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The Transformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Fichte's Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fall 2009 The rT ansformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre Kenneth Angwe Agede Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Agede, K. (2009). The rT ansformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/251 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE TRANSFORMATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: FICHTE’S WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Kenneth Angwe Agede December 2009 Copyright by Kenneth Angwe Agede 2009 iii THE TRANSFORMATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: FICHTE’S WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE By Kenneth Angwe Agede Approved November 6, 2008 Approved____________________________________________ Tom Rockmore, Ph.D., Dissertation Director Professor of Philosophy Approved____________________________________________ Ronald Polansky, Ph.D., Reader Professor of Philosophy Approved____________________________________________ Daniel Selcer, Ph.D., Reader Assistant Professor of Philosophy Approved____________________________________________ James Swindal, Ph.D. Chair, Department of Philosophy Approved____________________________________________ Christopher Duncan, Ph.D., Dean Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate Scool of Liberal Arts iv ABSTRACT THE TRANSFORMATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: FICHTE’S WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE By Kenneth Angwe Agede December 2009 Dissertation supervised by Tom Rockmore This dissertation examines Fichte’s original philosophical system, or the Wissenschaftslehre, against the background of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and was conceived within the framework of restating Kant’s critical philosophy. Although Fichte hyperbolically claims that his philosophical view is identical with Kant’s transcendental system, the question of his relationship to Kant is a controversial one and continues to generate intense debate in the literature. Some Fichte commentators flatly reject comparisons between the two philosophical positions, claiming that Fichte’s system is a variant of Reinhold’s, whose Elementarphilosophie sought to return Kant to a Cartesian model of mind. Others, however, see striking similarities between the theories of Kant and Fichte. They maintain, though, that Fichte’s Kantianism should be qualified: for v although certain aspects of his theory look obviously Kantian, they insist that Fichte’s theory is still unique in a variety of ways. This dissertation argues the thesis that Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is identical with and yet different from Kant’s theory. To the extent that Fichte rejects a representationalist solution to the problem of knowledge, his position is true to the spirit of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy. However, to the extent that his method of presentation differs from Kant’s, Fichte’s view is his own and should be evaluated on its own merit. vi ACKOWLEDGMENT This dissertation affords me the chance to pay a debt of gratitude to individuals and groups who have facilitated me in one way or another in the course of my academic pursuit. Although the individuals are too numerous to mention within the context of the present circumstance, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of the following. I am eternally grateful to Most Rev. A. A. Usuh, the Catholic bishop of the diocese of Makurdi, Nigeria, for allowing me the facility to undertake graduate studies at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA. My special thanks go to my professors in the Department of Philosophy at Duquesne University for their assistance and professionalism. I am immeasurably indebted to my dissertation director, Dr. Tom Rockmore, for his inspiration and guidance. I cannot thank him enough for teaching me the invaluable lesson of being a scholar. I am profoundly grateful to my readers, Dr. Ronald Polansky and Dr. Daniel Selcer, for their critical insights and useful suggestions. I would like to recognize the following, whose camaraderie I enjoyed at one point or another during the course of my graduate program in philosophy. They include Revs. Simeon Iber, Thomas Akpen, CSSp., Matthew Asemagema, Francis Iber, Michael Angula, Hyacinth Alia, Stephen Akange, Pius Ajiki, Joseph Mali, Godffrey Bonnet, Joseph Nietlong, Peter Agema, Thomas Dekaa, Daniel Asue, Vitalis Torwel, Daniel Melaba, Dominic Jir, Gregory Ugah, Matthias Idyu, CSSp, and Louis Yaya. Others are Msgr. Cletus Gotan, Revs. Angus Fraser, CSSp., David Baka, Innocent Jooji, Felix Kumai Kanyip, Stephen Ishor Herbert Bulbwa, Gabriel Gberikon, Samuel Tumba, Emmanuel Abela, Clement Iorliam, Cosmas Jooli, Simon Ikpum, Isaiah Ter, Remigius vii Ihula, Peter Adoboh, Nicholas Tarbo, Francis Wegh, Joseph Oppong, Joseph Dube, Oliver Ortese, and Augustine Igbum. I acknowledge the support and best wishes of the following: Angela Egbikuadje, Franca Niameh, Eunice Atsu, HHCJ, Dorothy Ugbe, HHCJ, Anne Arabome, Antoinette Opara, SHCJ, Brendan Ezeigbo, DDL, Agatha Ozah, HHCJ, Mercy Akoh, SON, Margaret Dowd, Nancy Grimes, Judy Bartley, Terry Wachter, Mary Ann Soerries, Ed Hahn, Brian Giebler, Mike McCleary, Corita Holmes, Carolyne Keith, Margie Moss, Missy Little, Sue Dixon, Waren Tsafa, Patricia Suswam, John Ediri, Dr. and Mrs. Dekaa, Mr. and Mrs. Hule, and Mike Aaga. The faith community of Our Lady of the Valley Church, Donora, PA, graciously provided me with room and board while I was enrolled for graduate studies at Duquesne. For this, I am sincerely grateful. I am equally grateful to my current host community, St. John the Evangelist Church, Honesdale, PA, and its priests, Rev. Martin Boylan, pastor, and Rev. Balaraju Desam, parochial vicar, for their hospitality. My sincere thanks go to my immediate family: Kuleve, Angbiandoo, Nguetor, Kasaren, Saa-Aondo, Denen, and Atamo for graciously enduring my absence while I was pursuing advanced studies in the USA. I remember the memory of Rev. David J. Kriss, Rev. Stanley Wyczawski, Rev. Rene Desmarais, Rev. Geoffrey Iortyer, Rev. Godwin Ande, James Jogo, Ann Kusmirack, and Violet Kowall. I am deeply indebted to Liana MacKinon for painstakingly editing this work. I benefited immensely from her careful work. My parents, Mbailaave and Mnzuulga viii Agede, passed on during the course of my graduate program. To their memory I dedicate this work. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------iv Acknowledgment------------------------------------------------------------------------------------vi General Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 CHAPTER ONE Kant’s Transcendental Idealism-----------------------------------------------------------------6 Introduction-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6 1.1 The Rationalism/Empiricism Debate as the Conceptual Framework for the Emergence of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism-----------------------------------------7 1.2 Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Philosophy----------------------------------------------16 1.3 The Epistemological Import of Kant’s Copernican Turn---------------------------------22 1.3.1 The Thing-in-itself and the Problem of Affection in Kant’s Critical Philosphy----26 1.4 The Immediate Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy---------------------------------31 1.4.1 Frederick Henrich Jacobi (1743–1819)---------------------------------------------------32 1.4.2 Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823)----------------------------------------------------34 Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------41 x CHAPTER TWO The Evolution of Fichte’s Original Philosophical System: The Wissenschaftslehre---------------------------------------------------------------------------42 Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------42 2.1 Fichte’s Path to Kantianism-------------------------------------------------------------------44 2.2 Aenesidemus: A Synopsis---------------------------------------------------------------------50 2.2.1 The Review of Aenesidemus---------------------------------------------------------------53 2.3 Positing as the Hallmark of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre---------------------------------57 2.3.1 The I’s Self-Positing Activity--------------------------------------------------------------61 2.4 Fichte’s Philosophical System and the Solipsism Charge--------------------------------66 Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------70 CHAPTER THREE The Wissenschaftslehre as Circular Epistemology------------------------------------------72 Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------72 3.1. Circular Demonstration: A Tentative Description----------------------------------------74 3.2. Circular Justification and the Question of Method in Philosophy----------------------78
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