DOCSLIB.ORG

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY and the PHENOMENON of MIND

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY and the PHENOMENON OF MIND It would have been foolish even to think of the solution of such a problem without having prepared myself by a thorough study of the means and by busying myself with less difficult problems Weierstrass THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY and the PHENOMENON OF MIND Richard B. Wells Copyright © 2006 by Richard B. Wells All Rights Reserved This book is dedicated to my loving sisters, Sherri and Melody, who are the talented members of our family. Contents Preface xxv 1. First Prolegomenon: The Phenomenon of Mind 1 § 1. Common Views of the Mind 1 § 2. Different Views of the Mind 2 § 3. Empirical Materialism 3 § 4. Scientific Materialism 5 § 4.1 The Mind Dust Theory 7 § 4.2 The Behaviorist Theory 8 § 4.3 The Functionalism Theory 8 § 5. The Mentalist Views 13 § 5.1 Theme I: Mind is Intelligence or Reason and is Part of the Soul 13 § 5.2 Theme II: Mind is a Thinking Substance 16 § 5.3 Francis Bacon and the Dawn of the Age of Reason 17 § 5.4 Rationalism and Mind as Substance 19 Descartes 20 Leibniz 23 The Supersensible 25 Monads 28 Leibniz' "Art of Discovery" 33 § 5.5 Theme III: Mind is a Soul or Spirit, Having the Power of Cognition and Action 35 Representationalism 37 Subjective Idealism 41 Hume's Skepticism 43 § 5.6 Two Other Rationalist Themes 47 Theme IV: Mind as a Particular Mode of God's Thought 47 Theme V: Mind as Self-Consciousness, Knowing Itself as Universal 49 § 6. The Unified Themes 51 v Contents § 6.1 Theme VI: Mind as an Organization of Mental Phenomena 53 Advantages and Shortcomings of Kant's Critical Philosophy 60 § 6.2 Theme VII: Mind as the Totality of Mental Processes and the Principle of Meaningful and Purposive Behavior 62 Mind as the Stream of Thought 63 Genetic Epistemology 69 Summary of Theme VII 72 § 7. The Phenomenon of Mind 73 § 8. The Doctrine of Organized Being 77 2. Second Prolegomenon: Science and Philosophy 79 § 1. The Sciences 79 § 2. Positivism and the Natural Sciences 84 § 3. Laboratory and Nonlaboratory Sciences 87 § 4. Paradigms 89 § 5. Rational Principles 91 § 6. Kant's Philosophy of Science 93 § 7. Science, Metaphysics, and the Critical Philosophy 98 § 7.1 The General View of Metaphysics 98 § 7.2 Kant's Classification of Metaphysics 100 Transcendental Metaphysics 102 Metaphysics Proper 103 § 7.3 The Critical Philosophy and Science 105 § 8. The Development of Theory 109 § 9. Common Characteristics in the Development of Science 127 Theme I: Every Science Has a Limited Topic 127 Theme 2: Every Science is Constructed 128 Theme 3: Every Science is Methodical 129 Theme 4: Every Science Concerns Itself with Specific Objects 131 Theme 5: A Science Begins as an Historical Doctrine 132 Theme 6: A Science Admits of Dubitability 135 § 10. Speculation 138 § 11. The Idea of a System of Metaphysics 145 vi Contents 3. Representation 152 § 1. The Primitive Character of Representation 152 § 1.1 Doctrine of Method for the Exposition of Ideas by Analytic Division 153 § 1.2 Comment on the Method Employed 157 § 2. The Notions of Matter and Form 160 § 2.1 Matter and Form in the Notion of "Existence" 160 § 2.2 Matter and Form in the Notions of "Being" and "Reality" 163 § 3. Second Level Analytic Representation 166 § 3.1 The Representations of Quality and Quantity 168 § 3.2 The Representations of Relation and Modality 170 § 3.3 The 2LAR Structure 172 § 4. The Making of Representations 175 § 4.1 Analytic, Synthetic, and Anasynthetic Representation 176 § 4.2 Kant's Verstandes-Actus 179 Comparison 179 Reflexion 183 Abstraction 184 § 5. Cognitions 186 § 5.1 The Object of Cognition 187 The Copy of Reality Hypothesis 187 The Construction of Reality in the Infant 189 The Objectification of Detail 191 § 5.2 Intuitions and Concepts 194 Intuition 195 The Idea of "Concepts" 196 The Sensible Nature of Appearances 199 Concepts 201 § 6. Kant's Threefold Synthesis of Experience 203 § 6.1 Functional Invariants and the Theory of Assimilation 204 The Functional Invariants 207 Assimilation and Equilibration 210 § 6.2 A Priori Foundations of the Possibility of Experience 211 "Knowledge" and "Experience" 212 The Necessity of A Priori Foundations of Experience 218 The Synthesis of Apprehension in the Intuition 220 The Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination 223 The Synthesis of Re-cognition in a Concept 229 § 7. The Ideas of Representation in Epitome 236 4. First Epilegomenon: Representation and Metaphysics Proper 240 vii Contents § 1. Questions Raised by Representation 240 § 2. The Idea of Organization 241 § 2.1 Organization and Rational Cosmology 242 § 2.2 Rational Cosmology and the Idea of Nature 243 § 2.3 Rational Cosmology and the System of Cosmological Ideas 246 The Cosmological Idea of Quantity 247 The Cosmological Idea of Quality 249 The Cosmological Idea of Relation 251 The Cosmological Idea of Modality 252 § 2.4 The Applied Metaphysic of Organization 253 § 3. Power and the Idea of a Faculty 255 § 3.1 Locke's Description of 'Power' and 'Faculty' 256 § 3.2 Faculties and Organization 258 § 4. Adaptation and Rational Psychology 261 § 4.1 The Object of Rational Psychology 265 The "I" and the "Soul" 267 William James and the "Soul" 268 § 4.2 The Ideas of Rational Psychology 270 § 4.3 The Implications of Rational Psychology for Adaptation 274 § 5. Adaptation and Rational Theology 276 § 5.1 The Ideas of Rational Theology 277 The Transcendental Ideal 281 The Idea of Entis Realissimi 282 The Idea of Ens Originarium 284 The Idea of Ens Summum 286 The Idea of Ens Entium 287 § 5.2 The Objective Reality of Adaptation 288 § 6. Transcendental Illusion 290 § 7. The Verstandes-Actus and Metaphysics Proper 297 § 7.1 The Various Definitions of "Logic" 297 § 7.2 The Growth of Logical Thinking 299 Autistic, Intelligent, and Ego-Centric Thought 300 Syncretism and Juxtaposition 302 Schemes, Functions, and the Logic of Meanings 306 A. Schemes 307 B. Constitutive Functions 309 C. The Logic of Meanings 311 § 7.3 Implications for the Verstandes-Actus 315 Comparison 315 Reflexion 325 Abstraction 327 § 8. Transformations and the Synthesis of Experience 328 § 9. Concluding Remarks 331 viii Contents 5. Consciousness 333 § 1. The Phenomenon of Consciousness 333 § 2. Consciousness and Transcendental Apperception 335 § 3. The Principle of the Unity of Consciousness 338 § 3.1 Hysterical Neurosis 338 Conversion Hysteria 339 Dissociated States 344 § 3.2 Pure and Empirical Consciousness 345 § 4. The Unified Themes of Pure Consciousness 347 § 4.1 James' Pragmatic Theme 347 The "Self" of Consciousness 348 Attention 351 Varieties of Attention 354 § 4.2 Freud's Theory of "The Unconscious" 358 § 4.3 Piaget and the "Grasp of Consciousness" 362 Functional Reasons for Cognizance 366 The Mechanisms of Cognizance 370 Observable Features and Inferential Coordinations 372 Evolution of Actions and the Three Levels of Knowledge 374 Processes of Interiorization and Externalization 377 § 4.4 Kant's Remarks on Consciousness 378 Remarks on Consciousness in General 379 Consciousness and "State of Mind" 381 Consciousness and "Feelings" 383 Consciousness and Receptivity 386 Consciousness and Spontaneity 388 The Conscious, the Unconscious, and Degrees of Consciousness 394 § 5. The Faculty of Pure Consciousness 397 § 5.1 Quality in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 399 § 5.2 Modality in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 401 § 5.3 Quantity in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 407 § 5.4 Relation in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 412 § 6. The 2LAR of Pure Consciousness 430 6. The Data of the Senses 433 § 1. Sense in the Faculty of Organized Being 433 § 1.1 The Rationalist View of Sense 435 § 1.2 The Materialist View of Sense 437 The Physiological Method 438 The Psychophysical Method 441 The Materialist Viewpoint 443 § 1.3 The Idea of Sense 447 ix Contents § 2. Kant's Anthropology of Sense 449 § 3. The Metaphysics Proper of Rational Physics 453 § 3.1 Pseudo-Metaphysics 456 § 3.2 The Pure Science of Nature 459 § 3.3 The Pure Principles of Rational Physics 462 Quantity and the Axioms of Intuition 462 Quality and the Anticipations of Perception 466 Prolegomenon to the Dynamical Principles 470 Relation and the Analogies of Experience 475 A. First Analogy: Principle of Persistence 476 B. Second Analogy: Principle of Generation 477 C. Third Analogy: Principle of Community 481 Modality and the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General 483 § 4. Logical Division and Real Division 485 § 5. The Transcendental Sensorimotor Idea 490 § 5.1 Quantity and the Unity of Faculties 491 § 5.2 Quality and the Condition of State 492 § 5.3 Relation and Information 494 § 5.4 Modality and Meaning 496 § 6. The Empirical Sensorimotor Idea 497 § 6.1 Objections to the Brain-Automaton Model 500 § 6.2 The 2LAR of the Empirical Sensorimotor Idea 503 Quantity and the Anatomical Idea 504 Quality and the Moving Powers 506 § 7. The 2LAR of the Data of the Senses 508 § 7.1 Quantity and the Physiological Idea 509 § 7.2 Quality and Seeming 510 § 7.3 Relation and the Idea of Generalized Emergent Properties 512 § 7.4 Modality and the State of Satisfaction 514 § 8. The Applied Metaphysic of the Data of the Senses 517 7. The Ontology of Determining Judgment 521 § 1. Ontology, Epistemology, and Logic 521 § 2. The Classical System 526 § 2.1 Plato 529 § 2.2 Aristotle 537 Aristotle's "Metaphysics" 539 Aristotle's "Logic" 544 § 2.3 The Neoplatonist's Aristotle 547 § 2.4 The Journey to the Present 551 § 3. Mathematical Logic 560 x Contents § 4. Ontology and Logic Under the Copernican Hypothesis 567 § 5. The 2LAR of the Process of Determining Judgment 570 § 5.1 Quantity and the Form of Determinant
Recommended publications
  • Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Hegel's Criticism

    Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Hegel's Criticism

    U.Ü. FEN-EDEBİYAT FAKÜLTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER DERGİSİ Yıl: 2, Sayı: 2, 2000-2001 KANT’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND HEGEL’S CRITICISM A. Kadir ÇÜÇEN* ABSTRACT Kant inquires into the possibility, sources, conditions and limits of knowledge in the tradition of modern philosophy. Before knowing God, being and reality, Kant, who aims to question what knowledge is, explains the content of pure reason. He formalates a theory of knowledge but his theory is neither a rationalist nor an empiricist theory of knowledge. He investigates the structure of knowledge, the possible conditions of experience and a priori concepts and categories of pure reason; so he makes a revolution like that of Copernicus . Hegel, who is one of proponents of the German idealism, criticizes the Kantian theory of knowledge for “wanting to know before one knows”. For Hegel, Kant’s a priori concepts and categories are meaningless and empty. He claims that the unity of subject and object has been explained in that of the “Absolute”. Therefore, the theory of knowledge goes beyond the dogmatism of the “thing-in- itself” and the foundations of mathematics and natural sciences; and reaches the domain of absolute knowledge. Hegel’s criticism of Kantian theory of knowledge opens new possibilities for the theory of knowledge in our age. ÖZET Kant’ın Bilgi Kuramı ve Hegel’in Eleştirisi Modern felsefe geleneği çerçevesinde Kant, bilginin imkânını, kaynağını, kapsamını ve ölçütlerini ele alarak, doğru bilginin sınırlarını irdelemiştir. Tanrı’yı, varlığı ve gerçekliği bilmeden önce, bilginin neliğini sorgulamayı kendine amaç edinen Kant, saf aklın içeriğini incelemiştir. Saf aklın a priori kavram ve kategorilerini, deneyin görüsünü ve bilgi yapısını veren, fakat ne usçu ne de deneyci * Uludag University, Faculty of Sciences and Letters, Dept.
  • Noumenon and Phenomenon: Reading on Kant's

    Noumenon and Phenomenon: Reading on Kant's

    NOUMENON AND PHENOMENON: READING ON KANT’S PROLEGOMENA Oleh: Wan Suhaimi Wan Abdullah1 ABSTRAK Makalah ini membahaskan satu dari isu besar yang diperkatakan oleh Kant dalam epistemologi beliau iaitu isu berkaitan ‘benda-pada-dirinya’ (noumenon) dan ‘penzahiran benda’ (phenomenon). Kaitan antara kewujudan kedua-dua hakikat ini dari segi ontologi dan kedudukan kedua-duanya dalam pengetahuan manusia dari segi epistemologi dibincangkan berdasarkan perspektif Kant. Semua ini dikupas berdasarkan penelitian terhadap suatu teks oleh Kant dalam karya agung beliau Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Present Itself as a Science. Kant secara umumnya tidak menolak kewujudan noumenon walaupun beliau seakan mengakui bahawa pendekatan sains sekarang tidak mampu menanggapi hakikat noumenon tersebut. Huraian makalah ini membuktikan bahawa tidak semua hakikat mampu dicapai oleh sains moden. Keyakinan bahawa sains moden adalah satu-satunya jalan mencapai ilmu dan makrifah akan menghalang manusia dari mengetahui banyak rahsia kewujudan yang jauh dari ruang jangkauan sains. 1 Wan Suhaimi Wan Abdullah, PhD. is an associate professor at the Department of `Aqidah and Islamic Thought, Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya. Email: [email protected]. The author would like to thank Dr. Edward Omar Moad from Dept. of Humanities, Qatar University who have read the earlier draft of this article and suggested a very useful remarks and comments some of which were quoted in this article. Jurnal Usuluddin, Bil 27 [2008] 25-40 ABSTRACT The article discusses one of the major issues dealt with by Kant in his epistemology, that is the issue related to the thing-in-itself (noumenon) and the appearance (phenomenon).
  • Kant's Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter

    Kant's Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter

    Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter Daniel Rothbart, Irmgard Scherer Abstract: Kant’s theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle relationships between the experimental scientist, the modern instrument, and nature’s atomic particles. The principle of purposive- ness which governs judgment has also a role in implicitly guiding modern experimental science. In Part 1 we explore Kant’s philosophy of science as he shows how knowledge of material nature and unobservable entities is possible. In Part 2 we examine the way in which Kant’s treatment of judgment, with its operating principle of purposiveness, enters into his critical project and under- lies the possibility of rational science. In Part 3 we show that the centrality given to judgment in Kant’s conception of science provides philosophical in- sight into the investigation of atomic substances in modern chemistry. Keywords : Kant , judgment , purposiveness , experimentation , investigation of matter . Introduction Kant’s philosophy of science centers on the problem of how it is possible to acquire genuine knowledge of unobservable entities, such as atoms and molecules. “What and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?” ( CPuR , Axvii). This raises the question of the role of experiments in the knowability ( Erkennbarkeit ) and the experientiality (Erfahrbarkeit ) of nature. Kant’s insights into the character of scientific experimentation are not given the hearing they deserve. We argue that Kant’s theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle inter- actions between the experimental chemist, the modern chemical instrument, and molecular substance.
  • Feng Youlan's Interpretation of Western Philosophy

    Feng Youlan's Interpretation of Western Philosophy

    ASIANetwork Exchange | Fall 2014 | volume 22 | 1 Feng Youlan’s Interpretation of Western Philosophy: A Critical Examination from the Perspective of Metaphysical Methodology Derong Chen Abstract: This paper concentrates on Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy from the perspective of metaphysical methodology and aims to display a limited observation of Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy through the window of metaphysical methodology. Based on a brief review of the recent studies of Feng Youlan and Western philoso- phy, this paper analyzes the progress and insufficient aspects in current studies on this issue and particularly clarifies what are the metaphysics and metaphysical methods in the context of Feng Youlan’s philosophy. In clarifying Feng’s interpreta- tion of Western philosophy from the perspective of methodology, this paper further critically analyzes Feng’s positive metaphysical methods and negative metaphysical methods, and assumes that Feng’s negative metaphysical methods essentially is a kind of attitude towards metaphysics but neither a kind of metaphysics nor a kind of metaphysical methods. Instead of characterizing metaphysical methods as positive and negative as Feng did, this paper suggests an alternative division of metaphysical methods: direct and indirect methods of dealing with metaphysical issues. Keywords Feng Youlan; metaphysics; metaphysical methods; Western philosophy; negative metaphysics In the twentieth century, Feng Youlan was one of the Chinese intellectuals most deeply Derong Chen is a Sessional involved in the dialogue and interaction between Chinese and Western philosophies. In Lecturer II at the University of addition to studying Western philosophy at Columbia University, he systematically con- Toronto Mississauga. ducted research on Western philosophy, specifically the philosophy of life.
  • 7579 Bohr Anthropology Paper.Pdf

    7579 Bohr Anthropology Paper.Pdf

    268 I ATURE FEH. 18, 1939, \ 'oL. 143 Natural Philosophy and Human Cultures* By Prof. Niels Bohr, For. Mem. R.S. J T is only wiLh great ho.~ itai i on that I haYe for our general outlook i" common!.\' realized. it accepted a. kind invitaLion to address t his is scarcely yet so as rogardH tho unsuspectt'd assembly of distinguished reprcsenlati,·cs of tho epistemological lesson which tho opening of quite anthropological and ethnographical sciences of now realm s of phyHical ro::;oarch has given us in which I , as a physicist,. have of course no first-hand tho most recent years. Our penetration into the knowledge. Still, on this specia,l occasion. when world of atoms. hitherto closed to t.he oyo of man cYon tho historical smroundings speak to everyone is indeed an adventure wh ich may bo compared of us about aspoct.s of lifo other than those discussed with the great journoyil of discovery of the aL tho regular congress proceedings, it might. circumnavigators and t h(' bol<l explorations of perhaps bo of interest to try w.i t.h a few words Lo astronomers into t. ho depths of colosLial space direct attention to the epistemological aspect of As is well !mown. the man·cllou development of the latest dc,·elopmont of natural philosophy and tho art of physical experimentation has not only it s bearing on general human problems. Notwith­ romO\'Od t ho last traces of tho old holiof that the "tanding t ho great separation between ou r different coarse n r~s of our ~o;cnsrs would for over prcren hm nchcs of knowledge, the new lesson which has us from obtaining direct.

  • Introduction: Towards a Reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism Nicolas De Warren and Andrea Staiti

    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-03257-6 - New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism Edited by Nicolas De Warren and Andrea Staiti Excerpt More information Introduction: towards a reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti In the summer of 1914, T. S. Eliot arrived in Marburg from Harvard University to attend a summer course in philosophy before taking up residency at Merton College, Oxford, for a year of study with Harold Joachim, F. H. Bradley’s successor. At the University of Marburg, Eliot met Paul Natorp, who assisted him in finding affordable accommodation and lectured in his course on philosophy. The outbreak of the First World War would cut short Eliot’s stay in Marburg, but not before he had the chance to sketch a portrait of the venerable Neo-Kantian Professor. Natorp strikes a professorial pose, one arm tucked behind his back, the other slung across his waist. With elven ears and bald cranium, the philosopher appears endearing in his otherworldliness. Natorp’s face is hidden behind oval glasses, so large that they seem to constitute a hindrance rather than an aid to seeing reality. Eliot’s sketch can be seen as a visual epitome for how Neo-Kantianism appeared to a younger generation of intellectuals and philosophers who would come of age in the aftermath of a Europe laid waste through the cataclysm of the Great War. Eliot’s amusing sketch is an apt illustration for what Hans-Georg Gadamer, who wrote his PhD dissertation on Plato under Natorp in 1922, characterized as the Neo-Kantian “calm and 1 confident aloofness” engrossed in “complacent system-building.” With slightly more bite, Hannah Arendt charged Neo-Kantianism with drown- ing philosophy “in a sea of boredom,” thereby offering a softer version of the same hostility that spirited Martin Heidegger’s confrontation with 2 Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929.
  • The Phenomenon of Chance in Ancient Greek Thought

    The Phenomenon of Chance in Ancient Greek Thought

    THE PHENOMENON OF CHANCE IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT by MELISSA M. SHEW A DISSERTATION Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School ofthe University ofOregon in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2008 11 University of Oregon Graduate School Confirmation of Approval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by: Melissa Shew Title: "The Phenomenon of Chance in Ancient Greek Thought" This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree in the Department ofPhilosophy by: Peter Warnek, Chairperson, Philosophy John Lysaker, Member, Philosophy Ted Toadvine, Member, Philosophy James Crosswhite, Outside Member, English and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies/Dean ofthe Graduate School for the University of Oregon. September 6, 2008 Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University of Oregon Libraries. 111 An Abstract of the Dissertation of Melissa M. Shew for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy to be taken September 2008 Title: THE PHENOMENON OF CHANCE IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT Approved: Dr. Peter Warnek This dissertation engages three facets of Greek philosophy: 1) the phenomenon of tyche (chance, fortune, happening, or luck) in Aristotle's Physics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Poetics; 2) how tyche infonns Socrates' own philosophical practice in the Platonic dialogues; and 3) how engaging tyche in these Greek texts challenges established interpretations of Greek thought in contemporary scholarship and discussion. I argue that the complex status of tyche in Aristotle's texts, when combined with its appearance in the Platonic dialogues and the framework of Greek myth and poetry (poiesis), underscores the seriousness with which the Greeks consider the role of chance in human life.
  • Phil. 126 Leibniz Passages

    Phil. 126 Leibniz Passages

    Phil. 126 Leibniz Passages (A) Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in three ways. The first is that of natural influence. This is the way with which Mr. Huygens experimented, with results that greatly surprised him. He suspended two pendulums from the same piece of wood. The continued strokes of the pendulums transmitted similar vibrations to the particles of wood, but these vibrations could not continue in their own frequency without interfering with each other, at least when the two pendulums did not beat together. The result, by a kind of miracle, was that even when their strokes had been intentionally disturbed, they came to beat together again, somewhat like two strings tuned to each other. The second way of making two clocks, even poor ones, agree always is to assign a skilled craftsman to them who adjusts them and constantly sets them in agreement. The third way is to construct these two timepieces at the beginning with such skill and accuracy that one can be assured of their subsequent agreement. Now put the soul and the body in the place of these two timepieces. Then their agreement or sympathy will also come about in one of these three ways. The way of influence is that of the common philosophy. But since it is impossible to conceive of material particles or of species or immaterial qualities which can pass from one of these substances into the other, this view must be rejected. The way of assistance is that of the system of occasional causes.
  • Between Psychology and Philosophy East-West Themes and Beyond

    Between Psychology and Philosophy East-West Themes and Beyond

    PALGRAVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHY Between Psychology and Philosophy East-West Themes and Beyond Michael Slote Palgrave Studies in Comparative East-West Philosophy Series Editors Chienkuo Mi Philosophy Soochow University Taipei City, Taiwan Michael Slote Philosophy Department University of Miami Coral Gables, FL, USA The purpose of Palgrave Studies in Comparative East-West Philosophy is to generate mutual understanding between Western and Chinese philoso- phers in a world of increased communication. It has now been clear for some time that the philosophers of East and West need to learn from each other and this series seeks to expand on that collaboration, publishing books by philosophers from different parts of the globe, independently and in partnership, on themes of mutual interest and currency. The series also publishs monographs of the Soochow University Lectures and the Nankai Lectures. Both lectures series host world-renowned philosophers offering new and innovative research and thought. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/16356 Michael Slote Between Psychology and Philosophy East-West Themes and Beyond Michael Slote Philosophy Department University of Miami Coral Gables, FL, USA ISSN 2662-2378 ISSN 2662-2386 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Comparative East-West Philosophy ISBN 978-3-030-22502-5 ISBN 978-3-030-22503-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22503-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020. This book is an open access publication. Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.
  • An Introduction to Philosophy

    An Introduction to Philosophy

    An Introduction to Philosophy W. Russ Payne Bellevue College Copyright (cc by nc 4.0) 2015 W. Russ Payne Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document with attribution under the terms of Creative Commons: Attribution Noncommercial 4.0 International or any later version of this license. A copy of the license is found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 1 Contents Introduction ………………………………………………. 3 Chapter 1: What Philosophy Is ………………………….. 5 Chapter 2: How to do Philosophy ………………….……. 11 Chapter 3: Ancient Philosophy ………………….………. 23 Chapter 4: Rationalism ………….………………….……. 38 Chapter 5: Empiricism …………………………………… 50 Chapter 6: Philosophy of Science ………………….…..… 58 Chapter 7: Philosophy of Mind …………………….……. 72 Chapter 8: Love and Happiness …………………….……. 79 Chapter 9: Meta Ethics …………………………………… 94 Chapter 10: Right Action ……………………...…………. 108 Chapter 11: Social Justice …………………………...…… 120 2 Introduction The goal of this text is to present philosophy to newcomers as a living discipline with historical roots. While a few early chapters are historically organized, my goal in the historical chapters is to trace a developmental progression of thought that introduces basic philosophical methods and frames issues that remain relevant today. Later chapters are topically organized. These include philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, areas where philosophy has shown dramatic recent progress. This text concludes with four chapters on ethics, broadly construed. I cover traditional theories of right action in the third of these. Students are first invited first to think about what is good for themselves and their relationships in a chapter of love and happiness. Next a few meta-ethical issues are considered; namely, whether they are moral truths and if so what makes them so.
  • Aristotle's Account of the Vicious: a Forgivable Inconsistency (2007)

    Aristotle's Account of the Vicious: a Forgivable Inconsistency (2007)

    North American Philosophical Publications Aristotle's Account of the Vicious: A Forgivable Inconsistency Author(s): David Roochnik Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 207-220 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27745092 . Accessed: 20/08/2014 13:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History of Philosophy Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 13:16:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 24, Number 3, July 2007 ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF THE VICIOUS: A FORGIVABLE INCONSISTENCY David Roochnik the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seems to offer inconsistent ac In counts of the vicious man. In Book VII, he is explicitly contrasted with the akrat?s, the morally weak. The latter is overcome by a desire or an emotion that overrides his reason; he suffers a conflict between his logos and his pathos.
  • 5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Robert L

    5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Robert L

    Contemporary Civilization (Ideas and Institutions Section XII: The osP t-Enlightenment Period of Western Man) 1958 5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Robert L. Bloom Gettysburg College Basil L. Crapster Gettysburg College Harold A. Dunkelberger Gettysburg College See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/contemporary_sec12 Part of the European Languages and Societies Commons, History Commons, and the Philosophy Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Bloom, Robert L. et al. "5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism. Pt XII: The osP t-Enlightenment Period." Ideas and Institutions of Western Man (Gettysburg College, 1958), 53-69. This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ contemporary_sec12/5 This open access book chapter is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Abstract The ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) are significant enough to be compared to a watershed in Western thought. In his mind were gathered up the major interests of the Enlightenment: science, epistemology, and ethics; and all of these were given a new direction which he himself described as another Copernican revolution. As Copernicus had shown that the earth revolved around the sun, rather than the sun around the earth, so Kant showed that the knowing subject played an active and creative role in the production of his world picture, rather than the static and passive role which the early Enlightenment had assigned him.