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Technische Berichte Des Hasso-Plattner-Instituts Für Softwaresystemtechnik an Der Universität Potsdam Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on e- learning and Virtual and Remote Laboratories Bernhard Rabe, Andreas Rasche (eds.) Technische Berichte Nr. 21 des Hasso-Plattner-Instituts für Softwaresystemtechnik an der Universität Potsdam Technische Berichte des Hasso-Plattner-Instituts für Softwaresystemtechnik an der Universität Potsdam Nr. 21 Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on e-learning and Virtual and Remote Laboratories Bernhard Rabe, Andreas Rasche (eds.) Potsdam 2008 Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar Die Reihe Technische Berichte des Hasso-Plattner-Instituts für Softwaresystemtechnik an der Universität Potsdam erscheint aperiodisch. Herausgeber: Professoren des Hasso-Plattner-Instituts für Softwaresystemtechnik an der Universität Potsdam Redaktion: Bernhard Rabe, Andreas Rasche E-Mail: {bernhard.rabe; andreas.rasche}@.hpi.uni-potsdam.de Verlag: Universitätsverlag Potsdam Am Neuen Palais 10, 14469 Potsdam Fon +49 (0) 331 977 4517 Fax +49 (0) 331 977 4625 e-mail: ubpub@uni-potsdamde http://info.ub.uni-potsdam.de/verlag.htm Druck: allprintmedia gmbH Blomberger Weg 6a 13437 Berlin email: [email protected] © Hasso-Plattner-Institut für Softwaresystemtechnik an der Universität Potsdam, 2008 Das Manuskript ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Heft Nr. 21 (2008) ISSN 1613-5652 ISBN 978-3-940793-17-1 Foreword It is our pleasure to welcome all participants to VIRTUAL-LAB’2008, the 2nd International Workshop on e-learning and Virtual & Remote Laboratories, at Hasso-Plattner-Institute for Software Systems En- gineering at University of Potsdam, Germany. The workshop is a successor of the successful VIRTUAL- LAB’04 workshop held in Setubal,´ Portugal. The aim of this workshop is to present and discuss the latest development in the area of remote and virtual laboratories. Among other topics the interconnections of heterogeneous laboratory infrastructures by using middleware will be one special topic of the workshop. The workshop is sponsored by the Leonardo Da Vinci Programme of the European Union within the VET-TREND-project (RO/06/B/F/NT175014). These proceedings include 14 high-quality papers we received from 8 countries. Each paper has been reviewed by at least 3 members of the international program committee. As a result we are proud to present a collection of papers covering challenging topics, ranging from architecture of virtual & remote laboratories to service-orientation in virtual and remote laboratories, also including “New e-learning techniques” and “Analysis of virtual and remote laboratories in the field”. We would like to thank all authors who submitted papers and the Program Committee members for their efforts in properly reviewing the submissions. We also address our special thanks to Sabine Wagner who spent major effort around the workshop organization. The success of any workshop depends mainly on the quality of the program and participation of people. We thank you all for being here. We wish that your stay in Potsdam is really enjoyable. Bernhard Rabe Andreas Rasche VIRTUAL-LAB’2008 Organizing Committee Hasso-Plattner-Institute, University of Potsdam Potsdam, Germany i ii Workshop Committees Advisory Committee: Andreas Polze (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Christoph Meinel (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Organizing Committee: Bernhard Rabe (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Andreas Rasche (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Program Committee: Ioannis Anagnostopoulos (University of the Aegean, Greece) Paul Borza (University TRANSILVANIA of Brasov, Romania) Fernando Coito (Univ. Nova de Lisboa / UNINOVA, Portugal) Dirk Cordel (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Luis Gomes (Univ. Nova de Lisboa / UNINOVA, Portugal) Leandro Soares Indrusiak (Technical University Darmstadt, Germany) Eleftherios Kayafas (NTUA, Greece) Jose´ Martins (CINEL, Portugal) Bartolomeo Montrucchio (Polytecnico di Torino, Italy) Sorin Moraru (University TRANSILVANIA of Brasov, Romania) Domenico Ponta (University of Genoa, Italy) Florin Sandu (Siemens PSE, Romania) Anna Marina Scapolla (University of Genoa, Italy) Gheorghe Scutaru (University TRANSILVANIA of Brasov, Romania) Alexander Schmidt (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Michael Schobel¨ (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Wolfgang Schult (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, Germany) Peter Troger¨ (Blekinge Techniska Hogskolan,¨ Sweden) iii iv Contents Session 1: Architecture of Virtual & Remote Laboratory Infrastructures (I) An Internet-Based Laboratory Course in Chemical Reaction Engineering and Unit Operations ............................................1 Ralf Moros Universitat¨ Leipzig, Germany, Frank Luft Buro¨ Dr. Frank Luft, Germany, Roger Glaser¨ Universitat¨ Leipzig, Germany Internet Based Laboratory for Experimentation with Multilevel Medium-Power Converters ............................................5 Carlos Giron,´ Francisco Huerta, Fco. Javier Rodriguez, Emilio Bueno, Julio Pastor Alcala´ University, Spain Session 2: Architecture of Virtual & Remote Laboratory Infrastructures (II) Content management and architectural issues of a remote learning laboratory ...... 13 Markus Wulff, Patrick Lauer, Torsten Braun University of Bern, Switzerland Distributed Software Architecture and Applications for Remote Laboratories ....... 21 Sorin Aurel MORARU, Mihai ROMANCA, Paul BORZA Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania Tele-Lab IT-Security: an architecture for an online virtual IT security lab ......... 29 Christian Willems Hasso-Plattner-Institut, Universitat¨ Potsdam, Germany Session 3: New e-learning Techniques for Virtual & Remote Laboratories NeOS: Neuchatelˆ Online System ................................ 37 Heiko Sturzrehm, Frederic Aubert, Peter Kropf and Randoald Corfu University of Neuchatel,ˆ Switzerland A Flexible Instructional Electronics Laboratory with Local and Remote Lab Workbenches in a Grid ............................................. 45 Ingvar Gustavsson, Johan Zackrisson, Kristian Nilsson, Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden, Javier Garcia-Zubia University of Deusto, Spain, Lars Hakansson,˚ Ingvar Claesson Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden, Thomas Lago¨ Acticut International AB, Sweden Simulation of an Intelligent Network - Basic Call State Model Remote Laboratory .... 51 Florin SANDU Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, Sorin BALBˆ AE,ˆ Szilard´ CSEREY, Titus Constantin BALAN˘ Siemens PSE, Romania Session 4: Service-Orientation in Virtual & Remote Laboratories SOA Meets Robots - A Service-Based Software Infrastructure For Remote Laboratories . 57 Peter Troger¨ Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden, Andreas Rasche, Frank Feinbube, Robert Wierschke Hasso-Plattner-Institute, University of Potsdam, Germany Service Orientation in Education - Intelligent Networks for eLearning / mLearning ... 63 Florin SANDU Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, Titus Constantin BALAN,˘ Silviu DOVANCESCU,˘ Szilerd´ CSEREY Siemens PSE, Romania v A Virtual Laboratory for Digital Design ............................ 71 Domenico Ponta, Giuliano Donzellini University of Genoa, Italy Session 5: Analysis of Virtual & Remote Laboratories in the Field Virtual and Remote Laboratories Feasibility Study and Development Guidelines ..... 79 Vicent M. Rodrigo Penarrocha,˜ Javier Sanz Lopez,´ Bernardo Bernardo Clemente, Eva Antonino Daviu Universidad Politecnica´ de Valencia, Spain A Training Need Analysis of Trainers in the Field of Technical Vocational Education Training .............................................. 85 Mihai ROMANCA, Paul BORZA, Sorin Aurel MORARU Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania Remote laboratories over different platforms and application fields: A Survey ...... 93 Vasileios Kolias University of Athens, Greece, Ioannis Anagnostopoulos University of the Aegean, Greece, Eleftherios Kayafas University of Athens, Greece vi An Internet-Based Laboratory Course in Chemical Reaction Engineering and Unit Operations Ralf Moros Frank Luft Institut für Technische Chemie Büro Dr. Frank Luft Universität Leipzig Holsteinstr. 52 Linnéstr. 3 D-04317 Leipzig D-04103 Leipzig, Germany [email protected] [email protected] Roger Gläser Institut für Technische Chemie Universität Leipzig Linnéstr. 3 D-04103 Leipzig, Germany [email protected] Abstract and real experiments [1]. A simulation is always based on a mathematical model and does not exactly Practical courses are most important parts of studies reflect the “real” world. Therefore, remote access to in Chemistry. A laboratory course in Chemical Reac- real experiments is an interesting way to include ex- tion Engineering and Unit Operations typically con- periments into online material. sists of several hands-on experiments. We present an There are several interesting applications for such online laboratory course for web-based distance remotely controlled experiments. One example is the learning. This online course consists of a web-based heat transfer experiment [2] at the iLab project [3] of implementation of manuals for each experiment in- the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Boston, cluding animations and simulations as well as of USA). Another example is the non ideal reactor ex- remotely controlled experiments. An essential objec- periment [4] which is located at the University of tive of the project was the set-up of interfaces for Cambridge, Department
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