Tim Voelcker, Editor, Broke of the Shannon and the War of 1812

The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Tim Voelcker, editor. Broke of the Shannon and the War of 1812. Seaforth Publishing. 226 pages, illustrations, select bibliography, index, ISBN 978 184832 179 3. £19.99. Reviewed by Donald E. Graves

The "Glorious First of June 1813" saw the victory of Captain Philip Broke's frigate, HMS Shannon, over the American frigate, USS Chesapeake, commanded by Captain James Lawrence. This success brought to an end the almost unbroken string of success enjoyed by the American navy in single ship actions against British warships. In honour of the bicentenary of this famous engagement, naval historian Timothy Voelcker collected essays about Philip Broke, his ship, the battle and the times from a group of international scholars to include in this volume. Their contributions cover a broad and interesting range of subjects. There are several essays devoted to Broke himself -- his youth, training and early career, his letters to his wife, his professional obsession with gunnery, his recovery from serious wounds suffered in the engagement with the Chesapeake, and his memorials and decorations. There are two contributions on HMS Shannon and her fate, as well as essays on the ballads and musical broadsides that resulted from the battle and a fascinating essay on naval caricature of the period. Gabriela Frei contributes a

The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 useful essay on prize laws and Julian Gwyn adds an interesting commentary on the Halifax dockyard in the early 19th century. All of these essays are well illustrated with paintings, drawings, maps and photographs. Of particular interest are the pictures of HMS Trincomalee, a near sister ship to the Shannon, which has been restored as a museum ship at Hartlepool in Britain. These, of course, are particular studies but Voelcker has not neglected the general context and has wisely added several essays on the background of the War of 1812, particularly its naval aspects. Voelcker himself provides an overview of naval operations and it is interesting to note that, after its initial run of success, by the end of 1813 only one of the seven American frigates in commission was on the open seas, the remainder was under blockade by the Royal Navy. Context is also provided by three essays treating with the different American, British and Canadian perspectives on the war. The historian C.P. Stacey once remarked that the War of 1812 was one of those rare episodes in history "that make everybody happy" because both Americans and Canadians feel they won it, while Britons "are happiest of all because they don't even know it existed." There is more than a little truth in that quip but as far as John Hattendorf and Andrew Lambert are concerned, who contributed essays on the American and British perspectives respectively, their excellent scholarship transcends national boundaries and chauvinism. Hattendorf is particularly good on both the geo-political and internal political aspects of the conflict and their connection with the maritime side of the war. Lambert provides an excellent synthesis of the fine work he did in his recent publication, The Challenge, which provided new insight into both American and British writing on the war. Sadly, Christopher Madsen's essay on the Canadian perspective of the war does not match the quality of Lambert and Hattendorf's essays. I was much puzzled by many of the statements in Madsen's essay. To list but a few of the egregious errors Madsen makes, Canada was not "always a sideshow, and became increasingly so as the war progressed to culmination" (p. 41). Set against that statement the fact that almost exactly 66% of the regular American army campaigned in the northern and maritime theatres of the war as were 47 of the 64 infantry battalions that Britain deployed in North America during the war. This was clearly no sideshow. On p. 42, Madsen states that Canadians were "notoriously adverse to military and defence matters, displayed little Copyright War of 1812 Magazine, 2014

The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 enthusiasm for a war on their doorstep." Nonetheless, eleven battalions of embodied militia (units recruited for long periods or for the duration of the war, which were commanded by regulars and trained, armed and equipped as regulars) were raised in Upper and Lower Canada. In addition, one regular battalion and five fencible (regular units which only served in North America) battalions were raised in British North America. These forces do not include the volunteer militia or the sedentary militia (basically every male from 16 to 60) but their sheer number indicates that there was more enthusiasm for military service in British North America than Madsen realizes. On p. 43 Madsen refers to large aboriginal groupings "like the Iroquois Grand River six nations and the Mohawk nations." He does not seem to be aware that the Six Nations Iroquois or Haudenosee include both the Mohawk peoples on the Grand River and possibly those in the Tyendinaga community near Kingston. Madison did not "sideline" Harrison, as Madsen claims (p. 45); it was Secretary of War John Armstrong. Wilkinson's army did not meet the "main British military force head-on" at Crysler's Farm in 1813 (p. 45), as is claimed, because the main British force was deployed around Montreal. The Americans engaged a much smaller British and Canadian force that had been following them down the St. Lawrence. The American army under Major-General Wade Hampton did not advance "up the Lake Champlain Valley through Vermont, the traditional invasion route toward Quebec," in October 1813 (p. 45). Vermont is on the east side of Lake Champlain and does not have to be traversed to enter British territory. Also, Hampton did not take the traditional route, he marched overland from Plattsburgh to the northwest and then picked up the Chateauguay River, which he wished to follow down to Montreal. Prevost did not move in force "down the Champlain valley ... in loose support of the planned British invasions" (p, 48). Prevost's objective was the American naval base at Plattsburgh and he moved up not down the lake as Champlain drains north into the Richelieu River. I would also honestly like to know how an invasion of northern New York state could be in "loose support" of operations in the Chesapeake and Louisiana (still in the planning stage), hundreds of miles away as Madsen claims (p.48). Finally —and this is admittedly a minor point— in 1814, the city of Ghent was not in Belgium (p. 448) because that nation did not exist, Ghent was located in the kingdom of Holland. It appears that geography is not one of the author's strong suits. Copyright War of 1812 Magazine, 2014

The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

As an aside, Madsen's enthusiastic use of adjectives often detracts from the clarity of his prose. What is one to do with such clumsy phrases as: "relatively untouched westward wilderness areas;" (p.41); "establish themselves for a promised prosperous future:" (p,42); "from alive and dead victims:" (p. 44); and "a numerically and cannonade inferior British naval force (p.46), among others. I am sorry to go on at length about the one essay in what is otherwise a very commendable and interesting book but it demonstrates one of the perils of not including sources in an anthology. Voelcker explains that this was done to keep the volume at a manageable size and an economic price. For my part, I would like to know where Madsen found the evidence for many of the statements in his essay, some of which are so far off the documentary foundation that I seriously began to wonder whether he was discussing the same War of 1812 that I have been studying professionally for four decades. I dread to think that I have gone terribly astray over all these years. In sum, however, with the one exception, this is an excellent collection of essays on a naval hero of the War of 1812, his ship and a famous engagement. I highly recommend it to readers interested in the naval side of the conflict or maritime warfare in the early 19th century.