13 Points (30 November 1963)

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13 Points (30 November 1963) 13 Points (30 November 1963) An Introduction The constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus which resulted from the 1960 Zurich and London Agreements suffered from fundamental defects which impeded the smooth functioning of the State. The fact that the Constitution did not emanate from the free will of the Cyprus people but was imposed upon them by virtue of the agreements was at the origin of feelings of discontent among Cypriots. Moreover many of the constitutional provisions conflicted with international law e.g. the fact that the Constitution could not be amended, rendering the Republic of Cyprus subject to the will of the guarantor powers and depriving it of the fundamental requirements of the state such as internal independence and territorial supremacy. Other provisions promoting communal segregation prevented the smooth functioning and development of the country and created permanent sources of friction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The ratio of participation in the public service attaining 30 per cent for the Turkish Cypriot community (which represented 18 per cent of the population) constituted one of the causes of discontent for Greek Cypriots as it offended the international accepted principle of the right of everyone of equal access to the public service of his country. The constitutional provision relating to separate majorities for the enactment of certain laws in the House of Representatives was another source of serious problems affecting the smooth functioning of the state which was left without any taxation legislation for several months. Another element that created problems was the right of final veto accorded to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic against any law or decision both in the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers. Faced with this complex situation, the President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios III, by his letter of 30 November 1963 to the Vice President, suggested a series of measures to facilitate the smooth functioning of the State and remove certain causes of intercommunal friction. In his proposed amendments, President Makarios attempted to abolish the dividing elements of the Constitutions that kept Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart, fostering conflict and intolerance and replace them with provisions that would promote the well- being of the people of Cyprus as a whole. The thirteen points set forth by President Makarios in his letter provided, inter alia, for the abolishment of the President's and Vice President's right of veto (Point 1), and for the election of both the Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President by the House as a whole and not by separate majorities (Point 3). They also provided for the establishment of unified municipalities and for the unification of the administration of justice (Point 6). Other points were the following, The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces should be determined by a Law (Point 9), and, The proportion of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service should be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Point 10). The Turkish Government immediately rejected the proposals before the Turkish Cypriot community had commented on them. A few weeks later, on 21st December 1963 intercommunal fighting broke out. ************************* SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR FACILITATING THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE AND FOR THE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN CAUSES OF INTER- COMMUNAL FRICTION (1963) The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, in its present form, creates many difficulties in the smooth government of the State and impedes the development and progress of the country. It contains many sui generis provisions conflicting with internationally accepted democratic principles and creates sources of friction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At the Conference at Lancaster House in February, 1959, which I was invited to attend as leader of the Greek Cypriots, I raised a number of objections and expressed strong misgivings regarding certain provisions of the Agreement arrived at in Zurich between the Greek and the Turkish Governments and adopted by the British Government. I tried very hard to bring about the change of at least some provisions of that Agreement. I failed, however, in that effort and I was faced with the dilemma either of signing the Agreement as it stood or of rejecting it with all the grave consequences which would have ensued. In the circumstances I had no alternative but to sign the Agreement. This was the course dictated to me by necessity. The three years' experience since the coming into operation of the Constitution, which was based on the Zurich and London Agreements, has made clear the necessity for revision of at least some of those provisions which impede the smooth functioning and development of the State. I believe that the intention of those who drew up the Agreement at Zurich was to create an independent State, in which the interests of the Turkish Community were safeguarded, but it could not have been their intention that the smooth functioning and development of the country should be prejudiced or thwarted, as has in fact been the case. One of the consequences of the difficulties created by certain constitutional provisions is to prevent the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship, to undermine the relations between them and cause them to draw further apart instead of closer together, to the detriment of the wellbeing of the people of Cyprus as a whole. This situation causes me, as President of the State, great concern. It is necessary to resolve certain of the difficulties by the removal of some at least of the obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the State. With this end in view I have outlined below the immediate measures which I propose to be taken. • Point 1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned The right of veto given under the Constitution of the Republic to the President and the Vice-President can be exercised separately by each one of them against:- (a) laws or decisions of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence and security; and (b) decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. It is a right of final veto and, therefore, different from any other measure provided in certain Constitutions whereby the President of the country has a right of limited veto in the sense that he is entitled not to promulgate a law immediately, but to return it for reconsideration. Provisions for the return of laws and decisions for reconsideration exist in the Cyprus Constitution independently from the provision of final veto. The Constitution of Cyprus has been based on the doctrine of separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature. The balance between them must be carefully maintained and friction avoided, if it is to work. The right of veto cuts right across the principles involved and could bring the President and Vice-President into direct conflict with the Legislature. The exercise of the right of veto is a negative power in the sense that it does not enable the President or the Vice-President to take decisions, but it gives them the power to prevent a decision of the Council of Ministers or of the House of Representatives, on matters of foreign policy, defence or security, from taking effect. It is obvious that it cannot be considered as a power which affords the President or the Vice-President the opportunity to deal with an existing situation in a constructive manner. More difficulties are encountered because of the fact that the right of veto is not vested only in one person but in two persons, the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, thus increasing the occasions when a deadlock may occur. An example in point is the use of the veto by the Vice-President on the subject of the composition of the units of the Army of the Republic. Under the Constitution the Army of the Republic must consist of 60% Greeks and 40% Turks. The Council of Ministers, by majority, decided that the organizational structure of the Army should be based throughout on mixed units comprising both Greeks and Turks. The Vice-President, who wanted the structure to be based on separate units of Greeks and Turks, exercised his right of veto against the above decision of the Council, with the result that there is no decision on this matter and the Army has remained ineffective. In the case of the Army, no great harm has resulted, since it is doubtful whether the Republic can really afford its expansion to 2,000 men at present and cope simultaneously with the heavy financial burdens of economic development and expansion of educational and social services. But it is easy to envisage situations where exercise of the veto could result in more far-reaching and damaging repercussions. Therefore, the right of veto should be abandoned and reliance placed instead on the provisions for the return of laws and decisions for reconsideration, and the various other relevant safeguards. • Point 2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties Under the provisions of the Constitution, the Vice-President of the Republic does not deputise for the President in the event of his absence or incapacity to act, but the President of the House of Representatives does so instead. This provision creates the impression that a person belonging to the Turkish community and elected by it cannot deputise in a post the nature of which bears responsibility to Cyprus as a whole.
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