Retracing the Caucasian Circle Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus
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Retracing the Caucasian Circle Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus Fiona Hill Kemal Kiriş ci Andrew Moffatt turkey project policy paper Number 6 • July 2015 policy paper Number 6, July 2015 About CUSE The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings fosters high-level U.S.-European dia- logue on the changes in Europe and the global challenges that affect transatlantic relations. As an integral part of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Center offers independent research and recommendations for U.S. and European officials and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and public forums on poli- cy-relevant issues. 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AUTHORS’ NOTE This report provides an overview of the geopolit- Although the assessments are those of the authors ical and security issues facing Armenia, Azerbai- alone, the paper has benefitted from the input of jan, and Georgia and their consequences for rela- numerous individuals and organizations in inter- tions with the United States, the European Union, views in Ankara, Baku, Berlin, Istanbul, London, and Turkey. It is not, and does not purport to be, Tbilisi, Washington, and Yerevan. Specific points an in-depth research synthesis or a detailed policy and observations made in the report are informed analysis. Rather, the paper aims to provide prelim- by these interviews. The authors are indebted to inary considerations in a format intended to gen- all those who gave their time, publications, and erate discussion and critical comments, to sketch expertise to provide data and perspectives in sup- out key areas that the authors believe should re- port of this paper. The authors would like to offer ceive further research examination (by ourselves special thanks to Brookings Senior Fellow Suzanne and others), and to offer some recommendations Maloney for her contributions to the Iran-related for framing future policy. dimensions of this report. The report should be considered as a work in prog- We are grateful for the generous support of The Je- ress and is subject to revision. Views and opinions nesis Group whose contributions to the Brookings expressed are those of the authors and do not repre- Foreign Policy program made this report possible. sent any official position of the Brookings Institution. Retracing the Caucasian Circle – Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 04 Retracing the Caucasian Circle Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus Fiona Hill Kemal Kiriş ci Andrew Moffatt INTRODUCTION toward Euro-Atlantic integration has eroded since the 1990s, and regional elites have become genu- arsh geopolitical realities and historic legacies inely cynical about Western intentions and capa- Hhave pushed the South Caucasus states of Ar- bilities after the failure of past policy initiatives. In menia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia back onto the for- the wake of the global economic and Eurozone cri- eign policy agendas of the United States (U.S.), the ses, the United States, EU, and Turkey have fewer European Union (EU), and Turkey, at a time when resources and less overall capacity for crafting new all three have pulled back from more activist roles policies. in regional affairs. Western disengagement has exacerbated some of the more negative regional In the 1990s and early 2000s, after the collapse trends by signaling disinterest and a lack of com- of the Soviet Union, the region drew Western at- mitment toward resolving ongoing conflicts and tention as a strategically important crossroads for challenges just as the broader geopolitical dynam- hydrocarbons. The United States, EU, and Turkey ic has shifted dramatically. The South Caucasus supported the aspirations of the three newly-in- states have now become, at best, second-tier issues dependent nations of the South Caucasus to as- for the West, but they remain closely connected to sociate with Euro-Atlantic institutions and limit first-tier problems. To head off the prospect that both Russian and Iranian influence. Energy de- festering crises in the Caucasus will lead to or feed velopment was a top priority. Then, between 2008 into broader conflagrations, the United States, EU, and 2013, other urgent foreign policy crises over- and Turkey have to muster sufficient political will whelmed the agenda, and changes in global and to re-engage to some degree in high-level regional regional energy markets—combined with a drop diplomacy. in oil and gas prices after an unprecedented spike between 2000 and 2008—raised questions about As they consider reengagement, none of the three the future role of Caspian Sea resources in West- Western players can employ the same strategies ern energy security equations. The United States, that worked for them in earlier decades. The con- EU and Turkey all saw separate, signature proj- cept of a South Caucasus unambiguously oriented ects in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia run into trouble in the same period. They were forced to The annexation of Crimea and military interven- sacrifice the important to address the urgent. tion in the Donbas region were Russia’s respons- es to Ukraine’s pursuit of closer relations with the The purpose of this report is thus to explore the European Union. Moscow has now stepped up its rationale and assess the options for Western reen- regional game and is pressing the South Caucasus gagement with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia states to commit to joining Russian-led security given the current challenges and limitations on all and economic organizations. sides. Based on a series of study trips to the South Caucasus and Turkey in 2014 and 2015, and nu- Iran looms large as a significant uncertainty for the merous other interviews, the report reviews some economic and security interests of the South Cau- of the current factors that should be considered by casus. Tehran has periodically tried to exploit the Western policymakers and analysts. It also exam- region’s conflicts and domestic governance chal- ines the prospects for forging coherent Western ap- lenges to circumvent international sanctions and proaches through a degree of coordination among check the influence of regional competitors, espe- the United States, EU, and Turkey to build upon cially Turkey and Israel. If Iran reaches a durable their common interests; it concludes with some nuclear entente with the West and nuclear-related general recommendations for framing policy. sanctions are lifted or suspended, Iran’s aspirations to market its gas reserves to Europe will certainly For Washington, Brussels, and Ankara, the first-tier re-emerge as a factor in regional energy calcula- issues in the broader region around the South Cau- tions and projects. Tehran’s prospective reinte- casus include: dealing with Russia’s recent actions in gration into the international community and its Ukraine, including Moscow’s March 2014 annex- return to the South Caucasus is unlikely to be a ation of Crimea; the ongoing U.S.-led negotiations linear or consistent process—for Armenia, Azer- with Iran over the future of its nuclear program; baijan, and Georgia, Iran poses new threats as well and the challenges created by the upheavals in the as new opportunities. Middle East, most specifically the urgency of tack- ling the security threat posed by the Islamic State in In addition, in recent months, the South Cauca- Iraq and Syria (ISIS or “Daesh”) and other terrorist sus states have become embroiled in the chaos groups seeking to entrench themselves in Syria and and violence ascendant in the Middle East. Eth- Iraq. These foreign policy priorities have absorbed nic Armenian and Yazidi refugees from Syria have Western strategic attention. Nonetheless all of them sought asylum in Armenia. Foreign fighters from are linked to the South Caucasus in different ways. Azerbaijan and Georgia have joined the ranks of terrorist groups. This spillover has aggravated the In the wake of the war in Ukraine, Russia has un- region’s own longstanding problem of displace- derscored its clear opposition to the South Cauca- ment since the early 1990s, including the one mil- sus countries’ pursuit of integration with Western lion-plus refugees from the war fought between institutions, including the North Atlantic Treaty Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Organization (NATO) and the EU.