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Saddam's Best Friend

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Saddam's Best Friend 32 ANNALS OF ESPIONAGE nity is acute. One former C.I.A. operative 6 told me, “I don’t know how many times we had to say this to Strobe”—Strobe SADDAM’S BEST FRIEND Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State— How the C.I.A. made it a lot easier for the Iraqi leader to rearm. “but Primakov is just not a good guy.” BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH HE targeting of Saddam had grown, T in part, out of an extraordinary in- telligence coup by a team of UNSCOM AST December, after Saddam Hus- itary targets.” That, too, was a misstate- arms inspectors. The team—headed by sein threatened to end seven ment, for two of the targets were sites Scott Ritter, a former U.S. Marine L years of United Nations arms- where Saddam was known to entertain Corps intelligence officer—had been control inspections, President Clinton mistresses, and they were specifically trying for two years to unscramble the ordered American attacks on Iraq. Once struck in the hope of assassinating him. encrypted communications system that again, the world watched, on television, Saddam responded to the bombing— Saddam has used since the end of the as missiles fell on carefully picked tar- and the bungled assassination attempt— Gulf War to hide the full extent of his gets. The purpose of the attacks, Clinton by formally ousting UNSCOM and turning strategic stockpile. Ritter and his UN- SCOM colleagues knew that there were missiles and warheads to be found. They also knew that Saddam, who travelled frequently in and around Baghdad, lived in constant fear of attacks on his life— from both inside and outside Iraq—and had surrounded himself with a huge ap- paratus of bodyguards, known as the Special Security Organization. Saddam frequently communicated, through aides, with his entourage from secure telephones scattered around Baghdad and from a radio telephone in his car. UNSCOM also knew (from a high-level Iraqi defector) that these forces had or- ders to do more than protect Saddam: they were also responsible for safeguard- ing Iraq’s hidden weapons. The encryption system on Saddam’s telephones, made in Sweden, was as sophisticated as any on the international market. The phones had a series of channels, and on each channel were al- gorithms that chopped the signals into hundreds of bits as the channels were switched. To get at the signals, Ritter’s When the C.I.A. trampled the U.N.’s turf, Saddam survived, arms control didn’t. people took the extreme risk of operat- ing, under the cover of the U.N. flag, an told reporters, was to “degrade” Iraq’s anew to Russia, historically his most im- interception station in UNSCOM’s offices capacity for waging war, and he added, “I portant trading partner. Today, eight years in Baghdad and in a mobile unit. gave the order because I believe we can- after the Gulf War, American policy has Early in the spring of 1998, the gam- not allow Saddam Hussein to dismantle collapsed in Iraq, and a Cold War men- ble paid off. The algorithms were un- UNSCOM and resume the production of tality has returned. Saddam is unchecked scrambled, and Saddam’s most closely weapons of mass destruction with im- by U.N. inspectors as he pursues his goal protected communications were suddenly punity.” The President was mistaken. of becoming a nuclear power, with the pouring into UNSCOM. “It was one of the The United Nations Special Commis- aid of Russian strategic materials. Sad- most valuable operations since the Cold sion for Iraq, known as UNSCOM, had al- dam’s ally in these efforts is Yevgeny Pri- War,” one informed U.N. adviser told me. ready been effectively dismantled, by the makov, the Russian Prime Minister, a But UNSCOM’s mission was to uncover shortsighted policies of his own Admin- longtime friend who, according to highly Iraq’s complex system of concealing its istration. Then, a few hours after Clinton classified communications intelligence, weapons program; the mechanics of Sad- spoke, William Cohen, the Secretary of received at least one large payment from dam’s personal security were a benefit only Defense, appeared on television. “One Iraq—by wire transfer—in November of if they could lead to hidden arms caches. thing should be absolutely clear,” he told 1997. The distrust of Primakov through- The Central Intelligence Agency, reporters. “We are concentrating on mil- out the American intelligence commu- which had been helping UNSCOM inter- SUE COE TNY—4/5/99—PAGE 32—LIVE OPI—N41271—LINE SCREEN 133 ANNALS OF ESPIONAGE 35 pret its intelligence findings since 1991, to one of America’s least publicized attacked Iraq in December, cruise mis- had a different agenda. Its goal, autho- intelligence units, the Special Collection siles destroyed both targets. rized by President Clinton, was to work Service. The S.C.S., which is jointly Saddam, of course, survived. One se- with Iraqi dissidents, in Saddam’s Spe- operated by the C.I.A. and the N.S.A., is nior Clinton Administration intelligence cial Security Organization and elsewhere, responsible for, among other things, official acknowledged the failure, but he to overthrow the regime, by any means deploying highly trained teams of elec- added, “In our business, you never have possible. In the C.I.A.’s view, Ritter’s in- tronics specialists in sensitive areas one-hundred-per-cent assurance. Let’s telligence unit was always in the way— around the world to monitor diplomatic assume you know he’s there. You’ve got a and, in any case, could not be trusted and other kinds of communications. Its time delay. How do you know a guy with sensitive information; the C.I.A. felt operations are often run from secure sites doesn’t finish the business with his that any important intelligence it might inside American embassies. mistress and go on his way, or to the supply to UNSCOM would inevitably find The UNSCOM team in Baghdad felt bathroom. It may be a double”—some- its way back to the Iraqi regime. “There betrayed, and believed that it would now one posing as Saddam—“or he may have were killer fights about getting involved be vulnerable to capture and prosecution changed locations. There’s so much with the U.N.,” one former C.I.A. offi- by Iraq on espionage charges. The team’s potential for a slip between cup and lip.” cial told me. “We don’t get involved with equipment was still intercepting crucial A Republican who served at a high international organizations.” telephone calls, but the United States was level in the Reagan and Bush Adminis- In March of 1998, a high-tech team controlling the “take.” Ritter, desperate to trations told me that he had learned from the National Security Agency, keep the operation under U.N. control, before the December raid that the which is responsible for American com- asked the Israelis to process the telephone Administration had “a fix” on Saddam’s munications intelligence, flew to Bahrain intercepts. (Israeli intelligence had been whereabouts. Administration officials, he to review the telephone intercepts. One the first group to tell UNSCOM about the said, “were touting” the fact that they had official recalled that when the intercepts importance of Saddam’s Special Security good intelligence. “People treat Saddam had been decrypted and translated, the Organization.) The Israelis refused as an idiot,” he said, referring to Clinton Americans told themselves, “Here’s the (under pressure from Washington), and and his senior aides. He added that the best intelligence that we’ve ever had!” the UNSCOM operation was shut down failure of the bombing was evidence that The official went on, “Saddam is sud- until July, when the Americans unilater- Saddam had been aware of the penetra- denly exposed for the first time. He’s the ally installed their own collection devices tion of his telephones. In his opinion, the Godfather! He gets drunk, starts raving in the UNSCOM offices in Baghdad. man said, “He was doubling or tripling like a madman, and his secretary will get Ritter was reluctant to discuss the on the coms”—intelligence jargon mean- on and say he’s lost his mind—ordering specifics of the UNSCOM intelligence ing that Saddam was deliberately gener- murders. We never had him on this level program with me, but in a series of in- ating misleading or incorrect statements. before.” Like Mafia leaders, Saddam terviews recently he stressed that there Other high-level intelligence officials I rarely, if ever, uses the telephone himself, was an enormous difference between ac- spoke with had reservations about the but relies on aides to relay his commands. cumulating information on behalf of the Administration’s eagerness to eliminate The overheard “secretary” was Presiden- United Nations and accumulating it on Saddam in the absence of any long-term tial Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmoud, behalf of the United States. “Stuff was strategic plan for dealing with the region. Saddam’s closest aide, who was much being collected”—by the Americans— “I’m not against nailing the guy,” one fully feared by Iraqis. At the same time, the “without our knowledge and without informed military officer said to me, “but official said, senior N.S.A. managers Butler’s knowledge,” Ritter said. “That’s then what do you do?” Assassination, he were “panicked,” because the information espionage. My team was worried. I told added, “is not a policy. It’s a tool of pol- from the telephone intercepts was “con- Butler about it”—the American opera- icy.” (Officially, of course, “assassination,” trolled by the United Nations.” tion—“and said we have to shut it down.
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