TWA, Departs the World’S Gers, Not Mail, Unlike Most Other Airlines Skies in Almost the Same Industry Envi- PART I in Those Days

rans World Airlines, with one of the month; copilots, $250. most recognized U.S. airline sym- TAT was developed to carry passen- bols, TWA, departs the world’s gers, not mail, unlike most other airlines skies in almost the same industry envi- PART I in those days. TAT’s transcontinental ronment in which it came into being— As TWA ended its 71 years of air/rail service would take passengers the end of an unfettered period of ex- cross-country in 2 days instead of 3, as pansion marked by consolidation of air- continuous operations, it was rail-only travel required. On the west- lines. Born of a 1930 merger, TWA had the United States’ longest to-east schedule, passengers would most of its assets purchased by Ameri- board a Ford Trimotor at Los Angeles can Airlines on April 9, 2001, to end flying air carrier. at 8:45 a.m. (PST), deplane at Clovis, TWA’s run as the longest-flying air car- N.M., at 6:54 p.m. (MST) for a night rail By Esperison Martinez, Jr. rier in U.S. commercial aviation. Still, trip to Waynoka, Okla., via the Topeka Contributing Editor its 71 years of flying millions of passen- & Santa Fe Railroad, followed by an 8- gers throughout the world, of record- hour 8-minute Trimotor flight to Colum- ing achievements that won’t be quickly bus, Ohio, then onto the Pennsylvania duplicated, of establishing sterling stan- manager of NAT, became TAT vice- Railroad to arrive in New York City the dards of operations, safety, and profes- president. But Lindbergh was in charge next morning at 10:05. sionalism, mean that it will forever be of planning and developing TAT’s infra- Lindbergh inaugurated TAT’s coast- recorded in the annals of aviation his- structure and its route structure, which to-coast air-and-rail service on July 7, tory as one of America’s most presti- forsook the lighted airways of mail 1929, using east-to-west routing. En- gious airlines. routes across the country in the early sconced in Gov. C.C. Young’s office in TWA was created on Oct. 1, 1930, 1920s. Los Angeles, Lindbergh, at precisely when Transcontinental Air Transport After more than a year, all was in 6:05 p.m. (EST), pushed a button that and Western Air Express merged to be- place—routes over new terrain, newly sent a signal to New York’s Pennsylva- come Transcontinental & Western Air, created landing fields, selected aero- nia Rail Station where the Airway Lim- Inc. (T&WA). dromes, new weather reporting facili- ited train awaited. Amid a great deal of Transcontinental Air Transport ties, meshed rail/air schedules, and fanfare, which included political and cin- (TAT) had been formed on May 16, 1928. many other operational needs. ema celebrities, a band, and radio The carrier’s financial backers named Securing pilots to fly the about-to-be- broadcasts, the Limited caught the sig- Charles A. Lindbergh to head the tech- purchased 10 Ford Trimotors was an nal and moved out on the first leg of the nical committee that oversaw develop- equally laborious task. Three men took country’s first scheduled transcontinen- ment of the line and made all initial de- on the job: Paul F. Collins, pilot veteran tal air-rail link. The train arrived at cisions involving technical or opera- of World War I and postal mail flying, Columbus, Ohio (Port Columbus) at tional problems. Lindbergh’s influence became general superintendent; John 7:55 a.m. the next morning. Five thou- was so great that TAT became popu- Collings, ex-chief pilot at Ford, headed sand people braved drizzling rain to larly known as “the Lindbergh Line.” up TAT’s eastern division; and Max witness the transfer of the 20 transcon- At TAT’s helm was Clement M. Cornwall, the western. Collins directed tinental rail-to-airplane passengers Keyes, who was a promoter of multi- the search for pilots with multiengine who, having each paid $350 (air portion million-dollar aviation corporations, in- time, of whom he found few. In all, TAT $290 for a 16-cents-per-mile fare struc- cluding National Air Transport (NAT), hired 38 pilots, and 17 needed further ture), would fly on the next leg aboard and who later formed North American training. Many began with fewer than the two Ford Trimotors, City of Colum- Aviation. Paul Henderson, then general 500 hours. Captains received $500 per bus and City of Wichita. Columbus,

• Air Line Pilot September 2001 departing at 8:15 a.m., was the first aircraft airborne. Capt. Dean Burford, copilot H.H. Zimmerman, and courier D.W. Dudley were the crew members. The first west-to-east flight was made aboard the City of Los Angeles, piloted by Lindbergh and Eddie Ballande, a noted Glenn Curtiss test pilot, Navy World War I instructor, barnstormer, and movie stunt pilot. TAT’s air/rail transcontinental service was to prove momentous, as historians said, “for the inception of an idea— intercontinental air travel.” Two months into TAT’s operations, a Trimotor crashed, killing all on board. Within a year, passenger interest had withered, and losses mounted. Within 18 months, TAT recorded $2,750,000 in losses. Still, its owners were able to The pilots Maddax Air Lines brought as the carrier’s first aircraft. Three weather the financial storm. Within a to the TAT–Maddax merger were a more Army aviators were added to the few years, the carrier would be think- proud and very experienced lot who roster: Maury Graham, Al DaGarmo, ing of globe-circling flight. became top number holders on the and Jimmie James. TAT weathered the storm by acquir- eventual TWA seniority list. These in- These pilots, the initial cadre selected ing two airlines—one sought, the other cluded, among others, Arthur C. Burns to haul the mail on the CAM-4 route, “directed.” (11), Daniel W. “Tommy” Tomlinson were cautious to the point of inspect- (14), Ernie Smith (15), Henry G. “Andy” ing from the ground the route they Andrews (16), Felix Preeg (18), would fly while delivering the mail be- On Nov. 16, 1929, TAT bought Maddax Goodwin T. “Ted” Weaver (21), and tween Los Angeles and Salt Lake City. Air Lines, a profitable Southwest car- Albert D. “Major” Smith (38). During their 2-week inspection, they rier, and began its move out of a finan- TAT’s second acquisition, more “di- laid many “markers” visible from the cial hole and toward an air-only trans- rected” than “sought,” was Western Air air to reveal where a forced landing continental service. Just 18 months ear- Express (WAE). Incorporated on July might be managed. This certainly paid lier, Maddax had begun Ford Trimotor 13, 1925, by a wealthy Los Angeles off. The first WAE mail flight took place service between Los Angeles and San group to capture one of the private air- on April 17, 1926, and within the first Diego, followed by Los Angeles–San mail routes that the U.S. Post Office year, pilots made 36 forced landings Francisco service. In 1929, Maddax was offering, WAE gained the CAM-4, using those markers. opened service from Los Angeles to Los Angeles–Salt Lake City, route. But Carrying its first passengers only 1 Phoenix and southern California loca- WAE had no airplanes, or pilots, only month after startup, WAE ended 1926 tions. By the time TAT bought Maddax desire and determination. carrying 209 passengers. But the finan- Air Lines, it was operating 16 Trimo- Undaunted, Harris Hanshue, WAE’s cial mainstay and key to the airline’s tors along with two Lockheed Vegas founder, began creating an air carrier. existence would prove to be its mail and two Travel Airs. Having carried One of his first moves was to hire Maj. contracts, which in 1926 were paying 40,000 passengers in 18 months, busi- Corliss C. Moseley, a World War I pilot $1,500 per flight and cost WAE only ness was obviously good, but a carrier and a highly respected, well-known $360 to operate. could not be sustained on passenger West Coast aviation authority. Moseley The late 1920s marked a time of pub- service alone and needed a contract to quickly added an old college classmate, lic enthusiasm for flying, unfettered carry the mail. Maddax knew that no Fred Kelly, a 1912 Olympian and ex- regulation, and great freedom of action, mail contract would be offered and ac- military pilot, who became equipment resulting in a proliferation of new car- cepted TAT’s buyout offer. procurer and selected the Douglas M-2 riers. WAE’s growth was continual and

September 2001 Air Line Pilot • passengers, for a systemwide load factor of 3.9 passengers per airplane. The Los Angeles to San Francisco route ac- counted for the greatest amount of traffic, averaging 22 passengers per day, 7 per airplane. A devastating blow to the company’s operation came just 5 months after its first coast-to-coast flight. On March 31, 1931, a Fokker F-10 that came from WAE during the merger crashed in a Kansas cornfield. Famed Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne, one of the nation’s best-known personalities, was one of its fatally injured passengers. The precise cause of the crash was never determined, but another F-10 from WAE had evidence of dry rot in impressive, and its route structure ex- came better known as TWA, an acronym the wooden wing. The fleet of F-10s was panded with acquisitions. But the stock that became official in 1950 with the grounded. Eventually all of the com- market crash of 1929 also affected the name change to Trans World Airlines. pany’s wooden airplanes were inten- aviation sector economically. By 1930, Company ownership was split 47.5 per- tionally destroyed, after their engines WAE had built a solid reputation as a cent each to WAE and TAT, and 5 per- and other usable equipment were sal- passenger carrier; still, it discovered cent to PAIC. Harris Hanshue became vaged. As staggering as the accident that, without mail contract routes, it president of the newly formed airline. was to the company’s good fortunes at could be awash in red ink. Early in 1930, The new company received the mail the time, the crash helped set the tone WAE bought the Aero Corporation of contract on Aug. 25, 1930, and made the for the high aircraft standards and California to gain its subsidiary, Stan- first all-air-service coast-to-coast U.S. safety practices that would come to be dard Air Lines, in hopes of snaring the flight on October 25. The flight took 36 identified with TWA. southern transcontinental mail route. hours, including a 12-hour stop at Kan- With the purchase of the carrier came sas City. It was the start of an auspi- pilots like Jack Frye, who would in time cious but dubious future. Robbins advanced this movement by become head of TWA, and other notable Auspicious because TWA would establishing an equipment task force of flyers such as Paul Richter, Walt Hamil- eventually become one of the largest himself, Lindbergh, and pilots Jack ton, and Lee Flanagin. U.S. air carriers; dubious because the Frye and Tommy Tomlinson. After se- airline’s immediate future was fraught rious reviews and discussions, the with the uncertainty caused by the group set new requirements for the WAE found itself caught in the reorga- Depression, merged operations, and de- next generation of T&WA equipment. nization of the transcontinental airmail pendence upon mail subsidies. Hanshue A letter outlining the company’s needs, route system, under the auspices of the never really got heavily involved in dated Aug. 2, 1932, to leading aircraft Watres–McNary Act. Postmaster Gen- “leading” the company, and directors manufacturers called for an all-metal eral Walter Folger Brown had devel- seemed to act individually regarding trimotor monoplane; powerplants op- oped a vision for the nation’s airways, company needs; consequently, the op- tional; 14,200 pounds gross weight; com- especially its transcontinental system. eration had no management cohesive- plete instrumentation, including night- He did not believe more than one com- ness. Richard Robbins replaced Han- flying equipment; cruising range of pany should serve a single route and shue in early 1932. 1,060 miles at 150 mph; crew of two; 12 forced WAE, TAT, and PAIC (Pitts- Financially, the newly formed com- passengers minimum capacity; and abil- burgh Aviation Industries Corporation) pany also did poorly, losing as much as ity to take off with two engines from to merge and become Transcontinental $200,000 per month during its first year any T&WA airport. & Western Air, Inc. (T&WA), which be- of operation and carrying only 36,613 Thus was born the Douglas DC-1. It

• Air Line Pilot September 2001 was to bring new design, performance, believed it would eventually lead to re- and economics to the world of commer- duced pay through management-estab- cial aviation. lished flight-average duration times for Assured by Donald Douglas’s team which pilots would get paid. This move that its two-engine design would be further aggravated a nervous pilot able to operate on one engine, Robbins force, and in late May 1931, a small et al gave the go-ahead in September group of T&WA and United pilots se- 1932 for one prototype of the DC-1. The cretly met and approved a plan to form prototype was to be the first commer- a new national organization. A few cial transport of the Douglas line. Near months later, on July 27, 1931, a pilot disaster resulted from the first test convention of “key men,” held in the flight on July 1, 1933. Test pilot Carl Morrison Hotel in Chicago, officially Clover was at the controls. Shortly af- established the Air Line Pilots Asso- ter takeoff, he lost one engine but re- ciation. Organizing began, but member- gained it when he lowered the nose ship was kept secret, as public exposure down. When he raised the nose again, was sure to lead to a pilot’s removal both engines sputtered. He managed to from a carrier’s payroll. get the airplane down safely. Fortu- Union recruiting at T&WA proved nately, the problem proved to be only a difficult because of management intimi- poorly designed carburetor float. dation, but pilots like Hal George were The only DC-1 ever built was deliv- convinced of the union’s value and tra- ered to T&WA in December 1933. were to last only 4 years, ending in 1934. versed the airline’s routes explaining its T&WA ultimately ordered 25 But that was sufficient time for the worth; although the pilots achieved stretched (two additional passenger course of commercial aviation to be set. little initial success, ultimately their ef- seats) DC-1s, designated the DC-2, at The competition among carriers forced forts were rewarded with members a cost of $65,000 each. It entered ser- improvements in operations, lifted stan- signing up. vice on May 18, 1934, on T&WA’s Co- dards for equipment and facilities, and In 1933, most operators were intent lumbus–Pittsburgh–Newark route. paved the way for the commercial avia- on “reforming” the pay system and The passenger side of the T&WA op- tion scene in which TWA would come to copying T&WA’s hourly rate. The eration proved to be unprofitable within play such an important role. threat was so acute that ALPA threat- its first year; mail contracts provided ened a nationwide shutdown to stop it. the cash that kept the airline alive. T&WA’s response was to create a com- Hence, T&WA mail aircraft needed to While managements reorganized, re- pany union—the TWA Pilots Associa- be swift and dependable. Originally, the built, and renamed the surviving air tion. Management intended to control single-engine Northrop Alpha was se- carriers during those formative years, the pilot workforce; many pilots who lected for use. Powered by a 450-horse- the industry’s pilot force was undergo- willingly became TPA members did so power Wasp engine, the Alpha could ing a metamorphosis of its own. Histo- because they feared the threatened carry a 1,000-pound payload at an av- rians have chronicled well the plight of ALPA nationwide shutdown would cost erage speed of 150 mph and had a land- Depression-era airline pilots: pay cuts, them their jobs or because of manage- ing speed of 61 mph. Its inaugural flight reduced authority, loss of status, rigid ment intimidation. The T&WA MEC with T&WA was on April 20, 1931. discipline—all leading to the pilots’ be- chairman at that time, Waldon “Swede” By the end of the year, the airline had ing compared to chauffeurs rather than Golien, led the pilots out of ALPA. Sev- ordered 13 Alphas; four Lockheed Ve- to sea captains. The adverse working enteen pilots remained loyal to the na- gas were also part of the fleet. Among conditions had led a clandestine move- tional union, and some other pilots sim- the pilot group to first relay the mail ment toward self-protection—the for- ply quietly maintained memberships in across the country in these airplanes mation of a national pilots’ union. both organizations. were Harlan Hull, Cliff Abbott, Ted In early 1931, T&WA changed its pay The full character of the in-house Moffitt, Swede Gulien, and Bill Coyle. formula from mileage to an hourly rate. union was exposed during congres- The mail contracts garnered from The company claimed it was a compro- sional hearings concerning the crash of Postmaster Brown’s “spoils” conference mise that beat a flat pay rate; the pilots (continued on page 54)

September 2001 Air Line Pilot • itler’s defeat and the end of World $300 per month for copilots. Pilots War II marked enormous changes By Capt. Karl Ruppenthal would be paid no formula pay—no gross for U.S. airlines. With the end of (TWA, Ret.) weight pay, no mileage pay, no pay for years of shortages and rationing came training, no pay for weather delays, no an enormous pent-up demand for headed TWA; and W.A. Patterson, a ca- pay for any other items that current travel. During the war years, the air- pable, no-nonsense banker, ran United. contracts cover. lines’ schedules had been reduced to Each of these men had certain idio- A spokesman for the airline industry bare skeletons, providing little service syncrasies, which the pilots recognized summed up the industry position: an simply because the carriers had few air- (and sometimes used to their advan- airplane was an airplane was an airplanes and even fewer pilots—the mili- tage). Rickenbacker believed that his plane. All airplanes were pretty much tary had commandeered both. captains were the best in the industry. the same. War’s end meant that the airlines They reputedly would bring their flights At that time, the airlines had no for- could once again acquire all the air- to destination when the weather was so mal programs for training their pilots. planes they might want—not just new bad that the other carriers cancelled. Copilots basically learned what they ones from the factory but also hundreds While he was a tough negotiator, could from the captains with whom they of used airplanes from the military at Rickenbacker could usually be counted flew. They were commonly considered bargain prices. on to give his beloved captains a raise. to be trainees, under the tutelage of the Before the war, the venerable Dou- United’s Patterson was more demo- captain with whom they flew. Thus, rea- glas DC-3 was the industry standard, cratic. In his book, copilots were impor- soned the airlines, copilots were entitled with more of those 21-passenger air- tant, too. More than once, contract ne- to no more than a trainee’s pay. During planes in service throughout the world gotiations with United had produced an the war years, the airlines had had an than the combined total of all the other increase in copilot pay. They often were acute shortage of pilots. The shortage airliners. But war’s end changed all that. the best-paid in the industry. was so great that meeting the Army’s The airlines could now acquire the much Traditionally, ALPA negotiated with need for transport would have been vir- larger, much faster DC-4s and Lockheed one airline at a time. Whichever airline tually impossible unless pilots on war- Constellations. Because of their greatly was next in line to negotiate a contract time transport duties flew more than increased size and speed, one of these (and that was usually TWA or Ameri- 85 hours a month, which had long been new airplanes could do the work of six can) would be asked to meet the indus- the industry standard. After much de- or eight DC-3s. They were far more pro- try standard. That airline was asked to bate and considerable soul-searching, ductive. Further, they were but precur- match the captains’ raise that had been ALPA agreed to a wartime extension. sors to the far more advanced airplanes negotiated on Eastern, the copilots’ then on the drawing boards. A techno- raise negotiated with United, plus some logical revolution was in the offing. improvements in working conditions. A revolution of a different sort was The airlines had complained long and brewing in the airline boardrooms. For loud about these tactics, which they years, strong, charismatic individuals, called “whipsaw negotiations.” Now, most of whom had once been pilots, had they determined to do something about headed the important airlines. The fa- it. They proposed industrywide bargain- mous Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker led ing, under which all pilots would be cov- Eastern; Gen. C.R. Smith steered ered by one nationwide contract. Pay American; pilot-visionary Jack Frye and working conditions on every airline in the industry would be standard. The

Capt. Ruppenthal was a member entire airline industry would negotiate MAY 1946 of the TWA MEC during the strike but a single contract with ALPA, and and later served on the pilots’ Negoti- contract negotiations would occur no ating Committee for various contracts, more frequently than once a year. AIR LINE PILOT, as MEC chairman, and as executive Under this arrangement, all pilots vice-president of ALPA for a short would be subject to one industrywide time. He later earned a Ph.D. and contract. The two rates of pay would taught at Stanford University. be $l,000 per month for captains, and

• Air Line Pilot September 2001 To ameliorate the shortage, and to help in the war effort, flight-time limitations would be waived for the duration of the war, and pilots might fly as many as l00 hours per month (they were sometimes prevailed upon to fly even more). And so, the airline industry proposed an increase in allowable monthly hours. The pilots’ monthly pay would be based

on the assumption that all pilots could , MAY 1946 be required to fly l00 hours a month. They also proposed relaxation of the on- duty limitations.

As the war wound down and U.S. industry returned to peacetime, much of industry—including the airlines—was in considerable turmoil. Wartime legisla- taken their places for the duration. sen as the battleground for the proposed tion provided that no one would be dis- Well-regarded Paul Richter returned to industrywide contract. Aided by various advantaged because of having served in TWA as executive vice-president, seek- professionals from the Air Transport the armed services. The law provided ing to displace John Collings, his war- Association, Ralph Damon was desig- that their jobs would be preserved. time substitute. And Gen. C.R. Smith nated as the industry’s chief negotiator. On the airlines, the seniority system returned to American, where Ralph Although the negotiations were held at meant that the pilots who returned Damon had served as president during TWA’s headquarters (which were then from military service often displaced the war years. For reasons never made in Kansas City), TWA’s executives had other pilots who had been deemed es- public, Damon was selected to head the no formal role in the negotiations. sential to keep the nation’s airlines run- effort to restructure industrial relations The parties talked for many weeks ning and who had not gone off to war. in the airline industry and to institute but made virtually no progress. The two These pilots had stayed at home to industrywide bargaining. sides were simply too far apart. TWA’s make it possible for the airlines to pro- At that time, Howard Hughes was pilots wanted a contract with TWA that vide at least skeleton airline service. As TWA’s controlling stockholder. He and would provide some modest pay in- the servicemen returned, they fre- TWA President Jack Frye made an creases. But Ralph Damon and his quently displaced other employees. exceptional team. They were bold and people insisted that they would negoti- Considerable disruption resulted. For inventive. Further, they had vision. ate for the entire airline industry and a pilot who was accustomed to flying as TWA was the first airline to fly nonstop not just TWA. They insisted on an captain, being “bumped” back to copi- from coast to coast (albeit with an occa- industrywide contract with flat pay lot status because of the return of a sional refueling stop in Kansas City coupled with an increase in allowable more senior serviceman was particu- when westerly winds were strong). monthly hours. The negotiations had larly painful. TWA was the first to pressurize its air- much talk but no give. Less evident, but acutely important, planes, the first to provide coffee freshly Many fruitless days and countless were the problems caused by return- brewed on board, the first with in-flight hours of talking made clear that the par- ing colonels and generals. Some of them movies. Hughes and Frye dreamed of ties could not reach an agreement. Nei- were very competent executives on round-the-world schedules. They were ther party would budge seriously from loan from the airline executive suites. full of ideas. But they were novices in its initial bargaining stance. The nego- They, too, returned home from the war dealing with contract negotiations. tiations were completely stalemated. expecting to return to the offices they Privately, several of the pilots on the had temporarily vacated. They, too, of- negotiating team admitted that they ten “bumped” the presidents, vice- The year was 1946. For various reasons were in a particularly difficult spot. Some presidents, and other officers who had (or perhaps by default), TWA was cho- of them were in a financial bind, as were

September 2001 Air Line Pilot • It would be the first real strike in the airline industry, and a strike for which neither side was well prepared. a number of their friends. In returning gotiating Committee. He tried to inter- and Cairo? Questions concerning to their airline domicile from their pre- vene with Howard Hughes to persuade money abounded. vious military base, they had incurred him to break with the industry. Hughes moving expenses. Some had no savings. had often asked Voights to be his copi- A monthly guarantee of $1,000 sounded lot when he flew a new airplane or en- Not only did the paychecks stop coming like a lot of money to some captains. And gaged in some flying adventure. Other for pilots, they stopped also for the flight the Damon team offered a raise of $20 a captains asked Richter for his help. But engineers, the hostesses (now known as month to copilots who were already on to no avail. While Richter had returned flight attendants), the mechanics, and flat pay, because for pay purposes they to his former desk at TWA, he appeared the other ground personnel. ALPA had were considered as trainees. to have been shorn of his authority. no strike fund, and most of the other But the pilots had to look beyond The Negotiating Committee could employees were not even organized. their immediate financial needs. An find no easy way out of the dilemma. It Some pilots in Los Angeles, New industrywide contract would cost could capitulate and accept what Da- York, and Detroit managed to get part- ALPA an important bargaining tool: It mon had offered. It could continue the time or temporary jobs. But in Kansas could no longer play one airline against fruitless negotiations forever. Or it City (TWA’s largest domicile), the situ- another. It could not secure an advan- could call a strike on the airline. And ation was more difficult. TWA was one tage for the captains on one airline, fol- so, with great reluctance, the Negotiat- of the city’s largest employers. With so lowed by a raise for the copilots on an- ing Committee recommended a strike. many TWA employees out of a job, the other. Airline contracts would no longer It would be the first real strike in the city simply did not have enough avail- recognize that the needs of pilots fly- U.S. airline industry, and a strike for able jobs to employ them. Even when ing for short-haul carriers differ widely which neither side was well prepared. an employer had a vacancy, most were from those of pilots on long-haul routes. The TWA pilots had authorized a strike reluctant to hire someone who they Gone would be wage differentials for on March 26, 1946, by an 812–9 margin. knew would be temporary. They knew flying faster airplanes, for heavier air- The pilots’ Negotiating Committee, that when the strike was over, most planes, for night flying, for training, for together with the TWA Master Execu- employees would return to TWA. deadheading. If flat pay became a real- tive Council, announced the strike, stat- ALPA President Dave Behncke had ity, negotiating raises of any kind would ing that the airline would be shut down his hands full. He was doing his best to be much more difficult. as of Oct. 21, 1946. bolster the Negotiating Committee on Further, what if the proposed indus- And then the problems began. Al- holding the line, to get the negotiations trywide negotiations should founder? though the pilots in general agreed that restarted, and to provide at least some Did anyone really believe that the pi- something drastic must be done, to money to the out-of-work pilots. lots would be allowed to strike? some the idea of a strike was abhorrent. That last item was not an easy job. If industrywide negotiations failed, We consider ourselves to be profes- ALPA had no strike fund; further, it had pilots could, in theory, strike; but that sional people, they argued. True profes- no surplus funds at all. Some pilots had would be unthinkable in America, a sionals do not strike. (This was well never joined ALPA. If dues were raised country dependent upon reliable airline before the day when strikes were called or an assessment for strike benefits for service. The strike and the threat of a by teachers, nurses, doctors, and vari- the TWA striking members was begun, strike would forever be foreclosed from ous other professionals.) pilots might simply quit the union. the pilots. Many pilots, of course, feared that Some pilots did not fully appreciate the The TWA pilots’ Negotiating Com- the company might try to break the fact that the battle was not just be- mittee spent many hours in meetings strike. It could operate some flights tween the TWA pilots and TWA man- devoted to strategy and tactics. They using management personnel, and it agement, but was a battle that would had many frank, and sometimes heated, might persuade some pilots to join their profoundly affect them all. Such pilots exchanges. The negotiators were told ranks. The strike could disintegrate. might continue dutifully to pay their of copilots who had bought houses and Some pilots questioned how they dues, but refuse to pay strike assess- were behind in their mortgage pay- would get home. If the strike began ments. And then what? ments. Some desperately needed more when they were on a flight to Detroit, For several days, ALPA leaders dis- money, and they needed it soon. how would they get to their home base cussed the importance of strike ben- Bush Voights, a highly regarded in Kansas City? And what about the efits. After all, they reasoned, the TWA TWA captain, was a member of the Ne- pilots stationed in Frankfurt, Rome, (continued on page 54)

• Air Line Pilot September 2001 becoming the second carrier to sign an soon be back in the mail carriage busi- TWA (from page 13) ALPA pilot contract, on July 18, 1939. ness. President Roosevelt called a tem- Historians have suggested that had porary halt to the Air Corps involvement a T&WA DC-2 at Kirksville, Mo., on the TWA in-house union succeeded, on March 10, 1934, because of the high May 6, 1935. Sen. Bronson Cutting had such creations would have proliferated accident rate the Air Corps was experi- been killed, along with the pilots, Harry in the industry and piloting as a “pro- encing. The Army became active again Bolton and Ken Greeson, and one other fession” probably would not have on March 19 and continued to meet its passenger; nine others survived. Testi- developed. schedules until its last schedule flight on mony by the company union president, By the time the ALPA contract was June 1, 1934. But the die was cast. In Harlan Hall, an executive pilot, resigned, T&WA, becoming more com- March the government asked airlines for vealed how thoroughly the manage- monly known as TWA, had weathered bids on carriage of the mail, pending en- ment controlled the union and how the consequences of the political change actment of new legislation that would quickly pilot interests were cast aside. in government when President Franklin become the Air Mail Act of 1934. By 1936 the in-house union had with- D. Roosevelt took office in March 1933. T&WA, by virtue of its award of the ered away, pilots having deemed it in- Scrutiny of the manner in which the gov- Los Angeles to Philadelphia transcon- effective and finding it unconcerned ernment awarded air mail contracts dur- tinental route, joined with United, with advancing any pilot-interest work ing Postmaster Brown’s “spoils confer- American, and Eastern as one of the or operational issues, except for those ence” began in earnest during Septem- largest U.S. airlines. T&WA also gained that management wanted pushed. ber of that year. Following congressional a new president, Jack Frye. Named in Former in-house union members began hearings and Attorney General investi- December 1934, he departed 12 years returning to ALPA’s rolls. gations, President Roosevelt on Feb. 9, later, in 1947. His leadership moved One of the positive remnants of the 1934, cancelled the air mail contracts— T&WA pilots from Trimotors into pres-

TPA experiment, reinforced by the putting T&WA, among others, out of, surized cabins and into the renowned Cutting accident hearings, was T&WA and the Army Air Corps into, the mail “Connie,” while positioning the carrier✈ management’s increased awareness of delivery business. T&WA placed its en- to span the globe. the need to recognize the value of inde- tire roster of workers on furlough and pendent pilot voices relative to opera- began hemorrhaging about $250,000 per Part II will cover the Howard Hughes tional safety and efficiency. month, far exceeding the $130,000 profit years, equipment modernization, No doubt this new management en- it recorded in 1933. TWA’s postwar expansion, and the con- lightenment played a role in T&WA’s But the commercial carriers were to sequences of fuel shortages, deregulation, and corporate manipulations. paycheck to the next. And when those place. And, of course, funds could be First Strike (from page 16) paychecks stopped coming, the host- sent quickly to striking pilots in the esses could not pay the rent. event a strike actually was called. That they alone should bear the trauma Bob Overman, a well-liked, senior cap- The TWA strike of 1946—the first and uncertainties caused by a strike, in tain in Kansas City, addressed that prob- real airline strike—was a seminal event. addition to all of the financial costs, was lem. At a general meeting of all Kansas Its impact on the U.S. airline industry simply not fair. City pilots, he described the seriousness was doubtless greater than any other. Eventually, the ALPA leaders voted of the problem. Then he passed the hat, That strike prevented the airlines from to pay benefits to the striking pilots. The asking every pilot who possibly could do instituting industrywide bargaining. actual amounts voted were minimal, but so to contribute. Emergency loans were Had it not taken place, pilots today the ALPA board members felt that made to those pilots and hostesses who would be flying 100 hours a month, with these amounts were about all that the were truly in distress. And thus began no consideration whatsoever for the nonstriking pilots on the other airlines the first airline credit union in America. type of airplane they fly. In 1946, all cap- would be willing to contribute. But a sig- Not only did TWA formally establish a tains would have received a salary of nificant precedent was established: credit union, ALPA did likewise. $1,000 a month—no training pay, no sick ALPA would pay strike benefits to pi- Further, ALPA members in general pay, and no deadhead pay. Pilots flying lots on an authorized strike. began to appreciate the value of an a B-747 would receive no more than Persuading many pilots to pay their emergency plan. ALPA’s Board of Di- those flying a Fokker Friendship, a DC- strike assessment was difficult. ALPA rectors took a realistic look at the 3, or any other airliner. had virtually nothing in its treasury, Association’s finances and bolstered And pilots would have virtually no and the strike assessment funds were them. Then, perhaps for the first time, possibility of negotiating improved pay slow in coming in—so slow that they the pilots recognized the importance of or working conditions under threat of a were not paid to the striking TWA pi- a realistic strike fund—not just pious strike. That was clear then, and it is even lots until many months after the strike hopes that striking pilots could some- more clear now. The nation could not af- had been settled. how be compensated, but actual funds ford, and would not permit, a nationwide While the financial pressures on on hand, which could be useful in con- shutdown of the airlines. The threat of a many of the pilots were substantial, for tract negotiations, since their existence strike as a negotiating tactic would no

many of the hostesses, they were se- could convince recalcitrant manage- longer exist. vere. Poorly paid, they lived from one ment that a strike could actually take ✈

• Air Line Pilot September 2001 (Part I discussed T&WA’s transconti- stockholder, John Hertz (yellow cab and nental beginnings, its early passenger rental car mogul), who believed the and mail history, and its role in intro- PART II price of the new airplane, which Frye ducing the DC-1, which brought new saw as T&WA’s future, was too much design concepts, improved perfor- Howard Hughes plays a major for the financially strapped airline. The mance, and profits to the airlines.) role in T&WA equipment moderniza- dispute caused problems with the de- tion, which contributes greatly livery, and the order was cancelled. &WA, by virtue of its government- to T&WA’s post-war expansion, awarded Los Angeles-to-Philadel- Enter Howard Hughes phia transcontinental route during interrupted by the consequences Frye then turned to Howard Hughes, the 1934 airmail contract proceedings, of economic recessions, fuel who, sensing a major opportunity, sur- became one of the Big Four U.S. airlines, shortages, deregulation, and prised onlookers and bought enough along with United, American, and East- corporate manipulations. shares to gain control of the company. ern. T&WA also gained a new president, The Stratoliner contract was resur- Jack Frye, who was named in Decem- By Esperison Martinez, Jr. rected in September 1939, and delivery ber 1934 and departed 12 years later, in Contributing Editor of the pressurized, all-weather airliner 1947. His leadership moved T&WA pi- was made on May 6, 1940, with the in- lots from two- and three-engine air- stream, among other high-altitude fly- augural flight following on July 8, 1940. planes into pressurized cockpits and the ing findings. Upon landing after a high Pan American had already taken deliv- renowned four-engined“Connie,” while flight, he told meteorologists, “My God! ery of its order for four Stratoliners and positioning the carrier to span the globe. I had winds of 100 to 150 miles per had begun using them in June on routes T&WA’s move from the twin-engined hour”—an astounding discovery and to South America. Douglas airliners to the Boeing 307 adventure in that day. Capt. Tomlinson’s After T&WA’s shakedown period Stratoliner was significant for two his- research shows T&WA’s bent for ad- with the Stratoliner, it proved popular torical reasons: The move signaled de- vancing the technology that shaped com- with passengers and dependable and velopment of the world’s first pressur- mercial aviation and the airline depen- reliable throughout its commercial ser- ized commercial air transport, and dence on its pilots to succeed. vice, which was to be short-lived. Howard Hughes would gain control of From this research came the impe- At the onset of World War II, the the airline, which would benefit greatly tus for developing the Stratoliner, to largest U.S. airlines were pressed into from his progressive thinking. fulfill T&WA’s desire for a four-engine military service via contracts to trans- Frye firmly believed that airline suc- transcontinental transport with a pres- port men and supplies. On Dec. 24, 1941, cess would come only when passengers surized cabin. Boeing, owing to some of T&WA was signed to provide Army were carried comfortably, and that its own preliminary works, had sketchy transport needs to any place in the meant flying above the weather. To this plans available. Negotiations went world. The airline sold its five Strato- end, he turned to Capt. “Tommy” Tom- quickly and smoothly, and on Jan. 29, liners to the government and formed its linson, who had already set U.S. and 1937, T&WA ordered five Boeing 307 Intercontinental Division (ICD) to op- world aviation records and had con- Stratoliners, with delivery of the first erate within the Army Air Forces. The ducted thunderstorm research in set for Dec. 22, 1938. ICD would be the nucleus of what T&WA’s venerable, but modified, DC-1. Between the time T&WA placed the would become the Air Transport Com- Flying a T&WA Northrop Gamma, Stratoliner order and Boeing’s prom- mand. Eventually, T&WA pilots would modified for extremely high altitude re- ised delivery date, Frye’s vision clashed also fly a fleet of C-54 and C-87s that search, Tomlinson discovered the jet with the practicality of T&WA’s major the government procured. According to

18 • Air Line Pilot October 2001 T&WA pilot records, the ICD effort concluded in April 1946, having amassed 238,741 operational flying hours (179 mph average speed); 9,528 transoceanic flights; a load factor of 84 percent of capacity over 42 million miles, or 235 billion pound-miles; and 44 T&WA lives and nine C-54s lost. The experience during these operations readied T&WA for the transatlantic operations it would begin following the war. T&WA, in its early years, used Ford Trimotors to carry passengers Lockheed Constellation coast to coast, and marked them, even then, with the letters TWA. Once the Stratoliner situation with Boeing had been settled, Howard Announcement of the Constellation pro- utes. Although the Constellation was to Hughes’s vision turned toward more- gram, which had managed to stay a have given T&WA a healthy 3-year lead advanced, larger, and faster airplanes, tightly held secret, just a few months over its competitors in operating the talking with Frye about future equip- before Pearl Harbor caused a sensation highly sophisticated transport, the war ment even before the first Stratoliner within the aviation industry. But T&WA eliminated that possibility. Owing to the was delivered. The new airplane would was not to immediately reap the rewards “Connie’s” transport configuration, the be big—carrying 50 passengers and of its marvel; war needs prevailed. All government gave production prefer- 6,000 pounds of cargo, it would be fast Constellations that came off the assem- ence to combat aircraft, so that Lock- with over-weather capabilities, it would bly line were designated C-69s and went heed manufactured only half of T&WA’s be luxurious, and it would fly across the into military service. original order for 40. Hughes had con- continent nonstop. But most impor- However, the airline did accept the tracted to retain buy-back rights from tantly, all talk and plans pertaining to first Constellation, dressed in T&WA the government, so at the war’s end, a it would be highly secret. livery, and after its acceptance flight, sizeable fleet returned to T&WA. Many meetings with Lockheed con- turned it over to the military. The ac- On July 5, 1945, T&WA gained tem- tacts resulted in an order for 40 Constel- ceptance flight—Burbank to Washing- porary authority to serve Paris, Rome, lations at a cost of $425,000 each to be ton, D.C.—was a record-maker. On Athens, and Cairo, finally placing the bought by the Hughes Tool Company, April 17, 1944, Hughes and Frye flew Constellation into commercial service as would be all future aircraft purchases. the cross-country trip in 6 hours 58 min- on Feb. 5, 1946, when it made the first commercial flight from Washington, D.C., to Paris, via La Guardia. Capt. Hal Blackburn commanded the crew of co- captains Jack Hermann and John Calder, flight engineer Art Ruhanen, plus a navigator, a radio officer, and two cabin attendants. On February 15, the inaugural Los Angeles-to-New York flight became reality. Several events hurt T&WA’s operations and precipitated a drop in T&WA

FILE PHOTOS stock price from $71 a share to $9, along with a loss of $4 million in 1946. The 18 Constellations on order were cancelled.

AIR LINE PILOT The T&WA Board of Directors voted A Ford Trimotor with TAT markings sits aside a TWA jumbo B-747 in a Jack Frye, ever the visionary, out of graphic display of equipment growth at T&WA/TWA. The Trimotor took office. Although the company was ex- 36 hours to make the coast-to-coast flight; the B-747 takes 6. periencing equipment, financial, and la-

October 2001 Air Line Pilot • 19 bor problems, Frye wanted to buy more airlines and international routes that Constellations; Hughes and the Board spanned the globe, its pilots would set did not. In early 1947, Douglas intro- many aviation records, and its safety duced the DC-6, which proved to be se- record would be second to none. rious competition to the “Connie” fleet. But all that was not entirely evident But the next year, T&WA placed a new- from the Boeing order pad for the first model Constellation, the L-749, into ser- American commercial jet transport, the vice. Boeing 707, which showed 186 aircraft In 1950, the carrier officially changed ordered by the nation’s airlines, except its name to Trans World Airlines (TWA), for TWA, whose order tallied “0.” This and its bottom line improved, owing was not for lack of interest. Howard mainly to the success of its international Hughes continued to dominate TWA and division and increased transcontinental its planning and equipment procure- FILE PHOTOS traffic. TWA later replaced its short-haul ment. He was working with Convair to fleet of DC-3s with Martin 404s and develop a jet larger and faster than the AIR LINE PILOT 202As. For its transcontinental and in- B-707; the deal collapsed at about the ternational routes, TWA on April 1, 1955, same time that his company, Hughes stock) into a 10-year voting trust, repos- introduced the L-1049G to compete with Tool, which bought all of TWA’s air- sessed all the aircraft, and ousted the Douglas DC-7, which United and planes, suffered a serious cash flow prob- Hughes from control of the airline. By American were flying. lem that was not publicly evident. Ironi- 1965, TWA’s value had zoomed up, and For 25 years, the elegant, stream- cally, TWA was earning good profits. its stock was again in the range of $97 lined Connie, with its distinctive triple Hughes’s resistance to ordering the per share. The airline had revenues ex- tail and long fuselage, dominated TWA B-707 wilted; and on March 2, 1956, he ceeding $500 million and a profit of $50 skies. The airplane underwent much allowed an order for eight “domestic” million, and paid its first dividend to modification, culminating in what has B-707s to be placed; his executives were stockholders in 30 years. Hughes sold his been referred to as the “most luxuri- aghast at the meager number and air- holdings for $550 million and cut his last ous piston aircraft,” the L-1649A. The craft type. Ultimately, the order was ties with the airline. last TWA Constellation flight, Flight increased to a total of 33 as of Jan. 10, The upswing of TWA’s fortunes at 249, took off from Kennedy Airport at 1957. On March 20, 1959, TWA inaugu- this time is attributed to Charles 3:15 p.m. on April 6, 1967. The crew of rated jet transcontinental service from Tillinghast, a Wall Street lawyer and Capt. Joseph Duncan, First Officer Ri- San Francisco to New York with its former Bendix executive who was chard Green, and flight engineer single Boeing 707, almost 2 months af- named TWA president in May 1961. His George Martin closed a chapter of TWA ter American’s B-707 coast-to-coast acumen was to TWA’s business growth aircraft history as TWA prepared for flight on Jan. 25, 1959. The first TWA what Lindbergh, Frye, and Hughes’s the commercial jet transport. B-707 flight over the Atlantic was on acumen had been to TWA’s aeronautics Nov. 23, 1959. In that year, TWA expe- growth. Tillinghast guided the airline Jet age rienced its best financial year to date. to attaining financial success it had Just as the Douglas series of transports, The Convair 880 was brought on line never before reached. By 1969, TWA the Boeing Stratoliner, and the in 1960 to supplement the long-range earnings reached more than $1 billion Lockheed Super Constellation had B-707. The CV-880 was faster than ei- in sales; revenues quadrupled over 1958 played such vital roles in TWA’s devel- ther the B-707 or its competitor, the rates, and the number of employees opment during the piston-engine era, DC-8, and helped TWA pilots set many tripled. the jet-engined Boeing 707, 727, and city-pair speed records. The jets’ vora- This startling success is tied to the 747, along with the L-1011 and the DC9/ cious thirst for fuel, however, caused thought and planning that went into MD 80, would become the airline’s vital TWA to sell them in the early 1970s. developing its jet fleet, workforce, and equipment in years to come. During the In the meantime, Howard Hughes’s routes. On Oct. 1, 1962, TWA inaugu- 1950s, 1960s, and through the early financial problems with Hughes Tool had rated the first fully automated doppler 1970s, TWA further developed its first- deteriorated to the point that on Dec. 29, radar system of navigation on sched- class character for which it will long be 1960, his financial backers placed his uled transatlantic flights—the New remembered. The carrier would acquire TWA stock (78 percent of all company York to London flight was the first

20 • Air Line Pilot October 2001 jacked TWA Flight 840 enroute from Rome to Athens. An armed duo ordered Capt. Dean Carter, First Officer Harry Oakley, and Second Officer During the 1930s and 40s, the Hobart Tomlinson to fly to Damascus. Douglas DC-3 (above) and the Once there, the terrorists released the Lockheed Constellation (left) passengers and crew and blew up the became part of the growing fleet airplane. A few weeks later, the PFLP of airplanes of T&WA/TWA. hit again, taking six airliners. Terror- ists took over TWA Flight 741, a B-707 Shaggy 70s flying from Tel Aviv to New York, and TWA,when it retired the Constellation directed it to land in the desert near fleet in 1967, became the first U.S. air- Amman, Jordan. Three other hijacked line to boast an all-jet fleet. At the end airplanes were forced to the same point. of 1969, TWA’s fleet consisted of 232 air- In all, 595 passengers and crew mem- planes: 124 B-707s, 64 B-727s, 25 CV- bers were kept aboard their airplanes transatlantic flight ever operated with- 880/890s, and 19 DC-9s. And that fleet for some time, until removed, and then out a professional navigator aboard. would grow. On Feb. 25, 1970, the car- the skyjackers blew up all the airplanes. TWA began its B-727 service on June rier inaugurated B-747 service from TWA Capt. Tom Ashwood, as an 1, 1964, and started replacing its short- Los Angeles to New York, becoming ALPA national officer, was highly in- haul airplanes with the DC-9. By the the first to offer any B-747 service in strumental in the U.S. and international late 1960s, the TWA fleet of B-727s had the United States. Two years later, on effort to solve the hijacking menace. grown to 50, with more on order. Inter- June 25, 1972, TWA began L-1011 ser- The United States finally passed the national expansion was on the upswing, vice and flew the first flight, St. Louis Antihijacking Act of 1974, which put with service reaching several African to Los Angeles, on autopilot from take- into effect many of the security mea- countries, and with the airline securing off to landing. sures still used today. Pacific authority and engaging in But the 1970s were not to be all Although the fear of being skyjacked around-the-world flights. The most tell- golden. Along with the rest of the air- may have deterred some air travelers, ing mark of TWA’s growth is that in July line industry, TWA would experience the real cause of low load factors during 1969, it took the spot as top transatlan- hijackings, which began in 1968; the ill the 1970s was the depressed economy tic carrier away from Pan American for effects of an economic downturn; the oil and severe fuel shortages, coupled with the first time. The B-727 was looked embargo of 1973 to 1979; labor strife; overcapacity. Interestingly, the intro- upon as the “savior of TWA.” and the deregulation of the U.S. airline duction of the B-747 at such a financially The change from pistons to jets and industry, which over a prolonged period precarious time was reminiscent of the surge of hiring had an effect on the would change the face and character of TWA’s introduction of its DC-1 during pilot force as well. To meet the chal- air travel. the Depression. TWA’s fleet of 232 jets, lenge, TWA established the Jack Frye The airline industry and particularly coupled with delivery of widebody jets International Training Center in Kan- the pilots were fighting an uphill battle at a time when many small carriers and sas City. Dedicated on April 26, 1962, to overcome the menace of hijacking, fleets were being restructured or estab- the Center employed more than 240 which by 1972 had reached 160 recorded lished, helped create tremendous over- people and was equipped with six state- U.S. airplane hijackings. They started capacity and traffic stagnation as the of-the-art simulators. The Center task as political hijackings, with most des- traveling public was sharply reducing its was formidable because from 1963 to tined for Cuba. TWA had three air- air travel. 1965, TWA added 600 new pilots, and planes commandeered and directed to The carrier’s bottom line began to get 640 flight engineers also went into pi- Cuba during 1968 and 1969. worse, and TWA pilots suffered heavy lot training. In addition, pilots needed Worse was yet to come—terrorist furloughs—700 pilots were on the 7 weeks of training to make the transi- hijackings, which had been renamed street at the end of 1971, a number re- tion from pistons to jets. The retrain- “skyjackings.” On Aug. 29, 1969, a com- duced by only 123 by 1974. Looking for ing included 21 days of ground training mando unit of the Popular Front for the a way out of its financial hole, TWA ex- and 10 days of simulator work. Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) sky- changed routes with Pan Am in 1974

October 2001 Air Line Pilot • 21 and recorded profits for 1987 and 1988, when Icahn bought another 23 percent of TWA and convinced the stockholders to take the company private. The pro- cess took some $610 million out of TWA, earmarking $469 million in cash, and $196 million in preferred stock for Icahn;

FILE PHOTO and more than $539 million was added to TWA’s debt. By now, the unions fully recognized Icahn as a “corporate raider”

AIR LINE PILOT and no longer backed his ownership, TWA inaugurated Lockheed L-1011 service on June 25, 1972, making the comparing him to Frank Lorenzo. first flight, St. Louis to Los Angeles, on autopilot, takeoff to landing. The Gulf crises that began in 1990 made TWA’s debt of $2.8 billion totally and dropped its around-the-world ser- ers, establish fleets of small airplanes, unserviceable out of operating income. vice along with some other routes. and create unbearable loads of debt for Within 6 months, TWA’s cash was gone. By 1976, the carrier had financially the larger carriers. The smell of bank- Icahn was battling fare wars; de- begun to reach level flight and recalled ruptcy was in the air. Braniff was the manding large givebacks from pilots all its furloughed pilots; but the pilot hir- first large airline to fall under the heavy and other labor; and selling valuable ing hiatus that began in 1970 lasted until debt brought on by expansion. It de- assets, including route authority from 1978, when the airline hired 12 pilots. clared bankruptcy on May 12, 1982. Oth- New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and The next year, 1979, the air carrier’s ers, such as Eastern Airlines followed; Chicago to London to American Air- identity started to become clouded as TWA would not be forced to file for re- lines for $445 million in July 1991 and it became part of a new order: The organization until Jan. 31, 1992. the Philadelphia and Baltimore routes Trans World Corporation was formed But during those 10 years, the car- to London to USAir for $50 million in and included Canteen Corporation, rier underwent a massive upheaval in May 1992. Hilton International (bought in 1967), its organizational structure, financial On Jan. 31, 1992, TWA filed for Chap- Spartan Food Service, and Century 21 outlook, route structure, and workforce. ter 11 bankruptcy protection from its Real Estate. In 1982, TWA began operating new creditors. TWA’s earnings thus became corpo- widebody equipment and made its first TWA’s total workforce had made rate earnings; and in 1980, TWA con- transcontinental Boeing 767 flight, Los clear that any “givebacks” would hap- tributed more than $3 billion of the $5 Angeles to Washington, D.C. pen only if Icahn left. On Aug. 24, 1992, billion that the entire corporation Debt brought on by equipment pur- creditors agreed to give employees 45 earned. chases, rising fuel prices, fare wars, and percent equity in TWA for concessions In the same year, drained of its capi- instability were the plague of the time, of 15 percent. The following January, tal, the airline began furloughing pilots and in November 1983, TWA was cut Icahn resigned, relinquishing all control again, benching 670 through 1981—the away from the corporate “family” to fly and interest, but taking away with him effects of deregulation were setting in. on its own as a new public company. a deal that allowed him to buy blocks of To stave off a furlough of 200 more, By 1985, TWA was on the brink of discounted TWA tickets and resell them TWA pilots accepted reduced flight collapse, and Frank Lorenzo was bidding through his Internet website, a deal hours and pay to 72 hours a month— for the airline. that would come to haunt TWA’s future pilot givebacks would become a con- To thwart the “scourge of labor,” financial stability. stant management demand in future TWA’s unions backed Carl Icahn’s 52 On Nov. 3, 1993, TWA completed its negotiations. percent purchase of the company on Sep- reorganization and selected William R. tember 26. This was the midst of the “Go- Howard as chairman of the Board and Glide toward dusk Go 80s,” when the Reagan Administra- CEO. In April of the following year, Effects of the unfettered competition tion’s laissez-faire pro-business policy Jeffery H. Erickson was named presi- that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 encouraged Wall Street junk bond deal- dent and chief operating officer. brought on would touch every major air- ers and corporate raiders, among others. In 1995, TWA successfully completed line, spawn dozens of new small carri- TWA acquired Ozark in September 1986 a second financial reorganization.

22 • Air Line Pilot October 2001 time completion rates. With liquidation a near certainty, the airline refused to be buried. On Jan. 10, 2001, Capt. Compton announced: “TWA voluntar- ily filed petitions in the U.S. District Court in Delaware for relief under Chapter 11 of the US. Bankruptcy Code. American [Airlines] will purchase TWA’s assets out of bankruptcy and ul- CAPT. IAN DUNCAN (TWA)

Two of the numerous paint schemes TWA used during its 71- year history, are shown on a TWA DC-9 behind a code-sharing TransStates Jetstream 41 (above) and on a Boeing 767 (right).

In February 1997, Gerald L. Gitner was named chairman and CEO, and on Dec. 3, 1997, Capt. William F. Compton was named president and COO, putting a pilot back into control of the airline after a long line of business executives. Capt. Compton became president and CAPT. IAN DUNCAN (TWA) CEO on May 25, 1999. For the seemingly ageless airline, the the distinction of TWA’s being the only timately will integrate the TWA system 1990s proved a rocky decade. Its flight large airline not to turn a profit that into its own.” operations continued as did innovations year. Indeed, TWA had not turned a Thus, dusk has descended upon the in passenger services that brought profit since 1988. familiar TWA livery recognized in so praise from airline industry publica- The first three quarters of 2000 pro- many parts of the world and by the tions. About the time that the second duced a $115.1 million loss, and in Janu- many people whose lives it has touched. financial reorganization was completed, ary 2001, Standard and Poor’s Credit TWA leaves the national aviation scene in mid-1995, TWA added a distinctive Watch noted that TWA remains “vul- in much the same way it came in: A new aircraft livery. As if its new livery nerable over the longer term because marriage of airlines during a weak signified a fresh start, the carrier made of its limited route structure, weak fi- economy marked by an unregulated it first new aircraft buy since before the nancial profile, and lack of significant environment that sports unbridled com- Icahn days, ordering 20 new B-757-200s alliances with other airlines.” In the petition and with a pilot in command of on Feb. 12, 1996, and 5 months later, 15 preceding 12 months, TWA stock its operations, directing a stalwart new MD-83s. shares lost 55 percent of their value and workforce and a resolute pilot group fly- Two significant equipment events stood at $1.32 per share at the time of ing an improving aircraft fleet. marked 1998: the S&P report. All TWA pilots, the glue of the ven- • on February 20, the last of TWA’s Clearly, the financial lot of TWA erable carrier, will carry memories of Boeing 747s was retired; and made turning the company around im- their airline, the glorious ups and the • on December 9, TWA placed its larg- possible for the newly appointed pilot dismal downs it has experienced; the est aircraft order in the company’s his- CEO. But on the operations side, the unselfish giving of the “brotherhood” to tory—125 B-717s and A319/A320/ employees, following Capt. Compton’s help correct errant financial paths; the A321s, plus options for 125 more. management, did improve the perfor- pride, professionalism, and character The B-767 widebody had become the mance in the air: TWA flew a record 26.4 that labeled it “A Pilot’s Outfit.”

airlines’ main international aircraft. But million passengers in 2000 with high To them, its spirit will always live as 1999 ended with a $353 million loss and customer satisfaction and consistent on- “Go TWA!” ✈

October 2001 Air Line Pilot • 23