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Involving India and Pakistan: Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Nuclear Tests

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Involving India and Pakistan: Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Nuclear Tests BITS Research Report 99.2 Oliver Meier Involving India and Pakistan: Nuclear Arms Control and Non-proliferation after the Nuclear Tests Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) CONTENT: Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 5 1 Where we are............................................................................................................................................ 7 1.1 The situation in India ....................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 The situation in Pakistan................................................................................................................ 10 1.3 Bilateral relations after the tests.................................................................................................... 12 2 International Responses ....................................................................................................................... 14 2.1 The P5............................................................................................................................................... 16 2.2 The Western Group ....................................................................................................................... 21 2.3 The Non-Aligned Movement ....................................................................................................... 21 2.4 States in the Asian region............................................................................................................... 22 2.5 The New Agenda Coalition........................................................................................................... 24 3 Involving India and Pakistan ............................................................................................................... 27 3.1 The "pragmatists"............................................................................................................................ 27 3.2 The "conservatives"........................................................................................................................ 29 4 Scenarios ................................................................................................................................................. 31 4.1 Nuclear proliferation ...................................................................................................................... 31 4.2 Consolidation................................................................................................................................... 34 4.3 Nuclear disarmament...................................................................................................................... 36 5 Recommendations................................................................................................................................. 38 6 Documents ............................................................................................................................................. 44 · G8 Statement on Indian Nuclear Tests, 'Regional Statements', Birmingham, UK, 15 May 1998 · Paper Laid on the Table of the House on Evolution of India's nuclear policy, New Delhi, May 27, 1998 · Text of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Statement at a Press Conference on Pakistan Nuclear Tests, Islamabad, May 29, 1998 · CD Statement Delivered by New Zealand on Behalf of 47 States, Special Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 2 June 1998 · Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the P5, Geneva, June 4 · Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted unanimously, 6 June 1998 · 8-Nation New Nuclear Agenda Initiative, 9 June, 1998 · Towards a Nuclear Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda: Glossary · G8 Communiqué, London, 12 June 1998 · Resolution on nuclear testing by India and Pakistan As adopted by the European Parliament on 19 June 1998 · Final document of the 12th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement: Disarmament and International Security, Durban, South Africa, 3 September 1998 · Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan made on the sidelines of UN General Assembly in New York on 23rd September, 1998 · Memorandum of Understanding signed between foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan K. Raghunath and Shamshad Ahmad in Lahore on February 21, 1999 · Joint statement issued by India and Pakistan at the conclusion of two-day visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Lahore on 21 February 1999 · Lahore Declaration signed by Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India on February 21, 1999 2 Executive Summary More than one year after the nuclear tests in May 1998, India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapon powers. A quick reversal of the nuclear policies of the two countries is extremely unlikely. Both countries are in the process of weaponizing their nuclear programs and so far have not given up the goal of deploying nuclear weapons. Both countries are continuing to invest in their nuclear programs that are backed by strong domestic supporters, but also opposed by a growing number of people in India and Pakistan. At the same time, India and Pakistan have become more flexible on nuclear arms control issues and continue to insist that they favor a nuclear weapons-free world. The danger of an escalation of the conflict, including the possible use of nuclear weapons was highlighted by the fighting in the Kargil region. Unless steps are taken to eliminate nuclear weapons globally it is extremely unlikely that India and Pakistan will reverse their nuclear programs. Up until today, there is no clear-cut international response to the tests that took place in May 1998. The international community is almost united in opposing the tests, being pessimistic about the consequences for nuclear disarmament, doubting the utility of sanctions and hoping that the CTBT can be saved. However, differences in approaches exist between many groupings in international politics – the P5the , Western group, the NAM, and Asian states – and often within them. In addition, new groupings like the New Agenda Coalition which cut across political and regional lines have emerged. The international community can be divided into two broad groups: The first group (the "pragmatists") are flexible in dealing with India and Pakistan, while a second group (the "conservatives") fear that pragmatic solutions will damage well- established disarmament and nonproliferation norms. Any solution to the crisis in South Asia will have to find a middle ground between these two approaches. Three possible developments can be identified: First, the nuclear crisis in South Asia could result in an arms race and might result in further proliferation in the region as well as beyond if India and Pakistan continue to weaponize their arsenals and no progress in nuclear disarmament is made. Given the developments since the tests, this seems to be the most likely outcome. Secondly, the international community as well as India and Pakistan could attempt to consolidate the current situation. However, such attempts are likely to fail for a number of reasons such as the competitive nature of the bilateral relationship, making consolidation an unlikely outcome. Thirdly, non-nuclear weapon states could continue to put pressure on all nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapon capabilities and this could lead to new steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. While this seems not very likely, it is the only viable long-term solution to the crisis. 3 Only the latter option has the potential to solve the dilemmas which were highlighted or created by India and Pakistan as well as by the existence of other nuclear weapons powers. India and Pakistan have made it clear that nonproliferation and disarmament are directly linked. Unless we see decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament, it is likely that attempts to safeguard existing arms control agreements will fail and talks on new arrangements will be blocked. The elimination of nuclear weapons is therefore the only viable option. This demands a concerted effort by all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. Towards this end, a number of steps can be taken. · India and Pakistan should declare a freeze of their nuclear weapons programs and start a dialogue on confidence and security building measures. The international community should support such steps by constructively engaging India and Pakistan. · All nuclear weapon states should multilateralize nuclear arms control and disarmament as soon as possible and take steps towards deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. This includes plurilateral negotiations on cuts in nuclear weapons arsenals among the nuclear weapon states; a multilateral dialogue among all nuclear weapon states on issues like nuclear doctrine, postures, confidence and security building measures, dealerting measures and arms control; and consultations on future steps in nuclear disarmament between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. · The eight nuclear weapon powers should commit themselves to the speedy and final elimination of nuclear weapons. · Steps should be taken to ensure entry into force of the CTBT, including a provisional entry into force
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