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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. COLLISIONS OF HISTORY AND LANGUAGE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTING, HUMAN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ABUSES,
AND COVER-UP IN THE REPUBLIC
OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
by
Holly M. Barker
submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Anthropology'
Chair William Leap. Ph.D 'tj'OjtL UjjdljLuOnrv0 Bistt/Wiil
Peter Kuzmck. P
Dean ofthe College
Date O 2000
American University
Washington. D.C. 20016
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number. 3035440
Copyright 2000 by Barker, Holly M.
All rights reserved.
__ _® UMI
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. © COPYRIGHT
By
Holly M. Barker
2000
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to:
Jeilar and Mejjan Kabinmeto, my Marshallese parents from Nallu, Mili, for teaching me
the language and culture, for adopting me as one of their family members, and for
demonstrating the giving and loving nature of the Marshallese people; And to the
Marshallese people whose lives have been dramatically altered by the U.S. nuclear
weapons testing program.
With special thanks to:
Banny deBrum and Wilfred Kendall for their continuous encouragement and for allowing
me to undertake this research; And to Tony deBrum for his mentorship and for showing
me where to find evidence of the injustices and cover-ups.
Final thanks to:
Newton Lajuan, Alfred Capelle and the students at the Nuclear Institute of the College of
the Marshall Islands, Bill Graham, Kristina Stege, Barbara Rose Johnston, Bill Leap,
Brett Williams, Peter Kuznick, and my husband, William Sherman, for his constant
support.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. COLLISIONS OF HISTORY AND LANGUAGE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTING, HUMAN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ABUSES,
AND COVER-UP IN THE REPUBLIC
OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
BY
HOLLY M. BARKER
ABSTRACT
Nuclear weapons, the English language and American colonialism arrived
in the Marshall Islands at approximately the same time. Atomic and thermonuclear
weapons tested by the U.S. Government in the Marshall Islands from 1946-1958 spread
radiation throughout the region. Exposure to radiation dramatically altered the lives and
environments of the Marshallese who experience acute illness, exile from their home
islands, and a variety of radiation-related problems.
U.S. Public Law narrowly defines radiation exposure and U.S.
Government responsibility for the consequences of the testing program in the Marshall
Islands. The legal definition is limited in time and space, and fails to take into account
the knowledge and experiences of several populations affected by radiation. As a result,
radiation exposure is a legally binding, imposed identity that Marshallese radiation
populations actively resist because it does not comport with the experiences of a
substantial number of people exposed to radiation from the tests.
u
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This dissertation identifies and analyzes sources of information outside of
the official U.S. Government history to the testing program. Using oral histories and life
stories, recently declassified internal U.S. Government documents, and recent changes in
Marshallese language, this dissertation deconstructs the experiences of one community
downwind of the U.S. tests, Rongelap, to illustrate the breadth and complexity of
radiation-related problems faced by the Marshallese. Analysis of a Marshallese radiation
language, used by the Rongelapese and other radiation communities, demonstrates how
speakers resist U.S. Government efforts to minimalize the effects of radiation. The
existence of a Marshallese radiation language also shows that the Marshallese claim
experiences with radiation as their own.
This research challenges existing U.S. Government policy and demands
the writing of a new historical narrative to incorporate the knowledge and experiences of
silenced radiation populations.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...... »
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... viii
LIST OF TABLES...... ix
Chapter I. HISTORY, COLONIALISM, AND GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS (RM I)...... I
Location and Ecology
Early Migration
Structure of Society
The Marshallese Language and its Dialects
Colonial Expansion
U.S. Naval Administration of the Marshall Islands
Early Anthropology in the Trust Territory
Move Toward Self-Governance
Compact of Free Association
The Official U.S. History of its Nuclear Weapons Testing Program
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...... 53
Developing Bonds of Trust
Archival Research
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Preliminary Fieldwork
Return to the Field
Public Education and the Training of Students
Identification of Key Informants
Life Story and Oral History Collection
Transcription and Translation
Exploration of a Cultural Domain
Close Observation and Fieldnotes
Other Data Sources
Final Visit to the Field
3. THE "CRACKS”: LOCATING AND AMPLIFYING THE VOICE OF UNDOCUMENTED RADIATION POPULATIONS TO PROVIDE A MORE ACCURATE HISTORY......
A New Narrative of the History of Rongelap’s Radiation Exposure
Preparations for the Tests
Events on Rongelap and Ailinginae
Evacuation and Exile
Decision to Return
Documented Human Health Consequences of Systematic and Cumulative Exposure
4. CURRENT ERASURE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE RONGELAPESE PEOPLE......
Further Erasure
Exile from Rongelap
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Human Radiation Experiments
A Broader Understanding of the Consequences of the Testing Program
Different Risk Factors within the Community
A New Narrative of History
5. A MARSHALLESE RADIATION LANGUAGE: ANALYSIS OF LINGUISTICE DATA AND THE LANGUAGE OF RESISTANCE...... 187
A Colonial Language of Control
Language as Resistance
Linguistic Data
Themes
A Unique Radiation Language
6. CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING TO THE PAST, AND LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE...... 245
Importance of Applied Anthropology
Applied Outcomes of this Project
Looking Toward the Future
APPENDICES
1. Interview with Ellyn (Marshallese) ...... 255
2. Interview with Ellyn (English) ...... 264
3. Interview with Seiko (Marshallese) ...... 274
4. Interview with Seiko (English) ...... 278
5. Interview with Kiora and Kajitok (Marshallese) ...... 283
6. Interview with Kiora and Kajitok (English) ...... 290
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY 297
vii
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Figure Page 1. Map of the Republic of the Marshall Islands ...... 2 2. Atoll...... 4 3. Typical Island in the RMI ...... 8 4. We to...... 9 5. Complete List of Nuclear Weapons Tests in the RMI ...... 31 6. Crater from a Weapons Test on Bikini Atoll ...... 33 7. Welcoming Signs on the Airstrip on RongelapAtoll ...... 77 8. Celebrating a Return Visit to Rongelap ...... 77 9. Displacement of Communities ...... 80 10. Fish Poisoning ...... 104 11. Dense Living Conditions on Ebeye ...... 127 12. Dump Town ...... 128 13. Overcrowded Cemetery on Ebeye ...... 130 14. Rongerik Atoll as Morjinkot Land ...... 133 15. DOE Book Showing Reproductive Abnormalities the Marshallese Could Expect ...... 191 16. Linkage Between Atoll of Residence and Reproductive Abnormalities ...... 239
viii
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Table Page 1. Table 1: Ralik and the Ratak Dialect Variation ...... 14 2. Table 2: Marshallese Pronouns ...... 17 3. Table 3: Marshallese Place Names ...... 18 4. Table 4: Marshall Islands Timeline ...... 20 5. Table 5: Timeline of Events for the People of Rongelap ...... 81 6. Table 6: English Loan Words from Three Oral Histories ...... 200 7. Table 7: Expressions of Agency Conveyed by Ellyn ...... 221
IX
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
HISTORY, COLONIALISM, AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
INFORMATION ABOUT THE REPUBLIC
OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Location and Ecology
The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is part of the geographic area
of Micronesia, or “small islands,” situated between Hawaii and Japan in the northern
Pacific Ocean. The major island groups in Micronesia include Guam and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas to the north, Palau to the west, Nauru and the
Gilbert Islands to the south, the Federated States of Micronesia in the center, and the
Marshall Islands to the east, closest to the United States. Micronesia extends over an area
larger than the continental United States does but its total land area is similar in size to
the state of Rhode Island (U.S. Department of Interior 1987).
The Marshall Islands contains some 1,225 individual islands, clustered
mostly in 29 coral atolls and 5 large, stand-alone coral islands (Figure 1). A coral atoll is
composed of a number of islands... resting on a coral reef that typically encloses a lagoon. Some atolls have passages that allow entrance to the lagoon; others do not and are closed atolls. Atolls originated as fringing reefs around volcanic peaks that sank beneath the sea millions of years ago. As the peaks gradually submerged, coral growth continued to build upward, and reefs remained close to the ocean’s surface. The islands themselves are a mixture of coral debris, sand, and humus. Being flat, or low elevation, and seldom reaching more than three to ten meters about sea level, they are extremely vulnerable to tropical storms (Kiste 1994:7).
I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2
Marshall Islands
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Uo«M FEDERATED STATES OF MUTRONESi* KIRIBATI a*,U#-U/» Figure I: Map of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Source: National Research Council (1994). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 ten meters about sea level, they are extremely vulnerable to tropical storms (Kiste 1994:7). Of all the island and atoll types (Figure 2) in Micronesia, the drier coral atolls characteristic of the Marshall Islands “present the greatest challenge to human occupancy” (Mason 1968:278). These low-lying, dry atolls have “(s)Iender resources...(p)ractically no soil covers the coral, and the inhospitable sand will grow few plants” (Krieger 1943:21). Limited food and water resources, the seasonality of staple foods, droughts, and famines make survival challenging for the Marshallese and contingent on their extensive knowledge of their local resource base. Unrestricted access to a range of terrestrial and marine cultivation options from numerous small islands in their atolls provides the Marshallese with a flexible, fluid means of gathering resources necessary for survival. For hundreds of years, this range of options enabled the Marshallese to live sustainably with their environment by adjusting to seasonal and climatic variations and ensuring that they did not deplete available resources in any single area. The coral atolls in the Marshall Islands began to evolve approximately 70 million years ago (MIVA 1998). Many outside observers traveling to the islands from their continental homes describe the Marshall Islands world as a very small place—tiny spits of sand and reef forming islands and atolls, and separated by immense stretches of open sea. In actuality, the Republic of the Marshall Islands extends across some 750,000 square miles of ocean, an area equivalent to the landmass of Mexico. Within this water, national boundary lie an estimated 870 reef systems distributed along two island chains: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 A: High Volcanic Island Runoff Ocean surface B: Atoll Island Internal drainage Lagoon O cean Ocean Figure 2: Atoll Source: U S. Department of Interior (1988:50). national boundary lie an estimated 870 reef systems distributed along two island chains: the Ratak, or sunrise chain to the east, and the Ralik, or sunset chain to the west. For an estimated 4,000 years, the people of the Marshall Islands survived and thrived on thin Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 stretches of land in a universe of ocean. From their perspective, the world is largely and their terrestrial lands are part of - rather than separate from - the sea. Survival required knowledge, experience, and access to critical resources present in both these fixed and fluid systems (Johnston and Barker 1999). All of the islands in the Marshall Islands are low-lying (Figure 3). The average elevation of the islands is just 6 or 7 feet above sea level, and they are extremely narrow in width. In many locations in the country, the ocean water is visible on one side of the land and the lagoon water on the other. There are no mountains or rivers in the country and little grows in the sandy, rocky soil except for a few staple foods of the Marshallese, such as coconut, breadfruit, taro, and pandanus (Krieger 1943). Among the most well-known of the atolls in the Marshall Islands are Bikini and Enewetak, the ground-zero atolls for a massive U.S. nuclear weapons testing program, and Kwajalein Atoll, with the largest lagoon in the world. A U.S. Army facility on Kwajalein Atoll serves as the primary U.S. Department of Defense location for testing its missile defense programs, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. Early Migration It is difficult to ascertain when the first settlers arrived in the Marshall Islands and where they arrived from because few material artifacts exist in Micronesia (Beilwood 1979). Most materials produced by the Marshallese were made from local resources that decompose and leave little evidence for archaeologists. Researchers believe, however, that the first settlers of Micronesia were Pacific island populations that migrated from Melanesia. The predominant theory of settlement of the Marshall Islands Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 postulates that the initial settlers moved out of Southeast Asia, notably Southeast China and Formosa, approximately 5,000 years ago. Over hundreds of years, and with successive advancements in maritime and agricultural technology, migration progressed southeastward along the northern coast of what... are now the Melanesian island groups of Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and New Caledonia, and sometime between 2,000 to 3,000 years ago, into the Central Pacific (MIVA 1998:18). Motivations for the migration and settlement across the Pacific included ecological pressures, quarreling families, and the desire of rival siblings from the families of chiefs to establish new blood lines and power on distant islands (Kirch 1984). The linguistic record also supports the theory that the early settlers of Micronesia came from Melanesia, around the area of Vanuatu. Micronesian languages “share many lexical and grammatical features” that appear to reflect a common origin in eastern Melanesia (Kiste 1994:11). Furthermore, the languages in the western area of Micronesia, the area that Melanesian settlers would first occupy, demonstrate direct ties to Southeast Asia. This evidence, coupled with the greater antiquity of languages in western Micronesia (Kiste 1994), suggests a migration path across Micronesia from west to east. Structure of Society Traditionally, the Marshall Islands is a matrilineal society that revolves around access to land and its resources. The Marshallese refer to their lineage or clan lines as bwij. Customary rules provide land use rights to members of a bwij: The lineage (bwij) members may live on and exploit the resources of the land parcel or, if they possess rights in more than one land parcel, as is usually the case, merely make copra on it and use its food resources such as: coconuts, breadfruit, arrowroot, pandanus, bananas, and taro. Pigs and chickens are kept Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 and fish and shellfish are obtained from the adjacent marine areas. (Tobin 1958:7- 8). Land holdings pass through the bwij to successive generations through women. The women usually pass these land holdings in small parcels known as wetos. Wetos are parcels or cross-sections of land extending from the ocean to the lagoon (Figure 4). Sometimes land holdings are broken into smaller portions. The boundaries (kotan weto) are often marked by local plants or prominent outcroppings. Most Marshallese construct their homes on the lagoon side of the we/os to provide shelter from the wind and storms. Almost all wetos have access to the ocean and lagoon. A village path usually runs down the center of an island, passing through each weto, and connecting the community. Weto rights are inherited, with women usually investing a male member of their families with the power to manage use rights. To claim the right to use a weto, one must know its boundaries and history. The power to recognize and validate that claim rests in the hands of customary authorities (alabs and iroij). Changes in family structures and changes in customary power structures (with, for example the death of a mother, alab, or iroij) produce a redistribution of use rights. Under customary practice in the complex Marshallese land tenure system, the land and its resources provide for the needs of everyone: The Marshallese system of land tenure provides for all eventualities and takes care of the needs of all of the members of the Marshallese society. It is, in effect, its social security. Under normal conditions no one need go hungry for lack of land from which to draw food. There are no poor houses or old people’s homes in the Marshall Islands. The system provides for all members of the Marshallese society, each of whom is bom into land rights (Tobin 1958:1). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 Figure 3: Typical Island in the RMI Source: Vaughn, Greg. MIVA (1990:4). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 Ocean side Lagoon side Figure 4: Weto Source: Spennenmann, Dirk (1970:41). In addition to land tenure, marine tenure is important to the people of the Marshall Islands, and people throughout the Pacific region. According to anthropologist John Cordell: The construction of marine property systems appears in localized and specific knowledge of reefs, tides, currents, winds; in the traditions that govern access and limit knowledge of fishing areas to those with specific entitlements; and, in the names for territories, subsurface features, rocks, and reef clefts - names that represent events and mythical characters and provide local people with a “constant visible historical anchor” (Cordell 1989:9). In 1958, the Trust Territory’s District Anthropologist for the Marshall Islands, Jack A. Tobin, documented customary land and marine tenure in the Marshall Islands. Tobin confirmed that property rights extend from terrestrial property into the marine area: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 “according to custom, the property rights extended out to the area where people stood, usually waist deep, in order to fish with a pole. These rights belonged exclusively to the lineage, whose land holding bordered the marine area” (Tobin 1958:57). Tobin also noted that the marine resources belonged to the iroij, but the people residing on an atoll were free to use the resources: Traditionally everything of value in the lagoon such as shellfish, langusta, etc., was considered to be the property of the chiefs. The inhabitants of the particular atoll did not have to ask permission to take these items unless they were tabu property of the chiefs... the concept that the right to exploit the marine resources of an atoll is the prerogative of the inhabitants of that atoll only still persists (Tobin 1958:58). From a Marshallese perspective, the people clearly define their property holdings not only in terms of their terrestrial holdings, but also in terms of their rights to the marine resources: Weto rights extend to the water's edge, including the sand and any exposed areas. Beneath the tidal zone out to five miles belongs to the local government. From five miles to the two-hundred mile EEZ belongs to the national government (G. Anjain 1999b).1 People have rights up to the high tide mark where the water ends. The Navy explained this to us. Sometimes we just go and take foodfrom the water area on someone’s property, but sometimes we ask for permission (John Anjain 1999). Instead of a notion of individual property ownership, the Marshallese property rights system is premised on the notion that no single person owns the land. Marshallese culture and society revolve around a three-tier approach of reciprocal use rights for the iroij, alap and ri-jerbal (Tobin 1953, 1958, Mason 1968, 1 This and other remarks that appear in italics are English translations of information gathered from Marshallese informants. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 Kiste 1974). In western terms, the iroij are the chiefs who maintain authority over the clans and the land. The iroij are responsible for taking care of their people, and the people, in turn, must provide food and labor to the iroij. The alap act as the managers for the iroij with a day to day responsibility to ensure that the best interests of the clans and the land are met. The ri-jerbal, literally “ri,” or people, and “jerbal,” or work, are the workers. The workers are often referred to as the kajor or strength of the clan and reflect the symbiotic relationship in which the workers provide the strength or support to the alap and iroij. While the alap and iroij control and manage the land and the clan, the ri-jerbal maintain the rights to use the land and the resources necessary for survival (Johnston and Barker 1999). The Marshallese recognize the iroij's ultimate authority over the natural resources. To demonstrate this, certain foods and areas of the reef and land are set aside as iroij areas. Certain species are used just for the iroij, such as brown eel, turtle, whales, dolphins, and frigate birds, or ak. Other coral heads in the lagoons are reserved as the places to collect food for the iroij. It is mo, or forbidden, to go to islands and areas reserved for the iroij: The iroij had their own coral heads... When he was [visiting usJ here , we gave him foodfrom those coral heads. Sometimes foodfrom those coral heads was sent to him on Ebeye.2 We sent “janwin ” (preserved breadfruit), too (Job 1999). Beyond iroij authority over the resources, all three tiers of society are entitled to use the land and resources for their well being. The strongest entitlements come from matrilineal rights to the land, although the Marshallese recognize paternal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 rights to the land as well: “individuals are not excluded from usufruct rights in their paternal lineage land. Even though an individual may never become the alab on his father’s lineage land, unless the entire paternal lineage and all associated lineages become extinct, he does have the right to live and work on his father’s land” (Tobin 1958:6). From a Marshallese perspective, the following example illustrates the differentiation between the rights accorded to maternal and paternal lands: On this land, my father is the ri-jerbal. I don 7 have to ask to use my father's land. On my mother’s land, my mother is the alap. All of your mother's family has rights. Even if someone is gone for a long time, his her rights won 7 disappear. If other people have rights to the land, they can use it. People who don 7 have any rights have to ask permission to use it (John Anjain 1999). In addition to rights inherited from parents, people obtain rights to the land by permission of the iroij or family, or by marriage: When you are married, you are entitled to the land o f your spouse. It is also understood that relatives can ask for resources (J. Riklon 1999). Because land is critical to survival, “the Marshallese jealously guard their land rights and will not willingly part with them” (Tobin 1967:3). Maintenance of the property and resources is critical to ensuring the continued livelihood of everyone in the bwij, or corporation, with rights to the property. On certain occasions, however, landowners may allow non-landowners to live and work on their property: Members and associated members of the lineage (bwi j) work the land, clearing it of underbrush and performing other tasks necessary for the simple type of agriculture practices in these low-lying coral atolls with their limited resources. In some instances people are allowed to work land not belonging to their lineage 2 Majuro. the capital of the nation, and Ebeve. the center of Kwajalcin Atoll, are the two urban areas in die RMI. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 when members of another lineage have more than enough land for their own needs, or want to help some less fortunate person (Tobin 1958:10). In this type of non-family use arrangement, the non-landowning tenant acts, in western terms, as a renter. The renter provides a portion of cultivated resources or profits from the resources to the landowners in the way a sharecropper would. Additionally, the renter maintains the land by using the resources sustainably and ensuring the future productive capacity of the property and resources. If the renter is not a responsible steward of the property and resources, the landowners will evict the renters. The landowners benefit from this rent-like arrangement by having their property and resources cared for responsibly. By the same token, the renter benefits from accessing resources necessary for survival. In addition to caring for property and resources for the well-being of the existing generation, people with land rights work collectively to ensure that the lineage holdings will be productive for the succeeding generations that will inherit the land. In this regard, customary ownership of property and resources is based on sustainable interactions with the environment and responsible stewardship that will allow future generations to flourish. The Marshallese Language and its Dialects Beyond the sharing of property and resources, language is another tool that enables the Marshallese to flourish on their islands. Given the considerable distances between the atolls and islands in the Marshall Islands, it is surprising that the Marshallese language varies little from place-to-place. This is perhaps due to the acclaimed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 navigational prowess of the Marshallese (Krieger 1943) and their ability to navigate and travel between the atolls and islands. Marshallese are known throughout the Pacific for their navigational skills that are unique in their incorporation of the waves and wave patterns (Davenport 1964, Browning 1973). All languages in the Pacific, including Marshallese, belong to the Austronesian language family, the largest of the language families that encompasses one- sixth of the world’s languages (Pawley and Ross 1994). The Austronesian language stretches “from Madagascar to Easter Island, encompassing all of insular Southeast Asia and parts of mainland Southeast Asia” (Kiste 1994:10). The Marshallese language is related to other languages in Micronesia, particularly those from Pohnpei and Chuuk. There are two distinct dialects in the structure of the Marshallese language, the Ralik and the Ratak dialects that correspond with the two chains of islands that run north to south (Figure 1). The two dialects do not differ greatly, and speakers of the dialects have no problems understanding each other. In his seminal work on the Marshallese language, Byron Bender (1963) notes some of the differences between the two dialects (see Table 1). Table 1: Ralik and Ratak Dialect Variation ______ Ralik Ratak Enelish equivalent vowel variation of the word lok lak directional, go toward selection of intervening vowels laikiij aekitj need or want longer words in the Ralik dialect iep ep basket Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 Traces still exist of a much older, traditional form of the Marshallese language referred to now as kajin etto, or the old language. Some of the Marshallese elders can still recite chants (roro) in kajin etto, yet the meaning of most of these chants has been lost over the years. The elders know the meanings of some of the words or the phrases of kajin etto, but only enough to know whether they are reciting a chant to instruct them about war, navigation, or prayer to the shark gods before fishing.3 That the elders remember the words, despite the fact that the old language is no longer functional, demonstrates the remarkable oral tradition skills of the Marshallese. In addition to kajin etto, evidence also exists of an ancient, religious language used to show respect for sacred areas and the iroij. Although the arrival of the missionaries in the nineteenth century effectively replaced the indigenous religion with Christianity, indications remain of a Marshallese religion devoted to the mythical characters that personify the natural world, such as the god of breadfruit, Jebro, or the god of fish, iroij rilik. Marshallese also recall the words of chants used by fishermen before going into the water to appease the sharks and keep the fishermen safe. According to Tobin, the Marshallese maintained rituals for approaching islands set aside as bird sanctuaries. In 1958, Tobin noted the existence of bird sanctuaries in the Marshall Islands existing from “time immemorial” as reserves for animals and trees. According to Tobin, elaborate rituals to Lawi Jemo, or the kanal tree god, accompanied annual food gathering trips to these bird sanctuaries. The iroij would 3 Mwenadrik Kebenli. an elderly woman from Rongelap. recited a roro for me last year. While Mwenadrik said she did not know the exact meaning of the words, she knows that the roro instructs navigators to look for a particular pattern of waves that emerge when the sea bounces off of Kapijinamu reef a large reef on Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 lead a fleet of canoes from a neighboring atoll to the sanctuary. Upon arrival, women hid under mats in the canoes for fear of bringing bad luck to the collection of birds and eggs. Women were often considered bad luck to food-finding expeditions, such as fishing or bird and egg collection. For the men, “it was tab[oo] to use ordinary Marshallese, [and] the laroij (esoteric) language was mandatory” (Tobin 1958:50). Members of the expedition used special chants to request the strength to haul the canoes up on the beach. Once the expedition arrived on the sanctuary island: The chief was the first person to step ashore. Everyone assembled on the beach before proceeding inland and cut a leaf or coconut frond. With the chief leading the way toward Lawi Jemo (the kanal tree), they walked in single file, each individual carefully stepping in the footprints of the person in front of him so that only one set of footprints would appear, as if only one person had been there. Strict silence was observed on the way to worship Lawi Jemo. When the group reached the tree, each man placed his coconut leaf over a branch of the tree and then sat down in front of the tree and waited for a breeze to come and blow the leaf off. When this occurred, the kebbwi in bwil (ritual name for the chief on this occasion) would announce: Wurin, (we are lucky) (Tobin 1958:51-52). The same linguistic tendency to demonstrate respect by using pseudonyms remains today. Marshallese often use nicknames or vague words which enable them to refer to an iroij without using the iroij's proper name, and thus show their deference to the iroij. While people know the proper names of their iroij, they prefer to use nicknames to show their respect (Kabua 1999b). As demonstrated elsewhere in the Pacific, this practice demonstrates politeness rules that acknowledge the higher status of the chiefs and the lower status of the speakers (Duranti 1992). In forbidden, or mo areas, Rongelap Atoll. Because the islands lie so close to the sea. navigators do not see the land until they are in very close proximity and must rely on the wave and ocean currents to act as directionals. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 such as iroij lands or medicinal areas, the Marshallese use nicknames or disguised names to refer to the animals, the trees, and the people (Kabua 1999b). The extensive use of pronouns in the Marshallese language also enables speakers to draw from an extensively developed set of pronouns to refer to people without using their names. For example, pronouns reflect inclusion and exclusion as well as numbers of people (Table 2): Table 2: Marshallese Pronouns Kem = us, excluding anyone else in the area Kemro = the two of us, Kemjeel = the three of us, Kemean = the four of us, Kemwoj = the five or more of us,“ Kej = us, all inclusive Kejro = the two of us, “ Kejeel = the three of us, “ Kejean = the four of us, “ Kejwoj = the five or more of us, “ Another interesting aspect of the Marshall language is the way it reflects the history and the importance of land and wetos. Language describes how land parcels (weto) pass through the family and succeeding generations. Each land holding has a unique name and history (Tobin 1958) that everyone with rights to the land is familiar with. Language also describes the rights and access to the natural resources found on wetos. Marshallese place names4 explain the history of terrestrial and marine 4 See Byron Bender. 1963. See also pages 499-589 of the Marshallese-English Dictionary, by T. Abo et al. (1976) Honolulu: Univ ersity of Hawaii Press. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 property. Atoll, island, weto, and reef names all remind people of the history and the social and environmental significance of their property. For example, weto names are place names that describe the physical characteristics and explain why and how people inherited and use the land (Johnston and Barker 1999). Examples of Marshallese place names that reflect the history and the importance of property are included in Table 3. The Marshallese also give names to their reefs, such as Kapijinamu, Kijukan , Patelona, Kejenen, Tuilon en Kijenen, and Metalaen. The fact that they assign names to their reefs indicates that reefs are important reference points to the resource collection, navigation, and designation of property boundaries. Table 3: Marshallese Place Names Atoll names: Rongelap: Ron (hole, referring to the lagoon) + lap (large) = [atoll with| large lagoon Rongerik: Ron (hole) + rik (small) = [atoll with| small lagoon Ailinginae: Ailin (atoll) + in (in) + ae (current) = atoll in the current Island names: Eneaitok: Ene (island) + aitok (long) = long island Enebarbar: Ene (island) + barbar (rocky, lots of reef) = island with lots of reef Aeroken: .-le (current) + rok (south) + en (away from speaker) = distant island with southern current Weto names: Marren: X(ar (hushes) + en (away from speaker = distant [wero| with bushes Monbako: Mon (house) = bako (sharks) house of the sharks Aibwej: Aibwej (water) = [weto\ with water Colonial Expansion Although Pacific island communities migrated and traveled to the Marshall Islands for thousands of years, it was not until 470 years ago that the western world learned of the islands’ existence. The arrivals of western visitors, or ri-paelle s in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 Marshallese (literally, people with clothes), was anything but benign. Throughout Micronesia, western visitors disrupted and indelibly changed the islands: Early European explorers, missionaries, sea captains, traders, naval officers, and mapmakers gave names to these islands that commemorated their own sovereigns, ships, native lands, or themselves. Through these bestowals of names and accompanying acts of description, the otherness of the islands and their people was rendered in terms that were familiar, intelligible, and encouraging to those with an expansionist agenda... [Violence, domination, exploitation, and racism would all characterize to varying degrees the tenures of each metropolitan power that governed Micronesia...Each colonising nation would attempt to justify and enhance its rule through rituals of possession, denigrating descriptions of Micronesian societies, the usurpation of indigenous political authority, and the promotion of alien, disruptive systems of religion, education, and economy” (Hanlon 1994:93). Despite the damaging aspects of colonial domination, the colonial powers overlooked any inconveniences or hardships resulting from colonization because they believed they were bestowing all the benefits of civilization on local populations in Micronesia (Hezel 1995). In 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas gave Spain ownership of all the Micronesian islands. The first known contact between the Europeans and the Marshallese occurred in 1529, however, when Spanish explorer Alvaro de Saavedra went ashore on what appear to be islands on Bikini or Enewetak atolls. Despite occasional visits by Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century, primarily to exchange for water and supplies necessary to support long voyages, the western world had no real contact with the Marshall Islands. Because the Marshall Islands is strategically situated between Asia and the Americas, the nation became an important resting and refueling stop for transpacific ships (Lee 1998:401). In 1788, British captains John Marshall, the namesake of the nation, and Thomas Gilbert, whose name dons the neighboring Gilbert Islands, arrived. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 Marshall and Gilbert stopped at the Marshall Islands during their voyage to transport convicts for New South Wales. After this time, the Marshall Islands began to appear on European maps. Table 4: Marshall Islands Timeline 1,000 B.C. - Island populations from Melanesia migrate across Micronesia. 1494 - Treaty of Tordesillas gave Spain ownership of ail the Micronesian islands. 1529 - Spanish explorer Alvaro de Saavedra went ashore on what appear to be the islands on Bikini or Enewetak atolls. 1788 - British captains John Marshall, the namesake of the nation, and Thomas Gilbert, whose name adhered to the neighboring Gilbert Islands, arrived. 1885 - The Marshalls became a German protectorate. Germany established trading operations. 1920 - After Japan captured Micronesia in World War I, the League of Nations formally mandated Japan to administer Micronesia. 1944 - The Allied forces capture control of the Marshall Islands from Japan. July 1, 1946 - The U.S. Government detonates the first atomic weapon on Bikini Atoll, Test Able, as part of Operation Crossroads. 1947 - The United Nations appoints the United States as the administering authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the only post-WWH trust territory designated by the United Nations for “‘strategic” purposes. The U.S. Navy assumes administrative control of the Marshall Islands. 1952 - The U.S. detonates its first thermonuclear test, the Mike Shot, on Enewetak Atoll. March I, 1954 - The U.S. Government detonates its largest thermonuclear test, the Bravo shot. Bravo was the equivalent power of more than 1,000 bombs the size of the weapon dropped on Hiroshima. March 3, 1954 - The U.S. Government evacuates the Marshallese from their home atolls of Rongelap, Ailinginae, and Utrik after exposure to heavy fallout from the Bravo test and brings them to Kwajalein Atoll. The people of Rongelap and _____ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 Marshall Islands Timeline (Continued) Ailinginae remained off their islands for 3 years before resettling in 1957. In 1985, the people of Rongelap and Ailinginae removed themselves from their homelands because of fear for their health and safety. The people from Utrik returned to their atoll 3 months after the Bravo test in 1954. 1958 - The U.S. Government conducts its last atmospheric test in the Marshall Islands. 1978 - The Marshall Islands Constitutional Convention adopts the nation’s first constitution. 1979 - The Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is established and the nation becomes self-governing for the first time in almost 500 years. Nov. 3, 1986 - U.S. President Ronald Reagan signs the Compact of Free Marshall Association, a treaty defining the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Marshall Islands governments. The Compact grants the Marshall Islands its sovereignty and provides economic assistance in exchange for U.S. defense rights, primarily in the continued use of the U.S. missile testing range on Kwajalein Atoll. The Compact also provides $150 million to the Marshall Islands as a full settlement for all past, present and future consequences of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program. 1990 - The U.N. Security Council terminates the RMI’s trusteeship status. 1991 - The Marshall Islands becomes a Member of the United Nations. 1995 - President Clinton’s administration acknowledges the use of Marshallese citizens as subjects in human radiation experiments conducted by the U.S. Government. 2001 - The economic provisions of the Compact of Free Association expire, but can be extended to 2003. The relationship of free association continues indefinitely and the U.S. Government retains its right to lease land on Kwajalein Island until 2016. In the mid-1850s, the American Protestant missionaries arrived in the Marshall Islands. The missionaries were often accompanied by converted native Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 Hawaiians, who more closely resembled the Marshallese than the Anglo-American missionaries and helped convince the Marshallese to embrace Christianity. The missionaries permanently altered traditional society as they “converted the Marshallese in great numbers, leaving them with an established church headed by ordained Marshallese ministers, a taste for formal education, and a sense of modesty in dress that was much like the missionaries’ own” (Hezel 1995:45). Although some populations in the Marshall Islands initially resisted missionization, such as the people of Mili who fought and killed many missionaries, to this day approximately 99% of the Marshallese population remains Christian. The missionization of the Marshall Islands was so complete that any traditional religion that existed prior to contact with the missionaries is extinct. In addition to Christianity, German commercial interests in the Marshall Islands greatly impacted the nation. The most profound shift in the modem economy occurred during the German administration of the islands. By the 1870s and 1880s, German traders and the German Navy began large-scale trading operations in the Marshall Islands: in 1878 Germany secured the exclusive use of the harbor at Jaluit and special trading privileges in the Ralik chain by concluding a “treaty” with a powerful local chieftain. In 1885 the Marshalls became a German protectorate and were so recognized by Spain and Britain, principal rivals for colonial expansion in the Pacific at the time (U.S. Department of Interior 1987). German rule of the Marshall Islands was indirect. The local iroij, or chief, retained their power and the Germans acted primarily as administrators of the islands.5 5 Most but not all iroij are men. O f the nation’s seven paramount chiefs, or iroij laptop, one is a woman. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 The early economy of the Marshallese was based on inter-island and inter-atoll exchange. Between the atolls, people exchanged excesses of food, such as preserved arrowroot and pandanus. Within island communities, people exchanged food and labor between families and neighbors. People worked together and used their natural resources to survive sustainably and selfsufficiently from their environment. The Germans’ main objective in the Marshall Islands was “(c)opra-related economic exploitation” (U.S. Department of Interior 1987:335). German traders cleared breadfruit and food producing trees for the local population and encouraged the Marshallese to plant coconut trees on every island. The Marshallese provided copra, or dried coconut meat, to the Germans for export. Through the copra industry, the Marshallese began wage labor and became a part of the world economy. Many Marshallese identify the era of German rule as the beginning of a shift from communal self-sufficiency to family or individual income generation. Copra remains the largest export from the Marshall Islands today. The colonization of the Marshall Islands by the Spanish and Germans led to economic opportunities for the people. As with Hawaiians (Sahlins 1985) and other Pacific Islanders, the Marshallese were not passive subjects of the colonizers. They viewed the colonial powers as offering economic advantages and even protection for the iroij. The iroij used the colonizers to solidify their power and gain access to western goods without relinquishing the traditional political structure to the foreign occupants (Hezel 1995). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 During World War I, Japan captured the Marshall Islands from Germany and assumed authority for the islands.6 Japan’s involvement in the Marshall Islands was much more direct than its predecessor. The Japanese had four specific goals with regard to its island territory: “economic development and exploitation, colonization for Japanese emigration, integration with Japan, and militarization’’ (U.S. Department of Interior 1987:336). By 1938, Japan considered the Marshall Islands a closed military area and restricted foreigners’ movement in the territory (MIVA 1998). Marshallese describe the Japanese regime as strict, but effective: the Japanese built schools and roads and provided formal education to the Marshallese (Almej 1998). During World War II,7 Japanese administration of the islands changed from civilian to military regimes to defend the territory. Under Japanese military occupation, the Marshallese suffered greatly. The U.S. military cut off Japanese food shipments to the Japanese strongholds causing starvation to the Japanese and Marshallese residents of the islands. The inundation of Japanese soldiers caused food shortages, and hunger became rampant on the atolls of Mili, Maloelap and Wotje, where Japan established its bases. The Marshallese tell many stories about the hangings, beatings, and 6 “The seizure was unpopular among the major powers, and it was not until three years later that Japanese occupation was recognized by Britain - and then France and Russia - in return for a more active Japanese contribution to Allied war efforts against Germany. In 1920 Japan was formally mandated by the League of Nations to administer Micronesia" (U.S. Department of Interior 1987:335). There are more than 700 relics in the Marshall Islands that are still intact from WWII. These relics include air raid shelters, barracks, hospitals, storage tanks, power plants tanks, trucks, trains, towers, antiaircraft guns, coastal defense guns, multipurpose guns, pill boxes, walls, trenches, air control centers, various bombers and fighters, runways, and hangers. American and Japanese airplanes still remain near the runways on the outer islands. The remains of American and Japanese servicemen are still being discovered, along with bombs and other ordinance that never detonated. A collection of airplanes, trucks and other vehicles can be found in the reefs around the islands. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 mass murdering of Marshallese who competed for scant food resources or who defied Japanese policies and climbed trees at night in search of food.8 In 1942, the Marshall Islands became a fierce battleground as the Allies began to attack the Japanese forces in the Marshall Islands. Many Marshallese served as scouts to help the United States plan strategic attacks against the Japanese. The United States repeatedly bombed the islands and atolls where the Japanese built their military bases. During the bombing, many Marshallese lost their lives and entire Marshallese villages burned. Although no definitive numbers exist, the Alele Museum in the Marshall Islands estimates that 3,000 Americans and 11,000 Japanese lost their lives in the Marshall Islands. No figures exist for the numbers of Marshallese who lost their lives during U.S. bombing raids, or execution by the Japanese. In 1944, the United States successfully defeated Japan and the allied forces seized control of the Marshall Islands. U.S. Naval Administration of the Marshall Islands Before the U.S. Government decided to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a subcommittee of scientists headed by Nobel laureate James Franck considered the move. In their deliberations, “the Franck committee urged that the United States demonstrate the power of the new weapon before the eyes of the world on a barren island” (Welsome 1999:97). Although the United States Government ultimately decided to use its weapons of mass destruction on the Japanese before testing them on a barren 8 Mokko Mien, the grandmother of my Marshallese family, told the majority of these stories to me. Mokko grew up on Mili Atoll, one of the main Japanese strongholds, during the Japanese administration. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 island, the U.S. Government eventually embraced the recommendation of the Franck committee. After seizing the Marshall Islands from the Japanese, the U.S. Navy immediately understood the geographic and strategic importance of the area. From a U.S. military perspective, the Marshall Islands was geographically isolated from Soviet and public eyes. During the cold war and the competition between the Americans and Russians to develop and test nuclear weapons, the Marshall Islands provided an ideal location to conduct top secret experiments while simultaneously ensuring tight control over who entered the testing area. In addition to its isolation, the Marshall Islands was thousands of miles away from the United States. By testing high-yield weapons in the Marshall Islands, the U.S. Government could reduce radiation exposure for American citizens.9 Although the United States detonated atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the United States did not have a full understanding or appreciation of the atomic bomb and its effects. Because of the geographic isolation of the islands, the United States Government easily controlled all official information related to the testing program and its effects in the Marshall Islands. The U.S. also kept outsiders from entering the Trusteeship by asking the United Nations to deem the area a “strategic Trust” and hence off limits to anyone without U.S. Government permission to enter. This controlled entry policy enabled the U.S. Government to ensure that virtually all of the scientists and researchers responsible for determining the effects of the tests were U.S. Government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 representatives. Controlling entry also allowed the U.S. Government to control the dissemination of information. The U.S. Government did not share even basic information, such as the number of tests, their yields, and the path of the fallout clouds for each test, with the Marshallese people, the American public, or the international community. In 1946, more than a year before the United Nations placed the Marshall Islands in the administrative care of the United States, the U.S. Navy approached the people and leaders of Bikini Atoll to request permission to use their islands to test atomic weapons and their effects. Photographers, journalists and Hollywood film crews went to Bikini Atoll to record U.S. Navy Commodore Ben H. Wyatt’s request to the Bikinians to use their land for the atomic tests approved by President Truman in January 1946. In his book, Operation Crossroads, the Bikini islanders’ attorney, Jonathan Weisgall, describes Wyatt’s interactions with the Bikinians: Church services had just ended when Wyatt arrived to meet with the people, who sat cross-legged on the ground under Bikini’s coconut palms near their thatched- roof village.. The Navy reported[:] “It was an historic occasion, this impact of the accumulated scientific knowledge of centuries upon a primitive people, and it was staged with sincerity and poise.” Wyatt knew how to appeal to the Bikinians. He drew upon the Bible, the common denominator between the Bikinians and the Americans, and delivered a short homily. According to Wyatt’s own account, he “compared the Bikinians to the children of Israel whom the Lord saved from their common enemy and led into the Promised Land.” He described the power of the atomic bomb and “the destruction it had wrought upon the enemy,” and he told the people that the Americans “are trying to learn how to use it for the good of mankind and to end all world wars.” The Navy had searched the entire world for the best place to test these powerful weapons, and Bikini was it. Wyatt then asked, “Would Juda and 9 The U.S. Government was concerned about criticism horn continued testing and radiation hazards produced at the Nevada test site. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 his people be willing to sacrifice their island for the welfare of all men?” (Weisgall 1994:107). The film Radio Bikini includes clips taken of Commodore Wyatt and his request to the Bikinians. In response to Commodore Wyatt’s request, Juda, a descendant of the bloodline that settled Bikini Atoll, indicated that, if the United States needed the islands, the Bikinians would let them use it. When Juda stated to Commodore Wyatt and the film cameras, “Me// otemjej rej ped Ho pein Anij,” 10 or “Everything is in God’s hands,” he expressed his faith in God to lead the Bikinians. According to Kanike Almej, a Marshallese historian, there are three reasons why it was easy for the Bikinians to relinquish their lands for atomic testing. First, the Marshallese credit the United States with bringing them meram , or enlightenment. The American Protestant missionaries converted the Marshallese and the Marshallese believe American missionaries ended the warring and fighting between atoll populations. Therefore, the American request for assistance in order to promote world peace was seen as credible by the Marshallese. Second, Marshallese view the United States as saving the Marshallese from a brutal Japanese regime: “We were like animals [to the Japanese]. They took our land and they killed us” (Almej 1998). Third, the Bikinians, like the rest of the Marshallese, felt that the United States was a friend, and it is important to help friends when asked (Almej 1998). The Bikinians believed that they would demonstrate their commitment to the friendship by honoring the request of the United States. 10 This expression is written on Bikini Atoll's flag. The Bikinians' flag mimics the American flag and reflects the closeness the Bikinians feel to the United States as a result of the atoll population's history with and promises from the U.S. Government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 The United States Government evacuated the Bikinians from their home islands in March 1946 in preparation for the first test (Figure 5). Operation Crossroads, “a name that accurately described the confusing period immediately after the war,” (Welsome 1999:166) was the first of the weapons testing series. The highly publicized event consisted of Test Able airdropped over Bikini on June 30, 1946 and test Baker detonated by the U.S. Navy in the lagoon at Bikini on July 24, 1946. The U.S. Government placed 95 vessels, including decommissioned American aircraft carriers, captured Japanese battleships and a German cruiser, in the lagoon at Bikini. Researchers strapped pigs, rats, sheep and goats to the vessels to see how they would withstand the blasts. Shot Able missed the target by a half mile and only sank a few ships. The Baker shot, detonated 90 feet below the water, sent a large plume of radioactive seawater into the air. Manhattan Project doctors who watched the test from a nearby ship could hear the faint cries of the animals on the distant ships (Welsome 1999:172). 15,000 American soldiers went back to Bikini’s lagoon hours after the test to decontaminate ships.11 It was not until July 1947, after Operation Crossroads, that the Marshall Islands officially became a trust territory of the United States. As one of the eleven trust territories created by the United Nations in the shuffling of national and political 11 Despite documents outlining the severe exposure and radiation injuries of the soldiers, a decade after Operation Crossroads the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Shields Warren denied that any participants received excess radiation: “Ever conscious of litigation, Warren created a 'Medico-Legal Board’ for advice...the board's function was to reassure Col. Warren that the safety measures...were such as to attract no justifiable criticism and to give what assurances was possible that no successful suits could be brought on account of the radiological hazards of Operation Crossroads” (Welsome 1999:173-174). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 boundaries following World War II, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) was the only trusteeship designated as a “strategic” territory. The strategic designation of the TTPI enabled the U.S. Government to use the territory for closed military operations. Despite the fact that the United Nations Trusteeship Council required the United States to “protect the inhabitants [of the Trusteeship] against the loss of their lands and resources” (U.N. Trusteeship Council 1958), the United States’ strategic interest in these remote islands conflicted with its obligation to care for the local people. From 1946-1958, the U.S. Government used its territory to detonate 67 atomic and thermonuclear weapons in the air, on the land, and in the lagoons of the Marshall Islands. Some of these detonations completely vaporized islands, islands that no longer exist today. Giant craters in the lagoons of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls bear the scars marking the locations where these islands once stood (Figure 6). The testing program obliterated the land that the Marshallese people depend on for survival and permanently affected their health and ability to care for themselves. 18 of the tests detonated in the Marshall Islands were in the megaton range. Nearly 80% of the U.S. Government’s atmospheric tests were conducted in the Marshall Islands. The total yield of the 67 tests conducted in the Marshall Islands was 108 megatons, the equivalent of more than 7,000 Hiroshima bombs (Nuclear Claims Tribunal 2000). 33 of the weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands had greater yields than the largest atmospheric test conducted by the U.S. Government in Nevada, and the total yield of the tests conducted in the Marshall Islands was 93 times the total tested in Nevada (O. DeBrum 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 Teat Date Sire Type Yield (it) Tea Teat Ikte Ste Type Yieiddct} Tea 1 6/30/46 Bikini Airdrop 21310 ABLE 45 5/30/58 Enewetak Barge 1160 TOBACCO 2 7/24/46 Bikini Undrwtr 213)0 BAKER 46 5/31/58 Bikini Barge 923)0 SYCAMORE 3 4/14/48 Enewetak Tower XRAY 373)0 47 6/2/58 Enewetak Barge 153)0 ROSE 4 4/30/48 Enewetak Tower 493)0 YOKE 48 6/8/58 Enewetak Undrwtr 8310 UMBRELLA 5 5/14/48 Enewetak Tower 18.00 ZEBRA 49 6/10/58 Bikini Barge 2133)0 MAPLE 6 4/7/51 Enewetak Tower 81.00 DOG 50 6/14/58 Bikini Barge 319.00 ASPEN 7 4/20/51 Enewetak Tower 47.00 EASY 51 6/14/58 Enewetak Barge 1,450.00 WALNUT 8 5/8/51 Enewetak Tower 225.00 GEORGE 52 6/18/58 Enewetak Barge 113)0 LINDEN 9 5/24/51 Enewetak Tower 4 5 i0 ITEM 53 6/27/58 Bikini Barge 41100 REDWOOD 10 10/31/52 Enewetak Surface MIKE 10.400.00 54 6/27/58 Enewetak 8arge 880.00 ELDER 11 11/15/52 Enewetak Air Drop 500.00 KING 55 6/28/58 Enewetak Barge 8.900.00 OAK 12 2/28/54 Bikini Surface 15,000.00 BRAVO 56 6/29/58 Bikini Barge 14.00 HICKORY 13 3/26/54 Bikini Barge 11,000.00 ROMEO 57 7/1/58 Enewetak Barge 520 SEQUOIA 14 4/6/54 Bikini Surface 110.00 KOON 53 7/2/58 Bikini Barge 220.00 CEDAR IS 4/25/54 Bikini Barge 6.900.00 UNION 59 7/5/58 Enewetak Barge 397.00 DOGWOOD 16 5/4/54 Bikini Barge 13,500.00 YANKEE 60 7/12/58 Bikini Barge 9200.00 POPLAR 17 5/13/54 Enewetak Barge 1.690.00 NECTAR 61 7/14/58 Enewetak Barge LOW SCAEVOLA IS 5/2/56 Bikini Air Drop 3.800.00 CHEROKE 62 7/17/58 Enewetak Barge 255.00 PISONIA 19 5/4/56 Enewetak Surface 40.00 LACROSSE 63 7/22/58 Bikini Barge 65.00 JUNIPER 20 5/27/56 Bikini Surface 3500.00 ZUNI 64 7/22/58 Enewetak Barge 20100 OLIVE 21 5/27/56 Enewetak Tower 0.19 YUMA 65 7/26/58 Enewetak Barge 2000.00 PINE 22 S/30/56 Enewetak Tower 14.90 ERIE 66 3/6/58 Enewetak Surface FIZZ QUINCE 23 6/6/56 Enewetak Surface 13.70 SEMINOLE 67 3/18/58 Enewetak Surface 0.02 FIG 24 6/11/56 Bikini Barge 365.00 FLATHEAD 25 6/11/56 Enewetak Tower 8.00 BLACKFOaT 26 6/13/56 Enewetak Tower 1.49 taacAPOo 27 6/16/56 Enewetak Air Drop 1.70 OSAGE 28 6/21/56 Enewetak Tower 15-20 INCA 29 6/25/56 Bikini Barge 1.100.00 DAKOTA 30 7/2/56 Enewetak Tower 3603)0 MOHAWK 31 7/8/56 Enewetak Barge 1,850.00 APACHE 32 7/10/56 Bikini Barge 4500.00 NAVAJO 33 7/20/56 Bikini Barge 5,000.00 TEWA 34 7/21/56 Enewetak Barge 250.00 HURON 35 4/28/58 Nr Enewetak Balloon 170 YUCCA 36 5/5/58 Enewetak Surface 18.00 CACTUS 37 5/11/58 Bikini Barge 1560.00 FIR 38 5/11/58 Enewetak Barge 813)0 BUTTERNUT 39 5/12/58 Enewetak Surface 1570.00 KOA 40 5/16/58 Enewetak Undrwtr 93)0 WAHOO 41 5/20/58 Enewetak Barge 550 HOUY 42 5/21/58 Bikini Barge 25.10 NUTMEG 43 5/26/58 Enewetak Barge 330.00 YELLOWWD 44 5/26/58 Enewetak Barge 573)0 MAGNOLIA Figure 5 : Complete List of Nuclear Weapons Tests in the RMI Source: Nuclear Claims Tribunal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 The power of the weapons tests completely pulverized 6 coral islands. The force of the explosions pulled the crushed coral of the vaporized islands and the surrounding water into the giant mushroom clouds that grew to 25 miles in diameter, in the case of the Bravo test. Crushed coral and water mixed with the radioactive particles released in the blast and fell to the ground in the form of radioactive fallout. This fallout exposed the Marshallese people and their environment to dangerous levels of radiation and altered the health, economy, culture, and well being of the islanders for decades to come. Radiation from the testing traveled in the atmosphere to every continent in the world. The RMI Government believes it was no accident that the Marshallese people were purposefully left in harm’s way and exposed to radioactive fallout. Although the U.S. Government initially evacuated Marshallese residents for smaller tests, the U.S. did not evacuate the Marshallese for the largest thermonuclear weapon ever unleashed by the U.S., the Bravo shot. The Bravo shot was the equivalent of more than 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs and was designed to produce as much fallout as possible. Heavy local fallout was useful for scientific purposes. By keeping as much fallout in the local area as possible, researchers helped ally allaying international criticism about the levels of worldwide contamination (Atomic Energy Commission 1954). Despite efforts to contain fallout to the Marshall Islands, contamination from Bravo spread throughout the world. A scientist named Van Middlesworth located radioactivity in the thyroid glands of slaughtered steer that grazed on grass in Memphis, Tennessee. Middlesworth knew the radioactivity in the steer’s thyroid came from fallout Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 Figure 6: Crater from a Weapons Test on Bikini Atoll. Source: Bair et al. (1982:7). produced in the Marshal! Islands. The monitoring of thousands of thyroid glands of slaughtered steer confirmed his hypothesis: “We knew in one week the entire country Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 (U.S.) was contaminated.. Nobody believed you could contaminate the world from one spot” (Middlesworth in Welsome 1999:303). The Marshallese people attempted to petition the United Nations in 1954 to address the problems caused by the testing. William Lodge, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, asked the Secretary General not to introduce the Marshallese petition until after the United States completed its last testing series in 1958 (Lodge 1958). The U.N. Secretary General agreed, and the United Nations considered the Marshallese petition four years after it was submitted when the U.S. testing program concluded. The petition expresses the Marshallese people’s concern about damage to their health and the long-term implications of removal from their land: We, the Marshallese people feel that we must follow the dictates of our consciences to bring forth this urgent plea to the United Nations, which has pledged itself to safeguard the life, liberty and the general well being of the people of the Trust Territory, of which the Marshallese people are a part. ...The Marshallese people are not only fearful of the danger to their persons from these deadly weapons in case of another miscalculation, but they are also very concerned for the increasing number of people who are being removed from their land. ... Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a place where you can bury your dead. It is the very life of the people. Take away their land and their spirit goes also.. .(United Nations Trusteeship Council 1958). Although the Marshallese took the appropriate steps to protest the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program, as the colonial administrators of the Trusteeship, the U.S. Government controlled all political developments by speaking for the Marshall Islands at the United Nations and elsewhere. The Marshallese were powerless to stop the destruction rendered against them and their islands. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 This sense of powerless and resistance to the U.S. Government’s domination and control of the testing agenda and consequences is evident in the Marshallese language. The Marshallese language, as other languages, serves as “.. .the collective memory bank of a people’s experience in history” (Ngugi 1986:15). The abuses and radiation exposure imposed on the Marshallese by the U.S. Government led anthropologist Barbara Rose Johnston to conclude that the Trusteeship led to the “selective victimization” of the Marshallese whom the U.S. Government considered an “expendable population” with needs secondary to U.S. strategic interests (Johnston 1994:10). This sense of victimization is evident in the language of the radiation populations who use their language to describe the events they witnessed and the changes to their health and environment they continue to experience (see Chapter V). Early Anthropology in the Trust Territory Missionaries, colonizers, and atomic researchers were not the only foreigners to enter the Marshall Islands. U.S. anthropologists joined the parade of outsiders to Micronesia. Early anthropologists, almost exclusively American anthropologists, provided the U.S. Government with an . ..internationally voiced justification to cloak the self-interest that usually underlay the colonisation process. In this regard, the concept of primitivism served the advocates of empire well.. and the developing discipline of anthropology offered a scientific basis for primitivism and, inadvertently, a justification with which empire could be defended against its critics (Hanlon 1994:97). The first anthropologists to work in Micronesia were Americans hired by the United States Government to help the U.S. understand more about the people, culture, and land Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 of its newly acquired strategic zone. As a result, their research and writings support U.S. colonial and military activities. Prior to the expansion of World War H into the Pacific Ocean, U.S. anthropologists began to arrive in Micronesia. The earliest American anthropologist to work in Micronesia was William Krieger. In 1943, Krieger produced a war background study for the Smithsonian Institution that detailed local power structures and gave the U.S. military clear indications of the best means to work with and gain control over the people. Anthropologists worked in Micronesia at the same time that Margaret Mead collaborated with the U.S. military and exerted a tremendous influence on anthropology in the Pacific. In addition to challenging anti-nuclear sentiments in the United States, Mead believed that westernization and militarization of the Pacific were the best avenues for modernizing the region (Gilliam and Foerstel 1992). The U.S. Army wanted Mead to produce “knowledge about peoples and their cultures in [a] context [which] could not be other than strategic” (Gilliam and Foerstel 1992:127). In the vein of Mead’s anthropology, early anthropologists in Micronesia helped produce studies designed to get local populations to work with the military on a variety of projects, such as the construction of buildings or airfields (Gilliam and Foerstel 1992). Anthropologists in Micronesia worked with the U.S. military on two strategic initiatives: in the late 1940s: the United States Commercial Company conducted an economic survey to improve the Navy’s ability to administer the islands (Mason 1989, Alcalay 1992); from 1947-1959, the Navy sponsored a Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA), which spread 35 anthropologists throughout Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 Micronesia to “compil[e] basic scientific information on the islands and to ‘provide data relevant to the practical problems of administering the area and its peoples’” (Marshall and Nason in Alcalay 1992:185). The U.S. administrators assigned anthropologists to the district or local levels to serve “as intermediaries between the Micronesians and the [U.S. Government” (Mason 1989:7). Because U.S. strategic interests in the Trusteeship centered on the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program, most anthropologists worked in the Marshall Islands. One of the first anthropologists to arrive in the Micronesia was Jack Tobin. In 1946, Tobin helped the U.S. Navy relocate people from one home atoll, Bikini, so the United States Government could use Bikini for its atomic weapons testing program. A year later, Tobin assisted with the relocation of the Enewetak Atoll residents when the United States required a second ground-zero location for its weapons testing program (Alcalay 1992). Tobin’s work focused on the socio-political and land tenure issues for the populations displaced by the testing program. The people of Bikini, for example, refused to recognize their paramount chief s rights to govern on Kili, the island where the community resettled, because the paramount chief did not own the land on Kili (Tobin 1953). As the Bikini people contested the authority of their chief during exile, Tobin reported to the U.S. administering authority that “...the people have decided that they will stay under the U.S. Government” (Tobin 1953:22). Because the U.S. Government wanted the Micronesian people to cooperate with U.S. strategic interests, the administering authority was undoubtedly pleased to learn from Tobin that the Bikinians transferred the traditional care-taking role of their chief to the U.S. Government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 Move Toward Self-Governance U.S. colonial control of the Marshall Islands remained throughout the weapons testing period. After the testing program ended in 1958, Micronesians began to discuss plans to regain their self-autonomy. In 1965, representatives from all of the TTPI islands formed the Congress of Micronesia. The purpose of the Congress was to prepare for greater self-governance in the islands. By 1978,48 delegates in the Marshall Islands gathered to write the nation's constitution. The Preamble of the Constitution reflects the perseverance of the Marshallese people and their pride in their island traditions: WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS...have reason to be proud of our forefathers who boldly ventured across the unknown waters of the vast Pacific Ocean many centuries ago, ably responding to the constant challenges of maintaining a bare existence on these tiny islands, in their noble quest to build their own distinctive society. This society has survived, and has withstood the test of time, the impact of other cultures, the devastation of war, and the high price paid for the purposes of international peace and security. All we have and are today as a people, we have received as a sacred heritage which we pledge ourselves to safeguard and maintain, valuing nothing more dearly than our rightful home on these islands (RMI Government, Constitution, Preamble, Section 5) On May 1, 1979, the Government of the Marshall Islands was formed and the nation became self-governing although still under the auspices of the United States trusteeship. By 1982, the country changed its official name to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). Compact of Free Association In 1983, voters in the Marshall Islands approved the Compact of Free Association with the United States. It was not until the U.S. Congress ratified the treaty in 1986, however, that the treaty went into effect and the Marshallese people became Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 independent for the first time in nearly 500 years. The Compact defines the unique political affiliation of free association that continues indefinitely between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. In addition to providing the Marshallese people with their independence, the Compact also recognizes the RMI as a self-governing nation for the first time. With the end of the Trusteeship and the start of free association, the Marshall Islands Government inherited infrastructure as well as U.S. federal programs and economic systems that were inappropriate for the islands and relied on continued U.S. funding. For example, the American school system imposed on the islands left a whole generation of Marshallese without an education to prepare them for life on their islands or to provide wage employment. In 1990, the unemployment rate among male youths in the Marshall Islands aged 15 to 29 was 56% (RMI Government 1990). Furthermore, the U.S. Government created an enormous public sector that had no checks to monitor financial corruption or waste. In the last few years, however, certain sectors of the economy appear to show signs of progress, such as the fishing, diving, aquaculture and handicraft sectors. Although the U.S. and the RMI will remain in free association indefinitely, the economic assistance that the U.S. provides to the RMI in the Compact terminates in 2001, with the possibility of an extension to 2003. The U.S. gives economic assistance to the RMI in exchange for U.S. security rights and interests, particularly the exclusion of third country militaries from the Marshall Islands, and the rental and use of Kwajalein Atoll for the testing of U.S. missiles. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 One of the fundamental objectives of the U.S. when concluding the Compact with the RMI was to encourage Marshallese economic development and self- sufficiency. The obligation of the U.S. to foster the RMTs economic development provided the basis upon which the U.S. obtained its ongoing security rights under the Compact. The Mutual Security Agreement signed by both nations as part of the Compact expressly states this principle: "the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands recognize that sustained economic advancement is a necessary contributing element to the mutual security goals expressed in this agreement" (Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands Regarding Mutual Security Concluded Pursuant to Section 321 and 323 of the Compact of Free Association). The concept of mutual security is premised on the shared security resulting from the Compact: the U.S. gains military security and the RMI gains economic security. Specific provisions in the Compact attempt to foster economic development in the RMI, a condition necessary to support the security requirements of the U.S. Although there are many provisions of the Compact intended to boost the RMTs economic development, the RMI Government is having great difficulty implementing some of these provisions. Regrettably, these provisions provide some of the most basic services to the Marshallese people. These provisions include economic benefits to offset lost economic incentives, essential air services, and the rights of Marshallese to seek employment in the United States (Muller 1999). In exchange for economic assistance and military protection, the Compact of Free Association guarantees the United States Government lease rights to Kwajalein Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 Atoll. Kwajalein Atoll has the largest lagoon in the world. Geographic isolation from the world community and strategic positioning between the United States and China, North Korea and Japan makes Kwajalein of extreme importance to the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. Army uses Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR) for the developmental testing of theater and strategic ballistic missiles and missile interceptors, to support NASA space operations, and to assist the U.S. space command with earth, space and satellite tracking and surveillance. Kwajalein is of unique strategic importance to U.S. Army activities because “KMR possesses the only treaty-approved launch site from which the United States can test, due to extended flight distances, ‘operational’ Strategic ABM interceptor missiles” (Kwajalein Missile Range 2000: http://www. smdc. army. mi 1/KMR. html). Although U.S. economic provisions to the Marshall Islands terminate in 2001, the United States retains the right to automatically extend the use of Kwajalein for an additional fifteen years to 2016. It is clear, however, that the United States will continue to provide economic assistance beyond 2001 to ensure the stability of the Marshall Islands that U.S. defense interests depend upon. For example, the operation of Kwajalein Atoll depends on the support of the Marshallese people, the local labor force and a positive working environment between the U.S. and RMI governments (Campbell 1999). Recently, activities on Kwajalein Atoll amplified U.S. strategic interest in the island as Kwajalein played an integral role in a successful test of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. On October 3, 1999, a "kill vehicle" was launched from Kwajalein Atoll. The kill vehicle successfully Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 found its target launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. From Kwajalein, the kill vehicle ignored the dummy target and struck its intended target at 16,000 miles an hour, 1,400 miles away from Kwajalein. The U.S. Army monitored the impact from the radar system on Kwajalein and reported that the kill vehicle "totally pulverized" its target. Kwajalein is an important strategic asset to the United States Government. The U.S. Congress appreciates the RMI Government’s willingness to host the missile testing facility and assist the United States with its strategic goals. Congress’ awareness of the RMI’s Government’s role in bolstering U.S. defense interests provides a bridge for the U.S. Government to consider hardships endured in the past by the Marshallese as a result of U.S. defense activities. In this regard, Kwajalein Atoll provides assurances that the U.S. Government does not completely ignore the lingering problems from the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. As in other areas neighboring U.S. military facilities (Enloe 1989), the local population that provides the labor and the land to the U.S. Government suffers silently alongside a multi-billion dollar facility. Ebeye Island, the most densely populated island in the Pacific, is the island neighboring Kwajalein Island where the Marshallese reside. Ebeye is an urban slum with severe housing problems, little drinking water, rampant malnutrition, no sewers or sanitation facilities, and severe overcrowding in the schools and hospital. David Stanley, the author of the popular tourists’ guide Micronesia Handbook, describes Ebeye as a “reservation" where: The bacteria count in the lagoon is 25,000 times higher than deemed safe by the U.S. Public Health Service. Not surprisingly, the incidence of hepatitis on Ebeye is 3 times higher than on any other Micronesian island. Medical facilities are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 pitiful, yet Marshallese are refused entry to the well-equipped U.S. military hospital on Kwajalein. Epidemics and suicides are rampant. There have been cases of dying patients being turned away by armed guards!” (Stanley 1985:67). The RMI Government and the Marshallese people are frustrated by problems linked to the U.S. military facility, but it is highly likely that the Marshallese will ask the U.S. to leave. If the Marshallese do not host Kwajalein and the U.S. Army missile testing range, it is unlikely that the U.S. Government will provide the economic assistance, beyond the terms existing Compact of Free Association, that the nation now depends upon. U.S. economic assistance represents approximately 85% of the nation’s revenue (Johnson 2000a). The Official U.S. History of its Nuclear Weapons Testing Program12 The “culture of secrecy” (Welsome 1999) that existed in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its successor agency, the Department of Energy (DOE), began prior to the testing program in the Marshall Islands and set the tone for AEC and DOE’s interactions with the Marshallese. The Manhattan Project, the project to develop and test the atomic weapon, required extreme confidentiality and secrecy. Accidents, injuries and deaths that occurred during the Manhattan Project were covered up for fear of lawsuits that would jeopardize the secrecy of the project and the continued development of atomic weapons. Although this secrecy was essential to the U.S. Government’s efforts to build and test the world’s first atomic weapon, “it hardened into 12 This history of the nuclear testing program, the official U.S. history, is deliberately brief. In Chapter IV. 1 provide a much broader, alternative narrative. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 a protective and impenetrable shell after the war” (Welsome 1999:484). The AEC suppressed information about the environmental and health risks in the weapons plants as well as the test site locations in Nevada and the Marshall Islands. “When serious concerns were first raised about the effects of fallout from atmospheric testing.. .The defensive strategy was almost always the same: Deny the charges, classify the data, and destroy the reputation of the accuser” (Welsome 1999:421). The culture of secrecy that began in the AEC and its successor agencies was compounded by the fact that the veterans and proteges of the Manhattan Project controlled virtually all radiation-related information in the United States for decades. These scientists sat on the boards that determined radiation effects and set radiation standards, investigated radiation-related accidents, and provided information to the public (Welsome 1999:486). In the AEC and DOE’s dealings with the Marshall Islands, U.S. Government officials continued to protect their underlying interests in developing and testing weapons and promoting nuclear energy. The AEC and DOE routinely coveredup information about the dangers and risks associated with radiation exposure to both the Marshallese and the U.S. servicemen, and purposefully portrayed the effects of radiation as minimal. The U.S. Government codified its official history of its nuclear weapons testing program in the Marshall Islands in two documents, the Compact of Free Association and a document entitled The Meaning of Radiation for Those Atolls in the Northern Part of the Marshall Islands That Were Surveyed in 1978. The U.S. Government refers to these two documents each time a discussion ensues about U.S. responsibility for the consequences of its testing program. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, the section pertaining to the nuclear testing program, recognizes that “The Government of the United States accepts the responsibility for compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall Islands... for loss of damage to property and person... resulting from the nuclear testing program... ” In order to address the responsibilities of the United States for the consequences of the testing program, Section 177 requires that the U.S. Government provide $150 million to the Marshall Islands to create a Fund that, over the 15 years of the Compact, will generate $270 million in proceeds for disbursement “as a means to address past, present and future claims” (Compact, Preamble of the 177 Agreement). More specifically, the major components of the Fund provide: - $2 million annually to assist with health care services; - $3 million for medical monitoring and surveillance; - $183.75 million in payments for claims from the testing program (received on a quarterly basis) • $75 million to the people of Bikini; • $48.75 million to the people of Enewetak; • $37.5 million to the people of Rongelap; • $22.5 million to the people of Utrik; - $45.75 to establish a Nuclear Claims Tribunal to award for loss or damage of person or property. As authorized by the 177 Agreement, in 1988 the Republic of the Marshall Islands established an independent judiciary body in Majuro. The Nuclear Claims Tribunal makes awards for personal injury and damage to property as a result of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program. As of March 3 1, 2000, the Tribunal awarded more than $71 million in compensation for individuals with radiogenic illnesses. Additional claims are filed on a regular basis and this amount will undoubtedly continue to grow. To date, the Tribunal has made only one property damage award, an award for $341 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 million to the people of Enewetak. The Bikinians have also filed a claim with the Tribunal and are expected to receive an award for a similar amount. The awards for Enewetak and Bikini, as well as other atolls that have begun to develop land claims, will be close to a billion dollars. With only $45.75 million available for actual payment of all land and individual health awards, the Tribunal lacks the means to make awards for the full scope of injury in the Marshall Islands. Consequently, the terms of the 177 Agreement are manifestly inadequate. The Compact rigidly imposes legal definitions of exposure that directly determine which Marshallese are eligible to receive medical assistance for their radiation- related needs. In the section of the Compact pertaining to agreements between the Marshall Islands and the United States, the Compact provides “special medical care and logistical support” from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the population defined as “exposed” to radiation from the testing program (Compact, Section 103(h)). The Compact defines the number of people exposed to radiation as “...the remaining 174 members of the population of Rongelap and Utrik who were exposed to radiation resulting from the 1954 United States thermonuclear 'Bravo' test..." (Compact, Section 103(h)). When the Compact came into effect, only 174 people of the original 226 people exposed to radiation on Rongelap and Utrik atolls on March I, 1954 remained alive. Currently, fewer than 120 of those original survivors are alive and eligible to participate in the DOE medical program. To compare radiation incidence levels between the small population from Rongelap and Utrik deemed exposed on March I, 1954, the DOE contractor for the medical program, Brookhaven National Laboratory, established a control group. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 Although this control group was not exposed to acute radiation from the fallout that coated Rongelap and Utrik following the Bravo test in 1954, the control population lived in highly contaminated environments. The control group from Rongelap, for example, was absent from Rongelap in 1954, but returned to Rongelap when the U.S. Government resettled the population on their home atoll in 1957. From 1954 to 1985, the control population, a population deemed “unexposed” to radiation by Brookhaven National Laboratory, lived in, ate, drank, worked and played in an environment with dangerously high levels of radiation. Over time, the “unexposed,” control population exhibited the same types of illnesses as the legally exposed group of Rongelapese, such as thyroid nodules and a full range of cancers. By claiming that the control group was unexposed to radiation yet exhibiting similar incidences of illnesses, the U.S. Government declared that the medical effects of radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands are minimal. Furthermore, the binary categorization of people (Prakash 1995) as either “exposed” or “unexposed,” based solely on external exposure to the Bravo test, oversimplifies the consequences of people’s exposures and does not allow for different degrees and modes of exposure in a heterogeneous population of radiation victims in the Marshall Islands. In addition to the special medical program for 174 people, Congress approved a medical program for the "...people of the Atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik who were affected by the consequences of the United States nuclear testing program...and their descendants" (Section103(j)). This program, the 177 Health Care Program, provides $2 million a year to service the health care needs of approximately 11,000 members of these four communities. The Compact does not include an inflation adjustment for the annual disbursement. As a result, the purchasing Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 power of the $2 million has greatly declined over the course of the Compact at the same time that the cost of health care continues to rise. Although the intent of the 177 Health Care Program is to provide comprehensive health care to 4 atoll communities, the level of funding per person amounts to approximately $15 a month, an amount grossly less than required. The other U.S. Government document that imposes rigid boundaries limiting the scope of radiation injury in the Marshall Islands is the 1978 Survey, entitled The Meaning of Radiation for Those Atolls in the Northern Part of the Marshall Islands That Were Surveyed in 1978. According to the Compact, this 1978 Survey and other related U.S. Government documents: “represent the best effort o f ... [the U.S.] Government [to] accurately evaluate and describe radiological conditions in the Marshall Islands... and can be used for the evaluation of the food chain and environment and estimating radiation-related health consequences of residing in the Northern Marshall Islands after 1978” (U.S. Congress, P.L. 99-239, 177 Agreement, Article VIII). The 1978 Survey evaluated the environments of the 14 northernmost areas in the Marshall Islands, including the two ground zero atolls. The U.S. Department of Energy contracted the authors of the report, William J. Bair, John W Healy, and Bruce W. Wachholz. In the report, Bair et al. assign a number to each of the 14 atoll areas to indicate the levels of persistent radiation in 1978: a number-one rating indicates “the least amount of radioactive atoms” and a number-four rating represents “the largest amount of radioactive atoms” (Bair et al. 1982:9). In the survey, only the uninhabited areas of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap receive ratings of four. The village area where the Rongelapese resettled in 1957 rates a three, indicating “a larger amount of radiation” Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49 (Bair et al. 1982:9). This document focuses on radiation levels at the time of the survey in 1978. It makes no mention of radiation levels during the 1940s and 1950s when radiation levels were highest and Marshallese populations lived in the survey areas. By focusing on 1978 levels of radiation exposure, the Department of Energy asserts its power to confine the discussion of exposure in 1978. Once this document became the legal basis for considering U.S. responsibility for the effects of the testing program, DOE successfully erased and ignored U.S. Government responsibility for acute exposure during earlier decades. Eight years after the Compact came into force using the 1978 Survey as the U.S. Government’s best effort to explain the lingering effects of the testing to the Marshall people, the RMI Government had an opportunity to review U.S. Government documents related to the testing program. In 1994, President Clinton began to declassify DOE documents to investigate U.S. Government sponsored studies of the effects of radiation on human beings. For the Marshall Islands, recently declassified DOE documents indicate that the U.S. Government defined Ailuk Atoll as a “control” area not exposed to radiation. In the 1978 Survey, Ailuk Atoll falls into category-one exposure, an area with the “least amount of radiation.” Once DOE designated Ailuk with category-one exposure, Ailuk Atoll came to represent the low-end of radiation exposure on DOE’s radiation scale of the Marshall Islands. This scale presents Ailuk as an area with the least amount of radiation when compared to Bikini and Enewetak. Unfortunately, this scale fails to explain whether the least amount of radiation has human or environmental consequences for the residents of Ailuk. The term “least amount” provides no Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 understanding of whether this “least amount” of radiation is safe or provides a risk to the Marshallese people. Ailuk Atoll might have less radiation than the ground-zero areas used to detonate 67 atmospheric explosions, but it is unfair and inaccurate for the 1978 Survey to dismiss concerns about Ailuk’s radiation levels by designating Ailuk as a least exposed area. In 1978, virtually any point in the world was less exposed to radiation than Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. Unlike the 1978 Survey that downplays radiation levels received by Ailuk Atoll, the recently declassified DOE documents demonstrate that 1954 levels of radiation on Ailuk Atoll concerned the U.S. Government. Following the Bravo test, the U.S. Government evacuated the population of Utrik Atoll, an atoll approximately twenty miles from Ailuk. Utrik Atoll had a radiation level reading of 17 roentgens on March 1, 1954. At the time of the Bravo incident, 3.9 roentgens was the U.S. Government’s Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE). Although the U.S. Government evacuated the Utrikese, it made a purposeful decision not to evacuate the people of Ailuk despite evidence of high radiation levels on Ailuk. The U.S. Air Force reported that the people of Ailuk received 20 roentgens of radiation exposure. Although the 154 residents of Utrik were evacuated for receiving an exposure level of 17 roentgens, the U.S. Air Force decided it was too difficult to remove the 400 residents of Ailuk: “based upon the best estimate of fallout time it was calculated that a dose to infinite time would reach approximately 20 roentgens. Balancing the effort required to move the 400 inhabitants against the fact that such a dose would not be a medical problem it was decided not to evacuate the atoll” (House 1954:K-59). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 If 17 roentgens warranted evacuation for the Utrikese, and 3.9 roentgens represented the MPE for the U.S. Government, it is clear that a dose of 20 roentgens would create medical problems for the people of Ailuk. Beyond the inhumanity and the criminality of the U.S. Government’s decision not to evacuate the Ailukese because of the “effort required,” it is clear that the Department of Energy’s 1978 Survey should not consider Ailuk to represent a “control,” or unexposed, population. By using Ailuk to represent a control population despite its significant exposure, the U.S. Government systematically minimized the consequences of its testing program when the 1978 Survey became the legal basis for Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association. The United States continues to use the Compact and the 1978 Survey as the legal means to continue to shape the scientific and political facts about radiation effects in the Marshall Islands because there have been no agreements to supercede the Compact, which is U.S. public law. These documents downplay and minimize the number of people needing medical care and the land areas with dangerous levels of persistent radiation. Because the Compact represents U.S. Public Law, the U.S. Government succeeded in codifying an essentialized history of its testing program when the Compact came into force. To date, the United States Congress fails to accept the need to amend the U.S. Government’s minimal financial and legal obligations to address the adverse consequences of the testing program. Furthermore, the U.S. Government does not have an interest in recognizing a broader definition of radiation injury in the Marshall Islands because this would establish a precedent for radiation communities in the United States, such as the Atomic Veterans, the downwinders, and the subjects of U.S. Government-sponsored human radiation experiments, to demand broader Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 recognition of harm. By focusing on the political and legal constructions of radiation exposure, the U.S. Government fails to “...deal with the socially constructed ‘facts’ of [radioactive] fallout” that the affected communities live and experience on a daily basis (Stephens 1992:272). Chapter IV of this research explores local constructions of radiation injury in the Marshall Islands. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTERn RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Developing Bonds of Trust My first introduction to the Marshall Islands was as a Peace Corps volunteer. From 1988-1990,1 lived with a Marshallese family and served on a remote, outer island community. By living and working with the Marshallese, I learned the language, the culture, and what the lived experience for Marshallese entails. My Peace Corps experience also started my personal relationships with the people, a relationship that anthropologist Henry F. Dobyns considers essential to fieldwork (Dobyns 1987). I believe the distinct “bond of trust” (Parker and King 1987:172) I have built with the Marshallese over the years is a result of my relative fluency in the Marshallese language and appreciation of the culture. I use the word “relative” with regard to my speaking skills to acknowledge the fact that, although people tell me I am fluent, I continue to learn more of the Marshallese language each time I travel back to the islands. Native fluency entails a working knowledge of clan hierarchy and land ownership that outsiders cannot easily understand. Continued learning of the language, however, is one of my on-going research goals (Basso 1995). Frequently, Marshallese tell me they entrust me with sensitive information about their experiences because my Peace Corps experience demonstrates that I can, and want to, live with the Marshallese. Furthermore, I am told that the local people regard 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 my continued work with the Marshallese as evidence that I love and care about them, and want to help them. When introducing me, many people say I am not an American, but refer to me as the “ledik in Mili” or the young woman from Mili, the atoll on which I did my Peace Corps service. People introducing me often add: “she has a Marshallese mother and father in Mili." The fact that I have adopted Marshallese parents indicates to the listener that I remain part of a Marshallese family with ongoing commitments. I continue to look after my adopted family each time I return to the Marshall Islands by paying school fees for the children, sending supplies to the family, and taking my parents on trips. My adopted family also sends local foods and handicrafts to me. My employers and friends in the Marshall Islands always make sure that people are aware of the strength of my ongoing relationship with my Marshallese family so they will understand that I am more than an outsider passing through. Achieving this “one of us” status enables researchers to get access to important resources (Han 1996). Archival Research Before going into the field, I reviewed existing data and government records about my research subject (Trager 1995). In the wake of the cold war, the Clinton Administration is making thousands of previously classified documents pertaining to its nuclear weapons programs available to the public. For the Marshall Islands, this means that the Department of Energy has delivered hundreds of thousands of pages in declassified documents to the RMI Embassy door since 1993. Extensive archival research was an essential component of my dissertation because the purpose of my research is to debunk the limited, official U.S. Government representation of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 history of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program in the RMI. Therefore, it was imperative for me to research the historical archives to understand how the U.S. Government constructed its history in the Marshall Islands. These DOE documents, for the first time, provide the RMI Government with a more complete, comprehensive understanding of the events that took place in their boundaries, and the effects of radiation on the health of the people, and their environment. Since 1993,1 have reviewed and taken notes on thousands of these documents. I arranged for interns from American University to help organize the documents as well as the photographs and videotapes from the testing era. I also wrote a grant to hire a computer programmer to create an extensive database of the documents, to establish a website, and to set up a computer database at the College of the Marshall Islands. Consistent with the objectives of applied anthropology, the purpose of all these projects is to increase public access to and understanding of the newly declassified information. What do the documents tell? The newly declassified documents demonstrate that the levels of radiation exposure and the geographical range of the exposure were much greater than the U.S. Government ever admitted to the Marshallese. According to the documents, every atoll and every person present in the Marshall Islands during the testing program was exposed to radiation from the weapons tests. The documents also demonstrate how the U.S. Government used its colonial power to control all information about the effects of the testing, and to represent the consequences of the testing program as having minimal impacts. From U.S. Government documents, we begin to find the cracks (Prakash 1995) in the wall of history constructed by the U.S. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 Government. This wall was previously impervious to the Marshallese to challenge because all information about the testing program remained in the tight control of the U.S. Government. Behind the formidable wall of history constructed by the U.S. lies the systematic erasure of the experiences of Marshallese radiation populations that were never included in the U.S. presentation of its testing activities in the islands. Those in charge of the information about the testing program grossly misrepresented its destructiveness to Congress, the U.S. and Marshallese publics. The U.S. Government maintains that the Bravo test was larger than expected, and fallout from the test accidentally exposed Marshallese people living on two atoll communities downwind from the test site, Rongelap and Utrik. The newly released documents discredit this notion of an “accident,” however. According to a U.S. Air Force weather forecast taken just six hours prior to the detonation of Bravo, “... winds [were blowing] in the direction of [the populated atolls of] Rongelap and Utirik.. (House 1954a). This information was communicated at the Command Briefing for ail senior level officials responsible for detonating the Bravo test, including General P. W. Clarkson, Commander for Joint Task Force 7, who was in charge of test operations. The newly released documents also allow the RMI Government to begin to tally cumulative exposure levels to radiation released from all the tests, not just the Bravo shot. U.S. Government history espoused in the Compact maintains that only people exposed to high levels of radiation from the Bravo test are in danger of suffering from medical conditions associated with radiation exposure. Yet, adding the cumulative radiation doses from the fallout of many Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 of the tests13 demonstrates that the U.S. Government exposed the whole nation to dangerously high levels of radiation. For those populations affected by radiation but not within the narrow parameters of the U.S. Government’s definition of “exposed,” the people continue to suffer silently with a range of medical and environmental problems the U.S. Government fails to acknowledge or recognize as linked to radiation exposure. The U.S. Government represents the “exposed” category as a fixed, unchanging identity. This means that Congress must amend statutory law to make the Marshallese radiation populations eligible for the same medical and environmental monitoring the 174 legally “exposed” group receives from the U.S. Government. Changing the law to acknowledge the problems and needs of radiation communities in the Marshall Islands is the primary policy objective of my applied research. Preliminary Fieldwork During the summer of 1994,1 spent two months in the RMI collecting oral histories and life stories for the RMI Government. With the assistance of two Marshallese key informants, Newton Lajuan and Fred DeBrum, I gathered life stories from more than 80 people who reside just outside of the geopolitical area that the U.S. Government defines as “exposed.” Except for two of these interviews, I conducted all of the interviews in the Marshallese language. I conducted most of these interviews in the homes of the people to provide the most relaxed, culturally appropriate, position to sit, 13 The U.S. Government still has not declassified information regarding the yields and fallout patterns of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 converse, and share food or drink with the interviewees (Beebe 1995). Initially, I experienced the awkwardness of meeting and conversing with new people (Hart 1996) and with conducting interviews, but the more interviews 1 conducted, the more comfortable I felt. For anthropologists, there is no substitution for at-the-site fieldwork to understand the day-to-day life of research subjects (Mason, J. 1987) and to consider language construction in context with the rest of the lived experience (Leap 1987, Williams 1977, Winford 1994). From this preliminary data, there is ethnographic evidence, as well as observable evidence, of acute physical and environmental damage. The Marshallese recounted many stories about the horribly deformed trees, animals, and people in the years following the nuclear testing. Most of these severely deformed plants or people did not survive. The living people, however, can describe these losses clearly (Barker 1997). Return to the Field The RMI Ambassador to the United States, my current employer, gave his blessing for me to return to the field from December 1997 to May 1998. He agreed to send me to the Marshall Islands for six months to undertake my research and to work with the RMI national and local governments on radiation related projects that the Ambassador pursues in Washington, D C. Because the Ambassador continued to pay my salary and expenses and because he saw no distinction between my academic research all the weapons tests. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 and my responsibilities at the Embassy, I consider my return trip to represent a continuation of my work as an applied anthropologist. When I returned to the field to do my formal “academic” work for the dissertation, I arrived with a previously established, complex relationship with the communities I worked with (Swedenburg 1995). Although academic coursework provided me with the theory and methodology necessary to collect meaningful data, I returned to the field with a number of preconceived notions based on my years of experience with the Marshallese people. Many contemporary anthropologists, unlike our early predecessors, go to the field with preexisting knowledge about the community and culture that we intend to work with. A long-term relationship with communities significantly enhances our ability to reach more complex and deeper conclusions in our work (Basso 1995, Swedenburg 1995). Public Education and the Training of Students From the data I collected in 1994,1 came to see why open interviews are the most common transmission of cultural knowledge in fieldwork. Therefore, 1 determined that oral history and life story interviews were the best means for me to continue my data collection during 1998. Because of my particular interest in linguistics, interviews also provide important ways to capture moments of language use, and preserve these tape-recorded moments as text and linguistic data to consider in conjunction with the Marshallese lived experience. Since I had an abundance of linguistic and ethnographic data I collected in 1994,1 decided to focus my 1998 fieldwork on gathering data from interviews conducted Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 by Marshallese. Comparing data that I collected to data gathered by Marshallese interviewers allows me to consider the validity of my own data, to provide training to Marshallese, and to examine linguistic text in which both the interviewer and the informant are native Marshallese speakers. Another reason I chose to train and use Marshallese to conduct interviews rather than myself is because my 1998 data collection was not part of a specific RMI Government project as it was in 1994. Although I originally planned to conduct my own interviews, I faced unexpected ethical dilemmas when I tried to resume my interviews in 1998. First of all, I felt guilty for putting people through the pain of discussing the consequences of their radiation exposure when this information was not part of a specific RMI Government project. Furthermore, Marshallese are sensitive to outside researchers, particularly Americans, because the U.S. Government conducted research on the people for many years without the people’s permission. On many occasions, I have observed Marshallese express intense hatred and dislike for researchers who came into their communities and failed to represent the best interest of the Marshallese. I witnessed occasions where the communities and Government in the RMI terminated their work with researchers who had many years of association with the Marshall Islands because of concern that the researchers failed to adequately present the problems or issues facing the Marshallese. I also did not want to do independent research that could compromise my good working relationship with the Marshallese people even though I knew the information, in all likelihood, would benefit the Marshallese in the Iongrun. I am certain I could have obtained many interviews from willing informants, but I simply did not feel comfortable with such a direct means of conducting research when it was not tied to a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 direct RMI Government project. For these reasons, as well as my commitment to empowering communities, I decided to concentrate my efforts on working with local counterparts. As a result, the bulk of my linguistic data from 1998 comes from the students I trained, and a Marshallese interviewer with whom I worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Whenever possible, I involved Marshallese students as partners in my research (Bernard 1995, Moran 1995, Warry 1992) to help develop their interest in nuclear issues and to develop the local capacity to undertake research. Involving local people also ensures that the research I do is of value to the community where I work (Warry 1992). Because of my emphasis on public education and training, I affiliated myself with the local college during my fieldwork. I was candid about my dual interest of collecting data and training Marshallese with the President of the College of the Marshall Islands and with my students. They all understood that I would benefit from their work as much as they did. I volunteered to help the College of the Marshall Islands establish a Nuclear Institute based on the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University. I also taught the Institute’s first course, the History of Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Pacific Region. The first Director of the Institute, Mary Silk, is a Marshallese graduate from the course I taught. By working with students and faculty at the College of the Marshall Islands, I helped train local counterparts in techniques of data collection and analysis and improved public understanding about the nation’s history with nuclear weapons. Unexpectedly, my ethical concerns about data collection became a positive factor in my fieldwork. My concerns enabled me to provide a greater, direct contribution to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 Marshallese community by helping to develop the country’s human resources. I think that facing my ethical dilemmas enabled me to redirect more time and energy to public education than my original research plans allowed. Educating the Marshallese public about nuclear issues and encouraging Marshallese to conduct their own research and investigation of nuclear issues became an unplanned, but important, component of my work as an applied anthropologist. In retrospect, my ethical dilemmas enabled me to give more to the community that nourished my research all these years. Over the years, the RMI Government paid me to learn as much as I could about the topic, but the country does not benefit if all the knowledge stays with me. My experience at the College of the Marshall Islands allowed me to contribute to public education. With my students, I invited the public to hear guest speakers discuss various aspects of the nuclear legacy and I filmed guest speakers to create a video archive. Together we sponsored a national essay writing contest and a public ceremony commemorating Nuclear Victims’ Remembrance Day. The winners of the national essay writing contest for each school level read their submissions over the national radio station. For their final exam, students conducted a live, nationally broadcast radio program to discuss nuclear issues. This program reached thousands of people in the urban centers and remote outer islands. Each student covered a particular nuclear topic in detail. At the end of their topic presentations, the students fielded questions from the public for more than an hour. People called in by telephone or by one-way radio broadcast from the outer islands. The public responded with tremendous support and encouragement for the radio project. People came down to the radio station to congratulate the students after their show, and others called the radio station or wrote Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 to the local newspaper to indicate how impressed they were that young Marshallese knew so much about the issues that dramatically affect the nation. One woman who was alive during the testing program, and therefore had a first-hand experience with the nuclear weapons, said she learned a great deal from the students about basic information, such as the number of tests and their yields. Positive feedback, together with the outpouring of community support, bolstered the students’ desire to learn more about nuclear issues and signaled to them that their communities value the study of nuclear issues. Inspired by the success of the radio show and the need to create an ongoing opportunity for students to explore nuclear issues, the students established a Nuclear Club at the College. The goal of the club is to continue to educate the public about their findings. To date, two of the members of the club joined American University’s summer institute to study nuclear issues in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Marshallese participants in the summer institute returned from Japan and educated fellow members of the Nuclear Club about nuclear issues in Japan. Members of the College’s Nuclear Club make regular presentations to the public middle and high schools in the Marshall Islands, and to the outer islands when funding is provided, to share what they learn. The presence of peer educators helps motivate younger Marshallese to learn about nuclear issues. As an applied anthropologist, it is rewarding to see the effects of empowering communities to undertake projects rather than having them dependent on outsiders. Another requirement of the course was for students to research Marshallese radiation populations. The students chose to work in groups and to research three specific populations: Marshallese workers sent to the test-site areas, the people of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 Mejit Atoll, a community downwind from the test-sites, and the generation of Marshallese bom after the U.S. testing program ended. In addition to archival research, students collected life stories from the respective populations. Students collected, transcribed, translated and analyzed their interviews. The students, as my local counterparts, and I all benefited from this project (Whyte 1992). They learned research techniques and valuable information about their communities, and I gained additional insights into my research topic. I used the data collected by my students to compare to my own data, and to substantiate my own research. Additionally, students gave final reports of their research to policy makers representing the various communities. Students also summarized their findings on the radio show. Identification of Key Informants In addition to the data my students collected, I also worked with a local counterpart, or native collaborator (Warry 1992), John Milne, to identify and interview key informants from different radiation populations. This local counterpart is one of the test-site workers, and therefore, has a first-hand understanding and experience with many of the issues I explore. My counterpart also founded an organization, the Marshall Islands Radiation Victims Association (MIRVA), to address problems facing the test-site workers. The U.S. Government hired workers to go to Bikini and Enewetak Atolls to support various activities of the testing program, including cleaning-up the islands, containing radioactive materials, reducing environmental contamination, and preparing the atolls for the original inhabitants to resettle. While living and working at the test sites in the 1960s and 1970s, the workers ate and drank from the local environments, and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 worked without protective clothing, without knowledge of radiation hazards. The workers believe they suffer from the same medical problems as the 174 Marshallese that U.S. Government history and public law defines as “exposed” to radiation. Involving an informant from the research populations in the data collection is one way to allow subjects to become partners in research (Moran 1995). Key informants are critical to research as they are particularly knowledgeable about the experiences of their communities (Patton in Trager 1995). John helped me better understand the experiences of the research populations and was invaluable in identifying and getting me access to the people appropriate for life-story interviews. This was also true during my preliminary fieldwork. My counterparts in 1994, Newton and Fred, led me to the elderly survivors of the weapons tests that were not immediately visible in the community. Despite the initial value of working with a local counterpart to collect data, I discontinued my research with the founder of MIRV A because John used my presence as a way to lead his group members to believe that they would receive financial compensation from the U.S. as soon as this case arrived in Washington, D C. I worried about the implications of my local counterpart’s claims to his group members because of the expectation it placed on the RMI Government to extract financial compensation from the U.S. I shared my concerns with the former RMI Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Phillip Muller, my direct boss while in the Marshall Islands. The Minister expressed concern and recommended that I discontinue my interviews for fear of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 unreasonably raising the expectations of the test-site workers. Unrealistically high expectations could have negative political implications for the RMI Government if the government cannot deliver what the people anticipate.11 These experiences compounded my reluctance to conduct further interviews myself. For these reasons, the only type of data collection I felt comfortable with in 1998 was student-conducted interviews. While heavily researched communities are often wary of outsiders’ intentions (Medicine 1987), the interview subjects seemed eager to share their experiences with the younger Marshallese generation. Correspondingly, the Marshallese students had a real interest in conducting the interviews so they could learn about their country’s nuclear legacy, a subject often overlooked or ignored in the school systems. Because of the public education that surrounded the students’ project, I feel confident that the method of research led to both the collection of credible data for my work and a useful body of knowledge for the students and the community to consider. The only downside to relinquishing control of data collection is that I was unable to pursue specific areas of interest with the informants. My years of experience with radiation issues in the Marshall Islands provides me with a strong base of knowledge for eliciting specific, important information from informants. By the same token, if Marshallese citizens are to develop the same level of understanding about radiation issues that I have, they must start at some point. The research students conducted in the course 14 Although I had to end mv joint interviews with John. John and 1 continue to work together closely to address the needs of Marshallese radiation workers. 1 have great respect for the work that John has done on behalf of the workers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 and the interviews provided many Marshallese with their first opportunity to develop their knowledge base about radiation issues. Life Story and Oral History Collection The purpose of the interviews I conducted, or witnessed, and the interviews done by the students was to collect oral histories or life stories from the interviewees. “Oral histories” are verbal accounts or reflections of a person’s life. “Life histories,” like “oral histories” are a summary of “life stories,” or shorter experiences within the life of a person. I prefer to use the term oral history instead of life history because “oral history” provides a clear juxtaposition to the codified, or “written history” that this research aims to destabalize. When referring to important stories or events within the broader context of an oral history, I refer to these metastories as “life stories.” All of the interviews that my students, my counterpart, or I conducted collected were done at the site of linguistic construction as a means to “...investigate speech behavior in [its] natural settin[g]” (Winford 1994:52). This relaxed approach makes the interviews similar to managed conversations (Hart 1996). With the exception of two interviews, all of the oral histories and life stories were done in the primary language of the respondents (Bernard 1995), Marshallese. The style of my interviews and the technique I instructed my students to use was an open-ended, informal interview that allowed us to guide the discussion in a relaxed, flexible manner (Beebe 1995, Bernard 1995, Netting et al. 1995, Portelli 1997). We placed emphasis on developing a bond of trust, and a rapport with the interviewees (Basso 1995, Ginsburg 1989, Watson and Watson-Franke 1985). When possible, the interviews were conducted in the homes Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 of the people, as I indicated in the discussion of my preliminary research, to provide the most culturally appropriate atmosphere to conduct interviews (Beebe 1995). Furthermore, since language is inseparable from the rest of the lived experience (Williams 1977, W'inford 1994), interviews were also collected at the site of linguistic construction. This is imperative because researchers need to understand what happens outside of the text in order to understand what happens within (Basso 1995). Language is also a means to negotiate the social reality of its users (Scherzer 1987). Consequently, it is important for researchers to try to understand the social reality that speakers attempt to verbalize. During interviews, both the narrator and the audience co-construct the text (Basso 1995). This notion of co-construction acknowledges that many factors, most notably the physical, biological, cultural, linguistic, and political traits of the ethnographer, shape the texts in a variety of ways. My interviews were no exception as many factors influenced the co-construction of the texts. For example, my presence as an outsider and an American influenced the text (Hart 1996, Swedenburg 1995, Watson and Watson-Franke 1985, Wilson 1995). Because they were speaking to a citizen of the country responsible for the nuclear testing, the interviewees undoubtedly saw me as a conduit to transmit their information to the U.S. public and policymakers in Washington, D.C., where I lived and worked at the time. Therefore, the respondents partially shaped their messages to reflect what they wanted policymakers to know about their experiences (Swedenburg 1995). I was also aware of how my sex and the sex of the interviewees affect the text (Basso 1995, Ginsburg 1989, Wilson 1995). On a few occasions, my male counterparts had to leave the interview area so I could discuss medical and reproductive Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 illnesses with the women we interviewed. Because of my interest in women as a radiation population, my sex positively influenced these interviews. Customarily, it is inappropriate for Marshallese men and women to discuss reproductive matters in the presence of members of the opposite sex if relatives are present. Without knowing the family history of everyone present during any interview, I avoided any discussion about reproductive issues to avoid any cultural difficulties unless I could speak with only the women. Another factor influencing the text was the subjects' knowledge that I am an activist with shared concern for the problems facing the people (Ginsburg 1989). In addition to my presence, the interviewees were no doubt responding to the political and clan affiliations, as well as to community and family relationships (Wilson 1995), of my students and counterparts. The audiences at the different locations (Basso 1995, Duranti 1994) also influenced the narratives of the texts. For example, in homes where we could not speak with the interviewee without their children, grandchildren or male relatives overhearing, women were not free to discuss reproductive illnesses they or community members experienced. In this regard, the narrator had to negotiate stories with the audience (Basso 1995, Duranti 1994, Polanyi 1985, Wilson 1995) so the content of the narratives was acceptable for everyone present. Transcription and Translation A variety of individuals, including myself, all influenced the text during the transcription process. After my preliminary fieldwork, I turned over copies of the interview tapes to the RMI Government. The Government funded the project, and, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 hence, owns the information. The RMI Government hired two Marshallese men to undertake the enormous task of transcribing and translating the majority of the interviews. We often discussed the nuances of the radiation language and some of the problems involved in translation. I also transcribed and translated several of the particularly important interviews myself. In the process, I found several important omissions in the transcriptions as well as translations with which I was not comfortable. Reviewing the transcription and translation work of others gave me the opportunity to make important corrections in my data. A female radiation victim from Likiep Atoll assisted me with some of the translations I did at the RMI Embassy in Washington, D.C. She was particularly helpful to me because she was a child during the testing program and remembers many of the experiences described by the narrators. Because she left the Marshall Islands as a young woman, however, her day-to-day use of the Marshallese language reflects a more traditional manner of speaking consistent with language use on a remote, outer island where she grew up in the 1950s. In the early 1950s, the English language and the vocabulary of globalization was just beginning to encroach on the Marshallese language. As a result, the woman who worked with me has a rich Marshallese vocabulary that characterizes the speech of many older Marshallese who grew up on the outer islands. The woman has not traveled back to the Marshall Islands for decades and her language use does not reflect the modem changes, and increased use of English words found in modem Marshallese. I found her assistance in transcribing and translating invaluable, especially with the interviews I conducted with elderly radiation survivors on the outer islands. Furthermore, her “bilingual and bicultural fluency” (Nalven 1987.34) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 contributed to my efforts to make the research conducted in the RMI useful in the United States political arena. A number of Marshallese students I trained also assisted with the transcribing, and some translation of the interviews from both trips to the field. All of the students said they enjoyed learning about the effects of the weapons testing by listening to the interviews and said that the content of the interviews made them want to learn more about nuclear and radiation-related topics. Exploration of a Cultural Domain During the first class of the course I taught at the Nuclear Institute, I explored methods of investigating a cultural domain of Marshallese radiation exposure. The first question I asked the students was: “what is radiation?” For the second question, I asked the students to free list to help define the cultural domain (Bernard 1995). Free listing was a new concept to the students, however, and my request drew blank stares. Therefore, I made the second question an open-ended question like the first. I broke the question into two parts and asked them to write down a.) the health effects of radiation exposure, and b.) the environmental effects of radiation exposure. Beyond the difficulties of trying to introduce free listing in an oral culture, I question the accuracy of the data from this exercise. All of my students were younger Marshallese who were not alive during the weapons testing program. Although their responses offer insight into how changes in the language pass to successive generations, the linguistic cultural domain differs from the language of my interview subjects. By the same token, I could not conduct a free listing activity with the older Marshallese exposed to radiation because Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 I could not assume that everyone is literate given the limited formal education of the older generation and the strong oral tradition skills in the country. Traditionally, adults pass information about the Marshallese culture and methods for survival to successive generations through storytelling, not through the written language. Close Observation and Field Notes Unlike participant observation, which maintains distance between the observer and the subject (Bernard 1995), I augmented my interviews with close observation. Close observation allows me to get as near as possible to my research subjects while still maintaining the ability to step back and reflect (Manen 1990). This method worked well for me since it has no clear division between researcher and subjects, and instead assumes that “[t]he best way to enter a person’s life world is to participate in it... [the researcher should] be a participant and an observer at the same time” (Manen 1990:69). Observations are particularly important to ethnographic research with radiation communities, as it is often difficult for people to express physical disabilities using only words. In this regard, photographs and notations of hand gestures people use to show how the bodies they describe were deformed by radiation exposure are essential aspects of close observation. The oral testimonies captured on the tape recorder do not amply convey the physical challenges described or experienced by the people. I also recorded on-site observations and my daily thoughts in a fieldnote journal. I wrote fieldnotes during interviews and my daily interactions with the Marshallese. My field notes reflect the descriptions of what I observed and heard Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 (Bernard 1995), and jottings that I made on the spot when I observed or thought of an idea relevant to my research (Bernard 1995). I also recorded my ethical concerns about conducting research and the obstacles that I faced while collecting my data. Several themes emerge from the fieldnotes (Bernard 1995) that help me with the analysis of my data. Other Data Sources The final type of data I collected comes from a variety of public sources. I collected the words to a song written by a radiation survivor from the Rongelap community. The popular song deals with the suffering the Rongelap people endure as a result of their medical conditions and the population’s inability to return to their home atoll. I gathered other songs written and performed by students from the Nuclear Club at the College of the Marshall Islands. Notes I took when guest lecturers and the students presented information to the class augment my interview data as well. I also have a tape recording of a session of the Nitijela (Parliament). The Nitijela Members discussed, in Marshallese, the pros and cons of storing nuclear waste in the Marshall Islands as well as the lingering hardships the nation faces as a result of the U.S. weapons testing program. I also look at the compositions written in Marshallese for the essay contest, and relevant articles in the local newspaper to consider how written Marshallese addresses radiation issues. Finally, I took notes during public gatherings, such as the ceremony for Nuclear Victims’ Remembrance Day (observed each March 1, the day of the Bravo test), at public hearings, and at bilateral meetings between the RMI Government and the U.S. Department of Energy. Attending the meetings between the RMI and DOE and assisting Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 the RMI Government is both part of my job responsibility for the RMI Embassy and an opportunity to collect data. Final Visit to the Field In February and March of 1999,1 returned to the field to conduct additional ethnographic work. Research I conducted for this final trip supported a consulting project I did for the Nuclear Claims Tribunal in Majuro. As discussed in Chapter I, Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association established the Nuclear Claims Tribunal in the Marshall Islands to make awards to citizens and communities in the Marshall Islands for damages incurred as a result of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. In the land claims brought before the Tribunal by the people of Bikini and Enewetak, appraisers used a detailed analysis of property rental as the means to calculate the land value of the two atolls. In 1998, the Public Advocate at the Nuclear Claims Tribunal asked me if the tools of anthropology are appropriate for developing a more culturally appropriate strategy for assessing land value than calculating the amount of property rental. Specifically, the Public Advocate asked me to consider the case of Rongelap, a community encompassing the three atolls of Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae. Rongelap is in the process of developing its land claim for the Tribunal. I indicated to the Public Advocate that in the non-market economy of the Rongelap community, it is imperative to consider land value from a Marshallese perspective, not a western perspective involving individual property leases. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 As a result of my discussion with the Public Advocate, I recommended that he meet with an environmental anthropologist and friend, Barbara Rose Johnston, and me to explore a more holistic approach to valuing the damages and loss experienced by the Rongelap community. The Public Advocate invited us to the Marshall Islands to assess Rongelap’s land value in local terms. In March 1999, Dr. Johnston, and an anthropologist from the University of Michigan and I met and worked with a Marshallese advisory committee in Majuro to discuss the project and to create a mechanism for the community to have input and participation during every stage of the research. The Public Advocate arranged for five Marshallese key informants to convene an Advisory Committee to guide the work of the project and anthropological team. The Advisory Committee consisted of a paramount chief ( iroijlaplap ), a Senator and iroij, an expert on women’s and cultural issues, and male and female representatives of Rongelap’s local government. The anthropological team’s opportunity to work with such a prestigious and knowledgeable Marshallese Advisory Committee accelerated our ability to understand the most critical aspects of Rongelap’s land claim from a Marshallese perspective. After meeting with the advisory committee to discuss research plans, I worked with the Rongelap community from Majuro, Ebeye and Mejatto to conduct interviews and research supporting Rongelap’s land claim. I brought my Marshallese colleague, Tina Stege, with me to the field. During her undergraduate studies in the United States, Tina worked as an intern at the Embassy in Washington, D.C. to learn about issues related to the nuclear testing. Upon her graduation, Tina returned to the Marshall Islands and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, where she was assigned to work on U.S. matters. Tina and I continued to work together closely while Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 she was in Majuro and I was in Washington, D.C. When I went to Majuro for my fieldwork and teaching at the College of the Marshall Islands, Tina assisted me with the class I taught at the Nuclear Institute and continued to teach the course when I left the Marshall Islands in 1998. In May 2000, the Foreign Ministry assigned Tina to Washington, D.C. to take responsibility for radiation issues and the subjects I handled for the Embassy for many years. Tina’s ability and preparedness to move into my job at the Embassy provides me with tangible proof that my approach to consulting assists the Marshall Islands with the development of its human resources. I conducted interviews, with the assistance of Tina, in Majuro and Ebeye. Tina and I also accompanied a group of Rongelapese back to Rongelap Atoll on their first return visit since their exile in 1985 (Figures 7 & 8). Initially, I modeled the type of interview style and information I hoped to gamer from the interviews for Tina. After Tina understood my research goals, she conducted many of the interviews herself. If I had additional questions not covered in the interview, I asked them after Tina completed her questioning. This enabled me to gather more data from two Marshallese speakers, to take better fieldnotes, and to listen more carefully to certain areas of information I wanted to probe with my own follow-up questions (Warry 1992, Whyte 1992). As a result of this approach, the data is richer with Marshallese linguistic information, and both Tina and I benefited by improving our research techniques. Tina is an outstanding interviewer. With the exception of the ethnographic data collected at the site in Rongelap, most of our formal interviews occurred in the Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal in Ebeye. Although I prefer to interview the people in their homes in order to provide the most relaxed, culturally appropriate position possible (Beebe 1995), there are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Figure 7: Welcoming Signs at the Airstrip on Rongelap Atoll. Source: Holly M. Barker (1999). Figure 8: Celebrating a Return Visit to Rongelap. Source: Holly M. Barker (1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission 78 several reasons why I did not conduct the interviews in the homes of the interviewees. First, the severe overcrowding in the urban areas, particularly Ebeye, makes it difficult to find a quiet place to conduct the interviews. Furthermore, the need to ask interviewees about health issues and the cultural constraints regarding the discussion of health issues in front of close relatives, particularly in front of children of the opposite sex, made it difficult to raise important issues in a home setting. Finally, due to the limited time I had to collect interviews and my unfamiliarity with the houses in Ebeye, I decided it was better not to waste interview time searching for homes. Instead, a colleague from the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, Tieta Thomas, dispatched the local and national police to locate interviewees and bring them to the office. Although the involvement of the police may signal coercion in many areas of the world, the transportation provided by the police gave a feeling of importance and seriousness to the interviews. The interviewees felt important because we asked them to share their knowledge with us to develop their community’s land claim, and because the police provided them with transportation. I translated and analyzed all of the ethnographic material for this project. Further analysis of this ethnographic data pertaining to undocumented radiation populations appears in Chapters III and IV. In October 1999, Dr. Johnston and I presented a co-authored report to the Public Advocate of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal entitled “Assessing the Human Environmental Impact of Damage from Radioactive Contamination, Denied Use, and Exile for the People of Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae Atolls: Anthropological Assistance to the Rongelap Land Valuation/Property Damage Claim.” Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IH THE “CRACKS”: LOCATING AND AMPLIFYING THE VOICE OF UNDOCUMENTED RADIATION POPULATIONS TO PROVIDE A MORE ACCURATE HISTORY As discussed in Chapter I, the United States Government limits its definition of populations exposed to radiation from the weapons to test to 174 people from Rongelap and Utrik. This chapter deconstructs the notion of exposure to the Rongelap community to demonstrate that Rongelap’s radiation exposure extends beyond the confines of those individuals present on their home islands during the Bravo test on March 1, 1954. Through the deconstruction of Rongelap’s exposure, it is clear that several populations within the Rongelap community, populations that remain outside the U.S. Government’s legal definition of exposed to radiation, face acute problems as a result of the U.S. weapons testing program. Some of these problems are medical ailments as a consequence of people’s exposure to radiation. Other problems result from the community’s inability to live on their home islands. This chapter broadens Rongelap’s history with nuclear weapons testing beyond the usual discussion of the health effects of exposure to radiation to include a discussion of the effects of exile and displacement on the community (Figure 9). To appreciate the full range of adverse consequences the community faces as a result of its intersections with U.S. cold war 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Figure 9: Displacement of Communities Source: Lance Laack objectives, it is critical to add exile to the range of Rongelapese experiences linked to the testing program. While some of Rongeiap’s problems with displacement parallel the concerns addressed by Robert Kiste in his study of the relocation of the Bikini people, such as disruptions to the social structure and land-tenure system and dependency on the United States, Rongelap’s history and experiences differ for many reasons (Kiste 1974). In Kiste’s study of the Bikinians, he fails to consider how displacement affected various segments of the Bikinian population differently In this chapter, I will examine how the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program affects people within the Rongelap community differently. Social status, sex, age and other factors differentiate people’s experiences with radiation exposure and exile from their homelands. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 Table 5: Timeline of Events for the People of Rongelap WWII - Japanese move the people living on Rongerik and Ailinginae to Rongelap. 1946 - U.S. nuclear weapons testing program begins. As a precaution, the U.S. Government moves the people of Rongelap and Wotho to Lae before the testing. - The U.S. moves the Bikinians to Rongerik Atoll. 1947 - U.S. becomes the administering authority of the U N. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. March 1, 1954 - U.S. detonates Bravo on Bikini Atoll March 3, 1954 - U.S. evacuates the people from Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae to Kwajalein Atoll. June, 1954 - U.S. relocates the Rongelapese to Ejit Island on Majuro Atoll. July, 1957 - U.S. returns the Rongelapese to Rongelap Island. May, 1985 - Fearing for their health and safety, the Rongelapese remove themselves from Rongelap and arrange to relocate on Mejatto Island on Kwajalein Atoll. 1997 - Congress appropriates additional resources to Rongelap’s trust fimd bringing the total amount to S40 million. Today - The Rongelapese community resides in several locations, including Mejatto, Ebeye, Majuro, other atolls in the RMI, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland. - Phase 1 of the Rongelap resettlement program is underway. This phase includes construction of a base camp, dock and airstrip on Rongelap Island, as well as clearing of brush and preparation for the application of a potassium fertilizer intended to reduce the levels of radioactivity available to plants for absorption. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 A New Narrative of the History of Rongelap’s Radiation Exposure15 The Rongelapese define themselves as people with land rights on Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae Atolls. This identity stems from the Rongelapese people’s historical ownership and use of the marine and terrestrial resources from three closely situated, but separate, atolls for their survival. American and Japanese relocations of the Rongelapese people concentrated the population on Rongelap Atoll. As a result, colonial powers failed to consider Rongerik and Ailinginae as part of the people’s ownership and use rights, as well as their identity. During WWII, the Japanese moved all of the people residing on Ailinginae and Rongerik Atolls to Rongelap. Rongelap’s magistrate, John Anjain, recorded the names of the nine people moved off of Rongerik on January 12, 1946 and the twelve people later moved off of Rongerik on July 3, 1946 (John Anjain undated: 119).16 At the time, the Rongelapese did not know that this relocation was the first step in their exile and denied use of their land. When the United States liberated the Rongelapese from Japanese control on April 4, 1944, the Rongelapese declared this date their liberation day and rejoiced at their freedom from an oppressive Japanese regime (John Anjain undated:9). 151 excerpted portions of this chapter from the work that I prepared for the jointly authored report I did with Barbara Rose Johnston (Johnston and Barker 1999). 16 As Rongeiap's Magistrate during WWII and the US nuclear weapons testing program. John Anjain kept extensive record books detailing the movements of the population and the population's interactions with outsiders. John let me read, take notes and Xerox copies from the two remaining record books in his possession. John said he used to have five books. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 Preparations for the Tests As Japan did, the U.S. Government took control of Rongerik Atoll for military activities. The U.S. Government used Rongerik as a weather and data collection site to support its nuclear testing program that began in 1946. During early tests, the United States temporarily relocated people living on atolls downwind from the testing area, such as the Rongelapese, as a precaution. Before the U.S. conducted its first nuclear test, it used LST 1108, a ship used to land troops and tanks for amphibious invasions, to temporarily relocate 108 Rongelapese and the people from Wotho Atoll to the island of Lae (John Anjain, no date: 118). Although the U.S. Government contemplated the permanent resettling of downwind populations to Lae for the remainder of the testing period (Joint Task Force 7, no date), the U.S. Government returned the Rongelapese to their islands after their temporary evacuation to Lae. In addition to moving the Rongelapese as a precaution for the 1946 tests, the U.S. Government relocated the people of Bikini from their ground-zero islands. Without permission from or compensation to the Rongelapese, the U.S. Navy moved 181 Bikinians to Rongerik to reside while the U.S. Government used Bikini to test its atomic and hydrogen weapons (Joint Task Force 7, no date).17 Unlike the Rongelapese who returned home in 1946 after a brief evacuation, the Bikinians remained on Rongerik for approximately two years. During the Bikinians’ stay on Rongerik, an accidental fire destroyed 17 The record books of John Anjain include a statement by an aiap of Rongerik stating that no one ever asked him for permission to let the Bikinians use his land (John Anjain 1943 entry:78). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 critical food resources. On an atoll that served only as a supplemental food source for the Rongelapese, and not for long-term residence of the Rongelap community, resources were inadequate for the Bikinians to survive. Extended use of the limited resources on Rongerik resulted in extreme hunger for the Bikinians (Mason 1948, Kiste 1974). In attempt to avert their starvation, the Bikinians destroyed the plants on Rongerik. The Bikinians chopped down coconut trees to eat the core, or heart of the palm (Mason 1948). As magistrate, John Anjain, recorded the numbers of coconut, pandanus and breadfruit trees destroyed by the desperate Bikinians (John Anjain no date:2). According to John Anjain: In 1946, the Navy stopped the fieldtrip ship service between Rongerik and Rongelap and the Bikinians didn t have supplies. 99% o f the land on Rongerik was ruined by the Bikinians. Three quarters o f the land was burned in 1946 by an accidental fire from cigarettes. The people even ate the titty pandanus and cocotmt seedlings because the Bikinians were movedfrom their own homeland and left alone (John Anjain 1999). The Rongelapese understood that the Bikinians caused the destruction of Rongerik, but the Rongelapese also knew that the Bikinians had no choice. In response to the crisis of the Bikinians, the Rongelapese did their best to assist with food resources and the care of children and the elderly: From June to September 1947, Bikinians were making frequent trips of six hours by outrigger from Rongerik to Rongelap in order to relieve the strain on limited food resources at Rongerik. Old people and children especially were sent to Rongelap for a month or two, and returned with surpluses of coconuts, clams, and other staples from Rongelap (Mason 1948:15). Despite the efforts by the Rongelapese, the Bikinians continued to suffer from hunger and pillage the land. By 1947, the land was quite damaged. This makes me sad because Rongerik was the land o f my grandfather and it is difficidt to return and start Rongerik to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 way it was before. The Navy didn 't pay the iroij, alap or workers [of Rongelap] for the Bikinians ’ use o f the land. They didn’t let them know the Bikinians would use their land (John Anjain 1999). The starvation of the Bikinians on Rongerik contradicted the U.S. Government’s pledge to care for the Marshallese. When the U.S. Government became the administering authority of the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific that included the Marshall Islands, it agreed to “protect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources” (United Nations Trusteeship Council 1946). The Rongelapese never resettled Rongerik after the Bikinians used the land. When the U.S. Government relocated the Bikinians from Rongerik to Kili Island,18 it retained Rongerik Atoll for military use. After the testing period, the U.S. Government resettled the Rongelapese on one island, Rongelap Island, and forbade the use of Rongerik Atoll, whose natural resources had already been destroyed by a ravished population. In 1954, the U.S. Government prepared to detonate its largest nuclear weapon ever in the Bravo test. In preparation for the test, U.S. Government researchers consulted meteorological data regarding the directions of the winds and the potential radiological hazards that could result from Bravo. The U.S. Government decision makers in charge of the testing program knew that several experts predicted the winds would push Bravo’s fallout toward inhabited atolls to the east and southeast of Bikini 18 The Bikinians remain on Kili Island to this day because Bikini is too radioactive to resettle. Kili is a single island with scant resources and no lagoon and the Bikinians are unable to live a traditional Marshallese lifestyle. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 Reeves 1953).19 Colonel Lulejian, a government meteorologist calculated that “the islands of Rongerik, Rongelap and Bikar are clearly in the fall-out area even when such a simple extrapolation is used” (Lulejian 1954). Joint Task Force 7, the military team responsible for carrying out the testing program, had access to a large body of meteorological data on wind patterns from previous tests, and to information about the seasonal and unpredictable trade winds in the Marshall Islands. A 1953 report to the Commander of Joint Task Force 7 prepared by Elbert W. Pate and Clarence E. Palmer predicted that a high-yield detonation could trigger a cloud of radiation which would expand as it became self-sustained by energy during the test (Pate and Palmer 1953). In effect, this report showed that a blast could create its own weather system. After considering this particular report, the Commander of Joint Task Force Seven, P. W. Clarkson, proposed to “treat the report the same as I would a report from any other member of my staff when I do not agree with him. In short, we will kill it and stick it in the file” (Clarkson memo attached to Pate and Palmer 1953). Just six hours prior to the test, U.S. Government weathermen determined that the winds from the test site on Bikini Atoll were blowing in the direction of the inhabited atolls of Rongelap and Rongerik (House 1954a). Despite the recommendations of the U.S. Government meteorologists and the midnight weather report, Commander D.W. Clarkson proceeded with the detonation of the Bravo weapon. When the U.S. Government detonated the Bravo test on the morning of March 1, 1954, the giant mushroom cloud extended upwards more than 100,000 feet and eventually reached every 191 excerpted this discussion about the weather from the testimony I wrote for RMI Senator Tony deBrum Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 continent in the world. As predicted by U.S. Government meteorologists, the cloud spread over inhabited islands where the dusty, gray fallout rained on Marshallese communities. Although the U.S. Government evacuated the Rongelapese as a precaution for much smaller tests, it failed to evacuate the people before its largest and dirtiest test ever conducted. In fact, prior to the Bravo test, Joint Task Force 7 increased the danger zone for the test to just miles offshore from Rongelap and its neighboring atolls. By excluding Rongelap from the Danger Zone, the U.S. Government did not have to evacuate the Marshallese residents prior to the test. The Rongelapese remained on their home islands for the Bravo test.20 Prior to the Bravo test, the U.S. servicemen anticipated possible radiation exposure to their location on Rongerik: “for several days prior to March 1, 1954, the Air Force weather station on Rongerik noted the upper winds coming from the west and there was talk about the possibility of part of the radioactive cloud being blown directly over the islands” (U.S. Air Force 1954). On the morning of the Bravo shot, 28 American military weathermen were positioned on Rongerik Atoll. Once the fallout from the Bravo test began to rain down. Joint Task Force 7 ordered the weathermen not to eat or drink anything, and to put long sleeve shirts on. Within hours after fallout arrived on Rongerik, the U.S. Government sent airplanes to Rongerik to evacuate the weathermen. to present to the White House Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments on July 5. 1994. 20 The RMI Government maintains that the U.S. knew the winds were blowing in the direction of Rongelap before it detonated Bravo since pre-shot weather forecasts report winds blowing in the direction of Rongelap. Furthermore, the U.S. had evacuated the Rongelapese for smaller tests before Bravo as a precaution. The RMI Government surmises, therefore, that the exposure of people was intentional in order to research the effects of radiation on the Marshallese. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 In comparison to the safety measures taken for the U.S. servicemen, Joint Task Force 7 and the U.S. Government made little effort to inform local residents about the tests. A few weeks before the Bravo test, the U.S. military tried to explain the events problems resulting from the test, but despite the efforts of an interpreter, the people did not understand what the Navy Commander said (Joint Task Force 7 1955). Radiation safety plans prepared in advance of the test series indicate that, if communities became contaminated by radiation, the military had the capability to evacuate exposed residents in four hours (Joint Task Force 7 1955). Unfortunately for the Rongelapese, it was more than 50 hours before the U.S. Government evacuated the people from Rongelap and Ailinginae. The U.S. servicemen took radiological safety measures once their exposure occurred. As a result, the experiences of the Rongelapese and the U.S. servicemen with radioactive fallout varied greatly: The individuals exposed on Rongelap and Ailinginae remained outdoors and had no access to shelter of any kind on the island... (T)he heavy coconut oil hair dressing used by the Marshallese tended to concentrate radioactivity in the hair... On Rongerik, the exposed individuals recognized the nature of the fallout, put on protective clothing, and took advantage of the partial gamma shielding afforded by...buildings in the area, staying indoors as far as possible (Joint Task Force 7 1955:10-11). The Rongelapese continued to eat food and drink water tainted from Bravo’s radioactive fallout for the more than two days before the U.S. evacuated them to Kwajalein Atoll. While the Rongelapese remained in their contaminated environment without evacuation, military ships fleeing from the radiation in the testing area passed by Rongelap at midnight on March 1st without stopping. Still another ship was anchored adjacent to Rongelap during the test, but sailed away shortly after the incident without checking on the local population. As the United States Government scrambled to respond to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 radiological emergencies predicted for and caused by Bravo, it officially announced that a sudden change in the wind during the Bravo test “accidentally” carried radiation downwind and exposed the people residing on Rongelap and Ailinginae Atolls. Events on Rongelap and Ailinginae During the two days after Bravo, the Rongelapese were exposed to radiation both externally, from the fallout that burned their skin and clung to their bodies, and internally, from the ingestion of radioactive food and water and the inhalation of radioactive fallout in the air. Radiation particles stuck to the coconut oil Marshallese used on their hair and skin, and exacerbated the external exposure the Rongelapese received. The 82 Rongelapese continued to eat and drink contaminated food and water for the two days after their exposure because there were no other food and water available. At the time of evacuation on March 3, 1954, the people were exposed to an estimated 270 roentgens (rems) for those on Rongelap, a near lethal dose, and the people on Ailinginae Atoll received 120 roentgens of exposure from the Bravo test.21 Because of their small body size children obtained substantially higher doses of wholebody radiation, particularly to the thyroid gland which quickly absorbed radioactive iodine-131 from the environment. :1 According to the “Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation" homepage. http//:www.unm.edu/~rekp/caxd.html. a person exposed to radiation in a short period of time can expect the following health effects: 5 to 25 rems can cause genetic damage 50 rems can alter white blood cell counts 75 to 125 rems can produce radiadon sickness 400 rems can kill 50% of the exposed population 500-600 or more rems will kill almost all of the exposed people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 Ethnographic data which I collected in 1994 and 1999 demonstrates that the Rongelapese had no understanding that the U.S. Government tested a nuclear weapon 55 in their vicinity and that they were experiencing the effects of radiation exposure. People vividly describe the site of the bomb in the early morning light and the strong sound and wind that hit them soon after the blast. The data also shows the exposure pathways from Bravo’s fallout and the immediate effects of radiation exposure on the residents of Rongelap and Ailinginae: Our bodies hurt, we were nauseous. I was sick from the first day. I was really sick after the bomb. I had to stay in the house because I was so sick (Jenwor 1999). The children's hair fe ll out. Also, the skin o f the men who were fishing itched badly. Our fingernails turned black (Abija 1999). My hairfell out. It was really funny. I could pull out my hair easilyfrom the bums. Baldness. We were really cooked like they set our heads on fire ...I had bums on my arms, throat, legs. It’s like I was cooked here (points to throat and arms) (Emos 1999). Radiation illness felt like the flu (Eknilang 1999a). When the fallout came, it fell on our rice andfood. We threw out the rice at the school. We threw it out because it was bad, it made blisters in our mouths. I used the well water that was soap-like because o f the fallout dust on top o f the water. I soaped my head. I put the fallout on my head. My hairfell out. I am the girl in the Brookhaveir3 picture whose hairfell out (Joseph 1999). Events on Rongelap I was living with my parents and some other family members on an islet across “ John Anjain's records of 1946 make no mention of people's perceptions of Bravo and its effects. 3 From 1954-1998. Brookhaven National Laboratory monitored, studied, and conducted research experiments with the Rongelapese to better understand the effects of radiation on human beings. One of the pictures of the human subjects of these tests is Nerja. The picture of Netja's profile shows the acute epilation Neija experienced after the Bravo test Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 the reeffrom the main island where we had gone to make copra. On that March morning, my father woke me while it was still pitch dark to cross the reef with some o f myfriends to the main island to buy some coffee, flour and sugar. There were four o f us, three girls and one boy. Well, we were in the middle o f the reef between the two islands when the whole o f the western sky lit up. It seemed like it was afternoon, not 5 o 'clock in the morning. The color went from bright white to deep red and then a mixture o f both with some yellow. We jumped behind big rocks on the reef. We were too afraid to decide whether to run back to the small island or to run across the reef to the main island. It was the boy who finally pushed us to run to the main island. Just as we reached the last sandbank, the air around us was split open by an awful noise. I cannot describe what it was like. It felt like thunder but the force from the noise was so strong that we could actually feel it. It was like the air was alive. We ran the last bit to the island. Everything was crazy. There was a man standing outside the first hut staring at the burning sky. A couple o f us threw ourselves onto his legs; the others ran into his hut where they threw themselves onto his wife who was trying to come outside to see what was happening. That afternoon, Ifound my hair was covered with a white powder-like substance. It had no smell and no taste when I tried tasting it. Nearly all the people on Rongelap became violently ill. Most had painfitl headaches and extreme nausea and diarrhea. By the time of our evacuation to Kwajalein, all the parts o f my body that had been exposed that morning blistered and my hair began to fall out in clumps. Ijust had to run myfingers through it and they would come out fitll o f dust (Bobo 1994). Events on Ailinginae I was in my late 20's at the time o f Bravo. I was on Ailinginae with my husband, Jettwor Anjain, who has since died. All o f the older people, like my husband, have died We used all the small islands on Ailinginae. I went to Ailinginae three times, the third time is when the bomb dropped. When it dropped, we saw a light. It (the light) was to help find submarines my husband said (laughs). The 'powder' (fallout) was on the lagoon side. We were lookingfor birds when the powder fell. The old man was ready to take his boat to go and get birds. He told the children not to play there (on the lagoon side). I was supposed to take care o f the kids, but we all passed out on the lagoon side. When they came to take us away from the island later, our clothes had powder on them. We saw the powder and we said it was something to reduce the poison from the bomb, the old man said. We were happy because we said we Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 w ouldn 7 get as much poison because that thing was a bomb (laughs).24 We prepared the underground stove. We were going to split up the birds. I stayed with the kids. We saw the boats coming and we wondered why the huge boat came. We had no idea what was happening. We only thought about playing around and finishing our cooking o f the birds. How could we go off to Kwajalein ? I thought about my sleeping mat / was working on. I got my bible and songbook. Some people hidfrom the Americans inside the cement water catchments because they thought they were coming because there was a war, not that people were coming to evacuate them. We didn 7 understand yet about bombs. On Ailinginae, they didn 7 stop usfrom eating and drinking after the powder fell. We blew the powder o ff of our food and ate it. We couldn 7 take care o f each other, even the kids, because we were all sick. We ate sprouted coconut 25 because we were really nauseous, and when we ate, we got even more nauseous. On the boat, we took showers and put on trousers and sailors' underwear (Emos 1999). Evacuation and Exile The U.S. Government dispatched ships to evaluate radiological conditions and to evacuate the Rongelapese. At the time, the Rongelapese did not understand that the radiation severely contaminated their islands and that the Rongelapese were about to embark on years of exile and denied use of their land. The U.S. military ships evacuated the Rongelapese to the U.S. military facility on Kwajalein Atoll: The boat was fast and we arrived in Kwajalein in just one day. We got off on the dock. The bus took us - we didn 7 know to where. Four pregnant women and two older people who couldn 7 move well arrived by airplane. They put a fence around the place where we were on Kwajalein. It was forbidden for others to enter. Only police and doctors could enter. Every day they had us all go down to the lagoon to wash off. The people on Kwajalein, the Americans, helped us with clothes. On Kwajalein, we ate three times a day. We were treated well (Emos 1999). 14 It is possible that this statement was a joke that was added to the accounts of the day at a later time because of its reference to reducing the poison in the weapon. On many occassions the interviewees use laughter as a means to discuss painful subjects. Unlike this joke suggests, all of my interview subjects indicated, however, that they were surprised by and unprepared for the events of March 1 .1954. 25 Marshallese often eat sprouted coconut when they are sick or feeling nauseous. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 We were so ashamed. They had everyone in the community, men and women, brothers and sisters, and families take their clothes off and bathe in the lagoon together. In our culture, nothing could be worse! We had no choice, and we were deeply ashamed (Eknilang 1999c). On Kwajalein, the U.S. Government flew in physicians to provide medical care to the Rongelapese and the other Marshallese residents evacuated from Utrik Atoll.26 Without their knowledge, the U.S. Government enrolled the Rongelapese and Utrikese in Project 4.1, the “Study of Response of Human Beings Exposed to Significant Beta and Gamma Radiation Due to Fallout from High Yield Weapons” (Barker 1997). Conveniently, the different exposures on Rongelap, Ailinginae and Utrik provided the U.S. Government with a range of different exposures and case studies to leam more about the effects of radiation exposure on human beings (Polakov 1954). Project 4.1, stamped “secret restricted data,” was “a joint AEC-DOD [study] established to study the physiological symptoms of evacuated natives” (Atomic Energy Commission 1954:14). According to the Atomic Energy Commission, “this project represented the first observations by Americans on human beings exposed to excessive doses of radiation from fallout” (Atomic Energy Commission 1954:71). U.S. Government researchers considered Project 4.1 a valid study for several reasons: “the groups of exposed individuals were sufficiently large to provide good statistics.. .the exposures involved far exceed the normal permissible dosage...The internal dosage was due mostly to ingested material... [and] Beta activity in the urine of these exposed human beings indicated significant internal contamination” (Atomic Energy Commission: 71-72). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 Initially, U.S. Government researchers studied the immediate effects of radiation exposure. Researchers observed and photographed Rongelapese loss of hair, depressed blood cell and leukocyte counts, flu-like symptoms, fingernail discoloration, nausea and radioisotope activity in the urine (Joint Task Force 7 1955, Coleman 1959, U.S. Government Accounting Office 1985). Researchers also studied the skin burns of the Rongelapese and determined that beta from fallout penetrates well into the body as the skin absorbs a large portion of radiation and makes it possible to estimate radiation dose from skin bums: “The Marshallese incident has pointed up the fact that beta bums will occur at sub-lethal gamma levels only when particles come into contact with bare skin” like the Rongelapese who wore no protective clothing on the day of the Bravo test (Joint Task Force 7 195:615). By the end of 1954, a U.S. Government physician, Dr. Eugene Cronkite, determined that because of their acute exposure to radiation from the Bravo test the Rongelapese “should be exposed to no further radiation, external or internal with the exception of essential diagnostic and therapeutic x-rays for at least twelve years. If allowance is made for unknown effects of surface dose and internal deposition there probably should be no exposure for [the] rest of [their] lives” (Cronkite 1954). After studying the immediate effects of radiation on the Rongelapese, the U.S. Government concluded that Rongelap, Rongerik, and Ailinginae atolls remained too contaminated for habitation. The U.S. Government arranged for the relocation of the Rongelapese from Kwajalein to Ejit Island, a small island in Majuro Atoll. The 26 The U.S. Government evacuated the Utrikese from their home atoll after an exposure of approximately Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 Rongelapese resided on Ejit Island for three years. During that time, the people remember the food, supplies and buildings provided to them: After a few months, a big boat took us to Ejit. There was lots offood. There was chicken. There was rice, flour, sugar, and C-rations they brought to us. Lots of food Soap for washing clothes and showering. There were sleeping houses, a school building, a doctor's office, and a church. The doctors examined us two times in one year, May and October (Emos 1999). While the Rongelapese resided on Ejit, American scientists on contract with the U.S. Government surveyed Rongelap to learn about the movement of radionuclides in the environment and to learn more about the travel of radionuclides from the environment to animals, plants and the human body. Project 4.1 staff members collected soil and food samples from Rongelap Atoll. Researchers from the Applied Fisheries Program at the University of Washington noted that strontium-90 taken up by plants deposited in the bones of humans via air, water, plants and animal products (Palumbo and Lowman 1958). By measuring the amount of radionuclides present in human beings, researchers could confirm the levels of fallout produced by the weapons since “the deposition in the human body seems roughly to parallel the levels of fallout” (Dunham 1954). After the U.S. Government removed the Rongelapese in March 3, 1954, radiation continued to deposit on the atolls. The U.S. Government monitored the accumulation of radiation on Rongelap both after the Bravo event and subsequent shots from the 1954 Castle, 1956 Redwing and 1958 Hardtack series (Donaldson 1956a, Palumbo and Lowman 1953, Weiss et al. 1953, Joint Task Force 7 1955, Welander 1958, 17 rems. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 Palumbo 1959, Held 1965). Fallout from two additional Castle series tests after Bravo was thought to contribute as much as 8% of the surface activity on Rongelap (Donaldson 1956b). Some of these post-Bravo tests, such as the tests from the Redwing series, contaminated the southern part of Rongelap where the people later resettled (Palumbo 1959). Surveys of the soil, plants, animals and water conducted on Rongelap between the Bravo test and resettlement in 1957 confirmed that radiation levels on Rongelap were high. Shortly after the Bravo shot, U.S. researchers identified cesium-137 as “one of the principal radionuclides found at Rongelap” (Donaldson 1956a: 164). Cesium-137 was detected in edible portions of plants prior to the resettlement of the Rongelapese and the average counts in soils for cesium-137 appeared higher at Rongelap than the two ground zero atolls of Bikini and Enewetak (Palumbo 1959). In addition to cesium contamination, a 1955 survey by the University of Washington on Rongelap and Ailinginae indicated that “edible plants...such as pandanus, papaya, and squash, have been found to contain levels of Sr90 (strontium-90) which are above the tolerance level as defined in the Radiological Health handbook” (Palumbo 1959:32). In general, plants in the northern part of Rongelap, the area closer to the testing area, had higher levels of radiation than the islands in the south where the Rongelapese resettled in 1957. The exception to this rule was arrowroot, a staple of the Marshallese diet, particularly on northern atolls such as Rongelap. Arrowroot on Rongelap Island had almost three times more radiation than samples from other areas in Rongelap and Ailinginae atolls in 1955 (Donaldson I956b:3l). The U.S. Government attributed the increased radiation levels of arrowroot on Rongelap Island to the fact that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 the arrowroot tested came from radiation “hot spots.” Unfortunately for the Rongelapese, the hot spot “readings were highest in soil depressions and in pits such as those used by the natives for growing crops” (Donaldson I956b:31). Researchers also found that the coconut crab feeds on land plants high in Sr90 and Csl37 levels (Donaldson I956b:48). In a 1955 survey, radiation ecology studies indicated that “the highest Csl37 levels were found in the land plants and the coconut crab,” accounting for 26 to 100% of the radioactivity in the specimens that year (Donaldson I956b:58). Because researchers understood that coconut crabs bioaccumulate radiation, one year before the Rongelapese returned home, researchers recommended resettling the people provided they do not eat coconut crab (Joseph 1999), a Marshallese delicacy. Surveys of the plants, animals, soil and water in 1955 indicated that some of the “highest concentrations of internally deposited activity were found in marine specimens taken from the northern Rongelap lagoon” (Donaldson 1956b: 11). Based on oceanographic surveys and water sampling after the Castle series, “one conclusion evident from these surveys is that total doses of250r or more could have been accumulated throughout an area of about 5,000 square miles” (Folsom and Werner 1959:53). All of Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae fall within 5,000 square miles of the testing site. Therefore, there is little question researchers believed that the marine environment increased the radiation exposure of the Rongelapese who depended on food sources from the ocean and lagoon for survival. United States researchers monitored open sea marine plankton and its role in transporting fallout in the marine food chain (Folsom et al. 1953:17). Dr. Allyn Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 Seymour of the University of Washington observed that plankton was “the most sensitive indicator of radioactivity in the sea” (Seymour et al. 1953:55) because radiation readings in plankton showed how much radiation circulated in the marine ecosystem (Palumbo and Lowman 1958:64). In a 3,300 mile survey area in the Pacific Ocean, “radioactive materials were found in the plankton samples from every station” (Seymour 1953). By 1958, university researchers discovered that fish concentrated radioactivity by as much as “a thousand fold” because of the radioactive plankton they consume (Palumbo and Lowman 1958:59). Researchers also observed that “the lagoon would tend to hold radiation within its system of circulation” (Folsom and Werner 1959:85) and that radiation would concentrate in the lower levels of the lagoon where fish, such as the sturgeon fish, would concentrate high levels of cesium (Folsom and Werner 1959). Drs. Eugene Cronkite and Robert Conard, physicians who would eventually join Brookhaven National Laboratory, the U.S. Government contractors tasked with implementing Project 4.1, reported to the Atomic Energy Commission about radiological conditions on Rongelap. The physicians were anxious to study the movement of radiation from the environment into the human body. Rongelap Island became the best test laboratory because “the levels of [radiological] activity are higher than those found in any other inhabited location in the world. The habitation of those people on the island will afford most valuable ecological radiation data on human beings” (Conard 1957:22). The U.S. Government decided to return the Rongelapese to just one of their home islands in their three atoll property, Rongelap Island. The return of the Rongelapese was justified for scientific reasons, and because the Rongelapese expressed a desire to return home. What the Rongelapese did not understand at the time, however, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 was that their home islands remained highly contaminated and the community would suffer the consequences of living in an irradiated environment. Decision to Return Then we went back to Rongelap. They (the U.S. Government) said they had cleaned the island. (Emos 1999). The Rongelapese remained on Ejit Island until the U.S. Government told the Rongelapese it was safe to return to Rongelap Island in 1957. Earlier that year, the U.S. Government flew airplanes over Rongelap to record levels of radiation on the ground. Although the United States Government assured the Rongelapese they could safely return to Rongelap, Gordon M. Dunning, the Health Physicist for the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and other U.S. Government officials acknowledged that the U.S. Government failed to conduct adequate surveys of the atoll and foodstuffs prior to the resettlement of the Rongelapese (Dunning 1958). According to Dunning: “I had assumed there would be another radiological survey of the Rongelap [Ajtoll just prior to the return of the Rongelapese. ..It would have been highly preferable to have had a complete survey of the atoll, especially the foodstuffs, but it appears we will have to settle for the external readings only” (Dunning 1957). An LCU (landing craft unit) transported the Rongelapese to the main island on Rongelap Atoll. The U.S. Government restricted the Rongelapese, with three atolls spanning an area approximately the size of Delaware, to a single island with less than a square mile of land. Upon resettlement of the Rongelapese in 1957, the U.S. Government did not implement the 1956 recommendation to restrict coconut crab Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 consumption. The Rongelapese consumed coconut crab, along with vegetables, fruit, and roots grown in heavily radioactive soil, and chicken, pig, and crabs that ate from a contaminated environment, and, therefore, accumulated higher doses of radiation. Radiation also entered the marine environment the Rongelapese depended on for food consumption. Because fish and other marine species ate algae and plankton laced with radiation, the Rongelapese consumed foods that accumulated and concentrated radiation from the environment. It was not until a 1958 report to the Scientific Director of Joint Task Force 7 that the U.S. Government reported information from earlier surveys indicating that food, soil, water, and plankton indicated that radiation levels were “appreciably above background” (Curry 1953 . L57). At this point. Department of Energy contractors informed the people that they could not eat coconut crabs. As the ethnographic data indicates, the imposition of this food restriction caused confusion and concern in the population, many of whom refused to abide by the new policy: First they said we could eat crabs, and then they said to stop. What's the point when we already ate them (Joseph 1999)? Culturally, you can 7 tell people not to eat food, like crab, they see. Even if we were hungry, they said not to eat the crabs, but we ate them anyway (Kedi 1999). Even though it was bad, I ate them. I didn 7 think about it. The food we ate gave us blisters in our mouths (Kolnij 1999). Rongelap was an atoll with so much food - cocomtl, pandamts, and breadfruit. Now there is none. Because o f the poison, it disappeared When we returned, we ate the arrowroot. It gave us blisters in our mouths, but we had to eat it especially during the times o fhunger. The local doctor eventually stopped us from eating it. We also ate crabs even though we weren 7 supposed to (Jenwor 1999). A U.S. Government physician responsible for the monitoring of the radiation body burdens of the Rongelapese commented on the inconsistent United States Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 policies regarding food safety: “I must confess I didn’t know there was any difference between [a land crab and a coconut crab]. When I told them they could not eat the coconut crab, they were a little peeved since they had been told by the weather station people that they could eat them” (Conard 1958). Although the U.S. Government recommended that the Rongelapese cease consumption of coconut crabs, U.S. Government officials never advised the people to avoid other foodstuffs with levels of radiation higher than the coconut crabs, such as giant clams (Weiss et al. 1953, Donaldson 1956b). On Rongelap, Dr. Victor Nelson from the Laboratory of Radiation Ecology at the University of Washington easily measured five gamma-emitting radionuclides in the fish, plants and soil samples, including “significant fallout radionuclides” detected in the clams (Nelson 1977:12). Researchers also failed to restrict the consumption of pandanus, a Rongelapese staple food, although pandanus fruit and coconut crabs were the two food items of major concern with respect to Sr 90 content at the time of the return of the Rongelapese. The radiation that worked its way through the soil and water to the plant and animal food chain the Rongelapese depended on for survival provided scientists with a research opportunity to significantly expand their understanding of the transfer and bioaccumulation of radiation from the environment to human beings. Thus, in the long- range radiation ecology study at Rongelap major emphasis was placed on studies of the soil-plant relationship, aquatic bird populations, and mineral transport, as well as evaluations of the uptake of specific isotopes by plants and animals used as food by the Rongelapese. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 Fish is one of the most critical food soucres and main sources of protein in the Marshallese diet. As late as 1962, “the highest levels of gross beta radioactivity were found in samples of algae, fish liver and muscles, and sea cucumber muscle” at Rongerik (Palumbo 1962:11). Researchers also measured increases in gross beta radioactivity in fish between 1954 and 1958 (Welander 1958, Palumbo 1959). Radiation levels in fish is of particular concern because a 1982 study conducted by Dr. William Robison of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory27 found that, with the exception of coconut, fish was the primary food consumed by the Rongelapese (Robison et al. 1982). From radiation levels monitored in the bird populations, U.S. Government researchers concluded that the fish in southern Rongelap where the people resettled had higher radiation concentrations than fish in the restricted northern islands. Researchers also found high concentrations of radiation in birds, a terrestrial food source consumed by the Rongelapese. The birds from southern Rongelap had higher levels of radiation than birds from the north of Rongelap (Donaldson 1956b). According to Dr. Lauren Donaldson of the University of Washington, the “unexpected” findings of “higher levels of radioactivity in the tissues of the southern birds suggest the availability of a supply of food for fish with a higher average radioactive content in the southern area compared with that of the northern Rongelap” (Donaldson 1956b:43). Unfortunately, fish and birds were staples of the Rongelapese people. In the mid-l990’s, the RMI Nationwide Radiological Survey tested thousands of soil, plant, and occasionally marine samples :7 Like Brookhaven National Laboratory that was contracted by DOE to extend a U.S. medical program to the exposed Marshallese. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was contracted by DOE to undertake scientific studies of radiation present in the environment. The RMI Government believes it is a conflict of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 collected throughout the nation and confirmed the existence of unsafe levels of radiation at dozens of islands (Simon 1994). The Rongelapese observed that many previously safe species of fish became poisonous after the tests. Marine scientist, Tilman A. Ruff, suggests a relationship between fish poisoning and nuclear testing (Ruff 1989), with damaged reefs supporting abnormally high numbers of the plankton Gambierdiscus toxicus that produces ciguatera toxin. Fish feeding on the reefs absorb this plankton and ciguatera toxins accumulate in the fish. In turn, larger fish consume and concentrate the ciguatera toxins in their flesh. Humans who eat these fish suffer from vomiting, diarrhea, loss of balance, and, although rarely, death (Figure 10). Notably, the Marshall Islands and French Polynesia, the location of France’s extensive nuclear testing program, have the highest incidence of fish poisoning in the Pacific (Ruff 1989). Although U.S. Government researchers documented the radiation levels of fish consumed by the Rongelapese, U.S. Government officials dismissed Rongelapese reports of increased incidence of fish poisoning and concern that fish poisoning occurred in species that did not cause fish poisoning prior to the nuclear weapons tests. Perhaps most disturbingly, Dr. Paul Seligman of the U.S. Department of Energy recently informed approximately 30 Rongelapese that the U.S. Government injected them with radiation and gave them tritiated water to drink as part of a medical research program on radiation and anemia. This information, which came from the RMI Government’s participation in the research of the White House Advisory Committee on interest to have U.S. weapons laboratory, institutions with a clear interest in continuing to develop nuclear Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 disturbance of coral ecology dindUgefate plankton proliferate and/or art induced to produce toxin 'i© herbivorous list) ingest toxic dinallagellates herbivores are eaten by carnivorous fish which concentrate toxin in their flesh toxic fish cannot be simply distinguished and are caught and consumed Figure 10: Fish Poisoning ciguratura poisoning ensues Source: Greenpeace (1990: 19) Human Radiation Experiments in 1994-1995,only reached the Rongelap community in October of 1999. DOE representatives informed the Rongelapese subjects that Brookhaven National Laboratory researchers injected them with seven to fifteen mrems of chromium-51 despite a previous U.S. Government policy recommendation that the exposed people should not receive more radiation exposure perhaps for the rest of their weapons, responsible for explaining the effects of radiation to the U.S. and Marshallese publics. 3 During the proceedings of the White House Committee. I was responsible for preparing written and oral statements for all representatives of the RMI national government who appeared before the Committee. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 lives (Cronkite 1954). The purpose of these experiments was to consider if the incidence of anemia in the Marshallese population resulted from radiation exposure.29 Although radiation was an invisible threat to the Rongelapese, the people were aware of its high levels in their food sources and environment. Foods that the Rongelapese prepared and depended on for hundreds of years prior to the testing program began to give the people blisters in their mouths and cause health problems. Because consumption of these foods after resettlement caused health problems, the Rongelapese attributed changes in their environment to the presence of radiation: After returning, many things were different. The food we ate - there was one fo o d we didn 7 eat, cocotmt crab. The fish, our mouths were hot - we got bunts. Arrowroot also gave us blisters. We saw that many things were different. We sucked on pandanus and that was all right but the other foods were bad. We saw some coconut trees that had two heads, some three. We saw they weren 7 good for us to eat... We understood there were differences because we grew up there and we knew. They gave us other food to help usfor awhile on Rongelap. Then we ate plants and animals (Emos 1999). We had no problem with ourfood before the testing. Afterwards, arrowroot and the plants gave us blisters in our mouths. I also think the problems with our throats (thyroids) are from the 'poison. ’ After we went back, new fish gave us fish poisoning, such as paan (red snapper). Rongelap’s lagoon was affected. I got fish poisoning twice after reluming... As for the crabs, DOE told us not to eat them. It's forbidden to eat them. Before the bomb, we used to eat them a lot. DOE were the ones that said it was forbidden to eat them. I asked why. They told me to ask God (John Anjain 1999). Some coconuts had two or three heads. Tl%e arrowroot had no contents - it was empty inside (Joseph 1999). The throats (thyroids) o f the birds became abnormally large and swollen in the years after the bombs. When we opened them up, they had hard, white rocks in their throats that we had never seen before (Eknilang 1999a). 29 The U.S. Department of Energy presented this information at the annual DOE-RMI meeting held in Honolulu on October 18-19.1999. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 The people got mouth blisters from eating arrowroot, fish, clams, and coconuts. People got fish poisoningfrom types offish that never caused poisoning in the past, such as:Joo (mullet), andmalokf0 Before the tests, only the iuiukop (barracuda) fish causedfish poisoning. People never collected coconut sap from the trees after resettlement. We had no choice but to go back to Rongelap [in 1957J. It is impossible to limit people's consumption once they are on their land (Eknilang 1999b). Both U.S. Government researchers and the Rongelapese noticed strange mutations in the trees and foodcrops the Rongelapese survived from. Personal accounts of the deformed trees and plants correlate with U.S. Government documents. U.S. researchers noted the “atypical plants” observed on Rongelap, some of which were believed to be the result of exposure to radiation from fallout (Donaldson 1956a). Dr. Donaldson also found trees and plants that he described as “mutants” because of their extra flowers and limbs, and their stem abnormalities (including atrophied stems), and “thickened, swollen” stems covered with cancerous warts (Donaldson 1950:43). Dr. Donaldson concluded that some plants “survived the bombing unharmed, but when they grew into mature plants, they soon succumbed. It is clearly indicated that they were suffering from persisting effects of the bombing. Continuing radiation from soil particles must be the cause” (Donaldson 1950:43). In the plants exposed to radiation, Dr. Donaldson noted that at a certain point, “cell division ceased and the cells enlarged and took on an abnormally mature appearance” (Donaldson 1950:Appendix 9). Interestingly, this corresponds with the hydatiform molar pregnancies experienced by Marshallese women after the testing. These pregnancies, called “grape babies” by the Marshallese, result when cells stop 30 The maloklok fish is one of the species of fish listed as “unidentified." along with 38 other species, in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 dividing and swell to the size of grapes. The enlarged cells attach themselves to the uterus of the women and are often miscarried several months later, giving the impression of a birth to “grapes” (see Chapter V )31 Regrettably, when the Marshallese reported to the medical doctors from Brookhaven National Laboratory that they experienced blisters in their mouth from eating arrowroot, the U.S. Government contractors said the blisters appeared because the people did not know how to prepare arrowroot correctly. Other reports of illness from eating food reported by the Rongelapese were blamed on the fact that the Rongelapese eat unrefrigerated foods. Because U.S. Government researchers must have considered that the Marshallese people have been preparing and eating unrefrigerated local foods for centuries without causing blisters or sickness, the explanation about food preparation was obviously an attempt to dismiss the medical concerns of the Rongelapese. Given that the U.S. Government knew of the high radiation level in arrowroot plants, it appears that the U.S. Government was more interested radiation ecology research results obtained from a community living in a contaminated environment than the health and safety of the Rongelapese. Documented Human Health Consequences of Systematic and Cumulative Exposure Human ecological studies became important to the U.S. Government researchers who recognized that the protracted exposure of Marshallese occurred after Marshailese-English Dictionary on p.357. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 people returned to the contaminated areas (McCraw 1982). The U.S. Government gave responsibility for the long-term monitoring of the Rongelapese to a U.S. Government weapons facility, Brookhaven National Laboratory. Brookhaven doctors observed multiple human health consequences of radiation exposure in the Rongelapese. The exposed population enrolled in Project 4.1 complained repeatedly that they felt they were being given too many examinations for the sake of research, but they were not being treated for their problems.32 In response to complaints by the Rongelapese, Dr. Robert Conard from Brookhaven National Laboratory proposed that “perhaps next trip we should consider giving more treatment or even placebos” (Conard 1958). Through urinalysis, the U.S. Government monitored the amount of cesium-137 that the Rongelapese ingested into their bodies from the environment. Following resettlement, the average adult male Rongelap body-burden for Cs-137 rose 56% for adult men and 82% for female children (McCraw 1982). Concern was expressed by researchers about “... the bone seeking elements... likely to be the major cause of hazard for long-term internal effects” (Welander et al. 1966:97). Researchers continued to monitor the increased body burdens of the Rongelapese. They believed, but failed to notify the Rongelapese, that fetal and infant life were expected to be most sensitive to radiation exposure (Palumbo and Lowman 1958:104-106). 31 With the exception of thyroid disease, no epidemiological studies that could shed light on the numbers of medical problems have been conducted. In the case of “grape" babies, ethnographic data indicates that women throughout the Marshall Islands experienced this phenomenon. 3: The Japanese hibakusha also complain that the joint U.S.-Japanese medical research program established after World War II was more interested in documenting rather than treating their radiation-related illnesses (Boyer 1985). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 At least one case of childhood leukemia was confirmed on Rongelap. Lekoj Anjain, the son of Rongelap’s magistrate, John Anjain, died of leukemia at the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Lekoj was one-year old when he was exposed to fallout from the Bravo test. Medical studies of the Rongelapese also found about twice as many abnormally terminated pregnancies in the Rongelapese in the first 6 years after resettlement (Kohn 1984). “Markedly stunted growth” in children also “suggest(ed) thyroid deficiency” in Rongelapese children (Kohn 1984:14). In 1990, researchers found “unquestionable damage to the thyroid gland, especially to those exposed below the age of 10...” (Kohn 1984:15) as nearly all the people exposed on Rongelap to fallout at less than 10 years of age have developed nodules (benign tumors) of the thyroid (Conard 1977). Not surprisingly, the Rongelapese were aware of the human health consequences of their internal and external radiation exposure. Many of their illnesses were outside the narrow parameters of U.S. Government research. Instead of considering the total well being of the Marshallese people, U.S. Government researchers tended to dehumanize the local people and their bodies. Researchers did not consider the complex, holistic medical needs of the population exposed to radiation. Rather, researchers referred to the Marshallese by their identification numbers, not their names, and focused on parts of their bodies, such as the thyroid gland and the blood cells, or the levels of radiation in their bodies detectable from urine samples: It s really sad. Now we go to doctors. Many have thyroid problems. Some don 7. Some have had operations twice [on their throats f. Some three times. We take medicine to help our thyroids. One pill every day. Don 7 forget one day - keep taking it, keep taking it. Sometimes I forget, but I 'm not supposed to miss a single Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. n o day... Sometimes my throat really hurts, all the way down the esophagus. There are times when my head goes numb, my leg, my hand (Emos 1999). I was away from Rongelap in 1954. I returned to Rongelap... in 1957 and I saw friends and relatives who were afflicted with illnesses unknown to us. Their eyesight deteriorated, their bodies were covered with bum-like blisters, and their hair fell out by the handful (Jibas 1994). Hiroshi was a boy who was severely affected by the fallout. He hadfirst degree burns covering 90% o f his body and he suffered complete hair loss. His body was burned so badly that the bones in his feet were exposed and visible. Hiroshi died (Allen 1994). They found something behind my stomach. They told that to the doctor. I was operated on and they showed it to me. It was kind o fshiny. They removed a black, hard, shiny objectfrom just under my stomach. Maybe it came from the poison. After my surgery, my health was bad (Kolnij 1999). When the United States Government resettled the Rongelapese on Rongelap Island in 1957, several people who were not on Rongelap or Ailinginae during the Bravo test in 1954 were also included. Because this group was not exposed to external fallout from Bravo, the U.S. Government determined that this 1957 resettled population represented an “unexposed,” or “control group.” The U.S. Government’s use of the 1957 resettled group as an “unexposed” or “control group” is erroneous, deceptive, and fraudulent. In their presentation of incidence of radiogenic illnesses to the Marshallese and the U.S. Congress, U.S. Government researchers presented information based on comparisons using a faulty control group. U.S. Department of Energy medical contractors concluded that there was little difference between the incidence rate of radiogenic illnesses in the 1954 “exposed” Marshallese population and the “unexposed” or “control” population of Rongelapese who resettled Rongelap in 1957, but who were absent from Rongelap in 1954. Since there is little Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill observable difference between the populations, DOE surmises that the adverse health consequences of radiation are minimal for all Rongelapese. The Rongelapese and the RMI national government believe that the U.S. Department of Energy uses this comparison to downplay the human health consequences of radiation injury.33 Although many members of the resettled group were not exposed to radiation from Bravo, they were resettled on a dangerously contaminated island where they ate and drank from local resource supplies that the U.S. Government monitored and knew to be contaminated. Whole-body measurements after resettlement demonstrate the exposure of this group: “For the first few years after resettlement the body-burdens of cesium-137 and strontium-90 increased, reached an equilibrium with the environment, and then began a gradual decline. ..[before] reaching] their peak in 1965” (National Radiation Council 1994:53). The exposure to environmental sources of radiation affects the health of the group resettled in 1957. In a testimony to the U.S. Congress, one physician found that among the resettled population 63.6% of adult males and 76.8% of adult females have medical problems (Bertell 1989). The higher incidence of female illness in the environmentally exposed population is noteworthy given the startling lack of difference between the incidence of medical problems in the men and women exposed to external radiation in 1954. Ethnographic data indicates that the Rongelapese exposed to radiation in 1954 and 1957 were exposed differently. In 1954, the skin of the people 33 It was not until October 19.1999 that the RMI Foreign Minister got the U.S. Department of Energy to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 was burned from external sources of radiation in the form of fallout, and internal exposure came from the ingestion and breathing of radiation into their bodies. After 1957, exposure was predominantly internal as a result of eating and drinking contaminated resources. Both types of exposure are dangerous, but different. The Rongelapese use expressions such as “the poisoned people,” or “the bombed people” to describe their exposure to acute fallout or poison from the Bravo bomb in 1954. By the same token, the Rongelapese also recognize that both the 1954 incident and post resettlement exposed community members to radiation. Repeatedly, interviewees stated, “kij aolep baam," literally “we are all bombed.” This lack of distinction is important because it indicates that over time there is little difference in the ways radiation-related problems manifest in the differently exposed groups.34 Rongelapese women, for instance, report that, a few years after resettlement on Rongelap Island, the women who began their chronic exposure in 1957 suffered from the same horrendous reproductive problems as the women who were initially exposed on March 1, 1954. This is the main reason cited by Rongelapese women to demonstrate that everyone who resided on Rongelap is exposed to radiation from the testing program. Because children have smaller bodies than adults, a dose of radiation causes a larger body burden in children than in adults. For this reason, as well as the fact that children’s bodies are in the process of developing and growing, bom and unborn agree to change these terms “exposed” and “unexposed” to “acute exposure” and “chronic exposure” to denote that both groups are exposed to radiation, but exposed differently. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 children are at great risk from radiation exposure. Both the U.S. Government and the Rongelapese maintained concerns about Rongelapese children exposed to radiation from Bravo and children who were bom and raised on Rongelap Island (McCraw 1982). In a formerly classified notebook issued by the AEC Test Manager, James Reeves, Reeves expresses concern about several types of cancer and genetic disorders in children (Johnson et al. 1989:179). U.S. Government researchers also determined that exposure to radiation from fallout and exposure through the air, soil, water and food on Rongelap, affects human genetics. Dr. John C. Bugher from the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine was particularly concerned about the genetic effects of cumulative doses of radiation: “It appears that the effects of radiation in the area of genetics are cumulative, that as an individual has more and more exposure you can expect greater and greater probability of these changes ...double the dose should double the probabilities...” (Bugher 1939). This finding is disturbing since an independent physician, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, found a connection to reproductive problems and the previous exposure of young women’s parents. Dr. Bertell found that “adult RongeIap[ese] women, 16 to 34 years old in 1988, are more likely to have reproductive problems such as spontaneous abortions, still births or infant deaths if their parents were in the DOE 1954 exposed or comparison groups (post 1957 exposed)...” than young women whose parents were not (Bertell 1989:3). A year after the Rongelapese were returned to Rongelap Island, U.S. Government researchers studied how “radiation to the gonads will produce... [changes] 34 Brookhaven National Laboratory reports And little difference in the illness rates of the “contror group Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 in germinal cells... [It was calculated that if] a dose of lOOr is delivered to the gonad of each member of the population due to fallout radiation... for lOOr there will be one lethal invitation in five conceptions” (Palumbo and Lowman 1958:90-91). Department of Energy researchers concluded that in situations where radiation exposure is repeated in more than one generation, such as in the Rongelap community, there will be a genetic effect to the community for almost thirty years (Palumbo and Lowman 1958:92). Based on their findings, Department of Energy officials told the Rongelapese that unsuccessful pregnancies should be expected in the current generation. As a result, the community expected that children would die or be bom with severe disabilities, and they knew the medical problems of their offspring was a result of radiation exposure (Emos 1999) Linguistic evidence indicates that the reproductive problems experienced by the Rongelapese women did not exist before the testing program and their exposure to radiation (see Chapter V). Instead of using proper Marshallese words to describe their illnesses, the interviewees use non-human words from their local environment to illustrate the birth anomalies (they witnessed), such as "octopus,” “grapes,” and “hermit crab”. If these reproductive problems existed before the testing program, there would be proper Marshallese names for the illnesses, like other health problems experienced by the Marshallese before the testing program (Barker 1997), such as normally occurring stillbirths, or jibun. Reproductive problems and birth defects are so common amongst the Rongelapese that every female interviewee describes problems with their offspring or exposed to environmental sources of radiation, and the “exposed” group that suffered acute external and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 pregnancies. The Rongelapese believe these problems are directly linked to both the parents’ and the children’s exposure to radiation: There were 16 kids DOE found with low blood cell counts. Some kids died, some kids have severe problems. Like Julie whose mouth kept growing bigger. There were nineteen kids that moved o ff of Rongelap. Only two or three are alive now. Those who are alive have problems (John Anjain 1999). In the years afterwards, one kid was bom with a head like an octopus. Other kids never really grew and were very short. People died o f radiation but we had no doctors or charts to prove that it was radiation.. .1 have scars on my hands now. No medicine will take them away, Marshallese or American. They itch and they are bothersome. My thyroid is gone. I have to take medication every day. When I take too much medication I have too much energy - 1 can 7 sleep. I walk around doing laps, but I can 7 tire myself out to rest. When / don 7 take enough, I gain weight and get lethargic (Joseph 1999). One o f my kids is mentally challenged. He was bom in 1963. The child didn 7 walk until it was 5 years old... He stays with me. He gets mad sometimes. I will have to care for him because he has to stay with me. He gets upset and agitated when I do something he doesn 7 like. He went to schoolfor the challenged. He still hasn 7 got to the Department of Energy doctors because they say they don 7 take care o f our childrenjS (Kolnij 1999). / know a boy, actually a young man now, whose head is so large that his body is unable to support it and his only means o fgetting aroutui is to crawl backwards dragging his head along. Like the movements of a coconut or hermit crab (Bobo 1994). Some o f the children who were bom were deformed. Their arms and legs are short. Nothing covering over their brains. Still others were like “grapes:" But some were not from the poisoned people but they were the ones who went back in 1957 and after some years they also gave birth to those kinds. Doctor Conard (DOE physician) said: “Sometimes there will be different things in your stomachs because you were exposed ” There were lots o f words like these words. Some kids go right into the fire or slam into you - they ’re missing something. One kid they tied him up but he died because he crawled into the ocean and drowned. He just died on Mejatto. He was older, around ten years old. He looked O.K., but something was wrong with his brain. His parents aren 7 the bomb people but they lived on Rongelap after 1957. internal irradiation after the Bravo test. 35 The medical program provided by DOE to the 174 Rongelapese and Utrikese exposed to fallout from Bravo does not extend medical care to the children of the acutely exposed population. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 Some kids live fo r a week or so. You see their brains. Theirfaces are O.K., but their brains are scary. Their hands andfeet come out of their torsos. They know how to breastfeed They appear to be people, but they are different. We believed what DOE said - that some o f our kids would be born differently. Many children were this way (repeats many times). We came together to bury them because we knew and expected these kinds o f kids. They gave birth on Ejit. It was like what, like grapes. What kind of children were those that appeared? One kid bom on Rongelap hisfeet were flipped up so the soles faced up. His head was big and soft. A different kind of child My eldest daughter might have a heart problem. Another child has a bone problem - the hone sticks out o f his back. One extra finger was also removed (Emos 1999). These accounts by the Rongelapese correspond with Dr. Rosalie BertelPs testimony to the U.S. Congress regarding observations from her medical examination of Rongelapese children following the group’s self-evacuation from Rongelap Island in 1985: Among the children who were evacuated from the Rongelap atoll in 1985, a very high degree of ill health [existed], with about 42% having medical problems. Medical problems which were identified only among the evacuated children were Multiple Organ Systems Malfunctioning, Autism, Anemia, Arthritis, Arthralgia, Epilepsy, Down’s Syndrome, Facial Asymmetry, Loss of Nasal Bridge and Meningitis. Heart Disease was diagnosed in 9.2% of the evacuated children (Bertell 1994:3-4). In addition to the Rongelapese exposed to internal and external sources of radiation, Marshallese food-sharing customs led to the exposure of additional people throughout the nation. Marshallese depend on their neighbors and families to exchange food. Implicit in this notion of exchange is the need for people to work together to prepare food. Most frequently, people trade the types of foods they do have for the types that other people prepare. Because local food preparation in the Marshall Islands is labor intensive, people benefit from an economy of time by exchanging food (vitamin and calorie) sources. The presence of food resources in Marshallese communities expresses Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 the well being of the communities. For this reason, the sharing of food is an important component of group health and community cohesion (Pollock 1992). After resettlement, exchange of food to and from Rongelap continued because it is an important survival mechanism for the Marshallese. The exchange of food resources from Rongelap to other areas in the country led to the exposure of family members and iroij on distant islands. Although this exposure is less than the radiation exposure the Rongelapese received from residing on their home islands, the Rongelapese sent contaminated local foods to communities outside of Rongelap: Contaminatedfoods from Rongelap were shared with Ebeye and Majuro. You can 7 ignore your relatives in the urbatt areas because we have to share all food. There is an obligation for workers to share their food with their leaders at least once a year, usually at breadfruit harvesting time (Kabua 1999b). Like the Bikinians who were moved to Rongerik Atoll, Marshallese populations cannot survive from a limited range of resources. When the Rongelap community was relocated to just one island from their three atoll system of Rongelap, Rongerik, and Ailinginae, food resources on Rongelap Island alone were not adequate either for the consumption needs of the people residing on the island or for customary distribution. Therefore, despite U.S. Government restrictions on their movement, the Rongelapese used the small islands in the north of the atoll to collect and distribute food (Eknilang 1999b). Unfortunately, the northern islands of Rongelap “are approximately 10 times as contaminated as the southern islands, and cesium-137 rates in coconut, pandanus and breadfruit from the northern islands can increase exposure by a factor of 8 to 32” (National Radiation Council 1994:83). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 When an iroij visits his or her land, custom demands that the people provide large quantities of food to the iroij, including radiation bioaccumulaters, such as coconut crab and clams, as well as turtles and certain species of fish. The iroij consumes this food while present on the island and later distributes the remaining goods to other people and communities, as custom requires him or her to do. This custom caused problems during iroij visits to Rongelap following the resettlement of Rongelap Island. When the iroij visited after resettlement in 1957, the iroij felt concern about the safety of eating foods prepared by the Rongelapese, and about distributing the food to other people not residing on Rongelap. Yet, custom obligated the Rongelapese to provide bountiful quantities of food for him (Kabua 1999b). The people also felt nervous about giving contaminated food to the iroij (Eknilang 1999b), but custom warrants that the iroij could kick people off their land for not providing local foods during an iroij visit (Kabua 1999b). Based on traditional customs, the Rongelapese gave contaminated foods to their iroij and the iroij distributed these goods to people living in other areas, such as Ebeye. Ethnographic evidence and U.S. Government documents demonstrate that it was not just the Rongelapese present on their home islands on March I, 1954 that were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. We now know that there are several subpopulations in the Rongelap community who were exposed to harmful levels of radiation from the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program, and who suffer from many of the same problems as the legally exposed population defined in the Compact of Free Association. By locating and amplifying the voices of the Rongelapese subpopulations exposed to radiation, it becomes clear that a new narrative of history must come forward to include the experiences of all the Rongelapese affected by the testing program. This Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 more accurate history must recognize that, in addition to the Rongelapese exposed to the fallout from the Bravo test in 1954, the population that was not present in 1954 but returned to Rongelap in 1957, the offspring of the exposed population and the children who grew up in a highly contaminated environment, were also exposed to radiation. As long as the legal definition of exposure espoused in the Compact remains in place, the U.S. Government’s construction of the history of Rongelap’s exposure will continue to erase the experiences and needs of the community’s subpopulations exposed to radiation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV CURRENT ERASURE OF RONGELAPESE EXPERIENCES Further Erasure Beyond the failure of the U.S. Government to recognize the radiation exposure of several subpopulations in the Rongelapese community, the U.S. Government continues to ignore several critical problems associated with the community’s exposure to radiation. These experiences are not addressed in U.S. Government programs or assistance to Marshallese communities adversely affected by the consequences of the testing program. To reclaim a more accurate and complete history of the Rongelap community, I will describe some of these erased experiences and offer them as part of a new narrative of history that extends beyond the immediate medical problems and contamination of the environment associated with radiation exposure. The major experiences of the Rongelap community that have been erased by a U.S. Government representation of events in the Marshall Islands pertain to exile, customary value of land, and different social, economic, political, and psychological consequences for various subgroups of the Rongelapese community. Exile from Rongelap The Rongelap people experienced involuntary displacement from their home atolls when the U.S. Government physically removed them from 1954- 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1957 because of radiation produced by the Bravo test. U.S. nuclear weapons tests dangerously contaminated the lands and seas the Rongelapese depend on for survival. As a result, the Rongelapese lost access to a viable, healthy ecosystem and the ability and right to safely live in their environment. The U.S. Government further compromised this safety when it returned the Rongelapese to a contaminated environment in 1957. Fearing for their lives and the safety of their children, the Rongelapese voluntarily placed themselves into exile in 1985 when the U.S. Government refused to acknowledge the human ecological dangers facing the Rongelapese. Today, the Rongelapese remain in exile and the community suffers in many ways that remain outside of the U.S. Government’s purview of its responsibilities in the Marshall Islands. As indicated in the previous chapter, despite assurances by the U.S. Government that Rongelap was safe, the Rongelapese experienced health problems after their resettlement. The former Senator of Rongelap who died from bone cancer, Jeton Anjain, contested the notion that Rongelap posed no threat to the people. In particular, Anjain, the brother of Rongelap’s Magistrate, John Anjain, disagreed with DOE’s assertion that Rongelap was habitable. According to the late Senator, the Rongelapese would only accept a definition of habitability that would allow the Rongelapese “to live free of serious defects to health and safety” (Black’s Law Dictionary in Jeton Anjain 1989:16). As both the ethnographic and U.S. Government records demonstrate, Rongelap was not habitable because the Rongelapese could not live free of serious defects to health and safety on their home islands. According to his testimony to Congress, Jeton Anjain said that two U.S. 121 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 Government reports published in 1982, coupled with the experiences of the Rongelapese, ultimately led the people of Rongelap into self-exile in 1985 (Jeton Anjain: 10). The first report was the Air Force document demonstrating that the U.S. Government had been aware of the wind shift toward Rongelap before it detonated the Bravo shot (House 1954a). The second report was a DOE survey of the northern Marshall Islands (Bair et al. 1982). In this report, DOE concluded that Rongelap was habitable. Dr. Rosalie Bertell testified to Congress that this survey failed to include basic information about the health status of the Rongelapese, including the community members who were sick, risks to children, and pregnant women (Bertell 1989). U.S. Government documents declassified after the Senator passed away demonstrate that at least one representative in the U.S. Department of Energy, Tommy McCraw, also had concerns about DOE’s survey of the northern Marshall Islands. McCraw was particularly troubled by the survey because it lowered radiation protection standards applied to the Marshall Islands and enabled DOE to shift to a policy that allowed for higher permissible radiation exposure rates for the people of Rongelap. McCraw thought “this new approach to radiation protection will be difficult for this agency (DOE) to defend in the future” (McCraw 1982). Believing their lives to be in danger from environmental sources of radiation on Rongelap, Senator Anjain worked with the RMI Nitijela to pass a unanimous resolution asking the U.S. Government to relocate the Rongelapese. The U.S. Government ignored this request. The Rongelapese turned to Greenpeace, an environmental non-governmental organization, for assistance. Greenpeace dispatched The Rainbow Warrior to Rongelap Island in May of 1985 to assist the Rongelapese with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 their evacuation. With permission of the iroij for Rongelap and Kwajalein, the Rongelapese moved to Mejatto Island, a small island on the western side of Kwajalein Atoll. The U.S. Department of Energy opposed this move and declared there was “no justification” for the self-evacuation of the Rongelapese (Jeton Anjain 1989:14). The Rongelapese decided to leave Rongelap because environmental contamination made them concerned about their safety. The Rongelapese abandoned all that was familiar and owned by them. They had no option but to leave their home islands and live on other people’s land. After leaving Rongelap in 1985, the Rongelap community dispersed to Mejatto and Ebeye islands on Kwajalein Atoll, to the capitol, Majuro, and to other locations. The community remains dispersed in these areas to this day. In the areas where the Rongelapese now live, they are unable to get access to the traditional resources they need to survive. This loss of access affects diet, household economy and health, and also severely affects the people’s ability to produce or reproduce cultural knowledge about the local environment considered essential to survival and the long-term well being of the community. The disbursement of the community into several main residence locations means that the Rongelapese went from a close community where everyone worked together to a geographically fractured community. The physical disbursement makes communication (Haazen and McDiarmid 1986) and group cohesion difficult for the Rongelapese (Riklon 1999). Each of the different communities where the Rongelapese now reside present challenges for the Rongelapese that they did not encounter on their own land. It is clear that the social, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 economic and environmental problems that the Rongelapese face in the urban areas and Mejatto are an indirect consequence of the testing program that resulted in their loss of land and involuntary displacement. Life on Mejatto36 Approximately 350 people moved from Rongelap to Mejatto in 1985. Mejatto, a small island that was uninhabited until the Rongelapese arrived, is approximately one mile long. It is situated on the western end of Kwajalein Atoll, approximately 60 miles from Ebeye Island, the nation’s second largest urban area. When the bulk of the community moved from Rongelap Island to Mejatto Island, the Rongelapese viewed Mejatto as a temporary relocation while waiting for independent scientists to analyze the radiation problem on Rongelap (Haazen and McDiarmid 1986). Mejatto has no airstrip and its residents rely completely on small boats to travel the 60 miles from Ebeye. When the Rongelapese relocated to Mejatto little traditional food existed because Mejatto was previously uninhabited. The Rongelapese had to plant local food crops, such as pandanus, breadfruit and coconut, but it took five years before they would produce food (Haazen and McDiarmid 1986). The islands surrounding Mejatto had food, but the Rongelapese were reluctant to gather it because they had no rights or permission to use these islands and resources and because the rough waters made travel from island to island difficult. The interviewees clearly describe many of the difficulties in securing Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 food, transportation, and housing on Mejatto: On Mejatto, there was no food when we got there. We had to plant coconuts, pandanus, and other foods (Jilej 1999). People literally starved on Mejatto. There was no transport for food, no government support fo rfood (Koinij 1999). We only had small houses when we first arrived and the guys had to sleep outside under the trees where they were rained on (Kedi 1999). Dangerous tides and rocky reefs around Mejatto made it difficult for the Rongelapese men to fish for food or to pass on knowledge about fishing to the younger generation. Field trip boats serviced the island with supplies only once every three months. The people did not have motorboats or money to purchase fuel for the very rough ten-hour trip each way to Ebeye Island. These problems on Mejatto made people long for their home atolls that were too contaminated to occupy: Mejatto is really different from Rongelap. Mejatto is really small. There are scare resources, such as fish and grown foods. In Mejatto, people fish only two or three limes a week, but on Rongelap people fished everyday. People depend on USDAJ and importedfoods. It's “like a camp." People are not healthy. They have bad diets, diseases, and the health services are inadequate. It’s expensive for me to visit Mejatto. It is too rough to fish in Mejatto, and there are too many sharks. People die in the current around Mejatto (Riklon 1999). I didn ’t want to leave Rongelap in 1985, but the elders did, so I went. Because Rongelap was no good, I left, but I didn’t like Mejatto. It is pretty difficidt to fish on Mejatto. Wind prevents people from fishing. On Rongelap, there were many choices: many ways to fish and many places to fish...Kids on Mejatto don’t know how to sail an outrigger canoe. It’s too low to launch there. On Mejatto it’s hard to sail and hard to teach. On Mejatto there is lots o f American food There’s 36 In March 1999.1 tried to get a boat to Mejatto to interview people. I tried for days to rent a boat but could not despite money and political connections. This experience demonstrated to me how difficult the transportation problem is for the Rongelapese residing on Mejatto. 3' The U.S. Government provides USDA foods to the people of Bikini Enewetak. Rongelap and Utrik to reduce the amount of local food people will be forced to consume and to provide subsistence where food resources are inadequate to sustain the populations. The foods are high in fat and salt and have a negative health impact on the people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 more local food on Rongelap. There was nothing at all on Mejatto in the beginning. Now it's better because we planted food Mejatto is bad because it's hard to get back and forth. It's dangerous on all the small islands. Some people have disappeared ’ some drowned. It hard to move about (B. Boaz 1999). According to the Greenpeace team that helped evacuate the Rongelapese to Mejatto, teenage boys had a particularly difficult time with the transition: They have little to do...They sleep, talk story, play guitar and softball and now and then go fishing or help with community jobs... They are in between cultures, exposed to the American way of life through t.v. and videos and the consumer goodies available in Majuro and Ebeye...Outer island life is very different and does not prepare people for the materially orientated imported lifestyle (Haazen and McDiarmid 1986:3). The Rongelapese complain that it is difficult to get supplies and people back and forth between Mejatto and Ebeye and it is expensive, often costing as much as $1,000 a trip. By the same token, they understand that their decision to resettle was correct. The “much lower levels of plutonium” detected in the Rongelapese since moving to Mejatto in 1988 compared to the levels measured while they resided on Rongelap in 1981 and 1983 (Franke 1989:2) indicate that their decision to move did reduce their exposure to environmental sources of radiation. Life on Ebeye and Majuro In addition to Mejatto, the Rongelapese express concerns about the problems they face living in the nation’s two urban areas, Ebeye and Majuro. The people feel particularly concerned about the health problems resulting from their displacement. Instead of traditional work on the land and in the sea, the relocated Rongelapese are largely idle. Interviewees complain about suicide, malnutrition, alcoholism, smoking, and lack of physical fitness. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 Ebeye is the most densely crowded area in the Pacific Islands (Figure 11). With a population of approximately 15,000 people on 1/10 of a square mile of land, housing, water, electricity, employment, education, health, shade, and play areas are all in short supply. Although Majuro’s landmass is much larger than Ebeye’s, the Rongelapese on Majuro indicate the same problems in satisfying basic household needs. The Rongelapese cannot live on Ebeye or Majuro without money; they must purchase all of their basic needs: On Ebeye... we buy things. We don 7 have pandanus leaves to make sleeping mats. I lie on the tile. We need money for everything. When it runs out, there is no more food. Our things to cook with break. I still haven 7 eaten breakfast today (11:15 a.m.). There's no medicine. There’s no vehicle to go and get birds to eat. They are far away...My children - they grew up on Ebeye. They just hang around (Kebenli 1999). Figure 11: Dense Living Conditions on Ebeye. Source: Holly M. Barker (1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Figure 12: Dump Town. Source: Holly M. Barker (1999). Rongelapese living in the urban areas complain about their inability to take care of their needs without money, overcrowded housing, ill-health, unemployment, lack of knowledge about Rongelap in the youth, and the difficulties they encounter trying to bury their family members on other people’s land: What is life like now? It’s filled with sickness. It was better on the island (Rongelap). I came to Ebeye because my kids have to go to school. Food is hard when you don’t live on your own land It is also hard to find enough money to pay fo r school tuition (Jenwor 1999). Now we stay at one o f the typhoon houses at Dump Town (located next to the dump in Ebeye, Figure 12). Six o f our kids are married There are lots o f grandchildren. There are thirty some people in three rooms. You would laugh if you could see us sleeping - everyone together. I really need a house...My husband is retired but he still works because no one else has ajob (Kolnij 1999). Myfather died There are five people in my family now. No one in my family Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 works. We survive just from our quarterly payments...It was better when my grandfather was alive. My stepfather was good, too. He died at Christmas... I want to go to college, but it will be tough on the people at my house because no one works (M. Anjain 1999). For the Rongelapese and the Marshallese, it is important to maintain and pay respect to the graves of ancestors.38 Furthermore, it is customary to bury deceased family members on the land of the family or the clan. The first national anthem of the Marshall Islands expresses the importance of land ownership and the need to die on one’s own land: Ij iokwe lok aelon ko aoj9 I love my islands Ijo iar lotak ie. Here where I was bom. Melon ko ieim iaieo ko. The beautiful surroundings and joining together with friends. Ijamin ilok jen e I don’t want to leave here Bwe ijo jiku emool. Because this is my true place. In ao lamoren indeo It’s my inheritance forever Emman lok mae inaaj mij ie. It’s best for me to die here. The Rongelapese feel reluctant to bury family members on land where they do not have ownership or use rights for fear they will deny the deceased the right to rest peacefully, in perpetuity, on their own land. Since relocation, the Rongelapese must ask permission to bury their dead. Often, landowners deny permission to the Rongelapese because of severe overcrowding in the urban cemeteries (Figure 13). Even ifyou move to a [new} place, you still remember your true place. We were free. It's not good to die awayfrom our land We shouldn 7 have to ask permission to be buried... Even if we are fa r away, we know the place where we 38 Like the Marshallese, the Japanese anguished over their inability to properly bury their loved ones who perished after the U.S. Government dropped atomic weapons on the nation: “One of the most anguishing experience for relatives of the bombing victims was the inability to find the remains of their loved ones. If a person’s body is not found, the relatives feel the deceased person's soul can never rest peacefully in the world of the dead” (Welsome 1999:108). 39 The former national anthem has no copyright Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 should be together and where we share lands that we should bury our loved ones together on. Here on Ebeye, it's too crowded to bury. We have to look for places to bury our dead. I want to go back to Rongelap to die. Now they’re starting to cremate on Ebeye because there’s no place to bury now. They told us it’s too full to bury. The cemetery is full (Kolnij 1999). Burial areas are overcrowded but cremation is against the custom and religion (Kabua 1999b). In the areas where the Rongelapese remain displaced, such as Ebeye, the overcrowded cemeteries no longer accept people for burial. On other people’s land, the Rongelapese have no connection to their ancestors and cannot attend to their burial sites. In comparison, the importance of ancestral burial sites was immediately apparent during my site visit to Rongelap with the elders of the community. Immediately after the Figure 13. Overcrowded Cemetery on Ebeye. Source: Holly M. Barker (1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 airplane landed on Rongelap, many of the Rongelapese proceeded to the cemetery. An elderly woman greeted the gravestones of her family out loud with “ yokwe kom " or “hello to you” (plural). Morjinkot Land In addition to the problems that exile presents to customary burial practices, exile from Rongerik Atoll has extremely important cultural implications for the Rongelapese. The Marshallese value land for its inheritance benefits and for its connections to future generations. Each type of land relays information to the Marshallese about the historical events and relationships that took place on the land. For example: The names o f some land reflect the possession history o f the property: kidili land is land that an iroij or alap gives to his wife. That land will be passed down through the family of the wife upon her death... O f all the types o f land, land acquired by battle,40 or moriinkot land, is particularly important (Kabua 1999b). Morjinkot land literally means “land taken at the point of a spear” (Tobin 1958:29). It is land given to a warrior by an iroij to show appreciation for a warrior’s battle skills. Morjinkot land “was always given by the iroij alone to commoners” (Tobin 1958:29). Rights to the land extended to the family of the warrior but distinguished between maternal and paternal use rights: “maternal relatives and paternal relatives both used the land. Maternal relatives have a usufruct right to the land. Paternal relatives could utilize the resources of the land but did not have usufruct rights in the land” (Tobin 1958:29). 40 The Marshallese used to acquire land during battles between chiefs of neighboring islands and atolls. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 Rongerik Atoll is the rare example of morjinkot land, or land that an iroij gives to a warrior for heroics in battle. All of Rongerik Atoll is morjinkot land. The story of how this land became morjinkot in the mid-1800s is still recounted today. John Anjain recorded a history of Rongerik Atoll in his record books including a map that he made explaining the history and significance of Rongerik Atoll as morjinkot land (Figure 14).41 The iroij gave Rongerik Atoll to Lejkonikik Antoren, an ancestor of Rongerik’s current iroij, Anjua Loeak, for heroics in an ancient battle between Kill Island and Jaluit Atoll. For this reason, the land on Rongerik has tremendous cultural importance to the Marshallese, and particularly the Rongelapese. The cultural importance of Rongerik magnifies the loss the Rongelapese feel as a result of their inability to live on their homelands. The significance and value of Rongerik cannot be defined in a monetary, western sense. Inability to Reproduce Cultural Knowledge About the Environment It was exceedingly difficult for the Rongelapese to decide to move from their land. Alienation of land is extremely rare in the Marshall Islands because it is the lifeline for the lineage and the basis of Marshallese culture and survival. As an iroij and landowner in Majuro explained: It is extremely rare for people to alienate their land Traditionally, this only occurred when the iroij gave land as a gift or when it was won through war. Alienating land is so rare that there is no word for lease or borrowing land in Marshallese because that was never done. Land was never leased to another Marshallese because land is so precious (Kendall 1999b). 41 This map is the property of John Anjain. There is no copyright for the map. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 « I R0N6eHTK"AfcM EJ NORJtNKUgT AfTCEJKONI —- .Jen t.aJAj.jko'lMftili I^L Ja.iuiT ; *’ , J * tUj -iy L —>£yLy-> kanol j 'p-* •— £ ~ L ^ -i_-t r£pl‘£*A~—' ■**• ' ■ .>fc> l«u f y i j - j «—’ jjS j.’,. i U . -JunJ~j I J 0-/L \ f k k z <31>^ & £ h ^ \ {. * ° nje i'ik A \ V ri-»f>___ ^ tHL+h ,£■«*> *^— \ s l *"——*. ■ ,. **emt»o AM §t~ a *.'LL* “ 4-w' V** Bill euj ylaiuigf, ,J. j •/, •"~7~ A# m) A# A uTt _ 7 ‘ T f " 7 ‘t T p r r . AM =mv m -i.y. 'f \ l < — ^ l» Ai r * H i S S l i K 'r£s / > .> . / / <* , £, ^ 2 T /fV. J'T^TfJ Figure 14: Rongerik Atoll as Morjinkot Land Source: John Anjain record books. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 In the urban areas, where land is scarce and the environmental contamination forces the Rongelapese to live on other people’s land, the Rongelapese are an impoverished community. In their displacement, it impossible for the Rongelapese to practice traditional maintenance of the land and cultivation techniques necessary for survival. On Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae atolls the Rongelapese had relative wealth since their land ownership and access to resources ensured they could provide for the needs of their families. Older Rongelapese express deep concern and frustration about their inability to share this knowledge with the younger generation, such as information about survival, self-sufficiency, sustainability, storing or preserving foods, sharing of resources, medicine, legends or bwebwenaios , navigation, and strategies for coping with famine, drought or other dangers. If the elder Rongelapese cannot pass this information to the younger generation, the younger generation will lose the ability to survive on the only islands they will inherit land rights to. Despite long periods of absence, the Rongelapese who grew up on their home islands all remember critical information about their environment that is essential to survival and maintenance of the community’s land and tradition. Water On Rongelap, drinking water came from the collection of rainwater. Most rainwater was collected from tin roofs or cement water catchments built during the Japanese administration of the islands. The Rongelapese also caught and stored water in giant clamshells or in holes they dug at the base of coconut trees to capture the rain. Although not a primary source of drinking water, the Rongelapese also used other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 techniques, such as tapping water from roots and trees, during times of need. Collection techniques and sharing of a limited resource are essential to survival on Rongelap: We had different ways to quench our thirst... coconut milk, pandanus, we used the big roots from the pandattus tree to get water (Eknilang 1999a). Most water is a community resource, but rainwater is reserved more fo rfamilies. You have to ask permission before getting rainwater (Kendall 1999a). On Jabwaan, we drank the well water. It was less salty than the well water on Eniaitok or Rongelap. Rongerik had good ground water. Ailinginae had one well. Mwenlap weto on Jabwaan has the best water. It is a water source from long ago (John Anjain 1999). Fish Fish are central to the Marshallese diet. There are 66 entries in the Marshallese English dictionary that depict the wide range of fishing methods available to suit different weather variables and times of the day, or to catch specific species of fish. People caught fish on Rongelap using long line (mueo), net (ok), and fish traps of different sizes. People also caught lobsters on the reefs, and knew techniques to beach whales and dolphins. The Rongelapese consider themselves masters at fishing and pride themselves on their knowledge about where and how to fish. The Rongelapese men sailed throughout their three-atoll system to exploit different fishing areas. On Rongerik, one of the three beaches was set aside for women to fish, usually with nets: We got foodfrom all o f the islands on Rongelap. There was lots offish and lobster on Buroku Island It was a place to get our meats (John Anjain 1999). On Rongelap, Karuwe and Boarok islands in the north were the best places to fish (B. Boaz 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 People used fish to sustain themselves and to pay tribute to the alap and iroij. They also used fishbones to fertilize their lands. Birds Many of the interviewees discussed the importance of birds and bird eggs to their diet on Rongelap. In fact, most of the people on Ailinginae were busy collecting birds and bird eggs when they experienced the fallout from the Bravo test. The interviewees described the best islands for locating edible species of birds, such as Bokankaer. Enebarbar, Enealo, and Eniaitok islands, as well as the best techniques for sustainably capturing them: We would break the wings o f birds when they were young so they wouldn 7 fly away. This enables people to go back and gel them when they are older. Mot all the young have their wings broken. We also collected the eggs o f birds to eat. Birds were found on certain islands. Some types o f birds were best to catch at nighttime (Eknilang 1999a). On Rongerik, people used to collect the eggsfrom many birds, including the ak (frigate), kalo (brown booby), ker (tern), and peiwak (brown noddy). Jipedbao Island on Rongerik was known fo r its' birds (Kebenli 1999). On Ailinginae there were plenty o f birds to eat. We used to fill buckets with birds (Job 1999). Turtles Many species of turtles are found all over Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae atolls. There are no seasons for turtles. Again, the interviewees know the best locations to find turtles. Bock Island on Rongerik, for example, is particularly well known for turtles. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 137 Turtles used to lay eggs everywhere on the atolls, even on populated islands (Eiknilang 1999b). Rongerik is known as the atoll o f birds and turtles (Joseph 1999). Rongelap was always known for its bounty offood. It was number two in turtle after Kwajalein. There were turtles on all the small islands (Jilej 1999). Crabs Coconut crabs are considered a delicacy to Marshallese. The Rongelapese ate coconut crabs on a consistent basis. Islands, such as Arbar Island on Rongelap Atoll had crabs everywhere. The Rongelapese also consumed smaller crabs that live in the rocks and coconut husks by the shore. Clams Giant clams and other clams species found in the reef on Rongelap were important sources of food. Women and children often gathered smaller clams found along the shoreline. Men would collect.the larger clams found in deeper waters. Marshallese also use clam shells as tools, such as the dekenin. an implement used to soften the fibers for weaving mats that generations of women pass through their matrilineal line: On Rongelap, there were always lots o f clams on the reef where my grandmother lived, near the church (Eknilang 1999c). Ailinginae was known for its clams and birds. We would askfor permission to make trips to gather them (John Anjain 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 Lobster and Octopus The reefs on all three atolls were full o f lobsters and octopus. Anyone could go to the reefs and collect them because the reef food belonged to everyone (John Anjain 1999). Pumpkin Pumpkin was available on all three of the atolls. There was pumpkin all the time, it has no season (Eknilang I999e). When people traveledfrom Ailinginae to Rongelap at Christmas time, they would always bring pumpkin (Abija 1999). Coconut Coconuts provided not only food to the Rongelapese, but materials necessary for survival. Several interviewees noted that there are 1,000 different products that come from the coconut tree. The Marshallese depend on the coconut tree for food, drink, building, toys, and money made from the dried coconut meat, or copra: While the United States might look at a coconut tree and see the value o f the copra, we see medicine, toys for our kids, food, weaving materials, sails and canoes. Nothing is wasted One coconut tree, similarly to a pandanus or breadfruit tree, can almost support afamily with all o f its needs (J Riklon 1999). The Rongelapese traded copra for cash and supplies from the ships that stopped in Rongelap every three to six months. Pandanus, Breadfruit, and Arrowroot Pandanus, breadfruit, and arrowroot are other traditional staple food sources. Breadfruit is a staple food that the Rongelapese prepared in a variety of ways. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 The strong trunk of the breadfruit is ideal for building the traditional sailing canoes Ckorkor). Arrowroot was also so abundant that the Rongelapese used it to make flour. Pandanus and breadfruit are seasonal foods; arrowroot is not. Pandanus is important for making certain types of food for the iroij, such as jaankun, but also to make baby food. People eat the fruit raw or boil it and use the softened meat for baby food, baked goods or candy. People depend on the leaves of the pandanus trees to weave sleeping mats. The roots of pandanus trees also serve as water sources during extreme periods of drought when people would steam the roots until the water released. The Rongelapese distributed these foods to their iroij for distribution and to their relatives throughout the Marshall Islands. When the supply ships sailed to Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae, the people bought flour, sugar, rice and other foods, but the preservation techniques the Rongelapese used to prepare pandanus, breadfruit and arrowroot ensured that the people did not go hungry if the supply ships did not arrive. The Rongelapese often exchanged their staple foods for other cultivated food supplies. Medicine Marshallese use non-edible plants for windbreak, tools, spices, but particularly for medicine. People use virtually every indigenous species of plant for medicinal purposes (Eknilang 1999b). The practitioners of Marshallese medicine understand that parts of plants are more powerful during some times of the year than others and can cause harm or death. The Marshallese consider knowledge about medicine as very powerful and mostly secretive. Some families keep information about certain medicines that they pass to successive generations. Other medicines require Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140 higher, more rare knowledge that exists with just a few people. Ri-bubu, usually men, are particularly strong healers. Although Marshallese medicine is free, healers benefit from the power and prestige that their knowledge accords them and from the food and other expressions of appreciation from their patients (Kabua 1999b). The interviewees believe that Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae are very good areas for acquiring medicine: Everything that grows is medicinal. Even grass is usedfor kids, and as reproductive medicines. But, Marshallese medicines are never to be used on menstruating women. When the people lived on Rongelap, Rongelap used to be known as a place fo r making medicine (Eknilang 1999b). Legends or Bwebwenatos It is clear from the interviewees that legends and storytelling are important means to transmit knowledge about the environment that is essential to survival. For example, local stories instruct listeners about the best location to catch eels and find important resources, as well as how to navigate the islands: An old man, Jelan, saw a kwolei bird digging into the ground. When he went to see what it was, he found water (John Anjain 1999). On the ocean side o f Rongerik when you look out at the ocean, it looks like there are men out there fishing and they are looking for eels. The rocks are shaped like that (Kebenli 1999). Eniaitok, an island known fo r its birds, is shaped like a bird. There is a story o f a boy, Leok, who threw a rock at the bird, Jebtaka, and knocked it to the ground. The north and south sides o f the island are the wings, and the central part o f the island, Jibiken, is the tail o f the bird. The large stone in the reef on the northern part o f the island is the stone used to knock the bird down (John Anjain 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 In order to find Rongelap, sailors would follow the North Star CUmanmcm ). Limanmcm is included on the Rongelap Local Government’s seal to help people find the atoll (Abija 1999, Eknilang I999d). Navigation The Marshallese are legendary, even among Pacific Islanders, for being the best navigators (Krieger 1943). The Rongelapese were no exception as they relied on their navigational ability to access the small islands on Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae. This is particularly true for Ailinginae (aelon in ae = atoll in the current), which is one of the most difficult areas to navigate. The people who sailed to Ailinginae are expert sailors and navigators. I blow how to sail an outrigger canoe. I've sailed to every single island on Rongelap , which is about thirty miles across... On Rongelap, we grew up learning sailing and navigation (B. Boaz 1999). People transmit knowledge in ancient chants (roro), that instruct sailors about the hazards of the reefs and how to navigate the islands. One woman I interviewed recited an entire roro about how sailors can detect the wave patterns breaking off of a reef on Ailinginae in order to locate the island from the sea long before the islands or reef become visible. Locally based knowledge about navigation is crucial to the survival of the Marshallese. People can not live solely from the scant resources of one island. They depend on navigation to maintain their social and political relationships with family and chiefs on other islands and to gain access to the full range of natural resources necessary for survival. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142 Natural Resources and Social Relations When the Rongelapese lived on their own lands, natural resources provided the food, shelter, and water necessary for survival. One interviewee explained that land is important because it provides people with the means to be self-sufficient: The importance of land? We eatfrom it. We drinkfrom it. We make handicrafts from it. We can make foods and things to drinkfrom it. We make enra. Marshallese plates, for our one-year birthday celebrations. We also make copra that people can sell. We prepare the frondsfrom the coconut tree for sitting on and making fires. We also make broomsfor the houses. And pandanus, the ancestors made clothes form the coconut and pandanus. Women use the pandanus leaves to make sleeping mats, things to lie on. We are also made from it. And many kinds o ffood. There is pandanus time, and breadfruit. Wonderful fo o d Boats - outriggers. We make Marshallese tin by weaving coconut fronds. Cocomit husks to make ropes. They don 7 cost anything. Today they are really expensive (Emos 1999). Ethnographic data also demonstrates how natural resources provide the essentials for social well being. First-year birthdays (kemem), marriages and funerals, and iroij visits are important occasions for the community members to meet as a group, to celebrate, and to socialize: It is important to have materials to weave mats for funerals, as well as important occasions like iroij visits, the first year birthday party (kemem). weddings, and Christmas. It is also essential to share food with everyone on these occasions as the gifts and the food make people feel closer together as a community (Kabua 1999b). At one year, the survival chances for an infant seem more assured, and people celebrate the well being of the child and recognize her/him as part of the community. Gifts of food are central to Marshallese celebrations of the first-year birthday. Similarly, resources enable people to follow traditional burial techniques and custom during funerals: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 Duringfunerals, people come together and revisit and learn theirfamily connections and place in society. People give gifts to burial areas. Community members place white rocks around gravesites as a symbol o fpurity. People come together at the irak (one week after the burial) to forgive each other - a time to forget hatreds and to forgive any misdeeds o f the departed (Kabua 1999b). People know where the burial areas are. They also know where the sea burials took place (Kendall 1999b). During iroij visits, resources are an important aspect of people’s ability to demonstrate their respect for their chiefs: Certain flowers are usedfor the iroij during visits, such as the kano (fern). People always put the flowers on a necklace so they don 7 touch the head o f the iroij. Food is prepared in advance o f the visit. Fish comes from the coral heads designatedfor the iroij. Certain types offoods are given to the iroij, such as turtle, cocomit crabs, preserved breadfruit and pandanus, arrowroot, dolphins and certain species offish. The only type o f coconut the iroij can drink is the nibarbar. Food is placed in a large, woven basket or kilek that only the alap can bring to the iroij. The iroij collects food as he goesfrom island to island (keiinbwii) (Kabua 1999b). Sustainability and Self-Sufficiency Full access to a range of cultivation options from numerous small islands of their three-atoll system helped provide the Rongelapese with a flexible, fluid means of gathering resources necessary for survival: Using resourcesfrom all islands and all available atolls is essential to survival. People depend on the ability to use their whole system o f islands. On Rongelap, we needed to use the northern islands. Survival depends on being able to use everything around us and on sharingfood People got together to sail to distant islands and also to harvest food. Food was then collected and distributed to everyone (Eknilang 1999b). The Rongelapese accessed the plants, terrestrial animals, birds, marine, and reef life from Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae. This enabled the Rongelapese to live sustainably and self-sufficiently from their environment by ensuring they did not deplete available Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144 resources in any single area. Multiple resource gathering options also enabled the Rongelapese to adjust to seasonal and climatic variations. To protect their resource base, sustainable resource use was an important aspect of food gathering on Rongelap, Rongerik, and Ailinginae: ...the Rongelapese know to only fish for two days in one spot and then move. With the coconut crab, we didn 7 used to take the females and we didn 7 take too many from one place. We never took small crabs or pregnant crabs. As for the turtles and birds, we never took all their eggs. We didn 7 break the wings o f all the older birds, either, because we wanted to leave some older birds to lay more eggs. These principles are also true for trees and plants because ifyou don 7 clean them and take care o f the deadflowers or fruits, the trees and plants get sick and don 7 grow well (Eknilang 1999b). The Rongelapese also employed sustainable bird collection techniques: We broke their wings when they were young. We ate the younger birds so the adult birds could make more birds. We only ate them during the birthing season (Job 1999). It was also critical for the Rongelapese to know techniques for preserving and storing food because of the limited seasons of their primary food sources, particularly staple crops such as breadfruit, pandanus and arrowroot: Breadfruit appears in the rok season from July through December. Pandanus and arrowroot appear in the anonaen season from December through July. People got together to harvest arrowroot, breadfruit and otherfoods to preserve them (G. Anjain 1999a). We salted, dried and grated pandanus for preservation. Jekaka is dried pandanus that is grated like a powder or flour so it can last for years...Rainwater was carefully collected and stored People placed basins (emok) at the bottoms of cocomit trees to catch runoff rainwater. These basins were usually made o f clamshells or carved wood (Eknilang 1999a). Young girls like me learned to make ianwin (preserved pandatms) and otherfoods from pandanus ( Koinij 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 Because food and water are critical to survival, yet limited on a coral atoll, the sharing of resources is essential to survival. The Rongelapese worked together to harvest and prepare food, and to share water and food resources with families and neighbors. For example, the interviewees discussed how they would come together and work during breadfruit season, from July through December, to preserve breadfruit for ceremonies and family consumption, and to send to distant family members and iroij. The Rongelapese shared other critical resources as well: Because o f its central importance, water was shared perhaps more than any other resource. It was understood that ifyou have a good well, people can come and ask to use it, or ju st take it (Kendall 1999a). On Monluel we to, there was a big fence with chickens in it. The birds belonged to the family, but people would ask for them. When there were many birds, sometimes they would hand out a bird to each family (Job 1999). Due to the seasonality of important resources, including water, and the intense labor required to secure food, people periodically face times of famine and drought with severely limited resources. Because the Rongelapese could depend on the small islands of three atolls and ocean resources, they had multiple areas they could gather resources from. The multiple access sites and the Rongelapese people’s knowledge about local resources enabled the Rongelapese to survive periods of famine and drought relatively well. There was always pandanus and coconuts. During the times o f hunger, we were not really hungry because there was so much o f the pandanus (Abija 1999). We used to eat cocomit in times o f hunger. I f I could have eaten those foods, like [restricted coconut/ crab, during the famines, I wouldn't have been so hungry (B. Boaz 1999). We relied on sprouted coconut and thingsfrom the ocean - large clams, crab, small clams, fish - they were adequate in the times o f hunger. We ate mature Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 coconut and drank the drinking coconuts. As a water substitute, people would suck on the bweo (husk) or konawe to get the liquid out. We also drank the young cocomits, or m (Kolnij 1999). The interviewees also demonstrate knowledge about the best times, places and techniques to catch various species of fish. During certain times of the year, particular types of fish run: In January and February, the mackerel (mwilmwil) run. In November and December, the group fish (loiepiep) run (Eknilang I999e). Everyone who has rights to property and its resource base works collectively to maintain shared commodities. This involves shared cleaning, planning, harvesting, and division of food resources. People with land rights also decide to plant certain foods on certain islands (Lajuan 1999). Some Rongelapese believe that the people and plants work symbiotically for their own maintenance and survival. During a site visit to Rongelap in March 1999, a Rongelapese woman observed that currently the trees and plants on Rongelap have no flowers or fruit. She explained: Plants don 7 grow without people. We make the plants happy and they make us happy (Eknilang 1999c). Someone without rights to the land can ask the owners for permission to use the land. This enables those who seek permission to benefit from the resources on the land while the landowners have their property tended: People ask permission to work on someone else's land, but it is always expected that the land will be returned in good shape. You do what is expected o fyou or people will have the right to keep you from the land (Kendall 1999b). I f someone uses your land, they are expected to take care o f it, and to maintain it. If they don 7 or if they cut trees or wreck the house, you can stop them from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 making copra. You can even stop afamily memberfrom using the land because there is always a leader in the family (John Anjain 1999). In addition to maintaining the land for their own use, the Rongelapese have a clear perception of the importance of protecting the land for future generations. The Rongelapese understand that they are fortunate to receive the gift of property from their ancestors. They, in turn, look forward to bequeathing it to future generations: We don't ‘own ’ the land. It belongs to all generations. It's better to use the word iolet (inheritors) instead o f owner. We are the inheritors, but the owner is God (Eknilang 1999d). There is also a conscious effort by the Rongelapese to teach the younger people where their land rights are so they can continue to claim and use their property in the future. People never lose their claim to their land, but everyone has to be educated about where their land is and where they belong on the family tree: My mother shows me where our land is so I can take care o f it (Matayoshi 1999). My children have never been to Rongelap. I tell them where their land rights are so they will know (Jilej 1999). I was raised in the United States. My mother was Marshallese. She was an alap o f Kwajalein, and my father was American. My mother taught me all about Marshallese land rights. Before I ever came to the Marshall Islands, my mother taught me about the iroij system, land claims and family rights. My mother chose me out o f all ten children to come back to the Marshall Islands to claim my family's land rights (Jenkins 1999). Without question, access to land and resources enabled the Rongelapese to provide for themselves and to maintain their cultural traditions. People put a value on their way o f life, a life they are proud o f and which is based on self-sufficiency. Money and material are not as important as the ability to live without outside influences (J. Riklon 1999). I was bom in 1917 on Rongerik... We came together and made food We stored food So many kinds offood Every type was there. There was water. We ate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 arrowroot, preserved breadfruit, pandatms, coconut, fish, crab, foods from the reef like octopus, clam and smallfish. There's an island, Jipedbao, with lots of birds. There were also turtles on the islands... We would sail overnight in the outrigger canoe to Rongelap. We would take food to Rongelap. We always exchangedfood (Kebenli 1999). Dangers Knowledge about dangers in the environment saved the Rongelapese from potential hazards or threats to their lives. This knowledge was critical to the well being of the community. The Rongelapese taught their children about the species of fish and plants that were dangerous to consume or touch. The adults on Rongelap also taught children about the locations around the islands with many sharks: As children, we didn’t go swimming at the end o f the island where I lived, Jabwaan, because Jabwaan is fu ll o f sharks. Jabwaan is at the end o f the island, near a deep pass where the sharks enter the lagoon from the ocean side (Kabinmeto 1999). The knowledge about the environment and the resources that the Rongelapese possess enabled them to survive and to flourish on their own lands. While living on other people’s lands, the Rongelapese cannot use this information. Furthermore, the longer the people remain dislocated the greater the danger that the older generation will not transmit this knowledge to the younger generation. Exile, therefore, poses unique survival challenges both for the current generation living in Diaspora and for future generations detached from a knowledge base that is highly specific to the particular atoll environments they will inherit. If the younger generation will resettle Rongelap one day, they will need this information to live safely and to make use of the resources available to them. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 Human Radiation Experiments From 1940 to 1974, the General Accounting Agency reports that the U.S. Government supported thousands of human experiments involving biological, blister and nerve agents, and radiation (Welsome 1999). In her book, The Plutonium Files. Eileen Welsome catalogs numerous human medical experiments sponsored by the U.S. Government during the cold war. Ms. Welsome won a Pulitzer Prize for her journalistic investigation of the subject for the Albuquerque Tribune. Many of these experiments had no medical benefit for the patients. In many cases, the patients died or became seriously ill as a direct result of the experiments. In 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission launched a biomedical program focused on the “continuation and expansion of wartime research into the effects of ionizing radiation” (Welsome 1999:207). The AEC manufactured the radioisotopes used in the experiments. U.S. Government researchers conducted their experiments in government facilities, universities and hospitals throughout the United States (Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 1995). Researchers targeted women, children, unborn fetuses, minorities, the mentally retarded, schizophrenics, prisoners, alcoholics, and poor people of all ages and ethnic groups for their studies... Several doctors... (said) that poor patients often were selected because they were easily intimidated, didn’t ask questions, and belonged to a different social class (Welsome 1999:214). The arrogance of the researchers and their devaluation of the lives of their subjects enabled them to conduct their experiments on patients that they viewed as inferior to themselves. Based on the presumed inferiority of their patients, researchers believed they were appropriate candidates for helping the United States Government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 better understand the effects of radiation on human beings. Doctors purposefully chose children whose parents did not know the right questions to ask about their children’s treatment (Silverman in Welsome 1999). According to one doctor: We medical students and our teachers looked upon ourselves as belonging to another social class from the patients we were taking care of...without ever saying it, still it was felt that we didn’t belong to the same class... I really felt that had a little to do with the fact that we felt we were free to test these people and carry out studies on them (Beesom in Welsome 1999:215-216). In 1947 Shields Warren set up three AEC cancer hospitals, Argonne Cancer Research Hospital in Chicago, Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies in Tennessee, and Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, NY. Doctors and researchers performed scores of human radiation experiments in these facilities. Researchers sent body parts and urine of deceased subjects and specimens collected during biopsies to institutions throughout the United States. For example, “some 1,165 human thyroid glands were collected during the autopsies around the world and sent to the Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies for analysis” (Welsome 1999:304). Some of the human radiation experiments included plutonium injections, total body irradiation, experiments on the reproductive systems of prisoners, long-term studies of the Japanese hibakusha , and tracer studies. One of the researchers, Dr. Joseph Hamilton, conducted approximately 18 human plutonium experiments. Included in the 18 human plutonium experiments was a case that involved a four-year-old boy from Australia with osteogenic sarcoma, a bone cancer. Desperate and believing they could find a cure, the family agreed to let a U.S. military plane fly the boy, named Simmy, and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 his mother to the University of California Hospital in San Francisco for treatment42 On April 26, 1946, Hamilton injected Simmy with three radioisotopes, including plutonium- 239. Afterwards, surgeons removed a piece of Simmy’s bone for biopsy and to study the level of radiation deposits. The boy’s leg was put in a cast, and Dr. Hamilton sent Simmy and his mother back to Australia. Simmy died on January 6, 1947. At Cincinnati General Hospital, doctors conducted total body irradiation, or TBI tests. “The experimental subjects were homemakers, seamstresses, maids, salesmen, carpenters, and clerks. Sixty-two percent were African American. Most were poor or had such low-paying jobs they could not afford private physicians. Many had very little formal education” (Welsome 1999:342). The research committee with oversight responsibility for these experiments determined that the tests were an important means to determine how citizens could survive a nuclear war or accident (Welsome 1999). From the TBI experiments, doctors learned that patients exposed to radiation in the past suffer “more deleterious effects the second time around” (Welsome 1999:342). Similarly, Dr. Carl Heller concluded from his irradiation of the testicles of Oregon prisoners that “small chronic doses delivered over a long period of time caused more damage than the same amount of radiation delivered at once” (Welsome 1999:373). Dr. Paul Henshaw also determined from his long-term studies of the Japanese the level of radiation exposure required to double the level of mutations in species (Welsome 1999). The majority of studies conducted by U.S. Government researchers were tracer studies. Tracer experiments involved the ingestion of radioactive tracers into the 42 The name of the doctor in Australia who referred Simmy is deleted from DOE files. It is unknown how Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 body so researchers could follow the path of the substances. Many of these studies focused on tracing the movement of radioactive fallout into the environment and through the human food chain. Researchers at the uranium processing facility in Hanford, Washington fed radioactive fish to human subjects. At the University of Chicago and the cancer research facility at Argonne, “real and simulated fallout and solutions of strontium and cesium were fed to 102 subjects” (Welsome 1999:383). The AEC covered up all information about these experiments because public disclosure of the AEC’s biomedical program “would have damaged the commission’s bomb-building program and its efforts to build a civilian nuclear power industry” (Welsome 1999:194). To protect its interests in nuclear power and to avoid criticism from the public, the AEC suppressed all evidence of the human radiation experiments it supported. Doctors involved in the experiments avoided use of the word “experiment” and suggested the use of words such as “study, investigation, (or) research” (Saenger in Welsome 1999:405). Doctors purposefully did not write words such as “plutonium” or “uranium” in patients’ medical files. Most patients were referred to by code names, such as CAL-l, the first patient injected with plutonium at Dr. Hamilton’s research facility in California, to keep the identity of the patients confidential. The Doctors There is a correlation between the human radiation experiments conducted in the United States and the activities of U.S. Government researchers working with the original contact was made with Dr. Hamilton (Welsome: 134). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 Marshallese. Some of the doctors involved in the confirmed human radiation experiments conducted in the United States are the same doctors responsible for the medical care of the Marshallese after their exposure to radiation from the testing program. Dr. Joseph Hamilton was closely involved in the care of Marshallese for decades after their exposure to radiation. Marshallese patients were often referred to Dr. Hamilton at his facility in California, where he conducted plutonium injections. While there is not direct evidence that Dr. Hamilton injected plutonium into Marshallese patients, Marshallese citizens sent to the United States for radiation related medical treatment complain that they had organs removed, and procedures performed on them that they did not understand and did not consent to (E. Boaz 1994). It is also interesting to note that Dr. Hamilton temporarily halted his plutonium experiments in 1946 to join the AEC team of doctors sent to the Marshall Islands for Operation Crossroads (Welsome 1999). Unlike his American research subjects that he offered to pay money to as an incentive to remain close to his testing facility, Dr. Hamilton had a captive set of subjects to research in the Marshall Islands since it was difficult for people to leave their islands. Dr. Hamilton was also the doctor who helped the AEC gloss over the dangers posed by the testing facility in Nevada. Hamilton was aware “that fallout form the tests could pose serious hazards to nearby communities... (and Hamilton helped the AEC rationalize a decision) not to evacuate residents because. ..(of) fea[r] such a move would harm public relations and jeopardize the test site” (Welsome 1999:257). Another doctor involved in both the human radiation experiments in the United States and the medical care of the Marshallese was Dr. Eugene Cronkite. After the Rongelapese and Utrikese suffered from the severe exposure to radioactive fallout Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 from the Bravo test in 1954, Dr. Cronkite was one of the original team members sent to the Marshall Islands to provide care to and report on the medical effects of radiation exposure on the local people. Dr. Cronkite moved to the cancer research facility at Brookhaven National Laboratory established by Shields Warren in 1947 and remained a primary doctor for the Marshallese until at least 1974 when the cancer research facility was closed. According to Welsome, Dr. Cronkite was also involved in an AEC experiment involving the corpses of previous radiation subjects. In the 1970s, Dr. Cronkite helped the AEC with a program to exhume and study the bodies of subjects from the radiation experiments (Welsome 1999). Again, while there is no direct evidence that Dr. Cronkite sent the corpses of Marshallese to the AEC for study, but U.S. Government representatives did perform autopsies on deceased members of the exposed population. Other Marshallese express concern about U.S. Government interest in sending the bodies of deceased children, usually deformed babies bom to the acutely exposed population, back to the United States (Jibas 1994). Human Radiation Experiments Involving the Rongelapese There is very little hard evidence, such as U.S. Government documents, to connect the Marshallese to the human radiation experiments confirmed by President Clinton in 1995. It is clear, however, that the Rongelapese and the Utrikese people and their specimens were sent to the same institutions and doctors in the United States that conducted radiation experiments. Lauren Donaldson, the scientist at the University of Washington chiefly responsible for monitoring the levels of radioactivity in the food Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 chain on Rongelap where people resettled, was “an old buddy of Stafford Warren” (Welsome 1999:376). Stafford Warren was the director of the Manhattan Project’s medical section, an observer of Operation Crossroads, and the first director of the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition to the human ecological studies involving radiation, the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) confirmed in 1995 that U.S. Government researchers conducted two human radiation experiments involving Marshallese citizens. The first experiment involved a chelating agent (EDTA), normally administered shortly after internal radiation contamination to remove radioactive material, [that] was administered seven weeks after exposure. The stated rationale was that the agent would ‘mobilize and make detection of isotopes easier, even though it was realized that the procedure would have limited value at his time. Because there was virtually no therapeutic benefit envisioned, it appears the primary goal of the study was to measure radiation exposures for research purposes, although the knowledge may have been helpful in the clinical care of the patient. In the second experiment, a radioactive tracer (chromium 51) was used to tag red blood cells in ten unexposed Rongelapese to measure their red blood cell mass. The purpose was to determine whether the anemia that had been observed among Marshallese was an ethnic characteristic or due to their radiation exposures. The tracer dose used would have posed a very minimal risk, but it was clearly not for the benefit of the ten subjects themselves. The data could, however, have benefited Marshallese exposed as a result of the Bravo explosion. No documentation addressing whether consent was sought is available for either experiment (Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 1995:592). Disappointingly, ACHRE, like DOE, downplayed the problems associated with human experimentation and emphasized the positive medical applications. Neither of the studies involving the Marshallese benefited the patients in any way and both ACHRE and DOE maintain that the levels of radiation involved in the experiments did not harm the Marshallese. Unfortunately, when ACHRE and DOE provided their explanation for why the amounts of radiation did not harm the Marshallese, they failed to provide the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 Marshallese with any understanding about the cumulative effect of their exposure. Small amounts of radiation are not a problem for people who have not been exposed to radiation previously, but this is not the case for the Marshallese. While the subjects were not exposed to the direct fallout from Bravo they were living in and eating from the radioactive environment on Rongelap. ACHRE failed to acknowledge that the ten Rongelapese subjects considered “unexposed” to radiation were exposed to high levels of radiation in their environment. Given the scientific community’s increased understanding that incremental amounts of radiation exposure exacerbate problems caused by previous exposure, the U.S. Government failed to adequately explain the medical risks of the human radiation experiments to the Marshallese subjects. Despite some disclosure by the U.S. Government, it still has not declassified information about other human radiation experiments, such as the complete thyroidectomies of more than 70 Marshallese without their understanding or consent.43 Also, the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine did not share the results of autopsies it performed on deceased members of the “exposed” community. Furthermore, the U.S. Government is unwilling to address the severe human environmental rights abuses perpetrated against the Marshallese who participated in experiments to study the movement of radiation from the environment to the human being, and experiments involving the ingestion or radioactive tracer substances. The U.S. Government contaminated the environment of the Marshallese and used the contamination as an opportunity to conduct experiments. The U.S. Government dehumanized the Marshallese Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 people, and particularly the Rongelapese, by focusing on them as research subjects, or mere body parts, such as thyroids, rather than human beings. A Broader Understanding of the Consequences of the Testing Program The U.S. Government’s representation of the effects of its nuclear weapons testing program focus exclusively on the problems resulting from the direct exposure of human beings to radiation and to environmental damage caused by the testing program. In addition to profound medical and environmental problems, the testing program and its resulting displacement of multiple communities resulted in widespread political, economic, psychological and social problems not only for the Rongelapese community, but also for the nation. These problems resulting from displacement are not included as part of the U.S. Government construction of its history in the Marshall Islands. In the case of the Rongelapese, ethnographic data uncovers a range of indirect, but significant, consequences of the testing program that the U.S. Government erases and fails to account for. Political The displacement of the Rongelapese from Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae affects the political composition of the national government. Political representation in the nation’s parliament (Nitijela) is conditioned on physical 43 During a 1994 testimony to the White House Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. Senator Tony deBrum asked the U.S. Government to return the removed thyroid glands that reportedly remain preserved by researchers in Ohio (T. deBrum 1994). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 habitation of the atolls or large island districts. Residents from each occupied atoll or large island have the right to elect at least one senator. If there are no residents of an area, there is no political representation. Because the U.S. Government resettled the Rongelapese on just Rongelap Island in 1957, when it came time for the Nitijela to elect its representatives in 1979, the Rongelapese had only one elected official. The right to elect officials from Rongerik and Ailinginae was lost because of the U.S. Government’s resettlement plan for the population.44 Ailinginae and Rongerik are large atolls, but they are treated like small islands by the United States. People should have been returned to these atolls and there should be three senators representing the three areas, not one. In this regard, the testing affected the political make-up o f the country (Kendall 1999b). According to the previous Senator representing Rongelap Atoll, nuclear testing disrupted politics on the three atolls by reducing three atoll communities to just one: Now, people talk about Rongelap as if it isjust one place, Rongelap Island. But, it was the fallout and testing that brought people from Ailinginae and Rongerik to Rongelap. Actually, there should be political representation from all three areas since there are people with land rights in those different places (J. Riklon 1999). In the case of Rongerik Atoll, the Rongelapese cannot secure a seat in the national government to represent Rongerik because the U.S. Government denied the Rongelapese the right to occupy their land in order to accommodate the needs of the Bikinians: We movedfrom Rongerik during the war to stay together on Rongelap. We didn't use it after the war because the Navy used Rongerik. People lived with their relatives on Rongelap, but the land rights were different than on 44 This is a matter that may be appropriate for the Marshallese con-con to consider. Elected representatives to the con-con consider amendments to the RMI's constitution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 Rongerik (J. Riklon 1999). Similarly, the U.S. Government denied the Rongelapese the same right to seek representation for Ailinginae Atoll because the U.S. Government confined 1957 resettlement to a single island on Rongelap, and rendered Ailinginae off limits for occupancy. Economic As stated in the introductory section, the agricultural economy of the Marshall Islands is based on copra production and food that comes directly from the land (Tobin 1958). While living on their land, the Rongelapese purchased some provisions, such as kerosene, tin roofing, lamps, cigarettes, matches, sugar, rice, and flour. The Rongelapese would acquire these provisions by trading or selling their natural resources with ships that would pass by their islands. Current land use rights for the Rongelapese occupying other peoples’ land on Mejatto, Majuro and Ebeye entail occasional exchanges of cash payment for rental rights. Customarily in the Marshall Islands, people provide money and gifts of food to the land’s iroij to show respect to the iroij. On Mejatto and Ebeye, the Rongelapese do not pay the iroij for their occupancy of non-Rongeiapese land, although the iroij for Rongelap is the same iroij for the land where the Rongelapese now live in Kwajalein. Customary exchanges of use rights, and many current use rights arrangements, involve the exchange of labor and the products of labor for the right to occupy and use with permission the natural resources of a particular weto (tract of land). Rongelapese men sold copra, a major source of income, to the outer atolls in the RMI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 throughout this century (Tobin 1958, Mason 1988). Women assisted with the production of copra or generated an income from the sale of handicrafts or foodstuffs that they made as individuals or as part of a Rongelapese cooperative: Rongelap was the first area to establish a woman ’s group. We had a coop used to do all kinds o f work, such as making copra, pumpkin, and limes. The name o f this group was “ White Rose, " named after something rare and beautiful (Eknilang 1999c). In addition to the income generated by natural resources, resources have value to the Rongelapese as items of exchange between families and neighbors. The Rongelapese exchanged resources for labor, or to mark important cultural occasions. In their displacement, the Rongelapese cannot access the natural resources they need to sustain households and communities, exchange for other goods, or generate an income. Forced to live on other people’s land, the Rongelapese are not at liberty to exploit other people’s resources for their own economic or family needs. On Ebeye, there are no gardens and almost no trees. Only people with boats ftsh in the distant waters. People complain that the water near the island is polluted and over fished because of dense living conditions in the urban area. The few resources present in the urban area belong to the landowner and not the Rongelapese residents. Lack of occupational training to obtain employment in urban areas and the inability of the RMI Government to provide for the needs of the displaced Rongelapese exacerbate the problems caused by the Rongelapese people’s dependency on money, loss of land and natural resources, and inability to live self-sufficiently. While the Rongelapese possess life skills that enabled them to exploit their resource and survive from local resources on Rongelap, the people do not have the skills necessary to seek Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 employment in the urban areas. As the Rongelapese indicate, without employment there is no way for a family to purchase the food necessary for survival: Life is harder on this island (Ebeye). It's hard to get around You need money fo r everything, especiallyfood. On our own land we were really free and could eat everything (Kolnij 1999). We just survive from money here [on Ebeye J. You need money to do laundry. You need money for food, clothes. It’s hardfor a bigfamily (Emos 1999). I m deprived o f myfreedom on the land [I do not own]. You need permission on other people's land, land that you lease. Mow I don 7 have a place in Majuro. People are homesick and helpless in Majuro and Ebeye. We used to have such harmony. We'd support each other. You don 7 pay rent when you come on my land. Sometimes you give me fish, but at your leisure, not on a fixed schedule. We feel the strain o f having fixed economic resources but more mouths to feed. We would be okay on our land {I. Riklon 1999). In addition to the economic hardships on the population during their displacement, absence from their property affects their future ability to exploit and survive from their own natural resources. While the Rongelapese are off their atolls, there is no one to maintain the land and protect the resources and property inheritance of future generations. The Rongelapese express concern about people who sail to their atolls and pillage their resources while they reside in other locations: When land is evacuated, people can 7 protect their resources. Fishing boats and other boats steal the clams and other resources (Matayoshi 1999). The local government is unable to protect its resources. Foreign fishing and other vessels come and pillage the natural resources, such as the giant clams and turtles. Because there are no people living on the land, there is no one to protect the land (G. Anjain 1999b). The RMI national government has a constitutional requirement to provide for the needs of its people. The national law of the Republic of the Marshall Islands protects subsistence living for landowners and honors the fact that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 “...land, which is the source of their day-to-day existence, is considered by the Marshallese to be their most valuable asset. ..” (Tobin 1958:2). The Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands recognizes that the “means to obtain subsistence and benefits” is of utmost value. For this reason, the RMI Constitution upholds the notion of “just compensation” for “all interest holders” of the land when land is taken (RMI Government, Constitution, Section 5.5). Because the Marshallese view themselves as intergenerational holders of the land, interest holders of the land extend to future generations who will have rights to the land. According to Section 5 of the RMI Constitution, the RMI Government is responsible to provide for the needs of the people and the protection of their environment: No land right or other private property may be taken unless a law authorises such taking; and any such taking must be by the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, for public use and in accord with all safeguards provided by law... Where any land rights are taken, just compensation shall include reasonably equivalent land rights for all interest holders or the means to obtain the subsistence and benefits that such land rights provide (RMI Government, Constitution). In the case of the Rongelapese, the RMI national government lacks the resources to provide for the complex, and costly needs of the radiation affected communities who do not have access to their home islands. Furthermore, the RMI national government cannot ensure that the Rongelapese receive “just compensation” for their land that cannot be inhabited because of radiological contamination produced by the U.S. Government. Despite constitutional requirements to protect the land of its citizens, to provide adequately for land takings, and to provide basic services to its citizens, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 the consequences of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program prohibit the RMI Government from meeting these responsibilities to the Rongelapese. The RMI Government lacks the human, financial and institutional resources to provide the housing, food, water, and other needs that the Rongelapese used to provide for themselves on Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae. Furthermore, the RMI national government does not have three spare atolls to provide the equivalent of the land the Rongelapese lost, nor the resources to enable the Rongelapese to live self- sufficiently. Furthermore, Rongelapese dislocation causes a drain on national resources as the RMI Government struggles to provide services for the dislocated population. Psychological Injuries Many Marshallese who witnessed and experienced the consequences of nuclear weapons, like the hibakusha (survivors of atomic weapons dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Japan) suffer from severe psychological damage.45 This psychological injury results from the introduction or an alien and invisible threat that permanently alters people’s sense of security, well being, and health. In the case of Japan, perhaps the best representation of the all- consuming fear the people felt after their experiences with atomic weapons is the mythological creation of Godzilla. The creature, Godzilla, comes to life during a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 nuclear weapons test on Bikini Atoll.46 Like the deadly and often random nature of the damage caused by radiation, Godzilla annihilates anything in his path. Throughout the film, fears about Godzilla parallel Japanese fears about radiation. The film presents Godzilla as “beyond the scope of men’s imagination” (TOHO 1956). Godzilla destroys Tokyo, causing havoc, shock and strange burns. The only people who understand the nature of Godzilla’s destruction are “the natives” living on an island near Tokyo. Like radiation, once Godzilla was unleashed, “neither man nor his machines are able to stop this creature” (TOHO 1956). While the Marshallese did not create a mythic beast to represent their fears and psychological injuries resulting from the nuclear testing program, the trauma experienced by the people is very real. On April 20, 1954, a petition was submitted to the United Nations Trusteeship Council on behalf of the Marshallese citizens of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In this petition, the Marshallese people cited their concerns about the U.S. testing program and the disruptions and dangers it was causing their country and the populations, such as the Rongelapese, who were displaced from their land. The language of the petition underscores the importance of land to the Marshallese not only as a place to live and grow food, but 45 For an extensive discussion of the psychological aflccts of exposure to fallout from nuclear weapons, see Robert Jay Lifion (1968). Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 46 On March 1. 1954. a Japanese fishing boat. The Lucky Dragon, strayed within the Danger Area around Bikini Atoll. All of the men on board The Lucky Dragon were exposed to fallout from the Bravo test. When the ship arrived back in Japan and the public learned about the crewmen's exposure to radiation horn a nuclear test, the incident reignited Japanese concerns and fears about radiation and nuclear weapons. After the U.S. Government learned about the exposure of the Japanese fishermen, the U.S. Government made attempts to study the effects of radiation on the fishermen to compare to the effects on the Marshallese and the American servicemen also exposed to fallout. Japan denied the U.S. Government’s request to include the fishermen in U.S. Government research. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 as the essence of Marshallese life: ...we, the Marshallese people feel that we must follow the dictates o f our consciences to bring forth this urgent plea to the United Nations, which has pledged itself to safeguard the life, liberty and the general well being o f the people o f the Trust Territory, o f which the Marshallese people are a part. The Marshallese people are not onlyfearful of the danger to their persons from these deadly weapons in case o f another miscalcidation,4 but they are also very concernedfor the increasing number o f people who are being removedfrom their land Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a place where you can bury your dead. It is the very life o f the people. Take away their land and their spirits go also (United Nations Trusteeship Council 1958). The submission of this petition to the United Nations indicates that the Marshallese objected to the contamination of their environment and people from the time the testing program was underway and that they followed appropriate procedure for voicing their concerns to the United States Government and the international community. As the years pass and the Rongelapese remain exiled from their own land, the feelings of discontentment and concern expressed in the 1954 petition increase: The United States can't return the atoll (Rongelap) to how it was before. We lived in a poisonous place. The Rongelapese didn 't know until 1985 that they shouldn 'i have been living there. Now we 're wandering awayfrom our home (Matayoshi 1999). The Rongelapese suffer psychologically as a result of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. These psychological impacts result from decades of mismanagement of the radiation crisis by the U.S. Government rather than unjustified, unsubstantiated fears. A profound sense of spiritual loss connected to the loss of a way 47 The “miscalculation" refers to the U.S. Government position that the widespread radiological contaminatin from the Bravo test was “accidental" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 of life and loss of their home islands magnifies the psychological burdens of the Rongelapese. These fears and sentiments are similar to those experienced by the people of Bikini whom the U.S. Government removed from their home islands in 1946. Lore Kessibuki, a Bikinian elder, captured these feelings in the Bikinian Anthem: I jab ber emol, aet, Ijab berainmon48 Ion kineo im bitu kin ailon eo ao im melon ko ie. Eber im lok jiktok ikerele. Kot iban bok hartu jonan an elap ippa. Ao emotlok ronnni im lo ijen ion. Ijen ebin joe a eankin. Ijen jikin ao emotlok im ber im mad ie. No longer can I stay it’s true, no longer can I live in peace and harmony. No longer can I rest on my sleeping mat and pillow because of my island and the life I once knew there. The thought is overwhelming rendering me helpless and in great despair. My spirit leaves, drifting around and far away where it becomes caught in a current of immense power - and only then do I find tranquility (Niedenthal 1997:14). Prior to the testing, Rongelapese survival depended on their knowledge and understanding of the local environment. The Rongelapese knew when, where and how to cultivate the resources necessary for survival. With the introduction of a hazardous, invisible threat to their environment and health, the Rongelapese feared the radiation they could not see or taste when they ingested it. The Rongelapese cannot eat their traditional foods, such as the coconut crab, because of an intangible hazard. Their own lands remain off limits for an indefinite number of years because of radiation contamination. ■* This song was transcribed and translated by Jack NiedenthaL the Bikini Liason Officer. There is no copyright to this song. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 The U.S. Government’s mismanagement of the Rongelapese radiation crisis exacerbates people’s fears about radiation. The U.S. Government prematurely resettled the people on an island it declared “safe.” As a result of the premature resettlement, the U.S. Government compromised the health of the Rongelapese. The U.S. Government monitored increased radiation body-burdens in the Rongelapese and failed to inform them about their risks to environmental exposure. The U.S. Government also issued conflicting directives for the resettled Rongelapese. First the people were told they could eat coconut crab, then they were told they could not. The Rongelapese I interviewed believe the U.S. Government will not take responsibility for their radiation exposure because the Department of Energy refuses to discuss safety in terms of absolute safety. Since 1982, DOE adopted a policy that does not tell the Rongelapese definitively whether they put themselves at risk for certain behavior or food intake. Instead, DOE talks in terms of calculated risks in which a couple of people could be affected, but each person ultimately decides whether he or she is willing to take that risk or not. Even a U.S. DOE official recognized that the U.S. Government’s efforts to shift risk for radiation exposure to the Marshallese was “inconsistent” with restrictions placed by DOE in earlier years, unclear to the Marshallese, and unfair because it would require the Marshallese to make their own judgement about what foods they should eat (McCraw 1982). The U.S. Government’s wrongful resettlement of the people, the failure to disclose increased environmental exposure risk and the refusal to talk about safety in definitive terms increases the stresses and psychological burdens of radiation exposure for the Rongelapese people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 The Rongelapese have a first-hand understanding of the effects of radiation on human health and the environment that differs from the conclusions of U.S. Government scientists. For example, U.S. Department of Energy consultants from the weapons laboratories are unwilling to make any conclusions about the effects of radiation on the second generation. Although the scientific community remains ambivalent, the Rongelapese experience changes in reproduction among women and changes in the health of their offspring. These changes began to occur after the testing program. The U.S. Government’s unwillingness to respond to the effects of radiation that the Rongelapese attribute to the testing program undermines the Rongelapese people’s trust in the U.S. Government’s willingness to take full responsibility for the consequences of the testing program. Ethnographic data reveals the Rongelapese people’s anxieties about the insidious, invisible radiation threat that has taken them from good health to illness, from their homelands to Diaspora, from safety to fear, and from trust to skepticism: Psychologically, you slop believing in everything around you. Your feeling of safety no longer exists when the radiation-contaminated medicine49 and food around you is no good, restricted, and makes you worry (Eknilang 1999b). We were afraid o f the powder and the explosions. We were afraid they would drop powder again (Emos 1999). I won 7 go back. The radiation won 7 go away (Joseph 1999). The Rongelapese also feel great sorrow and concern about the loss of their way of life on Rongelap, Ailinginae and Rongerik. People recall the happiness they felt on their own land, and pride in their ability to provide for themselves and instruct the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 younger generation. The interviewees clearly articulate their deep sense of loss, anxiety, and sorrow about their home islands: Land is the place where we get all o f our needs. You can 7 get your needs without land. When you take away land, it's like you commit suicide. You take away our livelihood. Other Marshallese are sadfor us [Rongelapese] (M. Anjain 1999). There is no freedom in urban areas the way you have on your own property. It’s easy for people to walk all over you ifyou have no power and you are an outsider, or stranger (Kendall 1999b). I can 7 afford to fish because it's difficult to payfor gas and a boat. I lost my way o f life (J. Riklon 1999). Because of the central importance of land and property to the Marshallese, people have a strong attachment and sense of their place in society that comes from their families’ land. This importance is expressed throughout the Marshall Islands in national and local government seals, in the Constitution, and in the national anthem, popular songs and stories. The Marshallese have words to capture the critical connection between people and land that translate poorly into English, such as lamoren. or “old lineage land" (Tobin 1958:22), and iolet. or inheritance. In the ethnographic data I gathered some of the strongest expressions of sentiment occur in discussions about peoples’ atolls and homelands. Peoples’ connection to their land extends beyond the simple notion of property ownership into a spiritual realm that brings meaning, cohesion and happiness to peoples’ lives: Without the land, all shatters. Land binds us (Kedi and Silk 1999). On Rongelap, I went everywhere. No one told me I was forbidden from going anywhere. In Ebeye, Ijust gofrom my home to work and back again. What is the importance o f land? It’s so important! The land is what is important. Here are 49 The speaker refers to the contamination of local plants used to make Marshallese medicine. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 some examples: I planted so many coconut andpandanus seedlings (on Rongelap). It used to be great. I didn’t watch my father work. I planted the seedlings myself. But, now I ’m not there to see the trees I planted (B. Boaz 1999). Last week on Rongelap'01 was sad, extremely sad. The atoll is so big. And it's the surroundings where I grew up. I might or I might not live. I f they go back there, I will make a trip again. I stood in the church and remembered our good times there. The breadfruit there is all gone. I walked to Jabwaan so I could really see the land. I saw the tombstones and really stared at them. I stared at them fo r an hour ...It was sad (Emos 1999). Papa said that Rongelap was a place to get younger. You don 7 get older but you get younger on Rongelap. Rongelap women were known for looking young when they are older even though they may not be as good looking as women from other atolls when they are younger (laughs). We were sad about leaving Rongelap. It’s our place. I was accustomed to it (Abija 1999). This is the house where I lived (pointing to the fallen-down remains of her home on Rongelap that is nothing more than a concrete floor and rotted planks). My room was here (points to the front). My father died in this room (points to another area). We buried him over there (points to the cemetery down the road) (Job 1999). It makes me sad to come here because I used to come here all the time with my grandmother (swimming in the lagoon in front o f her grandmother’s house on Rongelap). She used to swim everyday in this small pool. I lived in three different places while I was here [on Rongelap/. I moved back andforth between my mother and father’s places. Life was so good here. We really had fun (Eknilang 1999c). I was really happy on Rongerik because it's my place, I grew up there (Kebenli 1999). Social Traditionally, Marshallese society has its own set of behavior guidelines that restrict access to certain areas. Some of these socially constructed 50 The speaker joined (he trip to Rongelap. the first for many of the elderly since their evacuation, mentioned in Chapter D. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 guidelines support the three tier social structure by demonstrating respect to the iroij. For example, it is forbidden to touch the head of an iroij, to stand or sit above or higher than the iroij, or to pass between the iroij's house and the lagoon. Certain foods and areas of land are reserved solely for the iroij and restrict access and consumption of these resources for non -iroij. Other restrictions exist for health and safety reasons. For instance, it is forbidden to have sexual relations for several months after a woman gives birth, for children to drink coffee (for fear that they will become crazy), or for women to climb coconut palms or other trees. Still other guidelines enable people living together on very small parcels of land to cooperate and live together peacefully. It is inappropriate, for instance, to express your anger or grievance directly with someone. Instead, Marshallese encourage the use of a third party to relay information and arbitrate any disagreement. With the introduction of radiation into the environment, the U.S. Government imposed new restrictions that undermine and replace traditional guidelines for behavior and the knowledge they are based on. After fallout contaminated Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae, all decisions prior to 1982 about where the Rongelapese would live and what they could and could not eat were made by the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government decided to evacuate the people to Kwajalein, to move them to Ejit, and to return them to a single island in a three-atoll system of hundreds of islands. Coconut crabs and the islands known for turtles and birds became off limits for the Rongelapese. Rongelapese experiences with radiation caused new and disturbing changes in the health of people that ultimately led to their decision to deem their atolls Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172 and islands uninhabitable. While the U.S. Government focused on restricting movement and prohibiting consumption of coconut crabs, the Rongelapese experienced new reproductive and other health problems as well as new reactions to the contaminated foods they consumed, such as blisters in their mouths. The well being of the community and future offspring of the Rongelapese depended on their ability to survive from their local environment on Rongelap. The experiences of the Rongelapese after their resettlement demonstrated to them that they had no choice but to abandon all that was familiar and owned by them in order to reduce their environmental exposure to radiation. Different Risk Factors within the Community Displacement from their land has profound social consequences for the Rongelap community. As noted by Robert Kiste in the case of the Bikinians, fragmentation and shifts in power structures dramatically affect the community (Kiste 1974). Beyond Kiste’s observations, displacement adversely affects men, women, youth, the elderly, and the traditional land tenure system in different, yet important ways. Because the Rongelapese people now reside in multiple locations, and because the younger generation grows up in a lifestyle radically different than their parents and grandparents, community unity is one of the foremost challenges for the local leadership. As the City Manager for the Rongelap Local Government commented during a community meeting last year, he is a City Manager with no city because there is no central location for the Rongelapese people in their Diaspora. While the fragmented communities still have many common interests, such as housing, health concerns, and the future of their land, the local leadership faces difficulties communicating with a dispersed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173 population and solidifying the community’s objectives from different locations. In comparison, on Rongelap the community worked together constantly to ensure the survival of all community members. Traditionally, landowners and elders had the authority to hold the community together since authority is tied to use of the land and resources. Relocation from Rongelap undermines cultural authority and respect for elders, however, as community members do not respect the requests of their traditional leaders when they no longer keep their homes on the land of their elders. Displacement, therefore, attenuates the unity of the entire community: Consider the role of individuals in a society defined by the environment. There are three tiers o f rights. These rights are reciprocal. A lap and ri-jerbal roles are specific. Community life comes from the land. The movement ofpeople from their land changes all o f this: people are no longer connected to the land, or anything. When people are not on their land with its social ranks they cannot perform what is expected o f them. This makes them feel insecure. Land is a privilege audit tells you who you are in the community (Kendall 1999). The land belongs 100% to the people. The structure of the custom is based on the land. Without it, it's like floating aimlessly on the ocean. The community is scattered and splintered with no base. There are many different categories o f Rongelapese now - those who have lived there, those who have not, teenagers, etc. (J. Riklon 1999). Sometimes today, there are problems determining who the alap is. There are more problems nowadays because there are more people, money is o f greater importance, and because people marry with outsiders and mix the blood. When you marry Rongelap to Rongelap, it is in the best interest o f the community to keep the conflicts down. Being moved off the land accelerates marriage to outsiders and reduces the power o f landowners. It’s easierfor a family to push you out, especially when your mother is from outside (John Anjain 1999). Displacement makes the Rongelapese marry non-Rongelapese. This attenuates the land and power afam ily is able to secure by marrying cross cousins and other Rongelapese. Menonak. or people who marry and go away with their spouse, also weakens the community (Kabua: 1999b). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 Elderly The older community members from Rongelap suffer greatly. As a result of the testing program the elderly population of Rongelap was exposed to near lethal amounts of radioactive fallout from Bravo. They suffer from a range of radiation-related health problems and continue to watch helplessly as their friends and children die, and their community dwindles. The elderly Rongelapese have been relocated many times. They are displaced from their land, anxious about death away from their homeland, and concerned they will not be properly buried on land that does not belong to them. Most of the elderly Rongelapese are unable to obtain their basic needs, and worry about the future of their children and the community. In addition to their current problems, absence from their land erodes the traditional respect once accorded to elders on Rongelap. Furthermore, the younger Rongelapese lack the monetary resources to adequately provide for the elderly the way they did on Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae: Elders lose their authority when the community is on someone else's land because they can 7 use the threat o f kicking people off their land to get work done for them or to get respect. There is no fear ofpunishment in the younger generation. Authority comes from the land (Eknilang 1999a). The elderly are concerned that if they die, who will pass on the information to them about their property and about their experiences during the testing (Kabua 1999a). Most elders died. They died wanting to go back. My great grandfather, Talekerab, said he wouldn 7 leave the island when it was time to evacuate. After they took him off, he started fasting and demanded to go back. Everyday he would chant, sing, and talk o f the good old days. He would ask: “ Why are we here fin MejattoJ? ” Because he said he wouldn 7 eat until he went back, he died (Kedi 1999). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 The elders mostly want to return to Rongelap because they blow no other way o f life (Matayoshi 1999). The elderly need the means to care for themselves to compensate for the loss of traditional care. Rather than handing out assistance, comprehensive compensation schemes could enable families to fulfill their traditional obligations to provide for the elderly. Youth The Rongelapese express deep concern about the fate of Rongelap’s youth that, unlike the elders, lack experience with or connection to their property on the outer islands. Furthermore, Rongelapese adults worry about the future of their youth because they will lack the knowledge and skills to exercise or understand their full range of property rights: Kids from Rongelap that live in Majuro are not involved in the Rongelap community. There aren 7 many community activities for them to get involved in. I don 7 think they feel Rongelapese. They don 7 know their relatives. Their friends are kids from other atoll communities. I doubt bds will want to go back to Rongelap. It will be a big adaptation from Coca-Cola to coconuts. Youth are not involved much in voting or other activities (J. Riklon 1999). When you leave home, there is no role for the kids. They used to work and contribute, but not anymore (Kabua 1999). My bds are Rongelapese but they are from Kwajalein (Abija 1999). When I was a youth on Rongelap, [started to fish when I was about eight years old. I knew how to make copra and do all bnds o f work. Eight to twelve years o f age are important learning years (Jenwor 1999). In addition to the adults’ fears about the younger generation, Rongelapese youth have their own concerns. The youth worry about decisions the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 elderly might make regarding the future resettlement of Rongelap. Their concerns are exacerbated by the fact that many elders lack formal education. This leads the youth to question the ability of the elderly to make the right decision about resettlement (CMI Nuclear Club 1999). Rongelapese youth also worry about the lack of opportunities available to them in the urban areas: Rongelapese youth can 7 climb trees, but they are familiar with Coca-Cola. Youth used to keep busy andfit doing work in their environment, such as making copra. They can't do that in the urban areas, however, and they are unfit as a residt. The types o f current activities Rongelapese take part in are gathering, smoking, talking, making yeast (a locally made alcohol). Suicide seems to be increasing, especially onMejatto (Kedi and Silk 1999). The U.S. Government fails to consider the special needs of Rongelapese youth that maintain the right to survive from their property and resources, yet lack the knowledge and experiences necessary to practice their rights. Youth also need sports equipment, education, and employment opportunities to help them adapt better to their urban environments. It is also important to educate Rongelapese youth about their community’s unique history as well as to impart the survival techniques and local knowledge of their elders and ancestors. Women Land passes down matriiineally in the Marshall Islands. Because the Rongelapese do not live on their land due to contamination, displacement attenuates the authority that women possess as inheritors of the land. Lack of access to local materials and resources also mean that displacement denies women the opportunity to make handicrafts in the urban areas and generate income from their sale. On Rongelap, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 women contributed more to the household economy and to subsistence activities for the family than they do in their displacement: On Rongelap, young girls like me learned to make preserved pandanus and foodfrom pandanus. We cooked it in the underground oven. We also made sitting mats, sleeping mats, and baskets. Our grandmothers taught us. We prepared shells for handicrafts. We got the pandanus leaves ready for the women. We got the pandanus leavesfrom the middle o f the island We didn 7 ask if we ait the pandanus. We all lived together from the resources. I also prepared a lot of ripe breadfruit (Kolnij 1999). There were so many good things on Ailinginae. There was a lot of coconut, lots o fpandcums andfoods we make from pandanus, also arrowroot. Foods from the ocean - there were so many. Big clams, crab, every kind in the depths o f the ocean. We ate, or sold them to boats that would come in, we could exchange shells andfood supplies. So many crabs, and birds. We got life from them... (Emos 1999). Lifestyle of women changed when they lost trees for handicrafts (Kedi and Silk 1999). The rental of property in urban areas creates other problems for Marshallese women. Rental arrangements place monetary compensation, for a fixed period of time, in the hands of the Marshallese men who manage the land for the women that carry the rights to the land. It is important to recognize and not undermine the power and position in society that women retain as a result of their land ownership. The U.S. Government fails to consider ways to improve Rongelapese women’s participation in the economy and to maintain their authority that accompanies land ownership as part of their needs associated with displacement from their land. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178 Men The Rongelapese men are proud of the fishing, sailing and navigation skills they cultivated on Rongelap, Ailinginae and Rongerik. On their homelands, Rongelapese had a range of fishing and food gathering techniques that ensured their ability to provide food for their families, as is expected of Marshallese men. In the areas where the Rongelapese now live, the ability to survive depends largely on the ability to generate an income. Rongelapese men believe they lack the educational and professional background required to obtain wage-earning jobs. As a result of the pressure felt by displaced men, the interviewees maintain that Rongelapese men feel a diminished sense of self-worth based on their inability to provide for their families: We have lost our knowledge, our ability, our moral standing and self-esteem in the community. What we were taught is no longer practical. To be a good fisherman, you have to know where to fish on an island A lot has been lost, not just our land (Kedi 1999). It is really hardfor the men to practice fishing skills they know so well (Kabua 1999a). Some of the interviewees believe the diminished sense of worth in Rongelapese men results in an increased suicide rate. The U.S. Government fails to consider ways to improve the long-term ability and qualifications of Rongelapese men to provide for their families. If the Rongelapese cannot return to their atolls because of lingering contamination, Rongelapese men need training and employment opportunities to improve their participation in the economy and their feeling of self-worth. Iroij and the Traditional Social Structure The Trust Territory anthropologist, Jack Tobin, often empathized Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179 with the plight of the Marshallese affected by the weapons testing program. Tobin documented the intricacies of the Marshallese land and sea tenure systems and warned the United States about the social and economic problems that result from disruptions to the system: The displacement of Marshallese from their land has created serious social and economic problems...Land in the Marshall Islands is placed in many categories, each with its own descriptive name and rules of inheritance. The Marshallese system of land tenure had developed to meet the needs of this particular group of people and is the dominant factor in the cultural configuration. Any radical change by outsiders would disturb the society and could do irreparable damage (Tobin 1958:2). Tobin also recorded Marshallese reactions to U.S. Government attempts to locate new lands for the people of Bikini after the U.S. Government destroyed their home islands. From a Marshallese perspective, it is clear that no land can adequately replace their home islands: "We will never willingly accept any other land in exchange for our lineage land" (Tobin 1958:3). When people alienate their land, the iroij are unable to authorize and manage the work on their lands that local residents provide. Correspondingly, the people who traditionally provide for the iroij lack access to the resources necessary to pay their tributes. Because the iroij distribute their tributes, primarily foods, between all the their people, the loss of resources and tributes from the Rongelapese reduces the iroij's ability to distribute goods to the alap and ri-jerbal in other areas under the iroij's auspices. This reduction in resources threatens the power of the iroij and their ability to provide for the people. Rongelap’s iroij explains: Without people occupying the land, there is no iroij. The word iroij means many people and comes from the words er woj (all of the people). What’s the point of being an iroij without any land? When the bomb exploded, the culture was also Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180 gone, too. It is impossible for people to act in their proper roles. Our social roles are something you use everyday, twenty-four hours a day: you have to use it everyday or you lose it (Kabua 1999a). The Kabua family, the iroij for the Rongelapese, does not charge rent for the Rongelapese people’s use of Mejatto (Johnson 1999). The U.S. Government fails to consider how displacement undermines the ability of the iroij to provide for the people, and for the people to provide a portion of their resources to the iroij as is customary. Once the Rongelapese were forced to abandon their homelands because of radiation contamination, the U.S. Government became the de-facto renters of Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae. Before outsiders came to the Marshall Islands, alienation of land never existed (Tobin 1958). Marshallese land tenure “... forbids sale of land to non-indigenes,” and it is impossible, in Marshallese terms, to accept any other land in exchange for lineage land (Tobin 1958:1). Unlike common law practice of Marshallese land rental, the U.S. Government did not exercise responsible stewardship of its rental property. The introduction of radiation into the environment degraded the environment for hundreds of years into the future. The U.S. Government fails to consider its responsibility to pay for the rent of the property, which includes marine and terrestrial areas as well as resources the Rongelapese depend on for current and future survival. In addition to rent, the U.S. Government fails to compensate the Rongelapese for the acute degradation of the property and resources on all three atolls. On the single island of Rongelap, as well as on the single islands of Mejatto, Majuro and Ebeye where the Rongelapese currently reside, the Rongelapese are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181 unable to practice principles of responsible stewardship. Notions of stewardship involve care of the land and limited use of resources in multiple marine and terrestrial locations: There is not enough localfood or water on one islandfor survival. People depend on the ability to use their whole system o f islands. In Rongelap , we need to use the northern islands. Survival depends on being able to use everything around us and on sharing food. People got together to harvest arrowroot, breadfruit and other foods to preserve them (Eknilang 1999b). The inability of the Rongelapese to adhere to principles of stewardship while confined to Rongelap Island during their resettlement, and currently while living on Mejatto, Ebeye, and Majuro, means that the Rongelapese contribute to the degradation of the land they use. The U.S. Government fails to consider the ability of the Rongelapese to compensate landowners where they currently reside. By the same token, monetary compensation for denied use or damage to land based on use rights for a fixed point in time will impose a system of individual property rights on a fluid, complex system of Marshallese land tenure. Purely monetary compensation could undermine the fluid Marshallese land tenure system and have adverse implications for the balance of power between men and women, on the iroij and social structure and on youth and the elderly. A New Narrative of History By comparing the U.S. Government’s history of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program pertaining to Rongelap with the documentary and ethnographic records, the cracks in the imposed colonial history begin to emerge. We can penetrate and shatter the imposed history of Rongelap and the inhabitants’ exposure to radiation by illuminating the major cracks in the U.S. Government’s representation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182 CRACK #1: Rongelap’s exposure to radiation from Bravo was the result of an accidental wind shift. Given the extensive meteorological data from previous tests and knowledge about the unpredictable nature of Marshallese trade winds in the Marshall Islands, it is not an “accident” that the wind blew radioactive fallout over inhabited islands. While it is difficult to conclude that the U.S. Government purposefully exposed the Rongelapese to radiation, ample information exists to conclude that the U.S. Government grossly failed in its duty to protect the residents of the Trusteeship from harm. CRACK #2: The U.S. Government provided adequate medical care to the Rongelapese after their exposure. While the U.S. Government did provide medical care to the Rongelapese immediately after their exposure to Bravo’s fallout, the U.S. Government used the Rongeiapese to further its medical and scientific interests, and in the process increased the exposure and harm of the people. After the U.S. Government enrolled the Rongelapese in Project 4.1, it conducted two human radiation experiments with the people and purposefully resettled the community on a highly contaminated environment for research purposes. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183 CRACK #3: The U.S. Government’s legal definition o f‘"exposed” in the Rongelap community includes only those who were exposed to Bravo’s fallout on March 1, 1954. It was not only the Bravo test and not only exposure to external fallout that exposed the Rongelapese to radiation. In addition to the external exposure people received on March I, 1954, everyone resettled on Rongelap Island in 1957 received internal exposure to radiation as a result of living in a highly contaminated environment. Consequently, the radiation burdens of all the Rongelapese increased. The U.S. Government systematically measured cumulative levels of radioactivity from Bravo and other tests in both Rongelap’s environment and in the urine of the Rongelapese. The bioaccumulative contamination in the marine as well as terrestrial ecosystem that islanders relied upon for food increased the harm the Rongelapese experienced from the testing program. The U.S. Government monitored the increased radiation burdens, primarily through urinalysis samples, but failed to report this increased burden to the Rongelapese. Furthermore, failures to restrict local consumption of foods with high levels of radioactivity led to increased radiation exposure for the Rongelapese and for the people throughout the nation with whom the Rongeiapese and the iroij shared their food resources. CRACK #4: It was safe to resettle the Rongelapese in 1957. The U.S. Government maintains that it was safe to resettle Rongelap in 1957 and there was no reason for the Rongelapese to evacuate themselves in 1985. It is only through the review of historical documents that the RMI Government now understands that the U.S. Government did not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184 conduct proper surveys of the islands and foodstuffs prior to the resettlement of the Rongelapese. Ethnographic data further illustrates the harm experienced by the Rongelapese and their children as a result of their resettlement. Historical and ethnographic data demonstrate that the U.S. Government ignored or covered up an array of knowledge critical to the history of Rongelap’s intersections with the cold war. This erased and covered-up knowledge includes both U.S. Government knowledge recorded in written documents and ethnographic data detailing the lived experiences with radiation of the Rongelapese people. The location of this erased knowledge indicates the existence of flaws in the U.S. Government’s representation of the history of the U.S. weapons testing program conducted in the Marshall Islands. These flaws in the official U.S. Government history are visible in the cracks that expose an essential ized and erroneous construction of history. The U.S. Government history pertaining to Rongelap fails to include critical aspects of the complete history. The U.S. Government does not define the exposed population of Rongelap as only those individuals present on Rongelap or Ailinginae on March 1, 1954. This definition excludes the offspring of the Rongeiapese and the resettled population that were exposed to environmental sources of radiation. Additionally, the U.S. Government version of history does not acknowledge human environmental rights abuses such as allowing the Rongeiapese to remain in a contaminated environment after their resettlement despite the fact that the people’s resettlement increased their injuries. Furthermore, the U.S. Government does not acknowledge the problems caused by exile and loss of land, particularly for women, men, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185 elderly, youth and for the social structure of the community. Women experience loss of power associated with land rights and reproductive abnormalities. Men lost the ability to provide for their families. The youth are denied an understanding and connection to their future land holdings. The elderly lost customary respect accompanying knowledge about the environment as well as the dignity to die and be buried on their own land. The iroij and social structure lost the ability to accumulate power and disperse resources to people. By documenting the experiences of the radiation populations in ethnographic data, this chapter demonstrates that it is possible to capture and amplify at least a portion of the voice of undocumented radiation populations. While not attempting to speak on behalf of the radiation populations, the ethnographic data demonstrates that there is more to the narrative than the history that the U.S. Government constructed. The ethnographic data serves as an anthropological tool for demonstrating the existence of radiation populations in the Marshall Islands with needs outside of the narrow parameters of injury currently addressed by the U.S. Government. It is clear that the official U.S. history espoused in the Compact of Free Association is incomplete and erroneous. Therefore, we must replace the colonial version of history that oppresses the needs and experiences of the people with a new history that includes the voice and experiences of the radiation populations and the historical documents suppressed by the U.S. Government. While I demonstrate the existence of radiation populations whose knowledge and experience are not included in the history of the testing era, this chapter does not present the entire, corrected history of the Rongelap community. To provide a complete history would take years of research orchestrated by the Rongelap community and all of its radiation populations. By the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186 same token, the historical and ethnographic data provided in this chapter presents a more accurate history of the consequences of the U.S. weapons testing program and challenges the efficacy of current U.S. responsibility for the problems it caused in the Marshall Islands. Through the collection of life histories, the Rongelapese lay claim to their local environments and critical resources and articulate their problems associated with contamination of and removal from their environment. It is clear that the collision of the histories of the United States Government and the Marshall Islands resulted in a large gain for the United States and great injury to the Marshallese people and their land. The powerful nation gained unquantifiabie military advantage and secured its superpower status in the cold war. The relatively powerless nation was left with severe, long-term health and environmental catastrophes, displacement of communities, psychological, social, cultural, political, and economic problems. In the case of the Rongelapese, their environment bore the risks and contamination that resulted from the U.S. Government’s assertion of its military objectives on the Marshall Islands. It is important to identify U.S. Government activities in the Marshall Islands as flagrant human environmental rights abuses. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V THE LANGUAGE OF EXPOSED POPULATIONS: ANALYSIS OF LINGUISTIC DATA AND THE LANGUAGE OF RESISTANCE In this chapter, I analyze linguistic data collected from a variety of sources, but primarily from oral history interviews I conducted. Without question, the most compelling data come from the analysis of the language used by Marshallese witnesses to describe the effects of the weapons testing program on their health and environment. One of the best ways to determine how the Marshallese perceive the events and experiences related to the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program is through the analysis of language. The Marshallese language provides a powerful means to understand how the testing program influences modem constructions of the social and cultural realities of the radiation populations. This chapter considers the ways exposed populations in the Marshall Islands construct and represent their experiences with radiation exposure. The radiation language employed by these populations reflects their lived experiences with nuclear weapons and U.S. Government representatives, and demonstrates the intersections between history, language and social constructions of reality. 187 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A Colonial Language of Control As noted by Raymond Williams, language embodies the ideologies of the upper and ruling classes and their institutions. The institutions of the elite produce and disseminate language that promotes the hegemonies of the ruling class (Williams 1977). The ruling powers that control the institutions assume and expect ..that those on whom meanings are imposed inevitably have to accept those meanings... in the way that they have been constructed” (Gunther 1985:65-66). For example, Peter Moss’ analysis of the speeches of President Ronald Reagan demonstrates how government institutions create a national defense ideology. To convince American citizens of the collective need to respond to Soviet threats, Reagan used familiar symbols of American life to discuss the unfamiliar realm of nuclear weapons, equating American bombers with family cars and drawing analogies between arms proliferation and the industriousness of American pioneers. Through the use of language, Reagan asserted his right to protect the heart and soul of the American nation. Reagan characterized anyone who rejected the great American defense ideology as ill-intentioned (Moss 1985). Throughout the world, colonizers exert total control over their territories, including linguistic control (Romaine 1994). In the case of the Marshall Islands, the United States Government, the English language, and nuclear weapons arrived at approximately the same time. The language of the United States became the language of control in the Trust Territory. The U.S. Government conveyed rules of governance, policies, and descriptions of U.S. activities to the islanders in English. As the colonial administrator of the Marshall Islands during the testing program, United States 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189 Government officials used scientific, political and legal language to describe the activities and consequences of the nuclear weapons testing program. The language imposed by the United States on its Marshallese subjects carefully protects American defense ideology and supports the necessity of testing nuclear weapons. If the American or international publics learned about reports of severe injury to people and property, these injuries could have threatened the defense needs and the testing schedule of the U.S. Government. Therefore, the U.S. Government carefully constructed the language it used to convey the effects of its nuclear weapons tests to the Marshallese people and the rest of the world. As mentioned in the Chapter IV, Department of Energy' reports always present radiation in terms of degree of risk: the U.S. Government provides information about the degree of risk Marshallese can expea from living in different areas of the Marshall Islands. After receiving this information, the U.S. Government places the burden of deciding where to reside and what amount of local foods to consume based on the degree of risk the Marshallese people are willing to incur. The U.S. Government first discussed nuclear weapons and defense ideology with the Marshallese people during Commander Wyatt’s trip to Bikini Atoll in 1946. Commander Wyatt turned to the Marshallese translator, dressed in U.S. military clothes and cap, and said: “Now James, tell them please that the United States Government now wants to turn this great destruaive power into something for the benefit of mankind and that these experiments here at Bikini are the first step in that direaion” (Wyatt in O’Rourke 1985). As instruaed, the Marshallese translator turns to the Bikini people and says in Marshallese: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190 Ej ba kio Uniled States an Amedka rekonan bwe armej en kojerbal men eo ekajor en ukot nan men eo emman im jiban. Because the Marshallese language could not capture the concepts that Commander Wyatt tried to convey to the Bikinians, James simply stated: He said the United States of America they want people to use something strong and turn it into something good and helpful. Based on what the Marshallese people understand from their interpreter, the leader of the Bikinians stands up, and states for the Hollywood cameras and the world, the Bikinian’s willingness to evacuate their atoll for the U.S. military experiments. Every time I show the film Half Life, which contains the footage of Commander Wyatt’s visit, to bilingual Marshallese audiences they laugh uproariously at the scene with Commander Wyatt and the Marshallese interpreter. They find the message and the attempt to translate it comical. This video clip provides the first example of the difficulties involved in the U.S. Government’s attempts to communicate its strategic interests to the Marshallese people. From this footage, it is clear that the U.S. Government and the English language failed to communicate even the basic purposes and rationale for the weapons testing program to the Marshallese.51 By the end of the testing program, the English language continued to fail in its ability to convey the consequences of the testing program to the Marshallese people. In the conclusions of the 1978 survey of the northern Marshall Islands (the document discussed in Chapter Q explaining the consequences of the testing 51 The U.S. Government also had a difficult time explaining the word "radiation” to American citizens. After the United States detonated its fist atomic weapon in Nevada the Trinity test on July 16.1945. monitors from Los Alamos were dispatched to the area to measure fallout. When the monitors visitied Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191 Can Animala and Plants Racaive Harm from Radiation? Sometimes radiation can cause harm to animals like it can to people. However, the amount of radiation must be very much larger to food-bearing plants and other plants than to animals for there to be harm to plants such as breadfruit, coconuts, pandanus. taro, and arrowroot. This means that plants would only be harmed if they received an exceedingly large amount of radiation. Because the amounts of radiation are small in the Marshalls today, scientists do not believe that there will be harm to animals and plants. Erkain /e t ian utam we ko: iibtkbik. im utam we in komalij. These are some defects' malformations and mental defects. Figure 15: DOE Book Showing Reproductive Abnormalities the Marshallese Could Expect Source: Bair, William J. et al. (1982:27). William Wyre’s ranch and explained what they were doing, Wyre recalled “They told me they were checking for radioactivity. 1 told him that we didn’t have the radio on” (Welsome 1999:102). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192 program to the Marshallese), the U.S. Government emphasizes that radiation exposure, miscarriages, and birth defects occur naturally (Bair et al. 1982:27) (Figure 15). The U.S. Government compares radiation exposure from nuclear weapons with exposure to “radioactive atoms that have always been in the world,” or the amount of radiation received by flying in an airplane (Bair et al. 1982:12). These comparisons fail to distinguish between radiation produced from nuclear explosions and other, less harmful types of radiation. As the U.S. Government explains to the Marshallese in the 1978 survey results: “there are three kinds of radiation that come from the radioactive atoms that have always been in and part of the world and also from radioactive atoms that came from the bomb tests: Alpha Radiation... Beta Radiation... Gamma Radiation...” (Bair et al. 1982:13). The U.S. Department of Energy regularly presents summaries of its environmental data and other information to RMI Government representatives to show them there is no reason for concern about persistent levels of radiation in the environment. During my fieldwork in 1998,1 continued to participate in govemment-to- govemment meetings as part of my work for the RMI Embassy in Washington, D.C. At one of these meetings, a U.S. scientist, Dr. William Robison, presented a summary of his 25 years of environmental monitoring in the Marshall Islands. I recorded my impressions of the meeting in my fieldnotes: DOE proceeded to show that background levels of radiation in the RMI are lower than the U.S. and Europe. The conclusion was that radiation in the RMI is lower than other places in the world and people shouldn’t be concerned about their environment...The U.S. Ambassador [to the RMI] was present at the meeting, indicating that the summary of data presented at the meeting is of importance to the U.S... It made me angry that DOE controls all the information and the presentation of the data. Tlie information was presented so nicely that it made it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193 difficult to refute, ft was also, I think, a bit intimidating for community members to challenge [U.S.] scientists and political representatives...It was misleading to talk about background radiation when there was no discussion of imposed, manmade radiation (Barker fieldnotes:46-50).52 What the 1978 survey and explanations by DOE representatives fails to convey is that most naturally occurring radiation is alpha radiation that rarely does harm to human beings as even a sheet of paper can stops its movement. Much of the radiation from the nuclear weapons that exposed the Marshallese is gamma radiation. Unlike alpha radiation, gamma radiation penetrates clothing and the skin; it seeks out and concentrates in the bones and organs of human beings. By lumping together both naturally occurring radiation and radiation produced by the nuclear weapons tests the U.S. Government masks the harms produced by different types of radiation. As a result, the U.S. Government minimizes the effects of radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands by presenting radiation exposure and resulting health problems, such as reproductive problems and birth defects, as normal occurrences along with alpha radiation exposure elsewhere in the world. One of the most interesting qualities of language is that it “enables [all] human beings to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of their experience of what goes on around them and inside them” (Halliday in Moss 1985:58). An examination of the Marshallese language shows how the influences of English, colonialism, and radiation 52 Imposed, manmade radiation is more dangerous than normal background radiation. DOE graphs do not distinguish between manmade and normal background radiation. In the graphs, the bar for background radiation in the Marshall Islands is frequently lower than other places in the world, such as Europe. What these graphs do not acknowledge is that the harm horn the component of manmade radiation in the bar for the Marshall Islands is much more dangerous than the higher bars of predominantly background radiation in other places of the world. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194 from nuclear weapons linger in the Marshall Islands and continue to affect how the Marshallese construct and convey their social realities. The language of populations exposed to radiation contains elements of U.S. Government imposed language and the Marshallese language. As Ellen Basso suggests, speakers of language, with strong oral traditions sometimes draw on more than one speech genre to convey their lived experiences: An anthropological understanding of the history of a people without writing, which will necessarily be communicated orally, must be effected both with respect to their particular ways of remembering and understanding events and to how they communicate this understanding and memory within one or another speech genre. Thus, for example, if we are to know how people construct an awareness of historical processes, we must learn why certain events have become memorable, how they are given explanatory meaning, and how they are integrated into earlier life experiences (Basso 1995:11). It is clear from the Marshallese language that radiation communities use language to convey the impact of the weapons testing program on their lived experiences. Ultimately, the radiation populations demonstrate their disdain for the U.S. Government’s explanations about radiation exposure by rejecting and transforming the imposed language used by U.S. Government representatives, such as Department of Energy officials. As indicated by linguistic data gathered for this project, the Marshallese create their own radiation language to convey their experiences resulting from the testing program that the U.S. Government’s language and politics cannot accommodate. Through the radiation language, Marshallese convey notions of agency, powerlessness. and injury to which speakers of English, such as U.S. Government representatives, are not privy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195 Language as Resistance Linguistic evidence demonstrates that the Marshallese resist attempts by the U.S. Government to set parameters on their experiences with radiation.53 This resistance is evident in the language that the Marshallese continue to create in order to explain and discuss the aftermath of the U.S. testing program amongst themselves. Reluctant to accept the “wall of history” of the United States Government, the Marshallese create radiation language with linkages to the English language, but with entirely different meanings. The radiation language, like other languages, reflects the unique historical and social conditions of the people (Williams 1977). Although radiation victims occasionally borrow English words to explain their realities, the Marshallese radiation language is the predominant vehicle for conveying the victims’ sense of powerlessness, for describing their horrific medical conditions, and for assigning agency for their sufferings. This is particularly true for women whose discourse of reproductive abnormalities indicates that they continue to suffer the adverse affects of radiation exposure silently, and differently from their male counterparts. Yet, even among Marshallese women, linguistic evidence indicates that their experiences and illnesses vary due to both the degree of medical attention they receive, and their atoll of birth. My preliminary fieldwork yielded a number of interesting linguistic themes that provide evidence about the lived experiences of radiation populations in the Marshall Islands. I analyze three of these interviews in depth to demonstrate how Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196 variables such as sex, atoll of residence and degree of U.S. medical attention contribute to the different experiences of one subset of the radiation population — women. As discussed in the previous chapter, women’s experiences with radiation are unique. Many men are also unaware of women’s experiences because women rarely participate in the bilateral political process with the U.S. Government designed to address problems resulting from the testing program. The unique experiences Marshallese women face as a result of their exposure to radiation is evident in the first interview, with Kiora Lokeijak and her husband Kajitok Lokeijak. Closely bonded, the couple sat very near to one another, finished each other’s sentences, continually expressed concerns about one another’s medical conditions, and even used a singular verb form to refer to the two of them as a single unit. Methodologically, Kiora and Kajitok’s joint construction of their experiences with radiation enhance the interview because it is often “useful when a man and a woman exchange memories together...[as] a husband and wife...can add to and correct each other’s accounts” (Sherbakova 1998:244). Kiora’s depiction of the birth anomalies she experienced is amongst the most devastating stories I encountered during more than a decade of work in the Marshall Islands. By the same token, her language indicates that she has received almost no medical care for or information about her illnesses. Because Kiora is from Likiep Atoll, which the U.S. Government currently defines as “unexposed” to radiation from the testing program, Kiora is not eligible for any U.S. medical monitoring or care programs S3 Sharon Stephens also noted that the Sami reindeer herders in Norway resisted attempts by government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197 currently provided to the legally “exposed” population. Like many subpopulations in the Rongelap community, the Likiepese represent another undocumented radiation population. The second interview is with a woman named Seiko Shoniber, who also lived on Likiep Atoll during the testing program, but currently lives in the capitol, Majuro. It is clear from the interview that Seiko has a better understanding about the medical effects of radiation. I believe Seiko’s improved understanding of radiation effects is a result of her command of the English language and her ability to access at least limited health care services provided by the RMI Government. Although the hospital in Majuro lacks the human, financial and technical capacity to deal with radiation illnesses, Seiko, unlike Kiora, had access to some medical care during her acute reproductive illnesses. The third interview I analyze describes the life history of Ellyn Boaz, a resident of Rongelap Atoll, an atoll of keen scientific interest to the United States. On March 1, 1954, Ellyn was one of the Rongelapese residing approximately 100 miles downwind from Bikini Atoll, ground zero for the Bravo test. As discussed previously, although radioactive fallout coated Rongelap on the morning of March 1, 1954, the U.S. Government waited 52 hours before evacuating Ellyn and the other residents of Rongelap. Once evacuated, the U.S. Government placed Ellyn and the other Rongelapese in a biomedical experiment entitled Project 4.1: Study of Response o f Human Beings Exposed to Significant Beta and Gamma Radiation Due to Fallout From and foreign experts to “constrain local experiences" (Stephens 1996:272). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198 High Yield Weapons. As part of its efforts to understand how U.S. troops and civilians could withstand radiation exposure in the event of a nuclear war, the U.S. Government began to study and monitor the medical consequences of radiation exposure received by the legally exposed populations from Rongelap and Utrik.54 Unlike Kiora, Ellyn is extremely familiar with U.S. physicians and researchers because of her participation in Project 4.1. In order to receive the medical care that Ellyn and the Project 4.1 subjects desperately needed after their acute radiation exposure, the U.S. Government forced them to enroll in an extensive medical and environmental research program. As a result of her experiences, Ellyn’s radiation discourse is much different than that of her counterparts from Likiep Atoll who lacked U.S. Government and medical attention. Linguistic Data Loan Words When I analyzed the life stories of these three women, one of the most interesting findings in the linguistic data is the borrowing of English radiation words that occurs. This borrowing of loan words is characteristic of the radiation populations as a larger group and not just in the individual texts of the life stories I analyze here. While an analysis of language cannot rely on the details of grammar alone, an initial look at English loan words that the Marshallese borrow to discuss their experiences with radiation does provide some important clues about the radiation language by providing a useful means to consider the grammar. Grammar is important to address because it 541 use the term "legally exposed" to refer to the small population of Marshallese legally defined as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199 provides the potential for discourse. It provides .. a way of conceiving and perceiving the word... by entering into a web and network of associations actualized in discourse” (Scherzer 1987:295). Therefore, my analysis of loan words is simply a launching point for discussing alternative language used by radiation populations. Prior to my analysis of the linguistic data, I predicted that an analysis of the English loan words would demonstrate that the Marshallese draw heavily from the English language and that I would find a radiation discourse bordering on an English pidgin or Creole. As the listing of loan words in Table 6 demonstrates, my expectation was completely false. In fact, the scant number of English words borrowed by radiation victims indicates that the radiation victims convey the majority of their experiences through a unique, highly situational and localized radiation language that they construct almost entirely with Marshallese words. The scant number of English words demonstrates two important findings: first, it means the radiation victims claim the weapons testing event as their own, and second the radiation victims actively resist an interpretation of their experiences as defined and described by U.S. Government representatives using an English scientific discourse. To isolate the English loan words that the women used in the three interviews, I compiled a list of the women’s common words (Table 6). There are only three English loan words common to all three women; paijin (poison), tokta (doctor), and kiraap (grape). Despite the fact that these women represent both the “exposed” and “unexposed” categories created by the U.S. Government, all three “exposed” in the Compact of Free Association. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 describe similar experiences: the paijin that dramatically altered the health of the people, the animals, and the land; the tokta(s), who did not explain the women’s ailments to them and whose motives the women question; and the horrifying kiraap pregnancies that Marshallese women did not experience until after the weapons testing. Language shows a commonality of experiences with radiation between the legally "exposed” population and the undocumented radiation populations the U.S. Government presents as "unexposed” to radiation. As a result of this linguistic evidence, it is clear that Table 6: English Loan Words from Three Oral Histories KIORA SEIKO ELLYN ENGLISH EOUIVALENT paijin paijin paijin poison tokta tokta tokta doctor, noun and verb kiraap kiraap kiraap grape (molar pregnancy) book book book baam baam bomb paota paota powder (fallout) kanjir kanjir cancer tumur tumur tumor aujpitol aujpitol hospital kilam kilam claim (for compensation) experiences with radiation are not limited to the narrow constructions discussed by U.S. Government representatives. The word that Marshallese frequently used to describe toxins introduced into their environment, like radiation, is "poison.” A person that suffers from the effects of radiation is also considered “poisoned.” The Marshallese term used to describe the effects of local toxins that produce illness or death, such as fish poisoning, is kadek, a word that translates similarly to the English word “drunk.” The effects of fish poisoning cause loss of control of the body much like excessive drunkenness, but these effects Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201 require a different term than poison, thereby demonstrating that the Marshallese view poison from radiation as very different than poison from fish or other sources. “Grapes” is the name which Marshallese women use to describe hydatiform, or molar pregnancies. During molar pregnancies, the mitosis that begins shortly after conception continues only for a short time. At some point, instead of continuing to divide, the cells become enlarged and grow to the size of golf balls. The large strands of golf ball-sized growths attach themselves to the uterus. In many cases, there are dangers associated with these pregnancies, such as cancer from the roots of the growths that remain on the uterus, extremely high fevers, or the inability of women to abort the cell masses. According to the women I interviewed, women with this illness have all the symptoms of pregnancy, and the enlarged size of the uterus causes them to think they are in the advanced stages of their pregnancy. Marshallese women report that they spontaneously abort their failed pregnancies after approximately three months although they appear nine months pregnant. These reports parallel information about hydatiform molar pregnancies provided by Peg Plumbo, a certified nurse practitioner. Unlike the Marshall Islands, Plumbo notes that hydatiform pregnancies are rare in the United States as they occu[r] in about 1/1000 to 1/1500 pregnancies...Hydatiform Mole is one type of "gestational trophoblastic disease". In some cases, there may be an embryo in addition (partial molar pregnancy) or there may have never been an embryo or fetus at all. This conception then does not result in the orderly course of events which produce embryonic tissue organization but instead the early products of conception (the chorionic villi) are converted into a mass of clear vesicles and these continue to grow and fill up the uterus. The uterus grows quickly making the size almost always larger than dates would indicate and extreme nausea may be present. There are no fetal heart tones and often bleeding and cramping occur. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202 This is most always the result of the sperm penetrating the egg[,] which then goes on to duplicate its own chromosomes. The chromosomes of the ova are either absent or inactivated. When there is a partial mole and an embryo is present also, the fetus is often non-viable with chromosomal abnormalities but some do survive (Plumbo 1999). Beyond the three common words used by all three women, such as grapes, the remaining seven words in Table 6 are common to the experiences of all three women even if all three women did not use the words in their interviews. For example, Kiora’s husband, Kajitok, used the words baam and paota to describe their shared experiences after the Bravo test. Because it was not Kiora who spoke these words, I did not include them in her list of borrowed words. Furthermore, I was the first person to introduce the baam and paota loan words into our conversation. Since responses and inputs of the listeners influence the content of co-constructed text (Basso 1995), I cannot conclusively determine whether Kajitok used the English words because I introduced them first, or because he wanted to make his Marshallese as simple as possible for me as a native English speaker. It is also interesting to note that both Kiora and Seiko use the phrase "men eo, ” or “the thing"’ to refer to a bomb as if they could not find a word to describe the weapon that irreversibly changed their lives. In addition to the English words that the women use in common, each of them have distinct patterns of borrowing. These words are not simply borrowed by the Marshallese women, but, like all “loan words,” are modified to fit the phonology and syntax of the Marshallese language. The differences in word selection correspond to the women’s atoll of residence, and degree of contact with medical doctors and scientists. For example, some of the English words that Kiora borrows and adapts to the Marshallese language enable her to make distinctions between different types of U S. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203 Government representatives who came to her island after the testing began. Kiora distinguishes between ri-tokta , literally person who is a medical doctor, and ri-etale paijin, a person who studies or examines the poison (or radiation in the environment), and, most specifically, tokta en pajinro, the radiation doctors. In the same interview, Kiora’s husband also makes specific reference to traditional Marshallese doctors, takto ro i-Majol, and American doctors. These distinctions between the types of activities Kiora and her husband observed are socially and historically important. The linguistic evidence demonstrates that non-English speaking residents of a remote outer atoll distinguish between doctors who are concerned about their well being, and doctors or researchers interested in studying the effects of radiation on human beings and the environment. Again, the English borrowing begins to provide clues to the emergence of a distinct Marshallese radiation language constructed to differentiate between researchers who the English language and the U.S. Government failed to distinguish for the Marshallese. While Kiora and Kajitok’s contact with U.S. doctors is limited to their observation of random researchers that visited their islands, Ellyn is intimately familiar with U.S. Government representatives. Similarly, Ellyn’s knowledge is first identified by the English terms she borrows. As one of the residents of the populated atoll that received the highest dose of radiation, Ellyn identifies herself and her fellow Rongelapese as ri-paijin (people who are poisoned or irradiated). Because of her long history of medical ailments resulting from radiation exposure, Ellyn is familiar with medical institutions, procedures, and physicians. Ellyn distinguishes between AEC and DOE doctors. This distinction demonstrates how language reflects historical influences: Ellyn identifies changes in U.S. institutions, realizing that the Atomic Energy Commission Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204 (“AEC”) was the predecessor of the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”). Beyond her awareness of U.S. institutional changes, Ellyn even identifies DOE contractors, such as doctors from Brookhaven National Laboratory ( Brookhaven). Furthermore, Ellyn borrows English words such as /op (soap), nurse, piia (picture or x-ray), peba (paper or medical chart), and tiroit (thyroid) to supplement her Marshallese radiation discourse. The use of the word thyroid is particularly indicative of Ellyn’s frequent interactions with U.S. medical personnel since Kiora, who is not familiar with English medical terms, refers to thyroid illness as buj burn, or swollen throat. Ellyn’s familiarity with specific medical procedures or ailments results, in part, from numerous trips to the United States. Ellyn recalls the multiple locations in Amedka, or America, where the AEC and DOE doctors sent her for surgeries and procedures she still does not understand: Hawaii, California, Cleveland, Ohio, Maryland, New York, and Washington [D C.]. It is interesting to note that all of the facilities where Ellyn was sent were either U.S. military hospitals or the locations in the United States where U.S. Government researchers were conducting human radiation experiments. English loan words also reflect how Seiko explains and understands her medical experiences. During the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program, Seiko lived on the main island of Likiep Atoll. Similar to the other women, Seiko remembers the poata (powder), or radioactive fallout, that arrived after the ground-shaking detonation and bloody red sky that hundreds of Marshallese witnessed on the morning of March I, 1954. After completing grammar school in Likiep, Seiko moved to the capital of the Marshall Islands, Majuro. Seiko is the only one of the three interviewees to attend high school, to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205 learn English, and to hold a wage-earning job. These experiences allow Seiko to converse in the language of the former colonial administrator. Years after the tests, when Seiko began to experience reproductive problems associated with radiation exposure, she was not eligible for U.S.-sponsored medical care for radiation victims. Seiko was admitted to Majuro public hospital where physicians who were unfamiliar with radiation-related illnesses attended to her. In her interview, Seiko discusses her near-death experience in Majuro Hospital. The English words that Seiko borrows help her explain the trauma she experienced and her recollections of the doctors’ explanations regarding her illness. Although Seiko uses many more English words than her counterparts, she still wanted me to interview her in Marshallese.55 I found this interesting since Seiko has the English skills to discuss her experiences in a purely English form. Seiko’s insistence on the use of Marshallese further indicates that the Marshallese radiation victims claim the event as their own. The activities and consequences of the testing program were explained to the Marshallese in English, but the Marshallese have found their own way of describing their experiences, modifying the information received from the U.S. to fit their needs and convey their realities, and ultimately to state the event in Marshallese terms. I found further evidence of English concealment over my years of interactions with the Marshallese. Even people who know me extremely well, and are not shy or insecure with me, often conceal their skills from me. Concealing English language skills could reflect modesty, or even pleasure at seeing an outsider speak Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206 Marshallese. On the other hand, concealing English is evidence of resistance as in the case of the Tewa who restrict their use of the colonial language in the presence of the dominant language speakers (Dozier 1956:156). Like the Tewa, the Marshallese resist acculturation through language choice. I observed a strong preference for Marshallese to use their own language even when I first arrived in the country and could not converse in the local language. Rather than divulging their English skills, many speakers of English allowed me to stumble through or sit out conversations until I learned the local language. In the case of Seiko, however, Seiko and I are friends, and I know she was not concealing her English from me. On the other hand, I believe Seiko and many other Marshallese prefer, and often demand, that we discuss certain topics, such as radiation issues, in Marshallese. This resistance technique allows the Marshallese to freely construct their social realities in the Marshallese language without fear that Americans will tell them their perceptions or experiences are not valid or radiation-related. Furthermore, insisting on the use of Marshallese to discuss radiation issues provides the Marshallese with the “vernacular for in-group communication” (Mufwene 1994:84) to place blame on the United States, to convey their anger, and to quietly discuss the social humiliation that women experience from giving birth to abnormal children. Like many Pacific languages, both agency and anger are traditionally concealed in the Marshallese culture since interpersonal discourse in the Pacific “...tends to incorporate ‘notions of passivity’” (Brenneis and Myers 1984:20). In small Pacific communities, preserving harmony is essential to survival, and direct accusation and anger 55 Seiko planned for us to meet in a quiet backroom of a restaurant where her daughter worked so no one Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207 is often concealed or expressed to a third party. By expressing their anger about the testing program in the Marshallese language, the Marshallese avoid direct expressions of anger and agency as custom dictates. Americans in the Marshall Islands rarely learn the local language unless they are advocates for and friends of the Marshallese, such as Peace Corps or Jesuit volunteers. During my interview with Seiko, the vast majority of our time was spent discussing her kiiraap (“grapes” pregnancy). The time dedicated to this topic demonstrates the importance of Seiko’s reproductive problem as the means to convey her experiences with radiation exposure. Seiko uses many English words to explain her ordeal. She learned these words from a medical book that her attending doctors showed her in the hospital to help identify and explain her illness. The use of expressions, such as “I was just skin and bones,” further demonstrates Seiko’s competence in the English language. In the following passage Seiko describes the suffering she experienced during the delivery of “grapes.” I highlight in bold the English loan words Seiko used in the Marshallese text: Jilu wot ao allon ak reba nine monthsjonan ao kilep...Rej ba imeloklokjete ao allon na iba ijjab ...Anbwinu elukkun bwil im rej boktok watermolo im ijojo ilo tubeo jen jibon nan bon. Jonan ao lukun in bwil, lukun bwil wot im bwil, im aolep raan rej filljuon tub itnm im ne ejako an molo tubeo ij etal nan tub eo juon. Im eliktata eo kio ke na ilukun in mojono ijab mona kinke ibban menono im kojela salivaejab bojrak an wotlok jen lomi .iluknn lose weightim ij eighty poundsim ej ba na iluktot skin im bonewot. 1 was only three months pregnant but they said I was nine months because of my large size.. They said I forgot how many months pregnant I was but I said I didn’t (forget)... My body was so hot that they brought me cold water and I sat in a tub would interrupt us during the interview, and more importantly for Seiko, perhaps, so no one would overhear Seiko's experiences. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208 from morning to night. I was so incredibly hot, extremely hot, so hot that every day they filled a tub near me and when that tub was no longer cold I transferred to another tub. At the end of this time I was so weak that I could not eat because I could not breathe and you know the saliva it did not stop pouring from my mouth... I really lost weight I was eighty pounds and he [the doctor] said I was only skin and bones. Eliktata ij kololak, rej kwalok grape ko im rej jolok jikin ninnin eo ao. Im tokta eo ear kootake na ej ba first time ej deliver kon naninmij eo im ej boktokjuon book kileplep im ej lale men ko iIowan lojieu im ejba: "Lojiem ebaam im men ko jojiem rej ainwot bin kan ilo bowling. Men ko rej ainwot shaped like that. ” Im aikwoj en kareokie jikin ninnin eo ao bwe imaron cancer im emman lok ne ej jolok aolopen... Finally, I gave birth and the doctors showed me the grapes and then they removed my reproductive system. And the doctor who attended my birth said it was the first time he had delivered this kind of illness and he brought me a huge book to see [pictures of] the things inside my stomach and he said: “Your stomach is bombed (irradiated) and the things in your stomach are like bowling pins. Those things are shaped like that.” And [he] had to clean my reproductive system out because I might have cancer and it’s better if he removes everything... In addition to interviews I conducted, the interviews conducted by my students and those conducted by the President of the Marshall Islands Radiation Victims Association also signal the importance of the use of English loan words. Because these interviews provide word use between native Marshallese speakers, the interviews demonstrate that educated Marshallese are comfortable with the use of English terms and that the Marshallese modify the use of English terms to resist the narrow parameters of U.S. scientific discourse to convey their experiences with radiation. In the case of the student interviews, it is interesting to observe that during the discussion about the events witnessed by the Marshallese after the U.S. Government detonated the Bravo shot on March 1, 1954, there are almost no English loans words describing the sights and sounds they experienced. For example, Edma Tartios, Raymond Johnson and Mary Silk, all students, ask Samos Relang to explain what he Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209 experienced during the Bravo event. Mr. Relang iived on Mejit Atoll, an atoll outside of the U.S. boundary defining radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands: Edma Tartios (ET):Ekar wor ta ear walok iolo en eo elkin kar tore eo kom kar lo me ram eo? Samos Relang (SR):Aet. Ekwe ij ron ainikien immur eo, ekar mokta walok meram eo ke ej marok wot. Ejjanin lukun raan. Etal im lak lukun jeded lok raan, jibbon, ejjanin tak al. Ewo jiljino jimatan. Ke ej bokolok, bwe iar tobtob ar lok im lale ne ilolo wa. Ke ij ron inurnur ejjanin bokolok men eo. Inumur in wot. ET: Ewi wewen an im m ur? SR: Einwot ne en inurnurjorur. Na ij lomnak rej bake wot turin en eo. Ak dak lale ejjelok jabdewot. Im elap ao bwilon, enaj ta? Ak ij lomnak ewor ijen rar buki. Raymond Johnson:Kom jaje ke Bikini? SR: Kom jaje. Mary Silk (MS):Ak meram mokta? Ewi wewen jokjok in meram eo? SR: Meram mokta, einwot meram in lightkane. Einwot meram in al ne etton joran tak. MS: Kain colorrot eo an ? SR: Einwot eburoro. Edma Tartios (ET): What happened out on that island (of Mejit) during the time that you saw the light? Samos Relang (SR): Yes. Well I heard a rumbling sound. It began before the light appeared when it was still dark. It still wasn’t day yet. When it got closer to daybreak, morning, the sun hadn’t come up yet. At the time that it (the bomb) exploded, everything was hazy looking to me and I looked to see if I could spot a boat. That’s because I heard the rumbling before that thing exploded. Just rumbling. ET: What was the rumbling like? SR: It was like the rumbling of thunder. Me, I thought they captured part of one of those islands over there. But when I looked out I couldn’t see a single thing. And I was really surprised, “what could it be?” But I really thought they captured some place. Raymond Johnson:None of you knew it was Bikini? SR: We didn’t know. Mary Silk (MS): The light came first. Describe the characteristics of the light. SR: The light came first, it was like the brightness of lights. It was like the brightness of the sun before it is about to rise. MS: What was the colorof it. SR: Well, it was red. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210 During the portion of the interview discussing the event that Mr. Relang witnessed, the student uses the Marshallese word for light, meram , to question Mr. Relang. Despite the student’s use of the Marshallese word, Mr. Relang responds using the English word “light." In this instance, Mr. Relang’s use of the word “light" means “flash,” rather than the ordinary English definition of light. It is also interesting to note that Mr. Relang and the students each confine their English borrowing to only one word, “light” and “color” respectively. Later, in the same interview, during the discussion of the effects of the radiation and the changes people observed after the testing, the Marshallese speakers begin to look for English loan words to describe these new experiences: SR: Raan eo kein kajilu ewalok juon mon wa. MS: Ta ko rej iwoj im kommani? SR: Rar itok im etetal im lale melan ailon en. Etale ewor ke ta. Kom jaje lukun mwilal in itok eo aer. Ak bolen itok eo aer rar itok bwe ren lale ewor ke paijinim men ko mae rar wotok, me rej ba kain ko ilo Bikini im Rongelap, poata. SR: On the third day after [Bravo] a ship appeared. MS: What was it that they came [to your island] to do? SR: They came to walk around and see the surroundings of the island. Study and see what there was. We didn’t really know the extent of their reasons for their visit. But maybe their coming was so they could see if there was any poison (radiation) and the things that fell, like the kinds they say are in Bikini and Rongelap, powder (fallout). Another student interview demonstrates an extensive use of English loan words to describe the work that U.S. contractors asked Marshallese to undertake in support of the testing program. This interview that Bienthy Ned conducted with John Milne, the President of the Marshall Islands Radiation Victims Association, contains more English loan words than my own interviews despite the fact that both speakers are Marshallese. John may have used as many English words as possible to impress the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 students with his knowledge of the English language, or that he couldn’t think of any Marshallese replacement words to describe the types of work the English speaking contractors asked the workers to perform. It is also possible that both John and Bienthy use more English terms because they both reside spent the major portion of their lives in the nation’s urban areas where English is more commonly used. The interview provides powerful testimony to the experiences of another radiation population the U.S. Government fails to acknowledge, the Marshallese test site workers. After the testing program, U.S. Government contractors sent the Marshallese test site workers to do clean up and ground moving activities on Bikini and Enewetak atolls. The U.S. Government did not provide protective clothing to the workers, nor did it restrict them from eating local foods and water from an extremely radioactive environment: Bienthy Ned (BN): John, komaron ke kwalok ekojkan am kar ijino jerbal? John Milne (JM): Komol. Mokta jen ao naj kwalok jidik ikonan kamoloi Anij kin jiban rainin kin melele ko me inaj monono in sharee ippamiro. Einwot ke na ij juon eo ej komane jerbal ko ilo eitan Marshall Islands Radiation Victim’s Association.Im ij bareinwot juon Presidentnan Associationin. Associationin ekkar jino ibben armij ro rar jino jerbal ilo Bikini ilo seventies ko im ear kobatok bar je t entities im dri-jerbal ro mae rar jerbal ilo Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utirik im ijoko jet ilo belakin Majol in. Mae watoki ebar wor radiationie e kobatok crew membersrar involveilo project ko rar komani ijokein ba kaki maanlok. Marshall Islands Radiation Victims Associationin ej composeak kakobaba eo in projectkein mae rej nae etaer juon lok nan rualitok. Kein kajuon liaison interpreterro armej ro rarjerbal ilo Enewetak, Bikini ilo ...nineteen forty-sixmaantak nan nineteen fifty-eight Im nombaruo: crew membersro ilo wa ko rekein supplykilok project ko rej komani joken. Im nombajilu : survey teamsko rar jilikinlok er nan Enewetak im kab Bikini ilo nineteen sixtieskab seventies ko. Army rein rekar etal im rubrub tok men in jerbal. ..materialko jen jokan nan kokaal mon jikulim koman power plantim men ko jet. Im nomba emen: clean-up teamko rarjilikinlok er nan Bikini, Enewetak ijino jen sixty-nine maantok nan jimjuonnoul eo. Jimjuonnoul jima ko. Im nombalalem ej construction teamko rarjilikinlok er nan Bikini, kab Enewetak ilo seventies kab Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212 eightiesko nan komman resettlement program.Im nombajiljino ej armij ro rar jerbal ippen DOE/RMI survey teamko ilo aoiepen ailin kein ba kakilok maanlok. Bikini, Enwetak, Rangelap, Utirik. Im earjino etal im jerbal ijoken kobelok ippen scientist ro je n America DOE/AECjen nineteen fifty-fournan nineteen ninety- seven tok nan raan kein. Nombajimjuon ej drikaki ro mae rekar jerbal ilo mon jikulko mae ekar boktok materialko komani jen Bikini im Enewetak eimvot jikul ko mo ilo Ebon, Taka, Namdrik im Jaluit, Jabor, Majuro, Rita kab Laura kab Amo, Mili, im Ebeye. Im nombamalitok armij ro rar jerbal ilo power plantko... Bienthy Ned (BN): John, would you explain how you got started with your work? John Milne (JM):Thank you. Before I begin I want to say a little word of thanks to God for his help in explaining these things that I will be happy to share with the two of you.56 Well I am the one who does the work in the name of the Marshall Islands Radiation Victim’s Association. And I am also the President of this Association. This association started its work with the people who started their work on Bikini in the seventies but it also incorporated some other entities and workers who worked on Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utirik and other places in the Marshalls. Another [group] that also experiences radiation that is included is the crewmembers that were involvedin the project they did up there that we discussed earlier. This Marshall Islands Radiation Victims Associationis composedor is comprised of the projects that we give names from one to eight. The first one is the liaison interpreters, the people who worked on Enewetak and Bikini in. . . nineteen forty-sixup until nineteen fifty-eight. And number two: the crewmembers on the ships that brought supplies to the projects that they did up there. And number three: the survey teamsthat they sent to Enewetak and also Bikini in the nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies. The Army [sent them] to go and take apart the things they used to support their work... materials from up their were used to build schoolhouses and a power plant and other things [in locations throughout the Marshall Islands], And number four: the clean-up teams they sent to Bikini and Enewetak starting in sixty-nineup until the seventies. Sometime in the seventies. And number five is the construction teams they sent to Bikini and Enewetak in the seventies and eighties to support the resettlement program. And number six is the people that worked with the DOE/RMI survey teamsat the islands that are closed until now. Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utirik. And they started to go to work there with the American scientists from DOE/AEC from nineteen fifty-fourto nineteen ninety-sevenup until today. Number seven is the teachers who worked at the schoolhouses where they brought the materials from Bikini and Enewetak such as the schools on Ebon, Taka, Namdrik and Jaluit, Jabor, Majuro, Rita and Laura 56 Another student. Dorothy Simeon, observed the interview. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213 and Amo, Mili, and Ebeye. And number eight is the people who worked at the power plants... BN: Kajojo ian groupkein, groupta kwar bed ie? JM: Na ij kar bed ilo groupko an dri-kal ilo nineteen seventies ko lok nan jen ba jen nineteen seventy eo nan nineteen seventy-four. Groupeo ear ton komane resettle programeo ilo Bikini einwot dri-kal. BN: Kio elon ke boj - ewor ke jab men en kwoj enjake an eoklak ko kar ke baj naninmej? JM: Aet. BN: Rej ke boj iewoj medical programkare ien ko ? JM: Elukun emman kajitok en am. Jet ian rar bed ilo programan DOE je t ian in rar jab. Ak men eo im ro rar bok er nan koman ekatak kaki er rar bed ilo programin toktako ejjelokresult rekar lelok nan er kain kein ejjelok. Rejanin kare lelok result in katak ko aear ken wawen ejmour ko aer. Jekar jab jela melele kein lok nan kio ebaak jej loe ke ewor jet ean armij rein ewor naninmij ilo enbwinier. Ak jej kab ton jela kio elaktok ealan ad etali melele kein. Enone ikoman bwe jen maron jela kin melele in ke rej declassify informationko. BN: Out of these groups, which group do you belong to? JM: Me, I am in the group of the builders in the nineteen seventies let’s say from nineteen seventyto nineteen seventy-four.The group was sent as builders for the resettlement program at Bikini. BN: Now are there - just are there any things you feel, anything different, have you been sick? JM: Yes BN: Did they give you access to the medical program that they had at the time? JM: That is a really good question. Some of them were enrolled in the DOE program and still others were not enrolled. This is one thing and then others they took them to study them and they were enrolled in a doctor’s[medical] program and they didn’t give any of the results to them, none. They still haven’t given the results of their studies that describe the health of these individuals. We didn’t know this new information that we’ve learned more recently that some of these people had sicknesses in their bodies. But we just learned recently that they were doing these kinds of studies. The reason I’m starting to know about this is from the informationthey are declassifying.37 BN: Kio armij rein mottam ke, ak ewor ke boj aer naninmej in kwalok bot jale reboj naninmej ke ? 5' The declassification John refers to is the Clinton Administration's decision in 1993 to begin declassifying documents related to radiation exposure from the Cold War era. As a result of this initiative, the Department of Energy has turned over thousands of documents to die RMI Government that the Marshallese had not seen before. These are the same documents referred to in the discussion of the White House Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiements. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214 JM: Aet. Majorityin armij rain ilo group kein, aolepen groupkein rualitok kenono kaki. Rar mij lok kin cancer,je t kein leukemia,je t kein prostate cancer.., im bwijin kain cancereo me jej watoki rainin ke rej jen radiation. Problemeo in elon wot ian armej rein rej mij lok im jab jela ke ekar wor naninmij ekin ibbaer. Lok ien en me rej eolol, im rej mij kinke ejjelok, ejjelokjuon ewein eo me, ak ejjelokjikin en me remaron rej etal im check-upe enbwinier em eikatak kake naninmej kan aer. Im ejjab menin wot, ak armij rein relok mij ejjab lukun alikar kinke ejjelok autopsy facilityilo hospitaleo ad rainin nan etale naninmej kein mae pathologistro me ewor kabeel ko ibbeir nan etale naninmij kein. Im men eo ekabiromojmoj in bwe jejela ke aolepen Majol in epaijin. Im elaptata groupin armij rein en ej targete lok er im ejjelok wewein ko im remaron in etal nan ialan jiban. Mene ewor ien ko jekar kajeon in kebaak jikin ko me jemaron kabok jiban ko jen er ak ejjelok uak lok nan koj. BN: Now about your friends, do some of them have illnesses that show that they are sick (from the radiation)? JM: Yes. The majorityof people in this group, from each of the eight groups talk about this. They have died off from cancer, some kinds of leukemia, some kinds of prostate cancer... and many other types of cancer show these days are from the radiation. The problem is that there are many people that die but they don’t know that they had illnesses. When it gets to the time that they’re weak they die because there is nothing, nowhere, not even one place they can go to get a check-up for their bodies and to learn about their illnesses. And this isn’t the only thing, when these people die it isn’t clear [what the cause of death is] because there still is no autopsy facilitytoday in our hospital to study these illnesses of the types that pathologistsknow about from studying these sicknesses. And this is really saddening because we know that all of the Marshalls is poisoned. And most of all these groups of people that were targeted [for scientific studies] but they can’t do anything and there’s no road open to them for assistance. There were times when they tried to go to these places [where the U.S. provides medical care to exposed populations] to see if they could get help from them but nobody has ever answered our requests. BN: Kio kajitok eo juon ikar konan ba in dri jerbal rein rekein mona einwot mona ko kijed make, einwot local food? JM: Aet. Bar juon in men. Ike jekar etal nan jokan ejjelok juon restriction ikijien mona rar komane nan kej restrictedjen mona kain io im kain ien Boj groupeo me nar ikar represente. A k me na ij represente dri-kal ro. Ejjelok juon men DOE/AEC kar ba mokta. Im kien eo an Trust Territoryba ke emo mona kain ion im kain ien. Tokelikjej kab jela ke emo mona jet kain mona einwot boj baru, oror bob, idaak ni. Ak men ko kirn kar mona kan ine ej to an itok field trip im to an itok supplyko am ilo ailin en jej mona mona in ailin kein kinke ejjelokjuon men jemaron mona...Ak dren, aiboj ko kirn ar etal im idaak ke, aiboj lal, ak aiboj jiment. Aiboj jiment ko rar etoon ke men kein rar bed iumwin test bombko maantak mae ien ko kemij kojerbali...Einwot jelak etal, jet ke ien ailin Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215 eo ejjelok dren bwe eka wot an dret. Ne ej maat koban aiboj ko ak water catchment ko knbwij aiboj lal ko im idaak dren. Ejjelok ar checki ak kirn are wonmanlok wot im ejjelokjuon armij ear ba jobrak. Relak itok kemij idaak einwot iajonjon im kain kein. BN: Now my next question I wanted to ask about the workers is if they ate our foods, what we call local food? JM: Yes. That is another thing. The places where we were sent [to work] there were no restrictions about the food that we made for ourselves, restrictions about eating this or that. That’s how it was with the group I was a part of, the group that built structures. There was never a thing that DOE/AEC told us in the beginning. Yet the government during the Trust Territorysaid that it was forbidden to eat this and that kinds of food. Afterwards, we learned that it was forbidden to eat some kinds of food like [coconut] crabs, pandanus, or drinking coconuts. The things we ate from the island we had to because it would take so long for the field trip ships to come and bring supplies to the islands out there and we ate the local foods because there was nothing else we could have eaten. And the water, the water we drank, well water, water stored in the cement. The water from the cement was dirty because it had been there earlier below the test bombs until the time that we used it... Now when we look back, sometimes there was no water on those islands because of the droughts. If there was no more water in the water catchment we dug for well water and drank that water. Nobody checked us so we continued and not one person told us to stop. BN: Kwoj kememej ke leo mottam mae kwoj ba komean kijon lelok einwot warninge ke en jab lukun lap an mona ? JM: Aet. Calep. BN: Armij in ia in? JM: Likao in Likiep im Mejit. Elikin lok ke jej ron rumor ke enana mona men io men ien im je j karon dron ak ejjelok official enaan ear itok jen kien im ba jen jab mona kain ak jen contractor ro ad ak jejela bwe jej ronjake im einwot jejela ke emo mona. Jar warninge leo bwe en jab mona ak eroltok im loken jet ien mij. Ear jab aitok an bed BN: Do you remember that guy, your friend, who you said all of you tried to warn him not to eat too much [local food]? JM: Yes. Calep. BN: Where was this person from? JM: A young man from Likiep and Mejit. After we heard the rumorthat it was bad to eat this and that we told each other but there was no official word that came from the government to tell just not to eat the food or even from our contractorsbut we knew because we heard and we knew it was bad to eat the food. We warned this guy not to eat but he got weak and after a bit he died. He wasn’t with us for long. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 216 It is interesting to note the style and the intentions of the student interviews. Raymond Johnson expresses surprise that the interviewee who witnessed the Bravo test did not know that the U.S. Government was testing nuclear weapons on Bikini at the time. Mary Silk wants to elicit people’s feelings about the events they witnessed and not just the factual information. Bienthy Ned scrutinizes the response of the U.S. Government. Similar to the interview language, a popular Marshallese song also borrows English radiation words and changes the meaning of the words to reject and resist their prescribed meaning. The English words, in their modified form, convey uniquely Marshallese experiences with nuclear weapons. In a song written by a Rongelapese man, the author expresses the pain, illness and despair that the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program inflicted on the Rongelapese: I. Naat inaaj ella lok jen entan kein ko ijaje kio 58 Komaron ke iuon ao ri-iinet im ao marin ko? (repeat) Chorus: Ne ij ped ilo ao radiation en bwe imojno kon tyroitim ao jojolair, Konan eo in bwe in wiwa wot ion juon ao jikin aeneman Im iab na wot ak ro ilo nomba en 177. (repeat) II. Aolepen lomnak e ao ij liwoj rej nan kom kio Kon wewin ko ij lo ilo an raan jabe kein ad. I. When will I be released from all my sufferings that I still now do not understand? Would you give me a guide and strength? (repeat) Chorus: I am irradiated because I am weak from thyroid disease and despair,59 58 There is no copyright for this song. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 217 I only want to live in peace This is not only mv wish but all those who belong to the number 177. (repeat) II. All these thoughts of mine I give to you These are the experiences I see in these davs that don’t belong to us. (repeat) Singing and songwriting are the most popular art forms in the Marshall Islands. As a nation with strong oral traditions and a keen appreciation of and ability to sing Christian songs, music is an important means for transmitting information and ideas to the Marshallese public. It is clear from the first verse of the song that the Rongelapese still do not understand the causes of their suffering or when they will be relieved from it. Frustrated — ostensibly from the U.S. Government’s lack of adequate answers — the Rongelapese appeal to God for assistance. In the chorus, the song imbues that radiation causes not only thyroid disease, as the U.S. Government acknowledges, but also despair. Radiation is no longer simply the poison produced by nuclear weapons, but the use of the word “radiation” signifies a loss of health and quality of life. The repeating section of the chorus makes fun of the U.S. Government’s categorization of radiation victims. The “number 177’ refers to the group of people from Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik eligible to participate in a medical program extended to the Marshall Islands under 39 As an exercise with my class. I asked students to translate the Rongelap Song so they could think about the difficulties involved in expressing Marshallese experiences with the problems resulting from the testing program. The students said it was the hardest to translate the line: "Ne ij ped ilo ao radiation en bwe imojno kon tvroid im ao jojolair." Variations of their translations of this line include: "I’ve been effected by radiation exposure:" "When I live irradiated that I’m weak because of thyroid and I’m lost;" “When I'm in radiation, my body goes weak because of my thyroid and loneliness:" I am irradiated because 1 suffer from thyroid problems and I am deprived of my life:" "If I’m affected by radiation that weakens my thyroid and makes me feel alone." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218 Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association. Rather than medical assistance, the song highlights the real desire of the radiation communities, to live in peace. In the final verse, the song underscores how detached the people of Rongelap feel from their lives over which they have no control. It is no surprise the Rongelapese do not feel their lives belong to them given they no longer have control over their health, their environment, their resources, or the place where they live. Themes Linguistic data from the radiation communities in the Marshall Islands demonstrate that the Marshallese have numerous social realities that overlap and intersect. Of these various social realities, there are three primary themes that emerge from the texts of the interviews: agency, powerlessness, and women’s reproductive abnormalities. Although the informants express these themes differently, linguistic evidence demonstrates the use of a Marshallese radiation language to convey the three women’s experiences in each of the interviews highlighted in this chapter. Language provides a multiplicity of shared identities and realities for speakers. Like the Kalapalo of South America (Basso 1995:299), the Marshallese find ways to express their multiple realities. Language provides the vehicle for Marshallese to construct and negotiate their historical, medical and cultural experiences with radiation. The fact that the themes of the radiation language exist and remain inaccessible to all but Marshallese speaking Americans is critical to understanding Marshallese resistance to constructions of the effects of radiation imposed by the U.S. Government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 219 Linguistic data demonstrates that radiation populations use the Marshallese language, not English, to convey agency, powerlessness and women’s experiences with reproductive abnormalities. Radiation and its effects are a clear part of the consciousness and lived experiences of the Marshallese people. The exposed communities insist on discussing radiation and its effects in a Marshallese context even when they borrow words from the English language to do so. Both the existence of the themes and the refusal to give up a Marshallese speaking context indicate that the radiation populations created a language of resistance to thwart U.S. attempts to impose a post-testing reality on the Marshallese people. Agency In the Marshallese language, like many Pacific languages, speakers often avoid assigning agency because interpersonal communication in the Pacific is often passive (Brenneis and Myers 1984:20). For example, I remember several occasions over the years when I asked a person what time it was. Instead of responding in the first person when they did not know the time, people often replied in the collective plural with “jenok” (“we don’t know”) even if there was no one else around. In small Pacific communities, preserving harmony is essential to survival; people often conceal direct accusations and anger and prefer to express their feelings to a third-party mediator. Use of the Marshallese language enables the radiation populations to ascribe agency and express anger while simultaneously avoiding direct confrontation with Americans. It is interesting to observe in the linguistic data that there is absolutely no question of ambiguity in the minds of the radiation populations regarding who did Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220 what to whom. As evidenced in Table 7, the radiation language enables the Marshallese to speak directly about their feelings in a culturally appropriate manner. Table 7 provides a partial list of the pronouns and verbs used by one interviewee, Ellyn. Ellyn speaks directly to convey her perceptions about who caused the radiation, which people the radiation affects, who makes decisions, and whom the decisions impact. There is little doubt in Ellyn’s mind that the Rongelapese, or “we,” experience radiation exposure, illness, dislocation, and false reassurances from the U.S. Government about their safety and health. According to Ellyn, the United States Government, or “they,” is the clear agent of the Rongelapese people’s suffering. Statements such as “they said they were helping” indicate that the U.S. Government representatives portray themselves as helpful to the Rongelapese. If Ellyn really believed the sincerity of U.S. efforts to “help,” however, she would have said, “they were helping.” Also, the introduction of the word “should,” along with taking medication and eating or avoiding certain foods, demonstrates that Ellyn believes she was following orders rather than simply receiving care and that the reason for taking the medication was not completely clear to Ellyn. If Ellyn were a participant in her medical care, she probably would have chosen words more like “the doctor gave me medicine to help with my medical problems.” Ellyn’s statements of agency also reflect the history of the Rongelap people. In 1957, the U.S. Government assured the Rongelapese that their home atoll was safe for reinhabitation after a three-year absence due to high levels of radiation from the Bravo test. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Rongelapese experienced death and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221 Tabh^JExgressi^ we were bombed they bombed us evacuated “ examined us sick “ checked us resettled “ told us it was OK evacuated again told us our illnesses are not related to radiation still sick ‘ said we should take medicine told everything was okay ‘ said they were helping ‘ said we should go to the U.S. ‘ said the food was OK to eat ‘ said we should not eat certain food profound illness after returning to their Rongelap because of the radiation they ingested from their environment. In 1985, the Rongelapese removed themselves from their home atoll for a second time. Greenpeace, an international environmental organization, assisted the Rongelapese with their evacuation because the U.S. Government refused to acknowledge that the proliferation of deaths and illnesses the Rongelapese experienced upon resettlement were radiation related. These experiences, in all likelihood, contribute to Ellyn’s skepticism and cynicism about any U.S. Government pronouncements regarding radiation safety or the health status of the Rongelapese. In addition to the three women highlighted in this chapter, people on other atolls in the Marshall Islands, students, and representatives of the national legislature also express strong sentiments that assign agency for the radiation-related problems the Marshallese face. The hurt and humiliation resulting from the U.S. Government’s failure to take responsibility for the problems is clearly stated by Tempo Alfred of Ailuk Atoll: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222 During the times immediately after the explosions there was not much change to human health. After afew years, people began to experience various kinds of health complications. They started to exhibit sicknesses like thyroid cancers and lumps all over their bodies. We've never seen atrything like these before the tmclecir testing... They didn 7 listen to us. They said it was nothing to worry about ... We thought it was terribly rude that they were lying to us...they failed to warn and inform the people about the nuclear tests and also about the fact that they used us as guinea pigs to learn how our bodies could resist or absorb the poison from the tests. Just like when they are about to send a rocket into space, they put many kinds o f animalsfor their experiments (in the rockets). That’s exactly what they did with us (Alfred 1994). In addition to the interviews I conducted, essays written by Marshallese students show how Marshallese who experienced the events of the testing program first hand pass their feelings about agency and responsibility for the consequences of the tests to the successive generation. Students prepared these essays for Nuclear Victim’s Remembrance Day, a national holiday observed every March 1st on the anniversary of the Bravo test. While the essays provide useful data, they do not provide as much information about the lived experiences of the students as co-constructed interviews do. Nonetheless, the essays provide powerful examples of the blame Marshallese youth ascribe to the United States. The students who wrote these essays were not alive during the testing events and, therefore, did not experience the direct consequences of the testing program. The clear ascription of blame and descriptions of the effects of radiation exposure that the students convey demonstrates that the older generation passes information, using the Marshallese radiation language, to the younger generation: Ri-pella...relukun in kometortor...Ri-pella rekanooj in bwebwe...elukun lap cut ri- American kakkure kij. Unin er kar kamelmel bomb nan ailon keni konke rej ba erik aelon kein ad, im ke rerik ren itokjen ailon kon aer im itok me kakkure im ko-poisett ene kein ad. Rejab etal kamemeli bomb nan ailon kon er ak retok im kamelmeli nan koj. Raan kein elon armij in Marshall rekanooj in jorren ak tairot im cancer. Unin jorren konke armej in American rar jolok bomb nan ailon kein ad, im poisen menin motir in lojet im ebar einwot menin eddok. Rar lukun jaje Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223 manet. Ebar Ion ajiri ro rejorren im elon lellop im lollap re-cancer im tariol. Ri- Marshallese relukkun jorren (Amani 1998). Americans...really harass people a lot...Americans they are really crazy...The Americans really did a lot of damage to us. The reason they tested their bombs on these islands of ours is because they said our islands are small and because they are small they can come from their country and come to do harm and poison these islands of ours. They don’t go and test bombs on their own land but they come and do their explosions here for us. These days many Marshallese people are really sick with thyroid and cancer. The reason they are sick is because the people from America they dropped bombs on our islands, and poisoned the animals in the ocean and also the plants. They really were badly behaved. There are also many children who were affected and many old women and old men they have cancer and thyroid. Marshallese are really suffering (Amani 1998). Some of the phrases in this young student’s essay particularly emphasize the blame placed on the United States for the problems resulting from the testing. The student uses expressions such as Marshallese: itok me kakkure im ko-poisen ene kein ad Literal translation: come to do harm and make-poison islands here of ours Meaning: come to do harm and poison these islands of ours Marshallese: retok im kamelmeli nankoj Literal translation: they come and make explosions to us Meaning: they come and do their explosions here on us In addition to directly blaming the Americans for their sufferings, the students also blame Marshallese health problems on exposure to radiation. As with the previous essay, students also express their anxiety about children who die or are affected by the radiation: Bomb eo ear kommati bwe aolepen menin eddik ko ijo ren joreen. Kon wot paijin eo ekar elon armej rar naninmej im jet ian ajiri ro rar mej. Kon an lap paijin, etal im mej KingJuda (Lang 1998). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224 The bomb made it so that all the plants here they would be damaged. From just the poison alone there were many people who were sick and some children who died. Because there is so much poison, King Juda went and died (Lang 1998).60 In the class I taught during my fieldwork, Nuclear Testing in the Pacific, I often asked guest speakers to come and share their experiences and thoughts with the class. One of the more provocative speakers was Rubon Juda, the son of the legendary “King Juda.” Rubon talked candidly about the suffering the people of Bikini endured during their exile from Bikini. Before the United States tested weapons on Bikini, the United States moved the Bikinians to Rongerik and Kili Island, where food and water supplies were insufficient to sustain the people. During Mr. Juda’s presentation, I recorded the expressions he used to assign agency on the United States for the sufferings of the Bikinians.61 Rar kalimor im ba "Kem naaj lo kom. ” They (America) made a promise to us and said: “We will take care of you.” Lukun kwole. Rej jab retok im lale koj. Kem kar ion juon jorren laplap. Kemim lukun jorren. Really hungry. They didn’t look after us and care for us. We encountered extreme suffering. We really suffered. Amedka eriab. Rejriab. Amedka ekar mone kirn. Naaninriab. Rar jab mool nankij. Janimentan. America lies. They lie. America tricked us. The words are lies. They weren’t truthful to us. [We] cry and suffer. Aolep men renana kemim kar ioone...im jorren kake. All the things that are bad we experienced. ..and suffered from them. 60 The Marshallese do not use the term King. The King Juda that the United States refers to was the leader of the Bikinians when the U.S. approached them to request use of their islands for the tests. Juda was a n . iroij. 61 Because 1 understand Marshallese and was privy to his direct attacks on the United States. Mr. Juda appologized to me. in front of the class, for the comments he made. I had not met Mr. Juda before class so my students assured him it was all right to express his feeling about the United Stales since "Holly is Marshallese.'' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225 Reriab...bwe ren bokjikier en kojerbali. They lied... so they could take our land and use it. Kim mijak er. Eben ba jab. We were afraid of them. It’s hard to say no. Kemim kar kaddok ik. Ejjelok ik kar emman. Elon rar mij jen kwole. We got fish poisoning. None of the fish were safe. Some people died from hunger (Juda 1998). Like Rubon Juda, Bikini’s elected representative to the RMI Nitijela , or parliament, Henchi Balos is very clear about the agency he ascribes for the problems believed to stem from the testing program. On a national radio broadcast, Senator Balos clearly stated that the problems resulting from radiation are not the RMI Government’s fault, and, therefore, not the RMI Government’s responsibility to address. Instead, Balos clearly places agency and responsibility on the U.S. Government: “The Government of the Marshall Islands didn’t bomb Bikini,” and “The Government of the Marshall Islands didn’t lie to the Bikinians in 1968 that we could safely return home.62 It was the U.S. Government” (Balos 1998). Powerlessness Radiation populations express deep feelings of poweriessness based on their inability to alter the circumstances resulting from their radiation exposure or to receive the type of medical care or explanations about their exposure they feel they deserved. They feel powerless to take care of themselves and obtain adequate care for 62 Like the Rongelapese. the U.S. Government prematurely resettled many Bikinians on their home atoll in 1968 with assurances that it was safe for them to return. After ingesting more cesium than any known human population (Balos 1995). the Bikinians once again left their home atoll. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226 their radiation-related illnesses, and powerless to seek recognition or retribution from the U.S. Government for their radiation-related injuries. The three women interviewees express frustration about their inability to understand the medical changes in their bodies. For example, Kiora and Kajitok explain the confusion they felt when U.S. Government representatives tried to explain why thyroid disease began to emerge after the weapons testing. Kiora and Kajitok remember that they could not understand the explanations of the U.S. Government officials that visited Likiep Atoll: Na ijab melele la wawen aer kar itok im etale im buki naninmij ko ke ejjelok jabrewot men reba non [kijj... I don’t understand why they came and took tests of different sicknesses because they didn’t say a single thing to us... ...rej konono tok ak komro jaje ta ko .rej ba...... they spoke to us but we didn’t know what.. .they said... Kiora seems reluctant to come to terms with the pervasiveness of medical problems throughout the community even though the Likiepese talk freely about illnesses that the community has experienced. She will not speculate beyond her family’s immediate experience with radiation exposure: ...ijela wot ke ekar wor jorren e kar walok nan ajiri eo kab komro... .. the only things 1 know about are those things that happened to our child and the two of us... Ellyn also acknowledges that she did not understand the medical procedures the U.S. Government subjected the Rongelapese to. The Rongelapese view themselves as the subjects of U.S. medical practitioners rather than the patients of doctors concerned about the well being of the Rongelapese. When I asked Ellyn what she Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227 thought about the medical care she receives from U.S. Government contractors she replied: Ekwe, ijaje. Rej toktaiki kij. Jenaaj ba la bwe ejjelok ke - jejaje waween bwe ejjelok - kij jej jaje tokta, kij jej jaje ta eo rekomani nan kij. Re lo ta? Ak kij, jenok. Boj - jej jaje tokta. Jej jaje lale anbwinin armej ejab ainwot er. Ke rej toktaiki kijJej tokta, akjenok. Kio emman, kio rej ba emmanlok. Ke relok toktaiki kij rej ba enanin ejjelok paijin ippad, bwe etan me ke rekonnan ba? Jej jaje bwe jelikijab jen men dein. Well, I don’t know. They treated us. What can we say, nothing - we don’t know about anything because we can’t - we don’t know a thing about medical care, we don’t know what kind of [medical] procedures they do to us. What do they see? But us, we don’t know. It’s ju s t- we don’t know about medicine. We don’t know how to examine the human body the way they do. Because they treat us, we visit the doctor, but we don’t know. Now it’s good, now they say [we’re] better. When they treat us they always say there is no radiation with us, what is it they always say? We don’t know because it’s hard for us to understand these things. Ellyn recognizes that the Rongelapese needed care after the initial near fatal exposure to radiation, and they continue to need care for their long-term latent illnesses associated with their exposure. Ellyn also realizes, however, that she is at the mercy of her doctors. The repeated use of the phrase J e j ja je ” (“we don’t know”) underscores the extent of Ellyn’s lack of understanding of the medical procedures the U.S. Government performs on her. In fact, Ellyn has a scar that extends from her jawbone down to her clavicle. When I asked her about the scar, she said she did not know what procedure the U.S. doctors performed on her thyroid. In actuality, Ellyn had her entire thyroid gland removed without her knowledge or permission. Ellyn recalls the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228 feeling of powerlessness she feit when the U.S. doctors examined her, especially during her numerous trips to the United States. Without a translator or Marshallese companion during one trip, Ellyn recalls: “I was afraid... [but] what can we do when we have no choice?” Ellyn’s statements demonstrates that the language of radiation populations in the Marshall Islands embodies the history of U.S. and RMI interactions and the relative powerlessness of the Marshallese to alter their experiences. Ellyn is apparently resigned to the fact that she has no means to influence even basic decisions about her own health and well-being. Ellyn is ill. She needs highly specific and very expensive medical care for her radiation-related illnesses and depends on the U.S. Government to provide all of her treatment. She has no choice, as the RMI Government does not possess the capability or the human and financial resources necessary to treat radiation-related illnesses such as brain tumors. In addition to her thyroidectomy, Ellyn explained her experiences with the U.S. Government doctors and institutions in the United States that diagnosed and treated her brain tumors: Ijab enjake ke elon tumor ippa. Ak ke rar etale io im pijaike io wot im etal. Kwo lo ke leo ekar bok eJJo in A£C, Conard, ear ba nan na ewor juon men ej eddek bara. Ear lukun ba nan na. lar etal im bar pija ilo Hawaii, im rar bar etale io inem ibar rool bwe e ba, “Rool im ped im lok en jet iio inaaj bar kur iok...Ekwe, emoj lok en ta eo juon im ruo iio ke, ekwe rekur io bwe na en tok im etal. Etal wot im kaju nan Mew - men, Washington...Boke io lok nan Washington. Im drore. Ij make wot ie...Ekwe, ij etal im rej jerame io aolep raan. Aolep jibbon. I couldn’t feel my tumor. They would just come and examine me and take x-rays and go away. You know the guy who was in charge of the AEC, [Dr.] Conard, he told me I had something growing in my head. He said this directly to me. I went to Hawaii for more x-rays and they also examined me. And then I returned [to Ebeye] because he said: “return and stay, and after a few years, I will call you again... Well, after what, one or two years, one year, right, well they came and told me to go. I went and head straight to New - Washington [D.C.].. .Took me to Washington. And stay put. I was by myself... I went and they (gave me) shoc[k treatment]everyday. Every morning. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229 Ellyn was clearly frightened by her experiences in the care of U.S. doctors and researchers. Still now, she has no understanding of her medical condition and no medical file that explains her treatment either in Marshallese or English.63 The women I interviewed did not believe they had any ability to either get access to information about their health, or to influence decisions about their medical care. Control of information and patient treatment is one way that the U.S. Government retains full authority to account for the consequences of the weapons testing program both during the maintained Trusteeship and in the post-colony. Use of the English language by U.S. Government officials contributes to the subordination of the Marshallese. Although the Trusteeship is officially terminated, the systematic control of information and medical knowledge by the U.S. Government enables the U.S. to determine which Marshallese demonstrate symptoms of radiation exposure and which people are eligible for medical care. This control of information left patients, such as Ellyn, vulnerable to experimentation. As long as the U.S. Government 63 According to the RMI Government and many Marshallese I interviewed, all of the medical files of the acutely exposed Marshallese from Rongelap and Utrik were destroyed by fire. The RMI Government has asked for explanations of the fires in the records keeping office in S t Louis and in the two Marshallese medical facilities on Majuro and Ebeye that destroyed all the records detailing the illnesses and treatment of the patients (T.deBrum 1994). A Marshallese medical practitioner I interviewed. Esra Riklon. described the fire that destroyed the files in Majuro (E. Riklon L994): Esra: ...there was a group of physicians hired by our government to come and take over the hospital's management, mostly budget So we moved from the old hospital to this new hospital and they burned all the charts except maybe less than a few - a hundred charts let's say. Holly: Purposefully? Esra: Weil, we asked them. You know, one of our boys who used to take care of these charts was mad. he said: “Why did you bum these charts, they are important files?” And they said: "Because we are going to take on a new system of charts - filing charts.” And he said: “You didn't have to bum them, all you do is change the number, or change the folder, whatever. BuL you need all the information available on the chart or it's going to be handicapped every time a physician goes to take care of these people.” Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230 retains the right to define the medical effects of radiation, it will continue to ignore medical conditions the people complain about, like reproductive illnesses, and subsets of the population that the U.S. will not recognize as exposed to radiation, such as the Marshallese test site workers or the people from Likiep, Ailuk or Mejit atolls. Women’s Reproductive Illnesses Without question, one of the greatest concerns of the radiation populations is women’s reproductive health. In The Illness Narratives , Dr. Arthur Kleinman discusses the cultural significance of symptoms and illnesses. In different cultures, the stigmatization of illnesses depends on local meanings and understandings of illnesses as cultures construct “... conventions about what is acceptable appearance...or what is ugly, feared, alien, or inhuman" (Kleinman 1988:159). Every culture creates its own stigmatization for illnesses that are not socially acceptable. Because of stigmatization, people anticipate rejection from society even before rejection takes place. In some cultures, illness is associated with immorality. As a result, even those individuals who successfully mask their illnesses, such as reproductive problems, tend to internalize feelings of shame associated with their medical problems. Kleinman’s observations apply to the shame and stigmatization that women with reproductive problems in the Marshall Islands experience. Ellyn, Seiko, and Kiora all miscarried, and gave birth to grossly deformed children who lived for a short time before dying. Both Kiora and Seiko expressed the humiliation women experience when they give birth to grossly deformed children. It is often the practice for women to quickly take these children away and bury them after they die in order to hide their shame Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231 from the community, and even from their spouses. Seiko’s description of the birth and burial process provides linguistic evidence about the speed with which these events take place. This is demonstrated by the closeness of the verbs, as seen in the phrase: Elotak emij rej kalibwene. It was bom it died they buried it. Seiko also linguistically demonstrates the rapidity of events following her birth of “grapes” with the phrase: Eliktata ij kolotak, rej kwalok grape ko, im rej jolok jikin ninnineo ao. Finally, I gave birth, they showed me the grapes, and they removed my reproductive system. Seiko also describes deformed births she has heard about, including Kiora’s: Ekwe, ajiri ro ilok kar ron, rej ba ekojak baran. Im ien eo wot elotak emij rej kalibwene. Rejab kwaloke nan armij. Me ainwot Kiora eo, ij ron elotak - im bar juon kora rej ba ainwot baran tepil, ajiri eo nejin. Na iar jab loe bwe rej lotak wot rej noeji im kalibwener. Well, the children who are bom, according to what I have heard, their heads are funny. When one [of these deformed children] is bom it dies [and] they bury it. They don’t show it to people... Like Kiora, I heard it was bom - and one other woman they say [gave birth to a baby] like a Devil, the child of hers. Me, I didn’t see it because they give birth, they hide them, and they bury them. The linkage of the deformed child to the Devil, as Kleinman implies, clearly indicates that Marshallese women associate these births with Biblical images of immorality. On many occasions, Marshallese women told me that if a woman gives birth to a deformed child it is evidence that she is unfaithful to her husband and, therefore, subject to the retributions of her husband and the community. The wife of the health assistant on Likiep Atoll related expressed this sentiment when trying to account for the deformed babies she knew about: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232 I was terribly, terribly upset. I cannot explain exactly what my feelings were except remembering the horror and compassion Ifelt for the women. I wondered to myself it those monsters (the women) gave birth to felt any pain or had any o f the human qualities we all share. I suspected black magic and wondered what those women may have done to offend someone to such a degree that the spell cast on them was so profound and terrible (E. DeBrum 1994). Because of the dual imposition of burdens in the forms of radiation exposure from the United States Government and community pressure against women, women’s radiation difficulties are even more difficult to document and address. My interview with Kiora provides a glimpse into the suffering Marshallese women with reproductive problems endure. Kiora had difficulty describing and talking about her own experiences as indicated by her use of repetition to convey intensity and to emphasize certain points (Basso 1995). To highlight the fact that many women experience reproductive problems, Kiora says: Ellon, ellon armej ar jorren, im ellon kora ar kuraap nejeer... Many, many people were injured [by radiation], and many women had ‘grape’ babies... When Kiora talks about her numerous miscarriages she uses the phrase "Mij wot. mij w ot" (“[they] just die, just die”) to denote her multiple losses of children. There is no mistaking that Kiora believes the cause of her medical problems is "paijin eo, paijin eo " (“radiation, radiation”). When Kiora tries to describe the two-headed child she gave birth to, she stammers: "Ainwot e, ainwot e..., " or “it’s like, it’s like...” and she goes on to say "ainwot armej ...ainwot armej, ” meaning that it “resembled a person... resembled a person” yet it was not. Sensing his wife’s difficulty describing the event, yet wanting me to document the story, Kajitok describes the child. Like Kiora, Kajitok’s repetition of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233 phrases denotes his personal difficulty discussing the birth and the need to underscore important aspects of the story: Ien eo ewotlok baam eo elikin emninmej kon ajiri...elok tak ajiri eo, ewor ruo baran ajiri eo...Ruo bar. Einwot ruo bar. Juon eped ilun kab baran. Ijo (ejibwe baran bwe en kwalok ia) e walonlok im ainwot jidik wot, ewor jidik men ijo (ejibwe baran) im bar eo eped ijo (ebarjibwe baran) ...Ewor juon bar eo edik jen bar eo, ainwot ruo, ejab bar men eo ak ainwot baran armej. Ear jab mour ajiri eo. Lotak inem mij ...Emenono jidik wot ien ke ej lotak. Emaron wot, ejab awa, jet wot minute. After the testing, she got pregnant with a child...When the baby was bom, it had two head... two heads. It was like two heads. One was on top of the other... Here (touches his head to show where) it was really small (touches head).. .There was a small thing coming out of the head, like two, it wasn’t a head but it was like a head that thing. That child didn’t live. Bom and died... It breathed for a short time after it was bom. Maybe only, it wasn’t an hour, only a few minutes. Over the years, I have found stories of extreme birth deformities experienced by women on every atoll where I conducted interviews. The more typical stories, not stories like Kiora’s, describe the horror that the mother’s felt when they saw the children they gave birth to: I returned to RongeIap...in 1957, and I saw friends and relatives who were afflicted with illnesses unknown to us. Their eyesight deteriorated, their bodies were covered with bum-like blisters, and their hairfell out by the handful. It was around this time that I had myfirst pregnancy. My baby had a very high fever when he was delivered, and the attending health assistant conveyed his doubts as to whether my son would survive the night. He was so dehydratedfrom the fever that his skin actually peeled as I clasped him to me to nurse. The only thing we blew to do was to wrap him in wet towels. And so it was that I held him to my body throughout the night, changing the towels and willing him to fight for his life. He lost the fight just as dawn broke. My second son, bom in I960, was delivered live but missing the whole back o f his skull - as if it had been salved off. So the back part o f the brain and the spinal cord were fidly exposed. After a week, the spinal cord became detached and he, too, developed a high fever and died the following day. Aside from the cranial deformity, my son was also missing both testicles and penis. He passed water through a stump-like apparatus measuring less than an inch. The doctors who examined him told me that he would not survive. And sure enough, he was dead Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234 within a week... You know, it was heart wrenching having to nurse my son, all the while taking care his brain didn 't fa ll into my lap. For in spite o f his severe handicaps, he was healthy in every respect. It was good he died because I do not think he would have wanted to live a life as something less than a human (Jibas 1994). / also know that o f all the babies bom on this island during this period, and it causes me great sadness to have to relate this, only two were born normal and without deficiencies o f any kind. The rest all suffered handicaps o f one form or another. A few could hardly be called human. One was such a horror to behold that it frightened even its own mother. This baby was born with a miniature head and extremely long arms. It is hardfor me to describe its appearance in detail for I did not have a chance to see it and those present at the birth were reluctant to talk about it. The mother was so distressed that it was days before she could speak coherently. Other children born during this time did not have any noticeable deficiencies, and yet lacked the ability to reason or comprehend to any degree at all. Others were incapable o f any movement although they seemed to be aware o f their surroundings. Some o f the children in the second category survivedfor a number o fyears although as nothing more than human vegetables or adults with the minds o f children (A. DeBrum 1994). In contrast to Seiko and Kiora’s experience as part of the “unexposed” populations outside the parameter of the U.S. Government’s radiological consideration, the Rongelapese women indicate that they were not surprised by the birth of deformed children nor did they feel the same type of shame as the Likiepese women. The U.S. Government told the Rongelapese women to expect birth abnormalities because of their exposure to radiation (Emos 1999). In contrast to the Likiepese women who felt shame and hid their deformed babies (because they did not know and were not told that their exposure to radiation would result in birth deformities), the U.S. Government prepared the Rongelap community for deformities during birth. The Rongelap community publicly buried and grieved the loss of these children. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235 Women from atolls outside of the U.S. Government’s narrow confines of radiation exposure suffered from a lack of medical care for and community understanding of their radiation-related illnesses. They had no preparation prior to their birthing problems, no doctors to care for them, and no support or understanding from the community for their experiences. Therefore, although the radiation groups all suffer from their undocumented experiences with radiation exposure, the groups with acute exposure and U.S. Government attention suffered differently from the atoll populations who received less initial exposure but no medical or U.S. Government attention. During her interview, Ellyn’s comments focused more on the Rongelap community’s experience with medical problems that the U.S. Government does not recognize as radiation-related. Ellyn is unwilling to accept the U.S. Government’s dismissal of medical problems that the Rongelapese connect to their radiation exposure. Ellyn questioned me, as an American, to demonstrate that she contests U.S. Government pronouncements about radiation-related illnesses. On different occasions in the interview, Ellyn describes medical problems experienced by the Rongelapese that are outside the tight U.S. Government parameters of radiation injury and follows her descriptions with rather curt and confrontational questions. For example, Ellyn says in a somewhat sarcastic tone: "Ak iar bar tumor, kwo jela ke? ” (“I had a [brain] tumor, did you know that?”). Another time, Ellyn looks me directly in the face, which Marshallese often find uncomfortable or even rude, and asks: Aimvot ke jet rane ajiri ro relotak, relotak ke jet ainwot armej ak jet jej lale re kamour kuraap, ekwe ta?! Some of the children who are bom here, when they are bom they resemble humans but when we look we see they give birth to ‘'grapes,’ well what is that?! Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236 Ellyn’s rhetorical questions serve as evidential because Ellyn did not expect an answer from me. Ellen Basso defines evidential as ways of “constituting ‘social truth’...ways of indicating the speaker’s attitude toward the validity of what is being said, marking...certitude that occur in statements” (Basso 1995:39). The challenging, direct manner of Ellyn’s questions signals that she has no question about the validity and truth of her experiences and that she was trying to gage whether or not I would defend the U.S. Government’s position. Ellyn backed off from her challenging of the U.S. radiation hegemony that I apparently represented to her. Although Ellyn understood at the time of the interview that the information from the interview was for the use of her government leaders, she focused her antagonism towards the United States on me. Considering the extreme amount of suffering Ellyn endures as a result of her experiences with brain tumors, a thyroidectomy, birth anomalies, radiation treatment in hospitals where “they shocked my head everyday,” and repeated prodding and other invasive procedures performed by U.S. medical practitioners, I find Ellyn’s bitterness appropriate. Instead of ending the interview with hostility, however, Ellyn moved from direct anger to an expression of the futility and powerlessness she feels as a result of her radiation exposure: Eluktin oktak mour jen jeamaan. Aolep men, ijaje kio Life is extremely different [now] than in the old days. I don’t know about anything anymore. The high incidence of reproductive abnormalities in the women I interviewed corresponds with the research done by medical anthropologist Glenn Alcalay (Alcalay 1995). Alcalay studied the incidence of miscarriages and reproductive abnormalities in the Marshall Islands after the testing program and found a direct Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237 correlation between the frequency of birthing problems and distance from the ground- zero test sites (Figure 16). This correlation demonstrates that the closer a community lived to Bikini and Enewetak Atolls where the U.S. tested its nuclear weapons, the more radiation the population would have received, and the greater the incidence of birthing problems in women. Women throughout the Marshall Islands complain about reproductive abnormalities linked to radiation exposure. The ethnographic data I collected in 1994 and in 1999 indicates that phenomena such as “jellyfish” and “grape” babies are widespread. Women in the far northwestern corner of the country close to where the testing occurred as well as women in locations furthest from the test sites understand what “jellyfish” and “grape” babies are and use these words to explain these reproductive phenomena. The existence of the word kiraap in the language indicates that the Marshallese assigned a non-human word to describe new phenomena in the post-testing era. If Marshallese women experienced these types of reproductive illnesses before their radiation exposure, the illnesses would have proper Marshallese names, instead of descriptive English names. For example, iibim and ko are the proper Marshallese names for stillbirths that the Marshallese have used since before the testing era. During my data collection in 1994,1 observed that the Marshallese use other non-human words from their environment or realm of experiences to describe the less-than-human “monsters” they give birth to, such as “jellyfish,” “turtle,” or “devil” babies. Jellyfish babies describe a widespread phenomenon where children are bom with no bones in their bodies. Witnesses say they can observe the hearts of the babies beating Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238 in their chests and the pulsing of the blood moving through the babies’ brains because the babies are born with translucent skin, like jellyfish. A Marshallese medical practitioner described the appearance of one jellyfish baby he witnessed: ...the baby was very funny looking. The legs and arms were there, but they were kind o f larger than normal, and shorter than normal. You can see the body, but there was no sktdL.and there was no skull except a membrane o f the brain, but you can see the brain with your own eyes, you can see the brain is moving - and the baby, the heart was beating also. After twenty-four hours the baby passed away, and the baby was quite shorter than normal. Kind o f thick and big (E. Riklon 1994). Another interviewee described a deformed baby bom on Wotje Atoll as a leiikan or a marlin fish. This description denoted the protruding spine that pushed out of the baby’s back like the fin of a marlin fish (Komram 1998). Another woman from Ailuk Atoll, an atoll adjacent to Utrik yet outside the confines of the U.S. geographic construction of radiation exposure, indicated that she gave birth to a clam-like child: Two (of my children) died One of them was bom defective. It didn 7 look like a human. It lookedjust like the inside of a giant clam (John 1994). Still another woman from Likiep Atoll told me: I will now confess that I, too, gave birth to something less than human. What I gave birth to was normal in every aspect except that the top o f the cranium had not fused and remained open like the cracks o fa coconut that has not completely split (E. DeBrum 1994). Lacking any English explanations for their experiences, Marshallese women search for non-human words in their environment, such as coconut, the insides of a giant clam, or a marlin fish, to describe the inhuman children they gave birth to as a result of their exposure to radiation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239 ROMGELAP UTIRIK c 0.9- 01 UJAI E AILUK I "WOTJE © 0.8- Q. LAE (0 LIKI I0 0.7- COw jA tu r ■ N 0.5- NAMORIK 0.4 1 0 0 200 300 400 500 600 Distance from Bikini (miles) Figure 16: Linkage Between Atoll of Residence and Reproductive Abnormalities Source: Alcalay, Glenn (1955). A Unique Radiation Language Regardless of the factual and ideological content of debates between the U.S. and RMI Governments as to the real nature and consequences of the events that took Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240 place in the U.S. strategic area, the linguistic evidence from the interviews undeniably captures the perceptions of the Marshallese radiation victims. Many Marshallese have lost faith in the U.S. Government’s ability to inform them about their health and safety. This lack of trust in the U.S. Government evolves from the inherent conflict of interest associated with having the agency directly responsible for the human and environmental exposure of the Marshallese also determine who is and is not harmed by this exposure. The hierarchical nature of the Trusteeship system allowed the U.S. Government to control access to information, to conduct human radiation experiments, and to serve its own security and scientific interests. For the Marshallese, this colonial domination continues to translate into physical and emotional suffering more than a decade after the Trusteeship terminated. Even though both the language of political and scientific domination is English, the English language cannot express the social and cultural realities of the Marshallese people and their experiences with radiation. As a result, the Marshallese borrow words from English, combine them with existing Marshallese words, and create new words to allow them to express their full range of experiences with radiation and the effects of nuclear weapons testing. These three distinct features characterize the Marshallese radiation language and are evident in the following passage from Senator Alvin Jacklick64 as part of a formal Nitijela's debate regarding the effects of radiation on the second generation: Kon komelmel an Amedka...enaaj Ion armej ilo Majol renaaj claimi naninmej. Jet kein in naninmej re ped ippen ri-Majol rebar ped ippen jekeke jet, armej ro ilo 64 Alvin Jacklick is now a Minister, but was a Senator at the time I collected this data. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241 Arizona im Utah, jet armej ro rar windowner ilo kamelmel an Amedka ijen...Paijin eo rar boktok ilo Bikini in Majol ejped wot nan rainin. By breaking this passage into parts and considering the literal translation of the words, the characteristics of the radiation language become clear: Kon komelmel an Amedka... enaaj Ion armej ilo Majol Because making explosions by America...there will be many Marshallese people renaaj claimi naninmej. Jetkeinin they will claim [for compensation to the Tribunal] illnesses. Some kinds of naninmej re ped ippen ri-Majol rebar ped ippen jekeke jet, illnesses they occur with Marshallese they also occur with some others, armej ro ilo Arizona im Utah, jet armej ro rar winddowner people from Arizona and Utah, some people they were wind downers ilo kamelmel an Amedka ijen... Paijin eo rar boktok in making explosions by America there...The poison they brought ilo Bikini in Majol ej ped wot nan rainin. To Bikini in the Marshall Islands it stays still until today. In this passage all of the characteristics of the radiation language become clear. First, it is clear that the language borrows from the language introduced by the U.S. Government to discuss the testing program. The Senator uses the word “claim” to indicate that Marshallese will file claims to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal to seek compensation for their radiation related injuries. Prior to the testing program, the Marshallese had no use for the word “claim”, as there is no Marshallese concept in which people receive payment for damage. Second, the Senator alters English words to adapt them to a uniquely Marshallese language context. The Senator’s modification of the word “downwinder” to winddowner reflects the Marshallese preference for a noun followed by a descriptive term as well as a significant change in the structure of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242 English word. Third, the Senator demonstrates the Marshallese creation of new words from Marshallese that enable speakers to express their full range of experiences with radiation and the effects of nuclear testing. Prior to the nuclear testing, there was no word kamelmel in the language. The Marshallese put the word together to create a new word to describe the weapons tests. Kamelmel . literally to make explosions, is a new Marshallese word. As evident in linguistic data from interviews and popular songs the Marshallese created their own radiation language to convey the havoc that entered their lives in the aftermath of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. In addition to communicating the social and cultural realities of the Marshallese, the radiation language is a form of resistance to the scientific-political-mi 1 itaristic paradigm of the United States Government that insists that radiation adversely affected only very few Marshallese. Through their unique radiation language and its themes of agency, powerlessness, and medical and reproductive abnormalities, the Marshallese construct the linguistic means to convey the social realities that U.S. definitions of radiation exposure deliberately ignore. For radiation populations that the U.S. Government ignores because their experiences fall outside the U.S. Government’s constructed space and definition of radiation exposure, the major avenue available for them to convey their experiences is through their language of resistance. Marshallese constructions of their social and cultural realities do not distinguish between “exposed” and “unexposed” groups. It is obvious that Marshallese people from both of these imposed U.S. categories suffer from the same type of illnesses. The interviews of Seiko, Kiora and Ellyn poignantly demonstrate the parallels between Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243 the medical problems women in both categories experience. Although Ellyn is the only legally “exposed” woman of the three, each of the interviewees and the women in their communities experience gross reproductive abnormalities. Linguistic evidence also indicates that the women feel ashamed about their illnesses in the legally “unexposed” areas, and, therefore, conceal the deaths of their deformed children from each other and from their communities. Despite the linkages between the medical problems of the three women, the interviews underscore the disparities of medical care available to each of the women. Because Ellyn is from the “exposed” community of Rongelap, Ellyn continues to participate in U.S. funded medical programs. Questions remain in Ellyn’s mind, however, about the efficacy of these U.S. programs that cause her to feel powerless and at the mercy of her medical practitioners. Seiko, on the other hand, experienced an ailment that is common enough in the Marshall Islands to warrant the creation of a name despite a relatively rare rate of occurrence in the United States. Despite the fact that Kiora suffered through multiple miscarriages and the birth of a two-headed child, and that Seiko nearly died while delivering grapes, both Seiko and Kiora, as well as other women and populations outside the two hundred and twenty-six originally “exposed” people of Rongelap and Utrik, remain ineligible for radiation-related health care. U.S. Government health care remains linked to the U.S. Government’s narrow, legal construction of the boundaries defining which atolls comprise the “exposed” area. The Marshallese language reflects the unique historical and social identities of the people. Because of the evolving relationship between the U.S. and RMI Governments, and the continued emergence of latent radiation-related illnesses, there is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244 little doubt that the radiation language of the Marshallese will continue to evolve and reflect the changing social and cultural realities of the lived Marshallese experience with radiation. It is my hope that U.S. Government responsibility for the health of the radiation victims will evolve, as well, to include the previously ignored radiation populations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING TO THE PAST, AND LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE The history of the Marshall Islands is a case where the powerful decided that the powerless should sacrifice themselves and their lands to science, medicine, and global political and strategic interests. The U.S. nuclear weapons testing program in the United States and the Marshall Islands cost American taxpayers approximately $5.8 trillion. Of that figure, just 0.04% has been provided to the victims of U.S. nuclear weapons (Schwartz 1998). The disproportionate amount of spending on security interests and assistance to affected communities is startlingly clear in the Marshall Islands where the U.S. Government’s nuclear weapons testing program represents the extreme in colonial domination. The scientists who created the hydrogen bomb, such as Robert Oppenheimer, knew they had created a weapon of genocide (Welsome 1999). This weapon of genocide, along with multiple atomic weapons, inflicted incalculable damage to the people and islands of a tiny atoll nation. Throughout the Trusteeship and into the post-colony, the strategic and research interests of the United States outweighed concerns for the safety, health and well being of the Marshallese people and their islands. U.S. Government representatives used their power to arrange for the tests to occur, to control or suppress information about the testing program, to determine which people and islands 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246 were exposed to radiation, and to decide which communities would receive compensation or U.S. Government programs for their radiation-related injuries or damage. Doctors and scientists vigorously pursued their research agendas with little or no thought about Marshallese knowledge and experiences with radiation. As anthropologist Lin Poyer noted, historical events “... are a touchstone for understanding modem life: they explain facts of language, custom, kinship, personal appearance, land tenure, and material culture” (Poyer 1993:22). In the case of the Marshallese, the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program has affected virtually every aspect of Marshallese life. From the data presented in this text, we see that it is impossible to separate the Marshallese radiation language from the history and relationship of the Marshallese people to their immediate surroundings, a world filled with invisible contamination and observable problems. We see that men, women, youth, the elderly, the legally exposed population, the test site workers, and the people from atolls such as Ailuk, Likiep, Wotje and Mejit have all been effected differently by the testing program. We see psychological and medical problems in the population. We see an economy that can not utilize large portions of its resources and land. We see a political system that does not represent all exiled populations. We see a social structure that has been weakened and changed by the introduction of radiation into the most valued possession of all, Marshallese land. In spite of the pain and problems resulting from the testing program, we can also see the incredible resilience and resistance of the Marshallese. The Marshallese protested the testing program and its consequences to the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, and the international community. Much to their credit, the Marshallese refuse Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247 to accept U.S. Government explanations about the effects of radiation exposure. The Marshallese continually and actively challenge U.S. Government policies that limit their inclusion in much needed medical and environmental monitoring programs. From a Marshallese perspective, the treatment by U.S. Government representatives shows that they are an expendable population to the United States, one whose sufferings and pain are part of the price of cold war politics. The Marshallese people are still struggling to cope with the devastation of their fragile coral islands that they depend on for survival and to come to terms with the pervasive deaths and health problems resulting from radiation exposure. The U.S. Government refuses to recognize or accept that these struggles are linked to its weapons testing. Importance of Applied Anthropology For the last ten years, I have worked as a consultant to the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. My experience working for the RMI Government has taught me a great deal about the contribution anthropology can make on behalf of communities exploited by international powers, such as the Marshallese. I do not think the cooperation I received from the Marshallese people would have been possible if the RMI Government has not been involved in my work, and had I not employed methods of applied anthropology. My years of work for the Marshallese people has demonstrated to the RMI Government that it can trust me to undertake research and that it is in the government’s best interest to sponsor my research. I work in a transparent manner in which all of my research objectives and methods are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248 understood in advance of my data collection and every phase of my research is shared with Marshallese counterparts. Applied anthropology provides me with the professional techniques and ethical guidance for my research in the Marshall Islands. The centerpiece here was my focus on praxis — working with communities as they struggle to identify their problems, helping communities determine the most appropriate types of action to address needs, and pursuing both tasks within the realm of anthropological theory. As a guiding approach, praxis calls on anthropologists to work with communities ". . . in such a way that the practitioner is compelled to make ethical and political decisions that matter” (Partridge 1987:217). Making these ethical and political decisions that matter to ourselves and the communities where we work requires a conscious effort to ensure that our presence and research contributes to local peoples' efforts to improve their lives. I am fortunate because my research interests and conclusions fully support the positions that the RMI Government is trying to advance. As an American citizen/activist, who feels a sense of responsibility for the past abuses rendered by my government against the Marshallese people and their islands, 1 am wholly committed to assisting the RMI Government with its efforts to assist the radiation-affected communities. Given our discipline’s history, scars, and links to colonial oppression and power, we have an even deeper obligation to assist communities such as the Marshallese. Therefore, contributing to human capacity building has become a critical component of my anthropological work. I have worked hard to contribute to the long-term development of the Marshallese so people will be better prepared to provide for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249 themselves in the future. I involve local people in every aspect of my research by teaching research techniques, allowing local people to assist in developing research design, and drawing conclusions from gathered data. Building local capacity and contributing positively to development efforts in the locations where I work is critically important to me. My main role as an anthropologist working for the RMI Government is to help convey the needs of the communities affected by the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program to the U.S. Congress and Administration. To convey the needs of the radiation communities, my consulting role often consists of acting as a cultural broker “translateing) one culture/society into terms comprehensible to another” (Nalven 1987:34), or as a liaison (Trend 1987) trying to bridge understanding between the U.S. and RMI governments. My work with the Marshallese shows that the most powerful way to convey the needs of the radiation communities to the U.S. Government is to allow RMI Government and community leaders to speak for themselves in bilateral meetings. Prior to bilateral meetings, I brief Marshallese leaders about the issues I researched, and I help them develop a technique for effectively conveying their problems and needs to U.S. Government leaders. During the bilateral meetings, I am able to sit quietly while Marshallese leaders speak for themselves, and whisper additional information into their ears only if necessary. I view my work as a success when my input is not needed at these meetings. In effect, my work requires me to give knowledge back to the communities (Mason 1987). Methods of applied anthropology stress the importance of disseminating information to the grassroots community (Medicine 1987, Warry 1992). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250 By providing local communities with a record and analysis of the information they share during our research, communities can use the information contained in my anthropological investigations long after my working relationship with the Marshallese ends. Applied Outcomes of this Project The research gathered and analyzed in this dissertation is contributing to RMI Government policy initiatives. The RMI Government has used portions of this research during bilateral discussions with the U.S. Government to address lingering problems from the nuclear weapons testing program. Much of the data from this case study helped the RMI Government convince the U.S. Government to put the Department of Energy’s medical monitoring program out to bid. As a result, Brookhaven National Laboratory is no longer the medical provider for the exposed population in the Marshall Islands. RMI national and local government representatives have also used elements of this research in testimonies to the United Nations, the White House, the U.S. Congress, the Nitijela , and other venues. National and grassroots leaders understand the significance of the ethnographic and historical research I provide to them. They frequently use the materials to pursue political objectives or to help educate their communities. As the information circulates, students and the younger generation of Marshallese also express an increased desire to understand the events that took place in their country during the cold war. By teaching classes at the College of the Marshall Islands and by including students in my research, I have seen interest in learning about the nation’s nuclear legacy deepen. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 251 Marshallese youth are also more likely to get involved with nuclear issues when they are inspired by their leaders who make knowledgeable, articulate, responsible requests for assistance from the U.S. Government. In addition to contributing to the policy objectives of the RMI Government, this project has become a rich and useful case study for anthropologists working on a variety of issues. By locating and documenting the knowledge of the Marshallese radiation populations, I investigate many themes central to anthropology in the new millenium, such as the importance of voice, documentation/witnessing, and representation. Certainly, this work demonstrates the value of oral history, life story collection, and other studies of local knowledge as a means to challenge colonial-based versions of history and to help the public gain access to knowledge that resides with local communities. The collection and transcription of these materials gives the RMI Government advance its political agenda with the U.S. Government. Indeed, the ethnographic and historical data presented in this text both challenges the adequacy of United States Government responsibility for the damages and injuries it caused in its former Trust Territory and calls for a new narrative of the history of the testing program. This new narrative of history must include the experiences and knowledge of all Marshallese radiation communities, not just portions of the Rongelap and Utrik communities included in the Compact of Free Association. This research also provides a useful case study for anthropologists interested in linguistics, environmental issues, land valuation, and public policy. By documenting the existence of a Marshallese radiation language, this research also provides an important case study for linguists to consider, particularly for linguists Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 252 interested in language and resistance. Environmental anthropologists will also benefit from a case study that documents how a colonial power devastated the health and environment of a relative powerless nation. For anthropologists interested in the consequences of resettling and relocating communities, this research shows that compensation for land alone is not adequate: We also need to consider the social, cultural, religious, economic, and political consequences of removing people from the places that give their lives meaning and value (Barker and Johnston 2000). Finally, anthropologists engaged in policy work will benefit from a case study of the ways that applied anthropologists can advocate for the needs and interests defined by their research communities (Barker 1996). I hope my efforts to empower the Marshallese communities will lend authority to anthropology as a discipline uniquely qualified both to understand and articulate problems facing communities and to take actionable steps to assist communities, particularly in the policy realm. Looking Toward the Future By acknowledging a more complete history of the testing program the U.S. and RMI governments can recognize the full scale of injustices, injuries, and damages experienced by the Marshallese. The RMI and U.S. governments must work together jointly to address these problems. In the near future, there will be two distinct opportunities to change the existing U.S. Government policy that severely limits medical and environmental monitoring programs in the Marshall Islands. RMI and U.S. Government officials will meet to discuss a changed circumstances petition to the U.S. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 253 Congress, and to renegotiate the economic provisions of the Compact of Free Association that terminate in 2001 but can be extended to 2003. The RMI Government has prepared a changed circumstances petition to the U.S. Congress that it will submit in late 2000. A provision in the Compact enables the RMI Government to request additional assistance for radiation-related damage and injury from the U.S. Government if the RMI Government can demonstrate three criteria. First, that new and additional information about the consequences of the testing program exists. Second, that this information was not known when the terms of the Compact were agreed to in 1985. Third, that based on this new and additional information the assistance provided by the U.S. Government for radiation-related damage and injury is manifestly inadequate (Compact of Free Association, 177 Agreement, Article IX). The draft petition includes extensive documentation of newly understood information about the effects of the testing program and the resulting shortcomings in U.S. funded medical care and compensation. Addressing the issues presented in the RMI Government’s changed circumstances petition to Congress provides an immediate vehicle to embrace the new narrative of the history of the testing program, a history that now includes the complex, wide breadth of problems facing a variety of radiation populations in the Marshall Islands. The second avenue for the U.S. and RMI governments to address the needs of radiation communities in the RMI is during bilateral renegotiations to extend U.S. economic assistance to the islands. The U.S. Government has a continued military and strategic interest in the Marshall Islands. Based on the mutual securities principle that provides the foundation for the Compact, the U.S. Government will provide Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254 economic assistance to the RMI Government in exchange for the defense interests the U.S. maintains in the Marshall Islands. Currently, Marshallese citizens face many problems as a result of past U.S. strategic needs. Therefore, it is in the best interest of both nations to ensure that any new defense agreements include provisions to assist all populations affected by military interests. I look forward to using my research to help the RMI Government advance the changed circumstances petition and renegotiate more favorable terms in the second period of funding under the Compact of Free Association. I will continue to conduct research, support, and work with the radiation communities in the Marshall Islands to seek the justice and recognition they deserve for their sufferings. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX I INTERVIEW WITH ELLYN (MARSHALLESE) INTERVIEWEE: ELLYN BOAZ (E) INTERVIEWER: HOLLY BARKER (H) LOCATION: MEJATTO, KWAJALEIN. MARSHALL ISLANDS. DATE: AUGUST 26, 1994 TRANCRIBORS: HOLLY BARKER, ELIZABETH CRUZ 1 H: Ekwe, moktata imaron ke jouj im kajitok etam? 2 E: Ellyn. 3 H: Ellyn. Im kwar lotak ilo iio jete? 4 E: [19]30. 5 H: Im kwar ritto lok ia? 6 E: Rongelap. 7 H: Ronelap. Im kwar ped ilo Rongelap nan iio jete? 8 E: Nan koj emakotkot tok nan enin. 9 H: Nan Mejatto. Im kwar ped ilo Rongelap ilo ien komelmel eo ke? 10 E: Aet. 11 H: Ewor ke jet men kwoj kememej jen ien eo mae kejro maron bwebwenato 12 kaki? 13 E: Jorren ko an enen? 14 H: Aet. 15 E: Aet. 16 H: Aet. Kwomaron ke komeieleik ta eo kwoj kememej jen ien eo? Jorren eo, 17 ak kwar ped ilo iio eo - baam eo ilo en eo, 54 eo. 18 E: larpedie. 19 H: Kwomaron ke bwebwenato kon men ko kwoj kememeji jen ien eo, raan in 20 baam Eo? 21 E: Aet. Ear kar wotlok paota im kemim kar kanooj en jorren. Naninmej en 22 malonlon im aolep kein. Elukun lap amim jorren. Ajirio ro rarjakilier, im 23 neer, im konwaer, tom kolan baraer, im aolep men kein. Tuanin ke - etan 24 men eo ekar jelet enen Iukun kenikon reolok ke eboklok men en. 25 H: Im naninmej ko ilo Rongelap, naat eo rar jino en walok? 26 E: Iio ko tokalik. Jen wot ien eo en woniiktok. 27 H: Jen raan eo wot? 28 E: (erumrum) 29 H: Komi kar emakot nan Kwajalein ilo wa eo, wan an Amedka? 255 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 256 30 E: Mmmm. 30 H: Kar Ion naninmej mokta jen an kar jerak nan Rongelap wa eo? 31 E: Kwo lo ke raan eo e boklok men eo, raelep en lok ewotlok poata eo im 32 naninmej ajiri, remalonlon ion wa eo tok. Remalonlon im lok to lok ion 33 Kwajalein, relukun...renaninmej. 34 H: Im ie eo kumi eo jen Amedka rej itaklok ilo Rongelap, elon ke melele rar 35 liwoj? 36 E: Aet. Ke rar to im lale dren ko im ni im retotok wot im reboktok kein 37 kakilkil ko er im drori ilo aibwoj ko, aibwoj jimen ko, ilo aibwoj jimen ko. 38 Im lukun kojela ke rejiban. Jibon eo ewalok wa eo im ektaki kim jen ijen. 39 H: Im rej ke ba komi etal nan ia? 40 E: Kwajalein, re ba. Jej emakotkot nan Kwajalein 41 H: Rej [ke] ba won eo? 42 E: Mmmm? 43 H: Rej ke ba wonin ami aikwoj en etal nan Kwajalein? 44 E: Ekwe, aet. Rej ba ejorren dren ko im aolep kein - kon paijin eo, kon baam 45 eo. 46 Im kemi lale - aolep jela - wonin aer kar kamakotkot kim. 47 H: Elon ke tokta rar etali armej? 48 E: Aet. Jen raan eo nan rainin. 49 H: Jen raan eo ilo Rngelap? 50 E: Ejjelok, ejjelok ien tokta. Kamakotkot lok wot kemim. 51 H: Komi kar ke jino en tokta ilo wa eo lok nan Kwajalein? 52 E: Kwajalein, inne. 53 H: Komi kar tokta ie, ke? 54 E: Wa eo, ke? 55 H: Aon, ilo wa eo. 56 E: Ekwe, rar jab. Men eo wot rar katutukeir, jopi im jop, jopi baraer im aolep 57 kein, rej ba rejelton. 58 H: Ak ien eo komi kar ped Kwjalein im tokta... 59 E: Ekwe. 60 H: ... kar elemen ami tokta? Rej ke liwoj uno? Rej ke etali armej? 61 E: Aet, etali armej. 62 H: Elemen? 63 E: Jej pija, im jej...ne kemim naninmej, re letok uno, rej toktaiki kij. Rar 64 jino wot toktaiki kij Kwajalein. 65 H: Elon ke peba en tokta rar lelok nan armej ne emoj aer tokta? 66 E: Ejanin kar wor. Aelon ko tokalik, inem re boktok kio. Bolen konke - kon 67 aer kar kakirir en toktaki armej. Taunin ke bwe renaninmej. Reped wot. 68 Aolep raan kemim tokta. Rej etali kij. 69 H: Im rej ke kamelele ta ko rej lewoj, ne uno, ak ne rej etali armej? Ewor ke 70 ri-ukok ak elon ke rej lewoj melele? 71 E: Elon. 72 H: Ri-ukok eo ekar ri-Majol ak ri-paelle? 73 E: Ri-Majol. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257 74 H Kwoj kememej ke etan ri-ukok eo? 75 E: Ke kemi ped Kwajalein, kwo lo ke kar leddik eo, juon leddik kar nurse e 76 Majuro. 77 H Tokalik komi kar rool jen Kwajalein lok nan Rongelap, ke? 78 E Kemim etal nan Majuro im jolok jet iio nae ie im kemim kar jokwe ie. 79 H Im rej bar etali armej ilo ien eo? 80 E Kemi wot tokta? 81 H Ak mokta jen ami emakot jen Majuro lok nan Rongelap, rej ba ta kon 82 pelaak eo pelaakemi? 83 E: Ke rar ba emman rool nan Rongelap. Emoj, kern rool. Ainwot kien eo 84 ekar kollaiki wonan. Leo, Tommy, eo ear ilikin peun kien eo. Tommy. 85 Ak ilo mool eo bwe kemim ri-Rongelap, jab kar jabdewot bwe elukun 86 jorren. Ij ba inena, ke? Relok kar etali raan ko tokalik, rej ba ejorren. Ak 87 kemim nok kio. 88 H Naat eo komi kar lomnak ejorren Rongelap? 89 E: Mmmm? 90 H Elikin komi kar rool nan Rongelap, kar naat eo komi kar jino en lomnak 91 bwe ejorren Rongelap? 92 E: Kemim kar jino ke jen jinoin kemim enjake kim make. Ak kien eo ej 93 karool kij, kemim rool. Nan rainin, ejjelok amim tomak Rongelap. 94 H Ta ko kar walok ilo Rongelap bwe komi en lomnak ejorren? 95 E: Ak ke nan rainin jejanin jibwe juon baru bwe rekike ad kan - mona. Men 96 eo kijon ri-en eo boj baru. lokwe, iokwe. Ak reba emman, ak kemim jab 97 tomak emman. 98 H: Elon ke naninmej rewalok ilo armej - ippen armej? 99 E: lo, elon kein en naninmej. Elukun Ion wot ippemim. 100 H: Ainwot ta? 101 E. Ainwot kejet rane ajiri ro relotak, relotak ke jet ainwot armej ak jet jej lali 102 jet rekamour kuraap, ekwe ta? Elukun oktak mour jen jeamaan. Aolep 103 men, ijaje kio. 104 H Ekar Ion ke naninmej ippam kar walok elikin ien eo? 105 E Ion. Tiroiteo. 106 H Im kwar ke tokta kon naninmej eo am? 107 E Jete alen in ao uwe, ekwe ruo. 108 H Ruo? 109 E Ruon. Ilo Cleveland. Kemi jab emwijwij ie. 110 H Rar mwijiti iok ia? 111 E Hawaii. 112 H Hawaii. Ruo kotton ilo Hawaii? 113 E (erumrum) 114 H Im kio, ejakolok am naninmej? 115 E Ekwe, ijaje (etton). 116 H Rejab ba? 117 E Rej ba emman lok. Rej ba emman. 118 H Ak ewi am lomnak? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 258 119 E: Ho ien eo aer kar mwijit burua bwe ij lomnak aer ke - ke ne ijaje, ilukun 120 jajealkio. Ak ikon bar al im ak kio ilukun jaje. Ri-elikin aer mwijit 121 burua. Ilukun ban al nan jidik. Ekwe, eban awanlonlok ainikio. Ej jab ke 122 jen jorren ko? Ak iar bar tumor, kwo jela ke? Jete alen imen wiik rar 123 jerami bara ilo Washington?! 124 Jilu wiik. 125 H: Rar bar mwijit iok, kon tumor eo? 126 E: Ekwe, iar jab mwijmwij. Rar jerame wot. 127 H: Im ejako ke kio? 128 E: Ekwe, inok bwe ijab - ijaje kon waween (etton) bwe ejab tokta na (etton). 129 Enaaj alikar. 130 H: Rej ke lewoj am peba en tokta jen trip ko ruo? 131 E: Ekwe, kio rej letok. Rej letok jen wot allon ko lok rej letok. Ak kon 132 jeamaan, rekon jab letok. Eped wot ippen DOE. Rej kab jinoin AEC ro - 133 AEC ro kim kein tokta ippeir etal, etal, etal e itok DOE ran. 134 H: Im tokta ro reped wot Majol rar bar toktaike iok ilo Amedka, ke? 135 E: Ij etal nan Amedka, ri-Amedka wot rej toktaike io. Tokta ran jekan. 136 H: Ak kwar ke kili tokta ro? Tokta ro, bwe rar bar ped Majol? 137 E: Ewor an ar itok ippen. Ke jeamaan, ekein itok Esraim. Kien ej boklok kij. 138 H: Ewi am lomnak kon waween an Amedka kar toktaik armej? Kwoj lomnak 139 ke rekonan kamour - rej ke lomnak kon ejmour an armej ak rej ke lomnak 140 en etali armej, ak ta? Ewi am lomnak kon lomnak ko er? 141 E: Ekwe, ijaje. Rej toktaiki kij. Jenaaj ba ta bwe ejjelok ke - jejaje waween 142 bwe ejjelok - kij jej jaje tokta kij. Jejaje ta eo rekomani nan kij. Re lo ta? 143 Ak re lok ba nan kij jej tokta jidik, reba emman. Akkij, jenok. B oj- 144 jejaje tokta. Jejaje lale anbwinin armej. Ejab ainwot er. Ke rej toktaiki 145 kij, jej tokta, ak jenok. Kio emman, kio rej ba emmanlok. Ke relok 146 toktaiki kij rej ba enanin ejjelok paijin ippad. Bwe ettan men ke rekonan 147 ba? Jejaje. Bwejelikjab jen men kein. 148 H: Jete nejim ajiri? 149 E: Jonouljilu. 150 H: Kar Ion ke nejim rar jorren ak... 151 E: Juon ear jorren. Earlotak im mij. Kwonbata? E - je lok lale -inne, 152 armej ak - e wot ekar lukun oktak. Jonan an boj kojak eo armej. 153 H: Bwe armej rot? 154 E: Elukun kanu neun im peun jonae irre ko (ej jonan kon peun). Jen ijo nan 155 ijo. Jonan irre ko. Ekwe, jej ba ta? Ejab paijin, ke? Ke jej kab ilolo. 156 Ekwe, ekar bar Ion ajiri ainwot rar bar wojaki. 157 H: Ekwe, ewi ajiri eo ekar lotak elikin ami kar rool nan Rongelap jen 158 Majuro? 159 Emaron jete iio im ami kar jokwe ilo Rongelap ilo ien eo elotak ajiri eo? 160 E: Elon. Elon iio. Akjet ran ajiri rerittolok jen e. 161 H: Kwar ke mona baru ilo ien eo? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259 162 E: Aet. Kwo lo ke juon konan? Rar ba ekar nana mona baru im lok tokalik 163 reba emman. Ukuk, kim mona. Lok tokalik rebar ba enana, juon im jab 164 bar jibwe juon baru. Bwe ta tokajein bwe emoj amim mona? 165 H: Jinoin tata, rej ba enana. Emoj, rej ukote im ba emman? 166 E: Inne, ien ko iio ko tokalik reba emman. 167 H: Im lamoj rej bar ukote im ba enana? 168 E: Enana. Kio, juon - nan rainin. Rejanin jibwe juon baru bwe enana. 169 Lukun nana. Ta tokajein bwe emoj ad mona? 170 H: Won ro jen Amedka rej liwoj melele kon ta ko komi maron en mona? 171 E: Na inot. Ijaje, ijaje. Ijaje won bwe ij Iok ilibok rej ba emman mona. 172 Emoj, kim mona. Im jenok ta, kien an Amedka ke ear ba ke emman ke - 173 jejaje. Jej mona. Lok tokalik reba enana. Emoj, kemim jab bar mona. 174 H: Ak mona ko jet, ainwot makmok im... 175 E: Makmok rej rekonkon bar mona. 176 H: Ewor ke jet men kwoj kememej, ak kwoj lomnak remaron aorok nan ad 177 bok melele kon wawen an Amedka kar lele Majol ilo ien eo? 178 E: Nan ta? 179 H: Jabdewot. Ne ewor jet men kwoj kememej, jet bwebwenato ak jabdewot 180 kwoj lomnak emaron aorok nan bwebwenato in. 181 E: Oh, kon Amedka, ke? 182 H: Iin. 183 E: Bwe en... men eo dreo. En lkun kwalok mool im jiban armej ro ilo Majol 184 bwe jemojno jen aolep men, jelikjab jen aolep men - jenok. Jejaje ta. Ak, 185 botab, jej kile ippad jen jorren ko ad, elap ad kile ak jemojno, jebani. 186 H: Kwoj lomnak nan kio rejanin kwalok mool eo? 187 E: Rej ba emman. Ak ke rej ba kio aolep en Majol in en paijin. Ejab ri-aelon 188 kein wot rar paijin ak ainwot rebok naninmej kane, tiroit im aolep kein. 189 Ak ke bar aelon ke jet elaplok an lonlok. Ekwe, eta? Ijokejenbain 190 aolep en Majol in epaijin. 191 H: Elemen an DOE etale armej ro raan kein? 192 E: Lukun koman aolep kein en tokta. Kwo lo ke ajiri ran neju, rej ba kij wot 193 jar paijin ak rainin kij - elonke aer paijin. Ejab bwe ren etale wot er 194 ainwot kij jar ped ilo jorren. Ne aolep en re nejad rejab. Rejab bok 195 kakilkil kejej komane. Ekwe, abajet? Elon ke ewor aer naninmej etal 196 ippen 177 [Health Care Program], Relelok er nan 177. Ak ne kij, na eo 197 ri-paij in reboke io. Ak ajiri ro neju relelok er nan 177 bwe ren Iali. Ak 198 rejab paijin kar an kij jineer im jemeer jar paijin? 199 H: Kwar ke koman am claim ippen Tribunal eo? 200 E: Aet. 201 H: Jete claim? 202 E: Konke men eo burua, mwijmwij ke. 203 H: Ak tumor eo? 204 E: Iar - men eo rejanin, rej ba ejanin wor claim kon tumor. Ainwot ejanin 205 alikar. Elon alen en ao etal ippen - kajitok ak rej ba... 206 H: Rejab kile naninmej eo? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260 207 E: Reba, reba rejanin konono kon tumor. Emoj iba etke jet rane rej kolla 208 ikijien rej ba tumro? Ekwe, reba: “Ekwe, ewor kein en tumor.” Rej ba 209 ewor kein. Jet rekar nan kolla, jet rejab. 210 H (pause) Kwoj kememej ke etan hospital eo ilo Washington? 211 E Inok li, Maryland? 212 H Bethesda? 213 E Ee? 214 H Bethesda? Ke, National Institute of Health, men eo rejba ke? 215 E Mmm. 216 H NIH. Elon ke bar ri-Majol rar etal ippam ilo ien eo? 217 E Kar juon tokta in im rar etal im iikit io im imake wot ilo hospital en ijen. 218 D Dr. Rikon ke? 219 E Jab. KarKeleb. 220 H Bar ri-Majol ke? 221 E Kar tokta eo. LoKeleb. 222 H Emour ke kio? 223 E Emij. Emoj elam drode io erro Conard. Tokta en. Leen an ri-naninmej an 224 DOE - AEC. Drode io im imake wot ilo Washington, im lok jet lok en jet 225 wiik e itok juon leddik nan ippa, etan in Ella. Enne, jibun Chutaro. Im 226 ped ippa. Lok en juon wiik e etal nan New York ippen juon lellap - lellap 227 ilo New York, Brookhaven. Im ped ippen bwe elukun nana an mour bwe 228 ej make wot ie im elukun mijak. Nurse ro rar etal im kedraake uno im 229 emokoko. 230 H: Kar ta naninmej eo an? 231 E Ekar bar mwijmwij buruon im kon an kar bar tonal im jaal. Ejjar to an 232 mour buruon im re drode nan ie. 233 H: Etke komro kar jab etal nan juon wot hospital? Kwe eo nan Bethesda, ak 234 e eo nan New York? 235 E Ekar nan tokta ran. Ij etal nan Washington. Iio eo rar jerame bara ie ilo 236 Washington. Ekwe, lellap eo elem mwijmwij iio Ohio inem bar itok nan 237 ijen. 238 H Jen Ohio lok nan New York? 239 E Inne, im kamomolok Brookhaven. 240 H Ruo jikin. Ak ear mwijmwij ia? 241 E Ilo Cleveland, Ohio. 242 H Ak ta kar wonin an aikwoj en etal nan New York ke emoj an mwijmwij ilo 243 Cleveland? 244 E Ke ijjo kemim etal im ped ie ilo hospital en ijen, an DOE ran. Jalem 245 kakije im ped ie, ped ie, ped ie ne ejejet ien ad mwijmwij je etal nan ie. 246 Inem bar rooltok nan jen im kamomo. 247 H: Kwar ke bar tokta ilo New York? Kwar ke ped ippen lellap eo? 248 E Aet. Kwo ran ke ruon alen en ao mwijmwij. Kein kajilu eo iar etal im rar 249 jerame bara. 250 H: Im leddik eo, Ella, im lellap eo, erro mour ke? 251 E Ee? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261 252 H: Erro...mour ke...? 253 E: Inne, rar mour inem etal im mij ilo [19]90 eo. 254 H: Im leddik eo ekar ped ilo Washington ippam? 255 E: Inen. Ippen leddik eo nejin ilo Ebeye. 256 H: Eped ia? 257 E: Ebeye. 258 H: Ebeye. Im etan ri-ukok ekar ped ippam ilo Amedka? 259 E: Mmm? 260 H: Etan ri-ukok eo ekar ped ippam ilo Amedka bwe en kameleleik iok kon 261 waween aer toktaike iok? 262 E: Ella wot. Ilo ie eo, Ezra eped wot. Im leddik eo ekar ped ippa ilo 263 Washington ejab nurse ak ekar jikul ilo California. Rar kar kappok ri-ped 264 ippa inem relok lo leddik eo. Lok lale, ej itok. 265 H: Ak leddik eo ejab tokta? 266 E: Ejab. E!:on jikul. 267 H: Ekar lap ke am entan ien eo? 268 E: Ien et? 269 H: Ien eo kwar ped ilo hospital? 270 E. Ejjab. Ijab enjake ke elon tumor ippa. Ak ke rar etale io im pijaike io wot 271 im etal. Kwo lo ke leo ekar bok eddo in AEC, Conard, ear ba nan na ewor 272 juon men ej eddek bara. Ear lukun ba nan na. Iar etal im bar pija ilo 273 Hawaii, im rar bar etale io inem ibar rool bwe e ba: “Rool im ped im lok 274 en jete eo iio, inaaj bar kur iok.” 275 H: Ejeun kileplok? 276 E. Ekwe, emoj lok en ta eo juon im ruo iio ke, juon iio ke, ekwe rekur io bwe 277 na en tok im etal. Etal wot im kaju nan New - men, Washington. 278 H: Rar lo tumor eo ien eo kwar ped Hawaii? 279 E: Inne, rar le ie. 280 H: Im karoole iok nan Rongelap? 281 E: Ebeye. 282 H: Ebeye. 283 E: Ien in ij ped Ebeye, joko. 284 H: Im ba nan iok im kottar? 285 E: Ba kottar bwe kemim naaj bar iwoj im (pause)... 286 H: Kwar kottarlok... 287 E: Kottar, kottar nan ejejet ien eo. 288 H: Iio? Elap lok jen juon iio? 289 E: Emaron juon iio. 290 H: Im Iamoj, rejilikinlok iok nan Washington? 291 E: lin. Leo eo ear boke io, Conard. Boke io Iok nan Washington. Im drore. 292 Ij make wot ie. 293 H: Kwe make? 294 E: Inne. Ij make tokta ak e - emman bwe ej call tok aolep jibbon. Jen ijen, 295 jen New York. Ijen ej ped ie. 296 H: Ak ta eo ej ba, ekar kilep, ke? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262 297 E: Ej ba men jininnin. E loe ak edrek. 298 H Ekar loe ilo Hawaii ak ej ba elukun drik. Ien eo kwar ped Washington, ej 299 ba ekar kilep Iok ke? 300 E: Ekwe, rejab ba. 301 H Rejab ba. 302 E: Ak eba dettan wot men jidik ke, kwo Io ke ilemej ke rekonan edek? 303 Ekwe, eba dettan wot ej kab edek. Ekwe, ij etal im rej jerame io, aolep 304 raan. Aolep jibbon. Ilok lale jonoul - ratimjuon awa. (ejemolok tape eo) 305 H Im aolep jibbon rej jeramaike iok? 306 E Aolep jibbon. 307 H Im kwar ke naninmej jen kain eo? 308 E Iarjab. 309 H Ekar ke turn koian baram? 310 E Ekwe, kio kwo lo ke ien eo rar jeramaike ijo (ekwalok ia eo ilo baran)? 311 Ear tumi. Ijo, kab ijo (ebar kwalok ia). Ijojo rane en io ijo andrein aer 312 jerbal. 313 H Kwar ke mijak? 314 E: Ekwe, iin. Taunin ke ij make wot? (etton) 315 H lin. 316 E: Mijak inem ejako bwe jenaaj et ejjelok ad maron, ak jej ped bujik. Ne rej 317 ba andeo, inane. Ak ij make wot, ejjelok ri-Majol ippa. Ejjelok tokta en 318 Majol ippa. 319 H: Ak tokta ro rej ke ba ta won en an walok naninmej ko am? Tiroit im kab 320 tumor eo? 321 E Ewor kon ao ba ke jen jorren eo inneo. Ne ewor tumor eo - men - tiroit 322 eo ej ba jen paijin. 323 H: Relukun ba nan kwe ke? 324 E Mmm. 325 H: Im elikin am rool jen Amedka nan Rongelap, Dr. Conard wot ekar etale 326 iok? 327 E E wot. E wot eo ekar itok nan ippad. Etal, etal, etal ej janije. Itok DOE. 328 DOE ran. Bwe AEC ro ren kein tokta lok. 329 H: Im ien eo rar mwijite buruom, rar ke bok aolep en tiroit eo am, ak jidik 330 wot? 331 E Na, ijaje. Ke jonan aer ebok. 332 H Rejab ba. Elon ke uno kwoj idaak? 333 E Ewor. 334 H Nan kio? 335 E Nan rainin. 336 H Ewor ke jet ien emaat uno eo? 337 E Ewor jet ien. Kwo Io ke kio ijanin - elok jete wiik en ao jab idaak? 338 H Bwe emaat ippam? 339 E (etton) Ijanin iten kappok makon. (etton) Ilukun kottarei ke? (etton) Ak 340 rej ba ien jab jolok juon raan, ak elok wiik en ao jab idaak. 341 H: Ta wonin am abwin idaak? (etton) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263 342 E: Lukun bwebwe. Ibwebwe bwe ej kakajor kij uno ke. Lok reba idaak, ijab 343 idaak. 344 H: Ewor ke am tokta ilo Amedka rej ba ekar ba nan kwe ke emman lok am 345 mour? 346 Ilo am lomnak, ilo am enjake, ekar emman lok ke? 347 E: Ekwe, ebwe lok ak botab ejjab. Ejjab jonane wot bwe jet ien ainwot jekije 348 lok. Enana ad mour. 349 H: Ekwe, emaron maat ao kajitok ne ejjelok jabdewot ippam, ak bar lomnak. 350 E: Ejjelok. 351 H: Ekwe, kommol wot. 352 E: (etton) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX II INTERVIEW WITH ELLYN (ENGLISH) INTERVIEWEE: ELLYN BOAZ (E) INTERVIEWER: HOLLY BARKER (H) LOCATION: MEJATTO, KWAJALEIN. MARSHALL ISLANDS. DATE: AUGUST 26, 1994 TRANCRIBERS: HOLLY BARKER, ELIZABETH CRUZ 1 H: Okay, first of all may I ask your name? 2 E: Ellyn. 3 H: Ellyn. And what year were you bom? 4 E: [19]30. 5 H: And where did you grow up? 6 E: Rongelap. 7 H: Rongelap. And until what year did you stay on Rongelap? 8 E: To the time we moved here to this island (Mejatto). 9 H: To Mejatto. And were you on Rongelap during the time of the [weapons] 10 tests? 11 E: Yes. 12 H: Are there things you remember from that time the two of us could discuss? 13 E: The damages to that island (Rongelap)? 14 H: Yes. 15 E: Yes. 16 H: Yes. Would you please explain what you remember from that time? The 17 damage - you were there during the year of - [from] the bomb in the year 18 of 1954. 19 E: I was there. 20 H: Would you please tell me about the things you remember from that day, 21 the day of the bomb? 22 E: Yes. Powder fell down and we were seriously hurt. Nausea and all kinds 23 of sicknesses. We were very seriously injured. The skin of the children 24 peeled, and their legs, and their necks, and their hair fell out, and all of 25 these things. Why not since - what is the name of that thing that covered 26 the island and all the trees and brush fell over after that thing exploded. 27 H: And the illnesses on Rongelap, when did they begin to appear? 28 E: In the years afterwards, from that time up to the present. 29 H: From that day? 30 E: (raises her eyebrows to signal “yes”) 264 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265 31 H All of you went to Kwajalein on the boat, on the American ship? 32 E Mmm. 33 H Were there any illnesses appearing before the ship sailed to Rongelap? 34 E You see on the day that thing exploded, that afternoon the powder fell and 35 the children were sick. They were nauseous on the boat trip coming here. 36 They were nauseous and when they got off in Kwajalein they were 37 really...they were sick. 38 H And when the group of Americans arrived at Rongelap, did they give you 39 and explanations? 40 E: Yes. When they disembarked they studied our water and the drinking 41 coconuts and they looked around and brought their instruments with them 42 to put inside the cement water catchments, the cement water catchments, 43 in the cement water catchments. They announced they were helping. The 44 next morning, a boat came and took us from there. 45 H And did they say where you were going? 46 E Kwajalein, they said. We were going to Kwajalein. 47 H Did they tell you the reason why? 48 E Mmm? 49 H Did they tell you the reason why you had to move to Kwajalein? 50 E Well, yes. They said the water and everything else were bad - from the 51 poison, from the bomb. And we all thought - everyone knew - the reason 52 that they moved us. 53 H Were there any doctors to examine people? 54 E Yes. From that day until today. 55 H From that day on Rongelap? 56 E Nothing, no time to see a doctor. Just move all of us. 57 H Did doctors begin to examine all of you on the boat to Kwajalein? 58 E Kwajalein, yes. 59 H You saw doctors there, didn’t you? 60 E On the boat? 61 H Yes, on the boat? 62 E Well, they didn’t. The only thing they did was to shower all of them, soap 63 them and soap, soap their heads and all kinds of things, they said they 64 were helping. 65 H: And the time when all of you were on Kwajalein to see doctors... 66 E Yeah. 68 H: ... what type of treatment, did they give you medicine, did they examine 69 people? 70 E Yes, they examined people. 71 H: How? 72 E We were x-rayed, and we... if we were sick, they gave us medicine, they 73 treated us. They began to treat us on Kwajalein. 74 H Did they give people medical records after they were treated? 75 E: They hadn’t started yet. In the months afterwards and now they bring 76 them. Maybe because - since they had to hurry to take care of people. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 266 77 Why not since they were sick, they stayed and everyday we saw a doctor. 78 They examined us. 79 H: And did they explain what they gave to you, if it was medicine, or if they 80 examined people? Was there a translator or anyone to explain to you? 81 E: There was. 82 H: Was the translator a Marshallese or American? 83 E: Marshallese. 84 H: Do you remember the name of the translator? 85 E. When we stayed at Kwajalein, do you know that girl, a girl who was a 86 nurse on Majuro. 87 H: Afterwards, you all returned to Rongelap from Kwajalein, right? 88 E: We all went to Majuro and we spent a few years there and we lived there. 89 H: And did they also examine people at that time? 90 E: We still saw a doctor. 91 H: But before you moved from Majuro over to Rongelap, what did they say 92 about your land? 93 E: Well they said it was alright to return to Rongelap. Therefore we went 94 back. The [U.S.] Government paid the expenses, that guy Tommy 95 [McCraw] took responsibility for the Government, Tommy. But the truth 96 is that we Rongelapese should not have done anything because we were 97 really suffering. Did I say what I am supposed to say? Later on they went 98 and examined it (the land) and they said it was contaminated, but we don’t 99 know now. 100 H: When did you begin to think Rongelap was contaminated? 101 E: Mmm? 102 H: After all of you returned to Rongelap, when did you start to think 103 Rongelap was contaminated? 104 E: We started thinking from the beginning, we felt it ourselves. But the 105 [U.S.] Government sent us back so we returned. Until today, we don’t 106 believe anything about Rongelap. 107 H: What happened on Rongelap to make you think Rongelap was 108 contaminated? 109 E: Weil still until today we cannot even take one (coconut) crab because they 110 don’t like for us to eat them. But that’s one of the staple foods of the III people of that island, crab. Too bad, too bad. But [now] they say it’s okay 112 [to eat the crab], but we don’t believe it’s okay. 113 H: Were there illnesses that people experienced? 114 E: Gee, there were lots of kinds of illnesses. There really were so many 115 [illnesses] we experienced. 116 H: Like what? 117 E: Like some children there when they were born, born and some were like 118 people but others when we examined them they gave birth to “grapes,” 119 well, what’s that? Life is so different now than it used to be. I don’t know 120 about anything anymore. 121 H: Did you experience any illnesses after that time? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267 122 E: Yes. The thyroid. 123 H: And did you see a doctor about your illness? 124 E: How many times did I travel (for medical care), well two. 125 H: Two? 126 E: Two. To Cleveland. We didn’t have surgery there. 127 H: Where did you have surgery? 128 E: Hawaii. 129 H: Hawaii. Two times in Hawaii? 130 E: (raises her eyebrows to signify “yes”) 131 H: And now, is your illness gone? 132 E: Well, I don’t know (laughs). 133 H: They didn’t say? 134 E: They say it’s better. They say it’s okay. 135 H: But what do you think? 136 E: At the time when they cut my throat I thought they - well I don’t know, I 137 really can’t sing anymore, but I want to sing again but now I can’t. I 138 really don’t know. After the people cut my throat. I really can’t sing at all 139 anymore. My voice won’t go high anymore. Is that not from the 140 contamination? And I also had a tumor, did you know that? How many 141 months and weeks they shocked my head in Washington! Three weeks. 142 H: Did they also give you surgery for the tumor? 143 E: Well, I didn’t have surgery. They only shocked med. 144 H: And is it gone know? 145 E: Well, I don’t know because I don’t - 1 don’t understand about these things 146 (laughs) because I’m not a doctor (laughs). It will be obvious. 147 H: Did they give you your medical records after your two trips? 148 E: Well, now they give them to me. They have given them to me only since 149 the past months do they give them to me. But back then, they didn’t used 150 to give them to me. It just stayed with DOE (Department of Energy). 151 They started with AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) when they were our 152 doctors, and after some time DOE began to come instead. 153 H: And the doctors that were in the Marshall Islands, did they also treat you 154 in the U.S.? 155 E: When I went to America, only American doctors used to treat me. Those 156 doctors over there. 157 H: But did you recognize the doctors? The doctors, were they the same as in 158 the Marshall Islands? 159 E: There was one that used to come to me. Along time ago. Esraim used to 160 come. The [U.S.] Government took us. 161 H: What do you think about how the medical care the United States 162 provided? Do you think they wanted to make you well - were they 163 concerned about the health of people, or were they concerned with 164 researching the people, or what? What do you think about what ideas they 165 had? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 268 166 E: Well, I don’t know. They examined us. What can we say because nothing 167 - we don’t know about doctoring, we don’t know what it is they did to us. 168 What they saw. But they would say to us when we saw a doctor, they said 169 all was fine. But us, we don’t know. Now it’s good, they say it’s better. 170 When they go to care for us they say there still isn’t and radiation with us. 171 because what is it that they say? We don’t know. Because it’s hard for us 172 to understand these kinds of things. 173 H: How many children do you have? 174 E: Thirteen. 175 H: Did you have any children with (medical) problems... 176 E: One was abnormal. It was bom and died. Do you know what? It - when 177 we looked - yes, it was a person but that one alone was really different. It 178 was a really funny kind of person. 179 H: What type of person was it? 180 E: It had really short legs and hands like this size (shows length with her 181 hands). From here to here. This was the size. Well, what do we say? 182 Because this we only now see these things. There were other children that 183 were the same. 184 H: Where are the children who were bom after you returned to Rongelap 185 from Majuro? About how many years did you live in Rongelap before 186 that child was bom? 187 E: Many. Many years. There are other children older than that one. 188 H: Did you used to eat (coconut) crabs back then? 189 E: Yes. Do you know something they did? They (U.S. representatives) said 190 it was bad to eat the crabs and later they said it was alright. Gross, we ate 191 them. And after that they said it was bad to eat them. Nobody should take 192 a single crab, but what’s the purpose of that if we already finished eating 193 [crabs]? 194 H: In the beginning they said it was bad, and then they changed [the policy] 195 and said it was alright [ to eat crab]? 196 E: Yes, in the years afterwards they said it was alright. 197 H: And then they changed [the policy] again and said it was bad? 198 E: It’s bad. Now, one - until today. They still don’t get crabs because 199 they’re no good. It’s so bad. What the purpose of this if we already ate 200 them? 201 H: Who from the United States gave you these explanations? (children 202 screaming) 203 E: What0 204 H: Who from the United States explained to you what you were allowed to 205 eat? 206 Who from the United States made these policies? 207 E: Me, I don’t know. I don’t know, I don’t know. I don’t know who because 208 I was surprised when they told us it was okay to eat them. After that, we 209 ate them. And we didn’t know what, the U.S. Government said it was safe Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 269 210 - we don’t know. We ate them. And after that they said it was bad to eat 211 them. After that, we didn’t eat them again. 212 H: How about the other foods, such as arrowroot... 213 E: Arrowroot, they also used to eat. 214 H: Are there things you remember, anything you think is important to explain 215 how the United States looked after the Marshall Islands at that time? 216 E: About what? 217 H: Anything. If there are any things you remember, any stories or anything 218 you remember that you think could be important to this discussion. 219 E: Oh, regarding America? 220 H: Yes. 221 E: Well.. the things I’ve said. [The United States should] really tell us the 222 truth and help the Marshallese people because we are really weak, 223 we’re powerless - we don’t know. We don’t know what. But, we see in 224 ourselves how we have suffered. We really recognize how weak we are 225 and there’s nothing we can do. 226 H: Do you think that until now they haven’t given you the truth? 227 E: They say all is well. But now they all of the Marshall Islands is 228 contaminated. It isn’t only the people of this island who were irradiated 229 since others experience these kinds of illnesses, thyroid and all types. 230 Other islands, experienced more and worse. Well, what’s this? What can 231 1 say when all of the Marshall Islands is contaminated. 232 H: How does DOE examine people nowadays? 233 E: [They] really provide all types of medical assistance. You see my 234 children, they tell us we are the only ones who were poisoned but these 235 days we - many are irradiated. It’s not only to examine them like those of 236 us who were here for the damage. In considering our children, they don’t. 237 They don't go for the same tests that I do. Well, why not? Some who 238 have illnesses go to 177 [Health Care Program], They hand them over to 239 177. But us, since I am one of the poisoned people they take me. But my 240 children, they turn them over to 177 for them to look after. But aren’t they 241 poisoned like us their mothers and fathers who were irradiated? 242 H: Have you filed a claim with the [Nuclear Claims] Tribunal? 243 E: Yes. 244 H: How many claims? 245 E: From the thing in my throat, the surgery. 246 H: And the tumor? 247 E: I - that’s the thing they haven’t yet, they said there still aren’t claims for 248 tumors. It still isn’t clear. Many times I have gone - ask questions but 249 they say... 250 H: They don’t compensate that sickness? 251 E: They say, they say they still haven’t considered tumors. So I asked why 252 some people get compensation for what they say are tumors? Well, they 253 said there are types of tumors. They say there are kinds. Some are 254 appropriate for compensation, some are not. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 270 255 H: Do you remember the name of the hospital in Washington? 256 E: I don’t know, Maryland? 257 H: Bethesda? 258 E: Huh? 259 H: Bethesda? Is it the National Institute of Health they referred to? 260 E: Mmm. 261 H: NIH. Were there other Marshallese who went with you for the same kind 262 [of treatment]? 263 E: There was a doctor and they went and put me all by myself in the hospital 264 there. 265 H: Dr. Riklon? 266 E: No. ItwasKeleb. 267 H: Was he also Marshallese? 268 E: He was a doctor. Keleb. 269 H: Is he alive now? 270 E: He died. Afterwards they put me there, he and [Dr.] Conard. The doctor 271 there. The guy who took care of the patients for DOE - AEC. They put 272 me there and I was by myself in Washington, and after some weeks a 273 young woman came to me, her name was Ella. Yes, the granddaughter of 274 Chutaro. And stayed with me. After a week, she went to New York with 275 an only woman - the old woman in New York, Brookhaven. And stayed 276 with her because she really was quite bad off because she was alone and 277 she was really afraid. The nurses tried to get her to take her medication. 278 but she didn’t want to. 279 H: What illness did she have? 280 E: She also had throat surgery and she also had diabetes and high blood 281 pressure. It took so long for her throat to heal, and they just left her there. 282 H: Why didn’t the two of you go to the same hospital? You were in 283 Bethesda, and she was in New York? 284 E: That what the doctors there wanted. I went to Washington. The year that 285 they shocked my head there in Washington. But the old woman had 286 surgery in Ohio and then she went there. 287 H: From Ohio to New York? 288 E: Yes, to recuperate at Brookhaven. 289 H: Two places. Where did she have her surgery? 290 E: In Cleveland, Ohio. 291 H: What was the reason she had to go to New York if she had surgery in 292 Cleveland? 293 E: Because that’s the place we went to stay in the hospital, it belongs to 294 DOE. We women used to rest and stay there, stay there, stay there until 295 the time was right for our surgery and we went there. After we would 296 return there and recuperate. 297 H: Did you also receive medical treatment in New York? Did you stay with 298 the old woman? 299 E: Yes. Did you hear that I had surgery twice. The third time I went they Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 271 300 shocked my head. 301 H: And the young girl, Ella, and the old woman, did the two of them live? 302 E: What? 303 H; Did they live after their treatment? 304 E: Yes, they lived but then died in [19]92. 305 H: And the girl who stayed in Washington with you? 306 E: She’s there. With her daughter in Ebeye. 307 H: Where is she? 308 E: Ebeye. 309 H: Ebeye. And what is the name of the translator who stayed with you in 310 America? 311 E: Huh? 312 H: What is the name of the translator who stayed with you in America to 313 explain to you the medical procedures to you? 314 E: Only Ella. At that time, Esra stayed behind. And the young woman 315 stayed with me in Washington. She wasn’t a nurse but she went to school 316 in California. They looked for someone to stay with me and they found 317 that young woman. When I looked up, she was there. 318 H: But the girl was not a doctor? 319 E: She wasn’t. She went to school. 320 H: Did you suffer much at that time? 321 E: What time? 321 H: The time you were in the hospital? 323 E: No, I couldn’t feel that I had a tumor. They examined me and took 324 pictures of me and left. You know the guy in charge of AEC, Conard, he 325 told me there was something growing in my head. He said this right to 326 me. I went to Hawaii for more pictures, and they examined me again and 327 then said I should go back because he said: “Go back and stay and after a 328 few years I will call you.” 329 H: It wasn’t big yet? 330 E: Well, after what was it one or two years, one year, right, well they called 331 me to go. I went straight to New - there, Washington. 332 H: They saw the tumor at the time you were in Hawaii? 333 E: Yes, they saw it there. 334 H: And sent you back to Rongelap? 335 E: Ebeye. 336 H: Ebeye. 337 E: At that time I stayed on Ebeye, over there. 338 H: And told you to wait? 339 E: They said to wait because we will come to you again and (pause)... 340 H: You waited... 341 E: Waited, waited to the timing was right. 342 H: Years? More than one year? 343 E: Maybe one year. 344 H: And afterwards, they sent you to Washington? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272 345 E. Yes. The one who took me, Conard. Took me to Washington. And left 346 me. I was by myself. 347 H: You alone? 348 E: Yes. I was the only one seeing a doctor but - it was okay because he 349 called every 350 morning. From there, from New York. There where he stayed. 351 H: What did he say, was it big? 352 E: He said it was a tiny thing. He saw it and it was growing. 353 H: He saw it in Hawaii and said it was really small. The time you were in 354 Washington, did he say it was bigger? 355 E: Well, they didn’t say. 356 H: They didn’t say. 357 E: But he said it was the size of small things, you know those moles that 358 grow? Well, they were just that size but beginning to grow. Well, I went 359 and they shocked me everyday. Every morning. It was 1 0 -9 o’clock. 360 (tape ends) 361 H: And every morning they shocked you? 362 E: Every morning. 363 H: And did that make you ill? 364 E: I wasn’t [sick]. 365 H: Did your hair fall out? 366 E: Well, now you see the time they shocked me? (shows the place on her 367 head) It fell out. Here, and here. That’s the way things work there. 368 H: Were you afraid? 369 E: Well, yes, why not since I was alone? (laughs) 370 H: Yes. 371 E: I was afraid and then it went away because what can we do when we are 372 powerless? We just stayed. If they said this is the way it is, that’s it. But 373 I was alone, no Marshallese with me. No Marshallese doctor with me. 374 H: Did the doctors say they reason why you experienced this illness? 375 Thyroid and the tumor? 376 E: Because I say it’s from the damage that’s the way it is. If there is a tumor 377 - thing - the thyroid he said was from the radiation. 378 H: They said that directly to you? 379 E. Mmm. 380 H: And after you returned from America to Rongelap, only Dr. Conard 381 examined you? 382 E: Only him. He was the only one who came to us. After a long time, he 383 was changed. DOE came. The DOE people. AEC used to provide our 384 medical care. 385 H: And the time they performed surgery on your throat, did they take all of 386 your thyroid, or just a small piece? 387 E: Me, I don’t know. How ever much they wanted to take. 388 H: What did they say? Do you take any medication? 389 E: Yes. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273 390 H: Still now? 391 E: Until today. 392 H: Are there times when you run out of medication? 393 E: There are some times. You know, now I haven’t - how many weeks since 394 I haven’t taken my medicine? 395 H: Because you’re all out? 396 E: (laughs) I haven't gone to get more, (laughs) I’m really playing with my 397 life, aren’t I? But they say not to skip one day, but it has been weeks since 398 I last took it. 399 H: Why are you reluctant to take it? 400 E: I’m tired of it. 401 H: You’re tired of taking it? (laughs) 402 E: Really crazy. I am crazy because medicine makes us stronger. They told 403 me to take it, I don’t take it. 404 H: Did your doctor in America tell you were getting better? Do you 405 think, do you feel you are better? 406 E: Well, it’s better but it’s not good. It’s not as it should because sometimes 407 it’s hard to breathe. Our health is not good. 408 H: Well, I guess I’m out of questions unless you have anything else, any 409 other thoughts. 410 E: None. 411 H: Well, thank you. 412 E: (laughs) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX in INTERVIEW WITH SEIKO (MARHSALLESE) INTERVIEWEE: SEIKO SHONIBER (S) INTERVIEWER: HOLLY BARKER (H) DATE, LOCATION: SEPTEMBER 1 ,1994, MAJURO TRANSCRIPTION: HOLLY BARKER, DAVID PAUL TRANSLATION: HOLLY BARKER, NEWTON LA JUAN 1 S: Kio, ta eo jenaaj ba? 2 H: Ekwe, moktata, jemaron ke kajitok etam? 3 S: Eta in Seiko Shoniber. 4 H: Im kwar lotak ilo iio jete? 5 S: Ilo nineteen forty-two. 6 H: Kwar rittolok ia? 7 S: Likiep. 8 H: Likiep. Im kwar ped ia ilo kamelmel eo? 9 S: Ilo kamelmel eo iped Likiep. 10 H. Ooh. Kwar ke ped ilo iio 1954 eo? 11 S: Aet, iped Likiep. 12 H: Ewor ke jet men kwoj kememej jen ien eo? 13 S: Elok jibbon elukun meram, ewor juon ainikien elukun kilep. Jej driwoj im 14 lale. Im jar lukun in mijak. Im jelok lale ilo, ilo, kwo lo ke tabalen dren 15 ko im rej ped likin mo ko mae jej jokwe ie, elon poata. Poata mouj. 16 H: Kom kwar ke lo an wotlok lal lok? 17 S: Ejab. Ijab lo an wotlok. Jelok lale keemoujilok in mo ko, akjejajeta 18 bwe jejaje kar baam men eo. Jejaje. Kim ear mijak bwe elukun lap 19 ainikien im lukun meram. Ak ejibbon, jibbon men eo. 20 H: Ekar wor ke poata ilo dren eo komi kar idaak? 21 S: Ekwe, ke jejaje ta eo, jej ke- jej lo poata mouj, ak - emaron bwe kim ej 22 ettaine nemennem dren jen e, kemij idaak ilo kajoliin. Ilo kajoliin ko - jen 23 ba likin mo ko rej tainke tok kajoliin ko. 24 H: Ak mokta jen baam eo, ekar ke Ion naan jen kumi eo an Amedka - jen kein 25 eo - bwe rar ke ba enaaj wor baam, kom naaj lo baam? 26 S: Ejjelok bwe jejaje taeo. Jejba: "Ta?!” Jejaje ke ewor baam rej jolokwe. 27 Ijaje ne armej ro ritto ne rejela, ak boj kim ajiri, kim jaje. Kimej bwilon 28 wot im kwor. 29 H: Ekar Ion ke ri-paelle rar etal nan Likiep elikin baam eo? 274 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275 30 S: Ijaje ne ekar wor ke, ak ijjab kememmej e. Ak ijjela ke ekonan wor balun 31 rej itok jen Kwajalein nan Likiep ak ijaje kon iio ko jet. Ijab lukun 32 kememmej. 33 H: Ak ekar Ion ke naninmej ekar walok ilo Likiep ilo iio ko tokalik? 34 S: Ijaje. Ijaje ak ne ewor armej rejela ke rej [ainikien juon kora]. Ijaje ne 35 ewor ak ikar ron ke ewor kora rej kolotak ak ekojak ajiri ro nejeir ilo ien 36 eo na ij ped ilo Likiep. Ak iar jab loi bwe rej ba - remij wot ak rej 37 kalibwen er. 38 H: Emaron jete iio - ejab aikwoj en jejet iio eo - jete iio elikin ien eo? 39 S: Ijaje, bwe.. . Ijaje, ibban ba. 40 H: Ta ko kwoj kememmej jen bwebwenato ko ikijien an kora ro kolotak? 41 S: Ijaje, ijaje ke rej itok jen baam im jejab jela. 42 H: Ewi waween ajiri ro rar walok, elemen? 43 S: Ekwe, ajiri ro ilok kar ron, rej ba ekojak baran. Im ien eo wot elotak emij 44 rej kalibwene. Rejab kwaloke nan armij. Ne ainwot Kiora eo, ij ron 45 elotak - im bar juon kora rej ba ainwot baran tepil, ajiri eo nejin. Na iar 46 jab loe bwe rej lotak wot rej noeji im kalibwener. 47 H: Kar ta armej rej ba ilo ien eo? 48 S: Jejaje bwe jej lukun ainwot - ejjelok, ejjelok ri-koman im jabdewot. 49 H: Jete nejim? 50 S: Jiljino. Ilo eliktata ij kolotak, rej kwalok kiraap ko im rej jolok jikin 51 ninnin eo ao. Ak kwo lo Dr. Will mae ear kalotak na ej, ej ba first time ej 52 deliver kain in naninmej eo, im ej boktok juon book kileplep im na ij lale 53 men ko ilowan lojeio. Im ejba: “Lojiem ebaam e look like ta?” Ainwot e 54 ba. Like, kwo lo ke men in bowling ko? Etan men ko? 55 H: Ijaje etan. 56 S: Mae rej - men in - mae men in rej boj okjak. Etan? Bowling ball? 57 Bowling ball. Ak ta kien? 58 H: Pin? (etton) 59 S: (etton) Ekwe, men ko. Ekwe men ko rej etoto im rej ainwot shape like 60 that. 61 H: Oohh. 62: S: Rej ped ilo book eo an. Im ej ba eben an naaj kareok wot bwe emaron 63 naaj Ion roots rej ped ilo wall ilo womb eo ao im renaaj koman cancer. Im 64 ej ba emman Iok ne ejolok aolepen. 65 H: Mokta jen am kar kalotak, ke? 66 S: Jab, rar jab loi, rejaje kar ta ko nan ien eo rej kalotak io. Jilu wot ao allon 67 ak reba jonan nae en kar drik lojeio im ijanin walok. Nae ej three months 68 kwojanin walok lojiad. Ej kab jidik wot. Ak ij ba three months im rejab 69 tomak na. Ak rej ba na bwebwe. Elukun kilep lojieo. Iban menono, ke? 70 Iban menono-jidik ao menono-inok menono bwe ebool lojieo. Ak 71 konke na ij bwil, they filled up tubs, eh? Kon water molo.Naijpedjen 72 jibbon nan jota ilowan tub en konke ilukun bwil! Lukun bwil wot im 73 bwil! Im aolep raan rej fill juon tub ijo bwe nae ejako an molo tub eo ij 74 etal nan tub eo juon. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 276 75 H: Kwoj ped wot ilowan hospital eo? 76 S: Jab. Jab, mo ko mweo imo. Eliktata eo konke na ij mona im kwo lo ke 77 iban menono. Ak na ij mumij - ak kwo lo ke saliva? Ejab bojorak an 78 torlokjen lonu. Im won en ao drelon. Konke etal im lukun mojno bwe 79 konke ijab mona konke ebool lojieo. 80 H: Kwar ketok jen Likiep? 81 S: Jab, kemim kar itok im iar ped wot enin (Majuro). 82 H: Emaron kar jete iio in am kar ped enin mokta jen am kar baroro? 83 S: Iar itok ilo nineteen-sixty im nineteen-seventy-two ij kalotak kon men ko. 84 Ke jilu wot ao allon ak kio elukun lap lojieo, emaron kar jilu ao tokta. Rej 85 itok im lale na im rej ba, rej ba, rej ba: “Elukun nine months.” Im na ij 86 ba: “Ejjab.” Dr. Kijino, Dr. Mita im Dr. Will - jilu ao tokta. Rej ba: 87 “Ebod, emeloklok jete an allon.” Imnaijba: “Naijjab!” Imrejba: “Jab, 88 nine months.” Im kio kwo lo ke ien eo mae rej ba renaaj jolok ajiri eo bwe 89 emij im ejjelok jabdewot ak nine months. Kio rej boktok juon I.V. im 90 joloke. Rar letoke im elukun - im na iar lukun bwil im lelok peu bwe ren 91 checke na im blood pressure bwe elukun jorren. Kio, Dr. Will ej - elikin 92 ej ba imok en ba jilu months ak ejab tomak na im ej ba elukun biromij. 93 Im kio ej ba: “Ekwe, Thursday kwoj karreo.” Ilok tak ilo jibbon eboktok 94 juon book kilelep in tokta, jibbon in Thursday eo. Ej ba ekar rool moj en 95 jerbal eo ilo jota en im lale ta kar naninmej eo ao bwe ej ba kar first time 96 ej deliver kind eo. Kio ej boktok book eo im kwo lo ke lukun lep kan mae 97 rej lep en Iojet jimjuon buki rej ped ilo kain eo. Kio re aikwoj en jolok 98 aolepen jikin nininin ne am bwe - Ej ba ren kar kareoke ak relukun ban 99 konke ne emoj roots ko ped ippa, it’s very hard to treat them im na inaaj 100 cancer. Im kio ijaje etke rar - re Io ta rej lo kij ilo ovary ko ao bwe ewor 101 ippa, ke? Im rej bar juloke. Im na ilukun - elukun - kio conem ne bwe 102 na ilukun lose weight im eighty pounds im na ilukun bones im skin 103 wot. Emaron kar four or five months before I gain my weight back. 104 ke... Ijaje ta. 105 H: Elon ke nejim rar lotak maan im ekar wor ke jorren ippeir? 106 S: Ejjelok ak ne kain - rittotata laddik eo kar jorren ippen. Bwe jilu leddik im 107 rittotata laddrik ej cleft pallet. 108 H: Cleft pallet. Ekar lotak ilo iio jete? 109 S: Ekar lotak ilo nineteen - edik jen leddik ro. Ekar lotak elik ilo nineteen 110 sixty-two. Ke elok bar Ion nejin, im laddik eo edik jen leddik ro jilu im 111 ear lotak elikin 1962, kio elok wor nejin rebar cleft pallet. 112 H: Ak ekar wor ke ilo baamle eo am ak ilo baamle eo an leo ippam? 113 S: Ejjelok, laddik eo neju wot im ajiri eo jibu. 114 H: Jete jibum ajiri ej kain eo? 115 S: Juon wot, laddik eo neju kab laddik eo nejin. Rittotata nejin ej kain eo. 116 Aolepero. Ak juon wot laddik neju ej cleft pallet. 117 H: Im kwoj koman am claim ilo Tribunal eo? 118 S: Rej ba ejjab ekkar bwe ijjab ped ilo listing in naninmej ko. 119 H: Im kwo ban claim, rej ba? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277 120 S: Rej ba jejab claim. 121 H: Ak kwoj ba ekar Ion am cyst, kwoj ke kolla nan kien eo? 122 S: Rej ba ejjab. Jelok lale ilo report eo rej ba elon cyst, ke. Ekwe, rej ba 123 ejab. 124 H: Rejab kijor en kolla. 125 S: Wonin ao kar etal Tony (DeBrum) ekar ba nan na jeamaan, ej ba: “Seiko, 126 kwojab kane am peba bwe kwar kalotak kiraap?” Im kio na ij etal. Ekar 127 juon ao leta jen Tribunal, ej ba ejjab - naninmej eo ejab ped ilo claim - 128 naninmej in claim ko. Ekwe, na ij bojorak. 129 H: Im tokta ro rar lale iok ilo hospital eo ewor ke melele rej lewoj? Rej ke ba 130 ta won in an walok kain naninmej eo ippam? 131 S: Rejjab. 132 H: Ewor ke am lomnak kon ta - kon ta won eo? 133 S: Ijaje, ijab jela. Ak na ij ba jet ien - konke armej ro rej ba konke armij in 134 Rongelap elon rej kalotak kiraap. Ak er wot ejjelok kar alikar jeamaan - 135 er wot ekar lap aer baam ke, ri-Rongelap? Ak ij ba taunin ij kalotak kiraap 136 ainwot ri-Rongelap? ... (jebanron). 137 H: Ewor ke jabdewot kwoj kememej jen Likiep ak jen am kar naninmej im 138 kwoj lomnak emaron naaj aorok naan - emaat ke? 139 S: Ijaje. Ijela wot kon ajiri ro mae rar lotak jeamaan. Mae rar kamijak. Kon 140 ajiri eo ekojak baran. Im kio jejab loi bwe rej karir im kalibweni. 141 H: Ekwe, kommol wot. 142 S: Ebar wor juon leddik ear kalotak mokta jen na, emaron - emaron jet allon 143 ke kio mokta jen na. Ippen Masao Heine (?). Ear bar kalotak eja kein eo 144 iar kalotake bwe iar, iar jeramaan ak e, ear jerata bwe emij. Ebool rej 145 bwebwenato nan na. Rej ba: “Kwolukun jeramaan bwe kwoj jab-” 146 Emman bwe elon tokta in paelle ippa. Im elon kamodmod eo ao bwe en 147 komane - ak e, ejjelok, reban drebwoj an tor lok. 148 H: Kora eo ej jen ia? 149 S: Ij ba wot ej - inok - elon ien rej jen Ailuk ak Wotho, ak kora eo kar jen 150 enin. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX IV INTERVIEW WITH SEIKO (ENGLISH) INTERVIEWEE: SEIKO SHONIBER (S) INTERVIEWER: HOLLY BARKER (H) DATE, LOCATION: SEPTEMBER 1, 1994, MAJURO TRANSCRIPTION: HOLLY BARKER TRANSLATION: NEWTON LAJUAN, HOLLY BARKER I S: Now, what are we supposed to say? 2 H: Well, first of all, may I ask your name? j** S: My name is Seiko Shoniber. 4 H: And what year were you bom in? 5 S: In 1942. 6 H: Where did you grow up? 7 S: Likiep. 8 H: Likiep. And where were you during the testing period? 9 S: During the testing period I was on Likiep. 10 H: Ooh. Were you there in 1954? 11 S: Yes, I was on Likiep. 12 H: Are there any things that you remember from that time? 13 S: During that morning it was really bright, there was a really loud sound. 14 We went outside to see. And we were really afraid. And when we looked 15 at, at, you know those water tables that are behind the houses where we 16 live, there was powder. White powder. 17 H: Did you see it fall to the ground? 18 S: No. I didn’t see it fall. When we looked, it was white behind the houses. 19 but we didn’t know what it was because we didn’t know that thing was a 20 bomb. We didn’t know. We were terrified of the extremely loud sound 21 and bright light. But it was morning. 22 H: Was there powder in the water that you drank? 23 S: Well, we didn’t know what it was, we - we saw white powder, but - 24 maybe since we filled our drinking water from there, we drank from the 25 tanks. In the tanks - behind the houses they filled the water from the 26 tanks. 27 H: Before the (1954) bomb, was there any announcement from the Americans 28 - from the [U.S.] Government - did they announce there would be a bomb, 29 or that you would see a bomb? 278 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279 30 S: Nothing because we didn’t know what it was. We said: “What?!” We 31 didn’t know they were dropping a bomb. I don’t know if any of the older 32 people knew, but us kids, we didn’t know. We were really surprised and 33 startled. 34 H: Did any Americans go to Likiep after the bomb? 35 S: I don’t know if there were and I don’t remember. But I know that there 36 were airplanes from Kwajalein to Likiep, but I don’t know about the other 37 years. I don’t really remember. 38 H: Were there any illnesses that appeared in Likiep in subsequent years? 39 S: I don't know. I don’t know if there are other people who know [voice of a 40 woman passing by], I don’t know if there were, but I hear there was are 41 women who give birth to strange children during the time I was on Likiep. 42 But I didn’t see them because they say - they die and they bury them 43 quickly. 44 H: About what year - it doesn’t have to be precise - how many years 45 afterwards [did this occur]? 46 S: I don’t know, because...! don’t know, I can’t say. 47 H: What do you remember from the stories about women giving birth? 48 S: 1 don’t know, I don’t know because they come from the bomb and we 49 don’t know. 50 H: What were the children who were bom like? 51 S: Well, the children I heard about they said their heads were strange. And 52 just after being bom it died [and] they buried it. They didn’t show it to 53 people. Like Kiora, I heard it was bom - and one other woman they say 54 [it was] like the head of the devil, the child of hers. Me, I didn’t see it was 55 bom and they quickly hid them and buried them. 56 H: What did people say at the time? 57 S: We didn’t know because we were really like - nothing, nobody could do 58 anything at all. 59 H: How many children to do have? 60 S: Six. The last time I gave birth they produced grapes and they gave me a 61 hysterectomy. And you know Dr. Will who did my delivery, he, he said it 62 was the first time he delivered that kind of illness, and he brought me a 63 really big book and I saw the things inside my stomach. And he said: 64 “Your stomach is bombed (irradiated) and it looks like what?” That’s 65 what he said. Like, you know those things for bowling? What are those 66 things called? 67 H: I don’t know the name. 68 S: Those things that - those things that fall down? What’s the name? 69 Bowling ball? Bowling ball. Or what are they? 70 H: Pin? (laughs) 71 S: (laughs) Yeah, those things. Well those things they were hanging [inside 72 my uterus] and they were shaped like that. 73 H: Oohh. 74 S: They are in the book of his. And he said it would be difficult for him to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 280 75 clean everything out because their might be roots that are on the wall of 76 my womb and they will cause cancer. And he said it’s better if he takes 77 everything out. 78 H: Before you gave birth? 79 S: No, they didn’t see them, they didn’t know what was happening until they 80 helped me give birth. I was only three months [pregnant] but they said I 8 1 was nine months because my stomach was so large. But I was three 82 months and they wouldn’t pay attention to me because it was really - at 83 that time [3 months] - at that time my stomach should have been small 84 and not yet showing. If it’s three months, our stomachs don’t show yet. 85 It’s still small. But I said three months and they didn’t believe me. But 86 they said I was crazy. My stomach was really big. I couldn’t breathe, 87 right? 1 couldn’t breathe - 1 could barely breathe - 1 couldn’t breathe 88 because my stomach was so full. And because I was hot, they filled up 89 tubs, eh? With cold water. And I stayed from the morning to the evening 90 inside the tub because I was so hot! And every day they filled a tub next 91 to me so if it was no longer cold I would go to the next tub. 92 H: Were you staying at the hospital? 93 S: No. No, at my house. At the end because I ate and you know I couldn’t 94 breathe. And I vomited - but you know the saliva? It never stopped 95 flowing from my mouth. And that’s the reason 1 was admitted. Because 96 after awhile I was extremely weak because I didn’t eat since my stomach 97 was so full. 98 H: Did you fly in from Likiep? 99 S: No, we had come in and I was staying on this island (Majuro). 100 H: About how many years had you been on this island before you got 101 pregnant? 102 S: I came in 1960 and in 1972 I gave birth to those things. I was only three 103 months but my stomach was so big, I had maybe three doctors. They came 104 to see me and they said, they said, they said: “it ’s really nine months." 105 And I said: ‘“It’s not." Dr. Kijino, Dr. Mita, and Dr. Will - 1 had three 106 doctors. They said: “She’s wrong, she forgets how many months she is." 107 And I said: “No I didn’t!” And they said: “No, nine months.” And you 108 know the time they said they would take the child out because it died and 109 there was nothing else to do at nine months. Then they brought me an I. V. 110 and took it out. They gave it to me and it was really - and 1 was so hot 111 and I gave them my arm to check my blood pressure that was so bad. 112 Then, Dr. Will - afterwards he said I had kept saying three months but he 113 didn’t believe me and he said he felt so sad. And then he said: “Ok, on 114 Thursday you’ll be cleaned out.” When I went that morning he brought 115 me a big book and you know they were really like balls like those seaweed 116 bunches with seven-hundred of that kind. Then they really had to give me 117 a hysterectomy because - He said they would clean it but they really could 118 not because once the roots were inside me, it’s very hard to treat them and 119 I would get cancer. And I don’t know why they - what did they see, did I Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 281 120 have an infection in my ovaries or what? And they took it all out. And I 121 was really - 1 was quite - then the concern was that I really lost weight 122 and I was eighty pounds and I was really only bones and skin. It was 123 maybe four or five months before I gained my weight back... I don’t know 124 what. 125 H: Did you have any children before that that had any problems? 126 S: None but if it’s the kind - the oldest boy had a problem. Because there are 127 three girls and the oldest boy has a cleft pallet. 128 H: Cleft pallet. What year was he bom in? 129 S: He was bom in nineteen - he’s younger than the girls. He was bom after 130 wards in 1962. And when he went to have children, and the boy who is 131 younger than the three girls was bom afterwards in 1962, then when he 132 had kids they also the cleft pallet. 133 H: And did you have that in your family or your husband’s family? 134 S: None, only my son and my grandchild. 135 H: How many of your grandchildren have that? 136 S: Only one, my son and his son. His oldest child has that kind. Both of 137 them. But only one of my boys has a cleft pallet. 138 H: And did you submit a claim to the [Nuclear Claims] Tribunal? 139 S: They said it wasn’t right because I wasn’t on their list of illnesses. 140 H: And you’re not eligible for a claim they said? 141 S: They said we couldn’t claim. 142 H: But you said you had cysts, could you be compensated for that type? 143 S: They said it couldn’t. When we look at the [medical] report they say there 144 are cysts, right. Well, they said no. 145 H: They don’t compensate. 146 S: The reason I went is because Tony [DeBrum] said to me a long time ago. 147 he said: “Seiko, why don’t you fill out your forms because you gave birth 148 to grapes.’’ And then I went. I had a letter from the Tribunal, it said it did 149 not - my illness can’t be claimed - from the illnesses that are claimed. 150 Well, I stopped [pursuing it]. 151 H: And the doctors who looked after you in the hospital, did they explain 152 anything to you? Did they say why you experienced that type of illness? 153 S: They didn’t. 154 H: Do you have any thought about why - about what the reason was? 155 S: I don’t know, I don’t know. But sometimes I say - because people say 156 that since the people of Rongelap give birth to grapes. But there was no 157 question about them from way back - they were the only ones who got a 158 lot of radiation, right, the Rongelapese. But I say why did I give birth to 159 grapes like the people of Rongelap?... (inaudible) 160 H: Is there anything else you remember from Rongelap or your illness that 161 you think might be important for - is there anything else? 162 S: I don’t know. I only know about the children bom a long time ago. The 163 ones that were scary. About the child with a strange head. And then we 164 didn’t see them because they hurried to bury them. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 282 165 H: Well, thank you. 166 S: There was also another girl who gave birth before me, maybe - maybe a 167 months before me. Married to Masao Heine (?). She also gave birth to 168 the same kind I gave birth to because I, I was lucky but she, she was 169 unfortunate because she died. Many have told me about it. They say: 170 “You are really fortunate because you didn’t - “ It was good because I 171 an American doctor. And I had people who could do things for me - but 172 her, nobody, they couldn’t stop her bleeding. 173 H: Where was the woman from? 174 S: I thing she was - 1 don’t know - many times they are from Ailuk or 175 Wotho, but this woman was from this island. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX V INTERVIEW WITH KIORA AND KAJITOK (MARSHALLESE) INTERVIEWER: HOLLY BARKER (H) INTERVIEWEES: KIORA (Ki) AND KAJITOK (Ka) LOKEIJAK DATE, LOCATION: AUGUST 14, 1994, LIKIEP ATOLL TRANSCRIPTION: HOLLY BARKER, TAMAR MYAZOE 1 H: Moktata, imaron ke kajitok etamiro bwe en ped ilo casette? 2 Ka: Na Kajitok Lokeijak. 3 Ki: Kiora Lokeijak. 4 H: Komiro kar rittolok ia? 5 Ka: Ho Likiep. 6 H: Ilo ene ta eo? 7 Ka: Ilo Melan, Likiep. 8 H: Komiro kar ped ia ilo ien kamelmel ko? 9 Ki & Ka: Ilo Likiep. 10 H: Komiro kar jimor ped ilo enen? 11 Ka: Mmm. 12 H: Komiro kememej ke jet men ilo raan eo ar wotlok baam kileplep eo ilo kar 13 iio lemnoulemen eo? 14 Ka: Inne. Komro ej koba ippen dron ilo ien eo. Ien eo ewotlok baam eo elikin 15 enaninmej kon ajiri. Eped ilo, kutom lok retoon lok tak ajiri eo, ewor ruo 16 baran ajiri eo. 17 Ki: Ejorren. 18 H: Ruo bar ke? 19 Ka: Ruo bar. Einwot ruo bar. Juon eped ilun kab baran. Ijo (ejibwe baran 20 bwe en kwalok ia) e walonlok im ainwot jidik wot, ewor jidik men ijo 21 (ejibwe baran) im bar eo eped ijo (ebar jibwe baran). 22 Ki: Ainwot e opene baran. Ewor bar ilik. 23 Ka: Ewor juon bar eo edik jen bar eo, ainwot ruo, ejab bar men eo ak ainwot 24 baran armej. Ear jab mour ajiri eo. Lotak inem mij. 25 H: Ien eo elotak wot e mij? 26 Ki: Jidik wot ien. 27 Ka: Emenono jidik wot ien ke ej lotak. Emaron wot, ejab awa, jet wot minute. 28 Ainwot an kar mour, ejab kanooj eman. Ke emoj an lotak im walok ajiri 29 eo, jen torre eo ainwot ejab momaan in wot, ainwot ej loi ke elon kein 30 naninmej ewalok. 283 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 284 31 H: Ejab naninmej in bar wot ak aolepen anbwinin ke? 32 Ka: Aolepen anbwinin. Aolepen, inne ijo (ekwalok aolepen anbwinin). Aolepen anbwinin lal lok kab lojien. Ilo torre eo mae - ainwot ar - elap 34 wot an etal - mujin ej tor wot kon botoktok. Komro etal nan Majuro en 35 tokta. Etto, etto an tokta, idaak uno, rekar letok uno. Ijaje ta won in an 36 tom baran, tom lok baran, kol. 37 H: Kolen baram? 38 Ki: Hmmm? 39 Ka: Ak uno ej kakure ke ak naninmej eo an ke. Komro ejab meiele. 40 H: Emaron kar jete allon elikin an kar wotlok baam eo? Edik jen juon iio? 41 Ka: Edik. Inne, edik. 42 H: Allon wot ke? 43 Ka: Inne, allon wot. 44 H: Ekar lab lojiem ien eo ke? 45 Ki. Inne, ikar naninmej im etal im rumoj wot an wotlok men eo... im tor wot. 46 H: Kwar naninmej wot? 47 Ka: Ekwe, kio, ainwot men eo komro kar kanooj etale ippen takto ro im 48 kanooj etale kon kilen nanimej eo erelok ajiri eo kon jorren eo an. Juon, 49 ekar itok juon kein naninmej. Ainwot juon bar ilon kab bar eo e opene. 50 Ki: Ebotak. 51 H: Ebotak? 52 Ki Inne, ainwot e opene ijo (ejibwe dreman) im bar ijo (ejibwe tulon en 53 baran). Ainwot eopene. 54 H: Komiro kar ba ke nan takto ro ilo Majuro ikijien ajiri eo? 55 Ka: Inne, emoj ao ba lok. Ke mojj in an walok ajiri eo im mij, lio ej bok mij 56 eo. 57 H: Im ta ko takto ro rej ba nan komiro kin men eo? 58 Ka: Ejjelok jabrewot men rej ba ak rej letok wot uno. 59 H: Rej ke kamelele ta won in an lap am tor ilo ien eo? 60 Ki: Rejab ak re letok uno. Rejab ba ak re letok uno wot, uno in idaak. Kwo 61 Io, jen moj en an mij ajiri eo im kien ij bar atin naninmej ke, ainwot rejab 62 mannon, mij lok, mij Iok wot. 63 H: Ooh, ejab ajiri eo wot... 64 Ki Mmm. Im elikin an watok wot, ainwot jorren wot. 65 H: Ekar Ion nejimiro mokta jen ien kamelmel eo? 66 Ki: Aet! 67 H: Elon ke? 68 Ki: Elon lok im ajiri eo elik, e lok kar Ion jorren ippen im mij lok bar 69 naninmij ejjab emman. Mij wot, mij wot. 70 Ka: Ewor bar juon ajiri ekar bar nanimej im bar make... 71 Ki: Wotlok... 72 Ka: Ejjab jejet an allon. 73 H: Im kar jete nejimiro mokta jen ien eo im rar lotak im emman iar mour? 74 Ka: Kajo mok... Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 285 75 Ki: Jonoul... ak armej ro jet relokwatok.. .juon, ruo, jilu ejako. Armej ro elik 76 jen... 77 H: Jete aolep iaer rar jako? 78 Ka & Ki: Jonoul aolep. 79 H: Jonoul remour? 80 Ka & Ki: Remour. 81 H: Im jete rar jako? 82 Ka & Ki: Jilu, emen... emen. 83 H: Emen? 84 Ka: Emen. Elikin jonoul kio ewalok ajiri eo mae ewor ruo baran, im bar jilu. 85 Ejjab jejet an allon ak ebar jorren. Relok walok ainwot armij. 86 H: Ainwot armij? 87 Ki: Ainwot armij. Ewor peiar, ainwot ewor armij ie. Jet ko kein ak men...ei- 88 io in armij. Einwot armij, ak rejorren. 89 H: Im elon ke takto rar iwoj im etale er ilo ien eo? 90 Ka & Ki: Ejjelok. Ejjelok. 91 Ki: Eliktata... 92 Ka. Ke komro ej etal nan Majuro, takto ro I-Majol... 93 Ki: Ajiri eo ekar lab lojei kake... emen, jilu ao allon im I tor im keen inaan 94 jibarok takto ilo jab jemlok ao etol... I etal nan takto. Keen reletok wot 95 uno. Rar ton etale im rej ba idaak uno. Reletok uno im rej ba ne ejjab 96 jako ao etor wot ke, kio inaaj mwijmwij. Epellok book in takto eo ilo 97 hospital ne ejjab bako ao etal wot. A-ko ewatok uno ko im bojrak, nan 98 kien ejjelok...emman, ejemolok ao naninmij, mejin allon. 99 H: Ta ko komiro kar lomnak ke ilo ien eo ke armij ro rej walok ak rejab 100 mour? 101 Ki: Ijbapaijin. Ilo lomnak eo amiro, komro ej ba jorren in paijin bwe konke 102 ajiri eo elik mae ekar mij, juon eo kein im ejorren. 103 H: Im etake komro kar lomnak kon paij in? 104 Ki: Konke paijin eo ekar itok... 105 Ka: Ien eo mae armij ej itok im etale paijin. Kio komro ej kalmenlok ijen im 106 ba: “Ooh, kon jorren in paijin...” 107 Ki: Ak komro ejjab kanooj jela, komro ej likiti wot Io lomnak ak lok itok takto 108 in paijinro im etale jorren, ekwe komro kar lelok aolep nan takto ro. 109 H: Elemen aer kar etale jorren eo? Rej lale ta, armij ak pelak eo pelaakami ak 110 ta? 111 Ki: Rej lale bwidij, momkaj rar ba paijin, lok ien ko tokaiik ekar bar itok ri- 112 etale im re ba ejjab paijin. 113 H: Rej ba ejjab paijin? 114 Ki: Ejjab paijin aelon in. Kar mokta wot rar boktok kein lale ko im men ko rej 115 kwalok ke ewor paijin. Im lot tokaiik ilo etale ko tokaiik re ba ejjelok. 116 Ka: Na ijab melele ta wawen aer kar itok im etale im boki naninmej ko ke 117 ejjelok jabdewot men re ba nan... 118 Ki: Kwo lo ekar wor, re kar ba e boj, emoj ekar walok boboj ak reletok uno. 119 H: Buruam, ke? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 286 120 Ki: Inne. Ri-etale re rekar ba enaaj kar walok boboj ijo (ejibwe buruan). 121 H: Ak ekar ke walok? 122 Ki: Ejjab.. .re letok uno ko. 123 H: Jolok bwod bwe ijab lukun melele, ak rej lewoj uno bwe en bobrae jen 124 men eo ak emoj aer loe? 125 Ki: Loi ke emoj, emoj aer loi ke... 126 Ka: Emoj aer loi boboj ijo (ejibwe buruan)... 127 Ki: Paijin eo, paijin eo. 128 Ka: Emoj an ijino paijin eo im emoj letok uno. Wonin ao lukun melele ke 129 eboj, na wot ian ro im rar jibwe buruaer. Kio rej lale maejan dron, takto ro 130 rej check im re jujen wot je etta. Ijjab melele ta wonin aer je etta im 131 jabdewot, ejjelok melele rekar letok ak men eo rej ba eo ke ki-janro rej 132 konono ippen dron im leo ejibwe ijo (ejibwe buruan) im ba ewor juon eboj 133 ijen ear jibwe. 134 H: Emaron naat eo rar loe? 135 Ki Jemeloklok naat... 136 Ka: Ien eo mae ekkar itok armej in check... 137 Ki Ri-etale paijin eo...momkaj jinoin tata ke... 138 Ka: Ij lomnak elemen ami naaj melele ke kumim jela jen ien nan ien. 139 H: Ak rej ke ba kwo aikwoj en takto ak rej ba ebwe wot idaak uno? 140 Ka: Ij lomnak rejjab ba aiwoj takto ak reletok wot uno im ejjelok jabdewot. 141 H: Im elikin aer jino lewoj uno, rar ke bar rool woj im etale iok? 142 Ka: Eteke rar jab bar itok? 143 Ki: Jab. 144 Ka: Inok. Ainwot ijab lukun.. ak ij loi wot wawen aer kar jerbal a rein. 145 Ejjelok jabdewot... 146 Ki: Kio ejjab moman an - ne ej ton kikin. elukun nana anbwinin, emetak. 147 Aolepen anbwinin ej metak, ejab moman an mour. 148 H: Im ilo ien eo rej kwalok nan kwe im ba ewor eboj ippam, elemen aer kar 149 kameleleik iok? Ewor ke juon ri-ukok ej ukot nan kajin Majol ak ta? 150 Ka: Ejjelok ej ukok. 151 H: Ejjelok? 152 Ka: Ejjelok. Ewor emen ri-paelle rekkar itok im rej jiban, rej konono ippen 153 dron im ijjab jela bwe iar jaje ainikier. Emoj edre ko men ke emoj aer 154 letok uno, im emoj ao kajerbal uno ko. 155 H: Im kar elemen am kar melele ke kwo naninmej ak elemen am kar jela jete 156 wod in uno kwon kar idaak ak.. rar ke jela kajin Majol? 157 Ka: Won? 158 H: Takto... 159 Ka: Ainwot rejjab jela kajin Majol? 160 H: Ak kwo jela ke kajin Paelle? 161 Ka: Ijjab kanooj jela. Ak ejjelok armej ej ukot ainikien... 162 Ki: Ladrik eo nejin Ajidrik wot. Etan ladrik eo? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287 163 Ka: Bolen ekkar wor ak imeloklok won eo bwe ejjelok melele rekar letok nan 164 na. len eo wot rej letok emen, jiljino uno bwe en kajerbali. Juon alen ilo, 165 komani ilo juon raan ij komani juon uno. Boke juon uno ilo juon raan, 166 emen uno ko rar litok. 167 Ka: Emman ke am ran ao konono? 168 H: Inne, imelele. Elukun alikar amiro kamelele. 169 Ka: Ekwe, kio ej jonan eo in komro ekkar tobare ilo ien ko. Aolep... 170 Ki Kio jemeloklok naat... 171 Ki: Ak - ooh, jejela wot ke ekkar wor jorren ekar walok nan ajiri eo kab 172 komro. 173 H: Ekwe ejjab aorok iio eo jen amiro melele kon men ko. Ak ilo ien eo ekar 174 rup baam eo ilo ien kamelmel eo, kar ta ko komro kememej jen lukun raan 175 eo ekar rup? Ainwot rej ba ekar juon raan in March ilo lemnoulemen eo. 176 Ka & Ki: Emaron. 177 Ki: Emaron lemnoulemen eo. 178 H: Ikijien ien ekar rup baam kileplep eo, kajitok ne komro kememej ke ne 179 komiro kar rool im bwebwenator kon raan eo im ta ko komro kar loi im... 180 Ki: Ien eo ekar bokolok, jonan an kar ebokolok nae ijo. Jelok ran, ewotlok 181 nae ilik turin mon jikul en, jonan an kar epaak an bokolok. Aolep armej 182 im kar iruj. 183 Ka: Ta eo mae komro ej enjake nan anweinimro ke, ta? 184 H: Kon ta eo komro kar loe kon meimro raan eo, ainwot an kar rup baam eo. 185 im ta ko komro kar loi? 186 Ka: Aet... kon an kar baam eo jerbal jakain... 187 Ki: Ainwot jekar naninmej... 188 Ka: Erup im emakotkot aolepen mweo komro ej jokwe ie... 189 Ki: Im jenaninmej, ejja kar wor naninmej. 190 H: Ilo raan eo wot? 191 Ki: Raan eo, aolepen ien ko tokalik... 192 Ka: Kio aolep armej im komro naninej wot... 193 Ki: Ilo elkin an wotlok men eo, ainwot ejjab emman mour. 194 H: Ak ilo raan eo ekkar wotlok baam eo, kar elon ke mottan baam eo, elon ke 195 poata ak elon ke men ekar wotlok jen mejatoto ke komro kar loi? 196 Ka: Men eo ikkar loi ilo ien eo kon juon ainikien ej itok ijo tok...ar itok im 197 bokolok ijo. 198 Ki: Im ainwot e, ainwot e... 199 Ka: Ejan aolepen - im ekar wawen rein an kar loi (edik ainikien im ejjab alikar 200 ta eo ej ba ilo taap eo). 201 H: Im elon ke men komro kar lo an wotlok jen mejatoto eo? 202 Ka: Ekwe, ainwot ejjelok men, men eo re eo ainikien komij ron tok ijo tok... 203 Ki: Emakotkot mokan... 204 H: Ekar ke wor naan in kakil mokta jen kein an Amedka - elon ke men ar ba 205 nan komi bwe en kabojak mokta jen ien eo? 206 Ki: Rar ba jab makotkot, ped wot ilowan em. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 288 207 Ka: Rar ba: “Korn naaj lo juon men kowatata. Enaaj walok men wot kom in 208 jab kalimijuke ” Emoj, komkom im ar koman ainwot in. 209 H: Komiro kar pokake? 210 Ki: Mmm! Eion nejim ro re ritto, ewor ajiri e ritto... 211 Ka: Ian. Komiro kar bokake. 212 H: Elon ke bar kora komiro kar loi rej bar naninmej andrein, naninmej eo am? 213 Ki: Elon, juon eo. Li-Kabik ekar ajiri eo nejin ekar kamoure ainwot grape. 214 Seiko, ekar bar jorren. Elon armej rekar jorren. Ak keen elon en ekkar 215 boboj juruon im rekar etal nan Hawaii im mwijmwij, ak jet re eboj burner 216 imremij. 217 H: Remij? 218 Ki: Remij. Bar Anjar, ekar boboj buruon im emij...(edik ainikien, ejab alikar 219 ta eo ej ba). Elon, elon armej ar jorren, im elonkora ar grape nejeer. 220 H: Elon ke kwar bar loi kon mejam? 221 Ki: Ekwe, armej rein rekar etal im takto Majuro im rej ba rekar, ikar jab loi 222 kon meja, ke elon en ejab loi kon an lap burner. Elon ri-ene kon, ri- 223 Malian, Jita, Li-Madrik, ippen bar Jita. Jekkar loi kon mejad ke e boj aer 224 im bar mokaj, lio ekar mokaj en takto Hawaii im emman bwe remokaje. 225 Kwo lo le ippen, remwijiti im awatok im mij. Im juon moman in Melan, 226 ekar bar boboj buruan im mij, Rio. 227 H: Ri-utiej ro an Amedka rar jela ke kon naninmej ko aer9 228 Ki: Ijeiao wot kon naninmej eo amiro. Ewe, emoj amiro idaak uno ilo ien ko, 229 im Iok etal nan Majuro im bar idaak uno im na rar bar letok uno, emman 230 im ejjab lap men eo ewalok. 231 Ki: Ne an mour ejjab moman, ej naninmej wot, naninmej. Ejab Iukun...(ejab 232 alikar). 233 H: Komro tomak ke men ko takto ro rej ba nan komiro? 234 Ka: Ikijien? 235 H: Ikijien naninmej ko amiro. 236 Ka: Ekwe, komro ej tomak bwe rej konono tok ak komro jaje ta ko... 237 Ki: rej ba. 238 H: Kwar etal im takto ilo Majuro jete kottan elikin am mwijmwij, kwar ba 239 kwar jino tor? 240 Ki: Juon alen ilok kar etal re taktoik na im emman, ebojrak, ejako ao naninmej 241 botab enbwinu ejab moman, metak wot, naninmej wot. 242 H: Ewor ke armij in Majol rej Iewoj uno in Majol nan kwe ilo ien kwoj 243 kamour? 244 Ki: lar bok uno ko. 245 H: Uno in Majol? 246 Ki: Aet, iar boki. 247 H: Rar ke melele kon naninmej eo am? 248 Ki: Aet, rej ba nan na ejab jimwe, loju. Im rar letok uno, tokta ro, ak iar bar 249 uno in Majol. Iar emman im ekar bojrakao tor wot jen uno in Majol rar 250 kar letok. Ne iar idaak uno eoer, Iar jab Iukun emman. 251 H: Elemen aer kar jiban iok - rej Iewoj wot uno? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 289 252 Ki: Rar kar letok im ne ej ien en ao idaak uno, ij make etal im kapok. Kio, 253 kon ao kar bok uno en Majol, ebojrak ao kar tor wot. 254 H: Elon ke kar jiban iok ilo ien eo kwar kalotak? 255 Ki: Ejjelok. 256 H: Ejjelok kar jiban iok? 257 Ki: Aet, tokta eo. 258 H: Etan tokta eo? 259 K: Remar, ekar jilikinlok io nan Majuro konike ebane boj naninmej eo ao. 260 H: Elon ke bar armej komiro jela ke kajier im remaron bar kameleleik io kon 261 men kein? 262 K: (ejjab uak). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX VI INTERVIEW WITH KIORA AND KAJITOK (ENGLISH) INTERVIEWER: HOLLY BARKER (H) INTERVIEWEES: KIORA (Ki) AND KAJITOK (Ka) LOKEIJAK DATE, LOCATION: AUGUST 14, 1994, LIKIEP ATOLL TRANSLATION: HOLLY BARKER 1 H: First of all, may I please ask your names so they will be recorded on the 2 cassette? 3 Ka: I am Kajitok Lokeijak. 4 Ki: Kiora Lokeijak. 5 H: Where did the two of you grow up? 6 Ka: In Likiep. 7 H: On which island? 8 Ka: On Mellan, Likiep. 9 H: Where were the two of you during the time of the testing? 10 Ki&Ka: On Likiep. 11 H: Both of you were on that island? 12 Ka: Mmmm. 13 H: Do the two of you remember any things about the day the big bomb 14 exploded, in 54? 15 Ka: Yes. The two of us were living together at the time. At the time the bomb 16 exploded, she was pregnant. It stayed - when the child was bom, the child 17 had two heads. 18 Ki: It was abnormal. 19 H: Two heads? 20 Ka: Two heads. It looked like it was dented. One was on top of the other 22 head. Here (touches his forehead) is where it went up from, and it was 23 Small. There was something small here (touches the top of his head) and 24 the head was here (touches his head). 25 Ki: It’s like it’s head was open. There was a head behind it (the first head). 26 Ka: There was one head that was smaller than the other, it was like two, it 27 wasn’t a head that thing but it was like the head of a person. That child 28 didn’t live. Bom and died. 29 H: When it was bom it died? 30 Ki: It lived only for a moment. 31 Ka: It was breathing for a short time when it was bom. Maybe, it wasn’t an 290 with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 291 31 hour, only a few minutes. Her health (Kiora) was not that good. After 32 that child was bom and appeared, from that time it hasn’t been that good. 33 She experiences many kinds of illnesses. 34 H: It wasn’t only it’s head that was affected, but it’s whole body? 35 Ka: Her whole body. Everywhere, yes, here (points to his entire body). Her 36 whole body downwards and her stomach. At the time, it’s like she, she 37 used to move about a lot, but afterwards she just poured out blood. We 38 went to Majuro to see a doctor. For so long, for so long she saw a doctor. 39 took medication, and they gave her more medication. I don’t know why 40 her hair fell out, her hair just fell out. 41 H: Your hair? 42 Ki: Mmmm. 43 Ka: Was the medication hurting her or was it her illness. We didn’t 44 understand. 45 H: Approximately how many months after the bomb test was this? Was it 46 less than a year? 47 Ka: Not long, yes, it wasn’t long. 48 H: Only months? 49 Ka: Yes, only months. 50 H: Were you pregnant at the time? 5 1 Ki: Yes, now, they thing that we really observed with the doctors and really 52 saw with this type of illness is that the child was damaged from its 53 exposure. One, it was the first time this type of illness occurred. It was 54 like one head on top of the other, it was open. 55 Ka: It was ripped open. 56 H: Ripped open? 57 Ki: Yes, it’s like it was open here (touches forehead) and also hear (touches 58 forehead). It (the forehead) was open. 59 H: Did you tell the doctors in Majuro about the child? 60 Ka: Yes, I told them. After the child appeared and died, she began to 6 1 menstruate. 62 H: And what did the doctors tell you about this? 63 Ka: They didn’t say a single thing and they only gave us medication. 64 H: Did they explain why you were bleeding so heavily at the time? 65 Ki. They didn’t and only gave me medication. They didn’t say, they only 66 gave me medication. Things weren’t good and I had miscarriages and 67 more miscarriages. 68 H: Ooh, it wasn’t only that one child? 69 Ki: Mmm. After it appeared, all the rest were abnormal. 70 H: Did you have any children before the testing? 71 Ki: Yes! 72 H: You had some? 73 Ki: There are others and that child was last, it was really damaged and after 75 that I only miscarried and wasn’t well. Miscarriages only, miscarriages Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 292 76 only. 77 Ka: There was another child that was also ill and it... 78 Ki: ...dropped down 79 Ka: It didn’t come to full term. 80 H: And how many children did you have before that time that were born and 81 healthy? 82 Ka: Count please. 83 Ki: Ten... but other children were bom... one, two, three they died. The 84 children after the... 85 H: How many all together died? 86 Ka & Ki: Ten all together. 87 H: Ten lived? 88 Ka & Ki: They lived. 89 H: And how many died? 90 Ka & Ki: Three, four... four. 91 H: Four? 92 Ka: Four. After the tenth that child with two heads appeared, and three others. 93 They didn’t come to full term and they were also damaged. When they 94 came out they resembled people 95 H: Resembled people? 96 Ki: Resembled people. They had arms, the way people do. Some kind of 97 people or things... kind of like people. Like people, but they were 98 damaged. 99 H: Were there any doctors who came at that time and examined them? 100 Ka&Ki: None. None. 101 Ki: At the end... 102 Ka: When we went to Majuro, the Marshallese doctors... 103 Ki: The child I was pregnant with... four, three months and I was bleeding and 104 I went to see a doctor because it wouldn’t stop... I went to a doctor. And 105 they just gave me medication. They gave me medicine and they said if I 106 didn’t stop my continuous bleeding, I would need surgery. The wards at 107 the hospital were open to me if the bleeding didn’t stop. But I took the 108 medication and it stopped. Until now there’s no...it’s good, 1 don’t have 109 that illness anymore, menstruation. 110 H: What did the two of you think at the time the children were born but didn’t 111 love? 112 Ki: I said it was the radiation. The two of us think, we think it’s the damage 113 from the radiation because the last child, when it died, it was a different 114 type of deformity. 115 H: And why did you think it was the radiation? 116 Ki: Because the radiation came and... 117 Ka: The time the people came and studied the radiation. Then the two of us 118 thought about it and said: “Ooh, the damage is from the radiation... ” 119 Ki: But we really didn’t know. We just thought that but when the radiation 120 doctors came to study the radiation, we told the doctors everything. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 293 121 H: How did they examine the radiation, what did they look at, people or your 122 environment? 123 Ki: They looked at the soil, in the beginning they said there was radiation, and 124 then afterwards they people doing studies came again and said there was 125 no radiation. 126 H: They said there was no radiation? 127 Ki: This atoll isn’t irradiated. Earlier on they brought their things 128 (instruments) to help them examine and show that there is radiation. And 129 afterwards when they examined afterwards they said there was none. 130 Ka: Me 1 don’t understand why they came and did research and saw the 131 illnesses and 132 then they didn’t say a single thing to... 133 Ki: You see, there was, they said it was swollen, he had started to have 134 swelling and they gave him medication. 135 H: Your throat, right? 136 Ki: Yes. The examiners they said swelling would begin to occur here 137 (touches his throat). 138 H: And did it occur? 139 Ki: It didn’t.. they have me medication. 140 H: Pardon me because I don’t quite understand, but they gave you medication 141 to prevent it but they already had seen it... 142 Ki: They saw it had started, they saw it... 143 Ka: They saw the swelling here (touches her throat)... 144 Ki: The radiation, the radiation. 145 Ka: The radiation started [in me] and so they gave me medicine. The reason I 146 really knew it was swollen, I was one of the ones whose throats they 147 examined. Then they looked each other in the eyes, the doctors that 148 checked me they went and wrote down my name. I don’t understand why 149 they wrote my name or anything else because they didn’t explain a single 150 thing to me. But the thing they said and talked about together, the guy 151 who touched here said there was swelling there that he felt. 152 H: About when was it they saw it? 153 Ki: We forget when... 154 Ka: The time that the people who check came... 155 Ki: The people who examine the radiation...in the beginning... 156 Ka: I think they said I didn’t need a doctor but they gave me medicine and 157 nothing else. 158 H: And after they gave you medication, did they come back and examine 159 you? 160 Ka: How come thev didn’t come back? 161 Ki: No. 162 Ka: I don’t know. I don’t really know.. .but I really saw how they went about 163 their work. Not a single thing... 164 Ki: It still isn’t better, when he goes to sleep, his body is really bad, he’s in 165 pain. His whole body hurts, he is not doing well. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 294 166 H: And at the time they told you had swelling, how did they explain this 167 to you, was there a translator, was there a translator to translate into 168 Marshallese? 169 Ka: Nobody translated. 170 H: Nobody? 171 Ka: Nobody. There were four Americans who came and helped, they spoke 172 together and I don’t know what [they said] because I didn’t know their 173 language. The thing is that they gave me medication and I took it all. 174 H: And how did you understand the illness or how did you understand how 175 many pills you had to take or - did they know Marshallese? 176 Ka: Who? 177 H: The doctors... 178 Ka: They didn’t know Marshallese. 179 H: Do you know English? 180 Ka: I don’t really know. But there was nobody to translate their language... 181 Ki: That boy, the son of Ajidrik was the only one, what was the boys name... 182 Ka: Maybe there was, but I forget who is was because nothing was explained 183 to me. Only that one time they gave me four - six pills for me to take. 184 One time each - each day I take one pill. Take one pill every day, four 185 pills they gave to me. Are you hearing what I’m saying alright? 186 H: Yes, I understand. You two explain very clearly. 187 Ka: Well, this is how much we experienced during those time. Everything... 188 Ki: Now we forget when... 189 Ka: These things were missing at the time... 190 Ki: But - oh, we only know about the damage that occurred with the child and 191 the two of us. 192 H: Well the year isn’t as important as your memories about these things. At 193 the time the bomb exploded, what do the tow of your remember from the 194 specific day it exploded? They say it was on the first day of March, in 195 [19]54. 196 Ki & Ka: Maybe. 197 Ki: Maybe it was 54. 198 H: During the time when the really big bomb exploded. I’m asking if you 199 remember if you went back and discussed that day and what you two 200 saw... 201 Ki: At the time it exploded, it seemed so close like it was right next to me. 202 When we heard it, it seemed to be near the school house, because it 203 exploded so close by. 204 Everyone woke up. 205 Ka: What did we feel with our bodies, or what? 206 H: About what you saw with your eyes that day, when the bomb exploded. 207 what did the two of you see? 208 Ka: Yes...how the bomb affected us here... 209 Ki: We were sick... 210 Ka: It exploded and all of our house where we lived shook... Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 295 211 Ki: And we are sick, he was sick. 212 H: From that day? 213 Ki: That day, and all the time since then... 214 Ka: Now all the people and the two of us are sick... 215 Ki: After the thing burst, life was not so good. 216 H: But on the day that the bomb burst, were there any pieces of the bomb. 217 and fallout or things that fell from the sky that you two saw? 218 Ka: The thing I saw at the time was the sound that came this way... it came and 219 burst by me. 220 Ki: And it’s like, it’s like... 221 Ka: Everybody cried. And that’s how it was here to see...(inaudible). 222 H: And were there any things you saw fall from the sky? 223 Ka: Well, not anything really, the thing here was the sound we heard coming 224 this way... 225 Ki: The houses shook. 226 H: Were there any announcements by the U.S. Government to warn you. 227 were there any things they said to prepare you before that time? 228 Ki: They said don’t move, only stay inside buildings. 229 Ka: They said: "You will see something dangerous that will appear and the 230 only thing that you should not do is look at it.” After that we did this. 231 H: You obeyed? 232 Ki: Mmm! We have children who are older, there are older children... 233 Ka: Yes, we obeyed. 234 H: Were there any women you saw who had similar illnesses, like your 235 illness? 236 Ki: There are, there’s one, Li-Kapik it was her child that gave birth to 237 something like 238 grapes. Seiko was also affected, many people were affected. And now 239 there are many whose throats swell and they went to Hawaii for surgery. 240 and some their throats swell and they die? 241 H: They die? 242 Ki: They die. Also Anjar, his throat swelled up and he died...(inaudible). 243 Many, many people are suffering, and many women give birth to grapes. 244 H: Did you see any with your eyes? 245 Ki: Well, these people went to Majuro to see the doctor and they say they did, 246 I didn’t see it with my eyes because many you don’t see because they have 247 a lot of pride. Many from those small islands, people from Melan, Jita, Li- 248 Madrik, again with Jita. We could see with our eyes how swollen they 249 were and they quickly - that woman went quickly to see a doctor in 250 Hawaii and it’s good because they got her quickly. You know her 251 husband, they gave him surgery and he fell over and died. And another 252 man from Melan, his throat also swelled and he died, Rio. 253 H: Did the officials from the U.S. know that they were sick and died? 254 Ka & Ki: Well, I don’t know. 255 Ka: I don’t know, they had shown their illnesses. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 296 256 Ki: I only know about the sickness of mine because the child was deformed, 257 damaged head, and also the people whose throats swelled. 258 Ka: Well, these are our understandings about our illnesses. The two of us took 259 medicine at the time and when we went to Majuro we took more 260 medication and me they gave me more medicine. It’s good because not 261 too much appears. 262 Ki: If his health isn’t good, and he’s always sick, sick. It isn’t really... 263 (inaudible). 264 H: Do you believe the things the doctors told you? 265 Ka: About what? 266 H: About your illnesses? 267 Ka: Well, we believe it but they talked to us and we didn’t understand what... 268 Ki: ...they said. 269 H: How many times did you go to Majuro to see a doctor after your surgery, 270 you said you started to bleed? 271 Ki: One time I went to the doctor and they said I was okay, it stopped, my 272 illness went away but my body isn’t well, it always hurts, always sick. 273 H: Did you use Marshallese medicine when you gave birth? 274 Ki: 1 used that medicine. 275 H: Marshallese medicine? 276 Ki: Yes, I used it. 277 H: Did the doctors understand why kind of illness you had? 278 Ki: Yes, they told me that there were problems with my stomach. So they, 279 doctors, gave me medication but I also kept taking Marshallese medicine. 280 I was felling well and my menstruation stopped because of the 281 Marshallese medication. When I took their medication, I was not too well. 282 H: How did they treat you? Were they only giving you medicine to take? 283 Ki: They gave them to me and when it was time for me to take my medicine, I 284 had to go get them myself. Now, by taking Marshallese medicine, my 285 bleeding stopped. 286 H: Were there any mid-wives during that time? 287 Ki: None. 288 H: Did somebody help you deliver your baby? 289 K: Yes, the doctor. 290 H: What is the name of the doctor? 291 K: Remar, he sent me to Majuro because he could not handle my case. 292 H: Can you think of anyone I should talk to who might be helpful and could 293 discuss these matters? 294 Ki & Ka: (no comments). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abo, Takashi, Byron W. Bender, Alfred Capelle, and Tony DeBrum 1976 Marshallese-English Dictionary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 1995 Final Report. Pittsburgh: U.S. Government Printing Office. Alcalay, Glenn. 1992 The United States Anthropologist in Micronesia: Toward a CounterHegemonic Study of Sapiens. ///Confronting the Margaret Mead Legacy: Scholarship, Empire, and the South Pacific. Lenora Foerstel and Angela Gilliam, eds. Pp. 173- 204. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1995 Presentation to the White House Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments Regarding Dissertation Research on the Incidence of Reproductive Abnormalities in Marshallese Women. Washington, D C. Almej, Kanike 1998 Presentation to students at the Nuclear Institute, College of the Marshall Islands, Regarding the Transition from Japan to U.S. Colonial Rule. Majuro. Amani, Shake 1998 Essay from Marshall Islands Middle School in Recognition of Nuclear Victims Remembrance Day on March 1, 1998. Majuro. 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Washington, D C. 1998 Speech Delivered at the Public Ceremony Commemorating Nuclear Victim's Remembrance Day. Alele Museum. Majuro. Barker, Holly 1994 Interviews in the Marshall Islands: Alfred, Tempo. September 8. Ailuk school house. Ailuk Atoll. Allen, William. August 22. Office of the Public Service Commission. Majuro. Boaz, Ellyn. August 26. Outside the family home. Mejatto, Kwajalein. Bobo, Aruko. August 27. Office of the Changed Circumstances Commission. Majuro. DeBrum, Agnes. August 14. Outside her family home. Likiep. DeBrum, Kramer and Esra. August 19. Inside their family home. Majuro. Jibas, Catherine. August 23. Office of the Changed Circumstances Commission. Majuro. John, Jalel. September 5. Inside her family home. Ailuk Atoll. Lokeijak, Kiora and Kajitok. August 14. Outside the family home. Likiep Island. Riklon, Esra. August 18. Inside his family home. Majuro. Shoniber, Seiko. September I. DAR restaurant. Majuro. 1996 Anthropology and Community Advocacy: Assisting Radiation Victims in the Marshall Islands. The Graduate Review. Pp. 4-8. Washington, D C.: American University. 1997 Fighting Back: Justice, the Marshall Islands and Neglected Radiation Communities. In Life and Death Matters: Human Rights and the Environment at Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 299 the End of the Millennium. Barbara Rose Johnston, ed. Pp. 290-306. London: Alta Mira Press. 1998a Fieldnotes. January to April, 1998. 1998b Interview in the Marshall Islands Komram, Likotar. February 13. In her home near Marshall Islands High School. Majuro. 1999 Interviews in the Marshall Islands: Abija, Kajim. March 16. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Ebeye. Anjain, George. 1999a March 3. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Majuro. 1999b March 17. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Ebeye. Anjain, John. March 16. 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Job, Mijua. March 10. Remains of her family’s home. Rongelap Island. Joseph, Nerja. March 8. Steps of a laundromat. Majuro. Kabinmeto, Shirley. March 10. Discussion at the remains of her family’s house at Jabwaan. Rongelap Island. Kabua, Mike. 1999a March 2. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Majuro. 1999b March 3. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Majuro. Kebenli, Mwenadrik. March 16. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Ebeye. Kedi, Ken. March I. Outrigger Hotel. Majuro. Kendall. Wilfred. 1999a March 2. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Majuro. 1999b March 3. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Majuro. Kolnij, Timako. March 18. Office of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Majuro. Lajuan, Newton. February 28. A home in Rita. Majuro. Matayoshi, James. March I. Outrigger Hotel. Majuro. Riklon, Johnsay. February 28. Outrigger Hotel. Majuro. Silk, Mary. March 1. Outrigger Hotel. Majuro. 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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 305 Laboratory of Radiation Biology, University of Washington. (DOE #7). Hezel, Francis X. 1996 Strangers in Their Own Land: A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands. Pacific Islands Monograph Series, 13. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation 2000 Hills, Howard 1984 Compact of Free Association for Micronesia. The International Lawyer l8(3):583-608. House, R.A. 1954a Memorandum for the Record: Command Briefing, 0000. 1 March 1954. Pacific Command: United States Air Force. 1954b March 4 Memorandum Regarding Discussion of OfF-Site Fallout. Pacific Command: United States Air Force. Johnson, A. et al. 1991 For the Record - A History of the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, 1978-Technical Report. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation. (DOE #187). Johnson, Giff 2000 Around Town Comments by Imata Kabua. 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