With Sampson through theWar By W. A. M. GOODE Being an Account of the Naval Operations of the North At­ lantic Squadron during the SPANISH AMERICAN WAR OF 1898 With Contributed Chapters by Rear Admiral Sampson U. S. N. Captain Robley D. Evans U. S. N. Commander C. C. Todd U. S. N. NEW YORK DOUBLEDAY & McCLURE CO 1899 COPYRIGHT, 1899, BY DOUBLEDAY & McCLURE CO. o :l8r 'Wlar of :IDeNcatfon With apologies for its shortcomings, I dedicate this book to my friends in the United. States Navy, who treated me with such kindness while on board the flagship New York as correspondent for The Associated Press. NOTE Those naval officers good enough to contribute chapters are in no way responsible for or even cognizant of anything contained in this book except their own individual chapters. CONTENTS OHAPTER I. ANTE-BELLUl,! lUTTERS, OHAPTER II. WAR IN EARNEST, • • 28 OHAPTER III. THE ATTACK UPON SAN JUAN, • 60 CHAPTER IV. THE AFFAIR AT CARDENAS. By OOMMANDER OHAPMAN C. TODD, U. S. N., COMMANDING U. S. S. Wilmington, 96 CHAPTER V. THE FINDING OF CERVERA, • 104 CHAPTER VI. WITH SCHLEY TO SANTIAGO. By CAPTAIN ROBLEY D. EVANS, U. S. N., (THEN) COMMANDING U. S. S. Iowa, 137 CHAPTER VII. THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO, • 143 CHAPTER VIII. THE BATTLE OF JULY THIRD, • 193 CHAPTER IX. REASONS FOR THE VICTORY. By REAR-ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON, U. S. N., • • 225 CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE-SHIP IN AND OUT OF ACTION, • • 238 CHAPTER XI. THE SOUTHWESTERN BLOCKADE. By COMMANDER CHAPMAN C. TODD, U. S. N., COMMANDING U. S. S. Wilmington, 240 CHAPTER XII. THE CAMPAIGN CLOSES, • 256 ApPENDIX, • 277 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE Rear-Admiral Sampson in His Cabin on the New york........ Frontispiece "\Vreck of the Maine in Havana Harbor. 6 Map of the West Indies. ............•. 12 Life Aboard the Flagship New york.................................. 18 'fhe Cushing; and Sampson's Fleet Bearing Down upon Havana... .. .•. 36 A Bird's-eye of the New York's Forecastle while Cruising " .. 62 Chart Showing Daily Positions of the Fleet in Campaign against Span- ish Squadron " .. .. .. 80 U. S. Torpedo-Boat Winslow; and U. S. Lighthouse Tender Mangrove.. 100 Some Officers of the North Atlantic Squadron 128 Bombardment of Santiago; and On the After Turret of the Brooklyn 162 Some Officers of the U. S. Navy 184 Some of the Officers of the Spanish Fleet.............•.••...•...•..... 196 Explosion of the Viscaya 0 ••••• •• 206 Chart Showing Position of Ships in the Battle of July 3d _" ..... 210 Port Side of the Maria Teresa as She Lay on the Shoals the Day after the Battle ," _ 216 Stern View of the Viscaya as She Lay Wrecked on the Beach 228 First-Class Battleship Oregon 236 The Cristobal Colon Lying on the Beach near Rio Tarquino.•........... 246 Starboard Quarter View of the Almirante Oquendo ...•• , 264 WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR OHAPTER I. ANTE-BELLUM MATTERS. IN the beginning of 1898 the United States Navy was, practically, in two divisions: one on the Pacific and one on the Atlantic. The Atlantic contingent was by far the more powerful, and it is to the doings of these ships, their officers, and crews, that this book is confined. In the month of January a detachment of the North Atlantic Squadron­ which then consisted of all the battleships except the Ore­ gon, all the armored cruisers, all the monitors except the Monadnock and lJ!J.onterey, the majority of the second-class cruisers and gunboats-had been sent to the Gulf of Florida to exercise. The South Atlantic Squadron, consisting of the cruiser Cincinnati and the gunboats Castine and Wilmington, were cruising north along the coast of South America; the European Squadron, consisting of the Helena and Bancroft, were at Lisbon, Portugal; while in harbors and dockyards along our Eastern coast were cruisers and monitors out of commission or undergoing repairs. Several cruisers of the North Atlant'ic Squadron were already in the vicinity of the Gulf of Florida on watch for filibusters with e arms and men for Ouban insurgents. For two years the Gulf of Florida had not been utilized as exercising grounds for the squadron, because it was feared that Spain might construe the peaceful evolutions as a naval demonstration. But now the feeling between the two countries was more amicable than it had been for some time, and to cap this climax of amity the second-class 1 2 With Sampson Through the War battleship Maine was sent to Havana on a long-delayed visit of courtesy. The telegraph operator at Key West, Fla., was sitting idly at his key on the night of February 15. Havana called him. He mechanically answered, expecting some personal message from his friend at the other end of the wire. Instead came quick, sharp ticks saying: "There has been a big explosion somewhere in the harbor." A few moments later the operator in Havana said: "The Maine has been blown up, and hundreds ofsailors have been killed. " Commander Forsyth, the commandant of the naval station at Key West, was asleep in his house a few blocks from the telegraph office. He was awakened, and at once sent a tor­ pedo-boat with the startling news to Rear-Admiral Mont· gomery Sicard, commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, who, with the New York, Iowa, Texas, Massa­ chusetts, and Indiana, was at Dry Tortugas, the headquar­ ters of the squadron. Dry Tortugas is an island sixty miles west of Key West, possessing an antiquated fort, and was then used as a base of operations for the manamvres. Ad­ miral Sicard at once moved with the New York to Key West, so as to be in close touch with the Navy Department in case his ships were wanted to move hurriedly. The other ships were ordered to be ready to start day or night. For not sending or taking two or three of his battleships that night to the scene of the disaster, without waiting for instructions from Washington, Admiral Sicard has been somewhat criticised by various naval officers. They main­ tain that a show of force by the United States Navy in Havana harbor on the morning after the Maine was blown up would have averted many of the unpleasant incidents which occurred subsequently, while some aver that it might have prevented the war itself, their idea being that once in Havana harbor the battleships, after investigation, could have demanded and secured satisfaction that would have paralyzed the hands of Spain. Instead, however, the small tender Fern went to Bavana to bring the wounded Ante-Bellum Matters 3 to Key West, and the people of that city actually believed tha,t this boat was a fair type of the United States Navy. To the least-versed in naval matters it must be evident that there is much to be said on both sides of this question, and I am not prepared to say whether the place of the battle­ ships was by the side of their destroyed sister, with her dead and wounded, or at Key West, in home waters and in close touch with Washington. A few weeks later the cruiser Montgomery was sent to Havana, and the risk she ran of being blown up in that harbor is taken by Admiral Sicard's critics as a justification of their theory. The whole question is interesting only because it opens up such endless possibilities, and the mention of it is not intended as a criticism by the author, implied or other­ wise, upon Rear-Admiral Sicard or the McKinley ad­ ministration. At the head of the Navy Department at this time was John D. Long, a conservative, level-headed Republican from Massachusetts. Theodore Roosevelt was his Assistant Secretary. What the Secretary of the Navy lacked in aggressiveness-he was quite unjustly derided for peace proclivities-was more than atoned for by the radical activ­ ity of Mr. Roosevelt. For months the Assistant Secretary had been ferreting among the few musty anachronisms which still pervaded the United States Navy. He had done much good work and had several innovations in view when the Maine disaster brought into play all the energies of the Department. Then it was that the general public first realized Mro Roosevelt's usefulness, and then it was that these two men, Roosevelt and Long, backed up by the Presi­ dent, put their shoulders to the wheel. But though they worked with unfailing zeal during the period which elapsed between the blowing up of the Maine and the declaration of war, their energies would have been useless drops in a bucket of confusion had not the navy itself been in good condition previous to the crisis. The Spanish naval admin­ istrators, probably, worked just as hard as did Long and 4 With Sampson Through the War Roosevelt during the two ante-bellum months, but the Span­ iards wasted their labors, because they dealt with a ser· vice without system, with crews that were not drilled, and with ships that were not cared for. It was not the"sprint" at the end, the feverish purchase of new ships or the repair of old ones, that enabled the United States Navy to meet all emergencies without hitch. No; it was the" hammer, ham­ mer" on the hard road of routine; the result of the gradual building up, by recent administrations, of a new navy based on modern lines, whose officers were men of intelligence and training, always eager to keep in touch with European innovations, and who were probably hampered less by pol­ itics than any other body of public servants in the United States.