ITPCM International Commentary Vol. VIII no. 30, July 2012

The ITPCM International Commentary

International Training Programme ISSN. 2239-7949 for Conflict Management

in this issue: udan outhsudan SBROADCASTING STATE POWER

Oil & corruption curses Neglecting the CPA, Nubian and land issues in South Sudan impacts on the Sudan/South in South Kordofan by Brian Adeba, p. 5 Sudan relations by Siham Khalid, p. 29 by Dagu David Justin, p. 17 South Sudan quest for freedom of expression The humanitarian about the ITPCM: by Enrica Valentini , p. 9 dimension of the crisis Next Events & Trainings, p. 34 by Laura Nistri, p. 21 Real and apparent causes Prosecutor of the of the Sudan/South Sudan Sudan: power International Criminal Court conflict demonstrations of a failed Ms. Fatou BENSOUDA by Marshal Olal, p. 13 state visiting the Scuola, 22nd October 2012, p. 34 by Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, p. 24 1 ITPCM International Commentary July 2012 ISSN. 2239-7949

the ITPCM International Commentary

Chief Director: Francesco Ceccarelli Scientific Director: Andrea de Guttry Editor in Chief: Michele Gonnelli

Contributors to this issue: Brian Adeba, Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, Dagu David Justin, Siham Khalid, Laura Nistri, Marshal Olal, Enrica Valentini

Graphic Design: Michele Gonnelli

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Submerged landscapes of the African State

Sudan was until one year ago - when Afterwards and upon independ- by the Sudanese example. Those enti- South Sudan eventually proclaimed ence, all those pending issues would ties are held tightly together by more its independence (9th July 2011) - the re-emerge with all the brutality and traditional, stringent and imminent biggest African country. Ruling over the inadequacies that lay before the linkages than the supposed suprema- its huge territory – more than 2,5 mil- eyes of the incredulous and yet often cy of a central power, often perceived lions square kilometres - and scat- blameable Western observer. The con- as being corrupt and too distant, if not tered population – about 45 million trol of the capital town, often claimed hostile. people in total - was a big challenge by a nationalist party or liberation and ultimately a big failure. The seeds army – supposedly representing the In this issue, we focus on those dy- of which can be traced back decades. majority of the people - legitimated, namics, their grounds, and the violent The Sudanese experience in this re- in the name of the uttered unity, the outcomes generated by unjust power spect can be regarded as a significant newly set-up governments. Yet the sharing and inefficient power broad- case-study that could help interpret submerged and intricate socio-politi- casting. Perhaps not surprisingly, and understand many dynamics in cal landscape underneath such an en- what the Sudanese government has Africa today. As peculiar as it might thusiastic claim remained generally been witnessing in the last 50 years be in the given context, a general unchanged and out of reach. seems to be replicated, in some ways, pattern and similar grounds can be by the brand new South Sudanese observed and extended to other sub- Later, along the fragile development experience. If the germs of such de- Saharan countries. path, when it came to resource exploi- generation can already be seen maybe tation and sharing, old socio-econom- the disease is innate in the institutional If population movements, migrations ic, ethnic and religious partitions and tool adopted. One could conclude and chiefdoms were the normality in grievances exploded in open conflicts, that the investigation and the de- the pre-colonial period, the advent of secessionist movements and quests velopment of other forms of power the colonial state, with its rigid bound- for self-determination. Inevitably in management, more adaptable to the aries and central apparatus had de fac- many African countries, and within African environment are needed, now to complicated matters. Furthermore, the new regimented, fixed bounda- more than ever. in the aftermath of WWII and since its ries, the central government had to independence – whenever it occurred come to terms with the too long over- - the very existence of the new African looked and unattended effective con- state was not endangered from out- trol of the hinterlands. In this respect, Michele Gonnelli side, but rather from inside. land tenure systems, customary land Beyond any declaration of principle, rights and local habits, with their set constitutional arrangement, power of rules, ethnic-religious traditions sharing, and alleged political de- and population movements, sud- velopment, reality was far from be- denly regained importance for their ing entrenched in the given imported ongoing role. framework. Sudan/South Sudan civil wars repre- If it is true that, in Europe, war made sent unquestionable evidence of all the state and the state made war, the this. Yet, the process at stake is not just African continent seemed to have es- that. The Sudanese issue includes also caped such a crude training and selec- Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile tion process, or to have postponed it, states, Abyei and the tribal conflicts in though just temporarily and accord- Jonglei, the alleged Dinka domination ing to different patterns. With only in Juba as well as the forced Islamisa- few exceptions, power in most Afri- tion carried out by the government in can countries was peacefully handed Khartoum. For many countries in Af- over by the colonial rulers to the new rica, what was supposed to be easily leaders of the independence move- achieved on the first day of independ- ments. Similarly, at the time of the ence later became an inefficient - po Berlin Conference in 1885, the African litical body, often sustained by a com- territory was divided along geometri- pliant international aid system that cal lines without resorting to armed artificially fed it. Here and there, that confrontations, while effective control statehood and its alleged unity are of vast areas was far from being exer- now disintegrating into more defend- cised. able and compact entities, as shown

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Abyei Town, by ENOUGH project, CC www.flickr.com by Brian Adeba

Journalist OIL AND CORRUPTION CURSES IN SS SOUTH SUDAN’S ECONOMIC CRISIS STEMS FROM THE OIL SHUTDOWN IN JANUARY 2012 AND HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS CONTRIBUTE TO THIS ECONOMIC IMPASSE.

The new baby buckles As South Sudan marks its first year as ed in a serious fuel and hard currency nomic state of the newly established an independent state, it faces an un- shortage and skyrocketing prices for nation has raised the concern of the precedented economic crisis manifest- basic commodities. This dire eco- World Bank and the United Nations.

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In May 2012, a confidential report by marcation debacle.3 understanding of how this scenario the World Bank warned that South came to be is useful. Prior to seces- Sudan’s economy was on the verge The second problem regards both sion, Khartoum ensured – whether by of collapse.1 The United Nations has countries’ failure to agree on the design or accident – that all labour in- echoed similar sentiments, warning amount of transit fees for shipping puts on oil production were connected that despite the enactment of austerity South Sudan’s crude oil through the to the northern Sudanese economy. measures to address the impact of the Republic of Sudan’s pipelines and port. Consequently, the oil infrastructure – crisis, South Sudan will require more South Sudan suggested the conciliato- refineries, pipelines, export terminals, relief aid to keep its population alive in ry above-market rate of US$ 1 per bar- airports, roads, and ports – were well- the coming months.2 rel, but Khartoum pegged the price at developed in the north, while practi- the exorbitant rate of US$ 36 per barrel. cally nothing exists in the south where Two reasons are behind South Sudan’s Subsequently, as a stalemate wore on, the oil fields are located. This move en- economic woes: a decision to stop oil Khartoum unilaterally siphoned off a sured Khartoum’s dominance in the oil exports through a pipeline controlled sector, even after secession.5 by its arch foe, the Republic of Sudan; the crux of South Sudan’s economic and rampant corruption among the woes rests in the failure to diversify However, like many oil rentier states ruling elite. its economy, which relies solely on encumbered by the proverbial “re- This commentary reviews these rea- oil exports, which account for 98 source curse,” the crux of South Su- sons, situating them within the context percent of the national budget dan’s economic woes rests in the failure and dynamics of South Sudan’s socio- to diversify its economy, which relies political factors with a broader outlook portion of South Sudan’s crude flow- solely on oil exports, which account on the residual political hiccups aris- ing through its pipelines to compen- for 98 percent of the national budget. ing out of the split of the Republic of sate for what it called “unpaid” transit The agricultural sector, which has a Sudan into two countries in July 2011. fees. In response, South Sudan shut high potential as a revenue earner, re- Specifically, this commentary argues down oil production and transfers, ef- mains underdeveloped despite the fact that although South Sudan’s economic fectively cutting off the country’s sole that 90 percent of the land is arable and problems stem from the inability to revenue source.4 50 percent of it is prime agricultural reach a fair deal to ship oil through Su- land.6 Funding for agriculture has con- dan’s pipelines, lack of foresight and The stoppage of oil production and sistently been less compared to other planning for alternatives to address transfer through Khartoum’s pipe- sectors. For example, in the 2011-2012 potential oil revenue shortfalls has lines, however, must be viewed holisti- budget, funding for infrastructure de- contributed significantly to the current cally within the context of extant latent velopment trumped funding for agri- crisis. Additionally, this commentary political tensions with Sudan and the culture.7 In the 2012-2013 budget, over emphasizes that the emergence of a aura of mutual mistrust this created. 60 percent of the $1.3 billion budget is powerful kleptocracy at the centre that The lack of political will by Khartoum earmarked for security and rule of law is dependent on the avails of oil, has to implement the full stipulations of sectors, while other sectors, including managed to create a corrupt system the CPA (The Abyei Protocol, Popular agriculture received a total of 17 per- that is siphoning off billions of dol- Consultation in South Kordofan and cent of the budgetary allocation.8 lars, thus contributing significantly to the Blue Nile States, Wealth Sharing) Similarly, rampant corruption is a sig- South Sudan’s current economic woes. forms the sublime context of this mis- nificant factor contributing to the coun- trust. This spirit of mutual mistrust is try’s economic problems. Corruption Unresolved differences, the curse of responsible for the failure to reach a has roots in the centrifugal dynamics oil and kleptocracy deal on oil transit fees. Foot-dragging surrounding the reorganisation of the South Sudan’s road to secession in July by Sudan on border demarcation and country’s political forces after seces- 2011 was plagued by several problems, the decision to withhold a portion of primarily the failure to implement South Sudan’s oil in lieu of “unpaid” The agricultural sector, which has a in full, stipulations of the Compre- fees, only served to reinforce previous high potential as a revenue earner, hensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that convictions of “unfair dealing” by the remains underdeveloped despite ended the war in 2005. Two of these northern neighbour and formed the the fact that 90 percent of the land is problems are critical to understand- subtext of the emotions that motivated arable ing the genesis of the country’s current the oil shutdown in January 2012. economic crisis. The first problem is sion and the question of resource al- the failure to demarcate the 3,000-mile But it is only fair to note that South location among political elites. Key in common border between South Sudan Sudan’s economic woes are partially this dynamic is the installation of the and the Republic of Sudan. Extant hur- grounded in its inability to refine its Sudan People’s Liberation Movement dles in addressing the status of Abyei, own crude after independence. Such a (SPLM) as the dominant political force a contested enclave, and failure to ad- capacity would have ensured enough after the secession. Within the SPLM, dress outstanding political issues in petrol is refined for local consumption, new power blocks and allegiances South Kordofan and Southern Blue a move that would have mitigated were forged, ostracizing some mem- Nile States, are other supplementary the current fuel shortage the country bers and elevating others to positions concerns compounding the border de- is facing. Nevertheless, a contextual of influence. Ethnicity and affinity to

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the power brokers ensures who gets the rate is 5 pounds. Subsequently, the antee of accessing them at reasonable political power and access to resourc- country has been gripped by a fuel interest rates. es. Within this structure, a powerful scarcity; a litre of petrol now sells for kleptocracy has emerged at the centre, 6 pounds compared to 5 pounds in In essence, the persistence of the eco- monopolizing power and resources. In January. Long queues for fuel are now nomic crisis may potentially lead to the absence of a viable democratic plu- a common phenomenon in South Su- inability to pay salaries to the civil ralism and its accompanying modali- dan. Annual inflation has risen sharp- service and the armed forces. This is a ties for checks and balances, this klep- ly, to almost 80 percent in June, com- significant concern because South Su- tocracy has had free reign to plunder pared to 29.6 percent in April. This rise dan’s estimated 200,000-strong army public monies. is fueled by price hikes in the cost of still faces challenges as it transforms it- President Salva Kiir confessed in June food and non-alcoholic beverages. The self from a guerilla unit into a conven- that the country had lost US$ 4 bil- inflation rate may be much higher in tional army. Discipline and respect for lion to corrupt government officials. northern regions where supply routes the chain of command is still an issue Subsequently, Kiir wrote letters to 75 were shut down by Khartoum follow- because of the absorption of thousands government ministers and former ing a brief border skirmish with South of former militia soldiers who were a ministers, urging them to return the Sudan after the latter’s capture of the law unto themselves. Four years ago looted money.9 Opposition leader Lam oil-rich Heglig town in April. The rise when South Sudan experienced salary Akol however contends that this is a in inflation is significant because it -ex delays, sections of the army mutinied conservative figure when juxtaposed acerbates an already fragile situation in a number of towns. Armed rebel- where more than half of the popula- lions, insecurity and a breakdown of Ethnicity and affinity to the power tion lives below the poverty line. the law at the hands of unruly soldiers brokers ensures who gets political are real concerns if there are delays in power and access to resources At the moment, there is no end in sight dispensing remuneration for the army. to South Sudan’s economic challenges. against US$ 20 billion earned in oil The 2012-2013 budget presented in In essence, the persistence of the 10 revenues since 2005. June is a painful recognition of this economic crisis may potentially lead fact. After the oil shutdown, the gov- to inability to pay salaries to the civil Significance of the economic crisis ernment relied on oil revenue reserves service and the armed forces and implications to finance its operations, but Finance As the South Sudan economy buckles Minister Kosti Manibe cautioned that under the strain of the oil shutdown, these reserves will be depleted before The way forward: thinking outside the local currency has declined consid- the end of the year. Domestic and the box erably against the dollar, losing 40 per- foreign loans are alternative means In the absence of a diversified econo- cent of its value. The official exchange of financing the budget, but Manibe my, a rentier state dependent solely rate is 2.95 South Sudanese pounds warned that there is no guarantee of on oil export revenues that are gov- to the dollar, but on the black market getting these loans, nor is there a guar- erned by the antics of belligerence and

South Sudan Police Recruits at Training Academy, Rajaf, Sudan. UN Photo/Paul Banks, CC www.flickr.com 7 ITPCM International Commentary July 2012 ISSN. 2239-7949

mutual hostility with a neighbouring the British colonial administration and 2 Doki, C., 2012.Economic crisis country, is a recipe for disaster as the its successor Sudanese state to ensure hits South Sudan. The East African, No.919, oil shutdown has shown. a cash flow through exports is also im- pp.30 Although the quest for an alternative portant. 3 D’Agoot, M., 2009. Energy poli- pipeline through Kenya remains a top tics and the South Sudan referendum: An priority for the South Sudan govern- However, it is important to note that anatomy of a resource curse. Middle East ment, the prospects for this export oil will remain a significant contributor Policy, Vol. XVI (No.4, Winter), pp. 118-130. channel dimmed considerably when to the South Sudan economy. Because 4 Laessing, U., 2012. S.Sudan oil China, which was expected to finance South Sudan is a landlocked country, shutdown weighs as pound falls, tax hikes the enterprise, declined to do so.11 access to external markets through loom. Available on: www.reuters.com/ar- Furthermore, the 2012-2013 budget ports in neighbouring countries is cru- ticle/2012/03/26/southsudan-investment- acknowledges that even if this option cial. In light of the fact that a pipeline idUSL6E8EP1EN20120326 was implemented, it will not generate to the Kenyan ports of Mombasa and 5 See Energy politics and the South cash for this year nor for several years Lamu is unfeasible, the most viable Sudan referendum: An anatomy of a re- to come. and cost-effective means of accessing source curse, pp. 124. foreign markets is through Sudan’s 6 See Agriculture in South Sudan. South Sudan needs to wean itself of ports. Fostering friendly neighbourly Available on: www.agfairsouthsudan.org/ dependence on oil as its sole revenue ties with Sudan by building trust is an agriculture-in-south-sudan earner. The country should invest in important factor in this configuration. 7 Government of South Sudan South Sudan should utilize all the tools 2011 budget speech, January 2011. The Although the quest for an alternative at its disposal, including diplomacy, to budget for agriculture was 65.5 million pipeline through Kenya remains ensure good ties with Sudan. Sudanese pounds compared to 628 million a top priority for the South Sudan for infrastructure development. government, the prospects for As corruption is a major contributor 8 Government of Republic of this export channel dimmed to the country’s economic woes, there South Sudan: 2012-2013 budget speech. considerably when China, which was is need to steer away from the current June 2012. expected to finance the enterprise, parochial system of government to a 9 Salva Kiir’s letter dated 3 May, declined to do so more egalitarian system that is toler- 2012 in which he laments that “most of ant of democratic pluralism. Demo- these funds have been taken out of the its own oil infrastructure and develop cratic pluralism will create institutions country and deposited in foreign ac- capacities to produce fuel for local for checks and balances that may curb counts.” consumption to lessen dependence on corruption by ensuring government 10 Position of the opposition on the imported processed fuel. Furthermore, officials are subject to scrutiny and are president’s letter to corrupt government of- accelerating the development of alter- held accountable for their actions. ficials. Letter by Lam Akol dated 17 June, native revenue sources, especially in 2012. the agricultural sector, is of crucial im- 11 China non-committal on financ- portance to future economic viability. Endnotes ing South Sudan pipeline as Kiir cuts short Boosting domestic production to en- 1 South Sudan economy on the his visit. Sudan Tribune, 26 April 2012. sure a food surplus for export is a pos- verge of collapse, World Bank warns. Available on: www.sudantribune.com/ sible way to earn cash for South Sudan. Available on: www.sudantribune.com/ China-non-committal-on-financing,42395 Similarly, reviving large-scale industri- EXCLUSIVE-South-Sudan-economy-on, al agricultural schemes first mooted by 42512

Colorful Old Oil Barrels, by L. C. Nattaasen, CC www.flickr.com 8 ITPCM International Commentary December 2011 ISSN. 2239-7949

Naath FM Radio Station Coordinator Lonya Banak Bany live on air during the offical opening of the station, Southern Sudan Community Radio Station, Internews Network, CC www.flickr.com

by Enrica Valentini

Director of Voice of Hope Radio Wau, South Sudan SS QUEST FOR FREEDOM [OF EXPRESSION] THE STILL SHAKY SOUTH SUDANESE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION SEEMS TO BE THREATENED BY THE NEW MEDIA LAW UNDER DISCUSSION, WHILE THE RADIO REMAINS THE DOMINANT MASS MEDIA WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

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South Sudan is a one-year-old nation. remain a dominant model. The Transi- find expression’ (Art 38,1,d). But tribal- After fighting for decades against tional Constitution also mentions that ism in the country has a negative con- the northern oppressor,1 the country ‘all media shall abide by professional notation, and people’s tribal belonging has now to learn how to live in peace ethics’ (Art 24,3). But most media per- may still inhibit freedoms. and freedom. The war left a legacy of sonnel are no professionals at all, and However, first and foremost, South hatred, corruption and paternalism, the media sector in South Sudan suf- Sudanese media are still operating in which hardly matches with the coun- fers from an endemic lack of proper the absence of a legal framework, as try’s motto ‘Justice, Liberty, Prosperity’. training. no media law has been approved yet. Freedom of expression represents no As the country keeps growing and exception to this situation. while the constitution is under review, taking shape, it is not yet clear which most of the population has still no direction it is taking. All the previous After decades of war and isolation, all clear understanding of the role of a questions are difficult to answer, and it acknowledge the need for disseminat- constitution is hard to unravel this situation in such ing and accessing information, but the a complex environment. practice reveals many contradictions. Media are also acknowledged as a Moving ahead from what is written on The Transitional Constitution of the privileged channel to disseminate paper, it does not take long to realize Republic of South Sudan grants to ev- awareness about the constitution and that the situation on the ground does ery citizen ‘the right to the freedom of shall be constantly informed about its not look better. expression, reception and dissemina- revision (Art 4,4; 201,3,c). Several episodes of harassments and tion of information, publication, and summary detentions of journalists access to the press without prejudice But while the constitution is under re- have been recorded since last year’s in- to public order, safety or morals as view, most of the population has still dependence, and censorship and bru- prescribed by law’ (Art 24,1). But can no clear understanding of the role of a tality are still common practice in the there be freedom when one is not even constitution and even less understand- aware of having rights? ing about this reviewing process, from tribalism in the country has a which the civil society struggles not to negative connotation, and people’s Freedom of the press and media shall be excluded. tribal belonging may still inhibit also be guaranteed ‘as shall be regulat- The transitional constitution also freedoms ed by law in a democratic society’ (Art counts media among the channels to 24,2). But which democratic societies promote South Sudan’s ‘cultural di- government relations with media per- is South Sudan looking at? The teach- versity and encourage such diverse sonnel. Journalists are often denied ac- ings of the Khartoum regime seem to cultures to harmoniously flourish and cess to information for the sake of na-

Northern Sudan Minister of Interior Ibrahim Hamid, flanked by Unity State Governor abanT Deng Gai, speaks to the media following a security committee meeting to discuss tensions arising from recent attacks along the border. Photo by Tim Freccia, Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com

Kerman Bazar, Iran, Photo by NINARA, CC www.flickr.com

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tional security; they are still perceived only channel that allows them to know ibility. Communities and institutions as spies attempting to undermine the what is happening in the world, in the could rely on the Church, and the pop- country’s safety and often fall in the country and in the neighbourhoods. ulation felt its voice represented. hands of untrained security personnel. In spite of the low literacy rate, people Churches have been a privileged chan- Journalists self-censor their own work, know how to recognise reliable, rel- nel to convey information, both inside and citizens hesitate to report and col- evant and consistent news. Listeners and outside the country, and Sunday laborate with the media, because they know exactly what time news pro- celebrations or catechetical meetings fear retaliation from government and grammes are broadcast on each radio often brought along civic and social armed forces. station and are ready to switch from teachings, as promotion of human de- one station to another to follow the best velopment, attention to the most vul- bulletin. nerable groups and standing for the Journalists self-censor their own People also look for all other kind of truth are their core values. work, and citizens hesitate to report information that can improve their life During all relevant social and politi- and collaborate with the media conditions: peace building and recon- cal occasions in the recent life of South ciliation in the country, health, human Sudan (signing of the CPA, election, A thirst for information rights, education, agriculture, busi- referendum, independence, constitu- In a country where about 80% of the ness.6 tion review process), the Church was population is illiterate,2 where there always in the front line in the effort of is almost no electricity to keep televi- raising awareness. sion and mobile phones running, and The first public opinion survey in the The Church has an amazing capability where a poor road system and high country carried out in September to reach remote areas through a net- costs for printing prevent newspaper 2011 revealed that 61% of the South work of chapels and prayer centres, to distribution, radio is the most common Sudanese interviewed considers know people needs and to speak the and affordable channel of information. radio its primary information and communities’ languages, and even rel- The first public opinion survey in the news source evant international NGOs, which usu- country carried out in September 2011 ally refrain from partnering with faith- revealed that 61% of the South Suda- Media overview based organisations to guarantee their nese interviewed considers radio its Since the signing of the Comprehen- independence, are now collaborating primary information and news source. sive Peace Agreement in 2005, media with the Church to carry out their pro- In the list of primary sources, word have been growing in South Sudan grams. of mouth follows with 16%, commu- and are contributing to the develop- During the election and referendum nity meetings get 7%, television 4%, ment of the country. periods, civic education programs while newspapers, internet and mobile Government television and radio sta- were produced and broadcast by cath- phones were only mentioned by 2% of tions were already present in almost olic radio stations, church leaders were the sample population.3 each of the ten states of South Sudan, trained on how to carry out voter edu- People access radio more often and though not always functional. Some cation in the rural areas, and priests more regularly than all other sources. of them are owned and funded by the kept encouraging the faithful to as- 73% of the interviewed never got infor- national government, other by the lo- sume their duty as citizens. mation from newspapers, 82% never cal government; other have mixed got information from internet, 69% structure and fall partially under the Ways forward never got information from television state and partially under the national Improving media professionalism and 62% never got information from responsibility. and approving the media law would mobile phones.4 Most of them are facing challenges in improve South Sudan freedom of ex- Though other sources than radio are terms of limited financial resources, pression. But while the media sector is used, the perception of their impor- unqualified human resources, and out- already engaged in several initiatives, tance and reliability is that they are al- of-date equipment.7 the government seems to have differ- most irrelevant. According to a survey The past six years also witnessed the ent priorities. carried out in December 2008, radio is proliferation of independent media; A consortium of different national considered the most important source several private radios have been fund- and international organisations has of information by 71% of the respon- ed all over the country. Commercial already been working at strategies to dents and the most reliable source of radios are mainly distributed in Juba, strengthen the media operators’ ca- information by 66%. As far as impor- while community radio stations are pacities. Training sessions have been tance is concerned, newspapers, televi- present all across the country. Some carried out in several locations in the sion, internet, mobile phones and word of them are faith-based, both Catholic country. A code of conduct and eth- of mouth scored 3%, 7%, 1%, 5% 7% and Anglican, others are supported by ics was developed for journalists to be respectively, while regarding reliabil- international NGOs. aware of their duties and responsibili- ity they got 5%, 6%, 0%, 6%, and 10% ties. Debates and seminars have been respectively.5 Speaking out the truth organized in order to allow media and People are mainly looking for news. Being the only organization remaining institutions to discuss their respective Many years of war, a vast territory, in the country and close to the people, roles as far as information is concerned the lack of proper communication in- providing aid, education, moral and and to try to pave the way for a positive frastructures led people to live in iso- physical support throughout the war collaboration. lation, therefore radio represents the period, the Church gained a high cred-

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A draft of media bills was first pre- Paola Moggi, director of the Catholic Sudan: World’s youngest country yet to embark pared in 2005, and initially the Gov- Radio Network and member of AM- on road to civil liberties, July 2012. Available ernment of South Sudan positively DISS Executive Board until April 2012, at: http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/report_rwb_ contributed to its revision process. Af- identified some worrying contradic- south_sudan.pdf http://en.rsf.org/soudan- ter several amendments, the draft was tions: while the Media Authority Bill du-sud-report-world-s-youngest-coun- presented to the Ministry of Legal Af- advocates for independent media, the try-03-07-2012,42933.html, accessed 8 July fairs and Constitutional Development Media Authority falls under the Min- 2012. in 2008, and it was passed by the Coun- istry of Information and Broadcast- 3 International Republican In-In- cil of Ministers to be presented to the ing’s direct control and is exclusively stitute, 2011. Survey of South Sudan Public Assembly only at the end of 2009. accountable to the Government. The Opinion, p.75. Media representatives kept appealing Right of Access to Information Bill 4 International Republican In-In- for more inclusive revision procedures introduces unspecified fees to access stitute, 2011. Survey of South Sudan Public and for a quick approval, and the Presi- Opinion, p.76. dent of the Republic, while opening the the Media Authority falls under 5 Consumer Options Ltd, South Su- second session of the National Legisla- the Ministry of Information and dan Media Survey, 2008, p.12. Available at ture last May, called on the members of Broadcasting’s direct control and http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ PNADR807. the parliament to pass the media laws, is exclusively accountable to the pdf, accessed 6 July 2012. but the discussion shall only take place Government 6 Voice of Hope radio Audience re-re- in August 2012. search findings. May 2011. The three bills approved by the Cabinet public information and defines the 7 Article 19, Mapping the Void: a and submitted to the National Legisla- timeframe to access requested data up State-by-State Media Assessment Report on tive Assembly include: the Right of Ac- to 20 working days. South Sudan and Selected Northern States, cess to Information Bill, regulating the As long as freedom of expression are August 2009. Available at: http://www.un- public’s right to access state-held infor- just words to impress the international hcr.org/refworld/docid/4ae957152.html, ac- mation; the Broadcasting Corporation community, no real freedom will be cessed 8 July 2012. Bill, transforming South Sudan Radio there. 8 Reporters Without Borders, South and Television into a public service Sudan: World’s youngest country yet to embark broadcaster; and the Media Authority Endnotes on road to civil liberties, July 2012. Available Bill, creating a media regulatory body.8 1 Khartoum’s government has al-al- at: http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/report_rwb_ ways been considered oppressive and dis- south_sudan.pdf http://en.rsf.org/soudan- AMDISS, the Association for Me- criminating towards the Southerners, who du-sud-report-world-s-youngest-coun- dia Development in South Sudan, is focused the campaign for independence try-03-07-2012,42933.html, accessed 8 July among the main promoters of the me- on the fight for freedom and the end of all 2012. dia bills and raised concerns about the forms of oppression. approval of the present draft. 2 Reporters Without Borders, South

Spirit FM 99.9 Yei, South Sudan, photo by Werner Anderson, Norwegian People’s Aid,, CC www.flickr.com

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UNAMID Officials Meet Arab Nomads, UN Photo/Stuart Price, CC www.flickr.com by Marshal Olal Johnson Limong

Professor for Ethnic Studies, University of Juba Centre for Peace and Development Studies REAL AND APPARENT CAUSES OF THE S/SS CONFLICT

DIVISIONS ALONG ETHNO-RELIGIOUS LINES HAVE PLAYED A GREAT ROLE DURING OVER 50 YEARS OF CIVIL WAR. HOWEVER, THE CONFLICT WAS POLITICAL IN NATURE AND SUSTAINED BY RESOURCE DIMENSION.

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The role of religion in the kept speaking of a war against the in- the civil conflict. Handed over by the sudanese civil wars fidels. These infidels according to Mr Turko–Egyptian rule, power passed The Sudanese civil wars have been Gassis were Christians and among routinely characterized as conflict be- them the most popular targets were they were socio-economic tween north Sudan, predominantly the Christian Catechists. The war, ac- grievances derived from an imposed Muslims, and South Sudan, predomi- cording to him, was an attempt to wipe marginalisation that led to the nantly Christians and Animists. The out every form and prove of Christi- outbreak of the civil conflict essence of religious conflict started anity from the land. Indeed, whenever because of divisions between the the northern soldiers attacked villages directly in the hand of the Arabs in Christian South and Arab North. The in the south, their first target were the North. The imposition of Arabism religious differences between the two the religious people, especially those and Islam became the pillars of the regions were encouraged by the Brit- wearing crosses as sign of their faith.6 national identity. Those who did not ish Condominium rule. Indeed, the When the regime in Khartoum denied identify themselves with such pillars British allowed the entire Arab North any flight into South Sudan that was were marginalised and economically to remain Muslim while they encour- meant to deliver food reliefs, cost- excluded. As British colonial admin- aged Missionaries to go into the South ing some 450,000 lives, most of them istrators prepared Sudan for inde- to convert the Southern natives that Christians and Animists, David Ka- pendence, the northerners leveraged followed traditional African religions. gunda, field Program Officer for the the Arab-Muslims identity as the sole As a result, many southerners became United Nations Operation Lifeline legitimate background of national in- Christians while others maintained Sudan insisted that these people were dependence. Nonetheless the north- their traditional beliefs. It is this which being starved just because of their reli- ern nationalists were absolutely firm defines the religious identity of the gion belonging.7 about their request of annexation of two regions. the separately administered south to The successive Islamic governments The role of ethnicity and political the newly Independent Sudan.9 As a in Khartoum have always dreamt dimension matter of fact, in the early 1950s, the of making the whole of Sudan an Is- Many people also considered the civil southerners were increasingly con- lamic nation. They received over $180 war between North and South Sudan cerned about the transfer of power to million in aid and weapons from the as an ethnic conflict because of its ra- the Northern Arab Muslims. fundamentalist government in Iran in order to fight a war against the rebel the conflict between Arabs and During the transition to independ- movement in the South. This made re- Africans is more than ethnic but ence, the Sudanisation process, both ligion become an important reason for rather racial in a strict sense. Its at national and local level, appeared waging war.1 roots date back to the Turko-Egyptian very clear, and resulted in the politi- rule, in pre-colonial times, when the cal marginalization of the southern- In 1983, the regime based in Khar- South was massively subjected to ers. The northern elites inherited ex- toum instituted strict Islamic law in slave raiding clusively the political power from the the entire country. This change also British authorities. They also managed applied to black Christians and other cial and political nature. The popu- to acquire administrative positions in non-Muslim in the South. The Islamic lation inhabiting the South cannot the south. In 1954, out of 800 admin- government constitutionalised its reli- be considered as a monolithic ethic istrative sudanised posts, only 6 ma- gious beliefs and imposed them on the group, but composed of many dif- jor level positions were occupied by whole country. This, not only offended ferent ethnicities. These ethnicities southerners. Arab was also imposed all sections of southern Sudanese so- are supposed to be part of an alleged as the official administrative language ciety, but also triggered the reaction African race, while the Northern Ar- from the Christians and the Animists abs would represent an Arab race. In In 1954, out of 800 administrative in South Sudan. The people were not this sense, the conflict between Arabs sudanised posts, only 6 major willing to adhere to strict marginal- and Africans is more than ethnic but level positions were occupied by ising Islamic law that had created a rather racial in a strict sense. Its roots southerners sharp division in society. The renewed date back to the Turko-Egyptian rule, wave of Islamisation sparked tensions in pre-colonial times, when the South of the South, preventing locals from between the North and the South, that was massively subjected to slave raid- being appointed in administrative po- culminated in Dr. John Garang and ing. A practise that was carried out sitions. This did not only angered the his SPLM/A restarting the conflict in because the blacks were considered as Southerners, leading to a loss of hope 1983.2 inferior race, the traditional justifica- for regional economic development, In 1992, a fatwa3 was declared, that tion of slavery.8 but also alimented fears of renewed gave theological justification to the exploitation, economic exclusion and extermination of non-Muslims. It was Although religious and racial issues dispossession. Such deep grievances publicly supported by the Govern- might have exacerbated tensions and were the makings of further regional ment in Khartoum.4 reasons for confrontations, the real instability and emergence of violence.10 cause of the conflict was political. His Lordship Macram Gassis5 ques- They were socio-economic grievances Trying to refer to a punctual event, it tioned the denial of the holy nature of derived from an imposed margin- was the first parliamentary election the Sudanese war, while the Muslims alisation that led to the outbreak of that led to the outbreak of the first civil

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war, while giving complete political abrogated the Addis Ababa Peace cording the letter of the Addis Ababa control to the northern elite. By the end Agreement (1972) that had given the Agreement. At the same time the of 1954 almost all ex-colonial adminis- south restricted financial autonomy regime launched big infrastructural trators had been replaced by northern and the right to collect all central taxes plans that resulted in the building of Sudanese. This sharp increase in their from industrial, commercial and agri- pipelines running all the way from presence as administrators, senior cultural ventures located on its terri- Unity State to Port Sudan. army and police officers, teachers in tory. Such a plan was carried out with schools and merchants spurred south- a view to directly access the oil fields In order to further secure oil extrac- ern fear of northern domination and and resources.12 tion, this time adopting more refined colonisation. All this made the south- political means, in June 1983, Nimeri erners to perceive themselves as politi- Nimeri also undertook to deepen the partitioned the South along new eth- cally excluded.11 political marginalization of the south nic boundaries in order to diminish in three ways. Firstly, in the late 1970s, its political power and impact. By The Role of Resource in the Conflict by disrupting the southern political claiming that the partition was car- The discovery and exploitation of oil order through direct interventions and ried out towards meeting the needs as well as the fierce competition over by suspending the regional assembly of other southern ethnic groups, de several times in an effort to appease facto dominated by Dinka, the largest Moving from apparent religious- northern faction that had opposed the ethnic group14, the South was actu- ethnic grounds the conflict was Addis Ababa Agreement. Secondly, by ally divided into the three original re- then driven by mere economic replacing southern troops with their gions established during the colonial considerations, the struggle for the proximate northern army units in or- rule period. As planned oil revenues control of oil fields der to control the oil fields. Thirdly, started to play a significant role also the Nimeri government proceeded to in financing civil war expenditures resources and revenues has played a redrew provincial boundaries curving thus alimenting it in a vicious circle. major role in shaping the dynamic of the oil region out of the southern ter- Khartoum could count now on strong Sudanese civil wars. Moving from ap- ritory by establishing the Unity State, incentives not to give in to the requests parent religious-ethnic grounds the design to include many of those oil of the southerners for sharing political conflict was then driven by mere eco- fields that actually were located be- power and accompanying economic nomic considerations, the struggle for yond the border.13 benefits. the control of oil fields. The Nimeri’s regime played instrumentally with Once the oil licensing contracts were The impacts of the civil conflicts southern political rights in order to signed, the resulting revenues were the civil wars between North and gain authority over natural resources not handed over to the southern re- South Sudan were not only the long- located there. With the discovery of gional government, that was actu- est and the most costly conflicts in oil in South Sudan, president Nimeri ally supposed to administer them ac- Africa but they also had deep impacts

Writing on the wall in Tajalei, Abyei region, by Tim Freccia/Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com 15 ITPCM International Commentary July 2012 ISSN. 2239-7949

on the Sudanese society. They caused ing countries in terms of GDP losses, Endnotes untold sufferings, human misery and plus $30 billion in peacekeeping and 1 D. Michelle Domke. ICE Case material destruction. According to humanitarian costs for the interna- Studies: Civil War in the Sudan: Resource well-investigated figures, more than tional community.21 Aggressive oil or Religion? November 1997. p. 1 two million people died as a result pumping in order to finance the war 2 Hercules Alexander Sanden- of the fighting. This includes victims could also have strong side-effects on bergh. How Religious in Sudan’s Religious of direct violence or conflict related the coming generations, being oil not War? April, 2006, p. 2. starvation and diseases. Half a mil- renewable and thus posing serious 3 A religious decree lion refugees had fled in neighbouring sustainability issues. 4 Mark O’Keefe. Religion Inflames countries and roughly four millions The violent conflict has destroyed the Sudan War. 27 October, 1998, p. 3. people have been violently displaced education system and left the resident 5 Bishop of El Obeid is sometimes and driven from their habitual places population without the necessary called the “the bishop of the rebels”. He of resident.15 The biggest direct impact knowledge that is needed to rebuild a heads the (geographically) largest diocese of the war on the economy resulted in nation. More than 1.3 million children in Sudan, almost three times the size of a sharp reduction in the labour force in South Sudan, in primary school age, Italy, and he lives partly in exile, for in fact available, injuries and the depletion of are left out of any basic education. The he divides his time between Nairobi in Ke- UNESCO published a report express- nya and the Nubian mountains. the outbreak of a renewed civil war ing that the country was second to the 6 Ibid. p. 8. between the two nations, would last one in the world ranking for net 7 Ibid. p. 8. result in a cumulative loss for them enrolment in primary education and 8 Aleksi Ylowen. “Grievances and both, the neighbouring countries at the bottom of the world league ta- Roots of Insurgence: Southern Sudan and ble for enrolment in secondary educa- Darfur,” Peace Conflict and Development: An and the International Community 22 amounting to over $100 billion US tion. Inter-Displinary Journal, vol. 7, July 2005, p. Dollars 106. Long years of civil conflicts have not 9 John Markakis. Resource Con- only militarized Sudan, they have flict in the Horn of Africa. London: Sage physical capital.16 also shaped a mentality of violence Publication, 1998, p.111. Douglas John- Between 1990 and 1996, during a con- among the people. Legislative, judici- son. The Root Causes of Sudan Civil War, flict period of high intensity, the na- ary and law enforcement institutions Bloomington, 2003, pp. 24-25. tional investments fell by two-third suffer from capacity deficit and a lack 10 Aleksi Ylowen. “Grievances and and GDP decreased at a cumulative of adequate training, often generating Roots of Insurgence: South Sudan and rate of 8%.17 Strikingly enough it has a lack of confidence in the justice sys- Darfur” p. 108, 110. been estimated that the central gov- tem. Small arms continue to circulate 11 Ibid. p. 112. ernment spent instead up to $ 1 million massively within the country, along 12 Aleksi Ylowen. “Grievances and per day in 2001 in war expenditures.18 with prolonged low intensity conflicts root of Insurgence: South Sudan and Dar- A lot of government resources were and criminality in some parts of South fur.” diverted away from productive invest- Sudan. 23 Increasing levels of militia 13 Ibid. p. 117. ment to destructive purposes. An ad- violence continue to break out in the 14 Ibid. p. 116. ditional 2.2 of GDP spent on the mili- country, instrumentally exploited as 15 International Crises Groups. God, tary - the typical increase in war times proxies by the Sudanese government Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of war in - led to a permanent loss of around 2% to destabilise the situation and weak- Sudan. Brussels, 2002, pp. 3-7. of GDP. War has a negative effect on en the political stability as well as to 16 Frontier Economics. The Cost of the investment ratio over GDP.19 retain rents earned on oil revenue.24 Future Conflict in Sudan. 2010, p. 13. The religious dimension of the con- 17 Ali Abdel Gadir, Ibrahim A. El- Sudan Produces about 0.6% of world flict deeply affected the Christians badawi and Att El Batahani. The Sudan oil. This places Sudan 31st among oil communities from South Sudan. In Civil War: Why has it prevailed for so long? p.2 producing nations. It represent around the past years non-Muslims faced reli- 18 Aleksi Ylowen. “Grievances and 10-20% of Sudan’s GDP and 98% of gious persecution: Catholic priests and the Roots of Insurgences: Southern Sudan South Sudan government revenue. An religious leaders had been arrested and Darfur” p. 123. interruption in the oil supply as it took and mistreated, churches were closed 19 Frontier Economics. The cost of place in early 2012 would pose serious or burnt down. Non-Muslims were ex- Future Conflict in Sudan. 2010, p. 13 problems to South Sudan and have an cluded from schools or jobs, or obliged 20 Ibid. immediate impact on the Sudanese to conform to Muslim codes of behav- 21 Ibid, p. 6. GDP.20 iour such as the wearing of the chador 22 Melany Markham. “South Su- The Frontier Economics warned that for women. From many people con- dan: The Lasting Effect of Conflict on the outbreak of a renewed civil war version was extorted. A lay religious South Sudanese Education System,” Alert between the two nations, would result leader, Agostino El Nur, was crucified Net, 8Feb. 2012, p.1. in a cumulative loss for them both, for 24 hours on the Nuba Mountain. 23 IRC. May, 2004. the neighbouring countries and the He was not nailed but tied to a pole in 24 Frontier Economics. The Costs of International Community amounting form of a cross, hands and arms out- Future Conflict in Sudan. 2010, p. 11. to over $100 billion US Dollars. This stretched. He was denied food, water 25 Mark O’Keefe. Region Inflames would include $50 billion for Sudan it- and beaten with a gun butt.25 He lived, Sudan War. 27 October, 1998. p. 1. self and $25 billion for the neighbour- to tell his stories.

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UNMIS Launches DDR Launch Programme, 10 Jun 2009. Juba, Sudan. UN Photo/Tim McKulka, CC www.flickr.com

by Dagu David Justin

South Sudanese MA candidate Human Rights & Conflict Management NEGLECTING Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna THE CPA, IMPACTS ON S/SS RELATIONS

THE INAPPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2005 COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENTS (CPA) RESULTED IN THE RECENT RE-EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT AND DISPUTES BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

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CPA – background and origin Without putting into perspective the cemented and structured unequal 23 years until the signing of the CPA intractable nature of the conflict in Su- dispensation and exacerbated the al- in 2005 in Nairobi Kenya. During the dan and without revisiting its history, ready precarious conditions in South- war, more than two million South it would be impossible to explain and ern Sudan. It is however important to Sudanese lost their lives directly as understand how the CPA came into emphasize that the history of contem- a result of the war or indirectly as a being. In one of the most authoritative porary conflicts between the elites of consequence of the war. Four million books written on Sudan,The “ Root the centre and the marginalized peo- others were uprooted and around causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars”1, Douglas ples of the periphery predates coloni- 600,000 sought refuge beyond Sudan’s Johnson identifies, foremost among al interventions. The decision by the borders4. The CPA was signed thanks the causes of the country’s recurring colonial powers, the Anglo-Egyptian to the political and diplomatic pres- wars, the presence of a durable politi- condominium, to grant independ- sure exerted by the Troika: United cal economy monopolized by a cen- ence to a united Sudan on January States, United Kingdom and Norway tral power whose elites harboured 1, 1956, before inequalities between under the auspices of the Inter-Gov- expansionist tendencies against pe- North and South could be remedied, ernmental Authority on Development ripheral regions. This expansionist was ill founded, and today this can be (IGAD). The CPA was divided into six ambition has been ongoing since the viewed as a major contributor to the main protocols: the Machakos Proto- 18th century through feudal processes wars and the now seeming perpetual col, The Protocol on Security Arrange- of slave raids and cattle rustling. The conflicts in the periphery regions of ment, the Protocol on Wealth Sharing; manifestation of the exploitative na- Sudan. the Protocol on Power Sharing; the ture of relations between the elites of Protocol on the Resolution of conflict Sudan has a history and precedence in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile The manifestation of the exploitative of peace-making although it has al- States; and the Protocol on the Reso- nature of relations between the ways hardly respected the terms and lution of conflict in Abyei5. elites of the centre and the Sudanic provisions. A case in point is the Ad- peoples of the periphery resulted in dis Ababa Agreement, signed after The provisions of the 2005 CPA massive inequality in the country the first civil war in Sudan between the north and south, which lasted for The table below summarizes the con- the centre and the Sudanic2 peoples of 17 years from 1955 to 1972. The Addis tent of the CPA provisions adapted the periphery resulted in massive in- Ababa Agreement unravelled in 1983 from the agreement document. It con- equality in the country. Colonial inter- leading to the start of the second civil tains all the main elements of the pro- vention by Turkey, Britain, and Egypt war in Sudan, again mainly fought visions in the agreement. The table is introduced a governance system for between the north and south. The Su- also expected to provide an easy and the Southern part of the country that dan People’s Liberation Movement/ simplified understanding of all the el- was known as the “Southern Policy”3. Army (SPLM/A), the main protago- ements contained in the bulky docu- The creation of the Southern policy nist in the second civil war, fought for ment - the CPA.

Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 9 January 2005 Provision relating to DETAILS OF PROVISION

1) Armed Forces The North and South are to maintain separate armed forces. There is to be the withdrawal of 91,000 government troops from the South within 2 and half years. The SPLA has 8 months to withdraw its forces from the North. The Naivasha Protocol that forms part of the CPA outlines the details of integration: it allows for integrated units of 21,000 soldiers (of which half will be government and half SPLA) to be formed during the 6 year interim period. They are to be deployed to sensitive areas (such as the 3 under dispute). These units will be commonly stationed yet will maintain separate command and control structures. If, after the interim period, the South decides not to secede, both sides will unify into a 39,000 strong force. 2) Autonomy The South will have autonomy for 6 years, which will be followed by a referendum regarding secession from Sudan to be held in 2011. 3) Oil wealth To be shared on a 49:49 basis between the Khartoum Government and the southern SPLM- led government. The remaining 2% will be advanced to the oil producing areas on a monthly basis. The oil wealth sharing formula is structured for oil reserves that are extracted from territories within South Sudan only. 4) Economic issues The country’s currency - the dinar - will be changed to the pound and a dual banking system will be used in the north. Since South Sudan was in favour of running a secular system, it will adopt a conventional banking system as opposed to an Islamic one. Originally, before the war, Sudan had used the pound as its currency, therefore the pound was reinstated during the six year interim period.

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5) Administration Positions in the central transitional government are to be split 70:30 in favour of the government, and 55:45 in favour of the government in the contentious areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States and 70:30 in favour of SPLM in the South. Bashir’s position as Head of State is entrenched and Garang is to serve as Vice-President. A government of national unity is to be formed. 6) Islamic Law Shari’a is to remain applicable in the North and parts of the constitution are to be rewritten so that Shari’a does not apply to any non-Muslims throughout Sudan. The status of Shari’a in Khartoum is to be decided by an elected assembly. 7) Other Each territory is to use its own flags. The North will maintain use of the current Sudanese flag and the South is to introduce its own flag.

Implementation Challenges

The CPA provided for the institu- ment fell short of achieving econom- unions, civil society organizations tion of various specialized commis- ic decentralization, on the basis of and other stakeholders, was not per- sions acting as monitoring bodies. which the states and local govern- mitted to emerge in both north and Unfortunately, differences in vision ments would have key roles. This is a South Sudan where security regimes between the two parties – NCP and central and fundamental problem as dominate. SPLM - on how the implementation it will later be seen that most of the In particular and as a matter of con- process could be directed, derailed national budget gets exhausted at na- cern, the CPA overlooked problem- and hampered efforts exerted - to tional (federal) government level with atic conflict situations in Darfur and wards that respect. This generated an as little as 14% going to the state gov- atmosphere of suspicion between the ernments6 as a result of the shortcom- The media in particular was two parties as each one of them was ing. treated - especially by the NCP - as afraid its counterpart may achieve an a threat to the peace process rather upper hand in the implementation Another CPA weakness is manifested than as a partner for the sake of process. From the onset this caused a in the fact that the agreement only dissemination of information on the significant loss of trust, political will recognized two legitimate political same and good faith between them. Fur- actors - the SPLM and NCP - thereby thermore the establishment of various relegating other political groups and Eastern Sudan. As such, even if peace important commissions prescribed in actors notably, the many opposition was achieved between the north and the CPA was considerably delayed, political parties, trade unions and civ- south, the country continued to be in thereby jeopardizing the attainment il society organizations to the periph- a state of war as conflict raged on in of several milestones such as the bor- ery, a situation that was to become a these peripheral fronts. der demarcation, Abyei Referendum, big recipe for polarization. This real- Popular Consultation in Southern ity effectively made the CPA be per- Furthermore, the CPA disempow- Kordofan and Blue Nile States, and ceived as a bilateral arrangement be- ered other important instruments of redeployment of forces to each side’s tween the SPLM and NCP, towards checks and balances in the system, borders. which most people in Sudan did not like the civil society organizations Not to mention the limited capacity and the media, through the coopta- of the SPLM and the general estab- the agreement only recognized two tion of their strong members, there- lishment of the South, which greatly legitimate political actors - the SPLM fore producing loopholes such as hampered the CPA implementation and NCP - thereby relegating other corruption and bad governance. The process. The large number of transi- political groups and actors [...] to the media in particular was treated (espe- tional institutions (such as the com- periphery cially by the NCP) as a threat to the missions) represented a challenge to peace process rather than as a partner the human and organizational capac- feel a sense of ownership. Addition- for the sake of dissemination of infor- ity of the SPLM. The enormity of the ally, the CPA is devoid of an inclusive mation on the same7. task of post-war development, com- peace-building strategy capable of bined with the need to form and staff avoiding state failure. This point is The non-implementation of the pro- institutions within the Government of validated by the fact that the mecha- tocol on the resolution of conflict in Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the Gov- nism established through the vari- Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile ernment of National Unity (GONU), ous bodies and Commissions – called States is another major case of CPA was a nightmare. to regulate, adjudicate and monitor neglect. This has manifested today in the CPA implementation - could not large scale conflict and in the current CPA weakness and neglect manage to rise above the differences humanitarian catastrophe ongoing From the above table, oil wealth shar- and lack of trust between the SPLM in these two regions. Coupled with ing and all other forms of taxation and NCP. As a result, the lack of in- that is the non implementation of the revenue collected from the South and clusivity in the peace process means Abyei Protocol. The result of these divided between north and south was that the development of democratic deliberate acts of neglect has been one of the fundamental cornerstones culture conducive to the participation reflected in several armed confronta- of the CPA. However, this arrange- of opposition political parties, trade tions between the SPLA and Sudan

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Armed Forces (SAF). The latest in this charged with the task of demarcation. the chairmanship of Thabo Mbeki episode of confrontations is the inva- It has always rejected the committee’s and the auspices of the African Union sion and occupation of Abyei by SAF reports. The recent clashes in Heglig High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in late 2010. SAF’s pull-out from Abyei in April 2012 were directly the result - require support in order to decisive- was only possible through pressure of the neglect of the implementation ly resolve the remaining disputes. from the late May 2012 United Nation of this CPA aspect. Security Council Resolution 20468. Endnotes In conclusion, weaknesses and ne- 1 The Root causes of Sudan’s Civil Moreover, during the term of the CPA, glects of the CPA clearly prove that a War is on of those books that emerged another big source of conflict between re-thinking of the Peace Agreements’ and became an authoritative voices of the the two parties was the National Pe- implementation process is needed. It conflict studies and analysis of the country. should adopt a robust approach char- The author, prof. Douglas Johnson is a most of the oil wealth resources are acterized by a strong commitment to well known scholar of the country and an interestingly located in the border democratic change. This requires a important expert and commentator on the areas much wider involvement by all stake- Sudans holders towards the achievement of 2 www.thefreedictionary.com/Su- troleum Commission lack of transpar- reconciliation and mutual respect for danic retrieved on 23/06/2012. Sudanic is ency, with regard to the disclosure of the common interest of peace. Such an a group of languages spoken in scattered the actual amount of revenue from approach will recognize that endem- areas of the Sudan, most of which are the petroleum sector. Their activi- ic and intractable conflicts, such as now generally assigned to the Chari-Nile ties resulted in huge discrepancies those suffered in Sudan are the result branch of the Nilo-Saharan family in wealth sharing distribution, thus of deeply-rooted issues and therefore 3 http://countrystudies.us/ reinforcing the mistrust between the require a complete structural change. sudan/16htm, retrieved on 27/06/2012 parties. In 2007, this culminated in the 4 http://unmis.unmissions.org/ SPLM pulling out its members from the conflict has re-emerged once Default.aspx?tabid=515, retrieved on participating in the National Assem- again and has assumed a different 02/06/2012 bly and the Government of National dimension – that of an international 5 Adapted from the 2005 Compre- Unity. Of course this SPLM action im- armed conflict hensive Peace Agreement signed between peded the proper implementation of the Government of the Republic of Sudan the CPA as per its timeline. Although the Troika was viewed as and the Sudan People’s Liberation Move- the CPA watchdog, it did not rally ment. Of major interest to South Sudan is the international community enough 6 Finding of a research on www. also the border demarcation between to ensure that SPLM and NCP imple- sudantribune.com, published on 28th May north and south as per the borders mented the agreement to the letter and 2012 as they stood on January 1, 1956. spirit. As a result the conflict has re- 7 www.sudantribune.com/weak- The strategic importance of this as- emerged once again and has assumed nesses-of-IGAD-mediation-in,25725, re- pect rely in the fact that most of the a different dimension – that of an in- trieved on 26/06/2012 oil wealth resources are interestingly ternational armed conflict. The role of 8 This UNSC Resolution was ad- located in the border areas. With no the international community is still opted unanimously on May 2, 2012 and clear boundaries, each side continues important for the pending issues to be it calls for Sudan and South Sudan to im- to claim encroachment on its side of implemented, in order to ensure the mediately halt fighting in all the disputed the border, hence resulting in skir- coexistence of the two countries living areas of the border, especially Heglig and mishes and clashes. Khartoum has side by side as responsible members the two parties should resume negotia- continuously obstructed the work of of the international community. The tions on all the pending and non imple- the ad hoc Border Committee that was current ongoing negotiations - under mented aspects of the 2005 CPA.

SPLA soldiers drive through Aniet (Agok) to reinforce a defensive line established after SAF (Sudan Armed Forces) tanks entered and occupied Abyei town. Photo by Tim Freccia / Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com

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Abyei Woman Walks Across a Field, by ENOUGH project, CC www.flickr.com by Laura Nistri

Head of the Tracking & Monitoring Department IOM- International Organisation for Migration Mission in South Sudan, Juba Office THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION OF THE CRISIS SINCE GAINING INDEPENDENCE ON 9TH OF JULY, 2011, SOUTH SUDAN HAS BEEN FACING A CONTINUOUS OUTBREAK OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES: FROM THE ABYEI IDPS, TO THE SOUTH SUDANESE RETURN MOVEMENT AND TO THE REFUGEE EMERGENCIES AT THE BORDER WITH SUDAN.

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The 9th of July 2011 was a day cel- remain shackled to providing emer- mated 4 million people fled Southern ebrated across the world by South Su- gency assistance for decades to come. Sudan. Those living in the border danese, for it marked the Independ- states with Sudan generally fled to ence of the world’s newest nation, the Since May 2011, humanitarian and Khartoum, whereas those living in Republic of South Sudan. government partners had been pro- the Equatoria Region, including Juba, The journey to independence was viding emergency assistance to generally fled to the neighboring long and hard, over two decades of 120,000 people displaced from Abyei, states of Kenya and Uganda. Many civil war finally led to the Compre- a disputed area between Sudan and Southern Sudanese moved beyond hensive Peace Agreement in 2005, South Sudan. Entire villages had fled the region and are scattered across the whose validity came to an end in fighting between the Sudan’s People world. This diaspora can be defined January 2011, after the referendum on Liberation Movement (SPLA) and Su- as conflict forced migrants, economic self-determination for the people of dan Armed Forces (SAF). The Abyei migrants or refugees, according to South Sudan. Over 5 days, 3,910,197 IDPs found shelter with extended what kind of assistance and liveli- South Sudanese marked their ballots family members in the neighbour- hood they have been building up in to determine whether South Sudan ing states of Warrap and Northern the countries they have settled in. should remain a part of Sudan or be- Bahr el Ghazal or sought protection However one definition is now uni- come independent.1 in temporary transit sites established further south in Wau (Western Bahr During the civil war an estimated 4 An overwhelming, 98,83% voted in el Ghazal state). During the fighting, million people fled Southern Sudan. favor of independence which was of- Abyei town was burnt to the ground Those living in the border states with ficially proclaimed six months later. along with surrounding villages. Sudan generally fled to Khartoum, The Republic of South Sudan was whereas those living in the Equatoria quick to receive recognition from The Abyei Temporary Arrangements Region, including Juba, generally the international community, it was Agreement stipulated between the fled to the neighboring states of admitted as the 193rd member of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Libera- Kenya and Uganda United Nations within a week of the tion Movement (SPLA) prior to Inde- declaration of Independence and pendence in June 2011 detailed a joint fying all of those who wish to return, later that month, it became the 54th administration structure and called they are referred to as returnees. A re- African Union member state (27 July for the establishment of a new peace- turnee is a South Sudanese that after 2011). The challenges for the newly keeping force, United Nation Interim having fled during the war, from an sworn in Government of South Sudan Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). area falling now within South Sudan, (GoSS) were significant, this included Despite the deployment of the secu- has expressed an interest to return or the need to address underdeveloped rity force to Abyei, the government returned since the signing of the CPA road and rail networks, non-existent of Sudan was reticent to withdraw in 2005. health and welfare services and fa- police and army forces from the area The International Organization for cilities, unite a nation of ethnically, until recently. SAF finally withdrew Migration reports that since the sign- culturally, and linguistically diverse from Abyei town in the first week of ing of the CPA, over 2.5 million peo- groups, and respond to the reintegra- June 2012. However, the SAF troops ple have returned to South Sudan. tion needs of the hundreds of thou- have not moved very far, they have Between last December 2010 and sands of returnees that had returned relocated to Diffra, a location in the June 2012 they were over 360,000, since the beginning of the CPA. The North of the Abyei Administrative the majority of them from Khartoum. development priorities of GoSS were Area which is rich in oil. Humanitarian agencies working in to take a backseat in the first year of Sudan estimate that there are still independence as numerous humani- Since SAF withdrawal some IDPs 350,000 -500,000 South Sudanese liv- tarian emergencies unfolded within have begun to return to their villages, ing in Sudan, despite the fact that the weeks of separation from Sudan. or what is left of them, with burnt out Government of Sudan limits access to Understanding the complexities of shelters and polluted water sources. these communities and a proper reg- the humanitarian response to the Humanitarian actors are trying to istration exercise could not be carried multiple emergencies in South Sudan determine whether to provide as- out. requires a multi-level approac. With- sistance to those returning to Abyei out funding for transition and recov- or to those that are displaced in the Access to traditional return routes, surrounding region. The response is roads and railways passing through Without funding for transition complicated by the reluctance to cre- Southern Kordofan and Southern and recovery, reintegration, and ate a pull factor to a disputed region Darfur States, has been limited in the sustainable development programs, where there are outstanding political past year due to fighting in the oil- the humanitarian community in and security issues which need to be rich and disputed areas of Abyei and South Sudan will remain shackled to addressed and where resurgence in Heglig. The safest route for return, providing emergency assistance for fighting may create secondary and also supported by the humanitarian decades to come tertiary displacements. community, is via White Nile State South Sudan and Sudan have to find through Kosti and onto Renk. Renk is ery, reintegration, and sustainable de- a durable solution to a more complex the most northern town in South Su- velopment programs, the humanitar- and long lasting humanitarian emer- dan and has limited ability to provide ian community in South Sudan will gency. During the civil war an esti- space and services for large transit

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sites. During the rainy season it is cut of South Sudanese are stranded in ian community and relied on donor off from the rest of the country and Khartoum unable to return to South funding to assist with the continuous since October 2011, when the border Sudan without assistance through hu- emergency situation. However the in- with Sudan was closed, goods and manitarian or government organized ability to make significant progress to commodities need to be brought in movements. In May, the Governor of resolve outstanding issues, both inter- by road, barge or by boat from Juba White Nile state, issued an expulsion nally and issues with Sudan pending and Malakal. Given Renk’s isola- order to 12,000 stranded returnees liv- from the separation, has led to hesi- tion and the lacking of other viable ing at the Kosti Way Station. Almost tancy by donors to be as generous as commercial transport options, here 12,000 individuals were moved by hu- they have been in the past. returnees become stranded without manitarian partners to Juba through means of proceeding south, this area an expensive air-bridge operation (it Yusif Batil - the newly established resulting in a bottleneck. According cost $ 5 million USD and included 79 refugee camp in Maban County, to the last verification exercise it was flights over 24 days). Upper Nile State - received 15,000 determined that there are over 18,000 refugees in 8 days and in Yida, Unity stranded returnees in Renk, residing While government and humanitarian State, over 4,000 refugees were in four different transit sites. partners respond to the needs of in- reported arriving in a single week ternally displaced communities and Returnee is not an internationally to stranded returnees in entry points recognized status. Returnees are not and bottlenecks in the north of the The UN and other humanitarian protected by enhanced international country, in November 2011 refugees partners forecast a deteriorating hu- standards and the national legislation from Sudan’s Blue Nile state began manitarian environment within the in force to safeguard their journey to cross over into South Sudan flee- next six months, whereby the last UN ing the aerial bombardment of their SC res. 2046 (2012) Calls for Immedi- Returnee is not an internationally villages and the increased scarcity of ate Halt to Fighting Between Sudan and recognized status. Returnees are not food across the state. Refugees from South Sudan, and Resumption of Nego- protected by enhanced international South Kordofan State were also cross- tiations will hardly impact within the standards and the national ing over into South Sudan from the unfolding scenario. The assumption legislation in force to safeguard Nuba Mountains where they had is that refugees, IDPs and returnees their journey and reintegration been caught in the conflict between will keep on growing in number, the process is scarce and rarely SAF and SPLA North. Sudan has re- capacity of the national government implemented peatedly denied access to UN observ- will continue to deteriorate due to ers to these affected areas. Currently the shrinking economic space, war in and reintegration process is scarce there are over 113,000 refugees in Up- South Kordofan and Blue Nile State and rarely implemented. The Gov- per Nile State and 55,000 refugees in will continue unabated unless there ernments of Sudan and South Sudan Unity State. These areas are located is an intervention, inter-communal resolved (Memorandum of Under- close to the borders creating critical conflicts will continue to be the major standing on Returns, March 2012) to access problem for the humanitarian cause of internal displacement and work in cooperation with all other response and being subject to peri- destruction of property, and food in- parties that work on the return, in odical aerial bombardment by SAF. security, due to poor crop production, order to facilitate and assist in the Humanitarian actors are struggling to will fuel tension among communities voluntary return and reintegration provide emergency relief to refugees along ethnic lines. in peace and dignity of the nationals flooding into South Sudan, Yusif Batil On the 9th of July the people of South of South Sudan. A few weeks before, (the newly established refugee camp Sudan have celebrated a year of Inde- the two governments had adopted in Maban County, Upper Nile State) pendence. Unfortunately, the achieve- the Framework Agreement on the received 15,000 refugees in 8 days and ments of the past year are likely to be Status of Nationals of the Other State in Yida, Unity State, over 4,000 refu- overshadowed by the financial, po- and Related Matters, whereby they gees were reported arriving in a sin- litical, and social challenges that the should assume full responsibility for gle week. country is facing, exacerbated also by the protection of each other’s nation- the multiple and complex emergen- als in line with international princi- The emergency response to vulnera- cies. ples. However neither the Framework ble communities rests almost entirely Agreement nor the MoU have been on the shoulders of humanitarian ac- ratified yet, no clear reintegration pol- tors as the government’s ability to as- Endnotes icy adopted, and thousands of return- sist its people has been crippled by 1 The “Fifth Population and ees are stranded across South Sudan the serious economic crisis resulting Housing Census of Sudan”, of Sudan as waiting for land allocation in order to from lack of oil revenues, continuing a whole, was conducted in April 2008. begin their new lives. economic blockade and severe auster- Notwithstanding that the final result was ity measures affecting South Sudan. rejected by Southern Sudanese govern- Without clear communication on The shutdown of oil production alone ment, the census showed the population how to legalize their status in Su- resulted in a loss of 98% of the govern- of South Sudan to be 8.26 million. Since dan or whether they have the option ment’s revenues. In the past, the gov- then no other population census has been to remain, hundreds of thousands ernment has turned to the humanitar- carrying out yet.

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by Amgad Fareid Eltayeb

Abyei citizens leave en masse, by Tim Freccia/Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com Sudanese PhD researcher in Life Science Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine based in Khartoum SUDAN: POWER DEMONSTRATIONS OF A FAILED STATE THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN USES DIFFERENT KINDS OF STRATEGIES AND TOOLS TO STAY IN POWER. SOME OF THESE TOOLS LACK LEGITIMACY, SOME OTHERS ARE CORRUPT, IN THE END, THEY ALL REVEAL A VERY CRUDE FORM OF FASCISM.

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The term failed state is sometimes even more obvious. President Bashir ruling-class worldview is imposed as loosely defined in political literature. took advantage of the instability and the social norm (Alan Bullock, 1999). Formal theorists of accused regimes military fighting which took place in The Islamic front and its successor, tend to defend their systems by saying the aftermath of the dubious South the National Congress Party - which that this term lacks concrete definition Kordofan elections, whose two can- conducted the 1989 military coup and is often used as a tool of negative didates were Ahmed Haroun (an- that brought the current regime to propaganda rather than realistically other official wanted by the ICC) and power - do actually represent a social describing state or regime status. In Abdelaziz AlHilu (SPLM-N candi- class. This class is mainly composed the case of Sudan, we have all the rea- date); there were also attempts to en- of educated villagers who migrated sons to believe that this is not the case. force immediate disarmament on the to towns and were integrated into the In classical political literature, Max SPLA1 in May 2011, dismiss an elected higher middle class of the society as Weber defined the state as the entity governor of another state (Blue Nile professionals and merchants. They capable of maintaining the monop- state) and appoint an army general attained strong economic power dur- oly on the legitimate use of physical as ruler of the state. On 3rd September ing the final years of Sudan’s second force. If this is not the case the state’s 2011, Bashir declared a state of emer- dictatorship (the 1969 – 1985 Nemeri statehood is in doubt, thus becoming gency in the Blue Nile State and dis- a failed state (Max Weber, 1922). The missed its governor, Malik Agar, who The Islamic front and its successor, Darfur conflict which is approaching was elected in April 2011, appointing the National Congress Party [...] do a decade now, and the recent flare up Major General Yahya Mohamed Khair actually reepresent a social class of military clashes in Blue Nile, Nuba as military ruler of the state. This [...] mainly composed of educated Mountains, and South Kordofan was accompanied by mass arrests of villagers who migrated to towns clearly demonstrates that the current SPLM/N members, the irrational de- ruling regime in Sudan is not able to struction of state infrastructure (in- maintain this essential condition. cluding the state cultural centre) and government), when they formed a the flare up of military clashes in the shaky political alliance with the rul- In Darfur, the International Criminal state, which had not witnessed fight- ing regime, helping them to succeed Court is prosecuting several state of- ing until this time. This act was op- in their coup against the third democ- ficials including the head of state - posing the constitution itself and can racy (1985 – 1989) and seize power in President Omer Al Bashir - and there never be described as legitimate nor 1989. is a further list of 51 officers under have anything to do with political cor- ICC investigation according to a for- rectness. Legitimacy of the physical The regime and its political allies con- mal request from the UN (SudanT- power used by the national govern- tinue to describe their ideology as the ribune 2006). This prosecution was ment in these occasions is of course only universal, natural, and desired carried out because of the massive questionable. way to rule Sudan. President Bashir crimes committed in Darfur, not only announced publicly that after the by the government supported proxy A recent Failed-States Index devel- South secedes he would change the force - known as Janjaweed - but also oped by the Washington based Fund constitution, introduce Islamic laws by the regular army troops. Recently, for Peace Research Centre, in collabo- (Shariaa Laws) containing no impuri- also the Sudanese Minister of Defence ration with Foreign Policy magazine, ties and adopt Arabic as the only offi- Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein ranked Sudan as the third failed state cial language of the state (BBC, 2010). was added to the list. The official ICC in the world for 2011. There were no On the same day, all mobile phone statement accused him of 41 crimes signs of significant improvement in networks companies sent a text mes- against humanity and war crimes in- the ranking of Sudan as it was the sage to every phone in Sudan stating cluding persecution, torture, as well number one failed state in both 2006 that 96% of Sudanese were Muslim as murder and rape, occured dur- and 2007 (Kristen Blandford, 2011). and 95% of them had Arab origins. It ing 2003 -2004 (ICC, 2012). Hussein The index was created in 2005 and it was clear that the government decid- was Sudan’s Minister of Interior and encounters 12 different social, eco- ed to adopt the Arab-Islamic notion as President Representative for Darfur nomic, and political indicators for the the norm for Sudan. at that time. This - and similar other evaluation of sovereign states’1 (Fund warrants including the one against for Peace, 2012). all mobile phone networks President Bashir himself - reflect the companies sent a text message to actual deep involvement of the state Despite all this, the regime is still able every phone in Sudan stating that apparatus in using immoral physical to impose its popular control over the 96% of Sudanese were Muslim and power in Darfur in the last decade. society. It is using all the elements of 95% of them had Arab origins Gramsci’s cultural hegemony theory In other recent conflicts in Sudan, the to maintain its power and its populist illegitimate use of physical power is face. Gramsci hypothesized that a cul- It is a political party headed by Al- turally diverse society (as is the case tayeb Mustafa, president Bashir’s A recent Failed-States Index in Sudan) can be dominated - ruled - uncle, who was once (and for a long developed by the Washington based by one social class, whose dominance period of time) a federal minister Fund for Peace Research Centre [...] is achieved by manipulating the so- in Bashir government. The plat- ranked Sudan as the third failed cial culture (beliefs, explanations, form uses its newspaper Alintibaha, state in the world for 2011 perceptions, values, morals) so that its which stands for alertness in Arabic,

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to spread severe racism and hatred. Cultural hegemony serves the reali- Trotsky’s statement about the fascist Terms such as slaves, infidels, etc, are zation of another element of the to- system’s ability to control the country commonly used in this newspaper. It talitarian state power: it makes the when the police and parliament fail to even describes women’s rights and majority of people quietly accept the guarantee stability to the community political activists using socially de- use of brutal force against dissident (Leon Trotsky, 1932). The economic rogatory terms such as prostitutes. minorities. The regime tends to de- crash which followed the independ- Although there is very strong state scribe any social or political conflict as ence of the oil-rich South provoked press censorship in Sudan, this news- a battle between good and evil, major- multiple military conflicts and nation- paper is subject to restrictions and ity versus minority, in order to create wide popular riots. Once again fascist its publications are never questioned. a popular fear among the masses. The measures seem to have been the only This creates an increasing belief that social and economical elements char- way for the Sudanese regime to main- the stance of this newspaper and its acterizing the historical conflict in tain its political domination. The real platform are actually representing the south were simplified and trans- fascist face of the Sudanese govern- the government and its ruling party. formed into a mere battle between the ment has been disclosed. This judge- Aiming for a larger ostensible effect, Arab Muslims in the north and the in- ment is also confirmed by the work the newspaper describes itself in its fidels in the South. Darfur is described of Lawrence Britt, which studied the as an Arab – African conflict, and, as fascist regimes of Hitler (Germany), Cultural hegemony serves the such, ignores all the pending econom- Mussolini (Italy), Franco (Spain), realization of another key element ic and resource-related disagreements Suharto (Indonesia), and Pinochet of the totalitarian state: it makes the between farmers and shepherds. Even (Chile). Britt describes 14 identifying majority of people quietly accept the the struggle for civil rights is trans- characteristics of fascism (Lawrence use of brutal force against dissident formed into religious controversy Britt, 2003). These characteristics minorities between Muslims and secular society. shape the picture of the state in Sudan In addition, these strategies - through today: slogan as the voice of the silent major- the strong state monopoly of the me- ity. On the other hand, the newspaper dia - continue to have the support of Powerful and Continuing National- offers biased justifications for govern- the people. ism: even in response to internal ten- mental actions. The case of the Sudanese regime re- sions regarding economic and civic ally represents a genuine reflection of rights issues, Sudanese officials tend

Destruction in Tajalei, by Tim Freccia/Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com

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to attribute such difficulties to- inter and implementation of the articles of other private health care investments. national collusion against Sudan. the law (like indecent dressing which is only directed towards women). As a Labor Power is suppressed: the first Disdain for the Recognition of Hu- result, court sentences providing for order of this regime when it came to man Rights: detention, torture, beat- punishments such as lashing are fre- power was to dissolve all the elected ings, sleep deprivation, electric shock, quent against women. Article 152 of trade unions. Any labour strike is and other forms of physical and men- Sudan’s 1991 Penal Code states that treated with extreme violence by the tal abuse, are usual practices of the “whoever ... wears an obscene outfit NISS. The 2010 Doctors’ strike caused Sudanese security agencies. Security ... shall be punished with flogging the immediate detention of their trade officials were also implicated in sexu- which may not exceed 40 lashes or union leader and the public beating of al violence and harassment of female with a fine, or with both.” doctors in the streets. activists, including the alleged brutal rape in mid-February of Safiya Ishaq, Controlled Mass Media: Sudanese Disdain for Intellectuals and the a youth activist who was forced to flee authorities have a long history of clos- Arts: It is not uncommon for pro- the country after speaking out against ing newspapers and silencing journal- fessors and other experts to be cen- her ordeal (Human Right Watch ists. Continuous press censorship is sored or even arrested. Professor M. 2012). Not to mention the systematic taking place and prolonged court cas- Zein al-Abidin Dean of the College practice of rape carried out by the es against journalists are a common of Higher Education at the Zaem Al pro-government militias in Darfur. practice. For example, in May 2012 Azhari University was detained for This also reflects another characteris- state security agents had prevented almost 2 weeks during February 2012 distribution of the Almidan newspa- without charges being raised, for hav- Despite the acute economic crisis per - affiliated to the Sudanese Com- ing commented on Bashir’s tv speech in Sudan, over 77% of the state munist party - 13 times, while many on a newspaper. The newspaper was budget is dedicated to military prominent journalists face criminal closed for the same reason. In the expenditures, while less than 4% is charges for commenting on political early 1990s Professor Farouk Moh Ib- spent on health and education events. Journalists are also arrested rahim was arrested and severely tor- by the National Intelligence and Se- tured for teaching Darwin’s theory of tic, that is to say the Obsession with curity Services laws which give the evolution. National Security. Members of the right to arrest for a period of 40 days NISS, regardless of their rank, enjoy without raising charges. The NISS full legal immunity against all laws has a list of policy provisions which in May 2012 state security agents requiring NISS approval to proceed. are changeable and ungoverned by had prevented distribution of the Needless to say, such approval had law or judicial order. For example, it Almidan newspaper - affiliated to never taken place despite the many demands newspapers to abstain from the Sudanese Communist party cases raised against the police by the covering the International Criminal - 13 times, while many prominent legal system. Court, government corruption, hu- journalists face criminal charges for man rights violations, Darfur, the commenting on political events Identification of Enemies/Scape- war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, goats as a Unifying Cause: The Suda- armed movements, and many other Obsession with Crime and Punish- nese government always tries to iden- topics. ment: the power of the Sudanese po- tify its enemy as a public threat for the lice is almost limitless. In March 2012, community, by using racial, ethnic, or Religion and Government are Inter- Awadia Ajabna, a young woman liv- religious labelling. twined: the government tends to use ing in Khartoum was shot dead by Islam, which is the predominant reli- a Public Order Police officer during Supremacy of the Military: Despite gion in the country, as a tool to ma- a scuffle, after she had accused her the acute economic crisis in Sudan, nipulate public opinion. The Sudan brother of being drunk. Although over 77% of the state budget is dedi- Council of Religious Scholars often many were enraged by this, there cated to military expenditures, while issues Islamic judgements (fatwas) were no consequences for the officer, less than 4% is spent on health and in political issues that are of public at least not in public. education. This was true in the past, concern and support the government even at the time of the CPA imple- stance. Rampant Cronyism and Corruption: mentation. Every year the parliament since 2004 Transparency International approves a budget having these per- Corporate Power is Protected: large (TI) has ranked Sudan among the five centages. industries and businesses in Sudan most corrupted countries in the world belong to government officials. Wide- according the Corruption Perceptions Rampant Sexism: many of the cur- spread corruption also plays a role, Index. rent Sudanese laws are highly sexist as most of the officials run their own and some of them are designed es- private businesses. For example, the Fraudulent Elections: the regime pecially against women. The Public Khartoum Minister of Health is the tends to repeatedly manipulate the Order Act gives police officers -con owner of the ì2 largest private hos- results of elections. In the previous siderable power in the interpretation pitals in the country, along with many presidential elections of 2010, ma-

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jor frauds were highlighted. Videos References: • Lawrence Britt , Fascism Any- showing election officials stuffing bal- • Alan Bullock; Trombley, Stephen, one?,” Free Inquiry, Spring 2003, page 20 lot boxes were recorded (BCC, 2010). The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern • Leon Trotsky, What Next? Vital Thought Third Edition, 1999. Question for the German Proletariat, 1932 • Antonio Gramsci, David For- • Max Weber, Economy and Soci- since 2004 Transparency gacs, Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Antonio ety, 1922. International (TI) has ranked Sudan Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916- • SudanTribune, ICC: ‘No Suda- among the five most corrupted 1935. 2000 nese official immune from Prosecution’, countries in the world according the • BBC, Sharia law to be tightened Dec 18, 2006 (http://www.sudantrib- Corruption Perceptions Index if Sudan splits, 2010. (http://www.bbc. une.com/ICC-No-Sudanese-official-im- co.uk/news/world-africa-12033185) mune,19321) This cannot continue forever. Suda- • ICC, The ICC issues a warrant of • The fund for peace, The Failed nese government acrobatics in man- arrest for the Sudanese Minister Abdel Ra- States Index: Frequently Asked Ques- aging people’s lives in Sudan will heem Muhammad Hussein,2012 (http:// tions, retrieved June 2012 (http://www. not succeed as people started to re- www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/C41F9D16- fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-faq) sist it long time and the resistance is D6A2-48FF-9A01-5AD2D96DF7B4.htm) • Human Rights Watch, World Re- spreading day by day. Such resistance • Kristen Blandford, J. J. Messner, port 2012: Sudan, (http://www.hrw.org/ continues and shall overcome at last Sudan country profile, The Fund for Peace world-report-2012/world-report-2012-su- since Sudanese people are fighting Publication FFP : CCPPR11SD (Version dan) and they believe that they are not de- 10U), October 2011 (http://www.fundfor- • BBC, Sudan opposition claims feated while they are continue to fight peace.org/global/states/ccppr11sd-coun- video shows election fraud, April 2010 the injustice and fascistic measures of tryprofile-sudan-10u.pdf) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8633162.stm) the ruling regime.

A distressed woman in Wunrock. The U.N. estimates 76,000 Abyei area residents fled south when SAF tanks invaded, creating a humanitarian crisis. Internally displaced persons are sleeping in makeshift shelters, many under trees, as the region’s rainy season reaches torrential proportions. by Tim Freccia/Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com

28 ITPCM International Commentary December 2011 ISSN. 2239-7949

Governor of South Kordofan and indicted war criminal, Ahmed Haroun, and Abyei Chief Administrator, Deng Arop, embrace following a security committee meeting to discuss tensions arising from recent attacks along the border, photo by Tim Freccia /Enough Project, CC www.flickr.com

by Siham Khalid

Sudanese MA Candidate, Human Rights & NUBIAN Conflict Management, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna AND LAND ISSUES IN SOUTH KORDOFAN THE CPA FAILED TO BRING PEACE TO THE INDIGENOUS NUBA TRIBES AND WAS EVENTUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS OF LAND AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE NUBA PEOPLE

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Southern Kordofan is home to both existing entitlements, and pave the 1979 in the areas of Heglig (South- Arab Muslims and African Christian way for unprecedented forms of com- ern Kordofan) and Bentiu (Northern tribes that speak some 50 different petition. While there were a number part of South Sudan). The year 1998 languages. Years of conflict, politi- of land-settlement commissions ap- marked the signing of bilateral trade cal and ethnic favoritism, which can agreements with China concerning be traced back to independence in in the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, large arm deals and training of Mili- 1956, have led to the polarization of southern Blue Nile or South tary Sudanese officers. the area. Sudan [...] no individual-private However, resource infringement by landownership was recognized the north, the abolishment of the au- The administrative province of South- tonomous region of the South, and ern Kordofan was first created after pointed in the northern and central the introduction of Sharia law in the the conclusion of the CPA in 2005. districts of Sudan, nothing of this legislative system as a means to ter- The area was further divided by a kind was pursued in the Nuba Moun- rorize and humiliate the govern- decision to allow the border areas of tains, Darfur, southern Blue Nile or ment’s opposition brought about the the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, South Sudan. Consequently, “no in- second civil war that lasted from 1983 through popular consultation, to re- dividual-private land-ownership was to 2005. main with Sudan or join South Sudan recognized in these regions.” after the referendum in the South. On 30 June 1989, Lieutenant-General The continued mutual distrust be- Ultimately, government policy fa- Al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi’s Na- tween South Sudan and Sudan and vored investment companies over tional Islamic Front (NIF) staged a the deferred post secession provi- traditional Nuba farmers, and mecha- military coup and took over the gov- sions of the CPA threaten to cause a nized agriculture, financed by urban ernment in Khartoum, thus aborting return to war in Southern Kordofan. investors, replaced traditional farm- the peace process and upcoming con- Should this occur, the population of ing. Small farmers facing distorted stitutional conference with SPLA/M. Southern Kordofan and the Nuba prices and unfair terms of trade could As war escalated in the South and tribes will pay the ultimate price. no longer compete in the domestic moved towards the Nuba Mountains market. This exacerbated the poverty (Southern Kordofan) in 1998, with the Historically, land has been among the Nuba, and deepened their looming danger of the SPLM winning distributed according to social sense of marginalization. the war with its new alliances with norms that assigned land to the Nuba people, the government of families or individuals on the basis Water is another critical factor in Sudan armed the Arab tribes against of traditions and colonial-era Southern Kordofan mainly because it the Nuba and sealed off the Nuba land ownership legislation. Land is stored in man-made basins called Mountains and started forced reloca- disputes are normally resolved Hawafir. Insufficient water resources tions of the Nuba tribes towards so- by consensus through dialogue in the area remain a challenge for the called “Peace Villages”. between tribes population due to the fact that these basins rely on the rainy season for re- By the 1990s, oil production began to plenishment. Through the years these gather pace after government troops The role of land in the conflict in basins have become dry, due to envi- seized large areas in the south from southern kordofan ronmental changes and global warm- faction-fighting rebels and declared The issue of land in Southern Kordo- ing. Continuous conflict and instabil- the start of crude oil production in fan, inhabited mainly by the Nuba, ity have prevented the local popula- Southern Kordofan. These events has been an obstacle for peace and tion from replacing these Hawafir. caused the civil war to escalate. Soon security in the area. Historically, thereafter, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethi- land has been distributed according water scarcity forced people to opia, Uganda and Kenya attempted to social norms that assigned land abandon their land and seek jobs in to resolve the conflict in Sudan by to families or individuals on the ba- Khartoum, and other large towns pursuing a peace initiative called sis of traditions and colonial-era land the Declaration of Principle (DOP) as ownership legislation. Land disputes This water scarcity forced people to members of the Intergovernmental are normally resolved by consensus abandon their land and seek jobs in Authority on Development (IGAD) through dialogue between tribes. Khartoum, and other large towns, in that called for autonomy and self-de- order to provide for their families. termination for South Sudan. Soon after obtaining independence in The Nuba people’s grievances to- The adoption of the Islamic Constitu- 1956, Sudan confronted a situation of wards the Government in Khartoum tion in Sudan in 1997 marked the end institutional/legislative dualism with increased and ultimately brought of the Declaration of Principle agree- respect to natural resources. State about their partnership with the Su- ment. The conflict in Sudan spiraled elites, aiming to build a unified sys- danese People’s Liberation Movement out of control once again. A coalition tem of natural resource legislation, (SPLM/A). of the National Democratic Alliance made decisions determining land and SPLA/M forces opened an eastern access and user rights that would al- Oil discovery front, seized patches of territory be- ter established equilibriums, violate Oil was discovered in the south in tween the Red Sea and the Blue Nile,

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threatening the Roseires hydroelec- major points of the negotiations. The census in Darfur and Southern Ko- tric dam near Damazin. Ultimately, first was the division of Southern Ko- rdofan by preventing displaced Nuba this brought about the Khartoum rdofan into two states and the second Peace Agreement signed between was the decision allowing the popu- The demarcation and reassignment the government and six splinter rebel lar consultation in the Blue Nile and of areas of Southern Kordofan was a groups. However, mainstream SPLA Southern Kordofan to take place after clear attempt of the government to members were absent in the negotia- the referendum in South Sudan. With politically marginalize the Nuba and tion leading to the agreement. All of this compromise, the Nuba tribes lost replace them with Arab tribes loyal this coincided with the commence- a bargaining chip that they were nev- to the government in Khartoum ment of exploration and develop- er able to regain. ment in the Sharaf, Tabaldi and Abu Jabra oil fields in Southern Kordofan Mistrust between the SPLM and the from returning to their homes in or- by China’s National Petroleum Cor- National Congress Party (NCP), and der to maintain the dominance of the poration. Another DOP attempt was the lack of political will display by Arab tribes. made between May 2002 and January their partnership government, led to 2005, and many explain this initia- hesitancy. The NCP feared that the The Regional elections of Southern tive was due to the increasing interest popular consultation would lead to Kordofan were conducted on May of the US to fight the War on terror.1 the Nuba tribes deciding to join the 2011, four months after the referen- But most of all, the evident interest South, which would lead to the loss dum of South Sudan. Preoccupied regarded pressure from the oil lobby of the oil rich Heglig area. with its new found independence the upset for being denied access to the South forsook its allies in the north, lucrative Sudan market because of The popular consultation was an at- the SPLM North. The NCP’s priority American Sanctions. tempt to give the Nuba indigenous was to remain in power, and the isola- These incidents suggest that the crisis tribes the political mechanism to tion of the Nuba allowed the NCP to in Southern Kordofan was caused by determine their future. But the con- dominate the election process. There economic competition surrounding sultation never took place. The NCP was little opposition. The SPLM the issue of oil exploitation between made only false promises to Nuba North’s candidate withdrew due to the two Sudans. tribes due to pressure from the inter- the continuation of the Darfur con- national community. flict and elections irregularities. This Comprehensive Peace Agreement permitted the NCP candidate, Ahmed The Comprehensive Peace Agree- Southern Kordofan election Haroun, who is under indictment by ment in 2005 represents a missed op- The demarcation and reassignment the International Criminal Court in portunity to bring justice to the Nuba of areas of Southern Kordofan was The Hague for his role in Darfur, to tribes because it failed to give them a clear attempt of the government to be reelected as governor in Southern the chance to address the issues of politically marginalize the Nuba and Kordofan. As governor, he can safe- power sharing and land. In contrast replace them with Arab tribes loyal to guard his party’s interests against to the peace agreement that they con- the government in Khartoum. the Nuba and the SPLM North. His cluded with the government in 2002, victory essentially marked the begin- the CPA leaves the Nuba to an uncer- In accordance with the CPA, the gen- ning of the current conflict in South- tain future. eral elections were scheduled for 2009 ern Kordofan. but were held in April of 2010. The Two highly crucial elements of the main reason for the delay was the Disheartened, the Nuba have lost CPA are (i) the six-year transitional disputed results of the 2008 census hope for any political change. They period that led to the referendum which led to a new one to be held in have also become skeptical about the and the secession of the South Sudan June 2010; significantly the number SPLM North representing their in- from Sudan, and (ii) the contested of counts recorded increased from terests. Consequently, the party has areas between the North and South, 1,406,404 to 2,508,268 persons. The lost popular support from the Nuba namely Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan final voter registry, which was pub- in Southern Kordofan. The loss of the and Abyei, would decide their fate lished by the NEC on March 4 2011, South, which produced 70 percent of through popular consultation. included 642,558 voters in Southern the oil revenues as well as the weak- In exchange for the guarantee of a ref- Kordofan, out of 1,172,406 eligible vot- ness of the opposition in the Southern erendum for South Sudan, the SPLM ers. The Carter Center noted that the Kordofan, allowed the NCP to reas- number of registrants was “approxi- sert control of the area by exploiting In exchange for the guarantee of mately 100,000 fewer” than during the region’s religious and ethnic divi- a referendum for South Sudan, the the previous April 2010 elections. sions in order to advance their eco- SPLM abandoned the Nuba agenda nomic agenda. The issue of ethnic and religious identity was of great concern to the The unwillingness of the NCP to give abandoned the Nuba agenda. This ppposition party but these two ele- the Nuba a genuine chance to de- compromise was reflected in two ments were highly downplayed by cide their fate has created obstacles the Government. The SPLM accused for peace and reconciliation. There the government of politicizing the is great danger of a return to conflict

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to arise between the two Sudans, and ments in the Near East and North Africa world/2001/oct/02/afghanistan.terrorism3 the emergence of a humanitarian cri- Region”, Report 3rd March, 2003, www. 8. Sudan Tribune, last modified 30th sis in Southern Kordofan. ifad.org/events/nrp/case/sudan.pdf May 2007, John Youg, GAD Peace Process: 2. Mohamed Sulieman, Cultivat- An Evaluation, www.sudantribune.com/ Conclusion ing Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in IMG/pdf/Igad_in_Sudan_Peace_Process. The discovery of new wealth caused Natural Resource Management, 1999, In- pdf an opening of an eastern front dur- ternational Development Research Cen- 9. International Crisis Group, Oc- ing the civil war that changed the dy- tre, Ottawa p. 205-220. tober 2008, Sudan’s Southern Kordofan namic of the civil war to one of cen- 3. Habitat International Coalition, Problem ; the Next Darfur Crisis group tre vs. periphery rather than one of Guma Kuna Comey, Communal Land Africa report n. 145 www.crisisgroup. North vs. South, the Centre represent Rights, Identities and Conflict in Sudan: org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ elites of the Regime and their loyal The Nuba question ,Paper Conference (ac- sudan/Sudans%20Southern%20Kordo- supporters and the peripheries rep- cessed May 13, 2012)http://www.hicmena. fan%%20Problem%20The%20Next%20 resented in the Sudanese population org/documents/Kunda%20Kumey%20 Darfur of the South, North and the East that Nuba%20Question.pdf 10. Sudan tribune website, Factbox: have been effected by the economic 4. BBC New Website: “Land Grab Southern Kordofan Elections, last modi- interest and manipulation of the Re- or Development Opportunities “, ac- fied 11th April, 2011,http://www.sudant- gime. cessed on the 12 May 2012) ribune.com/Background-briefing-South- Now, almost a year after the eruption 5. Sudan News Agency (SUNA): Kordofan,38531 of the present conflict in Southern Ko- Article by Professor Ibrahim Gambari 11. Darfur Relief and Documenta- rdofan, Sudan and South Sudan, with –Special Representative for the African tion (DRDC), last modified 16th June, the facilitation of the African Union, Mission-United Nation mission in Darfur, 2012 report of 2012 on the 5th population have reached an agreement on oil “Water for Peace in Darfur “(Accessed on consensus in Sudan, southsudaninfo.net/ revenues, transport fees, and transi- April 18th 2012) wp.../5th_population_housing_census_ tional financial assistance for Sudan. 6. UN General Assembly, Op- sudan.pdf However, the crucial issue of South- eration Lifeline Sudan : resolution / 12. Geopolitical monitor website: ern Kordofan remained unresolved adopted by the General Assembly., 21 last modified April 7, 2012, SPLM to and now threatens the stability of the December 1990, A/RES/45/226, avail- boycott elections in most of north Sudan North Sudan and possible returns of able at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ Conflict with South Sudan and Dar- docid/3b00efe454.html [accessed 20 June splm-to-boycott-elections-in-most-of- fur. 2012] north-sudan-3660 7. The guardian Website, last mod- 13. International Crisis Group web- Endnotes: ified 2 October 2001,US Bombing Khar- site, Alerts: last modified April 18, 2012, 1. IFAD website, ”Empowering the toum Al-Shiffa Pharmaceutical Plant in Preventing Full-Scale War between Su- rural poor under volatile policy environ- August 2000 http://www.guardian.co.uk/ dan and South Sudan

Nuba village - Kordofan - Sudan, photo by Rita Willaert, CC www.flickr.com 32 ITPCM International Commentary July 2012 ISSN. 2239-7949

about the ITPCM

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33 ITPCM International Commentary July 2012 ISSN. 2239-7949

The ITPCM Next Events & Trainings For complete info about trainings, research, evaluation and project design/delivery activities please refer to our website: www.itpcm.sssup.it

Inauguration Ceremony When/Where Description

Ms. Fatou BENSOUDA will visit the Scuola Superiore Prosecutor of the Sant’Anna on the 22nd October 2012. She will deliver the 22 Oct 2012 key-note speech at the Inauguration Ceremony of the International Criminal Court Pisa, Italy Ms. Fatou BENSOUDA 2012-2013 Academic Year. OPEN EVENT contact: [email protected]

Trainings/Education When Deadline Contacts

Comunicare la Cooperazione e 25 - 28 October [email protected] 19 September 2012 la Solidarietà Internazionale 2012 www.itpcm.sssup.it

Master of Arts in Human 2 July 2012 - I rd non EU January 2013 - [email protected] 17 Sept 2012 - II rd non EU Rights and Conflict Spring 2014 www.humanrights.sssup.it Management 17 Oct 2012 - EU

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Integrated Training Course 18 -22 16 January 2013 [email protected] on Mentoring and Advising February 2013 www.itpcm.sssup.it

Health Systems through 8 -19 18 December 2012 - I rd [email protected] Conflict and Recovery April 2013 26 February 2013 - II rd www.hscr.sssup.it

34 ITPCM International Commentary July 2012 ISSN. 2239-7949

THE ITPCM

Staff members & Contacts:

Director: Prof. Andrea de Guttry [email protected]

Peace Keeping Branch

Emanuele Sommario the ITPCM venue in Pisa, archive photo Research Fellow [email protected] Barbara Nicoletti Research Fellow [email protected] Annalisa Creta Research Fellow [email protected] Alessia Lenci Project Officer [email protected] Rossella Altamura Project Officer [email protected] Communications Secretariat & Logistics

Decentralised Cooperation Michele Gonnelli Federica Faldella Branch Communication/Media Officer [email protected] [email protected] Pasqualetta Campus Annarosa Mezzasalma [email protected] Project Officer The ITPCM [email protected] International Commentary: Address: Serena Rossignoli Via Cardinale Maffi, 27 Project Officer Chief Director 56127 Pisa - ITALY [email protected] Francesco Ceccarelli tel: +39 050 882685 Luisa Nardi Scientific Director fax: +39 050 882665 Research Fellow Andrea de Guttry [email protected] [email protected] Editor in Chief www.itpcm.sssup.it Fabrizio Coticchia Michele Gonnelli Research Fellow Graphic Design International Training Programme [email protected] Michele Gonnelli for Conflict Management

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