Rethinking the Link Between Categorization and Prejudice Within the Social Cognition Perspective

Bernadette Park and Charles M. Judd Department of Psychology University of Colorado

For the past 40 years, social psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice in the United States has been dominated by the social cognition perspective, which has emphasized the important role of basic categorization processes in intergroup dynamics. An inadvertent consequence of this approach has been a disproportionate focus on social categorization as a causal factor in intergroup animosity and, accordingly, an emphasis on approaches that minimize category distinctions as the solution to intergroup conflict. Though recognizing the crucial function of categorization, we question existing support for the hypothesis that the perception of strong group differences necessarily results in greater intergroup bias. Given that it is neither feasible nor ulti- mately desirable to imagine that social categories can be eliminated, we suggest that a more useful approach is one that promotes intergroup harmony even while recognizing and valuing the distinctions that define our social world.

Over the past four decades work in the areas of ste- (e.g., Allport, Tajfel, Campbell) did not identify reotyping, prejudice, and intergroup relations has categorization per se as the root problem underlying grown at an impressive, if at times overwhelming, rate. hostile intergroup relations. Rather they saw categori- For much of that time, a social cognition perspective zation, and its attendant cognitive processes, as fac- has dominated the work, at least within the United tors in the service of prejudice, serving to rationalize States, with an emphasis on the cognitive determinants and justify intergroup hostility. and consequences of stereotyping processes. Because However, social cognition research during the sub- of this emphasis, social cognition researchers have fo- sequent decades abundantly documented the negative cused on the negative consequences of social categori- consequence of social categorization and the ways in zation. Though enormously productive, this approach which those consequences might lead to biased group has resulted in an often implicit and at times explicit stereotypes. Through this work, there slowly evolved conclusion that, to reduce prejudice and intergroup an implicit assumption that categorization, with its at- conflict, it is necessary to eliminate the grouping of in- tendant negative consequences, would need to be ad- dividuals into social categories. This article is an at- dressed if intergroup hostility was to be reduced. Ac- tempt to examine the evolution of thinking on the rela- cordingly, social cognitive theories of prejudice tion between prejudice and categorization within the reduction became largely based on the assumption that social cognition perspective. breaking down group stereotypes, eliminating cate- Our purposes are partly historical, partly theoreti- gory boundaries, and emphasizing the common hu- cal, and partly empirical. We start by noting that early manity of individuals were necessary to reduce inter- theorists who pointed the way toward the social cog- group bias. nitive revolution by underlining the role of basic cate- We argue that this assumption is problematic in at gorization processes in stereotyping and prejudice least two ways. First, it is supported by almost no empirical evidence. Though there is evidence to suggest that categorization under some circumstances may This research was partially supported by National Institute of lead to intergroup discrimination, there is very little ev- Mental Health Grant RO1 MH45049 to Bernadette Park and Charles M. Judd, as well as by a sabbatical award to Bernadette Park from the idence that increasing the strength of category bound- James McKeen Cattell Fund. We thank Myron Rothbart and Joshua aries leads to more hostile intergroup relations. Thus, Correll for their extensive thoughts and comments regarding the empirically, there is little to suggest that weakening ideas in this article, as well as the University of Colorado Stereo- group boundaries is necessary for prejudice reduction. typing and Prejudice laboratory group (CUSP). Second, given the importance of categorization to ba- Requests for reprints should be sent to Bernadette Park or Charles M. Judd, Department of Psychology, 345 UCB, University sic human cognitive functioning, a point documented of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309–0345. E-mail: bpark@ most convincingly by social cognition researchers, it is psych.colorado.edu or [email protected] clear that social categories are a fundamental aspect of

108 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE social perception and that, therefore, the means for re- was the more fundamental issue. Tajfel stated quite ducing intergroup bias will need to come from some forcefully in numerous publications that stereotypes place other than the elimination or minimization of so- are a consequence, not a cause of prejudice (Tajfel, cial groupings. 1981, 1982). In his 1981 book he noted that stereotypes In the concluding sections of this article, we review do not create “intergroup social situations” and “that, literature that suggests how one might improve inter- on the contrary, as LeVine said, not only origins of ste- group relations even while maintaining the importance reotypes but even their contents cannot be dissociated of category boundaries and indeed valuing the impor- from the prior existence and the special characteristics tant differences that exist among groups in society. Al- of a conflict of interests” (p. 225). though we do not pretend at this point to have a com- In summary, early theorists in the field, though plete solution to the problem, we do believe there are clearly intrigued with the power of social categories, promising approaches that need further elaboration understood that the intense negative sentiments that of- and empirical examination. ten accompany intergroup dynamics were in fact the central problem to be addressed. Though the researchers who followed these early theorists concurred with Historical Overview the importance of prejudiced sentiments, the focus on cognitive processes, due partly to the larger zeitgeist The early theoretical and empirical work on inter- operating within psychology at the time and to the group relations in social psychology defined prejudice methods that dominated research paradigms, resulted (e.g., unwarranted negative sentiments toward an primarily in work that documented the negative by- outgroup, Allport, 1954) as the primary problem in in- products of categorization processes. This emphasis tergroup relations. The mechanisms thought to pro- resulted in a number of unintended, and to a large ex- duce prejudice were diverse, focusing both on intra- tent, unarticulated consequences. personal and interpersonal (and intergroup) factors. These included realistic group conflicts or competition between groups over scarce resources (Levine & The Cognitive Revolution Campbell, 1972), displaced aggression resulting from frustration (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, With some important exceptions (e.g., social domi- 1939), psychodynamic dramas (Adorno, Frenkel- nance theory, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; terror manage- Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and satisfac- ment theory, Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, tion of ego needs, later articulated as the need to estab- 1997; aversive racism, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), a lish and maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel, more cognitive perspective on intergroup relations 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). In all of this work came to dominate theoretical and empirical work in so- (including Tajfel’s), the key problem was seen to be the cial psychology in the United States during the 1970s strong antipathy (or negative affect) that can exist be- and 1980s. Much of this research grew out of Tajfel’s tween groups and it was this strong antipathy that so- work on the minimal group situation (Tajfel, 1970, cial psychologists defined as the problem to be solved. 1978; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In this Discrimination was seen as resulting from this intense paradigm, participants are assigned to groups presum- negative affect. Similarly, stereotypes, defined as be- ably on the basis of some minimal difference in prefer- liefs about the negative attributes of outgroup mem- ence (e.g., for painters) or judgment style (e.g., over- bers, were argued to develop in response to the nega- vs. underestimators of dots). In fact, assignment is ran- tive affect, serving to justify the dislike and to support dom. Participants then engage in some evaluatively the animosity. Thus, the problem to be solved was laden behavior, either by expressing their preferences outgroup hate. Eliminating outgroup stereotypes, with- for the groups, or most commonly, by distributing re- out trying to address the underlying negative affect, wards among individuals who belong to one of the two would serve little purpose because a new set of nega- groups. Tajfel showed than, under these most minimal tive stereotypic beliefs would simply be constructed of conditions, respondents show ingroup preferences, (Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1967; Krech & Crutchfield, either by evaluating the ingroup more positively, or by 1948). distributing a greater number of rewards to ingroup Henri Tajfel (1969) was notably influential in estab- members. Although this literature is not without ambi- lishing the social cognitive perspective in intergroup guities (an issue to which we return later), taken at face dynamics. Clearly he believed that categorization was value these findings appear to show that a history of in- a powerful component of the problem, and that it could tense dislike and conflict is not necessary to produce have negative consequences even when the basis for ethnocentric behavior. The mere division into groups categorization was minimal. Still he argued that, even suffices. though these effects were substantial, they were not the In response to Tajfel’s (1969) cognitive analysis, re- core problem; rather antagonism between the groups searchers in the field were intrigued by the potential

109 PARK AND JUDD power that mere categorization held in maintaining in- that intergroup bias may be … a direct product of the tergroup bias and so began to explore the various cog- categorization process. He has argued that the mere ex- nitive consequences of social categorization. In part istence of different social groups is sufficient to foster the cognitive approach was compelling because, in biased behavior” (p. 228). Two important implications contrast to earlier theories, it suggested that anyone of this claim, according to Wilder, are that intergroup was capable of intergroup hostilities, not just a certain bias and prejudice may be an unavoidable byproduct of personality type or a certain culture (Ashmore & Del organizing the world into social groups, and that bias Boca, 1981; Wilder, 1981). This was a pronounced therefore may have nothing to do with irrational shift in thinking, one that was certainly the intent of thought processes, but instead may be a “consequence Tajfel. of one’s attempt to organize and simplify the environ- The drive to understand the cognitive ramifications ment” (p. 231). In the same volume, Ashmore and Del of categorization had at least three significant conse- Boca (1981) noted, “What seems to be most distinctive quences for research on intergroup relations. First, about the contemporary cognitive orientation to stereo- there seems to have been a divergence in how Tajfel in- types and stereotyping … is a view of these phenom- terpreted his work on minimal groups and the way it ena as ‘nothing special,’ as not essentially different was conceptualized by (again primarily American) re- from other cognitive structures and processes” (p. 28). searchers in this field. Though Tajfel clearly wished to And Hamilton (1981b) credited to Tajfel the notion push the cognitive aspects of stereotyping and preju- that, “judgmental and behavioral phenomena from dice, throughout his work he continued to see the moti- which stereotypic beliefs and prejudicial attitudes are vational components of these phenomena as central, typically inferred can occur as manifestations of our whereas he is often portrayed among social cognition normal cognitive functioning” (p. 336). In a related researchers as pushing a “purely” cognitive explana- vein, Doise (1978, p. 23, as translated by Tajfel, 1981, tion of intergroup conflict. Second, in an effort to ex- p. 60; see also Doise & Sinclair, 1973) stated, plore cognitive factors, cognitively oriented researchers set aside the affective force associated with Our thesis is that differentiation at the level of cogni- prejudice, noting that this would be “added in later.” tive representations is always associated with With few exceptions, this plan has yet to be realized. evaluative and behavioral discriminations, and that it Finally, with the focus on cognitive factors in inter- is sufficient to elicit a change at one of those levels in group bias there naturally came an emphasis in our ex- order to create corresponding changes at the two other perimental paradigms, stimulus materials, and depend- levels. ent variables on the evaluative content of intergroup beliefs. Thus the evaluative aspects of stereotype con- In the service of understanding social categoriza- tent took center stage and came to be viewed as the tion processes, researchers began to amass an exten- cause of prejudice, rather than the other way around. sive laundry list documenting the many and varied cog- Each of these consequences is considered in greater nitive consequences of categorization. The underlying detail in the sections that follow. assumption was that these cognitive processes were in large part responsible for stereotype formation and maintenance, that negative outgroup stereotypes give The Dominance of Cognitive Factors rise to prejudice and intergroup bias, and that, by un- Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed social identity derstanding these cognitive processes we might gain theory to explain why the norm of intergroup conflict is some insight into how negative outgroup stereotypes central to one’s sense of self. In an effort to feel good could be changed and prejudice reduced. The implicit about one’s self, it is important for people to feel good process assumption here was very different from that about the groups to which they belong, and one means assumed by the earlier theorists. Namely, the assump- for achieving this is to see one’s own groups as better tion was that categorization gives rise to valenced be- than outgroups. This establishes a pervasive tendency liefs about group differences (i.e., negatively valenced to differentiate between own and other groups (even stereotypes) and that intergroup bias follows from under the most minimal bases for categorization) and these beliefs. to do so in a way that enhances perceptions of the The extensive research on the cognitive conse- ingroup. This motivational component to Tajfel’s quences of categorization has been reviewed in detail work, however, was largely absent from theorizing in elsewhere (Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; American social psychological research during the Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Tajfel, 1982) and our goal 1970s and early 1980s. here is to simply give the reader a feel for both the In a representative analysis from the cognitive per- scope and the type of findings gleaned under this ap- spective, Wilder (1981) argued that the bottom line is proach. Adopting a cognitive perspective, research in that categorization per se is sufficient to produce inter- the illusory correlation paradigm demonstrated that group bias. He stated that “Tajfel (1969) has proposed negative attributes could come to be associated with a

110 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE group simply because both they and the group oc- dency to break the world into categories, then these curred with distinctive infrequency (Hamilton, 1981a; consequences could be avoided. Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Numerical distinctiveness It is important to recognize that the cognitive conse- in a group (i.e., solo status) also results in stronger or quences of categorization are real and consequential. more polarized evaluations, in better memory for the The list of effects emanating from the cognitive ap- remarks of the solo person, and in the perception of the proach is impressive both in scope and its implications. solo person as more influential or causal in a discus- The various phenomena documented by this research sion (Taylor, 1981). When memory load is great, ex- tradition have become part of our most basic under- treme individuals have an undue influence on impres- standing of intergroup relations, and we do not doubt sions of a group (Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & the usefulness of this research. The problem, however, Birrell, 1978). is that the particular emphasis led to an (perhaps im- Information is processed and organized by cate- plicit) assumption that categorization itself was the gory membership so that one is more likely to con- problem in need of rectification. Largely ignored was fuse two members of a group with one another than the very concrete reality of prejudice so strongly em- with individuals belonging to different groups (Tay- phasized by early theorists in the field and the role prej- lor, 1981; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). udice plays in creating and maintaining intergroup Within-group differences are minimized and be- animosity. tween-group differences are accentuated as a function of categorization (Tajfel, Sheikh, & Gardner, 1964; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Wilder, 1978, 1981). Mem- The Absence of Affect bers of an outgroup are seen as more homogeneous or Certainly the intention regarding the affective com- similar to one another than are members of an ponent of intergroup attitudes was to “pick it back up” ingroup (Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Park & and “add it back in” once the cognitive processes were Rothbart, 1982), even when the basis for categoriza- more completely understood. But as each new conse- tion is minimal in nature (Judd & Park, 1988). Evalu- quence of categorization became part of our collective ations of outgroup members are more polarized than knowledge, it led down yet another cognitively ori- those for ingroup members (Linville, 1982; Linville ented pathway, engaging yet another group of ener- & Jones, 1980). Positive ingroup behavior is attrib- getic researchers. Very few in the cognitive tradition uted dispositionally, and negative ingroup behavior have actively sought to bring affective factors back into situationally, whereas the opposite tends to be true for consideration. Twenty years ago, Hamilton (1981b) the outgroup (Pettigrew, 1979; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974). pointed out that no area of human interaction is as af- Negative behaviors are better remembered when they fected by strong feelings as that of intergroup relations, are performed by members of a nominal outgroup that the cognitive approach by itself is incomplete, and than by members of an ingroup (Howard & Rothbart, that, although 1980). Stereotypes are used to disambiguate information in pushing the cognitive approach as far as it can go … is a manner consistent with the stereotype (Darley & a worthy enterprise … we are now at a point where in- Gross, 1983; Sagar & Scholfield, 1980). They operate tegrative efforts toward determining the relationship to fill in missing information (Owens, Bower, & Black, between the cognitive and affective domains are ap- 1979), and they can act as a catalyst for a process of propriate and, in fact, will become of increasing im- self-fulfilling prophecies (Snyder, 1981; Snyder, portance. (p. 347) Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) and for confirmatory hypothesis testing strategies (Snyder, 1981; Snyder & In his 1982 Annual Review of Psychology chapter, Swann, 1978a, 1978b). When information cannot be Tajfel noted that, although the cognitive perspective retrieved, stereotypes drive guesses at what that infor- has provided important findings and conclusions, mation likely contained (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; “they are concerned with a fairly narrow range of inter- Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). group situations. These conclusions do not seem able This list could go on at length. Suffice it to say that at present to provide generalizations to interactions be- the cognitive perspective has been inordinately pro- tween groups which are powerfully determined by ductive in documenting the consequences of social cat- conflicts and by value-laden social differentiations” (p. egorization. Undoubtedly this work has resulted in a 31). Other researchers central to this field have simi- much richer and more complex understanding of cate- larly cautioned against a singular focus on cognitive gorization processes than one might have hoped for at factors (Fiske, 1982, 1998; Pettigrew, 1981; Rothbart the outset of this enterprise. Yet this intense emphasis & Lewis, 1994). on the consequences of categorization leaves the im- Perhaps as a sign of a collective shift within the pression that categorization is the problem to be field toward affectively laden questions, several re- solved. If one could overcome the human mind’s ten- cent approaches to prejudice have emerged with a

111 PARK AND JUDD more evaluative focus (e.g., social dominance theory, Weber & Crocker, 1983). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; and terror management the- much of the literature exploring mechanisms of stereo- ory, Schimel, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solo- type change has led to the rather pessimistic conclu- mon, Waxmonsky & Arndt, 1999; see Hewstone, Ru- sion that negative stereotypic beliefs rarely change in bin, & Willis, 2002, for a nice review of these the presence of disconfirming information. Such approaches). Even among more traditional social disconfirming information tends to be “subtyped” cognition researchers, attention has been focused on when possible (specifically, when it is concentrated in affective processes, although in many ways this work a small number of individuals or when disconfirming touches just the tip of the iceberg. For example, much individuals share some irrelevant attribute; Johnston & of this work examines “incidental affect,” that is, Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997; Mau- variation in affect that occurs in a manner unrelated rer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995; Rothbart & John, 1985; to the group interaction itself (e.g., mood induction Weber & Crocker, 1983) with little or no impact on un- paradigms, see Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, derlying group stereotypes. In fact, as discussed later, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Mackie & research on the contact hypothesis suggests that group Hamilton, 1993). Important recent extensions include evaluations can change independent of stereotype con- work by Smith and Mackie in which they attempt to tent, a finding that, when coupled with the difficulty of understand prejudice as emotion (Mackie, Devos, & generating stereotype change, suggests the model of Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993), work by Dijker (1987), prejudice as a product of stereotype content may in- work by Vanman and Miller (1993), and work by deed be misguided. Moreover, Allport (1954) argued Stephan and Stephan (1985) on intergroup anxiety. that stereotypes chiefly serve the purpose of justifying Still, compared to the massive amounts of research prejudices. He argued that, although beliefs can be from a cognitive perspective, we have a relatively challenged on rational grounds, “they have the slippery small amount of work that attempts to integrate these propensity of accommodating themselves somehow to sorts of “hot” emotions. But the trend in this direction the negative attitude which is much harder to change” is clear. (p. 13). In sum, though the cognitive orientation has been unarguably fruitful in developing our understanding of Prejudice as a Product of Negative numerous facets of intergroup relations, it has certainly Stereotype Content imposed a particular conceptualization on our thinking Conceptually, an important issue in this domain is in this area. In particular, it was easy to lose track of the the relation between the evaluation of a group and the importance of prejudiced sentiments in our quest to contents of one’s beliefs about the characteristics of the map out the cognitive consequences of social categori- group. A third consequence of the strong cognitive ori- zation. Certainly no researcher in this area claimed that entation to intergroup relations is that it promoted a the affective component of intergroup dynamics was model of negative stereotype content as the driving unimportant, and notable researchers maintained a force behind intergroup animosity. Consistent with strong emphasis on prejudice during this period (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) approach to attitudes, re- Cook, 1984; Pettigrew, 1997, 1998), although this searchers adopted a view that intergroup attitudes can work was not at the heart of traditional social cognition be conceived of as the weighted average of the valence research. But for all our good intentions to return to the of all attributes associated with the group (see Dovidio, study of “hot cognitions,” this remains a goal that has Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Esses, Haddock, yet to be fully or even largely realized. Moreover, the & Zanna, 1993). In this model, content comes first and intense cognitive focus highlighted the power and in- evaluation derives from it. Prejudice therefore is due to evitability of social categories and, because of the par- the (typically negative) attributes associated with the ticular bent of this research tradition, the largely outgroup. Such a model is clearly at odds with the writ- negative attendant consequences of categorization. ings of Allport and Tajfel, who, as discussed earlier, This pessimistic conclusion quite naturally led to mod- generally saw negative stereotypic beliefs as conse- els of prejudice reduction that focused on the weaken- quences of outgroup animosity, as beliefs that justify ing of category boundaries. However, just because cat- the prior dislike, rather than as instrumental in generat- egorization processes can, or even typically do, have ing the dislike. negative consequences, this does not mean that they Because the cognitive approach came to define prej- necessarily must. The critical question no longer is udice as a consequence of outgroup stereotypes, rather whether categorization can result in negative conse- than negative outgroup stereotypes as a consequence of quences; we already know this. Given, however, that prejudice, a considerable amount of effort was devoted social categories are a reality and will continue to exist, to the problem of stereotype elimination and change as the crucial question now is whether the relative a mechanism for achieving more harmonious inter- strength of category boundaries, or the perceived dif- group relations (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; ferentiation between groups, is necessarily predictive

112 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE of the magnitude of intergroup bias. Is it possible to strength of category boundaries in three primary ways: have strong and distinct boundaries that separate at a global level in terms of how distinct the groups are groups without there being heightened levels of inter- seen, at the level of differences in the perceived group group conflict? means on various attribute dimensions, and in terms of perceived homogeneity within the groups on those attribute dimensions. We will use the terms strength of Empirical Evidence on the Relations category boundaries and category differentiation to re- Among Categorization, Stereotypes, fer to this concept. and Intergroup Bias To define category differentiation as distinct from intergroup bias, it is imperative to differentiate be- The question to be addressed in this next section tween the strength of perceived group differences and concerns whether there is an empirical basis for the ar- the valence of group stereotypes. If category strength is gument that the strength of category boundaries, and defined as the magnitude of the perceived differences the resulting perception of group differences, leads to between groups on various attribute dimensions, then it intergroup bias and prejudice. At this point, we need to is important that these be examined across both posi- be clear about how we define and use these terms. In- tive and negative attributes. Often in the literature re- tergroup bias is any preferential evaluation or treat- searchers define stereotype content as negative content ment of the ingroup over the outgroup. This can take and then it is not surprising to find that this correlates the form of liking the ingroup better, of distributing with evaluations of the group (we discuss this literature more rewards to the ingroup, or of protecting the in some detail shortly). The question we wish to con- ingroup from negative outcomes. Prejudice and sider is whether the category differentiation between ethnocentrism are other terms frequently used to de- two groups (unconfounded with stereotype valence) is note intergroup bias. related to intergroup bias. If the category distinctions The strength of category boundaries is somewhat between two groups are strengthened, does greater more complicated to define. Conceptually we intend it evaluative bias ensue? to mean the extent to which two groups are distin- The most direct evidence for a causal link between guished from one other, or are seen as distinct and dif- categorization strength and intergroup bias would ferent. It can be operationalized in a number of ways. seem to come from the minimal group studies that we One is at an abstract level, simply asking to what extent have previously mentioned. As we have seen, these two groups are seen as similar or different from one an- studies have often been interpreted as showing that cat- other in general. An example of this approach is the egorization necessarily leads to intergroup bias. How- meta-contrast ratio, which is computed by dividing ever, it is clear even in this literature that there are lim- perceived between-group differences (how different its on where and when intergroup bias is found in are the groups from one another) by perceived minimal groups. In an early study, for instance, Rabbie within-group differences (how much variability is and Horwitz (1969) showed that there was no inter- there within each group). Higher numbers indicate group bias when participants had simply been classi- greater category differentiation. This ratio can also be fied into their groups. For bias to occur, group mem- computed using judgments of similarity. Here, per- bers needed to believe that they shared some common ceived within-group similarity is divided by perceived fate (i.e., the experimenter had randomly decided that between-group similarity (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, the members of one group would be rewarded while 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, the members of the other would not). Diehl (1990) 1987). Alternatively, we can examine the semantic summarized studies in which he shows that conditions content of attributes ascribed to the groups and ask how of anonymity and the absence of anticipated interac- similar or different these are. That is, to what extent are tions both seem to be necessary for intergroup bias to two groups seen to have very different characteristics. occur. Finally, Mummendey and colleagues have ar- This then is the content of the group stereotype. For ex- gued that evaluative intergroup bias in minimal group ample, if Whites are seen as industrious and yet also settings occurs primarily when allocating positive out- uptight and humorless, whereas African Americans are comes rather than negative ones (Mummendey et al., seen as lazy but also laid back and more fun loving, the 1992). Accordingly, though minimal group categoriza- groups are seen as very distinct in terms of stereotype tion may lead to more positive regard for the ingroup, it content. Importantly, we can examine how different the does not necessarily lead to negative outgroup evalua- groups are seen both in terms of their perceived means tions. Thus, even in the minimal group literature itself, (the more different the group means on a given dimen- categorization leads to bias against outgroups only in sion, the stronger the category distinction) and in terms very special circumstances. of perceived variability (the tighter the distribution re- Additionally, the minimal group studies have by garding the group means, the stronger the category dis- and large simply asked whether bias occurs in minimal tinction). Thus we can think operationally about the group settings. In this sense, these studies really

113 PARK AND JUDD amount to “single-condition” demonstrations that bias sult seems compatible with the notion that increased can be found even in the minimal condition specified in differentiation from an outgroup increases intergroup these designs. But no studies in this paradigm, to our bias, there are two interpretative ambiguities in the knowledge, have actually manipulated the strength of study that render this conclusion questionable. First, the category boundaries in minimal situations and liking ratings for the supposed ingroup members were shown that such variation affects the degree of inter- actually lower on average than those for the supposed group bias. outgroup members. Thus, it is unclear whether the re- Outside of the minimal group paradigm, there have sults are even relevant to notions of intergroup bias. been some experimental studies that have attempted to Second, the variable that was used to manipulate inter- document the causal link in which we are interested. group differentiation (i.e., distance of outgroup opin- Note that in this work researchers typically have not ions from own opinions) itself involves an evaluative been specific in defining and measuring category dif- differentiation. Attitude similarity is clearly a basis of ferentiation, but rather talk about the salience of group interpersonal liking (Byrne, 1961). Thus, the differen- membership. Salience is a more general and more am- tiation manipulation involves much more than just biguous term. One could affect perceived category dif- strength or salience of category boundaries; it tells par- ferentiation simply by calling attention to category ticipants that these other individuals disagree with boundaries (we will discuss such a manipulation from them more and more. our own laboratory shortly). But salience could also Both Doise and Sinclair (1973) and McKillip et al. simply mean that a particular grouping is more vivid (1977) examined intergroup bias as a function of the and noticeable, and more likely to be used in organiz- physical presence of ingroup or outgroup members, as- ing a social field (e.g., a solo status type of manipula- suming that categories are more salient when category tion; Taylor et al., 1978). This could be true without members are physically present than when they are necessarily affecting the perceived differentiation be- not. Doise and Sinclair found more positive ingroup tween the two groups. Thus in the following work the evaluations when participants did those ratings know- researchers manipulate what they call salience but typing they were also going to rate the outgroup than when ically do not measure perceived category differentia- they did not. But this difference was not increased by tion (or any other indexes) that would allow one to the physical presence of actual ingroup or outgroup know what the resulting effect was of the salience members. McKillip et al. found greater intergroup bias manipulation. along gender lines, when either three males and three In an Annual Review chapter covering literature on females or one male and three females were present intergroup relations, Tajfel (1982) lists a series of stud- than when one male and one female or one male and ies that he says, “show in various ways that an increase three females were present. They argue that these latter in the salience of group membership leads, through in- two conditions are ones in which the gender distinction tergroup comparisons, to more marked ingroup favor- in the group is less salient than the former two condi- itism” (p. 25). Although we do not want to take the tions, and thus, that intergroup bias is stronger when space to comment on all of these studies (Boyanowsky the categorization is more salient. But it is far from & Allen, 1973; Brown & Deschamps, 1980/1981; clear to us that categorization salience maps onto their Doise & Sinclair, 1973; Hensley & Duval, 1976; manipulations the way the authors think it does. Unfor- McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McKillip, tunately, in neither of these studies are the assumptions DiMiceli, & Luebke, 1977; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, about how physical presence of category members af- 1979; White, 1977; Worchel, Andreoli, & Folger, fects categorization salience tested. 1977), our reading leads us to conclude that none of More recent work is similarly problematic. Mum- them unambiguously supports Tajfel’s conclusion, at mendey, Otten, Berger, and Kessler (2000) examined least regarding the effect of category differentiation as positive–negative asymmetries in intergroup evalua- defined here. Three examples suffice. tions as a function of salience. In the first study, sa- Hensley and Duval (1976) exposed participants to lience was manipulated by the presence of either three opinions of hypothetical others who differed from the members of each group, or five members of one group participants’ own opinions by varying degrees. Some and one of the other (see also Oakes, Turner, & Has- of these were classified as ingroup members (based lam, 1991). Mummendey et al. (2000) argued that in presumably on the degree of similarity between their the latter condition the solo outgroup member is per- opinions and the participants’ own opinions) and some ceived more in terms of interpersonal than intergroup were classified as outgroup members. Between partici- interactions. However, no check was collected to see pants, the experimenters varied the distance between whether in fact the groups were perceived as more dis- the participants’ own opinions and those of the pur- tinct in the former condition. In Study 2, participants ported outgroup members. They found that outgroup were asked about both within- and between-group sim- members were liked less the further away they were ilarity, and a meta-contrast ratio was computed. How- described to be from the participants. Although this re- ever, there are two problems with this study. First, the

114 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE manipulation involved both a “structural” component (1993), on the other hand, found that participants’ rac- using signs of different colors to identify the two ism levels did not predict memory errors. Additionally, groups and a “functional” component in which the two Biernat and Vescio asked participants to evaluate the groups argued for outcomes that paralleled the differ- ingroup and outgroup targets in the memory confusion ent group interests. Though the structural component is task, and intergroup bias in these evaluations was unre- a nice manipulation, the functional component estab- lated to the pattern of memory errors. The same ab- lishes conflict over resources so that it does not simply sence of correlations is reported by Taylor and Falcone increase the perceived distinction between the groups (1982). Miller (1986) showed that stereotypic judg- but introduces a competition between the groups, a ma- ments of targets, on both positively and negatively nipulation that likely affects both category and valenced male and female trait adjectives, were weakly evaluative differentiation. The second problem is that correlated with the pattern of memory errors. But be- in fact there was no main effect of the salience manipu- cause the trait adjectives were balanced in terms of va- lation on the meta-contrast ratio. Rather this depended lence, this study does not show a relationship between on the valence of the resource to be allocation, further categorization strength and evaluative bias. Frable and indication that the salience manipulation involved Bem (1985) reported that individuals who are more more than simply affecting perceived category gender schematic tend to make more within-gender differentiation. than between-gender errors. But schematicity for gen- Beyond these experimental studies, all of the other der (as measured by the Bem Sex Role Inventory) is evidence on the link between categorization strength not necessarily the same thing as intergroup bias along and intergroup bias seems to be correlational in nature. gender lines. Finally, as best we could detect, van That is, studies have measured both variables in vari- Knippenberg, van Twuyyer, and Pepels (1994) mea- ous ways and examined whether or not they are related sured neither prejudice toward the relevant groups nor to each other. If categorization causes intergroup bias, evaluations of the targets in the group discussion. then we ought to find such correlations. But, of course, A number of studies have examined relationships the mere presence of such correlations does not dem- between expressed prejudice toward outgroups and the onstrate a causal connection from categorization to content of stereotypes toward those groups (e.g., Eagly bias. & Mladinic, 1989; Esses et al., 1993; Stangor, In the correlational literature, both categorization Sullivan, & Ford, 1991). As reviewed by Dovidio et al. strength and intergroup bias have been measured in a (1996), most of these studies have reported low but sig- variety of ways. One primary measure of categoriza- nificant positive correlations between these two. Al- tion strength has relied on Taylor’s “who-said-what” though on the face of it, this association should be re- paradigm (Taylor et al., 1978) involving memory con- lated to the link in which we are interested (i.e., fusions among category exemplars. Intergroup bias has between categorization strength and intergroup bias), it been alternatively measured either as evaluative differ- is important to bear in mind how stereotype content has ences in how particular ingroup versus outgroup mem- most typically been measured in this work. Because bers are judged or as responses to more generalized outgroup stereotypes have usually been assumed to prejudice measures toward entire target groups. Sum- contain negative traits and characteristics attributed to marizing the studies that have examined correlations the group, the content of outgroup stereotypes has most between intergroup bias and categorization strength typically been assessed by examining the extent to using the who-said-what paradigm, Fiske (1998) con- which the traits and characteristics attributed to cluded that, “category confusions are associated with outgroup members reflect a negative, as opposed to a prejudice, in studies that measure prejudice adequately positive, valence. Given this, the correlations typically (Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Frable & Bem, 1985; Miller, reported in this literature have focused on whether re- 1986; Taylor & Falcone, 1982; van Knippenberg & van sponses to prejudice measures about a given outgroup Twuyver, 1994; Walker & Antaki, 1986)” (p. 372). (In correlate with the negativity of the traits that are judged fact, the second to last reference should be van to be typical of the group. From our point of view, then, Knippenberg, van Twuyer, & Pepels, 1994.) these correlations are to be expected. If prejudice to- Our reading of these studies leads us to a rather dif- ward an outgroup leads one to construct negative ferent conclusion. With the exception of the study by outgroup stereotypes, then certainly prejudice and neg- Walker and Antaki (1986), none of these studies re- ative stereotypic beliefs about outgroups ought to be ports an association between categorization strength correlated. But such correlations really do not address and intergroup bias. In the Walker and Antaki (1986) the issue that motivates our survey of the literature study, general homophobic attitudes were found to be here. That question is whether those who see stronger predictive of categorization errors of target individuals intergroup boundaries necessarily display more inter- who were described as either gay or straight in the group bias and prejudice. who-said-what task. However, no evaluations of these There is another research tradition that is more rele- target individuals were reported. Biernat and Vescio vant to the link in which we are interested. Starting

115 PARK AND JUDD shortly after World War II, a number of researchers of group stereotypes (orthogonal to valence) and ex- were interested in whether more anti-Semitic partici- amined its correlation with intergroup bias. pants were better able to judge whether a target individual was Jewish or not, based simply on their facial Manipulating crossed categories. One line of features (Allport & Kramer, 1946; Elliott & work was motivated by the Deschamps and Doise Wittenberg, 1955; Himmelfarb, 1960; Lindzey & (1978) hypotheses concerning cross-cutting catego- Rogolsky, 1950; Scodel & Austrin, 1957). As reviewed ries. If two binary categorization dimensions are by Brigham (1971), these studies generally support the crossed, there are four resulting subgroups: individuals conclusion that more anti-Semitic participants were who are ingroup on both dimensions (the double likely to classify more faces as being Jewish than less ingroup), individuals who are ingroup on one of the di- anti-Semitic participants, without any difference in ac- mensions but not on the other (two partial outgroups), curacy. Similarly, Pettigrew, Allport, and Barnett and individuals who are in the outgroup category on (1958) reported that Afrikaner participants in apart- both dimensions (the double outgroup). Deschamps heid South Africa manifested a tendency to and Doise argued that, when one categorization dimen- over-include racially ambiguous faces in the more ex- sion is crossed with another, then categorization ac- treme Black, as opposed to “colored,” racial category. cording to either one will be reduced in strength, com- This work seems to suggest that those with stronger pared to the situation where only one dimension is prejudice are likely to include ambiguous others in available. This reduction in strength results from the outgroup categories, consistent with more recent work fact that, within any given category along one dimen- by Leyens and Yzerbyt on what they have called the sion, there are multiple subgroups along the other di- “ingroup overexclusion effect” (Leyens & Yzerbyt, mension, and thus the categories are less compellingly 1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995). Relatedly, defined than if those subgroups did not exist. Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, and Kibler (1997) recently As we noted in the last section of this article, Doise reported that more prejudiced participants took longer was convinced that categorization inevitably led to in- to classify racially ambiguous faces as either Black or tergroup bias; hence Deschamps and he (1978) argued White than did less prejudiced participants (although, that cross-cutting categories, if they reduce categoriza- surprisingly, there was no difference in the racial cate- tion strength, ought also to reduce intergroup bias. gorizations that were made for these ambiguous faces). That is, intergroup bias along one dimension should be All of this work suggests that more prejudiced indi- less strong when it is crossed with a second compared viduals may be more vigilant or attentive in making to when it is the only one available. categorization judgments, tending to exclude ambigu- Although there are many studies that have exam- ous target individuals from the ingroup category and ined these predictions (e.g., Arcuri, 1982; Brewer, Ho, deliberating more over their category memberships. In Lee, & Miller, 1987; Crisp & Hewstone, 2000; other words (and consistent with the study by Walker Hagendoorn & Henke, 1991; Hewstone, Islam, & & Antaki, 1986, reported earlier), it is perfectly reason- Judd, 1993; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, able that more prejudiced individuals attend more to 1993; Migdal, Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Urban & the category distinction along which the ingroup is Miller, 1998; Vanbeselaere, 1987, 1991), none have separated from the outgroup. That conclusion is rather examined both the categorization strength and the in- different, however, from the argument that stronger tergroup bias predictions in the same study. Accord- categorization leads to greater intergroup bias. ingly, we (Vescio, Judd, & Kwan, 2004) conducted two different crossed categorization studies to examine both predictions simultaneously and, if they were both supported, to examine whether the effects of crossed Empirical Work From Our Laboratory categories on categorization strength mediated their ef- In the past few years, we (along with various collab- fects on intergroup bias, as predicted by Deschamps orators) have conducted a series of studies that are all and Doise (1978). relevant to the point we are trying to make, that is, that In two different studies, participants were exposed to the strength of category boundaries need not be associ- target individuals who varied either along one categori- ated with the degree of intergroup bias. These studies zation dimension or along two cross-cutting dimen- can be grouped into two classes. On the one hand, we sions. In the first study, ethnicity (Asian American vs. have done experimental studies where we manipulated EuroAmerican)andgenderwerethetwodimensions.In factors that should affect categorization strength or the second, more artificial categorization dimensions evaluative bias. Our attempt in these studies was to ex- were made salient to participants, that is, whether target amine whether the processes that are known to moder- individuals were from a large city or small community ate one of these outcome variables also exert related ef- and whether or not they were involved in a long-term re- fects on the other. The other studies have been lationship. In both studies, not only did the target indi- correlational studies where we measured the strength viduals differ along both dimensions in the cross-cate-

116 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE gorization conditions, but participants did as well, so group members who disconfirm the group stereotype that in each study participants were recruited from all but who are nevertheless seen as typical (in other ways) four subgroups. In each study, participants were ran- of the group as a whole (cf. Rothbart & John, 1985). domly assigned to either the crossed categories condi- We recently completed a study (Wolsko, Park, Judd, tion or to one of the two single categorization condi- & Bachelor, 2003) examining the various ways in tions, where the targets differed only along one of the which intergroup contact impacts both the magnitude two dimensions. Participants listened to a group discus- of intergroup bias or prejudice and the strength of sion among the target individuals. They then rated the outgroup stereotypes. Consistent with much of our ear- individualsonlikingandsimilaritytoself,andindicated lier work (e.g., Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, the ones with which they would like to have a further 1995; Park & Judd, 1990) and earlier definitions we group discussion. Finally, they were shown a series of have given in this article, we assessed the strength of statements made by the target individuals and asked to group stereotypes by focusing on two components of identify who said each one (i.e., the who said what para- the perceived variability of groups: the degree to which digm of Taylor et al., 1978). groups are seen as stereotypically distinct (on both The primary results from both studies can be sum- positively and negatively valenced attributes) and the marized very succinctly. First, there was consistent degree to which they are seen as variable on those support for Deschamps and Doise’s (1978) categoriza- attributes. tion prediction. That is, the tendency to make more In the study, participants interacted with a Latino within-category than between-category errors along a confederate in a cooperative, group problem-solving given dimension was greater in the single dimension situation. Some of the participants interacted with a conditions than it was in the crossed conditions. This confederate who tended to confirm the cultural stereo- was the case for both dimensions used in both studies. type of Latinos, on both positively valenced attributes However, there was no support for the intergroup bias (e.g., religious, close to family) and on negatively prediction, in either study on either dimension. Al- valenced ones (e.g., unmotivated, academically unsure though outgroup members were chosen less often as of himself) whereas others interacted with a confeder- future discussion partners, were viewed as less similar ate who tended to disconfirm that stereotype. Impor- to self, and were liked less than ingroup members, this tantly, interactions with the confederate in both condi- was no more true in the single categorization conditions were generally pleasant and the cooperative tions than it was in the crossed conditions. group goals were achieved. Obviously the effects of crossed categories on cate- Consistent with the meta-analytic results from gorization strength could not mediate the intergroup Pettigrew and Tropp (2000), our results indicated that bias effects, because there were no intergroup bias ef- all participants developed more positive intergroup at- fects to be mediated. What was particularly interesting, titudes, showing more warmth and less prejudice to- however, was that in neither study were there correla- ward Latinos as a target group following the contact tions between the magnitude of intergroup bias along a than previously. Importantly, however, reductions in given dimension and categorization strength along that the strength of the Latino group stereotype occurred same dimension, either in the crossed categorization or only when the confederate disconfirmed the cultural the single dimension conditions. In sum, though cross- stereotype but was nonetheless seen as fairly typical of ing categorization dimensions seems to reduce catego- the group. This result is consistent with the theoretical rization strength, it had no impact on the degree of ideas of Rothbart and John (1985) concerning the nec- intergroup bias. Additionally, our measures of catego- essary conditions for stereotype change. Thus, differ- rization strength were uncorrelated with all measures ent mechanisms are seen to be responsible for the ben- of intergroup bias. eficial effects of intergroup contact on evaluative bias and stereotype strength. More positive evaluations fol- Manipulating intergroup contact. As documented low whenever contact is pleasant, cooperative, and in a recent meta-analysis conducted by Pettigrew and sanctioned by authorities (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Tropp (2000), intergroup contact has been consistently Category boundaries and group stereotypes are weak- shown to lead to prejudice reduction, so long as that ened, however, only in rather more narrowly defined contact is between equal status individuals, in a coop- conditions. The implication then is that intergroup con- erative context, and sanctioned by authorities. This tact can certainly lead to reductions in intergroup bias same meta-analysis, however, revealed that contact’s without any change in the strength of stereotypes, that effects on stereotype change, as opposed to prejudice is, the strength of category boundaries separating the reduction, are much less robust and consistent. And in- ingroup and the outgroup. deed, the experimental work that has examined stereotype change has suggested that reductions in the Increasing the strength of category boundaries. strength of group stereotypes only occur in rather un- In two studies designed specifically to examine the cat- usual situations, specifically when one encounters egory boundary–intergroup bias link, we manipulated

117 PARK AND JUDD participants’ perceptions of how different and distinct mometer ratings toward an outgroup relative to the two groups were and then examined changes in ingroup. evaluative differentiation (Deffenbacher, Park, Judd, & As discussed previously, the argument that categori- Correll, 2003). In the first study we created artificial zation strength leads to intergroup bias necessitates a groups and provided information describing the mem- correlation between the two. However, the simple pres- bers of those groups. Half the participants were as- ence of such a correlation of course does not demon- signed to one of the groups whereas the other half were strate a causal sequence between the two. The conclu- not. Crossed with the membership manipulation, half sions from our correlational results are decidedly the participants were asked to study and sort the group mixed. In two different studies (Judd et al., 1995), we member information in a manner that reinforced and examined intergroup bias and the strength of group ste- made salient the group distinction, whereas the other reotypes toward White American and African Ameri- half sorted members on an attribute that cut across can targets by participants from both ethnic groups. In group boundaries, blurring the group distinction. On general, the data collected in these studies showed very measures of perceived group differences (e.g., similar- weak relationships between the stereotype strength ity within groups relative to similarity between groups measures (i.e., perceived stereotypicality and disper- and perceived differences in stereotypic characteris- sion) and intergroup evaluative bias measures. Only in tics), the high salience condition saw the groups as one of the two studies, and then only among African more different than the low. However, on measures of American participants, was there a significant relation- evaluative differentiation (e.g., the difference in how ship between the perceived stereotypicality of the positively one group was viewed relative to the other), outgroup and negative evaluative ratings of that group. the salience manipulation had no effect. Instead, those On the other hand, in the Wolsko et al. (2003) re- assigned a group membership demonstrated intergroup search, we found consistent (although not large) corre- bias in favor of their group, whereas those who were lations between stereotype strength (both stereo- not assigned to a group showed no differential evalua- typicality and dispersion) and intergroup bias tion of the two groups. Importantly, the extent to which measures when examining White American percep- this was true did not depend on the salience manipulations of Latinos. tion, that is, on the strength of the category boundaries. A second study manipulated the salience of the cat- Summary of Empirical Work egory sorority group members simply by asking participants to practice sorting photographs either on the ba- If increased category differentiation results in sis of whether they believed each woman did versus did greater intergroup bias then we certainly should find not belong to a sorority, or on an irrelevant dimension. consistent correlational evidence that variations in the Measures of category differentiation revealed that the strength of category boundaries ought to be related to manipulation was successful, resulting in greater per- variations in the magnitude of bias. But, as we have ceived differentiation between the sorority and seen, the correlational evidence is very mixed, both in nonsorority groups when the basis for sorting was so- work conducted in our laboratory and in work con- rority group membership than when it was an irrele- ducted by others. When categorization strength is mea- vant dimension. However, this did not affect intergroup sured unobtrusively, using the who-said-what task, bias; all participants (who were nonsorority group only one study has reported the expected correlation. members) demonstrated a strong evaluative bias And when other categorization strength measures are against sorority group members, and the extent to used (for instance, our perceived variability measures), which this was true did not depend on the strength of sometimes correlations emerge and sometimes they do the perceived group differences. not. The correlational evidence, as we have repeatedly Correlations between intergroup bias and the emphasized, is a necessary but not sufficient condition strength of group stereotypes. In a number of the for making the argument that increased categorization studies that we have reported over the last decade, we strength leads to greater intergroup bias. And our re- have examined correlations between the degree of in- view of the literature suggests that experimental evi- tergroup bias and the strength of group stereotypes. In dence for this causal effect does not exist. Studies that these studies, we have measured stereotype strength as others have seen as establishing the causal link, on defined previously, namely the perceived stereo- closer inspection, are open to a variety of alternative typicality and variability of groups on both positively explanations. Additionally, three lines of work from and negatively valenced attribute dimensions. And in- our own laboratory have shown that factors that moder- tergroup bias has typically been assessed either by ex- ate either category strength (e.g., crossed categories amining the valenced content of the group stereotypes and category boundary salience) or intergroup bias (are outgroups seen as having more negative and less (e.g., intergroup contact) do not seem to show consis- positive attributes than ingroups?) or warmth ther- tent effects on the other construct. Crossing one cate-

118 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE gorization distinction with another can decrease cate- tion of category boundaries to reduce prejudice, the gorization strength without any effect on intergroup feasibility of such a strategy is questionable for several bias. Similarly, increasing perceived category differen- reasons. First, from a purely cognitive perspective, cat- tiation by calling attention to the boundaries that sepa- egorization is a basic tool by which we organize and rate two groups does not affect intergroup bias. Recip- manage our complex worlds, and it is unlikely that we rocally, intergroup contact can lead to warmer and can forgo this process in the social realm. Cognitive more positive outgroup evaluations without any effect psychology teaches us of the critical importance of cat- on the strength of ingroup–outgroup differentiation on egorization processes in organizing the complex array stereotype relevant attributes. In sum, it is extremely of stimuli that confronts us. Rosch (1977, pp. 1–2) difficult from the existing empirical data to support the noted, “the world consists of a virtually infinite num- proposition that increased category differentiation in- ber of discriminably different stimuli. Since no organ- evitably leads to increased intergroup bias. ism can cope with infinite diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment into classifications by which nonidentical Is the Elimination of Category stimuli can be treated as equivalent.” Given the nature Boundaries Feasible? of the social world, it seems impossible to eliminate social categorization per se. It is simply not possible for Influenced by the underlying perspective of the human beings to think of one another as “individuals,” cognitive approach, that outgroup hostility is fueled by or as all one and the same, with no organizational struc- categorization, a number of prominent models for prej- ture. One could perhaps attempt to slice the world in a udice reduction have been proposed that share at their different way so that, rather than grouping by ethnicity, core the goal of minimizing existing categorization the grouping is by occupation, region of the country, structures (see Gaertner et al., 2000, for a review). Two eye color, or make of car. But such alternative group- of the more prominent lie at opposite ends of the ings are not helpful for at least two reasons. First, many grouping continuum, with one arguing for the psycho- alternative categorization schemes are in fact corre- logical elimination of categories all together, and a fo- lated with ethnicity so that nothing is achieved with the cus on the individual (decategorization), and the other new scheme. More importantly, we know that these arguing for unification, or the establishment of a com- new dimensions can and likely will come to form the mon ingroup identity (recategorization). According to basis for new intergroup hostilities so that heated ten- the decategorization model, encouraging the members sions may flare, for instance, between SUV and of different groups to view one another as individuals non-SUV owners. and where possible to develop friendships eliminates Second, from the perspective of many members of the functional utility of the category itself, leading to a ethnic minority groups, abandoning category identifi- reduction in negative intergroup sentiments (Betten- cation is not regarded as a desirable option. As work on court, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992; Brewer & racial identity (Helms, 1990) as well as social identity Miller, 1984, 1988; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) would suggest, identifying Brewer, 1993; Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985; with a distinct, positively valued group can lead to a Pettigrew, 1997, 1998; Wilder, 1981). Thus an individ- positive sense of self for members of ethnic minority ual is no longer thought about as an African American groups. Many ethnic group members identify with dis- or a Hispanic. The category distinctions are simply not tinct cultural traditions, forms of dress, speech, food, meaningful. Alternatively, the recategorization model and action that set them apart as a group. To ask them stresses the importance of redrawing category bound- to abandon these practices is in and of itself viewed as a aries so that, psychologically, individuals see them- prejudiced action (Judd et al., 1995). selves as part of one larger group. The emphasis here is Not only does the presence of group identification on shared commonalities that unite diverse individuals produce potentially positive benefits to group members’ under one group. Thus, the common ingroup identity sense of self, but the presence of a “colorblind” perspec- model argues that, through cooperative interdepen- tive (i.e., one that acts as if ethnic categories do not exist dence, members of separate groups can come to see and do not matter) can actively lead to negative conse- themselves as members of a single group (Gaertner, quences. Schofield (1986) described many of these in Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; her 4-year ethnographic study of the desegregation pro- Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999), eras- cess in the mid 1970s in a middle school that attempted ing the category distinctions that previously divided to achieve roughly equal numbers of White and African them. American students. Schofield was first drawn to this site These models share the common approach of mini- because it embodied many of the conditions argued by mizing delineations that organize individuals into dis- earlier researchers as critical for successful intergroup tinct groups. Apart from the issue of whether there are contact (Allport, 1954; Cook, 1984). The school admin- theoretical or empirical justifications for the elimina- istrators and teachers adopted a strong colorblind ap-

119 PARK AND JUDD proach.Duringthecourseofherobservations,itbecame gued that to deny the existence of group differences clear to Schofield that this approach was problematic, does a disservice to members of ethnic minority groups resulting in unintended negative consequences. In large as it amounts to a form of ethnocentrism. part these negative consequences stemmed from an at- mosphereof“pretending”thatracedidnotmatterorwas Any deviations from the middle-class ethos appear of minimal importance in the day-to-day lives of the stu- somewhat shameful. Spokesmen for minority groups dents. Race became a taboo topic; students and teachers are proclaiming that their characteristics are not opti- were not to refer to the ethnicity of one another or how cal illusions. … If there are distinctive cultures, and if this might contribute to interactions. The teachers a culture’s distinctive values and consequent “charac- claimed that the students simply did not notice race and ter” are worth defending, then there must be some dif- yet, among the students, race was often blamed as the ference perceptible to others. (p. 443) cause of conflicts. Teachers and administrators argued that interpersonal interactions were based simply on the personal preferences of individuals, and yet an observa- Alternatives to Category Elimination tion of the school lunchroom revealed almost total self-segregation among the students on the basis of race. The foregoing discussion of the literature leads us to Schofield concluded that a colorblind perspective in the following set of conclusions. First, although it is schools clear that categorization is a necessary condition for prejudice to occur, at issue is whether it is a sufficient fosters an environment in which aversive racists, who condition. Work on the minimal group paradigm is are basically well-intentioned, are prone to act in a dis- somewhat equivocal on this point in that at least some criminatory manner. Further, it makes it unlikely that work suggests there needs to be at a minimum some the opportunities inherent in a pluralistic institution shared fate by group members for categorization to re- willbefullyrealizedandthatthechallengesfacingsuch sult in intergroup bias. In any event, it is clear that, once an institution will be dealt with effectively. (p. 250) individuals are divided into categories, with fairly minimal conditions met, intergroup bias ensues. At the Finally, to the extent that real differences do exist same time, we have argued that social categories are a between groups, attempting to act as if such differ- fact of life and that it is implausible to imagine we can ences do not exist flies in the face of accuracy goals in operate outside the presence of social category bound- social perception (Judd & Park, 1993; Kahneman & aries. Thus the reality is that social categories will con- Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In a tinue to be a prominent aspect of human interactions, compelling paper, Mackie (1973) argued that social and yet such categories are likely to foster a preference scientists have erroneously defined away the empirical for the ingroup over the outgroup. The challenge then topic of stereotype accuracy with their bias toward an for social scientists is to identify ways in which this “egalitarian dogma” that insists because everyone is preferential tendency can be kept to a minimum. In equal, everyone is the same. She acknowledges that particular, we need to examine whether it is possible to stereotypes may often be exaggerations, and that these maintain strong group boundaries and still keep exaggerations may themselves be driven by motiva- ingroup bias to a minimum such that, even as category tions of the perceiver. She noted the parallel to person boundaries become more salient or more distinct, perception work that finds the accuracy of perception ingroup bias does not increase. to be influenced by the wishes, values, and motiva- A number of scholars have proposed models that tional states of the perceiver. Still, those in person per- seek to maintain category boundaries while keeping in- ception research do not imagine that perceptions are tergroup bias to a minimum. One such approach is the wholly derived from the perceiver, but rather that they mutual differentiation model described by Hewstone are in part a function of properties of the stimulus. But and Brown (1986; Hewstone, 1996). Sherif, Harvey, in ethnic relations, Mackie argued the presence of mo- White, Hood, and Sherif’s (1961) research using the tivational influences results in an overreaction and the Robber’s Cave paradigm advocated the use of complete dismissal of possible real differences. She ar- superordinate goals to encourage distinct groups to gued that, because one can separate the content of ste- come together and work as one larger group. Hewstone reotypes from the evaluation of the group, it becomes and Brown point out, however, that individuals appear possible to ask about the accuracy of descriptive con- to have a need not only to belong to some identifiable tent without implicating a particular (typically nega- and positively valued group, but to be able to distin- tive) evaluation of the group. Thus in Peabody’s guish their group from other groups as well. (1967,1968, 1970) work, it is possible for two people Superordinate goals ask people to give up valued dis- to describe a group with the same semantic content tinctiveness. As an alternative, Hewstone and Brown (e.g., conservative with money), but with different suggest a goal that requires cooperative interdepen- evaluations (e.g., thrifty vs. cheap). Finally, Mackie ar- dence, but does so by utilizing unique strengths of both

120 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE of the groups involved. In research examining this ap- bers project ingroup attributes onto the prototype of a proach, people in different majors in the arts and sci- higher order category that includes both groups. Thus ences are brought together to solve common coopera- the outgroup is evaluated negatively because it differs tive tasks in a way that emphasizes the unique strengths from the characteristics defined as desirable for the that the groups each bring to bear on these common more inclusive category. One means for decreasing tasks. This emphasis allows each group to maintain its ethnocentric judgments is to encourage groups, within unique identity and the group members to develop a the context of a superordinate categorization, to see the sense of pride in their group membership and how they group prototype as multifaceted, consisting of positive contribute to the common goals. Thus in theory, more qualities possessed by each of the subgroups. Thus harmonious intergroup relations can occur even while whereas one subgroup is seen as high on a particular maintaining the strength of group boundaries (see dimension, the other group is seen as high on a differ- Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999; Brown & Wade, ent dimension, both of which help to define the proto- 1987; Deschamps & Brown, 1983). Such an interven- type of, or normative behavior within, the super- tion allows the groups to recognize their own individ- ordinate category. Evidence for the effectiveness of the ual strengths without feeling threatened while at the “multimodal approach” comes from studies in which same time recognizing the strengths of the outgroup. group members are allowed to rate the ingroup and the In some of their work examining the Common outgroup on different dimensions. In this way, one can Ingroup Identity Model, Gaertner, Dovidio, and col- select dimensions that are relevant to and favor each leagues (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, group while avoiding a direct comparison of the two Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994) have recognized that groups. Thus the groups are seen simply as “different” there may be situations in which it is infeasible to elim- with no forced comparison of which group is better inate subgroup identities entirely. In such situations, (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983, 1984). they suggest, the ideal contact situation is one that al- Our own research has argued for the utility of a lows subgroups to retain individual identities but that multicultural approach to interethnic relations that also stresses the common superordinate group to may in principle be extended to intergroup relations in which the groups belong. general. One of the strengths of this approach is that it Hornsey and Hogg (2000a, 2000b) compared the targets the ideological framework from which individ- Mutual Differentiation Model (Hewstone, 1996; uals consider intergroup dynamics. That is, rather that Hewstone & Brown, 1986) and the Common Ingroup focusing on the specific content of beliefs about the Identity Model (Gaertner et al., 1993), noting that both ingroup and outgroup (as is true in both the mutual dif- argue for the retention of subgroup identities but for ferentiation and multimodal models), multiculturalism very different reasons. The Mutual Differentiation reorients the perceiver’s conception of intergroup dy- Model suggests that it is important for subgroups to re- namics specifically with a focus on mutual respect and tain their identities so as not to experience a threat from tolerance among diverse groups. In the following sec- perceived loss of distinctiveness (very much from a so- tion we describe the multicultural approach in greater cial identity perspective). The Common Ingroup Iden- detail and examine more generally the assumptions tity Model suggests that subgroup identities are impor- that underlie current models aimed at both maintaining tant to retain, not so much because they are important category boundaries and minimizing intergroup bias. to the subgroups, but rather because this will promote generalization to other subgroup members outside the contact situation. That is, although it is quite possible Multiculturalism as a Viable Approach to improve sentiments toward members of an outgroup to Prejudice Reduction by stressing the common superordinate identity shared by two subgroups in a contact situation, for these feel- Multiculturalism has been discussed at length by ings to generalize to other outgroup members once the many in the educational and legal domains (Rist, controlled contact is over, it is necessary to retain the 1973; Takaki, 1993; Yinger, 1994). The principle no- subgroup tag with the common ingroup members. tion behind this approach is that individuals are en- Thus, although the most effective means for reducing couraged to understand that groups in our society do ingroup conflict according to this model is by com- differ from one another, and that this means they can pletely eclipsing the subgroup boundaries into the contribute to the strength of the society in different superordinate group, in the long run this is less effec- ways, resulting in a whole that is stronger than if the tive than maintaining subgroup identities for the pur- individual parts were all forced to be clones of one pose of generalization. another. One could make an analogy to the value of Mummendey and Wenzel (1999; Waldzus, biodiversity in species survival: The most resilient Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel, species are those with greater diversity because a sin- Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003) proposed that gle viral or bacterial infection, though affecting some one reason discrimination occurs is that group mem- of the population, will not be able to adversely affect

121 PARK AND JUDD the entire population. In the case of social groups, the We are in the unique position of having many importance of diversity exists not only at a physical different cultural groups living within our bor- or biological level, but also with respect to problem ders. This could potentially be a great asset. … solving techniques, the creation of music and art, in- Each ethnic group within the United States can tellectual capabilities, spiritual and religious orienta- contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing tions, and leadership styles, to name just a few of the this diversity would help build a sense of har- many dimensions. Thus, rather than fearing and dis- mony and complementarity among the various trusting our differences, we might be taught to under- ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, as stand and value the unique characteristics of various well as its own problems, and by acknowledging groups. Note that a key component to the success of both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate this approach is an appreciation of the existence of a the identity of each group and we recognize its larger society or other social entity to which all existence and its importance to the social fabric. groups belong. The critical message in this perspective is one of tol- In the colorblind perspective participants were told in- erance. We don’t all have to be the same. To be sure, stead that some of the differences will highlight positive qualities of one group over another. But so long as the emphasis Social scientists note that it is extremely impor- is on the greater strength that is gained as a function of tant to heed our creed in the Declaration of Inde- drawing from each group its own talents and abilities, pendence that “all men (and women) are created the larger orientation will be to value what a group equal.” That is, in order to overcome interethnic brings, even while being cognizant of some negative conflict and fighting, we must remember that we group characteristics. A necessary component to this are all first and foremost human beings, and sec- strategy is for perceivers to understand that, even while ond, we are all citizens of the United States. … the groups are typified by distinct characteristics, Currently, we are spending a great many re- within each group there is substantial variation regard- sources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we ing those characteristics. That is, perceivers must un- can recognize our “sameness” we will be able to derstand that the group distributions are overlapping rechannel those resources to work on difficult on any given dimension, and that the members of a and important other problems. given group are relatively dispersed around the group mean on the dimension. This is a delicate perceptual Later, participants were asked about their stereo- balance but one that helps minimize the sorts of cogni- types, as well as their evaluations of Whites and Afri- tive consequences of categorization discussed earlier can Americans. Relative to a control condition, both in this article. groups showed more positive evaluations of African Once again, Allport (1954) presaged this approach Americans, and participants in the multicultural condi- to intergroup dynamics in his chapter on “The tolerant tion did so while at the same time seeing greater differ- personality.” In it, Allport argued that the most compel- ences between their own group and African Americans ling approach to prejudice reduction is one in which in- across positive and negative attributes. In a second dividuals frame the world not in terms of “the good and study, participants in the multicultural condition were the bad,” or the “weak and the strong,” but rather in more accurate in their perceptions of the two groups, terms of shades of gray with an acceptance and a toler- seeing greater differences between the groups across ance for different shades, a “greater mental flexibility.” positive and negative attributes that in fact better re- Such tolerance, he argued, comes not from a single flected the actual differences between the groups in our source but rather from several forces “pressing to- society. In a third and final study, multicultural partici- gether” such that, “The greater the number of forces pants were more likely to use their initial base rates in that press in this one direction (temperament, family predicting the behavior of individual Hispanic males, atmosphere, specific parental teaching, diversified both when the dimension considered was positive esperience [sic], school and community influences), (family loyalty) and when it was negative (lack of ini- the more tolerant the developed personality will be” tiative). The point then is that White participants were (p. 428). able to express and use a more clearly defined set of be- In our research exploring the multicultural ap- liefs regarding both African Americans and Hispanics proach (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000), while at the same time maintaining at least as positive White undergraduates were asked to consider either a or a more positive evaluation of the groups. Drawing colorblind or multicultural perspective in thinking distinctions between ethnic minority groups and about interethnic relations in the United States. In the Whites did not lead to more negative evaluations of the multicultural perspective, participants were told that outgroups. sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political In a study using the ideological manipulation from scientists all agree that Wolsko et al. (2000), Richeson and Nussbaum (2004)

122 CATEGORIZATION AND PREJUDICE examined whether this would affect beliefs measured (Multiculturalism) If we want to help create a harmo- at the implicit level. After being exposed to either the nious society, we must recognize that each ethnic group multicultural or the colorblind ideology, participants has the right to maintain its own unique traditions. completed an Implicit Associations Test (IAT, Green- (Separatism) Ethnic minority groups will never really wald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), categorizing fit in with mainstream American culture. In addition, names as either White or Black, and concepts as either respondents completed a warmth thermometer for pleasant or unpleasant (see Dasgupta & Greenwald, Whites, African Americans, Asian Americans, and 2001). Replicating previous research, participants in Hispanics. Finally, they responded to two questions both conditions demonstrated a consistent pro-White tapping their perceptions of the degree of category dif- bias on the IAT, but the magnitude of the bias was sig- ferentiation between White and non-White ethnic nificantly reduced following exposure to the multicul- groups. Specifically, they were asked the extent to tural ideology. This finding is noteworthy because it which they agreed or disagreed with these statements: occurred on an implicit measure, which should in prin- (Within group similarity) Individuals who belong to ciple be less susceptible to social pressures than the ex- the same ethnic group tend to be fairly similar to one plicit measures studied by Wolsko et al. (2000). another. (Between group differences) Whites as a In an effort to understand the functioning of these group are very distinct and different from ethnic minor- ideological perspectives on a larger scale, we bought ity groups. time on the 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) con- We focus here on the data from the 2,062 White re- ducted by the National Opinion Research Center in spondents. First, looking at mean levels of endorse- Chicago. The GSS involves face-to-face interviews ment, multiculturalism was agreed with most strongly with a national probability sample of respondents. (M = 1.98 on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating strongest Time on the survey is therefore very expensive, limit- agreement), followed by the assimilation item (M = ing the number of questions that can be asked, but the 2.42), colorblind (M = 3.00), and separatism was least quality of the obtained data is extremely high. We likely to be endorsed (M = 3.75). Second, White re- wished to ask respondents about their degree of en- spondents reported warmer sentiments toward their dorsement of various ideological perspectives on ingroup (M = 2.78 on a 9-point scale with 1 indicating interethnic relations within the United States. In devel- very warm and 9 very cool) than toward the ethnic mi- oping the questions, we reasoned that the two ap- nority outgroups (M = 3.66 for African Americans, M proaches studied to date could be formulated in either a = 3.74 for Asian Americans, and M = 3.66 for Hispan- positive manner, or in a much more aversive manner ics). We computed a single intergroup bias measure by (Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2002). At one level the subtracting the average warmth toward the ethnic mi- “colorblind” ideology is distinctly positive, in particu- nority groups from warmth toward Whites. In examin- lar the notion that we are all created as equals and ing the relation between the various ideologies and this should be treated accordingly (a so-called “egalitarian” integroup bias measure, only multiculturalism showed approach). It is the “assimilationist” undertones that a negative correlation, such that as endorsement of mar this approach, the (often implicit) assumption that multiculturalism increased, the magnitude of bias in we are all equals so everyone should adopt the behav- favor of Whites decreased (r = –.16, p < .001). For each ior and values of the mainstream White norm. Simi- of the other three ideologies this relationship was posi- larly, in its positive form, multiculturalism is inspir- tive (r = .23, p < .001 for separatism, and r = .19, p < ingly optimistic. Every group has its own set of talents .001 for assimilation), although not significantly so for and strengths and if we utilize all of these we can fash- colorblind (r = .04, p = .10). A measure of category dif- ion a society that is optimal for everyone involved. But ferentiation was computed by multiplying the a more sinister implication one could draw from the within-similarity score by the between-group differ- recognition of group differences is that some groups ences (it was necessary to multiply rather than divide are therefore superior (which was in many ways the the two responses because the between-group measure impetus for pushing the “colorblind” approach in the asked about differences rather than similarities; this first place) and/or that because groups are inherently product is identical to the meta-contrast ratio discussed different it is necessary for them to live isolated and previously). In the simple correlations, category differ- segregated lives (a “separatist” approach). entiation was significantly related to intergroup bias To capture agreement with these four perspectives, such that to the extent the groups were seen as more we included one item designed to measure agreement distinct, bias was higher (r = .23, p < .001). with each on the GSS. These items were as follows: Our primary interest for the purpose of this article (Colorblind) Harmony in the United States is best was to examine the relation between perceived cate- achieved by down playing or ignoring ethnic differ- gory differentiation and intergroup bias as a function ences. (Assimilationism) To have a smoothly function- of the ideological perspective endorsed by a respon- ing society, members of ethnic minorities must better dent. Throughout this article we have challenged the adapt to the ways of mainstream American culture. claim that the perception of strong category boundaries

123 PARK AND JUDD necessarily results in greater degrees of intergroup social perceptions, it may very well be possible to fos- bias. Instead we have argued that there may be condi- ter positive intergroup sentiments even while tions under which it is possible to both see groups as maintaining strong category boundaries. Importantly, very distinct from one another, and yet not show the significant interaction between ideology and cate- heightened levels of intergroup bias. Specifically, we gory boundary strength in predicting intergroup bias have argued that a multicultural perspective toward in- suggests that it is indeed possible to foster such a view. tergroup relations should simultaneously foster the Those who strongly endorsed multiculturalism, more perception of intergroup differences, and yet keep to a so than the alternative ideologies, expressed lower lev- minimum intergroup bias. els of intergroup bias, even as perceived intergroup dif- To this end we computed a single ideological mea- ferences increased. Finally, the mean levels of endorse- sure for each respondent that captured the extent to ment of the various ideologies indicates that it is not which he or she endorsed multiculturalism, moreso unrealistic to imagine a cultural milieu in which a than the other three ideologies, all of which taken at multicultural perspective is favored. face value are conditions under which the perceptions A distinct characteristic of the approach argued for of strong group boundaries would be expected to in this section of the article relative to other approaches covary with greater intergroup bias. Thus we sub- that have been considered by social psychologists is tracted the average endorsement of these other three that it operates at a distinctly more abstract level. ideological perspectives from that for multicultural- Multiculturalism attempts to affect the ideological ori- ism. Next we regressed the magnitude of intergroup entation of individuals. It attempts to reorganize our bias onto this ideology score, category differentiation, thinking from a provincial and ethnocentric under- and their interaction. The overall R2 for the model was standing of group differences to one that promotes tol- .103, F(3, 2057) = 79.02, p < .001, and the interaction erance and understanding. This is very different from was highly significant, t(2057) = 6.54, p < .001, b = the sorts of models we have tended to consider in social –.039. The direction of the interaction coefficient indi- psychology in at least two ways. First it is not specific cates that, for those high on the ideology scale (i.e., to a given target group. Because it is an attempt to greater endorsement of multiculturalism over the other change ideology, if one can successfully master this three ideologies), stronger group boundaries resulted approach in thinking about interethnic relations, it in lower levels of bias, whereas for those low on the should generalize as well to diverse religious, or politi- ideology scale (i.e., endorsement of one or more of the cal, or gender groups. It can even generalize to the in- other ideologies), stronger group boundaries resulted ternational level. Second, many of the proposed mod- in greater levels of intergroup bias. els (e.g., decategorization, recategorization, and To examine simple relationships between category mutual differentiation) rely on direct contact between differentiation and intergroup bias for people with dif- groups so that members work on some concrete inter- ferent ideologies, we tested simple slopes for category dependent goal. This is in many ways a difficult inter- differentiation at particular values of the ideology mea- vention strategy to implement. Again, because multi- sure. At its extreme, this measure can go from –4 (com- culturalism works to affect the ideological perspective plete agreement with the other three ideologies and of individuals, it does not require direct intergroup co- complete disagreement with multiculturalism) to +4 operation to achieve positive outcomes. (complete agreement with multiculturalism and com- Based on our earlier analysis, one critical ingredient plete disagreement with the other three ideologies). of any approach that hopes to successfully reduce inter- For these values, the category differentiation–inter- grouphostilitiesisthatitmustprovideawayforindivid- group bias relation is significant and positive for those uals to derive a sense of positive well being from their low on the ideology measure, t(2057) = 8.49, p < .001, group memberships. This raises the difficult question of and significant and negative for those high on the ideol- whether it is possible to feel a sense of pride in the ogy measure, t(2057) = –2.00, p < .046. The point on ingroup without necessarily needing to denigrate the the ideology measure at which the slope changes from outgroup. That is, can individuals engage in ingroup negative to zero (that is, nonsignificant) is 2.52, and love without necessarily engaging in outgroup hate. from there it eventually becomes significantly positive. Brewer (1999, 2001) has written extensively on this Of the 2,062 cases in the data set, 240, or 12%, have an topic and concludes that identification with the ingroup ideology score of 2.52 or greater. does not necessarily require outgroup derogation. She These data provide a number of important insights. begins a recent chapter on this topic by stating, First, it is not surprising that social psychologists have assumed that strong category boundaries are predictive The basic thesis is that the formation of ingroups and of greater intergroup bias; for fully 88% of the popula- ingroup identification arise independently of attitudes tion surveyed in this study this is true. Again, however, toward outgroups. Attachment to ingroups is pre- we caution that these data are correlational and just be- sumed here to be the primary process, fundamental to cause the these two variables are positively related in individual survival and well being. Ingroup identifica-

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tion thus precedes outgroup hostility and intergroup if the tolerance is based on superficial, short-term rhet- conflict but is not by itself a sufficient explanation for oric. Related to this concern, it is certainly the case that such conflict. the human mind is impressively flexible and that when people are intransigent in their antagonism toward an Allport (1954) contemplated this issue when he outgroup, they will find a means for justifying a lack of asked whether it is possible to have an ingroup without tolerance for the group (e.g., religious factions that be- an outgroup. He noted that, to perceive the existence of lieve, in spite of their “humanness,” those who sub- an ingroup, it is necessary to contrast it with an scribe to other religions are fundamentally evil because outgroup. But he argued that the contrast can take vari- of their rejection of the “true” teachings of God). ous forms. One is of intense hostility, viewing the Third, a tension clearly exists between recognizing outgroup as an enemy to be defeated, thereby strength- and valuing group identities, and retaining a sense of ening the ingroup. Alternatively, the outgroup can be shared commonalities. For groups to value and re- “appreciated, tolerated, even liked for its diversity” (p. spect one another, there needs to be some larger goal 42). He goes on to say that Pope Pius XII recognized to which they all subscribe. It is not necessary that the importance of valuing diversity among groups, ar- this goal be very concrete (winning a prize or win- guing that the diversity should be maintained and that, ning a war). It need only be some commonly valued importantly, it should not be marked by an attitude of world state (peace, prosperity, a sense of security, hostility. Instead, “the unity of the people … is a unity controlling pollution), or a valued superordinate en- of attitude—of tolerance and love—not a unity of uni- tity such as “humankind” or “the Great Society.” For formity” (p. 43). This perspective resonates well with a multicultural approach to work, it is necessary for the core principles of a multicultural ideology. the groups to recognize that they share this common In our work on a multicultural perspective, we have goal, even in the midst of recognizing and enabling wondered about possible dangers or problems that group differences to exist. This balance of distinc- might be associated with this approach. We are cur- tions between the groups, and commonalities among rently involved in research to empirically address the groups, places fairly sophisticated cognitive de- many of these concerns. In a domain as complex and mands on the perceiver. In general, the multicultural important as this one, it is imperative to raise these con- approach requires a complex level of cognitive func- cerns. Among the issues we have considered are the tioning and one might ask whether the general public following. is capable or willing to embrace this. In the GSS data First, just as the colorblind approach can manifest described earlier, education level was in fact signifi- itself in a more negative or more positive form, there is cantly correlated with the ideology measure, r = .19, a danger in pushing for the multicultural ideology be- p < .001, such that the endorsement of multicultural- cause it too has a negative version, that is, the promo- ism over the other ideological perspectives was more tion of separatism (see Wolkso, Park, & Judd, 2002). It likely among more educated individuals. Of course is important to understand the interplay between en- we don’t know the direction of causation in this cor- couraging social perceivers to “see group differences,” relation and, moreover, level of education is certainly and yet to refrain from using those group differences as not the same thing as the ability to think in a a rationalization for discriminatory behavior. Obvi- cognitively complex manner. Sill the challenge re- ously we would not want to foster an approach that en- mains that, for the approach to work, people must be ables those with a more malicious agenda to use group able to see group differences on both positive and differences as a means for justifying inequitable treat- negative dimensions, to see how the different ment of sectors of the population. strengths of the groups contribute in their own ways A second concern regarding multiculturalism is to the greater good of the society, and to be tolerant whether the creed of positively valuing group differ- of these differences that will often involve values and ences can be maintained even in the face of intergroup behaviors that may be at odds with their own. They tensions. Is it the case that multiculturalism might must do all this while at the same time recognizing work well during times of relative harmony and abun- that the particular differences are not set in stone, not dant resources, but when we enter periods of conflict driven by some unalterable genetic code, and that and competition over scarce resources, because the change needs to be an option. group boundaries are firmly in place, conflict will all Allport (1954) argued that the fundamental deter- the more readily occur along group lines? This sce- minant of a tolerant personality comes from a particu- nario seems less probable if there is a longer history of lar life philosophy, namely, one where greater satisfac- understanding and respecting the group differences tion is derived from an inclusionary rather than than if the groups have interacted amicably for just a exclusionary approach. This life philosophy is influ- short period of time. If there is a solid tradition of mu- enced by numerous factors, including personality, tual respect and tolerance as part of the society, the early learning experiences, education, a liberal politi- groups should weather difficult times much better than cal outlook, and empathic abilities.

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Above all, a basic security and ego-strength are pres- entation,valuingthediversityofdifferentgroupsinaso- ent which counteract the tendency to repress, to blame ciety as they work towards common goals. Under this others, and to seize upon institutional and authoritar- approach, group differences are acknowledged and al- ian guarantees of personal safety. … If this view is lowed to exist with a strong social norm to respect and correct, the development of mature and democratic value these differences. Though we do not yet know personalities is largely a matter of building inner secu- whether such an approach is viable, at some level it has rity. Only when life is free from intolerable threats, or when these threats are adequately handled with inner to work. As social groups around the world come into strength, can one be at ease with all sorts and condi- ever greater contact with one another, we have no alter- tions of men. (p. 441) native but to find ways in which differences between groups can be preserved and valued even as intergoup tensions and hostilities are reduced.

Conclusions References Recent literature in American social psychology on intergroup relations and prejudice has been dominated Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. by a cognitive perspective, which has emphasized the N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper negative consequences of simple categorization of in- and Row. dividuals into distinct groups. The resulting rather pes- Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. simistic conclusion from this research is that, to reduce Allport, G. W., & Kramer, B. M. (1946). Some roots of prejudice. intergroup hostilities, it will be necessary to minimize Journal of Psychology, 22, 9–39. or eliminate social category boundaries. Many of the Arcuri, L. (1982). Three patterns of social categorization in attribu- most prominent models of prejudice reduction empha- tion memory. 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