Political Change and National Identification in South Korea and Beyond

Does Democracy Matter? Political Change and National Identification in South Korea and Beyond

Steven Charles Denney

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science University of Toronto

Does Democracy Matter? Political Change and National Identification in South Korea and Beyond

Steven Denney

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science University of Toronto

2019

Abstract

What is the relationship between political system type and preferences for national membership and belonging? Existing research suggests that preferences and institutions align. Cross-national work indicates that citizens in countries with consolidated democratic institutions have national identities that are more open and inclusive, whereas those in countries with weak democratic or authoritarian institutions tend to have more closed and exclusive national identities. But what about citizens in new(er) democracies? Do identities forged under autocratic regimes change, or are they resilient over time? Using pooled cross-sectional data on South Korean national identity between 2003 and 2015, this thesis considers whether people who were socialized under authoritarian political conditions have national identities different from those who came of age under democracy. Further, using newly collected survey and interview data, this thesis also leverages a natural experiment in institutional change to isolate the effects of both “growing up autocratic” and exposure to democratic institutions by comparing responses from native South

Koreans with that of resettled North Korean migrants. The research presented here confirms the

association between system type and national identity; democrats have more pluralistic and voluntarist conceptions of national membership and autocrats hold higher barriers to belonging and have more ascriptive national identities. The thesis further indicates the type of political system in which citizens are socialized determines, at least in part, their national identity.

Overall, the research findings presented in this thesis make three contributions. First, it adds further evidence to existing bodies of literature which hold that institutions and individual preferences tend to align. Second, it also confirms findings from existing literature on political socialization, showing that formative years’ experiences generate attitudes that endure over the life-cycle. Third, it adds new insight and understanding of changes in South Korean national identity across generations.

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Acknowledgments

Academic work is necessarily the product of collaboration. This dissertation is not an exception.

As such, I would like to acknowledge those who generously provided their time and expertise to this project. First, my dissertation committee – Professors Joseph Wong (supervisor), Neil

Nevitte, Andre Schmid, Edward Schatz (internal reader), and Katharine Moon (external reader) – was exceptionally supportive and always helpful. The dissertation never would have happened without their initial input and continued support, not just with the dissertation itself but with PhD life in general. My close friends and research collaborators, Drs. Christopher Green and Adam

Cathcart, provided support as sounding boards for my early ideas and later analysis.

Many others provided crucial input at different stages of the project. Professors Michael

Donnelly and Yoongkyung Lee gave initial feedback in the early analysis stages for which I am thankful. I am especially indebted to Heo Yong-rim, Lee Seo-hyun, and Brian Gleason for assistance in recruiting North Korean migrant participants during my fieldwork in South Korea,

2016. Bae Jin-su also assisted with recruitment and served as primary interviewer, with interview assistance provided by Choi Hyun-sook and Jin Yong-bak (“Jimbo”). Jin Se-wook helped edit and improve the Korean-language questionnaires. At home, Julia Jihae Chun helped locate and collect South Korean survey data in her role as Director of the Cheng Yu Tung East Asian

Library, at the University of Toronto.

Last but certainly not least, there is my family. To my mother (Jeannie), father (Keith), and younger brother (Chad): thank you for your unconditional love and support. And to my partner and biggest champion, Jin (Jamie) Seongbak. She deserves more credit than I can articulate here. Without her continued support, both emotional and intellectual, I would not have

completed this project. I am a better person all-around because of her, and it is to her I dedicate this dissertation.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...... II ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... IV LIST OF TABLES...... VIII LIST OF FIGURES ...... X LIST OF APPENDICES ...... XII CHAPTER 1: PROJECT INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 2 THEORY OVERVIEW: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 2 2.1 National Identity Types and Political Institutions ...... 6 2.2 Political Socialization and the Study of Identity Change ...... 10 3 CONCLUSION: PROJECT ROAD MAP ...... 12 CHAPTER 2: FROM “ONE RACE” TO MULTICULTURAL? AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 13 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ...... 28 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 28 2 DATA SOURCES ...... 28 3 MEASURING NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 31 4 MEASURING POLITICAL GENERATIONS AND COHORTS ...... 32 5 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION ...... 35 6 CONCLUSION ...... 36 CHAPTER 4: DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT AND GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN SOUTH KOREA: IS THERE A DEMOCRATIC GENERATION? ...... 37 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 37 2 DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN A THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY ...... 40 3 POLITICAL GENERATIONS, SOCIALIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT ...... 42 4 METHODS, VARIABLES & DATA ...... 44 4.1 Political generations ...... 44 4.2 Regime Legitimacy and Political Values ...... 45 4.3 Regression Analysis ...... 53 5 CONCLUSIONS AND TRANSITION ...... 58 CHAPTER 5: NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AFTER AUTOCRACY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE SOUTH KOREAN TODAY? ...... 59

1 INTRODUCTION: RECAP AND TRANSITION ...... 59 2 POLITICAL GENERATIONS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 60 3 METHODS, VARIABLES, AND DATA ...... 61 3.1 Measuring Political Generations ...... 61 3.2 Measuring National Identity ...... 62 3.3 Regression Analysis: National Identity ...... 69

3.4 Measuring Attitudes Towards Immigrants ...... 71 3.5 Regression Analysis: Immigrant Attitudes ...... 76 3.6 Alternative Method: “Eying” Generational Breaks ...... 78 3.7 Association Between National Identity and Immigrant Sentiment ...... 81 4 CONCLUSIONS ...... 83 CHAPTER 6: WHITHER PAN-KOREAN NATIONALISM? EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM ...... 85

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 85 2 CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF “KOREA” ...... 86 3 DATA, MEASUREMENTS & HYPOTHESES ...... 87 3.1 Empirical Findings ...... 91 3.2 Regression Analysis ...... 93 3.3 Alternative Method: “Eying” Structural Breaks ...... 95 4 CONCLUSIONS ...... 98 CHAPTER 7: NORTH KOREAN MIGRANTS AND IDENTITY CHANGE IN KOREA ...... 100

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 100 2 OVERCOMING ENDOGENEITY: THE KOREAN EXPERIMENT ...... 101 2.1 North Korean defection and migration ...... 103 3 THEORIES OF SOCIALIZATION: HOW AND WHY IDENTITIES CHANGE ...... 106 4 METHODS, VARIABLES, AND DATA ...... 110 4.1 Measuring Political Cohorts and Exposure ...... 112 4.2 Measuring National Identity ...... 114 5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ...... 115 5.1 Regression Analysis ...... 119 5.2 Why the Lack of a Democratic Cohort Effect? Interview Insights ...... 122 6 CONCLUSIONS ...... 125 CHAPTER 8: A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH: MATCHING NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN DATASETS ...... 127

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 127 2 OBSERVATION MATCHING ...... 127 3 MEASUREMENT: POLITICAL COHORTS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 129 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ...... 134 4.1 Regression Analysis ...... 136 4.2 Matching only autocrats to democrats...... 138 5 CONCLUSIONS ...... 140 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SOUTH KOREA AND BEYOND 142

1 LOOKING ACROSS CASES: DOES THE EXPLANATION TRAVEL? ...... 142 1.1 Transitions and Generations ...... 143 2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ...... 147 3 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS: A RECAP ...... 155 APPENDICES ...... 173

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List of Tables

Table 2.1: Immigrants by Country of Origin ...... 19 Table 2.2: Openness of Nationalities ...... 23 Table 3.1: Survey Data Sources ...... 29 Table 3.2: South Korea by Generations ...... 34 Table 4.1: Distribution by Generations ...... 45 Table 4.2: Authoritarian Alternatives to Democratic Rule ...... 48 Table 4.3: Authoritarian/Democratic Values...... 51 Table 4.4: Logit Regressions for Democratic Support (with categorical predictors) ...... 55 Table 4.5: Logit Regressions for Democratic Support (with dummy predictors) ...... 56 Table 5.1: South Korean Generations by Historical Period ...... 62 Table 5.2: Defining National Membership and Belonging ...... 63 Table 5.3: Principal Component Analysis – National Identity ...... 67 Table 5.4: OLS Results - National Identity (with categorical predictors) ...... 70 Table 5.5: OLS Results - National Identity (with dummy predictors)...... 71 Table 5.6: Attitudes towards Immigrants in South Korea ...... 72 Table 5.7: OLS Results: Immigrant Attitudes (with categorical predictors) ...... 77 Table 5.8: OLS Results: Immigrant Sentiment (with dummy predictors) ...... 78 Table 5.9: OLS Results: Immigrant Scale by Identity Type ...... 83 Table 6.1: Distribution by Generations ...... 88 Table 6.2: Measuring Pan-Korean Nationalism ...... 89 Table 7.1: History of North Korean Defection by Cohorts ...... 104 Table 7.2: 2016 National Identity Survey of North Korean Migrants in South Korea ...... 112 Table 7.3: Defining National Membership and Belonging ...... 114 Table 7.4: Principal Component Analysis – National Identity ...... 116 Table 7.5: National Identification – North Korean Migrants ...... 120 Table 8.1: Summary Balance for Datasets ...... 129 Table 8.2: Political Cohorts for Pan-Korean Sample ...... 130 Table 8.3: Defining National Membership and Belonging ...... 131 Table 8.4: Principal Component Analysis – National Identity ...... 134

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Table 8.5: OLS Results – National Identity ...... 137 Table 8.4: Paired T-Tests for Authoritarian and Democratic Cohorts ...... 139 Table 9.1: Political Generations by Case (Issp) ...... 145 Table 9.2: Principal Component Analysis - Japan and Germany (1995-2013) ...... 147 Table 9.3: OLS Regression Results for National Identity Strictness ...... 148 Table 9.4: OLS Regression Results for National Identity Priority ...... 149

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Quality of Democracy and National Identity Type ...... 9 Figure 2.1: Liberal Democracy index for South Korea ...... 18 Figure 2.2: Democracy and National inclusiveness ...... 27 Figure 4.1: How Suitable Is Democracy for South Korea? ...... 46 Figure 4.2: Percent Who Agree Democracy Is Suitable ...... 47 Figure 4.3: Opinions Regarding Authoritarian Alternatives ...... 48 Figure 4.4: Opinions Regarding Democratic Alternatives by Generations...... 49 Figure 4.5: Aggregate Opposition to Authoritarian Alternatives by Generations ...... 50 Figure 4.6: Authoritarian/Democratic Values by Generations ...... 52 Figure 4.7: Percent Showing Democratic Values by Generations...... 53 Figure 4.8: Political Legitimacy and Norms Across Birth Cohorts ...... 57 Figure 5.1: What Is Important to Being Truly South Korean? ...... 63 Figure 5.2: What Is Important to Being Truly South Korean? Breakdown by Generation ...... 65 Figure 5.3: National Identity by Political Generations ...... 68 Figure 5.4: South Korean Attitudes towards Immigrants ...... 73 Figure 5.5: Attitudes towards Immigrants by Generation ...... 74 Figure 5.6: Pro- and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment by Generations ...... 75 Figure 5.7: Identity Strictness and Priority Across Birth Cohorts ...... 79 Figure 5.8: Immigrant Attitudes Across Birth Cohorts ...... 81 Figure 6.1: South Korean Attitudes towards Pan-Korean Items ...... 91 Figure 6.2: Generational Attitudes toward Pan-Korean Items ...... 93 Figure 6.3: Predicted Probabilities for Pan-Korean Items by Birth Cohort ...... 96 Figure 7.1: North Korean Migrants Resettled by Year ...... 106 Figure 7.2: North Korean Migrants by Political Cohorts and Exposure to South Korea...... 114 Figure 7.3: What Is Important to Being Truly South Korean? ...... 115 Figure 7.4: National Identity Types by Political Cohort ...... 118 Figure 7.5: National Identity Types by Length of Exposure in South Korea ...... 118 Figure 7.6: Predicted Values for Authoritarian Cohort Effect ...... 121 Figure 8.1: What Is Important to Being Truly South Korean? ...... 132

Figure 8.2: National Identity by Political Cohorts ...... 135 Figure 8.3: National Identity by Survey Cohorts ...... 140 Figure 9.1: Liberal Democracy index: Germany, Japan, South Korea & Taiwan ...... 144 Figure 9.2: Predictive Values for National Identity Strictness and Priority ...... 151 Figure 9.3: Predictive Values for National Identity Strictness and Priority by Country ...... 153

List of Appendices Appendix for Chapter 4 ...... 173 Appendix for Chapter 5 ...... 178 Appendix for Chapter 6 ...... 188 Appendix for Chapter 7 ...... 192 Appendix for Chapter 9 ...... 196

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Chapter 1 Project Introduction

1 Introduction

Under what conditions do national identities change? Comparative studies of preference formation and national identity types point to political systems and institutions.1 Scholars of nations and nationalism argue that open and voluntarist national identities tend to form under democratic political institutions, whereas exclusive or ascriptive identities tend to develop under undemocratic or authoritarian institutions. But what about in countries that transition from authoritarian to democratic institutions? How does the transition affect political culture and, relatedly, the national identity of citizens in new democracies? Do citizens who came of age prior to democratization adopt new identities, or do they resist change? And what about those who “grow up democratic?” Are their predispositions more alike or different from their older compatriots?

To address these questions, this study examines the effects that differing institutional exposure have on citizens’ national identity, defined here as preferences for national membership and belonging. South Korea is studied as a case particularly well-qualified for examination. It is a country that has recently undergone political change, from an ethnocentric political culture ruled by an authoritarian regime to an increasingly pluralistic democracy. It is thus a comparatively interesting case to study the relationship between institutions and preferences, because we can consider the effects that authoritarian and democratic institutions have on national identity. Before turning to the research design employed in this study, it is first appropriate to review the literature on national identity. What has been discovered and what remains to be said.

1 Following North (1990), this research understands institutions as “the rules of the game in a society,” which includes both political rules, or “fast-moving” institutions, and social norms and culture, or “slow-moving” institutions, as per Roland (2004).

2 Theory Overview: Nationalism and National Identity

The theoretical literature on nations and nationalism is vast and cuts across many disciplines. Broadly speaking, the dominant approaches in the literature have been concerned with the task of constructing a unifying theory of ethnicity and nation(alism). Such works, writes Rogers Brubaker, are “resolutely macroanalytic, tracing the long-term emergence and spread of nations and nationalism” (Brubaker 2009, 30). Contributions to the general study of nations and ethnicity abound, and insights into an understanding of Korean nationalism are many.

Modernists, among the most well-read and influential group, having focused on the origins of modern nations and nationalisms. The modernist school in the study of nationalism sees nationalism (and national identity) as a product of modernizing processes. Ernest Gellner (1983), for instance, argues that modern nationalism is a by-product of early industrialization. During this period there was population growth, urbanization, and major socio-economic transformations of otherwise “pre-modern” communities. These conditions contributed to the institutionalization of homogenous “high” cultures characterized by standard ways of communicating (language) and education (public school); in short, industrialization created nationalism and nationalism made the nation. Gellner specifies that nationalism involves the instrumentalization of a high-culture by political elites to homogenize the population (thus stamping out various “low-cultures”). Benedict Anderson (1983) shows how modern forms of communication (e.g., newspapers), among other forces, generated a sense of difference between peoples and sameness among some people, thus fomenting a sense of common community.

While Gellner, Anderson, and others provide a convincingly thorough explanation for the origins of modern nationalism, they do not explain how – or even whether – nationalism and national identity vary within already established nation-states, nor can they account for heterogeneous national identities (i.e., the existence of different kinds of national identities/nationalisms). Indeed, Gellner claims that the cultural and national unit must be congruent, otherwise social discord is likely to ensue. Differing conceptions of what constitutes the “nation” within a national population challenge Gellner’s claim that a sense of common national identity is dependent on cultural homogeneity. In the literature on Korea, modernists interpretations include

Andre Schmid (2002) and Henry Em’s (1999) studies of modern (ethnic) nationalism’s origins in the era colonial era (circa 1920s).

Similar to the modernist variant is the instrumentalist theory of nationalism. This approach sees nationalism as a tool used by governing elites to construct a national identity and legitimize or otherwise justify their rule (e.g., Kedourie 1974). This is particularly appropriate for the study of Korean national identity. Early colonial nationalists instrumentalized Korean ethnicity in their nation-building (but not state-building) efforts (Em 1999 and Schmid 2002). Postwar nation- and state-building efforts under the developmental dictatorship of Park Chung-hee further instrumentalized ethnicity in an effort to shore up support for his authoritarian regime (Shin, Freda, and Lee 1999; Kim and Vogel 2011). In both cases, ethnic nationalism was used as a tool to legitimize the rule of governing elites. The use of education and other “information management tools” (Cathcart, Green, and Denney 2014) as mechanisms by which these governing elites, via state apparatuses, construct national identity connects instrumentalists with the modernists and provides a convincing explanation for why ethnic nationalism in South Korea has reproduced itself over time. While the instrumentalist approach brings into focus the organizing power and instrumental role of the state and governing elites – an approach shared by Michel Foucault (see Burchell et al. 1991; Bourdieu 1991) – the approach focuses exclusively on elite-driven, top-down processes at the expense of other explanatory variables.

Primordialists and perennailists, a somewhat less read but still recognized group (see Smith 1999 for an overview), emphasize the importance of ethnicity and stress the link between ethnicity and kinship and ethnicity and territory. Perennliaists, in particular, stress the power of language, ethnic ties, and origin myths in laying the foundations of “modern” nationalism. Nationalism scholars drawing from this deep well (e.g., Anthony Smith) underscore the enduring quality of ethnicity as the bedrock of the modern nation. Anthony Smith (1998), a scholar of nationalism who sees contemporary nations as partly constituted by ethnic primordialism, suggests that the disruptive and de-territorializing effects of globalization and the broader post-industrial transition will, contrary to what post-modernists think, lead to a strengthening of ethnic ties. Indeed, channeling this view, Shin Gi-wook (2006) concludes that globalization, and all its social disruptions and dislocations, has led to a strengthening of ethnic nationalism in South Korea.

Shin acknowledges the constructed and varying nature of national identity, but finds that, similar to the colonial period when Korea’s ethnic nationalism took root in reaction to oppression and subjugation from without, the dislocating effects and downward pressure of globalizing forces will produce a similar reaction – that which will sustain and reproduce Korea’s ethnic nationalism.

But the primordialist view, like other macroanalytical approaches, fail to take into account variation within and across national groups. The ethnic nation is portrayed as the most enduring group and the foundation of contemporary nation-states. From such a perspective, multicultural, multiethnic, or civic national communities are something of an anomaly. The fact that the salience of ethnicity as an essential quality of nationhood varies within a country cannot be explained. Moon (2012), Kim (2014) and Campbell (2015), for instance, find evidence that ethnicity as a salient feature of Koreaness is declining and being replaced by different, and perhaps more inclusive, conceptions of belonging. Ethnicity is not entirely unimportant, but it appears to be less important than it once was to younger South Koreans – a meaning not readily explained by scholars like Smith or Shin. This is indeed one of the more puzzling aspects of the phenomenon explored in this project.

More recent literature in the nations and nationalism canon has moved the discourse somewhat beyond the static conceptions of nationhood and belonging popular in the older literature. Some work concentrates on the question of whether nations and nationalisms are withering away (Soysal 1994; Appadurai 1996). Normatively, such work has appeal, but it does little to advance our understanding of current realities. In fact, rather than transcending national or ethnic forms, some of the most interesting work points to, in the words of Brubaker (2009, 24), “the reconfiguration of ethnicity, race, and nation as idioms of cultural understanding, modes of social organizations, and patterns of political claims-making.” Such literature, according to Brubaker (2009, 24) includes: transborder forms of nationhood and nationalism (Schiller 2005; Joppke 2005), multicultural nationalism (Brown 2005), and diasporic types (Clifford 1994; Toloyan 1996; Brubaker 2005). To the list can be added work based on public opinion data that explores the variation in national identity across nations (e.g., Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009). It is at this juncture that the current literature stands and where Brubaker and others see a pivot

underway towards temporally sensitive and context-rich studies of ethnicity, race, and the nation. In short, contemporary literature on changes in South Korean nationalism and the existing theories on nations and nationalism, while providing key insights, do not provide a sufficient explanation for the changes observed in contemporary South Korea.

The shortcomings in the literature have to do with the fact that scholars in the field have been primarily concerned with the origins of nationalism or national identity and elite-level articulations of national content -- not changes or variation in what citizens of nation-states think. Making inferences about popular beliefs based on such sources is problematic, at best. Considering development over long periods of time has its advantages, especially for those primarily concerned with historical origins, but from this perspective a nation is seen as a relatively static and enduring entity post-formation.

Even those who delineate different types of nationalism (e.g., ethnic and civic; see Brown 2000) do not account for the possibility of significant variation across time and context. Indeed, the popular civic-ethnic dichotomy, which is sometimes ahistorically employed to distinguish between “East” and “West” (Kohn 1944), depicts the origins of each type as sharply bounded and path dependent. More recent efforts eschew the East-West dichotomy to show that ethnic or ethnocultural cores define all nations at some point in history (Yack 1996; Kuzio 2002). Moreover, similar critiques show that seeing a nation as defined along purely civic or entirely ethnic lines is empirically and theoretically indefensible – no nation can be said to define itself entirely as either. Among studies which differentiate between types of nationalities, there is often an ahistorical and unsustainable division of the world into East/West, corresponding to an ascriptive/ethic and volunteerist/civic nationalism, or an excessively descriptive reading of historical development (e.g., Wong 2001). The latter of the two efforts is preferable, but it gets us no closer to understanding why national identities change; it simply asserts that that they do.

There is no shortage of ontological groupism in the nations and nationalism literature, an unsustainable approach to the understanding of nationality. “Groupness is,” as Brubaker notes, “a variable not a constant; it cannot be presupposed.” (2009, 30) Indeed, and it is for this very reason that the oft employed civic-ethnic dichotomy is analytically problematic. The popular

dichotomy has both heuristic and empirical value, especially regarding the value and meaning people ascribed to ancestry (Jayet 2012, 87), but as a conceptual framework it presupposes categories that may not, and often do not, exist. This is not to say that an ethnic-civic dichotomy is not best suited to explain conceptions of nationhood and belonging, but that they should not be assumed. Not all national identities are the same at all times. It is entirely possible that citizens of a nations could move from believing mainly in one form of national belonging to another.

2.1 National Identity Types and Political Institutions

Conceding that, broadly speaking, there are two predominant types: ethnocultural and civic, sometimes referred to simply as ascriptive and voluntarist. The former is an exclusive form of national identity, the other inclusive. Each specifies different conditions that must be met for membership in a national community. An ethnocultural national identity defines membership along ethnic lines, emphasizing shared ancestry, a common place of birth, and physical appearance. In other words, one is ascribed national belonging at birth. A civic national identity, on the other hand, defines the national belonging along voluntarist lines – a nation bound by creed, not blood. According to David Brown (2000: 51), membership in a national community based on inclusive terms is open to those who share “the belief that residence in a common territorial homeland, and commitment to its state and civil society institutions, generate a distinctive national character and civic culture, such that all citizens, irrespective of the diverse ancestry, comprise a community in progress with a common destiny.” Others suggest more categories. Some scholars (Shulman 2002; Orgad 2016) see three types – ethnic, cultural, and civic. Others, namely Brown (2000), agree but prefer ethnic, civic, and multicultural. Still others eschew or go beyond the ethnic/civic binary and the cultural/multicultural category for a national identity type that is either based on several credentials, or more open and post-nationalist (Medrano 2005). Evidence exists for the presence of any of these types and no one type of national identity is exclusive to any one society, either. Different strands can be understood as being present in any national society at any given time, even if one type is more prevalent than others. Still, what is missing is an understanding of how national identity changes.

Those writing on the relationship between institutions and national identity types argue that civic, or voluntarist, national identities tend to form under consolidated democratic political institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Nodia 1994; Shulman 2004; Snyder 1993), whereas exclusive identities defined by fixed or ascriptive characteristics tend to form under non- democratic institutions (Kunovich 2009; Shulman 2004; Nodia 1994; Snyder 1993). The relationship between national identity type and institutions (a core concern of this study) is theoretically simple. Democracy is in spirit and by definition incompatible with attitudes that define nationhood and national belonging based along ascriptive qualities (Snyder 1993; Nodia 1994; Shulman 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Snyder writes (1993: 86):

Nationalism based on equal and universal citizenship rights… depends on a supporting framework of laws to guarantee those rights, as well as effective institutions to allow citizens to give voice to their views. Ethnic nationalism… depends not on institutions, but on culture… ethnic nationalism is the default option: It predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available.

Thus, one would expect that democratic institutions would cultivate a more open and/or inclusive national identity – one based on civic or creedal attributes rather than the fixed or ascriptive ones. On the contrary, conditions under authoritarian regimes, or those with weak democratic institutions, can be understood as generally unsupportive of inclusive national identities.2 Of course, no democracy is perfectly inclusive and even among nations with strong civic traditions and democratic institutions ethnic nationalism and culturally exclusive values are present (Koopmans and Staham 1999; Ivarsflaten 2007; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013). Nevertheless, comparative historical and political studies suggest that, in theory, democracy and inclusion should develop concomitantly.

2 Rogers Brubaker (1998) is right to suggest that ethnic nationalism need not always be normatively bad, or necessarily exclusive. During times of national crisis, it can be a mechanism that produces social solidarity (e.g., Poland under foreign rule, or Korea during colonial occupation). Indeed, as will be entertained in Chapter 6, ethnic nationalism can be understood as playing an integrative function for many North Korean migrants in the process of resettlement in South Korean society.

The assertions about the relationship between political system type and national identity find some empirical support. Jones and Smith (2001) present evidence that national identity types – ascriptive and voluntarist – are associated with certain system-level indicators, namely post- industrialism and globalization. More developed and open economies are associated with more open national identities. Building on the authors’ findings, Kunovich (2009) finds evidence in his cross-national analysis that the quality of democratic institutions in a country can be used to predict the type of national identity prevalent in a country, noting that individuals in countries with strong democratic institutions tend to favor more open and inclusive conceptions of national identity.

Figure 1.1. maps national identity types across all democratic countries for which data are available (y-axis) by quality of democracy (x-axis). For national identity, data from the 2013 national identity survey from the International Social Survey Programme are used – the same source of data as Jones and Smith (1999; 2001) and Kunovich (2009). Democratic quality scores are taken from Varieties of Democracy’s 2018 “liberal democracy index” and range from 0-100, with 100 being the most liberal democratic. National identity type is a standardized measure of inclusiveness and exclusiveness based on a battery of national identity questions (explored in greater depth throughout this project) asked to each national population; scores range between -3 and +3 standard deviations.3 The more positive the score, the more inclusive the identity, and the more negative the score, the more exclusive. The scores in the figure show clear association between quality of democracy and national identity type, as the fitted line indicates. South Korea (read “ROK”) is situated in the middle, which, given its more recent democratic transition (1987) is expected.

3 National identity attributes defining the “exclusive/ascriptive” dimension include the following: sharing country’s dominant ethnicity; living most of one’s life in the country; being born in the country; having country’s citizenship; and feeling like the country’s nationality. Voluntarist, or inclusive attributes include following the country’s laws and speaking the country’s main language. The national identity score is a difference score calculated by taking the linearly weighted combinations of two principal components.

Figure 1.1: Quality of Democracy and National Identity Type

Data: Varieties of Democracy, scores for “liberal democracy” (2018) and ISSP, national identity survey (2013). Missing variables excluded. Line represents single linear regression.

The association presented in Figure 1.1 gives good reason to expect that citizens in consolidated democracies will tend towards open and inclusive national identities and that the quality of democratic institutions and type of national identity are related (a relationship corroborated by the findings in Kunovich 2009). This project, however, is interested mainly in differences in institutional exposure within countries having undergone democratic transitions. Do authoritarian or democratic institutions matter for national identity? Specifically, does exposure under one or the other matter? And how can this relationship be measured? These questions take us to the core theoretical concern of this study: political socialization.

2.2 Political Socialization and the Study of Identity Change

The type or quality of political institutions is not likely to matter for everyone equally across the life-cycle. Work in political socialization underscores the importance of formative experiences, arguing that events which take shape during the critical formative years of one’s life are resilient over the course of the life-cycle. Two core principles are associated with predispositions formed in the formative years, the period of one’s life between ages 12 and 25. The “primacy principle,” which holds that orientations remain basically unchanged, and the “structuring principle,” which holds that that attitudes formed early in life are reinforced throughout the life-cycle (Searing et al. 1973 ).

Evidence that formative experiences matter has been found for a score of social, economic, and political values (Crête and Favre 1989; Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Nevitte 1996; van Deth and Scarborough 1995). Additional research finds that political attitudes, even those under authoritarian regimes, tend towards resilience over time (see, e.g., Dalton and Shin 2014, 3474).

The conditions under which people come of age tend to be shared, defining what Sigmund Nuemann would call a “political generation.” Building on the previous work of Karl Mannheim (1928), Nuemann (1965, 235) held that the conditions which determine whether one belongs to a political generation are “common experiences, the same decisive influences, [and] similar historic problems.” Some destabilizing force or event alters the social, cultural, or economic conditions in which people are socialized, and through this process enduring predisposition are formed. Then, political generations are those individuals who spent their formative years under similar conditions. These conditions are often defined by the type of political regime under which one comes of age.

Chang and Wang (2005) and Rigger (2006), for instance, underscore the methodological value of generational analysis for the study of Taiwanese national identity. Chang and Wang, specifically,

4 The authors draw on the following: Verba 1965; Conradt 1980; Montero et al. 1997; McDonough et al. 1998.

look at the relationship between political generations and whether Taiwanese citizens identify with a Taiwanese identity, a (mainland) Chinese Identity, or some combination of the two. The authors group people in Taiwan into one of four generations, delineated by historical periods in post-liberation Taiwanese history. The authors find strong generational effects for national identity type. Moreover, they discover that the two older generations tend to choose either a specifically Taiwanese identity or a Chinese one, something the authors attribute to the discourse and ideas of the authoritarian era. The younger generations, having come of age conditions fundamentally different from that of those older than them (i.e., democratic and pluralist), are more open to a dual Taiwanese-Chinese identity. Rigger corroborates Chang and Wang’s findings for the youngest generation with qualitative data, using insights from in-depth interviews and focus groups, which serve as a verification of the causal mechanism indicated in Chang and Wang: differing generational predispositions conditioned by divergent formative years’ experiences. In Taiwan, what members of a generation collectively experience plays a constitutive role in national identity (re)production. Research designs like Chang and Wang’s can be employed to investigate whether recent social and political changes in South Korea have affected conceptions of national membership and belonging.

The link between political system and national identity is that the former is a reflection of the values system promoted by the latter. Political systems (democratic/authoritarian) and citizens’ attitudes and values tend to converge (Mishler and Rose 1996) and these attitudes tend to remain enduring across the life-cycle (Easton 1965). These claims are in line with findings in comparative studies which indicate that institutions and preferences tend to align (Hirschman 1982; Bowles 1998; Bisin and Verdier 2001; Alesina and Guiliano 2011; Benabou and Tirole 2011).

This project seeks, then, to bring together the theoretical and categorical insights from two literatures: the nations and nationalism literature on national identity types and work in political socialization. This project considers political socialization as the causal mechanism, thus explaining changes and variations in national identity in a transitioning society – South Korea, in this case.

3 Conclusion: Project Road Map

The project will proceed across nine chapters (including the introduction, Chapter 1). Chapter 2 situates the research in a (South) Korean context, providing an overview of nationalism, national identity, and the broader contours of Korean nation-building efforts. Chapter 3 provides a brief consideration of methodological concerns, including data selection and use, measurement (generations, national identity), and presentation of evidence. Chapter 3 subjects to empirical scrutiny the most basic assumption of this project – that there is in fact a democratic political culture in South Korea. Chapter 4 explores whether there is a new national identity in South Korea, with consideration for conditions for national membership and belonging (i.e., what makes someone “truly South Korea”) and attitudes towards immigrants across generations. Chapter 5 takes an alternative approach to South Korean national identity, looking at attitudes towards differing proxy measures for ethnic nationalism: ethnic affinity for North Korea, views of resettled North Korean migrants, and support national unification. Chapter 6 looks at the resettlement of North Korean migrants into South Korea society, with a consideration of the effects of differing institutional exposure on national identity. Chapter 7 matches native North and South Korean respondents using an innovative matching technique, and then re-runs the analysis presented in the previous two chapters. Chapter 8 concludes the project by summarizing the project’s findings and examining whether the causal claim presented for the South Korean case can be reproduced in similar cases; specifically, generational effects for national identity are considered in Japan, Taiwan, and Germany.

Chapter 2 From “One Race” to Multicultural? An Overview of South Korean National Identity

South Korea is a nation where ethnocultural traits have long predominated as the most important components of national identity. The minjok, a term that doubles in meaning as both “nation” and “ethnicity,” suggests just how closely the two concepts are related. Historians have traced the roots of Korea’s ethno-nationalism to the country’s early modern period, a tumultuous time when the country lost its national sovereignty to its colonizer Japan in 1910, under whose imperial rule the nation remained until 1945 (Em 1995; Schmid 2002; Shin 2006).

Ethnic nationalism in Korea was a reaction to Japanese imperialism, specifically the colonization of Korea (1910‐1945) and efforts to assimilate Koreans into the greater Japanese nation.5 In Shin’s (2006) portrayal of the period, the Japanese imperial policy of naissen ittai – an assimilation policy built on the idea that Koreans could become Japanese – had the unintended effect of generating a concept of national and ethnic self among Koreans; the early term for nation (minjok) has its origins in this period (Em 1995). And the codification of Korean identity by the colonial bureaucracy, as ethnically/nationally demographic category unique applied to “Korean” migrants, both spread and reinforced the idea of a national identity that had theretofore not existed (Kim 2016). Unsurprisingly, the racial politics of imperial Japan generated a ethnic understanding of the national self in Korea. As a nation borne of imperialism, the notion of a common ancestry uniting the people against a colonizing enemy proved useful in generating a unique sense of “Koreaness” that had theretofore not existed. Ethnic nationalism may have subsided some with national liberation in 1945, but national division and the volatility of both North and South Korea saw ethno-cultural traits instrumentalized for Korean state-building purposes under authoritarian regimes.

5 Shin (2006, 115-134) argues that the loss of national sovereignty to Japanese imperialism precipitated the formation of an ethnic nationalism; a reaction to national and cultural crisis. Ethnic nationalism as a reactive force would hold for other nations where the loss of national sovereignty, or the threat of loss, precipitates the formation of a strong ethnic nationalism (e.g., Poland, Israel).

The ethnic nationalism of the colonial era was reproduced by post-colonial national leadership.6 In South Korea, the first president of the new republic (founded 1948), Syngman Rhee, sought through his policy of “One Peoplism” (Ilmin Juwi) to mobilize Koreans in opposition to Communism (namely, the North Korean regime) on the basis of ethnic unity and collective opposition to forces which threatened Korea’s national sovereignty (Shin 2006, 100-103). One Peoplism may have been Rhee’s alternative to the North Korean variant of ethnic nationalism propagated by Kim Il-sung and his Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea,7 it was resolutely authoritarian in nature and design. Proclaimed an official state policy, this ideology sought to overcome social divides (class or otherwise) and bring about a sort of united national front ruled over by single party, rule by Rhee. Its basic tenants – social unity, ethnic homogeneity, high nationalism – were features common to the fascist regimes of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. It is of little surprise then that proponents of Rhee’s national vision thought it was incompatible with democracy. As Shin (2006, 102) points out, An Sang-ho, Rhee’s first minister of education, was clear that democracy was not suitable for Korea’s national development.8

Ethnic nationalism was also a crucial element of Park Chung-hee’s nation-building strategy following his military coup in 1962. Not entirely different from Kim Il-sung, Park instrumentalized Koreans’ sense of ethnic unity for purposes of political consolidation and economic development. The “Modernization of the Fatherland” drew upon Koreans’ sense of

6 Korea was liberated form colonial rule in 1945 by the Soviet Union and the United States. Separate states would be declared in 1948.

7 For more on power consolidation and the Democratic Front in North Korea, see Lankov (2001).

8 An, a philosopher who studied in interwar Germany at the University of Jena, espoused this view in his 1950 treatise “Fundamentals of Ilmin Juwi.” The ideas expressed about nation, race, and hierarchy by An and Rhee in South Korea and Kim Il-sung in North Korea, among many other national leaders at the time, were strongly influenced by Social Darwinism and idea of “national reconstruction.” These ideas, imported during the colonial period and spread by intellectuals and nationalist activists like Yi Kwangsu and Sin Chaeho, were popular at the time (Tikhonov 2016) and not at odds with the top-down, authoritarian state- and nation-building efforts of people like Rhee, Kim, and later Park Chung-hee. Schmid (2002) shows how ideas of national reconstruction (and relatedly ethnic nationalism) were articulated by colonial-era nationalists; indeed, herein lies the origins of modern Korean identity and the roots of the country’s ethnic nationalism.

ethnic homogeneity as a solidarity-generating mechanism to shore up support for a politically repressive but development-oriented regime (Shin 2006; Shin et al. 1999). More so than Rhee, Park, who oversaw South Korea’s developmental regime from 1962 to 1979 pursued an ethnic- based nation-building effort in a vein mirroring that of his North Korean rival, Kim Il-sung (Shin et al. 1999).9

Both Park and Kim instrumentalized the nation’s sense of ethnic unity for purposes of political consolidation and economic development and, in so doing, reinforced and reproduced the strong ethno-cultural nationalism from the colonial era. In other words, ethnicity and nation were portrayed as inseparable. As Shin et al. (1999, 476) argue, this is a clear case of nationalist mass politics, “which can be best seen in Kim’s juche ideology of independence of self-reliance, and Park’s slogan of choguk kundaehwa (modernization of the fatherland).” Both ideological programs reflect a deep commitment to ethnic homogeneity and the ethnic “roots” of the Korean nation. These collectivist ideas flourish under authoritarian regimes.

The political discourse either side of the divided peninsula can be seen at this time as somewhat interchangeable. Kim Il-sung, who had embarked upon a state- and nation-building effort of his own, spoke of “Our people [having] lived as a homogenous nation in the same land for thousands of years. [And] have spoken and written one language, and their history and cultural tradition are the same. Our country has no national minority” (Shin et al. 1999, 476). Park would not have disagreed. “Park Chung-Hee never questioned the fact that Koreans are of ‘one race and one people’ and constantly stressed Korea’s mythohistorical descent from a common ancestor, Tan’gun” (Shin et al., 407). That Park did not rule through consent of the people, he sought

9 Park Chung-hee’s brand of ethnic nationalism was certainly derived from his exposure to Showa Restorationism during his time as a cadet and eventual lieutenant in the Manchukuo Imperial Army (Manchukuo was a puppet state of Imperial Japan). Showa Restorationism emphasized qualities like “high statism” and “high nationalism,” ideas which at the time were strongly linked to highly exclusive conceptions of nationality and national belonging. Reviewing Carter Eckert’s 2016 biography of Park Chung-hee, Denney (2018) argues that, among other things, Eckert shows the ideational origins of Park’s developmental state and, by extension, the ethno-nationalist nation- building project he would embark on in postwar Korea.

alternative legitimization strategies. The effect was the reproduction of the ethno-cultural nationalism from the colonial era.

According to Yoonkyung Lee (2009), Park Chung-hee’s efforts to promote the racial homogeneity and collective singularity of the nation were most conspicuously shown by the Charter of National Education and the Korean Nationality Act. The former, recounts Lee (2009, 366), “hung on the wall of every government office and school classroom” and was used to cultivate an ethnonational identity through a “sense of duty and collectivity for Korea’s development.” The latter, legislated in 1948, stipulated that only children whose fathers were ethnic Koreans were considered full Korean nationals.10

Things changed rapidly in South Korea as a groundswell of demands for democratic reform in the 1980s boiled over and in 1987 the authoritarian ruling party conceded democratic reforms (see Wong and Slater (2013) on authoritarian parties conceding democracy).11 Conservatives maintained power in post-transition South Korea until 1997, when the first peaceful transition of

10 As noted by Lee, the law was modified in 1997. Nationality is no longer based on the ethnicity of the father and is, overall, far less restrictive. In fact, citizenship by bloodline (jus sanguinis) is no longer recognized by the Constitutional Court of South Korea (discussed below).

11 It is worth noting that many, and probably most, of the pro-democracy activists and so-called undongkwon (social elites who lead the opposition to authoritarian rule) described in works such as Namhee Lee’s The Making of the Minjung (2007) were not proponents of a civic nationalism. In fact, in an attempt to co-opt the state’s claim to legitimacy, many democratic activists used the ethno-cultural discourse of authoritarian governments in opposition to their oppressive rule. When democratic institutions and norms are spoke of in this research, it is not necessarily in reference to the aims of many democratic leaders. It is rather about the establishment of strong institutional norms and practices, the likes of which are considered, measured, and capture by organizations like Varieties of Democracy (see below). There is an interesting hypothesis to be considered which holds that the democratic activists of the 1980s (those part of the so-called “386” generation) have either taken on formal roles in government and administration (thereby mediating their once activist and ethno-nationalist views) or either these individuals stayed- on as activists but now campaign on behalf of migrant workers’ rights and those who might otherwise be classified as the “precariat” (Lee 2010). The author interviewed one such activist and situated their activities within broader social and political changes. Read the interview here: https://sinonk.com/2015/06/19/the-economics-of-identity- change-in-south-korea/.

power from ruling party to opposition party occurred, thereby indicating South Korea’s democracy was indeed consolidated, or at least mainly so. Comparative measures of democratic performance rank South Korea on par with other democratic countries (Economist 2017) and studies of Korea’s political culture find it highly supportive of democracy as a political system (Denney 2019).

The two-and-a-half decades since South Korea’s democratic transition have seen significant changes and further evidence of democratic deepening. In a country with a long history of military intervention in the political process, it is notable that since South Korea’s democracy transition in 1987, the quality of its democracy has steadily increased. Figure 2.1 shows South Korea’s liberal democratic score, provided by the Varieties of Democracy database. The score is a measure, on a 0-1 scale, of the extent to which individual and minority rights are protected against both executive overreach and majoritarianism. It also accounts for strength of electoral democracy.12 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, South Korea’s democracy deepened. There was a period of democratic recession during the 2008-2016 (explored in more detail in Chapter 3), but South Korea’s democracy is otherwise resilient and consolidated – the “only game in town.”

12 Vdem indices are aggregations of expert polling. See more at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/.

Figure 2.1: Liberal Democracy Index for South Korea

Data: Varieties of Democracy, scores for liberal democracy. Includes 95% confidence intervals.

Aside from system change and institutionalization of democratic norms, South Korea has undergone significant demographic change. Marked by an influx in foreigners – foreign brides, overseas Koreans, and migrant workers – and driven largely by economic growth and development, South Korea has gone from a net exporter of labor to importer of labor and an increasingly sought out destination for international migrants of Korean and non-Korean descent. Today, nearly four percent of all residents in Korea were born outside of Korea and projections show that by 2030 nearly 10 percent of the population will be constituted by foreign-born residents (Moon 2015; Ministry of the Interior 2017). Recent population numbers show nothing short of a demographic transformation underway. Katharine Moon (2015, 2-3) writes, “Currently, more than three out of one hundred residents in Korea hail from foreign countries, a spectacular change from 1990, when less than 50,000 foreigners, comprising 0.1 percent of the nation’s population live in Korea.” Projections underscore the transformation currently taking place. By the end of the current decade, roughly five percent of the total population is expected to be foreign born and, if the current trends hold, that percentage will double by 2030.

Table 2.1: Immigrants by Country of Origin (Top 10 most popular origins in 2017)

Country Number of immigrants Percent of all immigrants China (Chinese-Koreans) 497,656 33.64% China 212,072 14.34% Vietnam 147,519 9.97% Thailand 93,077 6.29% Uzbekistan 51,117 3.46% Philippines 48,033 3.25% Cambodia 45,406 3.07% United States 45,033 3.04% Indonesia 38,418 2.60% Nepal 34,293 2.32% North Korea† 32,467 -- Source: Ministry of the Interior and Safety. Data excludes temporary sojourners. † North Korean migrants are counted separately, given their unique legal status (see Chapter 6 for more). The number provided here does not reflect changes due to deaths or onward migration. Source: Ministry of Unification (December 2018).

For a country once ruled under ethno-nationalist and authoritarian state policies, it is no small feat that South Korea is now a consolidated democracy with an increasingly pluralistic society. This is not to say that South Korea has reached its pinnacle of political and social development – far from it. There is a tendency to enact a linear and triumphant telling of South Korea’s political, and now, social development reminiscent of a rags-to-riches story. Some of this celebratory narrative is true; for instance, South Korea is the only country to transition from OECD aid recipient to donor. It is also somewhat unique in that in was able to transcend the vicissitudes of highly extractive colonial institutions that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) describe as snaring the institutional development of many post-colonial states. However, there are no shortage of developments that run counter to the overall narrative presented in this chapter and throughout this research. Origins-based discrimination (Ha et al. 2015), even among co- ethnic immigrants (Seol and Skrentny 2009), is a distinct phenomenon in South Korea, especially for incoming migrants from culturally dissimilar locations, which Table 2.1 indicates

is likely perceived to be most immigrants. Even so, the social and political changes outlined here and in much of the new research on Korea have precipitated a new conversation in South Korea on Korean nationhood, especially the notion that South Korea is, or ought to be, an ethnically homogenous nation. Lie (2015, 1) writes: “[F]ew observers can now state with much conviction or cogency that contemporary South Korea is a monocultural and monoethnic society.” Not only is this objectively true from a social or demographic perspective, it is increasingly held to be an indication that South Korea both is and ought to be a different, more inclusive place for its residents – ethnic Korean or not.

Both the state and society have responded to Korea’s changing demographics in notable ways. Compared to the country’s autocratic and developmental years, national identity – at both elite and mass levels – is described and understood as being relatively more inclusive. This change has been driven in part by a desire to adhere to international norms and pressure from civil society to moves towards a more inclusive understanding of national identity. From the mid- 1990s and through to today, civic organizations have campaigned on behalf of migrant workers’ rights and academia and public opinion leaders have framed the discrimination faced by foreigners and non-ethnic Koreans as being at odds with democratic inclusiveness (Lee 2009; Lee 2010).13

The debate over the Overseas Korean Act (first passed in 1999; amended in 2004) was characterized, in part, by a debate about what it meant to be Korean. The initial draft legislation defined any person of Korean lineage as an overseas Korean. This language was successfully challenged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because race-based definitions of belonging violated international norms.14 The debate is contextualized by Hyun Ok Park (2015, 73-103).

13 Interestingly, the protest energy from the 1980s protest movement seems to have carried over into NGO and activist work in the migrant laborer and migrant bride space, thus effecting new top-down and bottom-up discourses of national inclusiveness (cf. Lee 2010). See also the author’s interview with a former student activist who works with Filipino migrant workers: http://sinonk.com/2015/06/19/the-economics-of-identity-change-in-south-korea/.

14 Park acknowledges this but argues that “identity politics” of liberal democratic regimes are used as a cover for creeping inequality and the creation of a new proletariat class consisting primarily of Korean-Chinese. See the author’s interview with Park here: http://sinonk.com/2015/12/09/talking-about-the-unconscious-interview-with-

Park reads into the debate a conscious effort on behalf of the South Korean state to prevent Korean Chinese from being recognized as “overseas Koreans,” and thus eligible for significant benefits, because it benefits Korean companies needing cheaper and temporary labor. Park’s critique is convincing, but the logic of actors involved, including the Constitutional Court, civil society actors, and the main political parties shows just how different the discourse on nation and belonging has become in democratic political context.

It seems only fitting that with the institutionalization of liberal democratic norms in South Korea that the government would shift from promoting ethnic homogeneity to multiculturalism. The South Korean state has primarily promoted immigration in two ways: temporary work visas for laborers and support for migrant-brides (for overviews of migration in Korea over the past decades, see: Park 1994; Epstein 2009). Those belonging to the former category, predominantly men from East Asian countries, are protected under the Employment Permit System (EPS). The expectation is that they will return to their home country at some point, although many overstay their work visas. Some resettle permanently through marriage. Migrant-brides, the second category, receives special policy treatment and support, usually targeting social integration and practical matters – language capacity, for instance (Cho 2018). While naturalization is much easier now than before, it is not a common practice. Even so, South Korean society is more diverse and becoming even more so. Additional support for multicultural families, particularly educational support for children of multicultural families, indicates a fundamental shift in how they state both talks about the nation and invests in its future (Draudt 2019).

Of course, such a policy move makes little sense absent significant demographic change but given these changes one would expect a democracy to make the necessary policy adjustments to support the participation, integration, and acceptance of culturally and/or ethnically different people – in Korea’s case, immigrants. That is the theoretical and normative argument made by scholars who explore the relationship between the two (Kymlicka 2003). In other words,

professor-hyun-ok-park/. Relatedly, the fact that there is special legislation for ethnic Koreans abroad to obtain legal status in South Korea shows the country’s continuing preference for co-ethnic persons (Lee and Chien 2016), even if greater diversity is seen as desirable.

pluralistic ideologies are supported by democratic political systems. This does not mean that democracies will necessarily promote more inclusive national societies, but it has long been held that authoritarian and collectivist regimes tend to promote ethnic nationalisms (see, e.g., Snyder 1993; discussed more in Chapter 5), so the expectation is that they will.

The demographic change described above is notable in its own right if only because South Korea, in its relatively short history as a country, has been all but void of a significant immigrant presence. But the reaction to these changes is more instructive and relevant to the research at hand. A 2018 Ipsos cross-national poll on national inclusiveness provides insight into how South Koreans are responding to greater demographic pluralism (Boyon 2018). Respondents across more than 25 countries were asked about conditions for true or “real” nationality. One question asked whether an immigrant who obtains Korean citizenship and speaks Korean fluently is a “real national.” 64 percent answered in the affirmative.15 Another pertinent question asks respondents whether an immigrant who marries a native-born South Korea is a real Korean national. To this proposition, 40 percent of Korean respondents agree.

Since we do not have historical or panel data with which we can compare responses, it is impossible to know how South Koreans responded to these questions at other points in time, but it also would have made little sense to ask these questions before now. Comparatively, South Koreans hold views on nationality similar to that of diverse society’s with well-known inclusive conceptions of nationality. 71 percent of Canadian respondents and 77 percent of Americans, for example, agree that having citizenship and speaking English (or French in Canada’s case)

15 Notably, only 34 percent agree if the immigrant is not fluent in Korean, underscoring the importance of language. Of course, this sort of question does not address the issue of whether language here is understood as a proxy for ethnicity. Korean education has long emphasized the notion of “one language, one history, and one ethnicity” (Choi 2010). A reasonable interpretation of this finding is that native South Koreans read “an immigrant who speaks Korean fluently” as Korean from the diaspora. This may not be the case (cf. Denney at al. 2019 who find that language and ability to work – sociotropic concerns – are most important to native South Koreans, independent from whether a newcomer is an ethnic Korean or not), but we cannot say definitively one way or the other. Further, as analysis in this research indicate, language tends to be associated with more exclusive characteristics of national identity (see Chapter 5).

fluently means an immigrant is a “real national.” 44 percent of Canadian respondents and 46 percent of Americans say marrying a native makes an immigrant a true national. In fact, among the 26 countries polled on these questions, South Korea ranks as one of the most open and inclusive (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Openness of Nationalities (Ranked by most open to least open)

% agree immigrant % agree immigrant who who marries native of Average speaks language & has country is true (Columns 2+3) citizenship is true national Country national 1. USA 77 46 61.5 2. Australia 72 46 59 3. Canada 71 43 57 4. Mexico 64 41 52.5 5. SOUTH KOREA 64 40 52 6. Chile 64 40 52 7. Sweden 64 39 51.5 8. South Africa 64 37 50.5 9. France 64 34 49 10. Argentina 58 35 46.5 11. Belgium 58 35 46.5 12. Spain 57 35 46 13. UK 56 34 45 14. India 52 37 44.5 15. Peru 51 32 41.5

Source: Ipsos Inclusiveness Index (2018). Only top 15 shown here, in descending order by average. After number 15, the order goes as follows: Brazil, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Turkey, Poland, Malaysia, Serbia, Hungary, and Japan.

By the average percentage of respondents who think marrying a native or obtaining citizenship and speaking the native language fluently makes one a true national, South Korea ranks fifth, behind the settler democracies of North America and Australia. This does not appear to be a fluke finding either. Another cross-national poll by Pew Research (Poushter et al. 2019) finds that when asked whether they favor more racial, ethnic and religious diversity in their country, 68 percent of South Koreans answered in the affirmative, or second highest (Indonesia scored

highest at 76%). Koreans favor more diversity than Canada (62% agree), United States (61%), and Australia (60%).

Contrast South Korea’s reception of its newfound social pluralism with North Korea’s take on the matter. A 2006 article published by Rodong Sinmun (the state-run Korean Workers’ Party newspaper) entitled “The Idea of a Multinational, Multiracial Society Means the Destruction of the Korean Nation.” The article is a state-sanctioned tirade against the demographic changes taking place in South Korea. The message is clear: Korea is for Koreans, and Korean nationality is reserved for those who share the same “bloodline” or ancestral background. While there is probably a cohort of South Koreans who would agree with this view (ethno-national conceptions of nationality are waning, not dead), it is almost unfathomable today that the South Korean state would take such a stance. In July 2018 when the South Korean national team played a friendly game against North Korea’s national team in Pyongyang, one of the star players for the South Korean team was Ra Gun-ah. A Virginia native, Ra is a former University of Missouri power forward who also goes by his birthname Ricardo Ratliffe. Of note here: Ra is black (Denney and Abrahamian 2018). In South Korea, whither ethnic nationalism?

Moon Chung-in finds that ethnicity’s salience to national identity “has become increasingly questionable” (2012, 222), leading him to suggest that support for an “ethnically homogenous nation” is waning and a desire for a more inclusive nationalism is rising. Reading from a 2007 poll from the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Moon finds that “72.6 percent… answered that Korean people do not insist on pure blood or the oneness of the Korean race, and 79.4 percent showed a favorable attitude toward foreigners who married Koreans, making a sharp contrast with the past” (222-223).

Repeated cross-sections lend support to Moon’s conclusions. Using data collected at three points since 2005, Kim Jiyoon (2015) finds that among the preconditions for “Koreaness,” those naming “having the Korean bloodline” as important have declined considerably. But the decline in ethnicity’s salience does not hold for all age cohorts. Looking at the data by age cohort for the 2013 data, Kim shows a significant difference between the 50s and 60s+ cohorts and everyone younger, arguing that institutional and social changes are the cause. In other words, ethnicity

appears to be a less salient feature of national identity for younger South Koreans – those who grew up under a democratic regime and more pluralistic society.16 Others agree with Kim and Moon that ethnicity’s importance is waning or on the verge of being eclipsed, positing its replacement by a civic, multicultural, or political nationalism (Chung and Lee 2011; Moon 2012; Hwang 2016), or some form of globalized-cultural nationalism (Campbell 2015; 2016).

Based on an in-depth study of youth attitudes, Campbell claims that younger South Koreans feel little sense of national solidarity with other ethnic Koreans based on a shared ethnicity.17 More popular during the country’s developmental years, ethnic nationalism has been replaced by what she calls a “globalized cultural nationalism,” or a national identity “that reflects shared cultural values including modernity, cosmopolitanism and status among the young” (2015, 489). In Campbell’s view (2015, 490), “The characteristics of South Korean globalized cultural nationalism […] reflect the opportunities provided by relatively wealthy and developed nations. Those opportunities include access to education, travel and technology, those same advantages readily available to young people who have grown up in contemporary South Korea.” In other words, a pride in South Korea’s achievements, including its relatively inclusive political and social institutions.

Notably, the recent, public opinion-based studies of South Korean national identity indicate that those who hold the most differing views (namely, people in their 20s and 30s) are those who grew up under significantly different political and social conditions than their elders. The collectivist zeal of early state ideologies and policies has been largely replaced with democratic pluralism. This is not to say that remnants of early times cannot be seen – they most certainly can. Certain authoritarian values are particularly noticeable among older members of Korean

16 Explored in more detail later in this study, it is important to note that democratic transition and consolidation began before the number of immigrants in South Korea started to increase. The demographic changes described here did not begin until the late 1990s, and not in any notable way until well into the 2000s. Democratic transition and deepening (institutional changes) began in the early 1990s.

17 The author interviewed Emma Campbell about this thesis in 2015. An abridged form of the interview is available here: http://sinonk.com/2015/09/07/rationalizing-identity-change-an-interview-with-emma-campbell/.

society, or those who grew up under the authoritarian regimes who promoted collectivist and unitary visions of society (e.g. ethnic nationalism). These differences in opinion across age cohorts and the relationship between regime type and state policy and national identity indicate empirical support for the idea that authoritarian regimes promote exclusive ideas of nationality and belonging, whereas democracies tend to promote more inclusive conceptions of the nation.

Consider, again, the Ipsos data on what it takes to be a “true national.” Figure 2.2 shows the association between quality of democracy (using, again, Varieties of Democracy’s liberal democracy index) and the average score for the two measures of inclusivity used above (language capacity/citizenship and marrying a native). There is a modest correlation (.52), with countries scoring high on the liberal democracy index (e.g., USA, Canada, South Korea) showing more inclusive attitudes towards national belonging. The less democratic (or authoritarian) countries (e.g., Russian, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) score lower. There are some outliers (namely, Japan) that warrant attention, but the association is otherwise clear.

As expanded upon in the coming chapters, South Korea is particularly well suited as a case study in national identity change, having gone from an authoritarian regime promoting a closed and highly exclusive ethnic nationalism to a democracy that supports, at least nominally, cultural and ethnic diversity. How, exactly, this research proposes to go about this investigation is the subject of the next chapter.

Figure 2.2: Democracy and National Inclusiveness

Data: Varieties of Democracy, scores for “liberal democracy” (2018) and ISSP, national identity survey (2013). Missing variables excluded. Line represents single linear regression.

Chapter 3 Methodological Considerations

1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of data sources and selection, measurement concerns, and the presentation of evidence. It is not an exhaustive overview. This chapter is meant only to introduce some of the larger measurement and other methodological concerns addressed more specifically throughout the rest of this project.

2 Data Sources

To explore generational differences in political values and national identity, this project makes use of various sources of observational survey data. The selection of data was determined by appropriateness and quality. For the study of political values and regime support, this project pools Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), which has been run as a cross-sectional survey of the South Korean population in 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2015. The closest survey for the measure of political values, in terms of content and quality, is the World Values Survey (WVS). But the ABS, which is in fact derivate of the WVS, asks more quality questions and contains more data (by sample size and survey year).

For the study of national identity, three sources are used. First, the International Social Survey Programme’s national identity module, run as part of ISSP’s cross-national sampling in 2003 and 2013. The ISSP national identity module was included in the Korean General Social Survey’s 2010 survey. In total, three separate cross-sections and a sample size of more than 4,000 were gathered. Second, the East Asia Institute’s “Korean identity” survey, implemented as a collaborative survey effort with the JoongAng Daily and the Asiatic Research Center at Korea University in 2005, 2010, and 2015, constitutes an additional three cross-sections of the population and a sample size of more than 3,000. The ISSP and East Asia Institute (EAI) national identity surveys constitute the two national identities surveys implemented in South

Korea. A variant of the national identity survey was designed and administered to 352 resettled North Korean migrants in South Korea in 2016.

For the study of the content and type of national identity, this project pools data from the ISSP questionnaires, but does not include the EAI survey data. The reason for this is twofold. First, the methods of data collection for the ISSP and EAI surveys are significantly different. The former used a multi-level random sampling method, whereas the latter used a quota-sampling method. The former method is understood as a better overall method, and the author wishes not to pool data across differing modes of collection when it can be avoided.18 Second, the battery of questions used to directly measure a respondent’s national identity are not identical. Question wording on several items differ and each survey uses a question the other does not. However, as a survey designed specifically for South Korean respondents, EAI’s national identity questionnaire includes as host of identity-relevant questions not asked in the ISSP variant. This include questions about pan-Korean nationalism, national unification, and related items. Thus, these surveys have immense value for the study of South Korean national identity and are used in this project. The ISSP national identity questionnaire for Japan and Germany (survey years 1995, 2003, and 2013) and Taiwan (survey years 2003 and 2013) are also used for comparative purposes. Table 3.1 lists the surveys used in this study by chapter, type, year, and other relevant information.

Table 3.1: Survey Data Sources Survey Survey Sampling Sampling Interview Number Survey Chapter Type Year Universe Procedure Method of Cases Period Asian Voting-age Multi-stage Barometer population 4 2003 random Face-to-face 1,500 February Survey (19 years- sampling (ABS) old+) Multi-stage Voting-age 4 ABS 2006 random Face-to-face 1,212 September population sampling

18 See the comparison between the two collection methods, specifically with regards to the national identity survey, at the ICPSR’s overview of the ISSP survey methodology for the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), 2010 (ICPSR 34666).

(19 years- old+) Voting-age Multi-stage population 4 ABS 2011 random Face-to-face 1,207 May (19 years- sampling old+) Voting-age Multi-stage population 4 ABS 2015 random Face-to-face 1,200 May (19 years- sampling old+)

ISSP and National Multi-stage KSSG: 5 2003 population random Face-to-face 1,315 July National aged 18+ sampling Identity Korean General National Multi-stage 5 Social 2010 population random Face-to-face 1,576 June-August Survey aged 18+ sampling (KGSS) ISSP and National Multi-stage KSSG: 5 2013 population random Face-to-face 1,294 April National aged 18+ sampling Identity

Resettled Targeted Mixed: National North sampling of 6 2016 Face-to-Face 352 June-August Identity Korean various locales and online Migrants in Seoul, ROK

Voting-age Quota Korean population sampling (age, August- 7 Identity 2005 Face-to-face 1,038 (19 years- gender, September Survey old+) region) Voting-age Quota Korean population sampling (age, October- 7 Identity 2005 Face-to-face 1,019 (19 years- gender, November Survey old+) region)

Voting-age Quota Korean population sampling (age, 7 Identity 2015 Face-to-face 1,006 May (19 years- gender, Survey old+) region)

National population ISSP: aged 18+ in Multi-stage Various 8 National 2013 Japan, South random Face-to-face 14,018 months Identity Korea, sampling (2013) Taiwan, Germany

3 Measuring National Identity

Despite the difficulties of measuring something as free flowing, complex, and heterogeneous as social identities, methodological advances in the social sciences argue that these can be objectively measured (Abdelal et al. 2009). There are many forms of social identity, but this study is specifically concerned with national identity as a concept that captures preferences and attitudes towards national membership and belonging. Related to nationalism, national (and ethnic) identity is argued as distinct from this phenomenon in the sense that an identity is how one identifies the self and other, whereas nationalism is a broader belief or political ideology which holds that the interests of the nation of a primary (though not exclusive) importance. Who constitutes the nation and how one is included or excluded from the broader national community – do they voluntarily join, or are they ascribed by birth? – is the chief concern in this project. The concepts of national identity and nationalism, though different, are not mutually exclusive. A change in national identity is almost certain to reflect a change in nationalism. That is to say, what one thinks makes someone “truly Korean” is both an expression of an identity and a broader belief or political ideology. As such, the two are used interchangeably, when deemed appropriate and meaningful.

How then is national identity measured? This project will rely mainly on a battery of questions that operationalize national identity by asking respondents whether certain attributes makes

someone “truly [nationality].” This approach to measuring national identity has been used in comparative studies (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009) and in South Korea specifically (Kang 2006; Kang and Lee 2011; Lee and Yoon 2015). In addition to questions that seeks to directly operationalize national identity, proxy measurements are used, such as attitudes towards immigrants (common questions, asked cross-nationally) and attitudes towards Korea-specific issues like pan-Korean nationalism, ethnic affinity for North Korea, national unification, and North Korean migrants.

4 Measuring Political Generations and Cohorts

Studies in political socialization find that citizens tend to internalize the values of the political systems they are born into and grow up under. The key concerns here then are: where are political generations in South Korea located, and how are citizens assigned to one generation or another? The demarcation of political generations is guided by objective measures of regime types. Three political generations are identified, corresponding to distinct historical periods and political regime types: an authoritarian generation, transition generation, and democratic generation. Individuals are then assigned to a generational cohort based on whether they spent the entirety of their formative years under the regime. This approach is consistent with previous studies employing generational analysis (Chang and Wang 2005; Rigger 2006; Nuendorf 2010; Dalton and Shin 2014) and more substantive definitions of what constitutes a “generation.”19

19 Generational analysis draws on the seminal work of Karl Mannheim and his understanding of generations. Mannheim argues that a generation is more than a community of people born at the same time and in the same place. There is a certain sociological quality to a generation that makes it more than a function of biology. Described as “participation in the common destiny of [the] historical and social unit,” Mannheim reasons that “Individuals of the same age are […] only united as an actual generation insofar as they participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period […].” (1928: 303-304). In this study, such periods are defined by political regime types and historical eras.

The authoritarian generation includes those who spent the entirety of their formative years (12- 25) under an authoritarian regime.20 The transition generation includes those who were between the ages of 12-25 at the time of democratic transition (1987), and the democratic generation includes only those who spent the entirety of their formative years under a democratic regime (i.e., those born after 1975).

Importantly, this project is not concerned with the variations in quality of democracy after 1987. From the point of transition until 2006, there is a steady rise in the quality of South Korean’s democracy (re: democratic consolidation). The, there is a modest democratic recession between 2006 and 2016 (the period overlapping with a decade of conservative rule). How that might have affected certain attitudes is an important and interesting question, but it is not considered here. The research here is concerned with how those who came of age before and after the transition do (or do not) have different opinions about national membership and belonging. Table 3.2 provides a brief overview of South Korea by political generations (read also: historical period or regime type), including a brief description of the defining historical period and when those belonging to the generations would have been born.

20 The authoritarian generation includes those who came of age under the Japanese colonial regime (those coming of age prior to 1945). This group is sometimes referred to as the late colonial/early authoritarian generation (Dalton and Shin 2014). There is some question as to whether earlier governments of the Republic of Korea, especially the first and second republics (1948-1960 and 1960-1961, respectively), were truly autocratic. This research acknowledges this concern, especially regarding the second republic, but holds that neither were they entirely democratic. At best, they were semi-democratic, with autocratic qualities.

Table 3.2: South Korea by Generations Birth Historical period/regime type year

Transition in 1987; successful turnover in rule (party-opposition in 1997 and again in After Democratic 2006). Increasing political (and social) 1975 pluralism coupled with post-industrial social and economic changes.

Political instability and military coup (1979- 1980); oppressive authoritarian rule (e.g., 1962- Transition Gwangju massacre); social unrest notable, 1975 with large-scale opposition and protests.

Late colonial rule followed by contentious state-society relations (esp. under First Republic) and economic malaise; modest economic recovery and social stability in the Before Authoritarian 1960s followed by heavy industrial push 1962 coupled with centralized and highly authoritarian control under the Yushin Constitution (promulgated in 1972, ended in 1979).

One methodological concern in generational or cohort analysis is disaggregating effects due to regime exposure or socialization from those due to aging and temporary period effects. Inglehart argues (1983, 103) that age and experience “are linearly dependent on one another and cannot be statistically distinguished from each other if the only information one has is each respondent’s year of birth and his or her age at the time of each survey.” The best one can do is “have theoretical grounds for ruling out or controlling for at least one of the three.” Given that the pooled cross-sectional data covers a sufficiently long time period (10+ years in each case), including survey year fixed effects provides a reasonable control for period effects. Controlling

for life-cycle effects, however, is more difficult and, according to some, impossible (Glenn 2005). Absent longitudinal data that accounts for generational displacement (cf. Neundorf 2010) one cannot empirically distinguish between generation/cohort effects and life-cycle effects. The theoretical case for the former can and is made in this research. However, this project also leverages the conditions of a natural experiment to disaggregate between age and exposure. As indicated in the data overview above, a modified version of the national identity survey is administered to North Korean migrants residing in South Korea. This is a group for whom age and institutional exposure can be disaggregated between pre- and post-migration experiences. 21

5 Data Analysis and Presentation

This project is mainly composed of statistical analyses, with additional insights drawn from secondary literature, interviews, and the author’s fieldwork observations. As such, the author is mindful of the need to present statistical results in a way that is both meaningful and intuitive. Results of statistical analysis should express substantively interesting relationships between groups. The author is also mindful of the difference between statistically significant and substantively meaningful results. To the extent possible and without sacrificing sophistication, the advice of King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) on presenting meaningful estimations of empirical relationships is followed.

Many of the response variables presented in this study are standardized. This can complicate interpretation of findings. Further, the use of dimension reduction techniques, namely principal component analysis, transforms variables such that they lose their intuitive interpretability. To improve presentation of findings, this project makes use of graphic visualizations and predicted values of regression parameter estimates, which often present more intuitive reads of statistical findings than do regression estimates shown in tables.

21 See Chapters 7 and 8 on North Korean migrant resettlement. See also a similar research design in White, Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, and Fournier (2008).

6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to present a general overview of measurement strategies to be used for estimating generational effects on national identity, including how this project is operationalizing political generations and cohorts among native South Koreans and North Korean migrants resettled in South Korea. It also introduced how national identity is measured. The chapter outlined sources and justifications for data selection and also commented on methods for presenting empirical evidence. The remainder of the research presented here will examine more specifically whether political generations matter for national identity.

Chapter 4 Democratic Support and Generational Change in South Korea Is There a Democratic Generation?

1 Introduction

From an institutional perspective, South Korea is a consolidated democracy. There are competitive and free and fair elections, the protection of basic civil and political freedoms, and peaceful transitions in power. Another crucial element to democratic consolidation is a supportive citizenry. For democracies to be viable over the long run, people must support democratic systems as suitable and legitimate It is beyond a doubt true that South Korea’s institutions function in a democratic fashion. Less understood is South Korean political culture. This is a question, then, of political culture. To examine South Korea’s political culture, this chapter examines relevant indicators from four waves of Asian Barometer surveys in South Korea (2003-2015). In so doing, two critical questions are addressed. First, does South Korea have a democratic culture? If so, do all citizens show the same level of support of the country’s political system? Second, and independent of question one, are there signs of growing democratic discontent? Trends among wealthy, liberal democratic nations suggest that South Korea, too, may be showing signs of a “democratic disconnect” as its citizens show decreasing levels of support for democracy as a system able to adequately solve political, economic, and social problems.

It is argued that citizens socialized in democratic political systems internalize democratic values and show supportive attitudes towards democratic regimes, even if they show signs of dissatisfaction with democratic governments (Norris 1999). However, more recent research suggests change is afoot. Amid worsening inequality and diminishing expectations for upward mobility and a better life, it is argued that support for democratic rule among younger age cohorts in consolidated democracies is waning. Stefan Fou and Yascha Mounk (2016, 16) write:

Even as democracy has come to be the only form of government widely viewed as legitimate, it has lost the trust of many citizens who no longer believe that democracy can deliver on their most pressing needs and preferences. The optimistic view that this decline in confidence merely

represents a temporary downturn is no more than a pleasing assumption, based in part on a reluctance to call into question the vaunted stability of affluent democracies.

Comparing data from two waves of World Values Survey data collected between 2005-2014 for the United States and Western Europe, Foa and Mounk examine responses to relevant measure of democratic support. The authors fix their attention on one question, which reads: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?” This is taken as the most direct and reasonable measure of one’s support of a democratic regime. Respondents are asked to answer on a scale of 1 (“not at all important”) to 10 (“absolutely important”). The authors look specifically at the number of respondents who answered 10/10, or those who think it is essential to live in a democracy. They find significant variation across birth cohorts. 72 percent of those born before World War II in the United States think it is essential to live in a democracy; only 30 percent of those born in 1980 or earlier agree. The same cohorts for Europe show a similar downward trend across cohorts.

Foa and Mounk dismiss the idea that this discrepancy is due to young people being more “critical” (cf. Norris 1999), or because of life-cycle effects. To the authors, the differences in opinion are due to cohort effects unique to younger citizens of democracies.22 In other words, the decline in support for democracy is part of a new generational predisposition and reflective of a trend towards democratic deconsolidation. The authors’ claims challenge the long-held belief that once democracies consolidate, they necessarily remain so. In a time of rising populist- authoritarianism (Norris and Inglehart 2019), Foa and Munk’s finding could be seen as the proverbial canary in the coal mine.

22 Life-cycle effects refer to changes that take place over the course of one’s life. If variation on some variable of interest is a function of age (or the process of aging), then one can expect similar attitudinal or behavioral at certain points in the life-cycle regardless of, say, when one was born or what they experienced growing up. Changes due to the life-cycle are different from cohort effects, which emphasizes the importance of period-specific experiences and their life-long effect on attitudes or behavior. Methodologically, it is difficult to determine what is a life-cycle effect and what is a cohort effect, or possible a temporary period effect. See Glenn (2005).

Not everyone is convinced that there is an anti-democratic wave sweeping the West. In responses to the authors claims, Pippa Norris (2017) and Erik Voeten (2017a), argue that Foa and Mounk’s findings are not entirely supported by the data. One of their main criticisms is that, without data going back further than the 2000s (additional measure considered by Foa and Mounk go back to the mid-1990s), one cannot conclude that the variation in opinion across birth cohorts are due to generational differences and not simply a predisposition of young people. In other words, the differences in opinions might be due to life-cycle effects, something which the authors cannot so easily dismiss. There is also exception taken to Foa and Munk’s measurement of democratic support. To take only those who answered 10/10 to questions about democratic support as constituting those who support democracy conflates those who answered 9 and those who answered 1 as the same. As Voeten (2017b) points out, “In reality, almost no one (less than 1 percent [of the samples used]) said that democracy is ‘not at all important.’” The analysis presented by Fo and Mounk is also merely descriptive. They do not control for socioeconomic, survey year, of country-level effects.

Yet even Voeten concedes that support for democracy is weaker among younger age cohorts, lending at least some support to Foa and Mounk’s claims. Indeed, criticism of interpretation and measurement aside, the data do show significant variation in opinion in the United States and Western Europe. But what about in newly consolidated democracies? The debate about democratic deconsolidation has focused mainly on Western countries, but there is no reason to limit the scope to only these democracies.

There is much to learn comparatively about democratic political culture by expanding the scope of the investigation to the newly consolidated democracies of East Asia, specifically South Korea. Do differences in historical sequencing and the timing of democratic transitions make any difference? As a newly consolidated democracy, is there a difference in values between the pre- democratic and post-transition generations? Studies of post-authoritarian political cultures (Shin and Dalton 2014; Denemark, Mattes, and Niemi 2017) lend some evidence to the idea that support for democracy may be on the rise as more people are born into and socialized in a democratic political system. How this take compares to claims being made about a so-called democratic disconnect are uncertain but will be addressed here. Building on extent research of

political system support in democratic countries, this chapter considers the extent of democratic support among political generations in South Korea.

The research presented here centers its focus on political culture and South Korean citizens’ attitudes towards their political system and their preferences for politics and society. It is not concerned with elite statements or sentiment, or the formal political process. Of course, democratic orders depend in large part on political elites and other relevant political groups (e.g., political parties) accepting a democratic political order. However, democracy’s long-term viability depends upon a supportive populace. In other words, democracy does not succeed if the political system and political culture are incongruent (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Relatedly, if the assumption of this dissertation is indeed true, then there should be evidence of a democratic political culture in South Korea.

2 Democratic Consolidation in a Third Wave Democracy

Why is South Korea an appropriate case for examination? Aside from the fact that this project is principally about South Korea, there are comparative justifications that go beyond the country itself. Most research into democratic values centers on Western Europe and North America. This is not surprising. Most of the world’s democracies are found there, and they have been there the longest. However, the universe of possible cases has expanded as the number of democracies have grown. With the maturation of some “Third Wave” democracies,23 there are new cases from which to choose, and data to use. Recent political developments in South Korea has also attracted more attention to its relatively young democratic political system.

23 Frist first coined by Samuel Huntington (1991), the third wave of democracy refers to the countries which transitioned from autocratic to democratic rule between the mid-1970s through the early 1990s in Latin America, Asia Pacific, and Latin America. The failed or troubled transitions rule in many of these countries to consolidated democratic has given rise to the study of “hybrid regimes” and “competitive authoritarianism” – regimes that are democratic in name, but either partially or effectively autocratic. See Diamond (2002) and Way and Levitsky (2010).

On March 10, 2017 then-President Park Geun-hye was removed from office by the Constitutional Court following an impeachment process started by the country’s legislature after the revelation of a corruption scandal and the severe abrogation of presidential duties. The lead- up to the impeachment vote on December 9, 2016 saw large-scale, peaceful protests by an engaged citizenry in the capital Seoul and throughout the country. The videos and images of protestors dancing, chanting, and marching repeatedly went viral. For a country with a history of military intervention during times of government instability, the removal of a president – one of the most power positions in South Korea’s presidential system (technically a presidential representative democratic republic) – is no small feat, even if the peacefulness with which it took place was not all that surprising.24 The court upheld the impeachment and relative peace was maintained.

However, not everyone in South Korea agreed that the president should have been impeached. A few pro-Park Geun-hye rallies are evidence that at least some in South Korean society did not agree that the president should have been removed from office (Aljeezera 2017). They may not have been as large as the anti-Park rallies, but these counter-protests, which were made up largely of elder members of society who came of age under different political and social conditions, indicates that not all Koreans agree on what it means to be a democracy. One organization that rallied in support of Park Geun-hye – the “National Coalition of Martial Law Implementation” – publicly called for the re-implementation of martial law, citing threats from communists and anti-state elements (JoongAng Daily 2017). 25

24 A leaked military document shows there was a contingency plan in place should civil unrest follow from Park Geun-hye’s acquittal that included possible declaration of martial law (Hankyoreh 2018). The debate surrounding this document was highly politicized, but it is worth noting that the military intervention was not about keeping Park Geun-hye in power necessarily, but about maintaining social order. The contingency plan was to be considered in the case of the Constitutional Court rejecting the impeachment bid. 25 The author’s own observations from South Korea confirm that even at the time of writing (late 2018), pro-Park protests were still being held. Not particularly popular, the fact that a discredited and jailed president still has some visible support is notable.

While a focus on anti-Communism may seem like a strange and an antiquated remnant of the Cold War, the message is better received than one might otherwise think. Survey data indicates that many South Koreans, and a vast majority of older South Koreans, find value in anti- Communist ideology (Denney 2016). It is also worth noting that the main conservative candidate in the latest presidential election, Hong Jun-pyo, ran on an anti-Communist platform. Hong publicly accused the current President Moon Jae-in of being a “pro-North Korean leftist” during his election campaign. His message did not resonate with the 20-40 years-old crowd, but it did succeed in capturing the older, more conservative base (JoongAng 2017).

On the day the Constitutional Court, the institutional body with authority to remove presidents, voted in favor of upholding the impeachment motion, many pro-Park protestors marched to the location of the court, demanding its dissolution (Yonhap 2017). They may not have been calling for the reinstatement of a dictator, but for these citizens democracy likely means something different than it does for their younger compatriots.

The point here is not to analyze attitudes towards Park’s impeachment specifically, but to show that there is something to learn from the South Korean experience. Are there any differences in political attitudes and orientations between those who came of age prior to South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987 and those who “grew up democratic?” If there is indeed a downward trend in support for democratic political systems, then we should expect to see some evidence of this in South Korea.

3 Political Generations, Socialization, and Democratic Support

Why do citizens support democracy? There are many ways to answer this question, but this research draws from the literature concerning the relationship between political socialization and preferences. This literature focuses on the theoretical relationship between late adolescent and early adult life experiences (the “formative years”) and support for political systems. Claims

made in this literature focus on the enduring predispositions of early life experiences and the impact these have on have political attitudes.

Political culture has long been understood as reflective of deeply ingrained norms, values, and behavior. Early research into this subject stressed the importance of early-life family and educational experiences in cultivating democratic norms (Almond and Verba 1963). The importance of early life experiences has been repeatedly confirmed in the political culture literature (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Pye 1985). The theoretical expectation established by this literature is that learning in the early years is strongly conditioned by the family, school, and the broader structure of society.

The relevant theoretical claim for this research is that citizens internalize values of the political systems into which they are socialized, forming concrete political values in late adolescent and early adult years (Dalton and Shin 2014; Jennings 1989; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Mannheim 1952). The logic of this claim is that attitudes and values broadly supportive of extant political system will be cultivated during early formative years and these predispositions will remain enduring over the course of the life-cycle. In short, the type of political system in which one comes of age will determine what kind of system they are more likely to support and the kind of values they are likely to demonstrate. Recent longitudinal studies of political attitudes (Ghitza and Gelman 2014) show connivingly that when one comes of age matters for political attitudes.

In transitioning societies, there is evidence that citizens coming of age under democratic conditions will show political attitudes more in align with democratic principles than those who came of age under prior to democracy (Neundorf 2010; Shin and Dalton 2014; cf., Denemark et al. 2016). Because of enduring predispositions, older generations – those who came of age under autocratic or distinctively non-democratic conditions – find it more difficult to adjust to a new, democratic political system. The theory is congruent with the story told above of older South Korean citizens, troubled by mass anti-government protests and calls for impeachment. For them, the restoration of order is preferred, even if it means acting in a manner not befitting a consolidated democracy (e.g., dissolving a court). Such was the order of politics and society during their formative years, and so it should be today.

According to socialization theory, we should expect to find those socialized under democratic show greater support for democratic rule and have values congruent with a democratic political order (H1). Inversely, we can expect to find those socialized under alternative political systems to show relatively less support and have values less congruent with democracy (H2).

4 Methods, Variables & Data

Data for this research comes from the Asian Barometer dataset, a repeated cross-section sampling of the South Korean population from 2003-2015. The Asian Barometer is a cross- national survey project focused on Asian countries that collects nationally representative samples on values, beliefs, and attitudes using a common questionnaire. It tracks support for democracy and attitudes towards religion, political leadership, and the military, among many other variables.26 Responses for the four survey years are pooled. Missing variables and various non- responses are omitted from analysis.

4.1 Political generations

Three political generations are identified, corresponding to distinct historical periods and political regime types: an authoritarian generation, transition generation, and democratic generation. As outlined in Chapter 3, each generation is defined by the period under which individuals came of age. This method assigns individuals to a generational cohort groups based on when they were within their formative years (ages 12-25). The authoritarian generation includes those who spent the entirety of their formative years under an autocratic regime. The transition generation includes those who were between the ages of 12-25 at the time of democratic transition (1987), and the democratic transition includes only those who spent the entirety of their formative years under a democratic regime (i.e., those born after 1975). Importantly, it introduces a lag for the democratic generation. Transition from autocracy and

26 For more, see: http://www.asianbarometer.org/.

democratic consolidation takes time; this grouping method takes this into account. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the pooled data across generations.

Table 4.1: Distribution by Generations Frequency Percent Democratic 1,283 25.06 Transition 1,790 34.97 Authoritarian 2,046 39.97 Total 5,119 100.00

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). No Missing variables reported.

4.2 Regime Legitimacy and Political Values

There are many ways to measure support for democracy. No one way will best capture the desired concept. What questions are used is in part determined by what the researcher is interested in measuring. This research is interested in both regime legitimacy and political values. The former concerns whether people think democracy as a political system is suitable for the country, whereas the latter is more related to peoples’ deeper beliefs about what is right and appropriate in politics and society.

To measure regime legitimacy, two measures are considered. The first looks at how suitable South Korean citizens think democracy is for South Korea. The second considers their preferences for alternative regimes. On the first measure, respondents were asked to rate on a 10- point scale how “suitable” democracy is for South Korea, with 10 meaning democracy is “perfectly suitable” and one meaning “completely unsuitable.” If a democratic system is deemed unsuitable, then democracy can be said to lack legitimacy. The distribution of responses for the entire sample is shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: How Suitable is Democracy for South Korea?

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). No Missing variables reported.

Data make clear that most South Koreans think it is important to live in a democracy, with more than 68 percent of respondents answering somewhere between 7 and 10 (the mean and medium values are both seven). Figure 4.2 shows how scores vary across generations if the suitability measure is divided at the midway point (seven). No generation averages less than 7/10, although there is a slight decrease from the authoritarian generation (76%) to the democratic generation (72%). According to this simple measure, South Korea’s democracy would appear to be legitimate.

Figure 4.2: Percent Who Agree Democracy is Suitable

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). Includes 95% confidence intervals. No Missing variables reported.

To consider whether someone thinks democracy is suitable for their country obviously does not provide a full picture of what they think about their political system. A common measurement strategy is to look support and opposition to authoritarian alternatives to democratic rule (see, e.g., Wike et al. 2017; Foa and Mounk 2016). In this case, a short battery of questions that examine the extent to which people oppose certain authoritarian alternatives is considered. Table 2 lists the questions. Respondents were asked whether they “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” or “strongly disagree.”

Table 4.2: Authoritarian alternatives to democratic rule 1. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. 2. No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power. 3. The military should come in to govern the country. 4. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have the experts decide everything.27

Figure 4.3 shows aggregate responses by percentages. Less than 10 percent of respondents indicate support for authoritarian alternatives, although, at 16 and 18 percent, there is significantly more support for expert and strong leader rule, respectively. Even so, South Koreans are largely opposed to the alternatives to democratic rule.

Figure 4.3: Opinions Regarding Authoritarian Alternatives

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). No Missing variables reported.

27 Not asked in the 2003 survey.

Figure 4.4 shows average scores by generations for the four authoritarian alternatives. While the average score for all generations is greater than three (out of four), there are some small but notable variations. On the strongman and military rule items, respondents from the authoritarian generations are slightly less opposed. On the experts’ rule item, those in the democratic generation are slightly more supportive. All generations are equally opposed to single party rule.

Figure 4.4: Opinions Regarding Democratic Alternatives by Generations

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). No data in 2003 survey for “experts rule.”

Includes 95% confidence intervals. “Don’t know”/ “Can’t answer” reordered as NAs and excluded.

The data on opposition to authoritarian alternatives suggest that South Koreans do not support non-democratic forms of government, although there is some evidence of generational differences. It is no small thing for someone in a consolidated democracy to support the eradication of the legislature or defer entirely to “strong leader,” so even some support for such alternative is notable. For an aggregate measure, the four items from the battery of questions are summed, producing an index measurement for opposition to authoritarian alternatives. The index is then divided at the midway point with those scoring at or above the median counted as one, else zero. The new variable is then plotted across generations in Figure 4.5 (as percentages).

There is little difference in opinion across generations. 51 percent of citizens in the democratic generation score above the median as well as 50 percent of those from the authoritarian generation.

Figure 4.5: Aggregate Opposition to Authoritarian Alternatives by Generations

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). No data in 2003 survey for “experts rule.” “Don’t know”/ “Can’t answer” reordered as NAs and excluded.

The empirics presented thus far provide evidence that South Korea’s political system enjoys broad support, with buy-in across political generations. Unlike in other democracies, there is no significant difference in opinion across age cohorts. While there is unequivocal support for a democratic regime, this does not necessarily speak to political values or a democratic culture. Dalton and Shin (2014, 362) explain why:

Regime preferences are an important measure of the democratic orientations of the citizenry. But even if there is a frequent endorsement of a democratic regime (and more limited support for authoritarian alternatives), a democratic political culture must go deeper. Democracy also depends on a set of political norms about how politics function, such as the rule of law, restrictions on government power, tolerance of differences, and related values.

Scholars of political culture agree (cf. Dahl 1971; Almond and Verba 1963; and Rohrschneider 1999). The Asian Barometer’s battery of questions on authoritarian and democratic values were devised to explore respondents’ more substantive understanding of politics and society. The full list of questions is provided in Table 4.3. Respondents are asked whether they “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with each statement.

Table 4.3: Authoritarian/Democratic Values 1. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly- educated people. 2. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions. 3. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society. 4. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups. 5. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch. 6. If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. 7. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything. 8. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

These questions provide a reasonable measure of respondents’ orientation towards democratic and authoritarian norms. To determine whether these questions actually measure the same thing, principal components analysis (PCA) was run. The PCA results show one dimension capturing items two through eight (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). The linearly weighted and standardized score from the PCA is then saved. Scoring higher on the dimension indicate values more congruent with a democratic political culture, while lower relative scores indicate more authoritarian norms. The standardized scores by generation is shown in Figure 4.6. At -.24 standard deviations, the authoritarian generation is the least likely to believe in democratic values. The

democratic generation, on the contrary, is more democratic at .11 standard deviations (a total difference of .35 standard deviations).

Figure 4.6: Authoritarian/Democratic Values by Generations

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). Includes 95% confidence intervals. “Don’t know”/ “Can’t answer” reordered as NAs and excluded.

For a more intuitive measure of political norms and values in line with the operationalization strategy above, an index of the seven items identified by the PCA are summed based on their original, ordered metrics. This creates a political values index ranging from 8-32. The index is then divided at the midway point yielding a score between zero and one, with those scoring one counted as having democratic values. These scores, read as percentages, are reported across generations in Figure 4.6. Whereas 68 percent of citizens coming of age under a democratic regime score higher than the median, only 53 percent of those who came of age under autocracy do (a notable 15pp difference).

Figure 4.7: Percent Showing Democratic Values by Generations

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). Includes 95% confidence intervals. “Don’t know”/ “Can’t answer” reordered as NAs and excluded.

4.3 Regression Analysis

To this point it can be said that South Korea’s democracy is legitimate. According to the descriptive statistics, most citizens find democracy suitable and oppose authoritarian alternatives. There are, however, notable generational differences in political values. The generational divergence in values is not empirically unexpected. If there is a democratic generation, evidence of that would be anticipated – and so far, it is observed. But do these findings based on the descriptive statistics hold when we include relevant statistical controls?

Taking into account the effects of education and economic satisfaction (both sociotropic and pocketbook) are particularly important. Economic theories of political support suggest legitimacy of a democratic regime is, at least in part, a function of economic satisfaction. Assessments are, in other words, performance-based and regularly updated based on whether one thinks they are beneficiaries of the extant political system. Studies in post-Communist countries

find the same effect at play. Those who perceived themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition are more likely to positively evaluate the new democratic system (Neundorf 2010; Mishler and Rose 2007; Ekman and Linde 2005). Likewise, class has been shown, especially recently, to determine political preferences (Foa and Mounk 2016). Including fixed effects for year of survey is also important for taking into account temporal change and variation in opinion (notably, period effects).

Generational effects models are estimated for the three dichotomous variables explored descriptively above. The first is the democratic support variable, based on the most directly measure of political legitimacy. The second variable is the measure of opposition to authoritarian alternatives, and the third variable measures authoritarian-democratic values. Logit models are estimated for each response variable. The predictor is a categorical variable for generations, with three levels (transition generation as reference category). Table 4.4 reports the logit coefficients and corresponding odds ratios.

The regression estimates largely confirm the descriptive statistics. Regarding political legitimacy (models 1 and 2), there are no discernable generational effects. However, regarding political norms (model 3), the authoritarian generation is 24% less likely to score above the cutoff point. There is no democratic cohort effect. In other words, the transition and democratic generations are more similar when compared with the authoritarian generation, as the descriptive statistics suggested.

Table 4.4: Logit Regressions for Democratic Support (with categorical predictors) Democracy as Opposition to Democratic

Suitable OR Alternatives OR Values OR

Transition (reference) ------

Democratic -0.17 .85 0.02 .98 0.07 1.08

(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)

Authoritarian -0.02 .98 -0.08 .92 -0.27*** .76

(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Socioeconomic Yes Yes Yes controls

Survey years Yes Yes Yes

N 4603 4570 4422

2 Pseudo-R N .03 .02 .03 Log Likelihood -2809.57 -2998.82 -3021.02

AIC 5647.13 6019.64 6070.05

***p < .01; **p < .05 Standard errors in parentheses. Tables with full model estimates are available in the Appendix.

For an alternative test of generational effects, the logit models above are re-estimated with dummy predictors specified for the democratic and authoritarian generations. Table 4.5 shows the logits and odds ratios. The results are similar to the categorical models, except that there is a democratic cohort effect. For the dummy predictor model, belonging to the democratic generation means one is 28% more likely to have democratic values. The authoritarian generation is similarly less likely to have democratic values, except the effect is slightly stronger in the dummy predictor model. In this case, autocrats are 26% less likely to have democratic values.

Table 4.5: Logit Regressions for Democratic Support (with dummy predictors) Democracy as Suitable Opposition to Alternatives Democratic Values

OR OR OR OR OR OR

Democratic -0.16 .85 0.01 1.01 0.20*** 1.28

(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Authoritarian 0.05 1.05 -0.07 .94 -0.30*** .74

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Socioeconomic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes controls

Survey years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N 4602 4602 4569 4569 4421 4421

2 Pseudo-R N .03 .03 .03 .03 .02 .03 Log ------

Likelihood 2809.59 2811.48 2991.50 2991.01 3027.83 3021.44

AIC 5645.19 5648.96 6009.00 6008.03 6081.67 6068.89

***p < .01; **p < .05 Standard errors in parentheses. Tables with full model estimates are available in the Appendix.

One problem with generational analysis is that it assumes temporal cut off points are appropriate. Even if these off points are historically and theoretically informed, they remain somewhat arbitrary (cf. Neundorf 2010). An alternative way to test for generational effects is to examine responses across birth cohorts and look for structural breaks. If observed breaks correspond with the start and end of certain generations, then it can be more confidently said that distinct generational predispositions exist. Figure 4.7 shows the marginal effects (statistical controls held constant) across birth cohorts for the three response variables regressed in Table 4.4. For these visuals, birth years are reordered as birth year bins, with each point on the x-axis representing a 5-year bin (i.e., 1945 consists of those born between 1941 and 1945).

The first two graphs show the marginal effects on political legitimacy measures. In the first graph, there is a slight decrease in the belief that democracy is a suitable political system after the 1955 birth cohort. The authoritarian generation, defined as those born before 1962, is

somewhat more supportive of democracy as a suitable political system. However, in opposition to authoritarian alternatives (graph two), the trend is reversed. Between 1980 and 1985, the line tracing probabilities trends upwards, indicating that younger South Koreans (mainly citizens in the democratic generation, defined as those born after 1975) are more opposed to authoritarian alternatives. For the third and final graph, there is clear variation across birth cohorts. Those belonging to birth cohorts between 1975 and 1995 are most likely to be democratic. This birth year range overlaps mainly with the democratic generation. There is between 1945 and 1960 a more authoritarian disposition, and the transition generation is somewhere in-between, trending towards more democratic.

Figure 4.8: Political Legitimacy and Norms Across Birth Cohorts

Data: Asian Barometer Data for South Korea (2003-2015). Includes 95% confidence intervals. “Don’t know”/ “Can’t answer” reordered as NAs and excluded. Tables with full model estimates are available in

the Appendix.

5 Conclusions and Transition

Several findings have been presented in this paper. They speak to both the comparative literature on democratic consolidation and norms, including the ongoing debate about democratic (de)consolidation, and to research specifically about South Korea. To the literature on democratic consolidation, evidence presented here corroborate findings in previous studies that explore the relationship between political socialization and regime support (Neundorf 2010; Shin and Dalton 2014). The type of political regime under which one comes of age matters. Coming of age under a democratic regime seems to instill more democratic values, while coming of age under autocracy tends to instill values congruent with that type of political system. Evidence presented here shows that citizens of the democratic era are somewhat more likely to oppose authoritarian alternatives to democratic rule, and their support for democracy as a suitable form of rule is high overall. There is some evidence that those from the authoritarian era are somewhat more supportive of democracy as a suitable regime, but the generational differences are insignificant.

Specific to South Korea, there is no concrete evidence to support the idea that democracy is de- consolidating at the level of political culture. If anything, society is becoming more democratic as the older generations are replaced by those who have come of age under democratic rule. This runs contra the belief that South Korea, like countries in more consolidated democracies, is undergoing democratic de-consolidation from below. Democratic rule is accepted across generations, making democracy truly “the only game in town.” Further, there is a burgeoning democratic culture, defined by values supportive of a more open, pluralistic, and inclusive politics and society.

Having established that democracy is consolidated and provided evidence of a democratic culture, the next question follows: Does this view extend to attitudes towards national membership and belonging? If so, what are the implications for South Korean society and the prospects of national reunification? As central questions of this research, the remaining chapters will be devoted to providing answers.

Chapter 5 National Identification After Autocracy What Does It Mean to be South Korean Today?

1 Introduction: Recap and Transition

In the preceding chapters, the following empirical observations were made: 1) South Korea is a democracy and relatively diverse society; 2) There is a democratic political culture and an identifiable democratic generation; and 3) Changes in how South Koreans define national membership and belonging.

How might these observations be linked? The causal mechanism for the variation observed in national identity data, specifically in South Korean, is weakly specified or completely absent. Most studies examined thus far merely describe the changes and variations. Theoretically, it is suggested that there is a causal relationship between political system type and national identity. Specifically, political socialization is proposed as central to understanding differences in national identity, much like the differences in political attitudes (Chapter 4). This is to say that younger people (i.e., those coming of age under a democratic regime) are less likely to see ascriptive or ethnocultural components of national identity as important or defining feature of Korean national identity because those values are incompatible with the values associated with the democratic norms and values into which the democratic cohort is socialized.

But is this true? Do changes in political culture resulting from democratic transition and consolidation support the formation of more inclusive national identities? This chapter applies a generational model which measures the effect of socialization, using pooled cross-sectional data from 2003 to 2015, to examine the effects of democratic transition and consolidation on national identity type. National identity is measured in two ways. First, it considers what people think is important for national membership and belonging. Second, it examines attitudes towards immigrants to determine whether democratization has any effect on immigrant attitudes and tests the association between national identity type and attitudes towards immigrants (i.e., prospective members of society).

2 Political Generations and National Identity

The relationship between national identity type and institutions indicates that inclusive institutions of the sort developed and supported under democratic regimes support the congruent development of an inclusive conception of national membership and belonging. Democracy is in spirit, and by definition, incompatible with a nationalism that defines nationhood and national belonging based on ascriptive, especially ethnocultural, lines, but authoritarian regimes typically do just that, relying on culturally exceptionally explanations of nationhood. Absent institutions supportive of things like the protection of individual and minority rights against both the excess of state power and the unjust imposition of the majority (qualities usually associated with liberal democracies), ethnic nationalism tends to prevail. (Snyder 1993; Nodia 1994; Shulman 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). This position on the relationship between institutions (democratic/authoritarian) and national identity type (open/closed) is supported by robust empirical research (Smith and Jones 2001; Kunovich 2009).

However, the type or quality of political institutions does not matter for everyone equally across the life-cycle. Work in political socialization underscores the importance of formative experiences, arguing that events which take shape during the critical formative years of one’s life (approx. ages 12-25) play a constitutive role in forming ideas, attitudes, and preferences that are resilient over the course of the life-cycle.

If the proposed relationship between institutions and national identity is true, then we can expect those coming of age in an increasingly democratic and pluralistic South Korea to have a national identity substantively different from those who came of age in differing political and social institutions. Growing up democracy, as it were, should generate less strict and more inclusive ideas of nationhood and belonging, including more favorable views towards newcomers to society. For those who came of age under conditions of autocracy, when ethnic nationalism was aggressively promoted, and a mechanism used as a means for nation-building and maintaining political legitimacy, we can expect attitudes towards the nation to be more closed and exclusive. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are considered:

H1a: Individuals coming of age under an authoritarian regime will have stricter and more exclusive national identities.

H1b: Individuals coming of age under a democratic regime will have more open and inclusive national identities.

H2a: Individuals coming of age under an authoritarian regime will show greater anti-immigrant sentiment.

H2b: Individuals coming of age under a democratic regime will show greater pro-immigrant sentiment.

3 Methods, Variables, and Data

To empirically test the hypotheses, this study first pools cross-sectional, observational data from multiple surveys on South Korean national identity covering the period 2003-2013. The “national identity” survey, first implemented cross-nationally by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 2003 and again in 2013. The Korea General Social Survey (KGSS), managed by Sunggyungwan University Research Centre, implemented the same survey in 2003 (separate from ISSP) and again in 2010. Overall, the pooled data used in this study represents five national identity surveys with a sample size of 5,500.

3.1 Measuring Political Generations

Three political generations are identified, corresponding to distinct historical periods and political regime types in South Korean history: an authoritarian generation, transition generation, and democratic generation. Respondents are assigned to a generational cohort based on whether they spent the entirety of their formative years under authoritarian or democratic political regime, or neither. Using 1987 as the point of democratic transition, the democratic generation includes those who spent all of their formative years under a democratic regime (i.e., those born after 1975). The authoritarian generation includes those who spent years 12-25 under

authoritarianism. The transition generation includes those who were between the ages of 12-25 at the time of democratic transition. Importantly, this coding scheme introduces a lag for the democratic generation. Transition from autocracy and democratic consolidation takes time; this grouping method takes this into account. Table 5.1 shows the distribution of the pooled data across generations.

Table 5.1: South Korean Generations by Historical Period Political generation Birth year N

Democratic After 1975 1,159

Transition 1962-1975 1,382

Authoritarian Before 1962 1,443

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). No missing variables reported.

3.2 Measuring National Identity

A battery of questions from the identity surveys operationalize national identity by asking respondents what they think makes someone “truly [nationality].” This approach has been used in studies of national identity, both cross-nationally (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009) and for South Korea specifically (Kang 2006; Kang and Lee 2011; Lee and Yoon 2015). Table 5.2 lists the seven questions asked to respondents regarding the characteristics that make someone “truly Korean.”

Table 5.2: Defining National Membership and Belonging “In order to be truly South Korean, how important is it to…” 5. Have Korean ancestry? 6. Be born in South Korea? 7. Live most of one’s life in South Korea? 8. Have South Korean citizenship? 9. Speak the Korean language? 10. Act in accordance with South Korean laws and its political system? 11. Feel Korean?

For the seven questions, respondents are given four ordered choices: very important; somewhat important; not particularly important; and not important at all. Figure 5.1 is a stack frequency graph which shows the proportion of responses. Most items are thought of as “very” or “somewhat” important by a clear majority, although some are noticeably less important than others. These descriptive statistics indicate that some exclusive or ascriptive characteristics of national identity are relatively less important. They do not indicate whether the variation is more pronounced at a lower level of aggregation (i.e., generations), which is the central concern in this research.

Figure 5.1: What Is Important to Being Truly South Korean?

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). NAs excluded (“Don’t know” / “Couldn’t answer” counted as NA).

Figure 5.2 shows responses by generation. The data show some variation. First, the democratic generation thinks every item is less important than older generation. More notable, however, is the variation between the democratic and authoritarian generations’ responses, especially on the ancestry, birth, and life items. Among democratic generation respondents, 50 percent find ancestry important, whereas 85 percent of those from the authoritarian generation do, a large 35 percentage point difference. For a country considered ethnically homogenous for most of its national existence, it is notable that approximately half of those born in the democratic era (i.e., people 42 years-old and younger) think ancestry is either somewhat or entirely unimportant to being truly South Korean. Regarding lifetime and birthright membership, there are similar divides. More than 78 percent of authoritarians find the birthright item important; less than 60 percent of democrats do. More than 78 percent of authoritarians find living most of one’s life in Korea important; less than 59 percent of democrats agree. Ethnic and territorial items, in particular, are less important with the democratic generation.

Figure 5.2: What is important to being truly South Korean? Breakdown by Generation

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). NAs excluded (“Don’t know” / “Couldn’t answer” counted as NA).

By no means a full evaluation of the priority placed on differing attributes of national identity, the findings here lend support to our empirical expectations that there are generational differences in opinion regarding what it means to be South Korean today. Specifically, it is observed that those from the democratic generation place relatively less importance on exclusive or ascriptive characteristics (namely, belonging by birth or shared ancestry – what some might otherwise call a “blood and soil nationalism”). Another finding is that respondents from the democratic generation place an overall lower barrier to national membership and belonging –

more post-nationalist, or less credentialist. Democrats score lower on all items. While the difference in some instances is not uniform, those from the authoritarian generation have stricter conditions for national belonging.

Rather than consider each national identity item individually, different dimensions of national identity are identified within the national identity battery of questions using a dimension reduction technique, following practices used in previous studies (Jones and Smith 2001; Heath, Martin, and Spreckelsen 2009; Kunovich 2009; Davidov 2009). In addition to simplifying the analysis by reducing the number of variables, this technique also resolves the question of identity content – that is, what type of identity does each item reflect? Language, for instance, can in theory be considered an ethnic component, as it is sometimes understood (Shulman 2004). Or, it could be seen as a mechanism of inclusion because it is something someone can adopt by choice in order to belong.

The matter of national identity’s components is dealt with as an empirical question. Principal components analysis uncovers two main components.28 The first component is exclusive, or ascriptive, and based on birth, citizenship, life, ancestry, and language. The second component is inclusive, or voluntarist, and based on legality and feeling. Each component weights the item based on how related it is to the others in the component. By weighting each item on its designate component, the issue of identity content is more satisfactorily resolved than grouping items based on theory alone (cf. Ha and Jang 2016).

Table 5.3 shows the two components, including the item weights. The linearly-weighted scores for each component are then saved, creating two new variables. Following pervious methods of national identity contributions using linearly-weighted component scores (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009), an additive and difference score is calculated. The former is the sum of the exclusive and inclusive components; the latter equals the exclusive component less the inclusive

28 Previous studies (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009) prefer exploratory factor analysis to PCA. The former, as a method of identifying latent factors, was also considered. The results are similar and supported by confirmatory factor analysis.

one (i.e., higher scores indicate a more inclusive national identity). The additive score is a measure of identity strictness that differentiates credentialists from post-nationalists. Relatively positive scores mean a more open and inclusive national identity. The difference score separates individuals who prioritize ascriptive characteristics over voluntriast ones. Additionally, a difference score is then calculated by subtracting the sum of the inclusive components form the exclusive ones. The difference score measures identity priority, or whether one prioritizes the ascritipve or voluntarist component of national belonging. Both the additive and priority variables are presented as standardized metrics.

Table 5.3: Principal Component Analysis – National Identity

Component 1 Component 2

Ascriptive Voluntarist

Living Most of One’s Life in Korea -0.74 -0.14

Having Korean Ancestry -0.66 -0.22

Born in Korea -0.84 -0.08

Respecting Laws and Political System -0.17 -0.81

Speaking Korean -0.63 -0.41

Having Korean Citizenship -0.75 -0.28

Feeling Korean -0.22 -0.80

Proportion of Variance 48.45 % 13.33 %

Cumulative Proportion 48.45 % 61.78 %

Cronbach's α 0.81 0.58

varimax-rotation

Do the identity types vary across generations? The analysis to this point suggests that citizens from the democratic generation should show a relatively more open and inclusive conceptions of

national membership and belonging. Figure 5.3 explores whether there are any notable generational differences in national identity strictness and priority. At -.28 standard deviations from the mean, the authoritarian generation is shown to be relatively more ascriptive or exclusive in its overall conception of South Korean national identity, whereas the democratic generation (.25 standard deviations) is relatively more open. At .13, the transition generation is in-between, but leans towards open. Given that those belonging to the transition generation were part of the democratic transition, this is not surprising.

Figure 5.3: National Identity by Political Generations

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). Includes 95% confidence intervals. NAs excluded. Variables based on PCA scores.

3.3 Regression Analysis: National Identity

Do the differences identified across generations hold once we account for the effects of relevant socioeconomic variables and other controls? Table 5.4 shows the results from ordinary least squares models for identity strictness and identity prioritization with the generational variable as a categorical predictor (transition generation as reference category). Minimum specification models are provided followed by models with statistical controls and survey year fixed effects included. Statistical controls are included for all variables which can be reasonably expected to matter. These include effects by education, gender, class/income, political difference (by identification), geographic (urban/rural), and religious (variable construction provided in the Appendix). For the generational predictor, the transition generation is the reference category. Ordinary least square models are estimated as all outcome variables are continuous.

The regression estimates confirm what the descriptive statistics suggest: citizens who came of age in the democratic era have a less strict conception of national membership and belonging than do older generations. Those coming of age under authoritarianism, on the contrary, are more credentialist in their conception of national membership. Regarding identity priority, those form the authoritarian generation place a greater priority on the exclusive/ascriptive component. Citizens of the democratic generation, when compared to those from the transition generation, are somewhat more likely to prioritize the inclusive component, but the effect is not nearly as strong, and when statistical controls are included, statistically insignificant.

Table 5.4: OLS Results - National Identity (with categorical predictors) Identity Strictness Identity Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Generations

Transition (reference) - - - -

Democratic -0.38*** -0.36*** 0.17** 0.12**

(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)

Authoritarian 0.54*** 0.48*** -0.40*** -0.28***

(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)

Socioeconomic controls No Yes No Yes

Survey year No Yes No Yes

N 3984 3984 3984 3984

R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.07

F Statistic 151.60*** 30.14*** 59.04*** 21.42***

***p < .01; **p < .05. NAs excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. Tables with full model estimates available in the Appendix.

An alternative way to considered generation effects is to specify generations as dummy variables and then estimate the effects (Table 5.5). In this coding strategy, the reference category is everyone who is not part of the generation specified. Two dummies are coded: a democratic generation dummy and an authoritarian generation dummy. The multiple regression parameters are similar, except an age variable is added as a statistical control to control for the potentially confounding effects of age.

The regression estimates for the dummy variables largely confirm the findings from categorical predictor models. Compared to everyone else, the democratic generation is more post-nationalist and prioritizes the inclusive component of national identity. The effect for identity priority in this model is statistically significant, whereas in the categorical model it was not. The similarities between the transition and democratic generations are, in this case, washed out. The effects of

belonging to the authoritarian generation remain as previously estimated: more credentialist with a priority on the ascriptive component.

Table 5.5: OLS Results - National Identity (with dummy predictors) Identity Strictness Identity Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Democratic Generation -0.46*** 0.19***

(0.05) (0.06)

Authoritarian Generation 0.53*** -0.29***

(0.05) (0.05)

Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes

Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes

N 3984 3984 3984 3984

Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06

F Statistic 26.29*** 28.24*** 19.92*** 21.29***

***p < .01; **p < .05. NAs excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. Tables with all model estimates available in the Appendix.

3.4 Measuring Attitudes Towards Immigrants

Regarding what it means to be “truly South Korean,” generational differences are noted. Opinions regarding immigrants in South Korea are also considered in this chapter as an important proxy measure of what it means to be South Korean today. We expect to find that those socialized in the democratic era are more accepting of social and demographic pluralism. They are expected to view immigrants more positively. Using a standard 4-item battery of questions about immigrants, attitudes are explored. Table 5.6 lists the questions used.

Table 5.6: Attitudes Towards Immigrants in South Korea 1. Immigrants increase crime rates. 2. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Korea. 3. Immigrants are generally good for Korea’s economy. 4. Immigrants improve Korea’s society by bringing new ideas and cultures.

Respondents are asked how much they agree or disagree with the following statements: Possible answers include “agree strongly,” “agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” and “disagree strongly.” Figure 5.4 shows the proportions per response for each item. The bar plots indicate that there are no extremes in opinion, but a plurality of people agree that immigrants will mean more crime (47.3% strongly or somewhat agree). Yet, a plurality tends to oppose that idea that immigrants steal jobs (42.7% strongly or somewhat disagree). A majority (51%) think immigrants are good for the economy. South Korean citizens are unclear or ambivalent on whether immigrants are good for culture (44.2% neither agree nor disagree). While most people take a positive sociotropic view of immigrants (“good for the economy,” “don’t take jobs”), the pooled cross-sectional data suggests some cultural uncertainty and some social anxiety surrounding public safety.

Figure 5.4: South Korean Attitudes Towards Immigrants

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). NAs excluded (“Don’t know” / “Couldn’t answer” counted as NA).

How do these figures differ across generations? If the empirical expectations are correct, citizens of the democratic generation should be relatively more accepting of immigrants. Figure 5.5 shows the average scores (out of 5) per item by generation. These descriptive statistics indicate

that citizens from both the democratic and transition generations are the least likely to think immigrants increase crime rates or take, compared to the authoritarian generation. Those not from the authoritarian generation have less anti-immigrant sentiment, in other words. On pro- immigrant items, the differences are much less pronounced. Everyone tends to think that immigrants are good for the economy. Whether immigrants are good for culture is unclear – opinions are basically ambivalent, as aggregate scores suggest. It would appear the democratic and transition generations are less xenophobic than the authoritarian generation, but not more pro-immigrant.

Figure 5.5: Attitudes Towards Immigrants by Generation

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). Includes 95% confidence intervals. NAs excluded (“Don’t know” / “Couldn’t answer” counted as NA).

Reading the first two items (crime and jobs) as measures of anti-immigrant sentiment, and the second two items (economics and culture) as pro-immigrant sentiment, the items are summed

with a range of 2-10 (10=entirely anti- or entirely pro-immigrant).29 Figure 5.6 shows scores for the anti- and pro-immigrant variables across generations. At 6.3, the authoritarian generation scores significantly higher than the transition and democratic generations (5.8 and 5.7 respectively). The difference between the authoritarian and democratic generation on the pro- immigrant scale is minor, although the authoritarian generation scores lower.

Figure 5.6: Pro- and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment by Generations

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013) 95% confidence intervals included. NAs excluded (“Don’t know” / “Couldn’t answer” counted as NA).

29 This division is clearly intuitive, but both principal component and factor analyses also support this interpretation. Statements about crime and jobs load strongly on one component or factor, whereas economic support and brining new ideas and cultures load strongly on a second component or factor.

3.5 Regression Analysis: Immigrant Attitudes

Including the same socioeconomic and geographic controls as before, Table 5.5 shows regression estimations for the anti- and pro-immigrant scales. A third variable shows overall sentiment towards immigrant, measured by subtracting the anti-immigrant sentiment from the pro- immigrant sentiment, yielding a scale ranging from -8 (completely anti-immigrant) to +8 (completely pro-immigrant). As continuous variables, the models are fitted using ordinarily least squares.

The results confirm the findings shown by the descriptive statistics. Models 1 and 2 show that citizens form the authoritarian generation are more likely to have anti-immigrant attitudes compared to the transition generation, while those form the democratic generation have an opinion more or less similar to those from the transition generation. On pro-immigrant sentiment, if we include statistical controls, there are no generational effects. In models 5 and 6, which takes the difference of the pro- and anti-immigrant measures, those from the authoritarian generation are shown to have, on balance, a relatively negative opinion towards immigrants. It is important to consider the anti- and pro-immigrant sentiments separately, because as the models show, those not from the authoritarian generation are less likely to be xenophobic but are not necessarily pro- immigrant.

Identical to alternative coding strategy used for measuring generational effects in the regression estimates shown in Table 5.7, the effects on attitudes towards immigrants are re-estimated with dummy predictors. Table 5.8 shows OLS estimates for dichotomous democratic and authoritarian generation variables. The effects are largely the same as the categorical predictors. Authoritarians are more anti-immigrant compared to others, but democrats are not more pro- immigrant.

Table 5.7: OLS Results: Immigrant Attitudes (with categorical predictors) Anti-immigrant Pro-immigrant sentiment Immigrant scale sentiment

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Generations

Transition (reference) ------

------

Democratic -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06

(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)

Authoritarian 0.49*** 0.33*** -0.11** -0.06 -0.58*** -0.38***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)

Socioeconomic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes

Survey year No Yes No Yes No Yes

N 3931 3931 3906 3906 3885 3885

Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.08 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.06

F Statistic 43.50*** 27.43*** 2.07 4.32*** 24.45*** 18.73***

***p < .01; **p < .05. NAs excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. Tables with all full estimates available in the Appendix.

OLS Table 5.8: OLS Results: Immigrant Sentiment (with dummy predictors) Anti-immigrant Pro-immigrant sentiment Immigrant scale sentiment

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic Generation -0.12* -0.08 0.04

(0.06) (0.06) (0.10)

Authoritarian Generation 0.31*** -0.03 -0.33***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.10)

Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N 3931 3931 3906 3906 3885 3885

Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06

F Statistic 38.41*** 41.67*** 5.26*** 5.27*** 26.09*** 28.27***

***p < .01; **p < .05. NAs excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. Tables with all full estimates available in the Appendix.

3.6 Alternative Method: “Eying” Generational Breaks

The analysis to this point provides some confirmation for our original hypotheses. However, a problem with generational analysis is that it assumes temporal cut-off points are appropriate. Even if these off points are historically and theoretically informed, they remain somewhat arbitrary. Another way to confirm the presence of generational effects is to examine responses across birth cohorts. This permits one to visually observe structural breaks and determine whether they line-up with the start and end of certain generations and the formation of new generational predispositions. It also permits one to consider how opinions may vary within generations.

Figure 5.7 shows predicted values across birth cohorts for the identity strictness and priority variables, with all the controls held constant at their means (regression models are reported in the

Appendix). For these visuals, birth years are reordered as birth year bins, with each point on the X axis representing a 5-year bin (i.e., 1945 consists of those born between 1941 and 1945).

Figure 5.7: Identity Strictness and Priority Across Birth Cohorts

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). 95% confidence interval included. NAs excluded. Tables with full model estimates available in the Appendix.

The predicted standardized values for identity strictness indicate a break around the 1950 birth bin, from which point there is a sharp and steady decrease, crossing zero between the 1960 and 1965 birth bins. While the predicted values across birth bins support the hypothesis that those coming of age in the democratic era are more likely than those born prior to have an open conception of national identity, it also strongly suggests that a transformation in identity began not in the mid-1970s (at the time of democratic transition), but sometime slightly before that. In

other words, the transition generation might be key – the generation who were instrumental in bringing about political change and transformation to South Korea. As such, it may be that growing up authoritarian matters most for national identity strictness.

The predicted values for identity priority provide clearer evidence of distinct generational predispositions, with those belonging to birth bins 1930-1955 prioritizing the ascriptive component, and those from the birth bins 1965-1990 prioritizing the voluntarist component. The authoritarian generation, as defined here, includes those born before 1962, and the democratic generation includes those born after 1975. The overlap is not exact, but it is close, with many of those counted as belonging to the transition generation included in the shift towards a more inclusive conception of national membership and belonging.

What about attitudes towards immigrants? Figure 5.8 shows the predicted values on the immigrant scale. Those belonging to birth bins within the authoritarian generation score lowest, supporting the finding presented above that this generation is the most anti-immigrant. Between 1955 and 1970 there is incremental increases, indicating more pro-immigrant sentiment. The upward trend, however, appears to be trending opposite the empirical expectation. From 1980- 1990, a downward trend appears. While there is a clear generational predisposition regarding conditions for membership, opinions are more varied regarding newcomers to South Korea, with the youngest citizens surveyed indicating a rising level of weariness.

Figure 5.8: Immigrant Attitudes Across Birth Cohorts

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). 95% confidence interval included. NAs excluded.

Tables with full model estimates available in the Appendix

3.7 Association Between National Identity and Immigrant Sentiment

Is there any association between national identity and immigrant attitudes? The causal arrow is much more difficult to establish than it is between generational experiences and national identity, but an association between certain types of national identity and sentiment towards immigrants should be expected. Exclusive characteristics should show negative correlations with positive immigrant sentiments and positive correlations with negative sentiments.

Table 5.9 shows OLS regression estimates for the immigrant scale variable regressed on four identity variables: national identity strictness, the ascriptive component, the voluntarist component, and the identity priority variable. Better read as correlations, output shows modest associations between identity strictness, the ascriptive component, and identity priority. For identity strictness, there is a weak and negative correlation (-.09), indicating that as identity becomes more credentialist, attitudes towards immigrants become somewhat less favorable. A moderately strong and negative association also shows with the ascriptive component (-.31), meaning that the more important the ascriptive component is, the more negative opinions about immigrants are. It follows then that for the voluntarist component, a positive association is shown. The voluntarist-immigrant attitude association, however, is not particularly strong (.11). For the identity priority variable, there is a relatively weak and positive association (.11), indicating that those who prioritize the inclusive component of identity are also more likely to view immigrants favorably. Of the associations, the ascriptive component has the strongest, although all associations are statistically significant.

Table 5.9: OLS Results: Immigrant Scale by Identity Type Response variable: Immigrant Scale

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Identity Strictness -0.09***

(0.03)

Ascriptive Component -0.31***

(0.04)

Voluntarist Component 0.11***

(0.04)

Identity Priority 0.20***

(0.03)

Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes

Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes

N 5126 5126 5126 5126

Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07

F Statistic 29.61*** 31.32*** 26.30*** 30.08***

***p < .01; **p < .05. NAs excluded. Tables with full model estimates available in the Appendix.

4 Conclusions

The research presented in this chapter has shown how, in the case of South Korea, differing historical periods and the associated political generations are associated with different types of national identity. Building off a prior research into the relationship between macro-level factors and national identity (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009), this research considers competing types of national identity in a country where the transition from an autocratic to democratic political system divides a nation between pre- and post-democratic cohorts.

Results from the generational regression models suggest that those coming of age under democracy will have a more pluralist conception of national identity (more post-nationalist, relatively speaking) and place less of an emphasis on the ascriptive components of identity,

although this generation effect only shows when the democratic generation is coded as an indicator variable. When compared to the transition generation, there is no statistically significant difference; the evidence suggests that the attitudes associated with young democrats begins much earlier. This is not exactly surprising, given that the transition generation was very much a part of the end of authoritarianism and the beginning of South Korea democracy. Perhaps more interestingly, it provides evidence that the transitions towards a more open and inclusive identity is not merely a function of global connectivity and the rise of information communication technologies. Those not belonging to the authoritarian generation are also less negative towards immigrants, although they are not necessarily more welcoming of them. Conversely, those coming of age under authoritarian conditions are more credentialist and show a preference for the ascriptive components of national identity. They also have more negative feelings about immigrants. Regarding conditions of membership and belonging and attitudes towards immigrants, the authoritarian generation shows the most distinct and resolute attitude, suggesting that coming of age under autocracy has the greatest and most lasting effect.

Chapter 6 Whither Pan-Korean Nationalism? Exploring Alternative Measures of Ethnic Nationalism

1 Introduction

Korean national division has long been understood as a violation of the nationalist principal (Shin, Freda, and Yi 1999), which “holds that the national and political unit ought to be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). A deep reservoir of support for national unification among South Koreans has long been seen as evidence that Korean division is a deeply undesirable state of affairs and an affirmation of the nationalist principal (Chung et al. 2018). However, it is far from clear how much support there is for “one Korea” or a fully unified peninsula. Evidence suggests a waning sense of pan-Korean sentiment or support for “one Korea,” especially among South Koreans (Smith 2018; cf. Choe 2018a and Choe 2018n). In the previous chapter it was established that authoritarians internalize the exclusive and collectivist logic of ethnic nationalism while democrats are either agnostic or adopt more inclusive understandings of Korean nationality. There is here another unique research opportunity to explore the generational predispositions of Korean citizens towards various components of national identity that fall broadly under the concept of pan-Korean nationalism, or the idea of that Korea is and ought to be one nation.

Kim (2015) finds that younger South Koreans exhibit attitudes towards North Korea unification that contrast significantly with older cohorts. Reporting on survey data from 2013, Kim shows that younger age cohorts are less likely to see North Korea as “one of us” and express less support for national unification. Having Korean ancestry – a crucial solidarity-producing element shared between North and South Koreans -- is also shown to be a significantly less important characteristic of Korean national identity for younger Koreans. Repeated cross-sectional data indicate these trends are enduring. Between 2010 and 2014, the data show that interest in unification and in North Korea (and North Koreans) are lowest among young Koreans – especially those in the 20s and 30s (Asan 2015). Denney, Green, and Ward (2019) show that about 70 percent of surveyed North Korean migrants support “immediate unification,” whereas

only 16 percent of South Koreans do. Of course, some of this difference is explained by the fact that natives of North Korea wish to see unification with their place of birth, but the utterly lack of support among native South Koreans is notable.30

If Gellner’s nationalist principal is to be taken seriously, then the lack of support for complete unification among South Koreans is a puzzling observation worthy of further exploration. How might it relate to the findings presented in this project? If closed or ascriptive conceptions of national identity are giving way to more inclusive ideas of belonging, then perhaps it is not at all surprising that ideas traditionally associated with ethnic nationalism (e.g., unification as “natural” and desirable outcome) also lack support.

Distinct generational differences show for political attitudes and national identity, do they show for other related measures, too? Not yet explored is whether opinions are changing regarding broader conceptions of the Korean nation – different from conditions for national belonging in South Korea. It stands to reason that if ethnic nationalism is waning, then the idea of a pan- Korean nation encompassing both North and South Korea would also be a less appealing idea. Using descriptive statistics and Regression analysis of pooled cross-sectional data from the East Asia Institute’s Korean Identity Survey (2005-2015), this chapter extends the generational analysis employed throughout this project to attitudes towards the idea of a pan-Korean nationalism.

2 Changing Conceptions of “Korea”

There is reason to believe that an understanding of Korea, broadly conceived, means something different to South Koreans who came of age during the democratic era. This group in society has no recollection of the Korean War or the decades of authoritarian rule that followed. Older generations, by contrast, have a historical memory of national reunification reinforced by

30 As Friedhoff (2018) explains, most of those polled express support for some limited form of integration which permits freedom of movement via a political confederation or similar arrangement. They do not support unification by absorption, which would like be the case if, say, North Korea collapsed.

exposure to the strong ethnic nationalism of the developmental years. South Koreans, we can surmise, think differently about North Korea based on when they came of age. Anti-communist education and state propaganda certainly influenced their view of the regime, but North Korea was something more than just another country. For many, it was once part of the nation they once knew or felt an affinity for and for a few, it was home. What remains unspecified, again, is the mechanism of change. The trends are well-defined, but what exactly explains the observed variation across groups?

If extant findings regarding Koreans’ attitudes towards nationhood and belonging are correct in pointing to the gradual decline in ethnic nationalism, then what might generational analysis tell us about changing conceptions of nationhood, specifically the idea of pan-Korean identity and united peninsula? Given the significant institutional and other structural differences across South Korea’s history, generational analysis and its emphasis on socialization as a causal mechanism appears useful for understanding the variation in attitudes among South Koreans.

It is expected that the institutional and cultural changes precipitated by the democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s have changed the country’s political culture such that those coming of age during South Korea’s democratic era will have attitudes significantly different from that of those who came of age in times prior. The theoretical logic behind this claim is that an understanding of nation and national belonging has evolved with the country’s transition to a democratic political system. The idea of an ethnic nationalism or ethno-cultural national identity, while still prevalent, is losing its appeal with those socialized under democratic institutions and thus feelings of inter-ethnic affinity with North Korea and support of pan-Korean nationalism are on the decline. How to measure the outcome variable of interest and what relationships to hypothesize is the addressed in the next section.

3 Data, Measurements & Hypotheses

This study uses pooled cross-sectional data from the East Asian Institute’s Korean Identity Survey, a rolling cross-sectional survey administered in 2005, 2010, and 2015. As done in previous chapters, three political generations are identified, corresponding to distinct historical

periods and the political regime types described in some detail above: an authoritarian generation, transition generation, and democratic generation. The distribution of respondents across generations is shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Distribution by Generations N Percent cumulative %

Authoritarian 1180 38.52 38.52

Transition 1016 33.17 71.69

Democratic 867 28.31 100.00

Data: Pooled cross-sections, EAI Korea Identity Survey (2005, 2010 & 2015). Total N=3063. No missing variables reported.

Four questions are chosen as an appropriate for the exploration of South Korean attitudes towards pan-Korean nationalism. These four questions are selected in order to explore attitudes on four related concepts. These are:

Table 6.2: Measuring Pan-Korean Nationalism 1. How “close” people feel to the idea of a pan-Korean nation. Referred to as hanminjok in Korean, this concept captures the idea of a singular, ethnic-based Korean nation transcending territorial borders, notably the North-South divide on the Korean peninsula. 2. The sense of ethnic affinity for North Korea (the country), specifically whether South Koreans view North Korea in ethnic kinship terms. 3. Whether resettled North Koreans (the people) in South Korea are viewed as integral members of the South Korean national community. This might otherwise be understood as support for “unification in action,” or what Oh (2010) calls “small unification.” it considers whether South Koreans accept native North Koreans as national compatriots. 4. Support for national reunification between North and South Korea, leaving out any indication of who would be unifying or why. Simply, whether South Koreans think unification should occur, as the nationalist principal would suggest.

The first variable uses the most direct question, asking South Korean respondents: “How close do you feel to the pan-Korean nation?” Four ordered choices are possible: “very close,” “somewhat close,” “not particularly close,” and “not close at all.” Those responding that they feel somewhat close or very close are counted as showing attachment to the pan-Korean nation, otherwise not. The second question selected asks: “How do you usually think about North Korea?” Six choices are given: “one of us,” “brother,” “neighbor,” “other,” “enemy,” and “no opinion.” Respondents are permitted two choices. So as to capture those who have either a first or second order opinion of North Korea as “one of us” or “brother” – the two entries suggesting inter-Korean affinity – a new, binary variable is created for those who selected either one or both of these answers.

It is possible that those who feel a sense of co-ethnic affinity with the people of North Korea may still see the North Korean state or government as an enemy or other. To get an alternative measure of inter-Korean affinity, answers to the question “How close do you feel about North

Korean refugees living in the country?” are also considered. Respondents are given four choices: “they are South Korean people,” “they are like South Korean people,” “they are like others,” and “they are completely others.” The relevant dimension here is ethnic-ethnic affinity for resettled North Korean refugees31 – or, alternatively, support for “unification in action.” As such, a new binary variable is constructed, counting those who answered “they are South Korean people” or “they are like South Korean people” as one, otherwise zero.

Lastly, preference for unification is measured. Ethnic, or pan-Korean, nationalism is the foundation of unification support. It stands to reason that for those to whom ethnic nationalism appeals least, support for unification will be lower. The Korean Identity Survey asks respondents what they think of unification. Four choices are provided: “We need unification quickly;” “Let conditions determine the approach;” “There is no need to rush unification;” and “There is no need for unification.” A new binary response variable is constructed. Those who respond that unification is needed quickly are coded as expressing support for unification, with those expressing some timidity or outright opposition as those not supporting unification. Accordingly, four hypotheses are tested:

H1: South Koreans coming of age in the democratic era will be less likely to feel close to the pan- Korean nation.

H2: South Koreans coming of age in the democratic era will be less likely to see North Korea in ethnic kinship terms.

H3: South Koreans coming of age in the democratic era will be less likely to view North Korean migrants as members of the South Korean nation.

31 As of 2018, data show that more than 30,000 North Korean migrants have arrived to South Korea at some point. Most, but not all, of them are still living in the country (some have deceased, others have migrated onwards). Following a devastating famine in North Korea and the collapse of the public distribution service in the 1990s, a more or less steady flow of North Korean migrants has been making their way to South Korea. Even though numbers have tapered off significantly since 2013, newcomers continue to arrive. In 2001, the total number of all resettled North Korean migrants equaled less than 2,000. Since then, no fewer than 1,127 (in 2017) entered South Korea. The number of newcomers peaked in 2009 at 2,914. See Ministry of Unification statistics at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/. The reasons for their defections vary. Surveys of the defector population published by Kim (2017, 98-99) indicates that significantly less than half of all defections are due to economic destitution or political oppression.

H4: South Koreans coming of age in the democratic era will be less likely to support national reunification.

3.1 Empirical Findings

Table 6.1 shows average percentages of respondents who feel close to the pan-Korean nation, show ethnic affinity towards North Korea, have inclusive attitudes towards resettled North Korean refugees, and support national reunification. For all four measures, more than half the sample answer in the affirmative. 67.1 percent feel close to the pan-Korean nation; 65.5 percent see North Korea in ethnic terms; 70.3 percent see North Korean migrants as part of the South Korean national community; and 61.6 percent support national reunification. These measures of central tendency show that, overall, a majority of South Koreans still feel in one way or another attached to the idea of “one Korea.” This is not surprising, but it also is not particularly revealing, as findings previous findings suggest there are likely to be significant differences across groups.

Figure 6.1: South Korean Attitudes Towards Pan-Korean Items

Data: Pooled cross-sectional data, Korea Identity Survey (2005-2015). N=3063, except for the second graph (NA/don’t know = 147; excluded).

Looking at averages by generations provides a better idea of what the South Korean population increasingly thinks and the direction of changing opinion. Figure 6.2 shows average scores by generation. For each of the four outcome variables, no significant differences show between the authoritarian and transition generations. This is a new finding, as in previous chapters the authoritarian generation was more distinct. In this case, those belonging to the democratic generation have significantly different opinions from the other generations.

Compared to the authoritarian generation, those from the democratic generation feel more distant from the pan-Korean nation (9 percentage point difference) and have less ethnic affinity for North Korea (14pp difference). Few of those growing up democratic feel as if North Korean refugees are not a part of the South Korean nation, although there is a six-percentage point difference. The biggest gap between generations shows for unification support at 19pp. Chi- squared tests of group differences are statistically significant for all variables at the .01 significance level or better. The descriptive statistics indicate that there is a generational difference in predisposition towards pan-Korean nationalism, but without controls we cannot be certain the bivariate relationship is not confounded by other variables. To address the potential issue of omitted variable bias, logit regression models are estimated.

Figure 6.2: Generational Attitudes Toward Pan-Korean Items

Data: Pooled cross-sectional data, Korea Identity Survey (2005-2015). N=3,063, except for the second graph (NA/don’t know = 147; excluded). Includes 95% confidence intervals.

3.2 Regression Analysis

To better test whether generational effects explain the variation in the outcome variables, two generational models are specified per outcome variable with statistical controls. Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, logit regressions models are estimated first using a three- level categorical variable for generation (transition generation as reference category) and then with dummy predictors for authoritarian and democratic generations. Statistics controls for all models include socioeconomic variables (ethnocentrism, education, income, gender, religion, and political identification) and geographical variables (urban/rural, Seoul). Controls for national security-consciousness and the fixed effects of survey years are also included. (Explanations for the construction of the control variables are included in the Appendix.)

Logit regression estimates are shown in Table 6.3. For models using a three-level categorical variable and those using a dummy for the democratic generation, the democratic covariate has a statistically significant impact on the responses. That the effect of belonging to a democratic cohort is basically the same for both the three-level categorical variable and the dummy variable supports the claim that the predisposition towards the pan-Korean nation – South Korean national identity, in other words – is significant different for those coming of age in the democratic era. The odds ratios (ORs) shows just are unlikely a member of the democratic generation compared to all others is to express attraction to pan-Korean sentiment. For the models with dummy variables specified, the ORs shows that democrats are between 24-41% less likely. The ORs are not significantly different for the models using categorical variables. The decrease in pan-Korean nationalism is unique to the democratic generation.

Table Table 6.3: Logit Regressions for Pan-Korean Items

Close to Ethnic affinity Inclusion of Support for

pan-Korea for DPRK N. Koreans Unification

M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8

OR OR OR OR

Transition generation - - - - (reference)

- - Democratic generation -0.41*** .64 .74 -0.37*** .70 .66 0.44*** 0.30*** (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)

Authoritarian generation -0.01 0.20* 1.28 -0.05 .94 0.11 1.14 1.01 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)

- - - - Democrat (dummy) 0.41*** .67 0.52*** .59 0.28*** .76 0.41*** .66 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)

Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N 3063 3063 2916 2916 3063 3063 3063 3063

R2 .04 .05 .13 .13 .03 .03 .08 .07

------Log Likelihood -1892.19 -1953.38 1892.19 1733.38 1735.11 1829.79 1829.92 1954.00

AIC 3820.37 3818.38 3502.77 3504.23 3695.58 3693.84 3942.76 3942.00

***p < .01; **p < .05 Standard errors in parentheses. Full model estimates, including models with minimum specifications, are available in the Appendix.

3.3 Alternative Method: “Eying” Structural Breaks

The logit coefficients indicate the hypothesized nature of the relationships are as expected, but logits are difficult to understand in any meaningful sense. Estimated mean or predicted probabilities better presented findings. This could be done for the generation variables, but it would be preferable to show predicted probabilities across birth years instead.

One issue with generational analysis is that it assumes cut off points are appropriate. Even though these cut off points are theoretically informed, they are still arbitrary. Considering responses across birth cohorts permits us to determine whether there are any noticeable structural breaks suggesting the formation of new generational predispositions. Predicted probabilities across birth cohorts for all four outcome variables are shown in Figure 2, with the control variables held constant. Birth years are grouped into bins, with each point on the X axis representing a 5-year bin (i.e., 1945 consists of those born between 1941 and 1945).32

Figure 6.3: Predicted Probabilities for Pan-Korean Items by Birth Cohort

Data: Pooled cross-sectional data, Korea Identity Survey (2005-2015). N=3,063, except for the second graph (NA/don’t know = 147; excluded). Includes 95% confidence intervals.

The plots show relatively clear and discernable structural breaks and the start of downward trends in three of our four cases: pan-Korean closeness, inclusion of North Koreans, and support for unification. For the pan-Korea and unification responses the break begins sometime between

32 The error bar for the 1995 bin is noticeably larger than the rest, due to the smaller sample size (<100).

1970 and 1975, or about the time when South Korea’s democratic transition began. Based on our theoretically-informed expectations about the nature of opinions between generations, the break occurs where we expect it. For instance, the probability a respondent part of the 1955 birth cohort (the authoritarian generation) feels close to the pan-Korean nation is 69 percent. For the 1980 cohort (democratic generation), the same probability is 10pp lower at 59 percent.

For inclusion of North Korean refugees there is also a sharp break, but it comes much later than for the other variables. Following a slight downward trend following 1975, there is a noticeable dip between 1985 and 1990. In other words, for those born in 1981 and sooner the predicted probability that they will see North Korean refugees as members of the South Korean national community is significantly lower than everyone older. For the 1965 birth cohort the probability that a respondent sees North Korean refugees as members of the South Korean national community is 75 percent. For the 1990 cohort, that probability is 48 percent and for the 1995 cohort it is 50 percent. The reason for this sharp dip can’t be determined by the survey data alone, but the period in which North Korean defectors started arriving in large numbers (starting approximately in the year 2001)33 overlaps with the formative years of these birth cohorts. In other words, those born the mid-1980s would be the first to experience “unification in action” -- the resettlement of North Korean migrants -- during their formative years.

The decrease in support for unification is similar to that of closeness to the pan-Korean nation. There is a break shortly after the democratic transition, indicating that coming of age during the democratic era matters. Between the 1935 and 1975, the average probability that respondents support national reunification is greater than 70 percent. For the 1980 cohort it is 65 percent and 54 percent for the 1990 cohort. One reading of this sharp dip might be the perceived cost of unification deterring younger South Koreans from support it. There is no sociotropic economic assessment control, but income is included. The evidence presented here indicates that most of those belonging to the democratic generation are less supportive of unification and that is a (new) generational predisposition.

33 The latest Unification of Ministry statistics on arriving North Korean refugees is available at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.

Lastly, for ethnic affinity towards North Korea there is a break, but it is less distinct than the others. After 1975 a clearly discernable downward trend sets in. Notably, this variable is the only for which the oldest, authoritarian generation respondents score significantly higher (this is shown in Table 3, for the three-level categorical predictor). For the 1945 and 1950 birth cohorts the probability respondents see North Korean in ethnic terms is 88 percent. That is slightly higher than those form the transition generation and significantly higher than many birth cohorts belonging to the democratic generation. These findings are expected and provide evidence for the claim that those closer temporally to division are more likely to feel close to North Korea in a ethnonational sense. The lower probability for the 1935 cohort isn’t surprising, given that those belonging to this cohort would have come of age during the Korean War (1950-1953), and thus are probably less likely to feel close to North Korea.

Overall, the findings for birth bins are in line with our hypothesized expectations. They show a decline in pan-Korean or co-ethnic affinities as well as a substantive waning in support for national reunification for those growing up democratic, as it were.

4 Conclusions

The data findings presented above corroborate claims of a new South Korean national identity, consistent with findings presented throughout in previous chapters. It also shows that the change in attitudes is correlated and arguably caused by the new institutional and cultural conditions under which younger South Koreans are coming of age. A new South Korean nationalism borne of the democratic era exhibits a greater sense of detachment from the pan-Korean nation, North Korea (the state) and North Koreans (the people), in addition to less support for national reunification. What are the broader implications of these findings? This research identifies two.

The first is that the theoretical underpinning to that idea that unification ought to occur – because it violates the nationalist principle – is less true today than it was in the past. Who is or can be part of a national community is a matter of national debate, but it has long been assumed that the common history and shared ethno-cultural characteristics of the two Koreas implied their reunion

would come in due course, and the prevention of this union constituted a violation of the order of nations. South Korean citizens coming of age in a post-autocratic South Korea are increasingly likely to disagree. Support for the idea of North and South Korea as “one nation” is waning.

The second implication is more comparative in scope. The findings presented in this chapter suggest the passage of time and changing circumstances affect the formation of national identities. This finding is in line with extant findings in the comparative study of nationalism (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2008) and findings presented in previous chapters. The generational models used in this study shows that growing up under democracy seems to matter and has precipitated a change in the way citizens think of the pan-Korean nation and thus its own national identity.

There is some question about how these attitudes might have changed after 2015 (the last survey year used). At the time of writing, South Korean president Moon Jae-in is pursuing détente with North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. Following a so-called “peace Olympics,” which saw North and South Korean athletes march side-by-side under a unified Korean flag and a unified (North- South) women’s hockey team, the prospects for improved North-South relations seems possible. It stands to reason that attitudes towards North Korea, along the dimensions explored in this chapter, might have changed. With a reduction in tensions, people might be feeling a closer inter- ethnic bond or have a more positive opinion of North Korea(ns). Without running the survey questions again (the survey is not likely to be run again until 2020), it is impossible to say how, or even whether, attitudes have really changed. It is possible all age cohorts are feeling, at this time, a renewed sense of pan-Korean nationalism and that feeling will endure going forward. However, polls taken around the time of Olympic-motivated engagement suggest attitudes have changed little (Choe 2018a); South Koreans are highly critical of engagement with North Korea, which supports the findings presented in this chapter.

Chapter 7 North Korean Migrants and Identity Change in Korea

1 Introduction

Findings in the previous chapters indicate that an ascriptive and exclusive national identity is giving way to a more inclusive conception of national belonging (Chapter 5). This finding is corroborated by evidence indicating a burgeoning detachment from pan-Korean nationalism among the democratic generation (Chapter 6).

Where the research explored in the previous two chapters falls short is in its ability to overcome two methodological hurdles. Frist, it did not, and indeed cannot, disaggregate institutions and preferences; the type of data used do not allow it. This is an issue of endogeneity and a severe hurdle for making causal inferences. The research cannot disaggregate age from exposure, either, as age and life experiences in South Korea are perfectly correlated variables. It is difficult to conclusively state that the observed variation is due mostly or entirely to socialization effects. In other words, the impact of exposure to democratic or authoritarian institutions is not being specifically measured. A solution to this methodological problem is the focus of the next two chapters.

Disaggregating preferences and attitudes from institutions is a difficult task. Related effects, namely those associated with the life-cycle, further complicate our understanding of how preferences change within a given population. It is difficult to determine whether some change is explained by a new cohort or generational disposition. The research presented here explores ways around both methodological hurdles.

Using a modified form of the International Social Survey Project’s national identity survey, this chapter examines the national identity of ethnic Korean migrants who have resettled in South

 The research for this chapter was made possible by an Academy of Korean Studies (AKS) Competitive Research Grant (AKS-2015-R-49) and an AKS Pre-Doctoral Fellowship.

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Korea. Using the unfortunate division of the Korean peninsula in 1948, this research leverages the “Korean experiment” (Acemoglu et al. 2005), an ongoing natural experiment in institutional change between North and South Korea. Homogenous prior to division, the separation of ethnically and culturally similar groups into divergent institutional environments opens a unique opportunity to specifically measure the impact of exposure to contemporary institutional conditions in South Korea among North Korean migrants resettling in South Korea. Specifically, it permits the researcher to overcome the problem of endogeneity by disaggregating exposure age from exposure such that one can measure the impact of institutions on preferences.

If South Korea’s democratic transition has precipitated the formation of a new Korean national identity, then we can expect to find evidence of this among resettled North Korean migrants. Accordingly, this research asks: Upon resettlement in South Korea, how do Korean migrants’ national identities change? Do these migrants learn from their new environment, or do prior experience make them resistant to change? The research findings are relevant to the study of institutions and preferences and national identity.

2 Overcoming Endogeneity: The Korean Experiment

The claim that broader structural changes in South Korea explain the observed variation in national identity finds support in the comparative literature on nations and nationalism and recent work examining the political culture of contemporary South Korea. Cross-national work on the macro- and micro-foundations of national identity finds that countries with more developed and open national economics generate the conditions under which more inclusive national identities form (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009). There is also support for the claim that those coming of coming of age under conditions different from older generations engenders new and enduring political orientations and identities that remain entrenched throughout the life-cycle (Inglehart 1979, 1997; Jennings 1987).

The problem confronting findings in the extant literature is twofold. First, it is difficult to separate the interaction between institutions and preferences; this is the problem of endogeneity. Second, without disaggregating age from exposure one cannot accurately determine why identity

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is changing, or whether a fundamental change has occurred, because age is perfectly correlated with exposure. We cannot be certain that current youth opinion is reflective of a new cohort or generational predisposition, as is suggested in the existing literature, because the impact of exposure to new institutions in South Korea (or to previous institutions in North Korea) is not being specifically measured. In other words, if age and experience are perfectly correlated, it is difficult to test whether the observed effect is actually due to the exposure to the conditions under which one comes of age, or some other effect.34 How, then, can preferences and institutions be disaggregated and age de-coupled from exposure? In other words, how can we measure the impact that living in contemporary South Korea has on the formation of national identity?

One solution to the methodological problem encountered in the literature is to look at a culturally similar group who did not come of age under democracy and for whom age is not perfectly correlated with exposure. Such a group exists: resettled North Korean migrants living in South Korea as citizens of the Republic of Korea. For this group, most of whom spent a considerable amount of their life in North Korea, institutional exposure can be disaggregated from preferences and age can be separated from their experience living in South Korea.

These two groups -- South Koreans and North Koreans -- can be understood culturally and linguistically as similar (Alesina et al. 2003). Prior to division, Koreans in the northern and southern parts of the peninsula were similar, both economical and socially (Lee and Kim 2011). The division, driven by the United States and the Soviet Union for geopolitically reasons, was an exogenous event largely undesired by the people of Korea. The institutions adopted and pursued since then have remained somewhat constant. South Korea sought inclusive economic (and eventually) political institutions, whereas North Korea adopted socialist institutions and an

34 This is to say nothing of the temporally limited data available for analysis. What allows scholars who use public opinion data to consider whether generational effects are at work (e.g., Inglehart 1979; 1997) is the existence of longitudinal or panel data stretching several decades. This makes it possible to distinguish between life-cycle, period, and generational effects. Such panel data on South Korean national identity do not exist. To the author’s knowledge, the farthest back the data go is 2003, when the South Korean population was first sampled for the International Social Survey Programme’s cross-national survey of national identities.

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authoritarian political system. Early on, the institutional differences may have been less noticeable, but as time passed the differences have become stark. South Korea’s political institutions have become increasingly inclusive and democratically consolidated and economic policymakers have continued to push an export-oriented and high growth economy based largely on free market principles. North Korea, on the other hand, remains authoritarian, its economy marginally reformed but underdeveloped and its institutions exclusive. There is little to no immigration to North Korea and aside from the privileged elite, a limited number of foreign laborers, and those residing in the porous Sino-North Korean borders, access to global flows of information and consumer goods is highly constricted, if not effectively shut-off.35 The institutional conditions between the two Koreas are substantively differently. It is from these divergent conditions that newcomers from North Korea hail.

2.1 North Korean defection and migration

Following a devastating famine in North Korea and the collapse of the public distribution service in the 1990s, North Korean migrants have been making their way to South Korea in steady flows. Even though numbers have tapered off significantly since 2013, newcomers continue to arrive.36 In 2017, a total of 1,127 defector-migrants arrived in South Korea, followed by another

35 Despite notable changes over the last decade, including a relative decrease in the state’s capacity to monitor its citizens, the institutionalization of selective market activity, and the rise of an informal market economy the regime lead by Kim Jong-un maintains a dense social network and coercive security apparatus with a relatively high degree of political control over society (Kretchun and Kim 2012; Gause 2013; Lankov 2013; Tutor and Pearson 2015; Baek 2016).

36 In 2001, the total number of all resettled North Korean migrants equaled less than 2,000. Since then, no fewer than 1,142 (in 2001) entered South Korea. The number of newcomers peaked in 2009 at 2,914. See Ministry of Unification statistics at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/. The reasons for their defections vary. Surveys of the defector population published by Kim (2017: 98-99) indicates that significantly less than half of all defections are due to economic destitution or political oppression.

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488 in the first half of 2018.37 At time of writing, a total of 31,827 defector-migrants have been resettled in the South.38 They come from a variety of geographical and socio-economics backgrounds and left North Korea for a multitude of different reasons. Some of those reasons were political and ideological, but for a majority, the decision was survival-based or, more recently, purely functional.

Defections from North Korea and resettlement in South Korea are not new phenomena. Since national liberation (1945) and through to today, the motivation and frequency of defection has varied. In total, there are six cohorts of North Korean defectors, according to Chung (2008). Table 7.1 outlines their period, the nature of their resettlement, and the frequency of their defection.

Table 7.1: History of North Korean Defection by Cohorts39

Nature of defection and Cohort Period Frequency resettlement

1: System selective 1945-1950 Migrants who chose one political High system or the other, mainly pre- 2: Korean War refugees 1950-1953 High war; or moved due to war.

Political defections; often reward-seekers for brining state 3: Cold War defections 1962-1993 Low or military secrets to South Korea.

37 Statistics on arriving defector-migrant numbers are published regularly by the Ministry of Unification. For the latest statistics, see http://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/NKDefectorsPolicy/status/lately/. Current numbers of arrivals are considerably lower than in the years 2006-2011, when more than 2,000 defector-migrants arrived annually.

38 This number does not include those who have since died or migrated onwards

39 The author would like to recognize Christopher Green (Leiden University) for introducing the Chung (2008) piece, which reviews the periodization of North Korean defections. He and the author have used this periodization in co-authored works. See, e.g., Steven Denney and Christopher Green, “Unification in Action? The National Identity of North Korean Defector-Migrants: Insights and Implications,” Korean Economic Institute of America, Academic Paper Series, October 1, 2018.

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Deterioration of economic conditions (including famine) in North Korea major push factor. Resettlement determined by Act 4: Post-Cold War defections 1993-1997 to Protect North Korean Brethren Low Who Returned, which provided substantive resettlement assistance (cash transfer and housing assistance).

Similar to cohort four (economic insecurity), but knowledge of objectively better and alternative lifestyle in South Korea known (major pull factor). Resettlement 5: Escapees 1997-2000 Moderate determined by Act on the Protection and Resettlement Support for the Residents (provides greater financial assistance and other services40). Rise of brokerage system and informal institutionalization of 6: New settlers mid-2000s-present defection routes. Family/chain- Moderate migration more popular. Reasons for defection vary significantly.

Figure 7.1 plots the number of resettled North Korean migrants by year, according to the Ministry of Unification. This does not include pre-war or Korean War migrants. Those survey and interviewed for this research belong predominantly to cohort six, with only a few respondents belonging to earlier groups. What is to note here is that having recently arrived, pre- migration and post-migration effects can be separated and measured. In other words, we can consider how divergent institutions affect the national identity of this culturally similar group, using the attitudes of North Korean migrants as reflective of national identities developed under an autocratic political culture in addition to measuring the effects of exposure to South Korea.41

40 The original cash transfer was equal to ~$36,000, but today that amount is much lower ($6,400). Currently, the government also aids with housing down payments (“key money” in Korea), in addition to fully subsidized education and employment assistance.

41 This study employs a research design similar to Kim et al. (2017). The authors in this study employ an experimental research design to study differences in social preferences between young South Koreans and youth

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What, then, is the impact on national identity for North Korean migrants resettling in South Korea? Figure 7.1: North Korean Migrants Resettled by Year

Data: South Korean Ministry of Unification.

3 Theories of Socialization: How and Why Identities Change

Regarding the type of national identity prevalent in a national community, comparative theoretical and empirical studies of national identity indicate that institutions matter. It is argued that consolidated democratic institutions created the conditions under which civic national identities take form (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Nodia 1994; Shulman 2004; Snyder 1993). The absence of democratic institutions nurtures the popularity of exclusive, or “fixed” characteristics

North Korean migrants who have recently resettled. Similar research designs have been pursued in the study of Canadian and American values (Lipset 1971) and political behavior and in the study of East and West Germany (Shiller 1991; Rohrschneider 1999; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007).

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of national identity (Nodia 1994; Shulman 2004; Snyder 1993). Extant empirical studies corroborate these claims (Smith 1998; Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009), as do studies of Korean nationalism (Shin, Freda, and Yi 1999; Myers 2010). In relatively closed and internationally disconnected polities experiencing economic hardships – e.g., North Korea – exclusive or ascriptive identities are more likely.42 While South Korea has moved into a new structural category as a consolidated democracy with an increasingly pluralistic society, North Korea’s political culture remains comparatively unchanged.43 Similarly designed research has found evidence that institutional differences between North and South Korean can explain differences in social and political preferences (Kim et al. 2017).

If South Korea’s democratic transition has precipitated the formation of a new Korean national identity, then we can expect to find evidence of this among resettled North Korean migrants as they are re-socialized and internalize the values of the new host country. Similarly, if institutions matter in the way proposed here, we can expect to find evidence that growing up in North Korea matters, too.

Research into the integration and (re)socialization of resettled migrants focuses primarily on experiences prior to migration in their host country (pre-migration experiences) and experiences in the new host country (post-migration experiences). Accordingly, two distinct sets of theories can be used to guide our empirical expectations regarding possible sources of change: a theory of resistance and a theory of exposure. The former concerns lasting effects of pre-migration experiences, while the latter focuses on the impact of resettlement.

42 Ethnic nationalism also flourishes when the territorial sovereignty of the nation is under threat, such as it was in early 20th century Korea. Shin (2006) claims that prior to Japan’s usurpation of Korea’s sovereignty, ideas of nationhood were universal and inclusive, not particularistic and exclusive.

43 This is not to say that North Korea hasn’t changed. Society there is more open today than it was in previous eras (Sullivan 2017; Kim 2017). Digital information flows more freely and is openly exchange via informal markets and personal networks. We should, however, be careful not to overstate the extent of the changes, or their effect, especially when comparing the two Koreas. Even at its most authoritarian point, South Korean society was more contentious and pluralistic than North Korean society has probably ever been.

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The theory of exposure holds that the longer migrants have spent in their new host country, the more they will become like their hosts (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). According to this view, identities are remade in the new host environment. Prior learning in the migrants’ home country is not considered, nor is prior socialization. This theory employs a “blank slate” approach to understanding newcomers’ attitudes and preferences. The longer one has spent in their new host country, the more like their host compatriots they will become. There is evidence that immigrants in the United States adapt to the norms of the US political system, such that length of exposure is positively correlated with voter turnout (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). White et. al (2008) makes identical findings in Canada. Regarding national identity, the empirical expectation is that newcomers should, over time, internalize the values and preferences of their new host society; institutions and preferences converge. Thus, the following hypothesis:

H1: The longer North Koreans migrants live in South Korea, the more open and inclusive their national identity will become.

The theory of resistance suggests that resocialization is not so easy. Grounded in classical socialization literature (Mannheim 1928; Nuemann 1965), this theory suggests all learning experiences post-formative years are conditioned by early life experiences. Referred to as “formative years” experiences, early and late adolescent experiences (usually between the ages of 12 and 25) are understood as instilling preferences that endure over the course of the life-cycle (Inglehart 1997; Jennings 1987; Merelman 1986). Orientations formed early on in life condition new life experiences, leading people to either interpret new ideas according to previously understood templates or to reject them altogether.

For new migrants, resistance theory indicates that adaptation to a new environment is conditioned or constrained by prior socialization. Change is expected to be strongly resisted and resocialization difficult. The more time a migrant has spent in his or her home country, the more difficult or unlikely resocialization becomes. However, it also means that for those migrants who arrive to their host country within the formative years window of 12-25 years of age, adaptation should be easier compared to those who did not. The empirical expectations for migration and

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resettlement are twofold. For that those who have spent their formative years in their host country, they will find it more difficult to become like their new host country compatriots. Their preferences may even be at odds with the native-born population. Those who arrived in their formative years, however, will more easily re-socialize; preferences will converge with the host population. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are considered:

H2: North Korean migrants who spent their formative years in North Korea will have a more closed and exclusive national identity.

H3: North Korean migrants who resettled in South Korea within their formative years’ window will have a more open and inclusive national identity.

Exposure and resistance are the main effects that this research is concerned with, but they are not the only variables identified in the literature on migrant resettlement. Other factors are shown to either explain, mediate, or confound effects associated with time. In Canada, for instance, White et al. (2013) show that those whose are financially well-to-do are more likely to hold positively appraisals of their new host country. Maxwell (2010) finds that government approval is positively correlated with economic satisfaction. These findings are not counterintuitive nor are they necessarily unique to immigrant populations (regime approval has been shown to be a function of economic performance for all citizens; see Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The extent of social integration matters, too. Studies show that immigrants who perceive themselves to be treated significantly worse than native-born populations are less likely to feel a part of their new country (Ono 2002; Berry et al. 2006; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007) and would be less likely to internalize the values of their new society. In the case of Korea, Song and Bell (2018) find that many North Korean migrants who choose to migrate onwards from South Korea do so because of social discrimination due to their place of origin (North Korea).

To the extent possible, as many factors as reasonable should be taken into account, as either rival explanations or socioeconomic controls. However, the most powerful and parsimonious theoretically explanation related to adaptation under divergent institutional conditions is time.

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For migrants, that means before and after migration. How time is captured exactly is a matter of definitions, which is addressed in the next section.

4 Methods, Variables, and Data

A common strategy used to measure migrant identity is to ask them what they think of themselves, as members of their new host country (Lien 2008; Kang and Lee 2010; de Vroome et al. 2011; Lee and Yoon 2015; White et al. 2015). The survey used in this study is comprised of questions from the “Korean identity survey” administered by the East Asian Institute (EAI), which follows closely the national identity survey developed by the International Social Survey Programme.44 As a survey designed for host residents, the original questionnaire does not ask respondents how long they have lived elsewhere or when they arrived in the country. These questions were added, making the survey similar to new immigrant surveys, such as the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in Canada.

Because of problems related to size of case, research into migrants’ values and identities using random sampling is difficult even under more ideal circumstances. Targeting new South Korean citizens who defected from North Korea is a difficult task. Given the security vulnerabilities of this group, completely random sampling of North Korean migrants in South Korea is not possible for ordinary researchers. The research here uses a combination of semi-random and selective, purposive sampling methods. Respondents were recruited by government-supported NGOs who maintain migrant databases inaccessible to researchers and were also selected from the researcher’s extant network connections in the North Korean migrant community.45 A total of 352 members of the North Korean migrant population in South Korea were sampled, using a mixed-method of face-to-face and online interviews in three distinct locations in and

44 See information on the Korean identity survey at EAI’s website: https://www.eai.or.kr/type_k/p2.asp?catcode=1117101200.

45 Recruitment and survey participation took place in the summer months of 2016.

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immediately outside of Seoul, the capital of South Korea.46 Table 7.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The final tally of respondents used in the analysis presented here equals 334. Those who spent fewer than 12 years in North Korea were excluded from the sample, as their pre-adolescent experiences are unlikely to have had any lasting effect.47

46 Different from completely random sampling methods, which can be used to infer about the population targeted, purposive sampling is pursued when random sampling is not possible. Accordingly, the sample used in this study is not representative of either the approximately 30,000 North Korean migrants living in South Korea, or the North Korean population. Despite its limitations, purposive sampling method is still useful as it can be used to test the relationship between key variables (Abramson 1983: 23-26).

47 Twelve years of age is the suggested cutoff point in the socialization literature, as per Greenstein (1965), Hess and Torney (1967), and Easton and Dennis (1969). More current literature finds support for this cutoff point (White et al. 2008).

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Table 7.2: 2016 National Identity Survey of North Korean Migrants in South Korea Number of respondents 334 Median age 43 Number of female respondents 240 (73%) Pre-migration Average number of years spent in DPRK 35 Average year of defection 2005 Completed high school or above 220 (65%) Number of respondents born or lived in borderland province 260 (77%) Perceived living standard in North Korea Upper and upper middle 63 (18%) Middle 85 (25%) Low and lower middle 175 (53%) Post-migration Average number of years spent in China 4 Average number of years spent in South Korea 8 Average year of arrival in South Korea 2008 Completed high school or above in South Korea 66 (19%) Currently a student 40 (12%) Currently employed in full time job 122 (36%) Notes: Values rounded to nearest whole number. Missing variables excluded. Provinces in the China-North Korea borderlands are counted as borderland provinces. These include: North Pyongan, Changang, Ryanggang, and North Hamgyong. Rason (Special Economic Zone) is also counted.

4.1 Measuring Political Cohorts and Exposure

To test the theories and hypotheses above, it is necessary to take into account prior socialization in home country under autocratic institutions in addition to the time and type of exposure in the new host country under democratic institutions. Prior socialization is measured by specifying a dummy variable, which counts those who spent the entirety of their formative years in North Korea (ages 12-25) as one, else zero. Those meeting this condition are categorized as belonging to the authoritarian cohort.

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To measure the impact of resettlement in South Korea (i.e., exposure), two additional dummy variables are specified. The first is intended to capture the effects of exposure for those having arrived within their formative years (again, ages 12-25). Those meeting this condition are counted as belonging to the democratic cohort. There mere fact of arriving before the age of 25 is counted as sufficient for resettlement and integration, as all North Korean migrants undergo an extended resettlement process, as explained above.48 The second measure of exposure, which disregards when the migrant arrived, is specified as another dummy, counting those who spent at or above the median number of years spent in South Korea (7 years) as one, else zero.

Figure 7.2 shows frequencies by political cohorts and exposure. The degree of exposure, or time spent in South Korea, is fairly even, with 56.3 percent having spent more than seven years and the rest newer migrants. Most North Korean migrants have spent their entire formative years in North Korea (71.6%), but more than quarter (28.5%) did not. Of those who left at a relatively early age, more than half resettled in South Korea within their formative years’ (18.3% of the sample). The remaining 10 percent spent their formative years in transition between North and South Korea. The transition group is not counted as a mere residual category. On average, North Korean migrants spent almost 3.5 years in China, and 56 respondents spent more than 2 years there during their formative years.

48 Ideally, a democratic cohort would be made up of those who both arrived prior to the close of their formative years and have spent several years in the country. However, due to sample size constraints, this research counts those who have gone through the resettlement process as having been resettled and integrated. Even still, a fair number of those belonging to the democratic cohort have spent considerable time in South Korea. The average number of years spent in South Korea by those having arrived before age 26 is seven years (and a median of six). Only 10 have spent less than three years and seven less than two.

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Figure 7.2: North Korean Migrants by Political Cohorts and Exposure to South Korea

Data: 2016 National Identity Survey of North Korean Migrants.

4.2 Measuring National Identity

A battery of questions from the identity surveys operationalize national identity by asking respondents what they think makes someone “truly [nationality].” Seven questions ask respondents what characteristics make someone “truly Korean.” They are listed in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3: Defining National Membership and Belonging “In order to be truly South Korean, how important is it to…” 1. Have Korean ancestry? 2. Be born in South Korea? 3. Live most of one’s life in South Korea? 4. Have South Korean citizenship? 5. Speak the Korean language? 6. Act in accordance with South Korean laws and its political system? 7. Understanding Korean history and following its traditions and customs?

For the seven questions, respondents are given four ordered choices: very important; somewhat important; not particularly important; and not important at all. Aggregate scores are sown in

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Figure 7.3. All items are thought of as important by a majority of migrants, but some are less important than others. Having Korean ancestry, being born in Korea, and living most of one’s life in Korea are noticeably less important to North Korean migrants – 50% of less of respondents find these traits “very important.” These statistics indicate some variation, but they do not consider how opinions vary across different groups, so the insight provided here is limited.

Figure 7.3: What Is Important to Being Truly South Korean?

Data: 2016 North Korean Migrant Survey. NAs excluded.

5 Empirical Analysis

Using the national identity battery of seven items, national identity is operationalized by an identity strictness and priority, as done in the previous chapter, but also by individual components. As discussed above, there are different components of a national identity – some ascriptive and exclusive, others inclusive. The idea behind the conventional ethnic/civic divide is that differing dimensions of national identity exist. Using a varimax-rotation of principal components analysis (PCA), three components are identified: ethnocultural, territorial, and legal. Table 7.4 shows the PCA outcome, and the items which correspond to the dimensions plus their weights.

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Table 7.4: Principal Component Analysis – National Identity

Component 1 Component 2 Component 3

Ethnocultural Territorial Legal

History and Tradition 0.61 -0.04 -0.56

Laws 0.06 0.15 -0.86

Language 0.48 0.34 -0.36

Ancestry 0.81 0.12 -0.25

Birth 0.68 0.36 0.19

Life 0.32 0.70 0.02

Citizenship 0.03 0.83 -0.22

Proportion of Variance 39.52 % 14.75 % 11.68 %

Cumulative Proportion 39.52 % 54.27 % 65.95 %

Cronbach's α 0.68 0.44 -

varimax-rotation

The dimension reduction outcome for the national identity responses for the North Korean migrant sample differ somewhat from that found for the native South Korean sample in the previous chapter. If two factors were specified with varimax rotation, several items loaded on each component, an indication that two components are not appropriate. Notably, the PCA analysis was run using binary variables from the national identity survey; these variables yield cleaner and more robust findings.

The ethnocultural and birthright dimensions can be understood as the ascriptive or exclusive components, as ancestry, history and tradition, and birthright items have loadings at .6 or higher (ancestry, tellingly, loads strongest at .81). The territorial dimension – living most of one’s life in a country and having citizenship – is likewise treated as an exclusive dimension, although a case

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could be made for the contrary, as citizenship and residence (i.e., living out one’s life) in South Korea is something that North Korean migrants choose by the act of defection. The legal dimension has only one item with a loading greater than .6 – following laws and the political system – and is typically understood as an inclusive item. To create new variables, the optimally- weighted linear combinations of the principal component scores are saved. This is a particularly useful method given the complexity of measuring something like national identity using multiple items, as one item is not likely to load completely onto any one dimension.

Following the variable construction method from the previous chapter and informed by similar studies (Smith and Jones 2001; Kunovich 2009), a measure of national identity strictness is calculated by summing the principal component scores. This strictness measure distinguishes between what Medrano (2005) calls “credentialists,” defined as those with more intense national identifications and higher barriers to national membership and belonging, and “post- nationalists,” or those pluralist and more open conceptions of national identity.49 The higher the score, the stricter and more exclusive the national identity. Then, a difference measure is taken by subtracting the exclusive or ascriptive components (territorial and ethnocultural) from the inclusive component (legal).

Do national identity types vary across political cohorts and by exposure to South Korea? Figure 7.4 shows scores across national identity types for each new variable by political cohorts, including the transition category. Notable differences show on identity strictness as well as the ethno-cultural component and legal components, but on nothing else. There are no group differences on the territorial component of based on the priority variable. Figure 7.5 shows scores on national identity types by length of exposure to South Korea. There is no evidence here that length of exposure matters.

49 As explored and explained in previous studies (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009), this measure is necessary to account for ambiguity and complexity in the survey data. According to Kunovich (2009: 581), a strictness variable accounts for “differences in the meaning and interpretation of the questions” and “the prevalence of multiple nationalists/credentialists who claim that all the items [in the survey] are salient for national membership.”

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Figure 7.4: National Identity Types by Political Cohort

Data: 2016 National Identity Survey of North Korean Migrants. Includes 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 7.5: National Identity Types by Length of Exposure in South Korea

Data: 2016 National Identity Survey of North Korean Migrants. Includes 95% confidence intervals.

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5.1 Regression Analysis

To determine whether there are any substantive and statistically significant differences between the main groups of interest, Regression analysis is run. This allows the analysis to account for simultaneous effects of the main predictors while holding constant relevant statistical controls. Accordingly, the independent effects of cohort effects (formative years in North Korea or South Korea) and democratic exposure, with statistical controls for potentially confounding effects of relevant variables. Controls include gender, geography and the pre- and post-migration effects for which data are available (see Appendix for overview of control variable measurement). The controls specified can reasonably be expected to affect the outcome variables and/or confound the relationship between the predictor variables and the outcome variables. As continuous variables, the strictness variable and weighted PCA scores are estimated using OLS models (the saved component scores are standardized, and the strictness variable is standardized for comparability reasons). Table 7.5 shows the coefficients and standard errors of the parameter estimates. Models with and without pre- and post-migration controls are shown.

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Table 7.5: National Identification – North Korean Migrants Strictness Ethnocultural Territorial Legal Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10

Authoritarian Cohort 0.75** 1.56*** 0.45** 1.07*** -0.05 0.28 0.34 0.21 -0.07 -1.14**

(0.31) (0.46) (0.18) (0.27) (0.18) (0.27) (0.18) (0.27) (0.32) (0.47)

Democratic Cohort -0.05 0.31 0.03 0.29 -0.17 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.21 -0.38

(0.36) (0.41) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.37) (0.42)

Democratic Exposure -0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.003 -0.001 0.04 0.09

(0.19) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.20)

Pre-/Post-migration No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes controls

N 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 334

R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.004 0.05

F Statistic 4.70*** 2.54*** 4.57*** 2.87*** 0.56 0.96 1.94 1.22 0.42 1.58 ***p < .01; **p < .05 Standard errors in parentheses. Full model estimates are available in the Appendix.

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Figure 7.6: Predicted Values for Authoritarian Cohort Effect

Data: 2016 National Identity Survey of North Korean Migrants. NAs (<2% of any variable) imputed. Includes 95% confidence intervals.

The Regression analysis show that having spent one’s formative experiences in North Korea has a statistically significant and positive effect on identity strictness (Models 1 and 2) and the importance of ethno-cultural traits (Models 3 and 4). The negative coefficient for identity priority (Model 10) indicates that, with pre- and post-migrations controls included, those who grew up autocratic, as it were, prioritize the exclusive components of national identity, although the model overall is statistically insignificant. Figure 7.6 shows the effects that coming of age in

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North Korea has on identity strictness, the importance of the ethno-cultural dimension, and national identity priority, using regression parameters in Models 2, 4, and 10.

The empirical findings presented so far can be summarized in two points. First, the strictness of one’s identity can be determined to significant degree by nature of their institutional exposure. Koreans who grew up under autocracy place significantly higher barriers on national membership and belonging. Second, the ethno-cultural dimension of national identity is more salient for those who grew up under autocracy than it is for those who did not. In other words, Koreans who came of age in North Korea are more likely to find exclusive characteristics of national identity important than those who left before their formative years ended. Neither belonging to the democratic cohort nor exposure to democratic institutions appears to matter, a puzzling and unexpected outcome.

5.2 Why the Lack of a Democratic Cohort Effect? Interview Insights

Exposure to different regimes is part of the casual explanation forwarded in this chapter. That is, socialization and re-socialization are the mechanisms by which change is enacted. It is interesting and unexpected that there is no democratic cohort effect among the North Korean migrant sample. There is no effect due to general exposure, either. While coming of age in North Korea (an authoritarian regime) results in a stricter national identity and greater importance attached to ethno-cultural characteristics, resettlement and integration into democratic South Korea does not seem to matter. What explains this?

To unpack this puzzling finding, the research turns to qualitative insights. Of the 352 survey takers, 92 participants were interviewed. The interviews, a combination of in-person, phone, and group interviews, focused on opinions regarding national belonging, namely the idea of co- ethnicity being an important quality of Korean national solidarity, as well as the nature and quality of the migrants’ exposure to South Korean society.50

50 Questions analyzed in this chapter are reproduced in the Appendix. Translations are the author’s own.

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The interview findings show a clear recognition of two things. First, having shared ancestry (the Korean “bloodline”) is spoke of as a particularly important trait of national belonging to North Korean migrants. When asked to expound on what they think about this, 84/92 interview respondents spoke of it as an important mechanism of national solidarity. Interestingly, even those who spoke positively of multiculturalism in South Korea also find a shared bloodline as important for belonging. Responding to the interview question, “What do you think about South Korea’s ‘multiculturalism’ policies? What does multiculturalism mean to you?”, a plurality of respondents (46) responded in a matter of fact way, simply describing what they think the concept and related policies mean. Of those who made a value judgement (46 in total), 85 percent (or 39 interviewees) spoke favorably of multiculturalism. Only seven identified it as something less than desirable, and among those who had a favorable appraisal, only one person did not also identify shared ancestry as an important or desirable trait of national belonging. One interviewee explained their reasoning as follows:

I see effort being made to help multicultural families in Korea. Children of multicultural families get teased and such. North Korean migrants look the same [as native South Koreans], so it’s not quite the same for us. I felt sympathy towards them [multicultural children]. South Korea is becoming increasingly a multicultural country and the government is simply trying to help those from different countries with various cultures and languages.

Another interviewee, recognizing the functional purpose of some of South Korea’s multiculturalism policies, said:

The world is becoming globalized, and we should too. I think South Korea’s multicultural policies are good. Some Korean men have a difficult time getting married, after all, and so many foreign brides are marrying them.

To the interviewee recognizing the increasing number of foreign brides (mainly from Vietnam), they were very straight in their opinion on the importance of shared ancestry, saying “Simply, it’s important to have Korean blood.”

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What do these seemingly contradictory positions mean? After all, if multiculturalism is a good or even desirable national condition, something like shared ancestry should be expected to be considered unimportant. At first glance, these positions seem to be mutually exclusive, but if one thinks of something like ethnic nationalism from the perspective of ethnic Korean migrants then perhaps not. Rogers Brubaker (1998) has made the case for a rethinking of ethnic nationalism dependent on national context. He argues that during times of national emergency – such as loss of national sovereignty (e.g., Japanese colonization of South Korea, 1910-1945) – ethnic nationalism is a force better conceived as solidarity-generating, not something meant to exclude members. In the case of North Korean migrants laying claim to national belonging in South Korea, a somewhat similar logic applies. Native North Koreans are in many ways an out-group. They may be culturally similar, but they understand themselves and are understood as being somewhat of an “other.” Consider these two quotes form interviewees who spoke of multiculturalism as something which North Korean migrants may belong. One person said:

I read a book while I was in university that categorized those who defected from North Korea as part of a multicultural group in South Korea (which also includes Filipinos and Vietnamese as migrant workers and foreign brides). I was shocked. I didn’t know why we were categorized as such. I feel a bit disappointed at this, but at the same time, and because Korea has been divided for so long, I feel there are some real differences [between North and South Koreans]. Some are cultural differences as well as differences in communication. Though we might not be as different as Filipinos or Vietnamese are to South Koreans, we [North Korean migrants] are different, too. We should be supported through the country’s multicultural policies.

Another interviewee spoke similarly, saying:

South Koreans include us with other multicultural groups. There was once a multicultural arts festival at city hall, and they [the government] asked us to participate as well. We did, but thought, ‘Oh, we’re seen as a multicultural group, too.” The multicultural policies are good, but I don’t think they should look at us as foreigners. Of course, not all people do.

South Korean society viewed accordingly, ethnic nationalism can be understood as a mechanism for national inclusion for co-ethnic migrants – in this case, native North Koreans. It follows then that the ethnocultural component of national identity identified and analyzed above might not

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decrease in importance based on when one resettled or for how long one has been in South Korea. This also provides an explanation for why identity strictness does not change, either. Shared ancestry, or other traits, need not be understood as excluding those who do not share certain ascriptive characteristics. But claiming them as important is a way of claiming membership; something which, in theory at least, supports integration.

The South Korean constitution grants North Korean migrants citizenship by right, but this does not mean they are in fact accepted as such. The difficulties of integration are well documented (Oh 2010; Lankov 2018; Song 2018). Sharing ancestry, tradition, and culture, North Korean migrants are not entirely out-groups, but they are not entirely an in-group either. It only makes sense, then, that something like a common bloodline would be thought of as important, even among those resettling prior to the close of their formative years some. It probably explains, in other words, why no democratic cohort effect is present. Importantly, among those recognizing South Korea’s increasing pluralism and demographic change, there is no negative association. One interviewee who stated that “Bloodline is important,” went on to highlight the North-South national differences, saying: “Living in North Korea, I thought of our people as a single-race nation. I didn’t even think about marriage with others [non-ethnic Koreans]. But in South Korea, I see that we live in a multi-race world, and looking at it this way is meaningful, too.”

6 Conclusions

The research findings presented in this chapter indicate that institutional exposure matters for national identity types and that institutions and preferences tend to align. For the sample of North Korean migrants, the analysis shows that pre-migration socialization under an authoritarian regime produces individuals that are more likely hold higher barriers to national membership and belonging. Growing up in North Korean makes one more of a national identity credentialist who prioritizes ascriptive components of national identity, especial ethnocultural traits. Further, spending one’s formative years in North Korea also means placing a greater importance on the ascriptive dimension of national identity, namely ethno-cultural traits.

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The quantitative analysis indicates no democratic cohort or exposure effects, an unexpected outcome. However, using insights from interviews conducted with many of the survey takers, an explanation is provided. North Korean migrants, and any co-ethnic migrant for that matter, may lay claim to national membership based on shared ancestry or other conditions typically understood as exclusive, not inclusive.

Chapter 8 A Quasi-Experimental Approach: Matching North and South Korean Datasets

1 Introduction

To test further the hypotheses that the type national identity varies according to type of institutional exposure, this research explores an innovative method that leverages the conditions of a natural experiment using propensity score matching (PSM). PSM is a statistical technique which matches observations from one case (or database) to observations in another. This matching technique helps strengthen causal explanations in quasi-experimental studies, usually where control and treatment groups exist. This technique is used for the current research to leverage comparable data for Koreans native to North and South Korea, taking advantage of the “Korean experiment” in institutional divergence. Pooled national identity survey data for native South Koreans is matched to data from the North Korean migrants survey. This procedure aids in leveraging the conditions of the Korean experiment in institutional difference, as it permits one to more accurately specify autocratic and democratic cohorts among the pan-Korean nation. Using a “nearest-neighbor” matching technique, North Korean migrants are paired with South Koreans who are “nearest” to them based on background metrics for which data can be reasonably compared between the two population cross-sections.

2 Observation Matching

Data for native South Koreans comes from the same sources as those used in Chapter 4. That database includes 3 nationally representative cross-sections of the population for a total of 3,984 respondents. The national identity surveys match the survey administered to North Korean migrants (findings for which are explored in Chapter 5), using the sample of 334 respondents. To match respondents, four socioeconomic variables are chosen from each dataset. Variables are limited by what is reasonably comparable in each database and, specifically, by the variables in

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the dataset being matched (the DPRK migrants survey, in this case51). The categories used include:

- education (1-3; 1 for less than high school; 2 for middle; and 3 for university and above); - gender (1=female, else 0); - socioeconomic status (1-3; 1 for lower; 2 for middle; and 3 for upper52); - age (continuous variable, 17-90)

The balance for each category from the datasets is shown in Table 8.1. The “after matching” column shows how the South Korean sample was adjusted after running the nearest neighbor matching technique.53 Computationally, the mean of each socioeconomic category is taken for the North Korean sample. Next, for each respondent in the South Korean sample, a distance score is generated by taking the difference between the vector of these same socioeconomic variables and the mean vector for the North Korean migrant sample (i.e., the centroid) using a Euclidean distance measure. Sorting the sample by the new distance variable these measures create (called “n”), the smallest distances are the nearest neighbors. The result is a sample that is more “similar” than it otherwise would be, and in this unique case a unified dataset of native South Koreans and resettled North Korean migrants.

A ratio of two-to-one was specified, which means that for every one North Korean migrant, two “similar” South Korean respondent were matched. 668 South Koreans were matched with 334

51 Aside from an inability to match datasets on more than the few socioeconomic categories used in this research, another limitation is the fact that most from the sample self-identify as coming from a lower social background in North Korea and that, as a wealthy and developed country, South Korea has comparatively few people in the lower class.

52 For North Korean migrants, this is based on a material well-being prior to defection. For South Koreas, this is based on current household income. The comparison isn’t ideal, but it is one of the better ways to capture the socioeconomic status of the respondents with the data available.

53 For matching in this research, rather than manually calculate a nearest neighbor score, the “MatchIt” package in R is used.

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North Korean migrants. The resulting dataset contains both respondents, for a total sample size of 1,002.

Table 8.1: Summary Balance for Datasets Matching group Before matching Mean difference After matching Mean difference

(DPRK) (ROK) before matching (ROK) after matching

Distance .07 .06 .01 .07 0

Education (1-3) 2.02 2.25 -.23 2.01 -.01

Social Class (1-3) 1.83 1.91 -.08 1.82 .01

Female .73 .54 .19 .73 0

Age 45.79 45.15 .64 46.33 -.54

N= 1,002 (North Koreans = 334; South Koreans = 668)

3 Measurement: Political Cohorts and National Identity

Following the definitions used in previous chapters, democratic and authoritarian political cohorts are defined. For native South Koreans, cohorts are defined by the type of political regime one spent the entirety of their formative years under. The authoritarian generation includes those who spent the entirety of their formative years (12-25) under an autocratic regime and the democratic transition includes those who spent the entirety of their formative years under a democratic regime.

Cohorts for the North Korean migrant sample are specified in two ways. Those who spent the entirety of their formative years in North Korea (12-25, like their South Korean counterparts) are counted as belonging to an authoritarian cohort. Second, those who resettled in South Korea before the close of their formative years (by age 25) are counted as belonging to a democratic

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cohort. As explained in Chapter 5, this is a somewhat liberal interpretation of democratic (re)socialization, but given that all North Korean migrants undergo a relatively substantive resettlement process, it is a reasonable measurement.

Not all respondents fit one or the other cohort. These respondents belong to a transition cohort. For native South Koreans, this represents those who were between the ages of 12-25 at the time of democratic transition. For native North Koreans, this groups represents those who concluded their formative years outside of Korea (North or South). Table 8.2 shows frequency counts for each cohort, by total and survey nation. Most respondents belong to the authoritarian cohort (57%), followed by the transition generation (23%). The smallest group is the democratic cohort, which is not unexpected given that most native North Koreans (the matching group) belong to this cohort and that the attributes on which native North and South Koreans are matched are likely to tend towards a non-democratic group. Even so, at a sample size of 160, the democratic cohort is sufficiently large. In fact, one of the benefits of combining samples on shared attributes is that it helps overcome sample size issues seen in the previous chapter on North Korean migrants -- the transition cohort in particular, which at 34 respondents is quite small.

Table 8.2: Political Cohorts for Pan-Korean Sample Political Cohort N % of sample

Authoritarian cohort 567 56%

DPRK survey 239

ROK 328

Democratic Cohort 158 16%

DPRK survey 61

ROK 97

Neither (Transition Cohort) 277 28%

DPRK survey 34

ROK 243

Matched Dataset. Total N = 1,002. Percentages for cohorts rounded to nearest whole numbers.

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To measure national identity, the same battery of questions from Chapters 4 and 5 are used. The questions, seven in total, ask respondents what they think makes someone “truly [nationality].” Table 8.3 lists the questions used. For the seven questions, respondents are given four ordered choices: very important; somewhat important; not particularly important; and not important at all. The questions read:

Table 8.3: Defining National Membership and Belonging “In order to be truly South Korean, how important is it that one…” 1. Have Korean ancestry? 2. Be born in South Korea? 3. Live most of one’s life in South Korea? 4. Have South Korean citizenship? 5. Speak the Korean language? 6. Act in accordance with South Korean laws and its political system? 7. Feel Korean?

In the North Korean migrant survey, the question for “feeling” Korean was not asked. For the purposes of comparability, responses were generated using a predictive mean matching (pmm) technique.54 It is also used to filled missing values for the other variables in both samples.55 Figure 1 shows what matched samples thinks and by the two main cohorts of interest (authoritarian, democratic). Responses are reordered as important (“somewhat” or “very”) or not important (“not particularly” and “not at all”).

All items are thought of as important by most respondents, but some are less important than others. Having Korean ancestry and living most of one’s life in Korea are somewhat less important, as noted in previous chapters. When subsetted by cohort, more noticeable differences emerge. Overall, authoritarians think all items are more important than democrats, a clear

54 The mice package in R is used to perform the “pmm” imputation technique. https://cran.r- project.org/web/packages/mice/mice.pdf

55 No one variable had missing values greater than 2% of the entire samples. In the case of native South Koreans, all were 1% or less. No discernable missing values pattern was observed.

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indication that they are national identity crendentialists, or have high barriers to national belonging. Democrats tend towards identity pluralism (less strict), but also think some items are less important. For the matched sample, the ancestry item is least important (45.6% of respondents think it is not important) – a finding consistent with findings from independent analysis of native North and South Korean samples. Language and birth are still important but significantly less important for democrats compared to the overall average and the average for the authoritarian cohort.

Figure 8.1: What is Important to Being Truly South Korean?

Data: Match Dataset. NAs imputed. N=1,002. National identity is then operationalized in two ways, following coding schemes used in the previous chapters. As explored in the previous chapters, there are different components of a national identity – some “fixed,” others more inclusive. Using a varimax-rotation of principal

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components analysis (PCA), two optimal components are identified. The first component represents ascriptive or exclusive characteristics of national identity; the second includes inclusive or voluntarist items. To create new variables, the optimally-weighted linear combinations of the principal component scores are saved. Then, as in previous chapters, an identity strictness measure is taken by summing the two components. Scoring higher on the additive measure indicates a stricter and more credentialist understanding of national membership. A priority score is calculated by taking the difference of the two components (ascriptive less voluntarist), measuring one’s identity priority – relatively more open and inclusive (voluntarist) or more closed and exclusive (ascriptive). The difference score is calculated by subtracting the exclusive component from those of the inclusive component. Both the strictness and priority variables are standardized. PCA scores by component are shown in Figure 8.4.

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Table 8.4: Principal Component Analysis – National Identity

Component 1 Component 2

Respect Laws and Political System -0.10 -0.81

Speaking Korean -0.63 -0.28

Having Korean Ancestry -0.62 -0.18

Born in Korea -0.77 0.04

Living Most of One’s Life in Korea -0.64 -0.16

Having Korean Citizenship -0.69 -0.20

Feeling Korean -0.22 -0.79

Proportion of Variance 39.14 % 14.51 %

Cumulative Proportion 39.14 % 53.65 %

Cronbach's α 0.71 0.50

varimax-rotation

4 Empirical Analysis

If institutional exposure matters in the way hypothesized in previous chapters, then evidence of that should show in the empirical analysis. Specifically, the democratic cohort should maintain a relatively more open and inclusive national identity, and the authoritarian cohort should have a relatively closed and exclusive identity.

First the average effects by political cohort on identity strictness and identity priority are explored. The results are shown in Figure 8.2. On the identity strictness variable, the authoritarian cohort has the most distinct score, scoring noticeably higher than the democratic and transition cohorts. On the identity priority variable, however, the democratic cohort shows the most distinctive score, as expected. Confirming that observed in the descriptive statistics

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from Figure 8.1, authoritarians hold the highest barriers to membership and democrats, relative to the overall score and that of the authoritarians, tend to de-emphasize highly exclusive characteristics of national identity. One-way ANOVA analyses were conducted to compare the effect of cohorts on the standardized scores for national identity strictness and priority. Effects were significant for both response variables at the .001 significance level.

Figure 8.2: National Identity by Political Cohorts

Data: Match Dataset. NAs imputed. N=1,002.

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4.1 Regression Analysis

To determine whether the descriptive statistics hold when socioeconomic controls are included, the identity variables are regressed against the cohort predictors. Statistical controls are included for education, socioeconomic status, and gender (i.e., the matching variables). The matching variables control for potential socioeconomic confounders and therefore also adjust the data (i.e., “correct” the estimates) based on the variables that could be reasonably matched. As all response variables are continuous, ordinary least squared (OLS) regression models are estimated. For each dependent variable, each cohort is regressed individually as a dummy predictor first (the first two models) followed by a third model that estimates cohort effects using the transition cohort as the reference category.

Table 8.5 shows the results for the OLS regression models. The results confirm the descriptive statistics and largely corroborate findings from the previous chapters on Korean national identity. For the strictness variable, those coming of age under autocratic conditions tend towards credentialism, having higher barriers to national belonging. The democratic cohort is more open or pluralistic. On identity priority, authoritarians tend towards ascription. Democrats are more inclusive, although the effects are weaker and statistically insignificant.

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Table 8.5: OLS Results – National Identity

Strictness Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic Cohort -0.45*** -0.17 0.38*** 0.22

(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14)

Authoritarian Cohort 0.52*** 0.46*** -0.33*** -0.25**

(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 0.22

Education (1-3) -0.15** -0.11* -0.11* 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.18***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Social Class (1-3) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.14** 0.14** 0.13**

(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)

Female 0.15 0.19* 0.19* 0.04 0.02 0.02

(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)

Constant 0.31* -0.16 -0.12 -0.73*** -0.44** -0.50**

(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20)

N 1002 1002 1001 1002 1002 1002

R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04

F Statistic (df = 5; 662) 6.88*** 11.85*** 9.72*** 9.11*** 9.98*** 8.49***

***p < .01; **p < .05

The matching procedure used here selects native South Korea respondents who are most like the cross section of the North Korean migrant population. The latter group is by consequence of having been born and/or grown up in North Korea different than many of their South Korean compatriots. They are products of an underdeveloped country ruled by an autocracy. Even if they are relatively well educated, come from better relative material conditions, and resettle in South Korean within their formative years window, differences might persist with otherwise similar native South Koreans. However, if the effects hypothesized and indeed observed in previous chapters are due to the institutional context in native North and South Koreans came of age, then that should show for both the North Korean migrant respondents and the native South Koreans matched to them.

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4.2 Matching only autocrats to democrats

What happens if we match only those North Korean migrants who spent the entirety of their formative years in North Korea with South Koreans who came of age under democracy? Strictly speaking, this is a better use of the matching function, since it pairs respondents who are theoretically identical, aside from differing institutional exposure. In this case, the survey nation to which respondents belong (North Korea, South Korea) define the new cohorts. Using a 1:1 matching scheme we can run paired t-tests and regression (including the matching variables as controls) to determine whether the scores for our response variables of interest differ significantly for autocrats and in the way hypothesized. Although exposure to South Korea varies for those who spent their entire formative years in North Korea (n=243), we assume that these respondents will reject any new ideas about Korean nationality, as socialization theory suggests. Matching Koreans fully socialized in North Korea (re: autocracy) to South Korean democrats using nearest neighbor, a new matched dataset of 486 respondents is created. Aside from disregarding political cohorts, all parameters are identical to the original matched dataset analyzed in the sections above.

After re-running the principal components analysis and saving new standardized component scores for an inclusive and exclusive component, difference and strictness variables are created using the same method employed in this research. Paired t-tests are then run to determine whether belonging to the authoritarian cohort (i.e., North Korean respondents) result in a statistically significant difference in mean scores. It (re)tests the hypothesis that institutional exposure matters. Table 8.6 shows the results of the t-tests. These findings show that belonging to the North Korean/authoritarian cohorts results in a national identity that prioritizes the exclusive component of national identity over the more inclusive one, corroborating findings presenting throughout this research. It also shows that authoritarians have a more credentialist identity, having a higher barrier to national membership.

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Table 8.4: Paired T-Tests for Authoritarian and Democratic Cohorts Treatment = DPRK Survey/Authoritarian Cohort Components Mean of differences (standardized metrics) Inclusive/voluntarist component 0.13 Exclusive/ascriptive component 0.64***

Difference score -0.51*** Strictness score 0.77*** ***p < .01 Next, OLS regressions are fit for all four response variables. The main predictor, a binary variable for whether respondents are from the DPRK or ROK cohorts is specified along with the matching variables (education, class, and gender) as controls. Estimated values, based on the OLS models with adjustments for the confounders (held at their mean values), are shown in Figure 8.3. The results show significant differences in national identities between those who are otherwise similar except that one was fully socialized under authoritarianism (DPRK) and the other fully socialized under democracy (ROK). The full regression models in tabular form are available in the Appendix.

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Figure 8.3: National Identity by Survey Cohorts

5 Conclusions

Specifying institutions as a primary explainer of individual preference, the findings from this chapter corroborate the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters. In short, the empirical results of the KNN-matched dataset support the finding that institutions matter. The type of political system under which one comes of age has national identity consequences. Results from the political cohort models suggest that those coming of age under democracy will have a relatively more pluralist understanding of national belonging. Conversely, those coming of age under autocracy lean credentialist and show a preference for the ascriptive components of national identity. Authoritarians, compared to those from the transition and democratic cohorts,

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are also more likely to prioritize the ascriptive component of national identity; there is no distinct democratic cohort effect for national identity type.

Chapter 9 Conclusions: National Identity in South Korea and Beyond

This study has provided evidence that political socialization matters for national identity in South Korea. Specifically, that the type of institutions one is exposed to during their critical formative years determines relative identity strictness and the type of identity they prioritize. There is especially strong evidence to suggest that growing up under an authoritarian regime tends to promote exclusive national identities which prioritize ascriptive characteristics of national membership and belonging. If political socialization is indeed the causal mechanism explaining group differences in society, then we should expect to find evidence of this in similar cases.

1 Looking Across Cases: Does the Explanation Travel?

The empirical focus of this study has been squarely on Korea, but by way of conclusion this study will briefly consider whether comparative evidence can be found in support of the research findings about the relationship between political socialization and national identity. Three “like” cases are considered. These are countries which share three crucial characteristics with South Korea: 1. Late-industrializers, by world-history time. This is a crucial characteristic, because in such cases, the organizing national principal tends to be to ancestry, or blood and soil ties. This is by no means to suggest that earlier industrializers did not organize their national societies around exclusive, ethnic-based conceptions of membership (they did), but simply that ethnic nationalism has tended to be a stronger force in national “late comers.” 2. Recent democratic transition. Recent should be understood as recent enough that authoritarian and democratic generations can be determined. 3. National identity data is available. The number of possible cases vs. the universe of possible cases is hardly ever the same. In this case, case selection is limited by what is available in the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) national identity surveys, 1995-2013.

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Among the conditions above, three cases are chosen: Japan, Germany, and Taiwan. All three are industrial late-comers (Germany somewhat less so than the others). Each country has undergone a democratic transition sometime since the end of World War II. And each country is covered by the ISSP’s national identity survey. Japan and Germany have been included in each of the three survey waves (1995, 2003, and 2015), providing a better coverage of time than is usually available. Taiwan, like Korea, was covered in the 2003 and 2013 survey waves.

1.1 Transitions and Generations

The same method used throughout this project of defining political generations is applied here. Those having spent the entirety of their formative years (ages 12-25) under authoritarian or democratic regimes are counted as belonging to one or the other generation. Transition generations are made up of those who were between the ages of 12 and 25 at the time of democratic transition. Transitions did not occur at the same time for each case. It is not the objective of this section to review in any detail the specific context of each country’s democratic transition, but merely to pinpoint when it occurred. Figure 9.1 uses Varieties of Democracy scores for “liberal democracy” to visualize points of democratic transition.

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Figure 9.1: Liberal Democracy Index: Germany, Japan, South Korea & Taiwan

Data: Varieties of Democracy scores for liberal democracy. “ROK” = South Korea.

Using the liberal democracy scores and accepted dates of democracy transition as guides, political generations in each case are defined as follows:

Japan Germany Taiwan Democratic transition: Democratic transition: Democratic transition: 1952 1949 1990 Authoritarian generation: born Authoritarian generation: born Authoritarian generation: born before 1927 before 1924 before 1965 Democratic generation: born Democratic generation: born Democratic generation: born after 1940 after 1937 after 1978 Transition generation: born Transition generation: born Transition generation: born between 1927 and 1940 between 1924 and 1937 between 1965 and 1978

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Based on the parameters for each generation set out above, frequency tables for political generations by country are produced in Table 9.1. Notably, the number of respondents for the authoritarian generations in Japan and Germany are significantly lower than in Taiwan. This is due to the fact that these countries experienced much earlier democratic transitions than relative new comers Taiwan and there are less citizens from the authoritarian generation still alive. For Germany, respondents form former East Germany are excluded due to exposure to socialist ideas under Communist rule.56

Table 9.1: Political Generations by Case (ISSP) Japan Frequency Percent Valid Percent Democratic 2667 74.25 74.25 Transition 693 19.29 19.29 Authoritarian 232 6.46 6.46

NAs 0 0 Total 3592 100.00 100.00

Germany Frequency Percent Valid Percent Democratic 2705 82.39 82.77 Transition 455 13.86 13.92 Authoritarian 108 3.29 3.30 NAs 15 0.46 Total 3283 100.00 100.00

Taiwan Frequency Percent Valid Percent Democratic 855 21.55 21.55 Transition 1069 26.94 26.94 Authoritarian 2044 51.51 51.51

NAs 0 0 Total 3968 100.00 100.00

56 The so-called “Socialist Man” project under Communist rule attempted to create what be best described as a classless, egalitarian society (Deutscher 1967, cited and discussed in Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017, 3). In practice, of course, realities were much different, but efforts are remolding society along this Communist ideal were real, and the effects at the time and thereafter make citizens coming of age under such regimes different from those without. East Germany (excluded) is counted as the following regions: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, East Berlin, Bradenburg, Saxony, Saxony Anhalt, and Thuringia.

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National identity is measured the same as it was in previous chapters, using the national identity battery of questions about what makes someone “truly [nationality].” To determine national identity types, for each country principal component analysis is run, with two factors specified and varimax rotation. In the 1995 module, respondents are not asked about “ancestry.” They are, instead, asked about the importance of belonging to the dominant national religion; this variable is used in lieu of the ancestry item. Findings from the PCA analysis are shown in Table 9.2. In the case of Japan, the ascriptive/voluntarist components do not load as cleanly as they do in the other two cases – language, and to a lesser extent religion, are multidimensional. This accounts for the lower Cronbach’s alpha (measure of internal consistency) for Japan’s voluntarist component (.52, compared to Germany’s .62). Even so, the two components in Japan are largely consistent with Germany’s as well as those found in cross-national studies that employed similar reduction techniques on the national identity battery of questions (Smith and Jones 2001; Kunovich 2009). Two variables are created using the saved PCA factor scores, as done in previous chapters. First, summing the two components, an additive score, which measures the relative strictness of citizens’ national identities, is created. Second, the difference of the two components (voluntarist less ascriptive) is taken, which provides a measure of national identity type priority – more inclusive (positive) or exclusive (negative). Each variable is recorded in a standardized metric.

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Table 9.2: Principal Component Analysis - Japan and Germany (1995-2013)

Japan Germany Taiwan

Component 1 Component 2 Component 1 Component 2 Component 1 Component 2

Ascriptive Voluntarist Ascriptive Voluntarist Ascriptive Voluntarist

Life 0.74 0.27 0.68 0.40 -0.60 0.40

Birth 0.84 0.09 0.81 0.23 -0.77 0.15

Laws 0.17 0.81 -0.05 0.78 -0.01 0.84

Language 0.66 0.41 0.24 0.72 -0.47 0.34

Citizenship 0.75 0.16 0.61 0.50 -0.64 0.39

Feeling 0.21 0.75 0.36 0.66 -0.09 0.84

Ancestry - - - - -0.75 -0.02

Religion 0.54 0.36 0.70 -0.06 -0.67 -0.18

Cronbach's α 0.81 0.52 0.74 0.62 0.76 0.73

varimax-rotation

2 Empirical Findings

Using the measures of national identity strictness and priority, ordinary least square regression models are estimated, regressing the categorical predictor (generation) against the continuous, standardized dependent variables for each case. Table 9.3 shows OLS results for generational effects on national identity strictness. The results indicate that in the cases of Japan and Germany, there are relatively substantive differences between generations. In Japan, there are statistically significant effects for both the democratic and authoritarian generations, although compared to the transition generation (the reference category), the effects are notably higher for democrats. In Germany, there is a small (and statistically insignificant) difference between the transition and authoritarian generations. However, there is a large and statistically significant 147

148 democratic cohort effect. In Taiwan, however, there is little effect for the democratic generation and a small effect for the authoritarian generation. In Taiwan’s case, there does not appear to be much differences across generations on national identity strictness.

Table 9.3: OLS Regression Results for National Identity Strictness Japan Germany Taiwan Japan Germany Taiwan

Transition (reference) ------

Democratic -0.89*** -0.64*** -0.17** -0.80*** -0.67*** -0.11

(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Authoritarian 0.35*** 0.09 0.19*** 0.37*** 0.17 0.16***

(0.12) (0.15) (0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.06)

Socioeconomic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes

Survey year No No No Yes Yes Yes

N 3211 3004 3630 3190 2962 3630

R-squared 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.02

F Statistic 148.15*** 54.51*** 19.28*** 54.27*** 23.92*** 9.38***

***p < .01; **p < .05 Standard errors in parentheses. Full model estimates available in the Appendix.

The evidence so far suggests that, aside from Taiwan, generations matter for national identity. Citizens of the democratic generations in Japan and Germany tend to place less overall barriers to national membership. But what about national identity priority? If political socialization matters in the way hypothesized throughout this project, then there should be evidence that the democratic generations are more inclusive. Democrats are expected to de-prioritize the ascriptive component, while authoritarians should either not show any preference (because they prioritize all items, including those belonging to the ascriptive component) or simply prioritize the ascriptive component. Table 9.4 shows regression results for national identity priority.

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Table 9.4: OLS Regression Results for National Identity Priority Japan Germany Taiwan Japan Germany Taiwan

Democratic -0.11** 0.47*** -0.11 -0.14** 0.47*** -0.26***

(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)

Authoritarian -0.01 -0.04 -0.46*** -0.01 -0.07 -0.29***

(0.10) (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.06)

Socioeconomic No No No Yes Yes Yes controls

Survey year No No No Yes Yes Yes

N 3211 3004 3630 3190 2962 3630

R-squared 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07

F Statistic 2.65 29.98*** 40.42*** 8.89*** 10.84*** 44.39***

***p < .01; **p < .05 Standard errors in parentheses. Full model estimates available in the Appendix.

The results show that only for the case of Germany are the empirical expectations fully met. In the case of Japan, the democratic generation has a slightly more exclusive view of national identity, and in the case of Taiwan, there is no difference between democrats and authoritarians - -- those from the transition generation are, in fact, those with the most inclusive conception of belonging, an interesting and unexpected finding.

Based on regression estimates from Tables 8.3 and 8.4, predictive scores across generations are estimated and shown in Figure 9.2.57 The standardized values predicted are adjusted for socioeconomic controls (held constant) and fixed effects for survey years. For comparison, South Korea is included, using regression estimates from Chapter 5 (see Table 5.3). The data visuals show an interesting story of national identity across like-cases. For all countries, there is a clear trend towards identity pluralism, or post-nationalism. The barriers for national membership are

57 For Figure 9.2 data: ISSP (1995-2013). Includes 95% confidence intervals. NAs excluded. Variables based on PCA scores.

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150 lowest among the democratic generations. The biggest generation differences are in Germany and Japan, where democrats have a distinct generational predisposition on identity strictness.

On the identity priority variable, however, the evidence presented here is more complicated. In the cases of South Korea and Germany (arguably the two most similar cases out of the four58), there are clear generational effects present, and in the way hypothesized in this project. Authoritarians hold ideas about national membership and belonging that prioritize ascription, or the exclusive component. Democrats, on the other hand, prioritize the voluntarist or inclusive component. In Germany, the transition generation is little different from the authoritarian generation. For South Korea, the transition generation is situated somewhere in-between.

58 Both countries were divided by war and either remained so for an extended period of time or continue divided. Strong ethnic nationalist strands have been present and particularly strong (in the World War II period for Germany, and in the colonial and post-war period for South Korea).

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Figure 9.2: Predictive Values for National Identity Strictness and Priority

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In the cases of Taiwan and Japan, the democratic generation tends to prioritize a less inclusive view of national membership, although the differences between the authoritarian and democratic generations are small and arguably not substantive. In Taiwan’s case, the differences are statistically insignificant. A Japanese exceptionalism, on the national identity question, is not without standing. Take, for instance, the 2018 Ipsos national inclusiveness index explored in Chapter 2. One question explored asked respondents whether immigrants who obtain citizenship and can speak the native language fluently are “real” nationals. In South Korea, 64 percent said yes. Only 25 percent of Japanese respondents did. Another question asked whether an immigrant who married a native of the host country is a real national. 40 percent of South Koreans said yes, but only 15 percent of Japanese respondents did. Despite the pressing economic needs and demographic realities (an aging society) Japanese officials and the public writ-large remain largely opposed to increasing immigration of ethnically or culturally different people (Chung 2010). Japan has started admitted some low-skill immigrants, in order to fill major labor shortages (AFP 2018), but public opinion is largely against it (Fraser 2018). The findings presented here are consistent with this reality.

For Taiwan, the first notable thing about the lack of generational differences is that, relative to the other cases, all Taiwanese tend to prioritize a more inclusive national identity. The reason for this, as interesting as it may be, is largely beyond the scope of this project. It appears that the ethno-nationalism of the authoritarian era in Taiwan was either qualitatively different or did not resonant with citizens as it has in similar cases.

To better highlight the country-level differences, Figure 9.3 shows predicted scores on national identity strictness and priority by country, using pooled cross-sectional data for all countries in 2003 and 2013, as provided by ISSP. The scores show that Taiwan has the least strict identity overall and, relative to the other countries, the most inclusive conceptions of national identity. South Korea and Japan have, notably, the least inclusive conceptions of national membership and belonging, a finding one might expect in South Korea, given its recent democratic transition,

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153 but perhaps not in Japan (who transitioned to democracy several decades before South Korea59). The findings shown here underscore Japan’s exceptionalism regarding national identity. It might also indicate a certain Taiwanese exceptionalism, but in a way very different from Japan.

Figure 9.3: Predictive Values for National Identity Strictness and Priority by Country

Data: ISSP and KSSG (2003-2013). Includes 95% confidence intervals. NAs excluded. Variables based on PCA scores.

What do the findings presented above mean regarding the portability of the explanation advanced in this study? In short, national context matters. In the case of Germany, a similar generational effect and trend is seen as that in South Korea. So long as South Korea remains democratic, which one has every reason to believe it will, generational replacement and the

59 The fact that democracy came on the heels of military defeat and occupation should be not ignored. Unlike South Korea, Japan’s democracy was installed from without and in a way completely different from South Korea’s.

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154 continued development of a democratic civil society means that as goes Germany, so goes South Korea – probably. This is not an articulation of a linear understanding of progress and history; it is contingent on the health and well-being of South Korea’s political culture and, relatedly, its democracy. As the current state of affairs in several long-time democracies suggest, democratic de-consolidation can and does occur. If immigration continues in South Korea and this is coupled with a decrease in economic opportunities (real or perceived), there is every reason to believe that South Korea too could experience a wave of populist authoritarianism similar to that seen elsewhere. The negative response to the arrival of around 100 Yemini refugees on Jeju Island indicates how easily immigration could be politicized, and how quickly and definitively public opinion might turn against the arrival of others, especially those who are ethnically or culturally different (Choe 2018a). Evidence in Chapter 4 indicates that the youngest of South Korea’s democratic generation are already showing some signs of anti-immigrant sentiment even though, overall, the democratic generation is feels slightly more comfortable with the idea of immigrants than older cohorts.

Regarding Taiwan and Japan, these two cases are interesting for their lack of substantive generational effects. In Taiwan, this is because all generations have relatively open and inclusive ideas of national membership and belonging. The reason for this is not exactly clear, and a definitive opinion on the matter is not provided here. But something is seemingly different about Taiwan, perhaps due to its unique history as an offspring of colonialism and civil war, but in a way qualitatively different than South Korea.60 In Japan, however, all citizens tend to prioritize a more exclusive national identity, and there is no evidence to suggest that the democratic generation thinks any differently. This is a challenge to the main argument presented in this research. It is convenient to simply write off Japan as sui generis (it may very well be), but a better approach would be a more focused comparison between Japan and South Korea, or another country. However, that is research for another project.

60 The author conducted a roundtable interview with Taiwanese experts on the question of national identity, the country’s colonial past, and the nature of Taiwan-Japan relations. In provides some insight into the national identity and ideational differences between Taiwan and South Korea and provides, perhaps, some explanation. See: https://sinonk.com/2015/08/31/collective-memory-of-japan-in-taiwan/.

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With these comparative insights in mind, this project now turns to the concluding sections of this project, where the main contributions are reviewed and discussed.

***

3 Main Contributions: A Recap

In studies of national identity, typologies and categories have been thoroughly considered. In the nationalism canon, these different types are typically associated with origins; certain types of national identities are linked to macro-national conditions. In the case of Korea, it was a reactive, ethnic-based nationalism that developed in response to Japanese colonialism. But what about changes in the way national membership and belonging is conceived? This question, while not without consideration, lacks scholarly attention. Using survey data on national identity, research new to the study of nationalism and national identity suggest that institutions and political systems matter (Smith and Jones 2001; Kunovich 2009). Namely, they find that open and democratic societies tend to promote more open and inclusive national identities. Building on these insights, the research presented here asks whether the institutional conditions under which one comes of age matters for national identity. This question is then applied to South Korea, an ideal case for studies in institutional divergence. As such, this study bridges the literature on political socialization with that of nationalism and national identity. While this approach to understanding preference formation and change is not new, its application to the study of national identification is.

Broadly, the research presented here adds to the literature which explores the relationship between institutions and individual preferences. Specifying institutions as a crucial mediating explainer of individual preference, this research adds to a body of research that does the same (Hirschman 1982; Bowles 1998; Bisin and Verdier 2001; Alesina and Guiliano 2011; Benabou and Tirole 2011). By considering the differences in opinion between those who came of age under an authoritarian regime and socialized democrats, this research finds that socialization under differing institutional arrangements may be key to understanding differences in preferences regarding politics and society and national membership and belonging. As found in

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156 previous studies, institutions and preferences tend to align (Hirschman 1982; Bowles 1998; Bisin and Verdier 2001; Alesina and Guiliano 2011; Benabou and Tirole 2011).

On questions of national identification, this research corroborates findings from extant studies which argue that national identity is associated with political system type (Snyder 1993; Nodia 1994; Smith and Jones 2001; Shulman 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Kunovich 2009). National identities are expected to align with institutions present in democracies and authoritarian regimes. In democracies, voluntarist, or civic, forms of national identity are products of more open societies or democratic institutions. Close, or ascriptive identities, are found to be strongly linked with citizens who came of age under authoritarian regimes. Evidence presented in the case of South Korea (Chapter 4) supports the theoretical link between political system and nationality. Those coming of age under democracy tend to have lower overall barriers to national membership and among all conditions for belonging, de-prioritize ascriptive conditions. Their identities are, in the language used throughout this project, less strict and more inclusive. Interestingly, however, those from the transition generation, too, have preferences and attitudes more consistent with the democratic generation than the authoritarian generation. This suggests that suggests that citizens need not come of age under fully consolidated democratic conditions.

Regarding the study of South Korea, this research corroborates findings from South Korea- specific studies which find the decline in importance of ascriptive characteristics of national identity as an emerging generational predisposition reflective of changing political and social conditions (Moon 2012; Kim 2015; Moon 2015; Kang and Lee 2016; Campbell 2015; 2016). It adds to the research on preference formation of North Korean citizens specifically (Kim et al. 2017), as well as research that explores socialism’s effects in other national contexts (Shiller et al. 1992; Rohrschneider 1999; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007). Insight into what South Koreans think about newcomers to society shows that while democrats tend to be less anti- immigrantion they are not necessarily more pro-immigrant than older South Korean nationals. If anything, there appears to be negative trend in what younger South Koreans think about immigrants.

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The research presented in Chapter 5 validates findings that national identity types vary across national contexts and are shaped in part by existing political and social institutions. By exploiting the conditions of a natural experiment, this research overcomes the problem of endogeneity inherent to research that looks at the interaction between institutions and preferences. No evidence of a democratic cohort effect is found, but qualitative insights indicate this is for a reason different than it might otherwise seem. Resettled North Korean migrants surveyed and interviewed for this study (Chapter 7) indicate they have little problem reconciling their belief that shared ancestry gives them a claim to national belonging in South Korea and that South Korean being a multicultural society is an acceptable, and to many, a good development. While native South Koreans from the democratic cohort may find ethno-cultural components of national identity less important (because they exclude members), North Korean migrants find them important as a mechanism of inclusion. Even so, there is a clear and empirically expected cohort effect on those North Korean migrants who came of age under North Korea’s authoritarian political system. Furthermore, evidence provided in this research specific to South Korea shows that citizens from the democratic generation tend to have a significantly weaker attachment to pan-Korean nationalism (Chapter 6). They identify less strongly with the concept of “one Korea” and are less likely to show co-ethnic affinity for North Korea or view resettled North Koreans in South Korea as part of the national community. Unsurprisingly, then, they are also the least likely to support national reunification. If shared ancestry or ethnicity is no longer the sine qua non of Korean nationality, then national reunification is no longer a priority – or is at least, a de-prioritized objective.

In the comparative portion of this research (presented here, in Chapter 8), which seeks to replicate findings on South Korean in similar cases, the research finds some support for the main findings. In all additional cases examined, citizens of democratic cohorts tend to have less strict national identities. And, in the case of Germany, there are generational effects presented which indicate that when one came of age determines the type of national identity one prioritizes. German democrats hold a definitively more open conception of national membership and belonging than do older citizens, especially those from the authoritarian era. Interesting and somewhat unexpected findings show for the cases of Taiwan and Japan. In the former’s case, there are no distinct generational effects, as citizens across generations tend towards a more

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158 inclusive conception of national belonging. In Japan, too, there are no distinct generational predispositions, but in the way opposite Taiwan. Citizens there tend to prioritize more exclusive conditions of belonging, a finding consistent with extant research on the subject.

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Appendices

Appendix for Chapter 4

Variable construction for statistical controls:

Economic Evaluation Reordered variables from ABS Economic Evaluation questions into 3 levels (poor/moderate/good), based on sociotropic and pocketbook indicators. Female Binary variable. Those answering “female” for gender coded as 1, else 0. Income High income: those already categorized as “high income” or making at least 6.245 million won per month = 1, else 0. Low income: those already categorized as “low income” or making less than 2.745 million won per month = 1, else 0. University Binary variable. Those with at least some college or above coded as 1, else 0. Urban Binary variable. For size of town, those answering “Urban industrial area,” “Urban commercial area,” or “Urban residence” coded as 1, else 0. Progressive On political scale, those who self- identify between 1 (far left) and 4 are coded as 1 (progressive), else 0. Conservative On political scale, those who self-identify between 6 and 10 (far right) are coded as 1 (conservative), else 0.

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Full results for logit regressions from Table 4.4 (Reference category = transition generation)

Support democracy Opposition to alternatives Democratic values

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Democratic generation -0.17* -0.03 0.07

(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)

Authoritarian generation -0.02 -0.08 -0.27***

(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Economic evaluation 0.23*** -0.26*** -0.15**

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Female -0.01 -0.03 -0.02

(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)

University education 0.01 0.18** 0.17**

(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)

Urban dweller -0.09 -0.04 0.29***

(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)

Income high 0.05 -0.03 -0.07

(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)

Income low -0.09 -0.16** -0.21***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)

Conservative 0.19** 0.02 -0.19***

(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Progressive 0.19** 0.04 -0.04

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey Year 2006 -0.02 -0.27*** -0.05

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey Year 2011 0.56*** 0.12 -0.07

(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)

Survey Year 2015 0.81*** 0.02 -0.12

(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)

Constant -0.04 1.29*** 0.40

(0.27) (0.26) (0.25)

N 4603 4570 4422

Log Likelihood -2809.57 -2990.94 -3021.02

AIC 5647.13 6009.88 6070.05

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

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175

Full results for logit regressions from Table 4.5

Support democracy Opposition to alternatives Democratic values

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic generation -0.16** 0.01 0.20***

(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Authoritarian generation 0.05 -0.07 -0.30***

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Economic evaluation 0.23*** 0.23*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.14** -0.14**

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Female -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02

(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

University education 0.01 0.01 0.19*** 0.18** 0.21*** 0.17**

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Urban dweller -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 0.32*** 0.29***

(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)

Income high 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07

(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Income low -0.09 -0.09 -0.17** -0.16** -0.23*** -0.22***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Conservative 0.19** 0.20*** 0.01 0.03 -0.23*** -0.20***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Progressive 0.19** 0.20** 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.05

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey Year 2006 -0.02 -0.03 -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.06 -0.04

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey Year 2011 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.11 0.11 -0.09 -0.06

(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)

Survey Year 2015 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.11

(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)

Constant -0.06 -0.09 1.25*** 1.28*** 0.25 0.42*

(0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25)

N 4603 4603 4570 4570 4422 4422

Log Likelihood -2809.59 -2811.48 -2991.50 -2991.01 -3027.83 -3021.44

AIC 5645.19 5648.96 6009.00 6008.03 6081.67 6068.89

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

175

176

Full results for logit regressions from Table 4.7

Support democracy Opposition to alternatives Democratic values

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Birth cohort 1935 0.11 0.31 0.11

(0.35) (0.31) (0.34)

Birth cohort 1940 -0.24 -0.02 0.17

(0.30) (0.27) (0.29)

Birth cohort 1945 -0.39 0.14 0.42

(0.29) (0.27) (0.28)

Birth cohort 1950 -0.35 0.18 0.30

(0.29) (0.26) (0.28)

Birth cohort 1955 -0.34 0.42 0.50*

(0.28) (0.25) (0.27)

Birth cohort 1960 -0.10 0.53** 0.69**

(0.28) (0.25) (0.27)

Birth cohort 1965 -0.22 0.28 0.56**

(0.28) (0.25) (0.27)

Birth cohort 1970 -0.21 0.47* 0.74***

(0.28) (0.25) (0.27)

Birth cohort 1975 -0.40 0.45* 0.77***

(0.28) (0.26) (0.27)

Birth cohort 1980 -0.44 0.48* 0.75***

(0.30) (0.27) (0.29)

Birth cohort 1985 0.01 0.39 0.52*

(0.33) (0.30) (0.31)

Birth cohort 1990 -0.49 0.46 0.79**

(0.34) (0.31) (0.32)

Economic evaluation 0.23*** -0.26*** -0.15**

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Female -0.02 -0.04 -0.01

(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)

University education -0.004 0.15** 0.16**

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Urban dweller -0.08 -0.07 0.26**

(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)

Income high 0.03 -0.04 -0.07

(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)

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177

Income low -0.10 -0.13* -0.18**

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Conservative 0.20*** 0.04 -0.18**

(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)

Progressive 0.21** 0.05 -0.04

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey Year 2006 -0.03 -0.26*** -0.04

(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey Year 2011 0.56*** 0.10 -0.08

(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)

Survey Year 2015 0.81*** 0.01 -0.13

(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)

Constant 0.15 0.85** -0.18

(0.38) (0.35) (0.36)

N 4602 4569 4421

Log Likelihood -2801.18 -2980.39 -3009.76

AIC 5652.37 6010.78 6069.52

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

177

178

Appendix for Chapter 5

Variable construction for statistical controls:

Income High income: those already categorized as “high income” or making at least 6.245 million won per month = 1, else 0. Low income: those already categorized as “low income” or making less than 2.745 million won per month = 1, else 0. Geography Urban: Those who report “urban” as their current place of residence, otherwise those who report living in one of the eight metropolitan districts of South Korea (Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan, Sejeong) = 1, else 0. Rural: Those reporting a residence outside of major urban districts or their suburbs = 1, else 0. Gender Female: Those reporting female = 1, else 0. Religion Christian: Those reporting Christian as their religious denomination = 1, else 0. Progressive On political scale, those who self- identify between 1 (far left) and 4 are coded as 1 (progressive), else 0. Conservative On political scale, those who self-identify between 6 and 10 (far right) are coded as 1 (conservative), else 0.

178

179

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 5.3 (Reference category = transition generation)

Strictness Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Democratic generation -0.38*** -0.36*** 0.17*** 0.12**

(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Authoritarian generation 0.54*** 0.48*** -0.40*** -0.28***

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)

University education -0.21*** 0.25***

(0.05) (0.05)

Income high -0.07 0.10

(0.07) (0.07)

Income low 0.07 -0.18***

(0.06) (0.06)

Urban dweller 0.19*** 0.02

(0.05) (0.05)

Rural dweller 0.14*** -0.06

(0.05) (0.05)

Female -0.004 -0.05

(0.04) (0.04)

Christian 0.10* 0.12**

(0.05) (0.05)

Conservative 0.16*** -0.08

(0.05) (0.05)

Progressive 0.16** 0.02

(0.07) (0.07)

Survey year 2010 0.13** 0.34***

(0.05) (0.05)

Survey year 2013 0.18*** -0.13**

(0.07) (0.07)

Constant -0.09** -0.33*** 0.10** -0.10

(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)

N 3984 3984 3984 3984

R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.07

Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.06

Residual Std. Error 1.36 (df = 3981) 1.35 (df = 3970) 1.39 (df = 3981) 1.37 (df = 3970)

F Statistic 151.60*** (df = 2; 3981) 30.14*** (df = 13; 3970) 59.04*** (df = 2; 3981) 21.42*** (df = 13; 3970)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

179

180

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 5.4

Strictness Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Democratic generation -0.46*** 0.19***

(0.05) (0.06)

Authoritarian generation 0.53*** -0.29***

(0.05) (0.05)

Age (continuous) 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

University education -0.31*** -0.28*** 0.31*** 0.28***

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Income high -0.06 -0.03 0.10 0.09

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Income low 0.13** 0.05 -0.22*** -0.18***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Urban dweller 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.04 0.02

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Rural dweller 0.12** 0.13*** -0.05 -0.06

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Female -0.04 0.003 -0.03 -0.05

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)

Christian 0.11** 0.10** 0.11** 0.12**

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Conservative 0.17*** 0.16*** -0.09 -0.08

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Progressive 0.12* 0.16** 0.05 0.02

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Survey year 2010 0.09 0.07 0.37*** 0.36***

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Survey year 2013 0.17** 0.11* -0.13* -0.11*

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Constant -0.18** -0.51*** -0.20** -0.04

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

N 3984 3984 3984 3984

R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07

Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06

Residual Std. Error (df = 3970) 1.36 1.36 1.37 1.37

F Statistic (df = 13; 3970) 26.29*** 28.24*** 19.92*** 21.29***

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

180

181

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 5.6 (Reference category = transition generation)

Anti-immigrant sentiment Pro-immigrant sentiment Immigrant scale

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic generation -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10* -0.04 -0.06

(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)

Authoritarian generation 0.49*** 0.33*** -0.11** -0.06 -0.58*** -0.38***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)

University education -0.40*** 0.12** 0.52***

(0.06) (0.05) (0.09)

Income high -0.07 0.12* 0.19*

(0.08) (0.07) (0.12)

Income low 0.25*** -0.13** -0.37***

(0.07) (0.07) (0.11)

Urban dweller 0.02 0.04 0.02

(0.06) (0.05) (0.09)

Rural dweller 0.04 0.02 -0.01

(0.06) (0.05) (0.09)

Female 0.13*** -0.22*** -0.35***

(0.05) (0.05) (0.08)

Christian -0.08 0.10* 0.18**

(0.06) (0.06) (0.09)

Conservative 0.05 0.02 -0.05

(0.06) (0.06) (0.09)

Progressive 0.004 0.04 0.02

(0.08) (0.07) (0.12)

Survey year 2010 0.71*** -0.02 -0.73***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.09)

Survey year 2013 0.80*** -0.13* -0.92***

(0.08) (0.07) (0.12)

Constant 5.92*** 5.52*** 6.50*** 6.53*** 0.58*** 1.01***

(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.14)

N 3931 3931 3906 3906 3885 3885

R-squared 0.02 0.08 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.06

Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.08 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.06

Residual Std. Error 1.65 (df = 3928) 1.59 (df = 3917) 1.43 (df = 3903) 1.42 (df = 3892) 2.41 (df = 3882) 2.36 (df = 3871)

43.50***(df = 2; 27.43***(df = 13; 4.32***(df = 13; 24.45***(df = 2; 18.73***(df = 13; F Statistic 2.07 (df = 2; 3903) 3928) 3917) 3892) 3882) 3871)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

181

182

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 5.7

Anti-immigrant sentiment Pro-immigrant sentiment Immigrant scale

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic generation -0.12* -0.08 0.04

(0.06) (0.06) (0.10)

Authoritarian generation 0.31*** -0.03 -0.33***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.10)

Age (continuous) 0.002*** 0.001 0.0001 0.0005 -0.002* -0.001

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

University education -0.47*** -0.41*** 0.13** 0.10* 0.59*** 0.50***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)

Income high -0.06 -0.07 0.12* 0.13* 0.18 0.20*

(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)

Income low 0.29*** 0.25*** -0.14** -0.14** -0.42*** -0.37***

(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)

Urban dweller 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)

Rural dweller 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)

Female 0.11** 0.13*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.32*** -0.35***

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)

Christian -0.07 -0.08 0.10* 0.10* 0.17* 0.18**

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)

Conservative 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.05

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)

Progressive -0.02 0.003 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02

(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)

Survey year 2010 0.68*** 0.70*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.71*** -0.73***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09)

Survey year 2013 0.80*** 0.79*** -0.13* -0.14** -0.92*** -0.92***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)

Constant 5.64*** 5.48*** 6.49*** 6.49*** 0.86*** 1.01***

(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14)

N 3931 3931 3906 3906 3885 3885

R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06

Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06

Residual Std. Error 1.60 (df = 3917) 1.59 (df = 3917) 1.42 (df = 3892) 1.42 (df = 3892) 2.36 (df = 3871) 2.36 (df = 3871)

25.86***(df = 13; 27.58***(df = 13; 4.25*** (df = 13; 4.12*** (df = 13; 17.73***(df = 13; 18.72***(df = 13; F Statistic 3917) 3917) 3892) 3892) 3871) 3871)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

182

183

Full results for OLS regressions from Figure 5.7

Strictness Priority

Model 1 Model 2

Birth cohort 1935 0.17 -0.02

(0.16) (0.16)

Birth cohort 1940 0.04 0.10

(0.15) (0.15)

Birth cohort 1945 -0.13 0.03

(0.15) (0.15)

Birth cohort 1950 -0.09 0.08

(0.14) (0.14)

Birth cohort 1955 -0.24* 0.11

(0.13) (0.14)

Birth cohort 1960 -0.36*** 0.12

(0.13) (0.13)

Birth cohort 1965 -0.51*** 0.41***

(0.13) (0.13)

Birth cohort 1970 -0.72*** 0.34***

(0.13) (0.13)

Birth cohort 1975 -0.97*** 0.40***

(0.13) (0.13)

Birth cohort 1980 -0.94*** 0.42***

(0.13) (0.13)

Birth cohort 1985 -1.00*** 0.61***

(0.14) (0.15)

Birth cohort 1990 -1.07*** 0.60***

(0.14) (0.14)

University education -0.17*** 0.24***

(0.05) (0.05)

Income high -0.07 0.11

(0.07) (0.07)

Income low 0.02 -0.17***

(0.06) (0.06)

Urban dweller 0.19*** 0.03

(0.05) (0.05)

Rural dweller 0.14*** -0.06

(0.05) (0.05)

Female 0.003 -0.05

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184

(0.04) (0.04)

Christian 0.10* 0.12**

(0.05) (0.05)

Conservative 0.15*** -0.07

(0.05) (0.05)

Progressive 0.17** 0.01

(0.07) (0.07)

Survey year 2010 0.13** 0.32***

(0.05) (0.05)

Survey year 2013 0.17** -0.16**

(0.07) (0.07)

Constant 0.28** -0.44***

(0.13) (0.13)

N 3984 3984

R-squared 0.10 0.07

Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.06

Residual Std. Error (df = 3960) 1.35 1.37

F Statistic (df = 23; 3960) 18.89*** 12.79***

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

184

185

Full results for OLS regressions from Figure 5.8

Pro-immigrant

Birth cohort 1935 0.17

(0.17)

Birth cohort 1940 -0.02

(0.16)

Birth cohort 1945 0.05

(0.16)

Birth cohort 1950 0.04

(0.15)

Birth cohort 1955 -0.01

(0.15)

Birth cohort 1960 0.18

(0.14)

Birth cohort 1965 0.10

(0.14)

Birth cohort 1970 0.11

(0.14)

Birth cohort 1975 -0.004

(0.14)

Birth cohort 1980 0.05

(0.14)

Birth cohort 1985 -0.05

(0.16)

Birth cohort 1990 -0.03

(0.15)

University education 0.12**

(0.05)

Income high 0.11

(0.07)

Income low -0.12*

(0.07)

Urban dweller 0.04

(0.05)

Rural dweller 0.02

(0.05)

Female -0.22***

(0.05)

Christian 0.10*

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186

(0.06)

Conservative 0.02

(0.06)

Progressive 0.04

(0.07)

Survey year 2010 -0.01

(0.06)

Survey year 2013 -0.12

(0.07)

Constant 6.41***

(0.14)

N 3906

R-squared 0.02

Adj. R-squared 0.01

Residual Std. Error 1.42 (df = 3882)

F Statistic 2.72*** (df = 23; 3882)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

186

187

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 5.7

Immigrant scale Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Strictness -0.09*** (0.03) Exclusive component -0.31*** (0.04) Inclusive component 0.11*** (0.04) Priority 0.20*** (0.03)

Age (continuous) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** -0.002

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

University education 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.61*** 0.53***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Income high 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17

(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)

Income low -0.41*** -0.37*** -0.42*** -0.38***

(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)

Urban dweller 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Rural dweller 0.02 0.03 0.005 0.01

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Female -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.32***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Christian 0.18** 0.17* 0.16* 0.15

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Conservative -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Progressive 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04

(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)

Survey year 2010 -0.70*** -0.76*** -0.72*** -0.78***

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey year 2013 -0.91*** -0.88*** -0.91*** -0.89***

(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)

Constant 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.89*** 0.90***

(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)

N 3885 3885 3885 3885

R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07

Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07

Residual Std. Error (df = 3871) 2.36 2.34 2.36 2.34

F Statistic (df = 13; 3871) 18.59*** 22.58*** 18.37*** 22.15***

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

187

188

Appendix for Chapter 6

Variable construction for statistical controls:

Ethnocentrism Those who think ancestry is “somewhat” or “very” important to being “truly South Korea” = 1, else 0. University education Those with a university degree or higher = 1, else 0. Security conscious Those who strongly agree that the National Security Law is necessary to keep Korea safe = 1, else 0. High income Those already categorized as “high income” or making at least 6.245 million won per month = 1, else 0. Low income Those already categorized as “low income” or making less than 2.745 million won per month = 1, else 0. Geography Urban: Those who report “urban” as their current place of residence = 1, else 0. Rural: Those who report “rural” as their place of resident = 1, else 0. Seoul: Those who report “Seoul Metropolitan Area” as their current place of residence. Progressive Those who self-report being left of center on a 10-point political scale (1-4) = 1, else 0. Conservative Those who self-report being right of center on a 10-point political scale (6-10) = 1, else 0. Student Those who are currently students = 1, else 0. Female Those reporting female = 1, else 0. Christian Those reporting Christian as their religious denomination = 1, else 0.

188

189

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 6.3

Close to pan-Korea Ethnic affinity DPRK Inclusive of N. Koreans Support for unification

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8

Democratic generation -0.34*** -0.42*** -0.48*** -0.45*** -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.36*** -0.36***

(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)

Authoritarian generation 0.05 0.01 0.16* 0.25** -0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.13

(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)

Ethnocentrism 0.14*** -0.003 0.02 -0.04

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)

University education 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.23**

(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)

Security conscious 0.13 0.21** -0.18** -0.03

(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Income high -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 0.14

(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Income low -0.10 0.03 -0.11 0.40***

(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)

Urban dweller -0.12 0.04 0.19 -0.13

(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)

Rural dweller 0.53*** 0.31** 0.22 0.07

(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)

Seoul dweller 0.21* -0.41*** -0.50*** -0.23**

(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)

Student 0.17 0.13 -0.06 0.03

(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)

Female -0.18** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.37***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Christian 0.07 -0.01 0.20* 0.32***

(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)

Progressive 0.21* 0.05 0.20* 0.28***

(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)

Conservative -0.01 -0.41*** 0.02 -0.04

(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)

Survey year 2010 0.06 -1.31*** -0.09 -0.72***

(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)

Survey year 2015 0.25** -1.19*** -0.23** -0.77***

(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)

Constant 0.80*** 0.91*** 0.73*** 2.09*** 0.98*** 1.42*** 0.56*** 1.38***

(0.07) (0.20) (0.07) (0.22) (0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.20)

N 3063 3027 2916 2887 3063 3027 3063 3027

Log Likelihood -1929.95 -1874.60 -1854.93 -1716.54 -1857.71 -1803.42 -2028.08 -1928.33

AIC 3865.90 3785.20 3715.85 3469.09 3721.42 3642.84 4062.16 3892.66

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

189

190

Full results for OLS regressions from Figure 6.3

Ethnic affinity Inclusive of N. Close to pan-Korea Support for unification DPRK Koreans

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Birth cohort 1940 -0.03 0.45 -0.55 -0.38

(0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34)

Birth cohort 1945 -0.03 0.70** -0.52 -0.27

(0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.32)

Birth cohort 1950 -0.20 0.73** -0.59* -0.29

(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)

Birth cohort 1955 -0.19 0.47 -0.59* -0.33

(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)

Birth cohort 1960 -0.06 0.34 -0.96*** -0.51

(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31)

Birth cohort 1965 -0.07 0.34 -0.68** -0.44

(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31)

Birth cohort 1970 -0.25 0.27 -0.82** -0.33

(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)

Birth cohort 1975 -0.19 0.03 -0.78** -0.69**

(0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.32)

Birth cohort 1980 -0.29 -0.01 -1.17*** -0.77**

(0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.32)

Birth cohort 1985 -0.43 -0.40 -1.37*** -0.77**

(0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34)

Birth cohort 1990 -1.20*** -0.59 -1.57*** -0.98***

(0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)

Ethnocentrism 0.02 -0.005 -0.04 0.14***

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)

University education 0.09 0.03 0.26*** 0.04

(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Security conscious -0.17* 0.22** -0.03 0.14

(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Income high -0.11 -0.12 0.15* -0.10

(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Income low -0.10 0.06 0.36*** -0.13

(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)

Urban dweller 0.20* 0.04 -0.12 -0.12

(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)

Rural dweller 0.22 0.32** 0.06 0.52***

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191

(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)

Seoul dweller -0.52*** -0.43*** -0.25** 0.19*

(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)

Student 0.36* 0.41* 0.30 0.24

(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)

Female -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.38*** -0.18**

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)

Christian 0.21** -0.01 0.32*** 0.07

(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)

Progressive 0.19* 0.03 0.26** 0.21*

(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)

Conservative -0.02 -0.43*** -0.08 -0.04

(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

Survey year 2010 -0.02 -1.28*** -0.64*** 0.09

(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)

Survey year 2015 -0.09 -1.13*** -0.66*** 0.29**

(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)

Constant 1.43*** 1.79*** 2.10*** 1.27***

(0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34)

N 3027 2887 3027 3027

Log Likelihood -1793.09 -1709.52 -1916.29 -1872.89

AIC 3640.18 3473.03 3886.58 3799.78

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

191

192

Appendix for Chapter 7

Variable Construction for statistical controls by demographics and pre- and post-migration variables:

Demographics Age. Dummy variable. Cutoff point at the median age (46). If older 1, else 0. Female. Males = 0 and females = 1.

Pre-migration experiences: North Korea Education (High). Dummy variable for those who completed a high school- level education or above prior to leaving North Korea. Class in DPRK. Dummy variable for those in upper class and those not. Class was determined by a question about respondents’ standard of living 3 years prior to leaving North Korea. Five levels were possible (see below). Upper class = levels 1 and 2. Middle class = level 3. Lower class = levels 4 and 5. Level 1: I have no problem purchasing expensive things, including: an apartment, car, etc. Level 2: I had no problem purchasing consumer items, such as a refrigerator. But I had difficulty purchasing very expensive items. Level 3: I could purchase rice and produce, but I had difficult purchasing consumer items necessary for daily living. Level 4: I had enough to eat and live, but I had no money to buy new clothes. Level 5: Surviving each day was difficult. Lived in Borderland. Dummy variable for those who were born and grew up in a borderland province. Borderland provinces = North Pyongan, Chagang, Ryanggang, North Hamgyong, and Rason (SEZ).

Post-migration experiences: Years in PRC. Dummy variable for those who spent equal to or greater than the median number of years in the People’s Republic of China (2 years). Working/employment. Dummy variable for those reporting full employment. Student. Dummy variable for those who report being currently enrolled in school. 192

193

Exposure ROK. Dummy variable for those who spent equal to or greater than the median number of years in South Korea (7 years). South Korea Education (High). Dummy variable for those who completed a high school- level education or above after resettlement in South Korea. Employment (ROK). Dummy variable for reporting employment in South Korea.

193

194

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 7.5

Strictness Ethno-cultural Territorial Legal Priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Formative years in DPRK 3.85*** 1.07*** 0.28 0.21 1.14**

(0.99) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.47)

Democratic cohort (ROK 0.02 0.29 0.06 -0.04 0.38

(0.88) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.42)

Exposure ROK -1.23*** 0.02 -0.12 -0.001 -0.09

(0.41) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20)

Female -0.28 -0.07 0.22* 0.07 0.08

(0.46) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22)

High education (DPRK) -0.63 -0.28** -0.10 -0.10 -0.27

(0.43) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20)

Destitute class DPRK (level 5) 0.40 0.07 0.12 -0.12 0.30

(0.44) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21)

Borderland dweller -0.09 0.18 -0.17 -0.24* 0.25

(0.53) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.25)

Working in ROK -0.17 0.02 0.13 -0.14 0.29

(0.43) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20)

Student in ROK -0.23 0.02 0.11 -0.11 0.24

(0.57) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.27)

High school education ROK 0.27 0.04 -0.005 0.14 -0.10

(0.51) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24)

Exposure PRC 2.26*** 0.69*** 0.31 -0.16 1.16***

(0.84) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.40)

Constant 21.75*** -0.90*** -0.28 0.18 -1.36**

(1.17) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.56)

N 334 334 334 334 334

R-squared 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05

Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.06 -0.001 0.01 0.02

Residual Std. Error (df = 322) 3.61 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.72

F Statistic (df = 11; 322) 4.39*** 2.87*** 0.96 1.22 1.58

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

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Interview questions consulted (author’s translation)

1. Do you think that North and South Koreans share the same “blood” (hyoltong)? a. Did your thoughts change after you defected? Or did you originally think this? 2. Do you think that it is important for minority groups to maintain their traditions and customs, why? 3. Do you think that you are an immigrant? 4. Do you think that defectors belong to a minority ethnic group? 5. Do you think that defectors and South Koreans belong to the same ethnic nation? a. Did your thoughts change after you defected? Or did you originally think this? 6. What do you think about South Korea’s “multiculturalism” policies? What does multiculturalism mean to you? a. Do defectors and South Koreans have different cultures? b. Did your thoughts change after you defected? Or did you originally think this?

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Appendix for Chapter 9

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 9.3 (Reference category = transition generation)

Identity strictness

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic generation -0.89*** -0.64*** -0.17** -0.80*** -0.67*** -0.11

(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Authoritarian generation 0.35*** 0.09 0.19*** 0.37*** 0.17 0.16***

(0.12) (0.15) (0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.06)

Female -0.02 -0.01 0.09**

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

Married (yes/no)61 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.17***

(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)

University graduate -0.32*** 0.07 -0.01

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)

Year survey 2003 0.21*** 0.08

(0.06) (0.06)

Year survey 2013 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.10**

(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)

Constant 0.52*** 0.68*** -0.04 0.12 0.40*** -0.25***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)

N 3211 3004 3630 3190 2962 3630

R-squared 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.02

Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01

Residual Std. Error 1.41 (df = 3208) 1.30 (df = 3001) 1.41 (df = 3627) 1.39 (df = 3182) 1.28 (df = 2954) 1.41 (df = 3623)

148.15***(df = 2; 54.51***(df = 2; 19.28***(df = 2; 54.27***(df = 7; 23.92***(df = 7; 9.38*** (df = 6; F Statistic 3208) 3001) 3627) 3182) 2954) 3623)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

61 Includes those married before and now divorced.

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197

Full results for OLS regressions from Table 9.3 (Reference category = transition generation)

Identity priority

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Democratic generation -0.11** 0.47*** -0.11* -0.14** 0.47*** -0.26***

(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)

Authoritarian generation -0.01 -0.04 -0.46*** -0.01 -0.07 -0.29***

(0.10) (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.06)

Female -0.07* 0.02 -0.13***

(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)

Married (yes/no)62 0.16*** 0.01 0.02

(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)

University graduate 0.18*** 0.05 0.63***

(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)

Year survey 2003 -0.25*** -0.23***

(0.05) (0.06)

Year survey 2013 -0.01 -0.06 0.21***

(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)

Constant -0.56*** 0.28*** 0.28*** -0.60*** 0.33*** -0.06

(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)

N 3211 3004 3630 3190 2962 3630

R-squared 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07

Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07

1.21 (df = 1.27 (df = 1.39 (df = 1.19 (df = 1.26 (df = Residual Std. Error 1.36 (df = 3623) 3208) 3001) 3627) 3182) 2954)

2.65* (df = 29.98***(df = 40.42***(df = 8.89*** (df = 10.84***(df = F Statistic 44.39*** (df = 6; 3623) 2; 3208) 2; 3001) 2; 3627) 7; 3182) 7; 2954)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

62 Includes those married before and now divorced.

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