Philosophy of the Brain : the Brain Problem / Georg Northoff
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<DOCINFO AUTHOR ""TITLE "Philosophy of the Brain: The ‘rain problem’"SUBJECT "Advances in Consciousness Research, Volume 52"KEYWORDS ""SIZE HEIGHT "220"WIDTH "150"VOFFSET "4"> Philosophy of the Brain Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research provides a forum for scholars from different scientific disciplines and fields of knowledge who study consciousness in its multifaceted aspects. Thus the Series will include (but not be limited to) the various areas of cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, linguistics, brain science and philosophy. The orientation of the Series is toward developing new interdisciplinary and integrative approaches for the investigation, description and theory of consciousness, as well as the practical consequences of this research for the individual and society. Series A: Theory and Method. Contributions to the development of theory and method in the study of consciousness. Editor Maxim I. Stamenov Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Editorial Board David Chalmers Earl Mac Cormac University of Arizona Duke University Gordon G. Globus George Mandler University of California at Irvine University of California at San Diego Ray Jackendoff John R. Searle Brandeis University University of California at Berkeley Christof Koch Petra Stoerig California Institute of Technology Universität Düsseldorf Stephen Kosslyn †Francisco Varela Harvard University C.R.E.A., Ecole Polytechnique, Paris Volume 52 Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain problem by Georg Northoff Philosophy of the Brain The Brain problem Georg Northoff Harvard University, Boston John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements 8 of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Northoff, Georg Philosophy of the brain : the brain problem / Georg Northoff. p. cm. (Advances in Consciousness Research, issn 1381–589X ; v. 52) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Mind-brain identity theory. 2. Philosophy of mind. I. Title. II. Series. B105.M55N67 2003 128’.2-dc21 2003054589 isbn 90 272 5183 5 (Eur.) / 1 58811 416 3 (US) (Hb; alk. paper) isbn 90 272 5184 3 (Eur.) / 1 58811 417 1 (US) (Pb; alk. paper) © 2004 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa For John who enriches my life much more than any brain could ever do Table of contents Acknowledgements ix Chapter 1 The ‘Brain problem’: ‘Mind problems’, hypothesis of ‘embedment’ and the neurophilosophical method 1 1.1 The ‘Brain problem’ 1 1.2 Definition of the brain and ‘dilemma of the brain’ 8 1.3 Hypothesis of ‘embedment’ 19 1.4 Neurophilosophy as a method for investigation of the brain 25 Chapter 2 Neuroepistemological account of the brain: ‘Epistemic–empirical relationship’ 59 2.1 ‘Spatial embedment’: The body and the own body 61 2.2 ‘Temporal embedment’: The own body and other bodies 82 2.3 ‘Mental embedment’: The brain and the own body 104 2.4 ‘Reflexive embedment’: The own brain and other brains 142 Chapter 3 ‘Philosophy of the brain’: Empirical hypothesis of the brain, ‘epistemology of the brain’, and ‘ontology of the brain’ 175 3.1 Empirical hypothesis of the brain: ‘Dynamic brain’, ‘event coding’, and ‘embedded brain’ 175 3.2 ‘Epistemology of the brain’: ‘Embedded epistemology’, ‘epistemology of events and environments’ and First-, Second-, and Third-Person Epistemology 207 3.3 ‘Ontology of the brain’: ‘Embedded brain’, ‘embedded ontology’ and ‘self-reference’ of the brain 260 Table of contents Chapter 4 The ‘Embedded brain’: ‘Mind problems’, hypothesis of ‘Embedment’, and ‘Paradigm shifts’ 337 4.1 The determination of the brain 338 4.2 The‘Dilemmaofthebrain’ 347 4.3 Hypothesis of ‘Embedment’ 354 4.4 ‘Paradigm shift’ 361 References 365 Author index 403 Subject index 405 Acknowledgements The book can be considered as a result from my clinical, neuroscientific, and philo- sophical work at Dept. of Neurology at Harvard University in Boston (USA), Dept. of Psychiatry at University of Magdeburg (Germany) and Dept. of Philosophy at University of Duesseldorf (Germany). It is a sort of “state of the art” of my own thinking that guides either implicitly or explicitly my clinical attitude, empirical studies and theoretical considerations. Writing such a book consumes much energy and valuable time in which you could have done other things that make more sense than thinking, reading and writing. Therefore, I want to thank everybody who gave me psychological support without which I could have not written this book. I owe special thanks to Alexander Heinzel, who had to bear many of the ideas in the book in a rather immature state. Emanuelle Arilli should be thanked as well since he, similar to Alexander Heinzel, opened my eyes for “real philosoph- ical thinking” especially in the logical concerns. Chen Yi, as a Chinese scientist and philosopher, focused my attention on several weak points in one of the ear- lier drafts and gave me numerous inspirations for improvement. F. Bermpohl, though coming in the final stages of this book into my group, helped me con- siderably in proof reading and getting all the references together. I also thank KN. Eicke for critical discussion especially about mental causation. Thanks also to I. Schwab, H. Böker, S. Grimm, A. Pfennig, A. Richter, R. Kötter, and many other members and collaborators of my research group for fruitful discussion. I have to thank B. Bogerts and D. Birnbacher who gave continuous support by allowing me to develop and pursue my ideas – free mental space was available for me that so often cannot be found in academics. Finally, I owe gratitude to Maxim Stamenov, two anonymous reviewers, Bertie Kaal and the publisher for their patience and continuous support. Financially, I have to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for sup- porting a leave from clinical and teaching duties and for giving me various grants, especially the Heisenberg grant, which finally made the transformation of ideas into a written book possible. Boston, February 2003 Chapter 1 The ‘Brain problem’ ‘Mind problems’, hypothesis of ‘embedment’ and the neurophilosophical method “Strange coincidence, that every man whose skull has been opened had a brain!” Ludwig Wittgenstein . The ‘Brain problem’ .. ‘Mind problems’ in the ‘philosophy of mind’ The mind and its relationship to the brain have been investigated extensively in neuroscience and philosophy. However, either way of their determination raises principal problems whose solution seem rather difficult. These problems shall be called ‘mind-problems’ (see Figure 1) and are discussed either implicitly or explicitly in the ‘philosophy of mind’. Empirically, the mind is determined by neuronal states, which are supposed to characterize the brain. Neuronal states of the brain are investigated empirically and related directly to different psychological and physiological functions. Meanwhile mental states can neither be investigated empirically nor related directly to neu- ronal states. Unlike neuronal states, mental states are not accessible in Third-Person Perspective, which makes their direct empirical investigation impossible. Since they are accessible in First-Person Perspective only, mental states can neither be related directly to psychological and physiological functions nor to neuronal states. Due to the inability to directly relate mental states to neuronal states, mental states cannot be detected and recognized within the brain as being characterized by neuronal states. Both problems, empirical accessibility of mental states with respect to the brain and the empirical relation between brain states and mental states remain, therefore unclear. Accordingly, one may speak of an ‘empirical mind problem’. Both subjective experience and contents of mental states cannot be detected and recognized within the neuronal states and thus within the brain. For example, subjective experience of certain events within the environment cannot be related Chapter 1 ‘Empirical mind problem’: No detection of mental states within neuronal states i.e. brain states Mental states ??? Philosophy of mind First-Person Perspective Mental properties ‘Epistemic mind problem’: ‘Ontological mind-brain problem’: No direct access to our own Relationship between ‘mental and brain as a brain in First-Person physical properties’ Perspective Figure 1. Philosophy of mind and ‘Mind-problems’ directly to the neuronal states of the brain. Neither the subjective experience, i.e., the ‘What is it like’ nor its content, i.e., the event to which the subjective experience refers, can be detected and recognized within neuronal states. If, however, mental states cannot be detected and recognized within neuronal states, they cannot be re- lated directly to the brain itself. From this inability to relate directly mental states to neuronal states, the principal impossibility of an empirical relation between men- tal states and brain states as neuronal states is inferred (see also Searle 2000:566). However, the brain might be characterized not only by neuronal states exclusively but also by some other type of state as well. In this case, the inference from the inability