THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

and the

PHENOMENON OF MIND

It would have been foolish even to think

of the solution of such a problem

without having prepared myself by a

thorough study of the means and by busying myself with less difficult problems

Weierstrass THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

and the

PHENOMENON OF MIND

Richard B. Wells

Copyright © 2006 by Richard B. Wells All Rights Reserved This book is dedicated to my loving sisters, Sherri and Melody, who are the talented members of our family.

Contents

Preface xxv

1. First Prolegomenon: The Phenomenon of Mind 1

§ 1. Common Views of the Mind 1

§ 2. Different Views of the Mind 2

§ 3. Empirical Materialism 3

§ 4. Scientific Materialism 5 § 4.1 The Mind Dust Theory 7 § 4.2 The Behaviorist Theory 8 § 4.3 The Functionalism Theory 8

§ 5. The Mentalist Views 13 § 5.1 Theme I: Mind is Intelligence or Reason and is Part of the Soul 13 § 5.2 Theme II: Mind is a Thinking Substance 16 § 5.3 Francis Bacon and the Dawn of the Age of Reason 17 § 5.4 Rationalism and Mind as Substance 19 Descartes 20 Leibniz 23 The Supersensible 25 Monads 28 Leibniz' "Art of Discovery" 33 § 5.5 Theme III: Mind is a Soul or Spirit, Having the Power of Cognition and Action 35 Representationalism 37 Subjective Idealism 41 Hume's Skepticism 43 § 5.6 Two Other Rationalist Themes 47 Theme IV: Mind as a Particular Mode of God's Thought 47 Theme V: Mind as Self-Consciousness, Knowing Itself as Universal 49

§ 6. The Unified Themes 51

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§ 6.1 Theme VI: Mind as an Organization of Mental Phenomena 53 Advantages and Shortcomings of Kant's Critical Philosophy 60 § 6.2 Theme VII: Mind as the Totality of Mental Processes and the Principle of Meaningful and Purposive Behavior 62 Mind as the Stream of Thought 63 Genetic Epistemology 69 Summary of Theme VII 72

§ 7. The Phenomenon of Mind 73

§ 8. The Doctrine of Organized Being 77

2. Second Prolegomenon: Science and Philosophy 79

§ 1. The Sciences 79

§ 2. Positivism and the Natural Sciences 84

§ 3. Laboratory and Nonlaboratory Sciences 87

§ 4. Paradigms 89

§ 5. Rational Principles 91

§ 6. Kant's Philosophy of Science 93

§ 7. Science, Metaphysics, and the Critical Philosophy 98 § 7.1 The General View of Metaphysics 98 § 7.2 Kant's Classification of Metaphysics 100 Transcendental Metaphysics 102 Metaphysics Proper 103 § 7.3 The Critical Philosophy and Science 105

§ 8. The Development of Theory 109

§ 9. Common Characteristics in the Development of Science 127 Theme I: Every Science Has a Limited Topic 127 Theme 2: Every Science is Constructed 128 Theme 3: Every Science is Methodical 129 Theme 4: Every Science Concerns Itself with Specific Objects 131 Theme 5: A Science Begins as an Historical Doctrine 132 Theme 6: A Science Admits of Dubitability 135

§ 10. Speculation 138

§ 11. The Idea of a System of Metaphysics 145

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3. Representation 152

§ 1. The Primitive Character of Representation 152 § 1.1 Doctrine of Method for the Exposition of Ideas by Analytic Division 153 § 1.2 Comment on the Method Employed 157

§ 2. The Notions of Matter and Form 160 § 2.1 Matter and Form in the Notion of "Existence" 160 § 2.2 Matter and Form in the Notions of "Being" and "Reality" 163

§ 3. Second Level Analytic Representation 166 § 3.1 The Representations of Quality and Quantity 168 § 3.2 The Representations of Relation and Modality 170 § 3.3 The 2LAR Structure 172

§ 4. The Making of Representations 175 § 4.1 Analytic, Synthetic, and Anasynthetic Representation 176 § 4.2 Kant's Verstandes-Actus 179 Comparison 179 Reflexion 183 Abstraction 184

§ 5. Cognitions 186 § 5.1 The Object of Cognition 187 The Copy of Reality Hypothesis 187 The Construction of Reality in the Infant 189 The Objectification of Detail 191 § 5.2 Intuitions and Concepts 194 Intuition 195 The Idea of "Concepts" 196 The Sensible Nature of Appearances 199 Concepts 201

§ 6. Kant's Threefold Synthesis of Experience 203 § 6.1 Functional Invariants and the Theory of Assimilation 204 The Functional Invariants 207 Assimilation and Equilibration 210 § 6.2 A Priori Foundations of the Possibility of Experience 211 "Knowledge" and "Experience" 212 The Necessity of A Priori Foundations of Experience 218 The Synthesis of Apprehension in the Intuition 220 The Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination 223 The Synthesis of Re-cognition in a Concept 229

§ 7. The Ideas of Representation in Epitome 236

4. First Epilegomenon: Representation and Metaphysics Proper 240

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§ 1. Questions Raised by Representation 240

§ 2. The Idea of Organization 241 § 2.1 Organization and Rational Cosmology 242 § 2.2 Rational Cosmology and the Idea of Nature 243 § 2.3 Rational Cosmology and the System of Cosmological Ideas 246 The Cosmological Idea of Quantity 247 The Cosmological Idea of Quality 249 The Cosmological Idea of Relation 251 The Cosmological Idea of Modality 252 § 2.4 The Applied Metaphysic of Organization 253

§ 3. Power and the Idea of a Faculty 255 § 3.1 Locke's Description of 'Power' and 'Faculty' 256 § 3.2 Faculties and Organization 258

§ 4. Adaptation and Rational Psychology 261 § 4.1 The Object of Rational Psychology 265 The "I" and the "Soul" 267 William James and the "Soul" 268 § 4.2 The Ideas of Rational Psychology 270 § 4.3 The Implications of Rational Psychology for Adaptation 274

§ 5. Adaptation and Rational Theology 276 § 5.1 The Ideas of Rational Theology 277 The Transcendental Ideal 281 The Idea of Entis Realissimi 282 The Idea of Ens Originarium 284 The Idea of Ens Summum 286 The Idea of Ens Entium 287 § 5.2 The Objective Reality of Adaptation 288

§ 6. Transcendental Illusion 290

§ 7. The Verstandes-Actus and Metaphysics Proper 297 § 7.1 The Various Definitions of "Logic" 297 § 7.2 The Growth of Logical Thinking 299 Autistic, Intelligent, and Ego-Centric Thought 300 Syncretism and Juxtaposition 302 Schemes, Functions, and the Logic of Meanings 306 A. Schemes 307 B. Constitutive Functions 309 C. The Logic of Meanings 311 § 7.3 Implications for the Verstandes-Actus 315 Comparison 315 Reflexion 325 Abstraction 327

§ 8. Transformations and the Synthesis of Experience 328

§ 9. Concluding Remarks 331

viii Contents

5. Consciousness 333

§ 1. The Phenomenon of Consciousness 333

§ 2. Consciousness and Transcendental Apperception 335

§ 3. The Principle of the Unity of Consciousness 338 § 3.1 Hysterical Neurosis 338 Conversion Hysteria 339 Dissociated States 344 § 3.2 Pure and Empirical Consciousness 345

§ 4. The Unified Themes of Pure Consciousness 347 § 4.1 James' Pragmatic Theme 347 The "Self" of Consciousness 348 Attention 351 Varieties of Attention 354 § 4.2 Freud's Theory of "The Unconscious" 358 § 4.3 Piaget and the "Grasp of Consciousness" 362 Functional Reasons for Cognizance 366 The Mechanisms of Cognizance 370 Observable Features and Inferential Coordinations 372 Evolution of Actions and the Three Levels of Knowledge 374 Processes of Interiorization and Externalization 377 § 4.4 Kant's Remarks on Consciousness 378 Remarks on Consciousness in General 379 Consciousness and "State of Mind" 381 Consciousness and "Feelings" 383 Consciousness and Receptivity 386 Consciousness and Spontaneity 388 The Conscious, the Unconscious, and Degrees of Consciousness 394

§ 5. The Faculty of Pure Consciousness 397 § 5.1 Quality in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 399 § 5.2 Modality in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 401 § 5.3 Quantity in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 407 § 5.4 Relation in the Faculty of Pure Consciousness 412

§ 6. The 2LAR of Pure Consciousness 430

6. The Data of the Senses 433

§ 1. Sense in the Faculty of Organized Being 433 § 1.1 The Rationalist View of Sense 435 § 1.2 The Materialist View of Sense 437 The Physiological Method 438 The Psychophysical Method 441 The Materialist Viewpoint 443 § 1.3 The Idea of Sense 447

ix Contents

§ 2. Kant's Anthropology of Sense 449

§ 3. The Metaphysics Proper of Rational Physics 453 § 3.1 Pseudo-Metaphysics 456 § 3.2 The Pure Science of Nature 459 § 3.3 The Pure Principles of Rational Physics 462 Quantity and the Axioms of Intuition 462 Quality and the Anticipations of Perception 466 Prolegomenon to the Dynamical Principles 470 Relation and the Analogies of Experience 475 A. First Analogy: Principle of Persistence 476 B. Second Analogy: Principle of Generation 477 C. Third Analogy: Principle of Community 481 Modality and the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General 483

§ 4. Logical Division and Real Division 485

§ 5. The Transcendental Sensorimotor Idea 490 § 5.1 Quantity and the Unity of Faculties 491 § 5.2 Quality and the Condition of State 492 § 5.3 Relation and Information 494 § 5.4 Modality and Meaning 496

§ 6. The Empirical Sensorimotor Idea 497 § 6.1 Objections to the Brain-Automaton Model 500 § 6.2 The 2LAR of the Empirical Sensorimotor Idea 503 Quantity and the Anatomical Idea 504 Quality and the Moving Powers 506

§ 7. The 2LAR of the Data of the Senses 508 § 7.1 Quantity and the Physiological Idea 509 § 7.2 Quality and Seeming 510 § 7.3 Relation and the Idea of Generalized Emergent Properties 512 § 7.4 Modality and the State of Satisfaction 514

§ 8. The Applied Metaphysic of the Data of the Senses 517

7. The Ontology of Determining Judgment 521

§ 1. Ontology, Epistemology, and Logic 521

§ 2. The Classical System 526 § 2.1 Plato 529 § 2.2 Aristotle 537 Aristotle's "Metaphysics" 539 Aristotle's "Logic" 544 § 2.3 The Neoplatonist's Aristotle 547 § 2.4 The Journey to the Present 551

§ 3. Mathematical Logic 560

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§ 4. Ontology and Logic Under the Copernican Hypothesis 567

§ 5. The 2LAR of the Process of Determining Judgment 570 § 5.1 Quantity and the Form of Determinant Judgments 572 The Idea of Identification in Synthetic Composition of Judgment 572 The Idea of Differentiation in Analytic Composition of Judgment 573 The Idea of Integration in Anasynthetic Composition of Judgment 574 § 5.2 Quality and the Matter of Determinant Judgment 576 Agreement and Experiential Concepts 576 Opposition and Notions 577 Subcontrarity and Ideas 578 § 5.3 Relation and Inference 580 The Internal and the Inference of Understanding 581 The External and the Inference of Reason 584 The Transitive and the Inference of Judgment 588 § 5.4 Modality and the Matter of Truth 591 The Determinable and Empirical Truth 592 The Determination and Logical Truth 598 The Determining Factor and Logical Perfection 600

8. The Ontology of Determinant Judgments 604

§ 1. Imagination 604 § 1.1 Imagination from the Classical Viewpoint 604 § 1.2 James' View of Imagination 607 § 1.3 Piaget's View of Imagination 609 § 1.4 Transcendental Imagination 615 Imagination and Apprehension 618 Imagination and Understanding 620

§ 2. Transcendental Schematism and Judgment 622

§ 3. The Transcendental Schemata 628 § 3.1 The Schemata of Quantity 629 § 3.2 The Schemata of Quality 632 § 3.3 The Schemata of Relation 637 § 3.4 The Schemata of Modality 642

§ 4. The Categories of Understanding 648

§ 5. The Categories from the Logical Perspective 653 § 5.1 The Categories of Quantity from the Logical Perspective 656 Concepts 657 Concepts and their Use in Determinant Judgments 659 Combination, Aggregation and the Scope of a Concept 662 Momenta and "Functions" of Quantity 665 The Momenta of the Categories of Quantity 669 § 5.2 The Categories of Quality from the Logical Perspective 672 The Logical Momenta of Quality 673 The Momenta of the Categories of Quality 675

xi Contents

§ 5.3 The Categories of Relation from the Logical Perspective 679 Propositions and the Categorical Logical Momentum 680 The Category of Substance and Accident from the Logical Perspective 683 Hypothetical Propositions and the Hypothetical Logical Momentum 685 The Category of Causality and Dependence from the Logical Perspective 687 Disjunctive Propositions and the Disjunctive Logical Momentum 690 The Category of Community from the Logical Perspective 692 § 5.4 The Categories of Modality from the Logical Perspective 694 The Logical Momenta of Modality 698 The Categories of Modality from the Logical Perspective 701 A. The Category of Possibility - Impossibility 702 B. The Category of Dasein - Nichtsein 706 C. The Category of Necessity - Contingency 707 § 5.5 A Comment on the Theory of the Categories from the Logical Perspective 709

§ 6. The Categories from the Transcendental Perspective 713 § 6.1 Metaphysics Proper in the Doctrine of Method 713 § 6.2 The Categories of Quantity from the Transcendental Perspective 716 The Comprehension of Extensive Scope 718 The Categories of Quantity from the Transcendental Perspective 720 § 6.3 The Categories of Quality from the Transcendental Perspective 723 The Principle of Compatibility 724 The Categories of Quality from the Transcendental Perspective 726 § 6.4 The Categories of Relation from the Transcendental Perspective 729 Anticipation 731 Transcendental Anticipation and the Categories of Relation 733 § 6.5 The Categories of Modality from the Transcendental Perspective 736 The Nexus of Perception 738 The Categories of Modality from the Transcendental Perspective 741

§ 7. The Perspectives with regard to Determining Judgment 743

9. The Ontology of Speculative Reason 744

§ 1. The Phenomenon of Reason 744

§ 2. The Empirical Development of Thought 747 § 2.1 Structures, Compensations, and Regulations 750 § 2.2 Equilibration as Regulation via Interactions 754 Interactions of Type I 756 A. Obs.S 756 B. Obs.O 758 C. Equilibration in Type I Interactions 760 Interactions of Type II A and B 764 Interactions of Type II C 768 § 2.3 The Hierarchy of Regulations 770 The First Stage of Sensorimotor Intelligence 770 The Second Stage of Sensorimotor Intelligence 774 The Action - Object Separation in the Hierarchy of Equilibrium 780

xii Contents

§ 2.4 Functions and Equilibration 783 The Compensation Behaviors 785 Functions, Compensations, and the Hierarchy of Regulations 789

§ 3. Acroamatic Principles and Empirical Postulates 791 § 3.1 The Principles of Rational Cosmology 795 § 3.2 The Principles of Rational Theology 804 § 3.3 The Regulation of Understanding 812 § 3.4 Pure Reason as Object 816

§ 4. The Categories from the Hypothetical Perspective 821 § 4.1 The Ideas of Nature and World, Object and Thing 822 Nature and World 822 Objekt, Object and Thing 824 A. Objekt 826 B. Object (der Gegenstand) and Thing 828 § 4.2 The Schematism of the Cosmological Ideas 831 § 4.3 The Categories from the Hypothetical Perspective 834

§ 5. The Categories from the Empirical Perspective 837 § 5.1 The Critical Philosophy of Empiricism 838 § 5.2 The Schematism of the Theological Ideas 841 § 5.3 The Limits of Knowledge and the Boundaries of Reason 846 § 5.4 Empirical Quantity and Quality 848 § 5.5 Empirical Relation 850 § 5.6 Empirical Modality 853

§ 6. Resume 854

10. Second Epilegomenon: Standpoints 856

§ 1. Summary of the Categories of Understanding 856

§ 2. Standpoints in the Systematic Faculty of Thinking 860

§ 3. Standpoints and the Legislative Faculty of the Mind 865

§ 4. The Theoretical Standpoint 872 § 4.1 Pre-Kantian Ideas Regarding "Understanding" 875 Aquinas and Understanding 876 Hobbes and Descartes 879 Locke and Leibniz 882 § 4.2 Understanding from the Theoretical Standpoint 886 § 4.3 The Idea of Perfection 890 § 4.4 The Ideal of Logical Perfection 894 Quantity in Logical Perfection 896 Quality in Logical Perfection 900 Relation in Logical Perfection 909 Modality in Logical Perfection 913

§ 5. The Practical Standpoint 919

xiii Contents

§ 5.1 The Idea of the Motivational System 920 § 5.2 Margenau and the Idea of Physical Causality 925 § 5.3 Brain Function and the Motivational System 928 § 5.4 Practical Causality and the Idea of Freedom 932 § 5.5 Practical Reason and the Practical Standpoint 937

§ 6. The Judicial Standpoint 940 § 6.1 The Two Sides of Reflective Judgment 942 § 6.2 The Principle of Zweckmäßigkeit 944 § 6.3 Reflective Judgment and the Judicial Standpoint 947

11. Third Prolegomenon: Practical Anthropology 951

§ 1. Freedom and Mechanism 951 § 1.1 The Amoeba 954 § 1.2 People 956 § 1.3 The Topical Question 958

§ 2. What Science Requires of Its Intelligible Ideas 960

§ 3. The Context of Practical Causality 966 § 3.1 Practical Anthropology and the Individual 971 § 3.2 Self-Consciousness and Individuality 974 § 3.3 The Mental Evolution of Reality Considered Psychologically 978 § 3.4 Objectivity and Piagetian Relativity 983

§ 4. Practical Existenz 990 § 4.1 Piagetian Causality 992 § 4.2 Causality and Assimilation 998

§ 5. The Emergence of the Self 1002 § 5.1 The Logical-Practical Perspective of the Self 1003 § 5.2 The Transcendental-Practical Perspective of the Self 1007 § 5.3 Greenspan's Six Levels of Development 1011 Level 1: Making Sense of Sensation 1012 Level 2: Intimacy and Relating 1016 Level 3: Buds of Intentionality 1020 A. Stage 3 1022 B. Stage 4 1026 Level 4: Purpose and Interaction 1033 A. Transcendental-Practical Unification 1034 B. Logical-Practical Unification 1036

§ 6. Practical Implications of the Evolution of the Self 1041

12. The Context of Practical Reason 1047

§ 1. The Context of Life 1047 § 1.1 Biological Life 1048 § 1.2 The Historical Themes of "Life" 1050

xiv Contents

Aristotelian Vitality 1051 Post - Aristotelian Vitality 1055 A. Later Greek and Roman Thought 1057 B. Moslem Scholasticism 1060 C. The European Aristotle 1064 Cartesian Mechanism 1067 § 1.3 Mental Life 1071

§ 2. Appetite, Desire, and Appetitive Power 1075 § 2.1 Appetite 1077 § 2.2 The Appetitive Power 1080 § 2.3 Desire and Satisfaction 1082

§ 3. Choice and Will 1086 § 3.1 Views Opposing the Idea of Choice 1087 § 3.2 Practical Choice and Practical Will 1090

§ 4. The Idea of Freedom 1094

13. Practical Reason 1099

§ 1. The Question of Pure Practical Reason 1099

§ 2. Themes of "The Good" 1102 § 2.1 The Theme of Value 1102 § 2.2 Plato's Theme 1104 § 2.3 Aristotle's Theme 1106 § 2.4 Pleasure and Virtue as The Good 1110 § 2.5 The Epicurean Theme 1111 § 2.6 The Stoic Theme 1113 § 2.7 The Critical Context of Good and Evil 1115

§ 3. The Development of Moral Judgment 1118 § 3.1 Childish Practice of the Rules 1120 The Motor Rules Stage 1121 The Egocentric Stage 1124 The Cooperation Stage 1127 The Stage of Codification of Rules 1128 § 3.2 Childish Consciousness of the Rules 1129 The Non-Binding Stage 1130 Rule Mysticism 1132 Rules as Common Law 1135 § 3.3 Moral Realism 1137 An Example of Childish Feeling of Guilt 1139 The Child's Definition of a Lie 1140 Childish Evaluation of Lies in Terms of Content 1143 Childish Evaluation of Lies in Terms of Consequences 1145 Moral Realism 1148 § 3.4 Apriority in the Moral Judgment of the Child 1149

§ 4. Practical Rules and Practical Tenets 1152

xv Contents

§ 5. The Categorical Imperative 1158

§ 6. Transcendental Freedom 1162

§ 7. The Principle of Happiness 1164 § 7.1 The Thesis of Life 1167 § 7.2 The Critical Definition of Happiness 1171 § 7.3 Somatic and Noetic Concordia in the Principle of Happiness 1175

§ 8. The Determination of Ends and Means 1178 § 8.1 Well-Being and Ill-Being 1179 § 8.2 The Practical Subsumption of Practical Rules 1181 § 8.3 The Practical Subsumption of Maxims 1186 § 8.4 Self-Respect and Compensation 1188 § 8.5 Conceptualizing Maxims and the Hypothetical Imperatives 1194

14. The Reflecting Power of Judgment 1201

§ 1. The Systematic Faculty of Mind 1201

§ 2. The Synthetic Capacity of Aesthetical Reflective Judgment 1204 § 2.1 Comparison and Association 1208 § 2.2 Reflexion and Compatibility 1209 § 2.3 Abstraction and Transcendental Anticipation 1215

§ 3. Rational Psychology and the Transcendental - Judicial Perspective 1218 § 3.1 Aesthetic Quantity 1221 § 3.2 Aesthetic Quality 1225 Perception and Psychology 1228 The Idea of a Common Sense 1230 The Momenta of Aesthetic Quality 1232 § 3.3 Aesthetic Judgments of Composition 1233 § 3.4 Aesthetic Relation 1236 Piagetian Interest and Value 1237 The Kantian Idea of Interest 1240 Interest and the Momenta of Aesthetic Relation 1242 § 3.5 Aesthetic Modality 1244 The Transcendental Schema of Modality 1245 Piaget's Findings on Possibility and Necessity 1248 Subjective Expedience and the Synthesis of Apperception 1252 The Aesthetic Momenta in Transcendental - Judicial Perspective 1258

§ 4. Aesthetic Judgment in Empirical - Judicial Perspective 1261 § 4.1 The Power of Designation and Symbolism 1264 § 4.2 The Presentment of Reality 1269 Aesthetic Sense 1273 Imagination, Understanding, and Aesthetic Idea 1275 The Function of Aesthetic Idea 1282 The Schematic Function of an Aesthetic Idea 1288 A. Analytic Aggregation and Entis Realissimi 1289

xvi Contents

B. Quickening and Ens Originarium 1290 C. Harmonization and Ens Summum 1292 D. Modal Awareness and Ens Entium 1292 § 4.3 The Momenta of Aesthetic Judgment in Empirical - Judicial Perspective 1293 Rational Theology and the Transcendental Ideal 1294 The Theological Ideas and Aesthetic Momenta of Judgment 1296 A. Entis Realissimi and Aesthetic Quantity 1296 B. Ens Originarium and Aesthetic Quality 1297 C. Ens Summum and Aesthetic Relation 1299 D. Ens Entium and Aesthetic Modality 1300

§ 5. Summary of the Functions of Aesthetic Judgment 1301

15. Third Epilegomenon: Lust and Unlust 1306

§ 1. The Noumenal Character of Lust and Unlust 1306

§ 2. Theories of Emotion 1308 § 2.1 Traditions and Paradigms of Emotion Theories 1311 § 2.2 Definitions of Emotion 1315 § 2.3 The Idea of Primary Emotions 1320

§ 3. Three Emotion Theory Examples 1322 § 3.1 The Differential Emotions Theory 1322 § 3.2 Plutchik's Psychoevolutionary Model 1325 § 3.3 The Fuzzy Circumplex Model 1335 § 3.4 Summary 1340

§ 4. Motivation 1342 § 4.1 Drives, Needs, and Instincts 1348 § 4.2 Piaget's View of Instincts 1351 § 4.3 Freud, Triebe, and the Lustprinzip 1354 § 4.4 James' Theory of Instincts 1359

§ 5. The Paradigm Problem 1363

§ 6. The Kraft Principle 1369 § 6.1 Act, Acting, and Action 1370 § 6.2 The Ontological Requirements of Act, Acting, and Action 1375 § 6.3 Transcendental Logic and Ontology 1384

§ 7. Psyche and the Lust Principle 1387 § 7.1 The Function of Self-Adaptation 1389 § 7.2 Adaptation, Organization, and Psychic Dimension 1392 § 7.3 Lust in the Psychic Dimension of Adaptation 1394 § 7.4 Lust in the Psychic Dimension of Organization 1398 § 7.5 The Lust Principle 1404

16. The Teleological Function 1412

xvii Contents

§ 1. Teleology and Science 1412

§ 2. Is Teleological Thinking Innate or Habitual? 1418

§ 3. The Systematizing Function of Teleological Judgment 1423

§ 4. Belief 1427

§ 5. The Transcendental Function of Teleological Reflective Judgment 1431 § 5.1 Objectivity 1432 The Psychological Realerklärung of Empirical Meanings 1434 Apperception and the Judicial Idea 1438 Objectivity and Meaning 1445 § 5.2 Orientation 1447 § 5.3 Continuity, Reflective Judgment, and Psyche 1452

§ 6. The Synthesis in Continuity: Part I 1460 § 6.1 Quantity in the Synthesis in Continuity 1462 § 6.2 Quality in the Synthesis in Continuity 1469

§ 7. The Motoregulatory Orientation 1479 § 7.1 William James and the Experience of Activity 1480 § 7.2 Jamesian Instincts 1486 § 7.3 The James-Lange Theory 1488 § 7.4 James’ Volitional Psychology 1495 § 7.5 Motoregulatory Expression 1503

§ 8. The Synthesis in Continuity: Part II 1505 § 8.1 Relation in the Synthesis in Continuity 1506 Continuity and the First Analogy of Experience 1511 Continuity and the Second Analogy of Experience 1513 Continuity and the Third Analogy of Experience 1519 § 8.2 Modality in the Synthesis in Continuity 1522 Meaning and the First Postulate of Empirical Thinking in General 1526 Meaning and the Second Postulate of Empirical Thinking in General 1528 Meaning and the Third Postulate of Empirical Thinking in General 1529

§ 9. The Animating Principles 1536 § 9.1 The Animating Principle of Somatic Kraft 1536 § 9.2 The Animating Principle of Noetic Kraft 1538 § 9.3 The Animating Principle of Somatic Organization 1549 § 9.4 The Animating Principle of Noetic Organization 1552

§10. Summary 1556

17. The Transcendental Aesthetic of Space 1558

§ 1. The Idea of Space 1558 § 1.1 The Greek Ideas of “Space”, “Place”, and “Void” 1559 § 1.2 Descartes 1567 § 1.3 Newton and Leibniz 1571

xviii Contents

§ 1.4 Maxwell and Einstein 1575

§ 2. The Psychology of Space: Poincaré and Piaget 1587 § 2.1 Geometrical Space and Representative Space 1588 § 2.2 The Child’s Conception of Space 1592 § 2.3 Analogy Example: The Permutation Group 1598 § 2.4 Piaget’s Practical Spaces 1601

§ 3. Metaphysical Requirements of the Intuition of Space 1606 § 3.1 Kant’s Remarks in Opus Postumum 1607 § 3.2 Does Kant’s Space Implicate a Euclidean Objective Space? 1610 § 3.3 Does Kant’s Space Deny Non-Euclidean Geometries? 1614

§ 4. The Pure Intuition of Space in the Theoretical Standpoint 1625

§ 5. Space and Reflective Judgment 1630 § 5.1 The Binding Code Hypothesis I: Convergence Zone Assemblies in Perceptions 1632 Spatio-Temporal Integration in the Brain 1634 Convergence Zones 1636 § 5.2 The Binding Code Hypothesis II: Dynamic Link Neural Networks 1638 § 5.3 The Interactive Roles of Pure Intuition and Reflective Judgment 1642

§ 6. The Topological Synthesis of Space 1646 § 6.1 The Topological Object 1646 § 6.2 The Topological Synthesis 1651 The Metaphysic of Motion and Empirical Space 1652 Gestaltung and the Topological Synthesis 1655

§ 7. Postscript: The Aesthetic of the Pure Intuition of Time 1661

18. Teleological Reflective Judgment 1665

§ 1. The Manifold in Formal Expedience 1665

§ 2. The Hypothetical Perspective in the Judicial Standpoint 1668 § 2.1 The Judicial Cosmological Idea of Modality 1671 § 2.2 The Judicial Cosmological Idea of Relation 1679 § 2.3 The Judicial Cosmological Idea of Quantity 1690 § 2.4 A Psycho-Neurological Example 1697 § 2.5 The Judicial Cosmological Idea of Quality 1701

§ 3. The Formal Purposiveness of Perfection 1704 § 3.1 The Schematism of Aesthetical Perfection 1705 § 3.2 The Transcendental Topic of Aesthetical Perfection 1709 Sameness and Difference 1713 Agreement and Opposition 1715 The Internal and the External 1723 The Determinable and the Determination 1727

xix Contents

§ 4. The Metaphysic of Nature 1730 § 4.1 Phoronomy 1736 § 4.2 Dynamics 1738 § 4.3 Mechanics 1746 § 4.4 Phenomenology 1760

§ 5. The Momenta of Teleological Judgment 1770 § 5.1 Quantity in Teleological Judgment 1770 § 5.2 Quality in Teleological Judgment 1773 § 5.3 Relation in Teleological Judgment 1780 § 5.4 Modality in Teleological Judgment 1784

§ 6. Summary of the Momenta of Teleological Judgment 1790

19. Fourth Epilegomenon: The Transition to Practical Judgment 1791

§ 1. Regulated Actions 1791 § 1.1 Damasio’s Proto-Self 1793 § 1.2 Regulation in Regard to the Autonomic and the Non-Autonomic 1797 § 1.3 Non-Autonomic Regulation 1803

§ 2. The Impetuousness of Reflective Judgment 1805 § 2.1 The Somatic Basis of Movement 1807 § 2.2 The Noetic Connection 1810

§ 3. The Task of the Appetitive Power of Pure Reason 1815 § 3.1 The Platonic and Aristotelian Traditions of the Power of Reason 1816 The Platonic Tradition of Reason 1816 The Aristotelian Tradition of Reason 1819 § 3.2 Appetitive Power in the Critical Philosophy 1823

§ 4. The Manifold of Rules 1825

§ 5. The Flavor of the Categories of Freedom 1829 § 5.1 Freedom and Kant’s Moral Categories 1831 § 5.2 Antisocial Personality Disorder 1837 § 5.3 Cognitive Dissonance, Conscience, and Practical Concepts 1844 § 5.4 The Ideal of Practical Perfection of Universal Practical Law 1851

§ 6. The Value Structure 1853 § 6.1 The Critical Context of Piagetian Value 1855 § 6.2 Value Structure in the Manifold of Practical Rules 1857

§ 7. The Motivational State 1861 § 7.1 Automaton Theory and the Idea of “State” 1863 § 7.2 The Modeling of Motivational State 1866 § 7.3 The Motivational Manifold 1869 The Motivational Dynamic and Lust per se 1872 The Motivational Dynamic and Valuation 1873

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The Motivational Dynamic and Reevaluation 1875

§ 8. Summary 1876

20. Practical Judgment and the Power of Choice 1878

§ 1. The Transcendental Ideas in the Practical Standpoint 1878

§ 2. The Logical-practical Perspective 1879 § 2.1 Axioms of Intuition in the Practical Standpoint 1880 § 2.2 Anticipations of Perception in the Practical Standpoint 1883 § 2.3 Analogies of Experience in the Practical Standpoint 1884 § 2.4 The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General in the Practical Standpoint 1887 § 2.5 Summary of the Logical-practical Principles 1890

§ 3. The Transcendental-practical Perspective 1890 § 3.1 Quantity in the Transcendental-practical Perspective 1893 § 3.2 Quality in the Transcendental-practical Perspective 1893 § 3.3 Relation in the Transcendental-practical Perspective 1894 § 3.4 Modality in the Transcendental-practical Perspective 1895 § 3.5 Summary of the Transcendental-practical Principles 1896

§ 4. The Hypothetical-practical Perspective 1896 § 4.1 Quantity in the Hypothetical-practical Perspective 1897 § 4.2 Quality in the Hypothetical-practical Perspective 1898 § 4.3 Relation in the Hypothetical-practical Perspective 1899 On Religious Doctrines of Free Will 1900 Mechanistic Causality in Science 1905 Mechanism and Psychological Causality 1911 The Third Cosmological Idea 1915 § 4.4 Modality in the Hypothetical-practical Perspective 1916 § 4.5 Summary of the Hypothetical-practical Principles 1919

§ 5. The Empirical-practical Perspective 1919 § 5.1 Quantity in Empirical-practical Perspective 1924 § 5.2 Quality in Empirical-practical Perspective 1926 § 5.3 Relation in Empirical-practical Perspective 1927 § 5.4 Modality in Empirical-practical Perspective 1929 § 5.5 Summary of the Empirical-practical Principles 1932

§ 6. The Momenta of Practical Judgment 1932 § 6.1 The Momenta of Quantity 1936 The Schematism of the Practical Ideas of Quantity 1936 The Practical Notions of Quantity 1943 § 6.2 The Momenta of Quality 1947 The Schematism of the Practical Ideas of Quality 1947 The Practical Notions of Quality 1950 § 6.3 The Momenta of Relation 1950 The Schematism of the Practical Ideas of Relation 1950 The Practical Notions of Relation 1954 § 6.4 The Momenta of Modality 1955

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The Schematism of the Practical Ideas of Modality 1955 The Practical Notions of Modality 1964 § 6.5 Practical Judgment as Critic Function in Judgmentation 1968 § 6.6 A Remark on ‘Memory’ 1971

§ 7. The Power of Choice 1972 § 7.1 The Synthesis of Appetition 1972 Practical Comparison 1973 Practical Reflexion 1975 Practical Abstraction 1980 § 7.2 The Process of Choice 1986

§ 8. Chapter 20 Endnote 1994

21. The Transcendental Aesthetic of Time 1996

§ 1. The Puzzle of Time 1996 § 1.1 Augustine’s Riddle 1999 § 1.2 Time and Motion 2000 § 1.3 Time and Duration 2004 § 1.4 Newton, Einstein and Objective Time 2010

§ 2. The Empirical Psychology of Time 2022 § 2.1 Time and William James 2023 § 2.2 Piaget and the Genesis of Objective Time 2027 The Primitive Foundation 2028 The Pre-construction of Objective Time 2032 The Beginning of Objective Time 2035 The Embryo of Objective Time 2037 The Birth of Objective Time 2038 § 2.3 Piaget and the Construction of Objective Time 2039

§ 3. The Pure Intuition of Time 2044 § 3.1 Order Structure 2045 § 3.2 The Modi of Relation 2051 § 3.3 Quantity and Aggregation in Time 2055 § 3.4 Quality and Subjective Time 2062 § 3.5 Endnote on the Pure Intuition of Time 2065

§ 4. Transcendental Time 2065 § 4.1 One-dimensional Time and Physics 2068 § 4.2 The Mother Structures 2073 § 4.3 The Induction of Concepts 2077 Unconceptualized Intuitions 2078 The Re-cognition of an Unsache-thing 2080 The Differentiation of ‘Before’ and ‘After’ 2082 § 4.4 Continuity in Subjective Time 2085 Subjective Time is Objectively Continuous: The Empirical Evidence 2087 Subjective Time is Objectively Continuous: The Mathematical Aspect 2096 § 4.5 Free Time 1097

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22. The Unity of Consciousness 2104

§ 1. The Principle of Unity of Consciousness 2104

§ 2. The Idea of the “Split Mind” 2105 § 2.1 Brain Organization, the Commissures and Commissurotomy 2106 § 2.2 The Lateralized Brain Paradigm 2110 § 2.3 The Split-mind Hypothesis 2114

§ 3. The Phenomena of Hysterical Neurosis 2118 § 3.1 Conversion Hysteria 2119 § 3.2 Dissociated States 2122 § 3.3 Closing Remarks 2123

23. Mathematics and Its Axioms 2126

§ 1. Mathematics and Its Axioms 2126 § 1.1 The Fall of the Axiom 2127 § 1.2 The Axioms of Set Theory 2132

§ 2. Mathematics as an Empirical Science 2140 § 2.1 Lakatos’ Criticisms of Formalism 2141 § 2.2 Confessions of the Formalists 2144

§ 3. Acroamatic Mathematics 2147 § 3.1 What Gödel’s Theorems Say 2148 § 3.2 The Constructivist Proposal 2150 § 3.3 Certainty, Transcendental Acroams and Set Theory 2152 § 3.4 Critique of the Axioms of ZFS Set Theory 2158 § 3.5 Acroamatic Set Theory 2165

§ 4. Mind and Mental Physics 2166

24. Final Epilegomenon: Noumena and the Critical Method in Science 2168

§ 1. The Need for Critical Discipline 2168

§ 2. ‘Reality’ and Experience 2171

§ 3. The Verification Problem 2179

§ 4. Noumena and the Horizon of Experience 2185 § 4.1 The Noumenon and Reproductive Imagination 2190 § 4.2 Transcendental Speculation and Transcendental Illusion 2195 Productive Imagination and Inferences of Analogy 2199 Productive Imagination and Inferences of Induction 2202 Scientific Generalization 2208 § 4.3 Slepian Quantities 2211

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§ 5. The Discipline of Pure Reason 2222

§ 6. The New Platonism 2228 § 6.1 The Roots of the New Platonism 2230 § 6.2 The Roots of the Big Bang 2236 § 6.3 Mathematical Relativity in Cosmology 2240 Models, Differential Equations and Boundary Conditions 2242 The Robertson-Walker Metric 2246 § 6.4 Big Bang Enthusiasm 2256 The Redshift Controversy and Accretion Disk Astrophysics 2258 Redshift Anomaly and Dark Matter 2265 § 6.5 Control of Enthusiasm 2271

§ 7. Toward a Science of Mental Physics 2274 § 7.1 Slepian Dimensioning 2275 § 7.2 Precepts of Ontology 2278 § 7.3 The Principle of Formal Undecidability in Science 2282 § 7.4 Concluding Remarks 2290

Appendices Glossary of Technical Terms 2293 Table of Realdefinitions of the Categories with Footnotes on Transcendental Logic 2332 Critical Acroams and Principles 2347 Summary of the Transcendental Ideas 2349 Synopsis of 2LAR Structures 2354 Synopsis of Momenta of Reflective Judgment 2357 Synopsis of Momenta of Practical Judgment 2360 Cross Reference of Kant Quotes 2363 Bibliography 2367

Index of Names 2382

Index of Subjects 2388

List of Tables and Figures 2429

xxiv

Preface

With this treatise I invite you to join me on a voyage of discovery into a question humankind has been asking for twenty-five centuries: What is mind? For me this voyage began over forty years ago when I was just a boy. It was for me at first a question prompted by that new marvel of the day, the digital computer, which was then popularly known as ‘the electronic brain.’ I can still remember how that phrase struck me to the core. “How could a machine think?” I asked myself. Of course, I later learned how to design and build them, and thereby learned that computers are not electronic brains and they do not think. Very few people today still call them ‘electronic brains.’ At that time, though, this nickname had all the force of the pronouncement of an Old Testament prophet: Chet Huntley, David Brinkley, and Walter Cronkite wouldn’t have said it if it wasn’t true. Computers were rare enough in those days to command a mystique, and their role in the then-early days of space exploration added weight and majesty to this mystique. So it was that this original question, which later broadened to the one with which this treatise is concerned, acted as a kind of compass that ended up providing the principal direction that my education and my professional career took. So it was that I came to study the still relatively new sciences of system theory and information theory, and later undertook the study of neuroscience.

For many years I worked entirely within the framework of scientific materialism, an attitude common among most physical scientists. In my younger days I had nothing worthy of being called a ‘philosophy’ and, rather, held to an attitude not uncommon among Americans that goes by the name of American Pragmatism. But as the years went by, and I felt myself no closer to achieving my goal, I gradually, and at first reluctantly, came to realize that those questions within the question that were proving to be the most intractable were questions of metaphysics. What does thinking mean? What does intelligence mean? What does it mean to reason? These were questions that I eventually had to admit my materialism could not answer. In the meantime, I was finding myself confronted by other questions, seemingly unrelated at the time but serving to jog my thinking out of relatively narrow channels and onto a broader plain. The study of physics was required in my choice of college major, and here I found myself having to work with other mysteries. What were these strange entities so common to our modern gadgetry called ‘electromagnetic fields’? Even stranger still was that absurd-sounding yet experimentally undeniable assault on one’s personal metaphysical prejudices known as quantum mechanics. I did not know at the time that these questions were in any way relevant to the questions that were proving so stubborn in the realm of the mental phenomenon. But, as it happens, the difficulties attending both types have a common source – ontological prejudice – and a common resolution in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.

And so I eventually came to gingerly entertain the suspicion that an answer to the What is mind? question might have to be sought first from philosophy. That, of course, raised up another issue. There have been many great thinkers who have explored and written about philosophy, and their conclusions, guesses, and speculations are as different from one another as a bee is different from a fish. I read many of their scholarly works and most served only to deepen my already ingrained opinion that philosophers ask a lot of questions but provide very few answers. As a scientist I was trained to spot holes in theories, and in philosophy I found many. Then I read Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant for the first time.

Like everyone who reads what has been justly called “Kant’s opaque masterpiece,” I did not understand it at first. But, unlike the works of other philosophers, I sensed something in Kant that I did not get from others’ works. It was a feeling that somehow this man was on the right track, that there were fundamental answers in what he had written, and that this philosophy was also a

xxv Preface science. Partly this was because the Critique helped me come to terms with many of the things I had found most troublesome in physics. But Kant also spoke of his theory as a system, and this was bound to appeal to me as a system theorist. Yet it was from the first clear to me that Critique of Pure Reason did not answer all the questions that must be addressed to understand the phenomenon of mind. My study expanded to include Kant’s other works, eventually coming to take in them all. Even then much of Kant’s work seemed to me like a magnificent catacomb cum maze. I read many scholarly opinions about what Kant seemed to be saying, and found these opinions to be as diverse and plentiful as the number of Kant scholars. Then one day I started reading an analysis by Professor Stephen Palmquist, and for me this was like someone had turned on the lights in a very dark mansion. Stephen wrote of “Kant’s system of perspectives,” and this was the key to Kant that I had been missing.

This treatise contains my interpretation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. I like to think that if Kant were alive today he would look at this work and say, “Yes, that’s what I was saying.” However, there will be no shortage of Kant scholars ready, able, and more than willing to disagree with this. Philosophers are, rightly so, a notoriously tough audience. Professor Palmquist tells me that what you will read here is a ‘reconstruction’ rather than an ‘interpretation.’ One of my colleagues in the Philosophy Department at our university tells me that I am a ‘Neo-Kantian’; I’m not sure exactly what he means by this, but he seems to mean it as a friendly brand of name-calling. Like almost everyone who is drawn into Kant scholarship, I have a strong conviction that Kant’s system is true and correct – an attitude that tends to cause other philosophers to laugh and make jokes, which is very understandable given the diversity of scholarly opinion over how Kant’s philosophy is to be understood. Most of their jokes are quite good. To those esteemed scholars who undertake to critique this treatise I make one request: Record your questions and objections as they occur to you in whatever manner best suits you, but withhold judgment until you have seen whether or not the issue is adequately addressed later in the treatise. This will be hard to do, because the Critical theory tells us that human reason is characteristically dialectical and strives to attain to the most general conclusions by the quickest apparent route. Patience is more than a virtue when it comes to understanding Kant.

Above all else, you, the reader of this treatise, must always keep in mind that epistemology always takes precedence over ontology in the Critical Philosophy. Giving the priority to ontology in thinking is a hard habit to break. But this reversal of priority, making epistemology the foundation and making ontology conform to the human power to know, is the central tenet of Kant’s theory. This is what makes Kant’s theory unique in the history of philosophy. So far as we know from the historical record, there was nothing like it prior to Kant (although Protagoras seems to have been the first to espouse something of the same sort in the 5th century B.C.). There has been nothing quite like it since (although the influence of Kant’s work was felt by all the later major figures in philosophy). The word ‘epistemology’ was not coined as a technical term in philosophy until 1854 – half a century after Kant’s death. The word he uses in its place is critique. Giving priority to epistemology over ontology means we do not ask how we can have knowledge of things but, rather, we ask what do we mean by ‘thing’ and what then can we know it as? It is this radical change of perspective – Kant’s “Copernican revolution” in philosophy – that opens the door to making metaphysics a true science. As you read on you will find the ideas of ‘meaning’ and ‘context’ to hold crucial central positions in the theory.

One impediment to understanding Kant’s system is that it is a system, and the whole must be grasped before the parts can be properly understood. Naturally, this raises serious issues of how to best present the material. In this treatise I decided to take an approach based on the supposition that it is easier to learn a difficult topic by beginning with the more concrete and progressing by degree to the more abstract. I think people must learn by examples before they are ready to

xxvi Preface comprehend the abstract general. My friends in engineering call this ‘peeling the onion,’ and that is the approach I have taken here. It adds length to the narrative, but depth to the understanding.

Another tactic I have employed in this work is based on my supposition that if someone is to be willing to invest the time and effort required to understand a difficult topic, there must be some evidence presented at regular intervals providing some basis of assurance that the time is not being wasted. In Kant’s system epistemology takes real precedence over ontology. But an epistemology, if it is sound and scientific, has implications for the ‘real world’ of experience and these implications can be tested. Therefore I have not neglected in this work to tie Kant’s theory in to scientific findings, most of which were obtained by some of the world’s most distinguished scientists. These are people who for the most part do not subscribe to what they believe to be Kant’s philosophy. This roster includes such giants in the field of psychology as Jean Piaget, William James, and Sigmund Freud. Among the other notables whose works come up in this treatise, many are Nobel laureates, many others are leading and highly-regarded scientists today, and still others were renowned scientists and thinkers from earlier times.

For the purpose of helping the reader to ‘make sense’ out of Kant’s deeply technical theory, I have tried to weave a tapestry of context in this treatise, and this has had the effect that many key ideas must be introduced in the early-going in incomplete form, leaving important questions and issues unresolved at that point in the telling. These come to resolution only later in the treatise when more of the relevant material is available to assist comprehension. I have written this treatise in the form of a discovery process rather than in the much more abstract theorem-proof format common in today’s technical literature. Some readers will be uncomfortable with this forward-referencing method of introducing and explaining important technical terms and ideas. For those who want to peek ahead to find out where we’re going, a Glossary and appendices have been provided that summarize the full and mature technical explanations and definitions of these terms and ideas. There is also an extensive subject index to help link related parts of the narrative located in divers places throughout the treatise. However, in general you, the reader, should read this treatise front-to-back because the later material builds on the earlier. But if it is your preference to begin at the end, Chapter 24 contains an overview of the Critical doctrine of method for Critical science, and part of the exposition of this doctrine can be used as a backward-pointing direction sign for some of the large and central ideas developed in the body of this work.

In our journey we will find ourselves confronted with most of the age-old questions of philosophy, and we will find that we need answers to these before our journey of discovery can arrive at its goal. ‘Existence’ is one of these questions, and we will find that the ‘question of existence’ has two facets, the one called Dasein by Kant, the other called Existenz. We will find the distinction to be of fundamental importance. There are many other ‘bedrock’ ideas like this to be encountered and dealt with as well. Chief among them is the idea of “reality” and what it means “to be real.” Another is the distinction between ‘thing’, ‘object’ and ‘Object.’ There are many others as well, and the Glossary can be consulted to help keep track of Kant’s legion of hair-splitting technical distinctions.

One of the most fundamental – and primitive – ideas of the Critical epistemology in regard to the human mind is that of representation. This term at root can have none but a practical definition. Kant explains it as “something in me that refers to something else.” This is, at its foundation, an explanation in terms of “what a representation does” – and so is a ‘practical’ definition. But to put it to practical use we will have to learn much more about it, namely how it is put to use. Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of the phenomenon of mind is that the human mind makes representations. You can therefore expect ‘representation’ to comprise a large part of the central core of Kant’s theory.

xxvii Preface

Kant lived and worked in a time before the divorce between empirical science and philosophy took place. He viewed philosophy as science, and consequently his work is highly technical with many terms that take on very precise meanings. This has always presented problems for the study of Kant by means of English translations. I have slipped in one example of this already: Dasein and Existenz both translate into English as ‘existence.’ There are many other such instances as this. Going the other way, some distinct English words all translate to the same German word. All the Kant quotations in this treatise are my own translations of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (AK). I have provided English-language references for these quotes, from texts in print or available that I regard as those coming closest to delivering Kant’s meaning. The citation is in the form [KANTx: pages in cited translation (AK volume: AK pages)]. However, I make an exception to this schema in the case of Critique of Pure Reason, where I use the standard form of citation for the A (first) and B (second) editions in place of the AK page numbers. I use a similar schema in citing Aristotle and Plato.

If you should look in these sources, you will find that my translations generally differ from theirs. Over many years and from the work of many renowned scholars there has been built up a ‘tradition’ for translating Kant. Many of these traditional interpretations I find to be technically faulty – that is, they involve words for which Kant intended a specific technical meaning that gets lost in the translation – although in most cases it is not difficult to understand how the translation comes about. Kant was never very consistent in warning us which of his terms were technical, and within his system of perspectives the perspective’s context always determines the proper interpretation of the word. Only a relative few English translations of Kant’s works – the best of the translations in print in my opinion – warn the reader when Kant used a different word (e.g. Relation vs. Verhältnis) from the word that was usually being translated to a particular English rendition. An example of one of these best-of-the-available translations is the Guyer and Wood translation of Critique of Pure Reason, which should in my opinion be used to replace the seriously flawed ‘standard’ translation by Kemp Smith.

In this treatise I have made every effort to keep Kant’s distinct technical terms distinct in their English rendition. Sometimes the distinctions are subtle, and I employ such devices as distinguishing them by capitalizations, e.g. the distinction between ‘object’ and ‘Object.’ In other cases I distinguish them by spelling, e.g. ‘reflexion’ vs. ‘reflection.’ In some cases where no suitable English word exists, I leave the term in German, e.g. Lust and Unlust, and explain the context and meaning of the term. In a few cases, usually with reluctance, I have invented new words to maintain the distinction, such as ‘desiration’ for Begehrung vs. ‘desire’ for Begehren, or ‘judgmentation’ for Beurtheilung vs. ‘judgment’ for Urtheil. I have also avoided the ever-present temptation to try to paraphrase Kant. As unlovely as some of his sentences are in English, they contain numerous hair-splitting distinctions that are important in understanding what he is saying.

Another issue – and this is the one most likely to raise up criticisms from Kant scholars – is that Kant did not actually complete his system in all its details. He tells us this directly in the preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason, and in some of his later correspondences to friends or colleagues. In this treatise I have strived to fill in those crucial details that Kant left out, particularly those that bear directly on the phenomenon of mind. Many of these are going to be controversial among philosophers. But controversy is nothing new to philosophy.

One thing about this treatise that is quite peculiar in comparison with most scientific or philosophical works is the space devoted within it to the history of particular ideas. Kant’s system was and is revolutionary. There was nothing like it in philosophy before Kant; there has been nothing quite like it since. Kant provided us with a window from which to view Nature and

xxviii Preface ourselves with fresh eyes. But before any person can be expected to embrace new and radical ideas of a very fundamental nature, I think we must attend to the popular ideas of our times, particularly those of long standing that have become deeply ingrained in our habits of thinking. Therefore, before erecting the new I survey the old to show us a bit of its history, a bit of its development, and to clear away certain idols and prejudices that have grown up around it. That, too, adds length to the narrative but helps to get us through the toughest spots.

In this review process, I have often critiqued some of the theories or hypotheses that hold sway in psychology or neuroscience today. At first encounter, some of these critiques will sound like criticisms. However, I admire and respect the works being critiqued and the first-rank thinkers whose works these are. It is their metaphysics I call into issue, not their science.

I also level criticisms at two classes of speculation. The first class consists of several lingering prejudices of the era of positivism and the so-called ‘new age’ reaction that has followed upon the death of positivism. These prejudices are antagonistic to critical thinking and, in the extreme cases, amount not merely to prejudicial presumptions but to arrogant dogmatism. One example in this class is provided by that distinctly American brand of ignorant poppycock called ‘creation science’; another is provided by some of the more extremist positions found in the craft known as ‘artificial intelligence.’

The examples in the second class have come from the physics community over the past few decades and are provided by the Big Bang theory of cosmology, the related Platonic theories of geometrodynamics, the so-called ‘grand unified theory’ of elementary interactions (GUT), and the newest Platonic adventures called ‘string’ or ‘membrane’ theories. I have chosen to use these theories as examples not because I have any physics to offer in their place but because they are examples of a rising attitude of new Platonism in science peculiar to the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. None of these theories have yet shown themselves capable of making unequivocally testable predictions, and all are in a constant state of patching and re- patching as new observations overturn the applecart. This does not render their claim to being called ‘science’ moot. Science must often grope in the dark toward solutions to scientific questions. It might be that future developments in experimental science could bring these theories to a better standing than is presently the case.1 If these merely mathematical speculations find better footing in experimental or observational fact than they have at the time of this writing, no one would welcome this more than I. But at present the Big Bang and GUT are being sold to the lay public as proven facts and this they are not. They are scientific hypotheses originating from facts, but no open-minded person would claim that “the Big Bang really happened” is known for a fact to be true. Meanwhile, speculation is feeding speculation and, what is worse, the basic premises of these theories have already become dogma among many members of the physics establishment. There is some evidence that sound scientific research aimed at looking at possible alternative explanations is not being tolerated by publishing or funding decision-makers. That is a symptom of the closing of the scientific mind and the rising of authoritarianism; it would be an irony indeed if the heirs of Galileo were to transform themselves into the new inquisitors. In the meantime, some theorists working within the establishment framework are piling one ad hoc occult quantity upon another (“dark matter”; “dark energy”; etc.) with a disturbing lack of reservation or foundational reflection. Thus I think we are seeing the building of new modern-day versions of what Francis Bacon once famously called “idols of the theater.” This is accompanied by publication in the popular press of a growing number of preposterous speculations – fantasies – in even such formerly reserved magazines as Scientific American. If so presented without

1 There is a test of string theory presently in the planning stages at CERN, and I look forward to hearing about its outcome.

xxix Preface making it very, very clear that these speculations are not facts, this can only hurt, and is hurting, the reputation of science overall. Finally, Big Bang cosmology is now being presented as fact in high-school science textbooks. Kids of high school age are impressionable, and it is short-sighted and unethical to present hypothesis, however ‘beautiful’ the theory might be, to children in the guise of fact. As the Jesuits were once fond of saying, “Give us the boy and the man is ours for life.” I use these theories to serve this treatise as present-day exemplars of why science needs metaphysics.

One purpose I have for writing this treatise is to prepare the foundations upon which a new unified science of mind can be erected. Psychology is a science in a crisis of disintegration. The field has become increasingly more fragmented into mini-theories and into specialties that often barely speak with one another. Science writer Morton Hunt has written, “though called a science, [psychology] is too heterogeneous to be defined or described in any but the most general terms . . . Can any discipline so untidy, multifarious, and disorganized be called a science?” But I can envision a day, whether in my own lifetime or not, when we will have a science of mental physics in which psychology, neuroscience, biochemistry, and the many other related disciplines can, in the company of philosophy, find a common ground and a firm foundation. Over the course of many years I have come to a deep conviction that philosophy, and especially metaphysics, can and must raise itself up and re-earn its place as the first science, dealing not only with questions but with answers as well. We will either have a scientific metaphysics or more pseudo- metaphysical science; there is no third alternative.

The outline of this treatise in brief is as follows. Chapter 1 briefly reviews some major philosophical themes that over the centuries have been applied to the problem of mind. It begins with a discussion of characteristics of the phenomenon of mind that are generally agreed to comprise the central features by which we distinguish the ‘mind’ phenomenon from other phenomena. Beyond these few common features there has been a wide diversity of opinion as to the details of what constitutes ‘mind’. The different themes we review have produced various attitudes that have historically dominated the presuppositions applied to the problem by different groups of people. This review leads us to what are here called the unified themes of mind, from which we will weave the Critical synthesis that, following Kant, I have called the Organized Being model. This model, with its three logical divisions of nous (‘mind’), soma (‘body’) and psyche, serves as the primary Object of investigation in this treatise.

Chapter 2 discusses the question of the proper relationship between science and philosophy. Since the 19th century, science has been viewed as an activity totally apart from philosophy. But what, exactly, is meant by the term ‘science’? How does ‘science’ differ from ‘natural philosophy’? Can there be any science without some philosophical foundation for what scientists do and how they do it? If not, how do we recognize what is scientific in philosophy and what is not? These are the questions discussed in Chapter 2. Kant’s definition of science is set out in this chapter, and we use this definition throughout the rest of the treatise.

Chapter 3 discusses the core topic of representation. Representation is a central primitive in the Critical Philosophy and is the key attribute by which we distinguish mind from phenomena we call non-mental (“physical”). How representation is treated proves to be the central doctrine of theory running throughout the entire Critical Philosophy and throughout this treatise as well. In this chapter we get our first look at what constitutes representation in general and at some of the fundamental processes at work in the synthesis of mental representation. We introduce here an

xxx Preface important tool, the second-level analytic representation or 2LAR2, that we will use throughout the rest of the treatise. We also here define four of Kant’s basic analytical terms – Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality – around which are organized Kant’s entire Critical exposition.

The theory of representation introduced in Chapter 3 raises at once particular questions and issues of a metaphysical nature. How these questions and issues are dealt with is crucial to the development of the theory of mind. Chapter 4 introduces the basic topics of Kant’s Critical system of metaphysics proper. It is here where we first meet the transcendental Ideas, which are the first principles of Critical epistemology and from which will come the fundamental principles of Critical ontology and of transcendental Logic that complete the rest of Critical science.

Our study of the phenomenon of mind begins in earnest in Chapter 5 with the topic of consciousness. Consciousness admits of only a practical explanation, namely that it is the representation that a representation is presented. However, the elucidation of consciousness must draw a distinction between empirical consciousness (which is a phenomenon and can be studied by psychology) and pure consciousness, which can only be regarded as a transcendental capability expressed in terms of the unity of noetic (‘mental’) organization. It is the elaboration of the structural organization of this capability, expressed in terms of basic powers and processes and culminating in the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness, that is the aim of Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 turns from the logical division of nous to that of psyche in the Organized Being model. Psyche represents the core reciprocity between nous and soma as expressed through a set of animating principles of mind-body community. Thus, we introduce psyche by means of the sensorimotor idea, an applied metaphysic that binds the observable phenomena of soma to the intelligible character of nous. It is here where we take our first step beyond what Kant called transcendental critique to the larger system of his transcendental philosophy, and here where we establish the Critical link between a priori first principles and concrete knowledge of experience. This chapter also introduces the metaphysic proper of Rational Physics and discusses some of its ramifications, not only for the phenomenon of mind but also for some popular Platonic enthusiasms that seem to be the order of the day in some branches of science. The principal topic of this chapter is the discussion of the Critical solution to the mind-body problem. As part of this solution, we also discuss the Critical analysis of the idea of emergent properties, which is one of the fundamental principles used in modern day biology and neuroscience. We show that ‘emergent property’ is an idea of reciprocity, and that it is erroneous to try to ground ideas of cause-and-effect or successive relationships through an appeal to emergent properties.

The discussion of the sensorimotor idea had to call upon elements of Kant’s transcendental ontology in advance of the full discussion of this topic. The next three chapters turn to a full treatment of Kant’s ontology and his theoretical Standpoint. Chapter 7 begins with a discussion of epistemology, ontology, and logic. Kant’s definition of ontology leads us to the discussion of the Critical ontology in regard to the process of determining judgment. A proper understanding of Kant’s theory requires that we also understand how Kant viewed Logic, and so we provide a brief review of the history of this topic. The central point made here is that there is not one meaning of the word “logic” but, rather, “logic” is a topic that has undergone many drastic mutations. From the proper understanding of Kantian Logic, we move to the exposition of the 2LAR of the process of determining judgment, which lays out the organization of objective principles of knowledge through thinking and judgment. Quite naturally, the topics of “truth” and “logical perfection” also come up in this discussion, and we give these their proper Critical examination.

2 The 2LAR doctrine used in this treatise was inspired by the work of Professor Palmquist. Although my 2LAR differs in detail from his, I am happy to acknowledge the importance of his contributions here.

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Chapter 8 begins our treatment of Kant’s categories of understanding. It is the second longest Chapter in this treatise and one of the most highly technical. The material here covers the core ideas of Kant’s transcendental analytic in Critique of Pure Reason. Our aim is to deliver up the Realdefinition of the categories from the logical and the transcendental perspectives of the Critical Philosophy’s theoretical Standpoint. Propaedeutic to this discussion is the discussion of the power of imagination and of Kant’s transcendental schemata of inner sense, by which concepts obtain their link to intuition. In the two perspectives covered in this Chapter we examine the Critical ontology of sensible objects and the thinking Nature of the Organized Being represented through and realized by the making of determinant judgments. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find the scope of topics to be broad, reaching out to take in numerous considerations outside the division of the process of determining judgment, and we find a number of key Critical definitions for various technical terms. We also find ourselves compelled to peek ahead and introduce some key and important ideas for which the full explanation cannot come until later in the treatise. All this makes this Chapter one of the most challenging, and the reader will find the Glossary and other appendices to be important aids for understanding the material here.

In Chapter 9 we complete our theoretical treatment of the Realdefinition of the categories by examining them from the hypothetical and empirical reflective perspectives. These dynamical perspectives shift our focus to the examination of the regulation of thinking by the power of speculative Reason. The metaphysics proper of these perspectives take us to the Critical ontology of Nature and Reality. The chapter begins with a review of Piaget’s theory of equilibration through compensations and regulations. This provides us with a practical overview picture of how mental structures are built up in infancy to establish the child’s conceptual universe from a foundation of practical sensorimotor schemes. The contextual setting this provides puts us in a better position to understand the Critical epistemology of Nature and Reality in the following section. Here we illustrate the connection between Kant’s and Piaget’s theories by means of a summary diagram of information flow in the noetic logical divisions of Kant’s system. We give this systematic representation the name “the cycle of thought.” Next we examine the cosmological Ideas as regulative principles for thinking-in-a-context. The ontology of speculative Reason from this perspective involves the Critical Realerklärung of the ideas of the world, Nature, Objects, objects, and things. Finally we take up the empirical reflective perspective, in which we find Kant’s theory of Critical empiricism and the Critical meaning of Reality.

Chapter 10 introduces the three superior Critical perspectives of Kant’s epistemology. These are called the Standpoints. The theoretical Standpoint views Critical epistemology in terms of understanding. The practical Standpoint views Critical epistemology in terms of practical Reason and the determination of the actions of an Organized Being. The judicial Standpoint views epistemology in terms of judgmentation in general and is concerned with the systematic organization of knowledge. A central idea in this is the idea of perfection in general, which specializes under the three Standpoints as logical, practical, and aesthetical perfection, respectively. The Chapter provides a thorough examination of logical perfection and concludes with a briefer introduction to the other two, which will be covered in turn in the later chapters.

An important idea introduced in Chapter 10 is the idea of practical causes and the causality of freedom. These ideas belong to the practical Standpoint of the Critical Philosophy. As ideas with merely practical objective validity, it is important that we tie them to observable effects, which are the only objectively valid ground for inferring the Dasein of any practical object. We find this tie point in the empirical Existenz of the Self. In Chapter 11 we examine the practical foundation for the idea of the Self. Perhaps no phenomenon in psychology is more universal than that each one of us divides the world into two parts: that which is my Self, and that which is not. The Self,

xxxii Preface in contrast to the I of transcendental apperception, is an empirical phenomenon. Because Self is bound up with the origin of the idea of practical causality, we begin the chapter with a discussion of the problems that arise in treating practical causality as an objectively valid idea. Our starting point is the automaton theory. From there we move on to discuss science’s requirements for its supersensible constructs. This is followed by a discussion of the idea of the individual and individuality. We conclude with a description of the emergence of the person’s idea of Self as this evolution is seen through the eyes of empirical psychology. The material in Chapter 11 serves as a prolegomenon to our practical theory as well as to the theory of the judicial Standpoint.

Our examination of the power of practical Reason from the practical Standpoint begins in Chapter 12. In this chapter we set up the context for an objectively valid theory of practical Reason. This real context is nestled in that phenomenon which is the most basic to any discussion of the Organized Being model, namely life. What does “life” mean? Here we do not ask “what is the meaning of life?” in the context of any “why are we here?” Rather, we inquire into what we mean when we say something is “alive” and from where this meaning draws its origin. Slightly over half of this brief chapter is devoted to this discussion. Its central point is a necessary distinction between biological life and mental life, and we shall see that the grounds for ideas of the first are found in the second. From there we proceed to discuss fundamental ideas that characterize the phenomenon of practical reasoning, and from these ideas we obtain our required contextual link to possible experience. The first of these is the idea of appetitive power, i.e. the capacity of an Organized Being to be, through its representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations. This idea is closely related to another idea, namely that of desire. We will see that the idea of appetitive power takes us forward in the practical Standpoint to the power of pure Reason to be a practical Reason. The idea of desire, on the other hand, will lead us into the judicial Standpoint and the process of reflective judgment in Chapter 14. We finish Chapter 12 with the examination of the phenomena of choice and will, which in turn take us back to the causality of freedom.

Chapter 13 discusses practical Reason and the capacity of practical Reason to also be a pure Reason. Because the practical objective validity of the idea of practical Reason is based on one’s observable and apparently spontaneous actions, the Nature of the Existenz of practical Reason must be understood in terms of the determining ground for such actions in the Nature of the Organized Being. This involves an idea of causality but causality in the form of a “because” or a “why” rather than in the form of a phenomenal mechanism. Thus we are led to consider the transcendental meaning of the rather notorious idea of “good” (and its opposite, “evil”). As a preparation for and a context of this discussion, Chapter 13 first reviews various ideas of “good” and “evil.” These ideas have consequences for the actions of an Organized Being, and so we next review the empirical findings of developmental psychology pertaining to these consequences. After this we are ready to undertake the Critical examination of pure practical Reason, which brings us to what is arguably the most famous part of Kant’s philosophy: the categorical imperative. In this treatise we present a new explanation of the categorical imperative. This new explanation, while congruent with Kant’s classic descriptions, is made subject to the requirement for objective validity in all ideas of non-physical causality, namely that it meet up with the requirement that there be a transformation that connects it to physical causality in the same appearance. Following this we take a short detour to discuss the Critical idea of happiness as a material principle working side-by-side with practical Reason’s categorical imperative. We close Chapter 13 by discussing the formulation of ends and means.

Chapter 14 begins our discussion of the judicial Standpoint. In the preface of the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason Kant made the immodest claim that within its pages the reader would find “that there must not be one single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or at

xxxiii Preface least to the solution of which the key has not been provided.” However, it has long been evident to Kant scholars that the finished solution to every problem is not presented in the first Critique (else Kant would have had little reason to write the other two!). Indeed, Kant remarked in the second edition of the first Critique that the task of “the illumination of those obscurities that are hardly to be avoided at the beginning of this work” would fall to “those deserving men who have made [his system] their own.” It is only fair for me to notify the reader that in Chapter 14 we encounter our first serious venture beyond what Kant explicitly and systematically analyzed, namely the Critical analysis of the process of reflective judgment. Reflective judgment has a two- sided character, as befits its role as the bridge between theoretical understanding and practical reasoning. On the side of sensibility we have aesthetical reflective judgment. Representations of aesthetical judgment are sensible (affective perceptions) but not objective. We will see that Critical aesthetical judgment is reflective judgment looked at from the transcendental-judicial and the empirical-judicial reflective perspectives. The Chapter uses these perspectives to develop the aesthetic Idea and the momenta (aesthetic functions) of aesthetical reflective judgment.

As becomes clear in Chapter 14, we cannot travel far in our exploration of reflective judgment without coming to terms with the Kantian idea of Lust per se (in its disjunctive character of Lust and Unlust). This topic occupies all of Chapter 15. The theory of Lust is none other than the Critical metaphysic of psyche in Organized Being. Because Kant left us with very few remarks concerning Lust per se (as opposed to the feeling of Lust and Unlust), we again follow Aristotle’s dictum and approach the question of Lust from psychological phenomena (emotion, motivation, etc.) that exhibit in experience the sort of character symptomatic of the idea of Lust. We will find the undertaking in this Chapter must Critically address a number of key ideas before we are in a position to deduce our Realerklärung of Lust as the power (Kraft) and organization of the adaptive psyche. Included among these are Critical definitions of act and action, the Critical ideas of Kraft (power) and adaptation, and the Critical Realdefinition of equilibrium. The Chapter concludes with the deduction of the Lust principle, which is the Critical principle for acting in the particular.

Chapter 16 explores the teleological function in judgmentation. It is the longest Chapter in this treatise and, in some ways, one of the most challenging. In it is found the weaving of a number of philosophical and metaphysical threads, and the Chapter itself makes up nothing less than a transition metaphysic of the principles of nous-soma reciprocity. We begin with a discussion of teleology in relationship to science and whether teleology can have any objectively valid context within science. Our discussion therefore is undertaken from the perspective of Rational Physics, and we will discover that the teleological function finds objective validity in the idea of the synthesis in continuity between reflective judgment and the animating principles of psyche. This synthesis involves four functions, one for each of the four general titles of representation: objectivity, the aesthetic Idea, the judicial Idea, and transcendental Meaning. We also introduce in this Chapter a number of other important Critical explanations, two of the most important of which are the idea of motoregulatory expression and the Critical Realerklärung of motivation. The Chapter finishes up with the exposition of the four animating principles of psyche, which establishes the bridge between Chapter 15 and the material that follows Chapter 16.

Implicit in the discussion in Chapter 16 is the role of the sensorimotor system in the formation (Gestaltung) of the pure intuition of outer sense. This pure intuition is called space, and is the topic of Chapter 17. The Chapter begins with a Critical review of the various notions of space that have been put forward over the centuries before undertaking the Realerklärung of space as it must be seen under Kant’s Copernican hypothesis. We will find that the objectively valid explanation of space is purely formal, is a transcendental aesthetic, and that the objective validity of the idea of the intuition of space is found only in the judicial Standpoint of the Critical

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Philosophy. The theoretical understanding of the pure intuition of space, on the other hand, is strictly a formal, that is to say mathematical, understanding as a process of presenting the pure form of intuition of outer sense in a topological structuring. This structuring applies to all the modalities of outer sense (not merely visual and tactile), and its possibility relies upon not only the receptivity of sense but also upon kinæsthetic feedback from actions of motoregulatory expression.

In Chapter 18 we come to the deduction of the momenta of teleological reflective judgment, which completes our development of the theory of reflective judgment. The discussion here again calls upon the judicial Standpoint, this time from the hypothetical reflective perspective of Rational Cosmology. Teleological reflective judgment is tasked with the structuring of Nature as a system. However, like aesthetical reflective judgment, the representations of teleological reflective judgment are non-cognitive and can call upon only a subjective principle of judging. We therefore begin with a detailed examination of the cosmological Ideas from the judicial Standpoint. The most important finding of this examination is: all our concepts of objects originate in subjective judgments of belief. Because teleological reflective judgment directly serves practical Reason, we also will find that it is intimately tied to aesthetical perfection. Thus, we next examine this important type of perfection. Acts of teleological judgment serving aesthetical perfection are judgments of transcendental topic, and so we next examine the character of judgment with regard to this determination. The orientation of Reason follows the pathway of perfection; however, teleological reflective judgment is also tasked with making a system of Nature and so we must next examine how this is possible. To do so we take up an examination of Kant’s applied metaphysic of Nature, but we do so not from the theoretical Standpoint, which he published, but from the judicial Standpoint, which he did not. From this we obtain a natural schema of judgmentation in general. Finally we come to the momenta of teleological reflective judgment through a synthesis of the ideas dug out of the preparatory analysis.

Chapter 19 takes us from the judicial Standpoint back to the practical Standpoint of pure Reason. The process of reflective judgment is the bridge between knowledge of cognition and pure Reason. As always we begin with the phenomena that inform our development of the Critical theory and work inward to understand the psychological Nature of pure Reason. In this Chapter we introduce two key ideas, namely the manifold of practical rules and the motivational dynamic in judgmentation. Along the way we must also deal with two phenomena, seemingly in contradiction with each other, that nonetheless illustrate human behaviors that strike as closely to the Nature of human Reason as it is possible to come with appearances. These are: the observable capacity of human beings to make moral judgments and the equally observable capacity of human beings to act in apparent contradiction to what most of us take as moral values. This latter capacity is strikingly illustrated in cases of people who are said to exhibit an antisocial personality disorder. In this Chapter we also return to the ideas of ‘value’ and ‘value structure’ and examine the connection of these ideas with those of ‘evaluation’ and ‘motivation.’

Chapter 20 continues in the practical Standpoint. Here we start with the completing of our compilation of the Ideas of metaphysics proper by deducing their statements from the practical Standpoint. It is in this part of the Chapter that we come upon the Critical Ideal of the summum bonum. With the practical Ideas in hand, we next undertake the deduction of the momenta of the process of practical judgment. These we call the categories of freedom. Finally we come to the Critical Realerklärung of the power of choice. The synthesis of appetition is introduced and the relationship of appetition to practical judgment and ratio-expression is discussed. With this we have the completion of the Critical presentation of the faculty of pure practical Reason.

Chapter 21 is the last of the ‘theory’ chapters. Here we take up the Critical examination of the

xxxv Preface transcendental aesthetic of time. Our objective is to lay out ideas of the necessary theoretical conception of the process of the synthesis of subjective time. We begin by reviewing the major themes in which ‘time’ has been conceptualized by different thinkers. Following this we examine the pure intuition of time, which we find to be the process of synthesizing an order structure in sensibility. Our examination of this structure brings us to the somewhat startling result that subjective time (which is the outcome of the synthesis of the pure intuition of time) is not one- dimensional but, rather, must be regarded in terms of a multi-dimensional timescape. Finally, we examine the transcendental considerations that must govern our concepts of objective time. This leads to the idea of transcendental free time, which is the logical order of form for the causality of freedom in the processes of judgmentation and Reason.

In the body of the treatise we left hanging a few loose ends concerning the unity of consciousness. Chapter 22 briefly returns to these questions and examines several empirical findings that some have seen as challenging the idea of unity of consciousness. We find that these phenomena fit quite smoothly within the theoretical framework we have set out in this treatise and that, indeed, they do not gainsay the principle of transcendental unity of apperception.

No doctrine of science can achieve the status of a science proper without the use of mathematics. However, for a science to maintain objective validity and objective truth in its theories the mathematics upon which it relies must itself be objectively valid and we must know the limits and boundaries within which it operates. Chapter 23 therefore undertakes the Critical examination of mathematics and its axioms and describes some of the real definitions and real axioms under which a true Critical mathematics must be developed. We will find that there can be a Critical mathematics wherein is contained real objective validity in mathematics. We will also find there is a hypothetical mathematics that gives practical service to science but which cannot be used for ontology. Both these sides of pure mathematics are necessary and essential for any exact science.

Chapter 24 brings the treatise to a close with the Critical doctrine of method. The central topic of this Chapter is how we must treat ontology in applied metaphysics in light of the Critical Philosophy. Here a key requirement is how we are to properly understand noumena and the limits of objective validity in ideas of noumena. The horizon of possible experience is introduced in this Chapter, and ways by which the natural dialectic of pure Reason trespasses beyond this horizon are discussed. In part to illustrate the latter, and in part to stand against the rise of New Platonism in science, a section of this Chapter is given over to a critique of the Big Bang theory of cosmology. The Chapter discusses the relationship between mathematics and the physical sciences and sets down the key principles of method for Critical science. The final section concludes the treatise with some thoughts on where we are to go and how we are to proceed from here in bringing into being a Critical science of mental physics.

The twenty-four chapters of this treatise examine in detail the entire phenomenon of mind, bring to light its fundamental principles, and set down the explanation of how this most human phenomenon must be understood in the light of what is necessary for the possibility of experience as human beings come to know experience. This treatise is a work of philosophy, but philosophy as the science of the general. I think the theory presented here will be found to be valuable not only for psychology and neuroscience, but for science in general in all its branches – including some arenas of scholarship that are not yet proper sciences, but can become proper sciences by proper application of Kant’s principles. And perhaps this larger domain of possibilities will some day come to make up the most enduring contribution of this work.

Richard B. Wells August, 2006

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