Using Force to Protect Civilians: Explaining Outcomes of United Nations Military Protection Operations in Africa

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Using Force to Protect Civilians: Explaining Outcomes of United Nations Military Protection Operations in Africa Word count: 9,969 Using Force to Protect Civilians: Explaining Outcomes of United Nations Military Protection Operations in Africa Stian Kjeksrud Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway Email: [email protected] Mobile: +47 924 12 429 Office: +47 23 09 57 78 Twitter: @stikjeks Dr. Stian Kjeksrud is an Associate Professor at the Norwegian Defence University College, heading a research and development program on United Nations peace operations (2019-2022). His research interests include the role, limitations, and utility of military force in improving human security in armed conflict. Kjeksrud worked as a senior researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment from 2007 to 2019. In 2014, he was a visiting researcher at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He holds a Master of International Relations from Columbia University in New York (2007) and a PhD from the University of Oslo (2019). He has served as a soldier and officer in Lebanon, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Afghanistan and as a police officer in Oslo Police District. 1 Ugradert – kan deles eksternt med godkjenning fra informasjonseier. Skal ikke publiseres åpent. Word count: 9,969 Using Force to Protect Civilians: Explaining Outcomes of United Nations Military Protection Operations in Africa ABSTRACT For two decades, the United Nations Security Council has tasked Blue Helmets to use all necessary means–including lethal force–to protect civilians from violence. Despite policy makers’ emphasis on protecting civilians, we remain ignorant of the causal conditions leading to successful outcomes when military peacekeepers use force to protect. This knowledge- gap is largely due to the lack of event data suitable for analysing outcome variations of protection operations. Introducing a new dataset capturing 200 military protection operations across Africa from 1999 to 2017, this article explores causal conditions that could explain UN troops’ ability to protect civilians. Keywords: UN peace operations; protection of civilians; use of force; armed conflict; Africa Introduction Can Blue Helmets use force effectively to protect civilians from violence? Puzzlingly, while protecting civilians from violence is the priority task for nearly every military United Nations (UN) peacekeeper, we remain ignorant of the conditions leading to successful outcomes when they use force to protect. This knowledge-gap is largely due to the lack of event data suitable for analysing outcome variations of military protection operations across time and UN missions (Dewaal, 2014; Diehl and Druckman, 2015; 2 Ugradert – kan deles eksternt med godkjenning fra informasjonseier. Skal ikke publiseres åpent. Word count: 9,969 Clayton, 2016; Williams, 2016). Reliable data from African conflicts−where the vast majority of UN troops deploy−remain elusive. Open reporting on the performance and outcomes of UN military protection efforts is also lacking (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 213; Lynch, 2014; Duursma, 2017, p. 7). Still, we know some things about the anatomy of successes and failures. Protection failures point to severe challenges. Some argue that the UN is unfit to wield military force for any purpose (Howard and Dayal, 2018). More specifically, UN missions often deploy insufficient numbers of troops on the ground, diminishing prospects for success. Troops are often risk averse due to debilitating political caveats, cumbersome command and control systems, and inadequate resources (Holt and Berkman, 2006, p. 64; Tardy, 2011; United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, 2014; High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015; dos Santos Cruz, Phillips and Cusimano, 2017). Despite new training material, UN troops are commonly not well trained on how to protect (Holt and Berkman, 2006; Integrated Training Service, 2008; Cammaert, 2016; Rosén, Allen and Tarp, 2016). Sometimes, UN troops do not even possess basic military skills (dos Santos Cruz, Phillips and Cusimano, 2017, p. 13). Troublingly, most missions neither possess technologies to provide early warning, nor relevant language skills, leading to wanting situational awareness (Dorn, 2010, 2016; Willmot, 2017). Despite improved formal guidance, there is still great variation in how troop contributors understand and implement their protection mandate in practice (Bode and Karlsrud, 2018). Notwithstanding this list of obstacles, UN peacekeeping is quite effective in the aftermath of civil war (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017). The presence of large UN peace operations reduces the intensity of conflicts, decreases their duration, and increases the longevity of peace after conflict (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 3 Ugradert – kan deles eksternt med godkjenning fra informasjonseier. Skal ikke publiseres åpent. Word count: 9,969 2010, 2011, 2015; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013a, 2013b, 2019; Haass and Ansorg, 2018; Phayal and Prins, 2018; Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson, 2019). Even though deployed to the most difficult cases, UN peacekeeping largely does work (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2007; Gilligan, 2008). Crucially, UN troops do on occasion protect civilians by force. Successes include defeating armed insurgents−such as the M23 in the DRC (2013)−and ending a regime crackdown on civilians in the Ivory Coast (2010- 2011), alongside French forces (PKSOI, 2013; Novosseloff, 2015). These observations indicate that UN troops can provide protection to civilians under the right conditions, but we still know little about what these conditions are and how they come about. I ask; what determines UN military troops’ ability to protect civilians from physical violence? To explore explanations for successful outcomes, I have developed a dataset termed the United Nations Protection of Civilians Operations (UNPOCO), which captures characteristics of 200 UN military protection operations at the tactical and operational levels across ten UN missions in Africa from 1999 to 2017 (Kjeksrud, 2019a).1 UN military protection operations are events fulfilling all of the following four criteria: i) perpetrators physically threatened or harmed civilians; 1 UNPOCO captures reported military protection operations from: i) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), ii) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), iii) United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), iv) United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), v) United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)/ United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (together counted as one mission), vi) African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), vii) United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), viii) United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), viiii) United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and x) United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 4 Ugradert – kan deles eksternt med godkjenning fra informasjonseier. Skal ikke publiseres åpent. Word count: 9,969 ii) UN military troops−with a mandate to protect civilians−deployed to the location where civilians were threatened or harmed; iii) UN troops used military force to protect civilians, and; iv) the UN Secretary-General’s reporting to the UN Security Council captured the event. The data captured in UNPOCO rests primarily on the UN Secretary-General’s (UNSG) reporting to the UN Security Council (UNSC), arguably “the most regular and visible reporting on mission operations”, although not without bias and flaws (United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, 2014, para. 16). Whenever possible, I have included other sources, mainly in existing literature and news media. All sources are referenced in the dataset.2 Method I pursue answers using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a method developed to help social scientists explain causal complexity across a larger number of cases (Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 8). Rather than isolating independent variables’ effect on a dependent variable, QCA uses Boolean algebra to discover causal pathways; combinations of causal conditions that are either necessary or sufficient for an outcome. To arrive at such pathways, QCA portrays each case as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. These combinations can be compared with each other and then logically simplified (Ragin, Drass and Davey, 2006). The comparison is performed with the help of software. The result of these comparisons are 2 The article builds directly on data and findings underpinning my PhD-thesis Using force to protect civilians. A comparative analysis of United Nations military protection operations (Kjeksrud, 2019b). 5 Ugradert – kan deles eksternt med godkjenning fra informasjonseier. Skal ikke publiseres åpent. Word count: 9,969 displayed as a “truth table”, where each row “denotes a qualitatively different combination of conditions, i.e. […] a difference in kind rather than difference in degree” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 92). In practical terms, I score each case’s membership in sets. Membership scores come in two forms, either “crisp” (either 0.0 or 1.0) or “fuzzy” (somewhere along the scale between 0.0 and 1.0). The fuzziness does not imply lack of clarity. It permits membership in the interval between 0 and 1 (Ragin, Drass and Davey, 2006). Understanding the utility of force to protect civilians from violence
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