Allied with the Enemy: the Italian Occupation of Yugoslavia (1941–43)

the Italian Occupation of Yugoslavia (1941–43) 15

Chapter 1 Allied with the Enemy: the Italian Occupation of Yugoslavia (1941–43)

Eric Gobetti

Five days after a German attack that all but destroyed Yugoslavia’s defences, the Italian High Command ordered to start an immediate offensive.1 In the evening of 11 April, an Italian motorized column reached Ljubljana without meeting any resistance. At the same time, at Palazzo Venezia, Mussolini received Ante Pavelić,2 the leader of the Ustashas, the extremist Croatian movement founded in 1929 in Italy.3 At the end of the meeting, Pavelić and 250 men left for Zagreb, which the Germans had already occupied and where an independent Croatian state had officially been proclaimed. These two almost simultaneous events highlight the main attitudes of the highest Italian authorities in Yugoslavia: a groundless arrogance by military command despite the inherent weakness of the occupation system, and a widespread but contradictory policy of alliance with the most extremist local forces. These choices contributed to stirring up and then strengthening the Resistance, while the Italians witnessed the gradual demise of their imperial dream on the Adriatic.4

1 Ordine d’operazioni della Seconda armata, Vittorio Ambrosio, 1 aprile 1941, in Salvatore Loi, Le operazioni delle unità italiane in Jugoslavia (1941–1943) (Roma: Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, 1978), p. 320. 2 Archivio centrale dello Stato (hereafter ACS), M. I., D.G.P.S., I.G.P.S. “E. Conti,” b. 10, il prefetto di Potenza, 11/4/41. 3 On the Ustasha movement in Italy, see Eric Gobetti, Dittatore per caso (Napoli: L’ancora del Mediterraneo, 2001). 4 On the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia during the Second World War, see James H. Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic: Mussolini’s conquest of Yugoslavia, 1941–1943 (New York: Enigma Books, 2005); Dragan S. Nenezić, Jugoslovenske oblasti pod Italijom.1941–1943 (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1999); and Eric Gobetti, Alleati del nemico. L’occupazione italiana in Jugoslavia (1941– 1943) (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2013).

A Great Victory

World War II reached Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. On 28 October 1940, Mussolini had unleashed his “parallel war” by attacking Greece, but had suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans then decided to intervene in support of their Italian ally. In March, the Yugoslav government, led by regent Pavle, was forced to adhere to the Tripartite Pact and allow the transit of German troops headed to attack the rear of the Greek army fighting in Albania. In response, a coup carried out by Yugoslav army authorities—and supported by the British secret service—had brought to power sixteen-year old, pro-British King Petar.5 “Today, in the early morning, the Yugoslav people found its soul”, declared Winston Churchill to the House of Commons.6 The Germans reacted promptly. On 6 April 1941, Germany launched the offensive, after a devastating bombing of the capital Belgrade; Italy, engaged on the Greek-Albanian front, took a defensive attitude towards Yugoslavia.7 The Italians conquered the majority of the cities along the coast and in Montenegro, but only after the signature of the surrender of the Yugoslav army, between 17 and 18 April. Germany made the decision to dismember Yugoslavia, divide it among the various Axis nations, and communicate this to Italy during the Vienna Talks (20–22 April).8 In spite of their scant military successes, Italy obtained about a third of the Yugoslav territory; a demarcation line was drawn from northwest to southwest between the Italian and German occupation zones. The territory ceded to Italy was vast, but underpopulated, with few real cities (essentially Ljubljana and Split) and few food resources. From a symbolic point of view, however, it was a huge success. By the spring of 1941, the Fascist army had already suffered a series of military defeats on all fronts: not only in Greece, but also in North Africa, where the British had conquered the whole of Cyrenaica and Rommel’s troops were beginning their counterattack. Additionally, the Italian navy had suffered a serious blow by the British fleet off Cape Matapan

5 Elisabeth Barker, British policy in South-East Europe in the Second Warld War (London: Macmillan, 1976); Phyllis Auty, Richard Clogg (ed.), British policy towards wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London: Macmillan, 1975); Mark C. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940–1943 (New York: Columbia university press, 1980). 6 “Relazioni Internazionali,” anno VII, n. 29, 19/7/41, Libro Bianco tedesco N.7, doc.80. 7 Mario Roatta, Otto milioni di baionette (Milano: Mondadori, 1946), pp. 161–2. 8 G. Ciano, R. Mosca (ed.), L’Europa verso la catastrofe (Milano: Mondadori, 1947), pp. 645–657. Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1948) ed. Malcolm Muggeridge, trans. Stuart Hood).