must also include an underlying tort or wrongful act committed by the employee. Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 2004) (in action by state trooper against county, alleging county negligently failed to train dispatcher with information that driver fleeing from law enforcement officers intended to crash vehicles into officers, negligent supervision claim arose out of act or omission in connection with emergency response so as to fall within scope of statutory immunity provided to county).
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