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Ukraine Reform Conference: Delegations List

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Ukraine Reform Conference: Delegations List Ukrainian Delegation Prime Minister Mr Volodymyr Groysman Mrs Ivanna Klympush- Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Tsintsadze Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers Mr Oleksandr Sayenko Minister of Finance Mr Oleksandr Danyliuk Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Pavlo Klimkin Minister of Justice Mr Pavlo Petrenko Minister of Defence Mr Stepan Poltorak Minister of Social Policy Mr Andrii Reva Acting Minister of Health Mrs Ulana Suprun Minister for Temporarily Occupied Territories Mr Vadym Chernysh and Internally Displaced Persons Other National Delegations Head of Eastern Europe and Central Asia Austria Mrs Katharina Ann Wieser Department, MFA Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Embassy of Belgium to Belgium Mr Jan Bayart the UK Bulgaria Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Yuri Borissov Sterk Canada Minister of Foreign Affairs Hon Chrystia Freeland Croatia State Secretary for Political Affairs Mrs Zdravka Bušić Cyprus Deputy Foreign Minister Mr Alexandros Zenon Czech Republic Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Jakub Dürr Denmark Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Anders Samuelsen Estonia Acting Undersecretary, Political Affairs Mr Paul Teesalu Finland Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Mr Kai Aslak Mykkänen France Political Director Mr Nicolas de Rivière Germany Political Director Mr Andreas Michaelis Mr Terens Spenser Nikolaos Greece Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Quick Hungary Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Mr Péter Szijjártó Director General for European Neighbourhood Ireland and Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and Mr Eoin O'Leary Trade Iceland Chargé d'affaires, Embassy of Iceland to the UK Mr Ingolfur Fridriksson Italy Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mr Benedetto Della Vedova Parliamentary Vice-Minister Japan Mr Motome Takisawa for Foreign Affairs Latvia Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Edgars Rinkēvičs Lithuania Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Linas Antanas Linkevičius Luxembourg Ambassador to the UK Mr Patrick Engelberg Director (External Relations and Mediterranean Malta Mr Claude Bonello Affairs) Ambassador/Special Representative for Europe Mr Willem Adriaan Cornelis The Netherlands and the Eastern Partnership Palm State Secretary / Deputy Minister of Foreign Norway Ms Tone Skogen Affairs Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Poland Mr Bartosz Cichocki Foreign Affairs Portugal Ambassador of Portugal to the UK Mr Manuel Lobo Antunes Romania Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr Alexandru-Victor Micula State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and Slovak Republic Mr Lukáš Parízek European Affairs Slovenia Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mrs Darja Bavdaz Kuret Spain Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Ildefonso Castro López Mr Bengt Andreas von Sweden Deputy Director-General Beckerath Mrs Anna Elisabeth Von Switzerland State Secretary Cappeller Oswald Turkey Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Ahmet Yildiz Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of United States of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Mr William Brownfield America Affairs Delegations of International Organisations Special Adviser of the Secretary Council of Europe General of the Council of Mr Regis Oliver Brillat Europe for Ukraine European Bank for Reconstruction and President Sir Sumantra Chakrabarti Development Vice-President of the European European Commission Mr Valdis Dombrovskis Commission European Investment Bank Vice President Mr Vazil Hudák Assistant Director, European International Monetary Fund Mr Ronaldus van Rooden Department Deputy Assistant Secretary NATO General Political Affairs and Mr James Appathurai Security Policy Division Organisation for Economic Co- Deputy Secretary-General Ms Mari Johanna Kiviniemi operation and Development United Nations Development Country Director Mr Janthomas Hiemstra Programme World Bank Regional Vice President Mr Cyril Muller Other Participants Member of Parliament of Ukraine Mrs Hanna Hopko Member of Parliament of Ukraine Mr Sergii Berezenko Member of Parliament of Ukraine Mr Pavlo Rizanenko Member of Parliament of Ukraine Mrs Iryna Friz Executive Director, European Business Association Mrs Ganna Derevianko President of the European Business Association Mr Tomas Fiala Executive director, "Patients of Ukraine" Mrs Olga Stefanyshyna Head of the Board, Centre of Policy and Legal Reform Mr Ihor Koliushko Executive Director, Centre for Economic Strategy Mr Glib Vyshilinski Director, UkraineInvest Mr Daniel Andrew Bilak CEO, Naftogaz Mr Andriy Kobolyev Co-Chairman of the RPR Board Mr Taras Shevchenko IFES Senior Global Electoral Adviser, IFES Ukraine Country Director Mr Peter Duss Erben Business Ombudsman, Ukraine Mr Algirdas Gediminas Semeta UK representative, Defence Reform Advisory Board Sir Nick Parker Member of Parliament of Lithuania Mr Andrius Kubilius Director of DeJuRe Foundation, RPR lead expert on judiciary Mr Mykhailo Zhernakov Global Adviser and Senior Resident Director, Ukraine, National Lady Mary O'Hagan Democratic Institute Professor of Politics, University of Birmingham Prof Kataryna Wolczuk Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security Mr Oleksiy Melnyk Programmes, Razumkov Centre Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House Mrs Orysia Lutsevych Chairman, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House Robert Edward Brinkley Head of the Reforms office of Ministry of Defence of Ukraine Mr Andriy Zagorodnyuk Associate Fellow, Chatham House Mr James Sherr Canadian Representative, Defence Reform Advisory Board Ms Jill Elizabeth Sinclair Founder and Chairwoman, Legal Hundred NGO Mrs Lesia Vasylenko Policy Director, European Council on Foreign Relations Ms Jana Kobzova President, American Chamber of Commerce Andrij Ihor Hunder International Adviser, National School of Government Sally Jane Gill Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House Mr James Nixey Associate Fellow, Chatham House Mr John Lough Nestor Group member Mr Yevhen Hilbovtskyy Privatisation and SOE Reform Advisor, Strategic Advisory Group Dr Andriy Boytsun for Supporting Ukrainian Reforms (SAGSUR) Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Naftogaz Mr Paul Cyril Warwick Team leader, EU Advisory Board for Public Administration Reform Dr Gregor Virant in Ukraine Professor, International Security Management, Prof Ann Fitz-Gerald Cranfield University Director, Crown Agents Mr Bryan Richmond Head of Strategy and Communications, JKX Oil & Gas PLC Mr Philip Vorobyov UK Special Defence Advisor Mr Philip Jones .
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