This Document IS a HOLDING of the ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO

~1Pd~XTIC~L STUDY

'~R~AII31 IN OV~SIA2

arl13 li

Realism in overseas supply pia zing, by L~t Gol C. B. Henderson. CCISC. 1946-47.

JUiN 2 1 1965

This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO. N-128.20 COPY NO. W

Col: J Th GNERALC STAFF C0ILB(JE

Regular. Course 1946-4'1

ANALYTICAL STUD~Y

RR LI 'tIN OVERSEAS SUPPLY IPLAN TING

Page

The Problem 1

Facts Bearing on the Problem ...... 1-2

Discussion ...... 2-8

Conclusions...... 9-10

Recommendations...... 10-11

Appendix A - Procurement

Appendix B - Documentation.

Appendix C - Port and Beach Activity

Appendix D - Service Troop Requirements.

Appendix EL - Storage

Appendix F- Transportation

Appendix G- Bibliography

Submnitted by:

Carroll B. Henderson Lt Col, Cavalry REAi=SM IN OV1RIS SUPPLY IMPJING

A. ?ROBL A.

A picture of the phases of supply planning in the Zone

of Interior and overseas theaters, is here presented, with the

idea of indicating the apparent lack of realism and appreciation

for the critical factors limiting the receipts and distribution

of cargo. While it is appreciated that all phases cannot be

considered in a study of this.scope, it is believed that sufficient

information is available to develop solutions to the principal

problems affecting the matching of supply demands to lines of

communications capabilities.

It must be appreciated that the allied nations won the war due

to overwhelming superiority of natural resources and nan-power,

of which the united States contributed the maximum end products

and accompanying jobs which ultimately determined the destruction

of the Axis Forces. In making a study of this nature it is necessary

to accept, without comment, the accomplishments well done, and

emphasize the errors in planning and execution.

B. FACTO"BEARING ON TII~ PROBL .

Throughout the war, the almost universal tendency on the

part of overseas commanders to ask for more supplies than the

theater distribution systems could absorb, resulted invariably

in the existance of one or more of the following conditions:

(1) ~cessive quantities in the transportation

"pipe-line.'

(2) Necessity of unloading and storing low priority

cargoes when facilities were overloaded.

(3) Large amounts of supplies, which never reached

the front, being transported and stored at

tremendous effort.

(4) aste of shipping with resultant curtailment of

other critical shipping programs.

Recent experimental. developments of atomic energy and improve-

ments in air transport, are indications that in the event of another l major conflict, deception and shock Will play an important

part, perhaps the most vital role rather. than overhel ming

superiority of manpower and materials. Accepting this observ-

.ation as a.premise, it is obvious that the military system

utilizing proceedures having the fewest mistakes, regardless

of its potential, stand the best chance of winning or surviving.

The following doctrine outlined in Field Service Manual,

"Administration," is quoted and accepted as the fundamental basis

for all subsequent discussion and findings.

"nxiety for certainty of supply creates a desire to accumulate large stocks in combat areas, but need for flexibility in

the supply system dictates a minimum stock level to enable combat units to meet rapidly moving situations and to maintain safety

of supplies from capture, distruction or abandonment."

C. DISCUSSION.

Although numerous factors affect realistic supply planning,

it is believed that the most predominent can be' analyzed by con-

sideration of the following topics:

(1) Procurement.

(2) Documentation.

(3) Port and Beach Activities*

(4) Service Troop Requirements.

(5) Storage.

(6) Transportation.

(1). Procurement (Jppendix A)

Speculations and forecasts of requirements of the near future

must of necessity.be based on experience and lessons learned during

the war years of 1940-45. Conclusive evidence is available to

prove that the production, procurement, and man-power potential

of the United States are not unlimited. The phenominal increase

in production, attributable to native ingenuity being applied on

the production line, was approaching or had reached maximum per-

formance by early 1945. Shortages of critical materials accentuated the develorment of synthetics for use as substitutes-in some

instances; whereas in other instances, strict 'regulations were

inforced on utilization of end products by both civilian and

military agencies. Measures initiated to establish production

priorities allocate production facilities and raw materials,

were only.successful in varying degrees. Throughout the entire war, the production and procurement of itens essential to a

supply service for tb.e accomplishment of its mission, was the

sole responsibility of that particular service. The net result of

this procedure was in many instances a duplication of procurement

effort, by more than one supply agency, to secure the same type

of items. This condition was an outgrowth of the systems and procedures followed during World far I, and any indications of

"mpire Building" by the services could be attributed to the lack

of procurement, coordination and standardization of specifications.

Lack of latitude in procurement resulted in each service writing

its own particular specification for an item and wpith the exception

of the CQuartermaster and Ordnance services, each developed its own particular nomenclature and stock record number. It appears that the several agencies preparing, coordinating, recording and promulgating specifications are more than sufficient to process all classes of

supplies and equipment required by the armed forces. It appears obvious that there is a need for an agency to control and coordinate all activities pertaining to standardization of specifications. In addition the advantges resulting in a saving in time and the elimination of duplication of effort and manpower occasioned by the universal adoption of Feeral Stock Catalog Numbers makes the effort required appear worthwhile.

(2) DOCUir i TTICTAT (Appendix B)

Prior to the war there was little evidence to indicate the magnitude of the tonnage or the thousands of items which were later transported to every part of the world, As a consequence, the significance of the full importance of the relationship of documentation to items and tonnage was not fully realized until the later phases of the European operations.

Consideration of tbis ;phase of supply planning must atlays include the factors of (1) Utilization of P~anpoer, (2) ~EAailability of Supptly, (3) Comunications and? (4) Record proeittre. Pioity was given to the selection of personnel for combat troops resulting in most

instances in a shortage of trained service personnel. The in the- depots and dumps results are readily apparent. Paperwork/became secondary as physical handling of tonnage received first consideration.

Personnel normally assigned to documentation duties were needed to augment the generally insufficient handling personnel. The practice of augmenting service troops with combat troops was considered justifiable although the loss of efficiency due to the lack of trainim was apparent.. Temporary or permanent loss of supplies was proportional to the emphasis on tonnage moved and the corresponding lack of documentation. Inefficient use of transportation and the failure to deliver the maximum supplies are direct results of poor or ineffective documentation.

Adequate communications and accurate records procedure were the object of gradual and progressive improvements. In most instances these improvements in procedure were made as indicated by experience only, as the individuals responsible had not previously been sufficiently trained.

(3) PORTS AIM BiACF (Appendix C)

Possibly the most important phase of amphibious operations involved the study of the ports and beaches, to include their tactical and supply potential. The tactics generally applied by the Axis was to restrict the movement of the allied forces by denying them port facilities, regardless of cost. This principle was predicated on the belief that an amphibious force could not be supported over beaches sufficiently to permit the waging of an offensive war. The fallacy of this thinking was shown when major operations in all theaters were supplied for protracted periods of time by use of beaches only. It is interesting to note, as a matter of comparison, in the Normandy invasion the over optimistic planning of the initial tactical phase as well as the tonnage to be unloaded, and the pessimistic approach by logistical planners as to the capacities of the ports and beaches.

The retarding of the tactical progress had a corresponding effect on unloading activities and thereby was a contributing factor in the accumulation of a back log of shipping in the vicinity.

The desire on the part of most commanders to unload as much tonnage as possible in the early phase of operations is not without fault as the generally crowded areas immediately in rear of the beaches do not permit satisfactory beach operations. Selective unloading and complete unloading were highly controversial subjects during the war. From the navy and transportation point of view, the backlog of partially unloaded ships carrying items of low priority; was wasteful of transportation which was an ever present critical factor.

Complete unloading had its accompanying problems. It results in the dumping of tonnages on the beaches and in dumps with the ideas of identification and documentation generally becoming secondary.

Shipping was rapidly unloaded but the ever present shortage of facilities and service personnel during the early phases resulted in increased burdens on storage and documentation personnel. The result, in turn, was a waste of supplies, manpower transportation, and time.

Somewhere in between these extremes appears to be the most satisfactory solution.

(4) SRVIQiE TROOP R,,E IR2tJENTS. (Appendix D)

The limitations on manpower availability have posed the problem of establishing the proper balance between combat and service troops as well as the. extent of the utilization of individuals generally listed as limited service. Due to the nature of the assignment, the

Arms do and should continue to have the priority on physically fit individuals, however, it must be appreciated that the requirements for key personnel are just as exacting in a Service as in an Arm.

A most noticeable weakness in planning, which directly affected supply activity was the inability to establish a firm troop list or troop forecast. Shortages of either transportation, personnel, or critical supplies invariably affect the availability of service troops. Remarks made durinL the Bolero operation such as "which troop strength did youuse" may be slightly humorous, but are indicative of a condition which was general at that time. The determination of combat troops for each operation indicated

the approximate number of service troops to be included in the

list, however, any change in the tactical situation would, as a rule, cause the phasing back of much needed service personnel

in favor of an increase of combat troops., It is understandable, that this was important and vital although it becomes difficult

to justify the use of combat trained personnel for normal service

personnel duties when the landing of additional combat troops

was predicated on the increased danger in the tactical situation.

The shortage of manpower existing during World War I1 gradually

became more acute and. the increasing demands made by the combat forces forced the Allies and Axis to cast around for additional

personnel that might be used in lieu of some service personnel.

Sources of manpower exploited advantageously by both the Axis

and Allies were: (1) Allied civilians, (2) prisoners of war,

(3) civilians from either friendly or enemy occupied countries,

and (4) displaced persons.

(5) STORAGE (Appendix )

Planning of storage facilities and operations must include

a careful consideration of the tonnage requirements, handling equip-

ment, and the necessary personnel to accomplish the mission. The

planned capacity of a depot should be such as to receive, handle,

store and issue incoming and outgoing supplies, as any change in

one factor will have a definite influence on the others. The

success of the storage plan during the early phases of an amphibious

operation exerts a lasting influence on the efficiency of subsequent

operations. The efficiency of unloading operations was too frequently

measured in terms of tonnage handled: without consideration being

given to the number of items that could be efficiently handled or the ultimate effect on storage planning. Such procedure generally

resulted in the accumulation of "back-logs" of unclassified items.

Difficulties in location of sites for storage areas were experienced in all theaters, however the situation was particularly acute 6 in the Southwest.Pacific Area. The influence of the high rate

of percipitation on the terrain placed emphasis on hard standings

for open storage or improvised covered storage. Terrain having

the appearance of being firm changed to an impassable condition

in a short period of time and items stored in such an environment were frequently lost or damaged.

Considerable difficulty was experienced during the invasion

of Normandy and the New Caledonian campaign in the control and

use of water transportation. .In both instances the accumulated back-log of shipping served as reserve storage for the operation.

Such cargo as was needed was removed from the ships and the remainder unloaded at a later date. This new development served as a link in the depot system but the advantages gained were far out-weighed by the waste of shipping. The condition was remedied quite satisfac-

orily in the Pacific Theater by a control system which included phasing the outloading of a vessel and its sailing and arrival dates from the time it arrived at the port of embarkation. In the European

Theater the situation was improved by stricter War Department control,. although a definite solution of the problem was never attained..

(6) TRANSPORTATION (Appendix F)

Throughout the war the influence of transportation on realism

in supply planning was most-apparent. The long lines of communication requiring a constant or increasing flow of supplies were an ever present problem when tactical planning was given consideration. The

War Department solution for this shortage of shipping was by short- ening the "Order and Shipping Time," which materially reduced the shipping backlog as was related elsewhere in this analysis. Additional emphasis was placed on speeding up the turn-around time by placing time limits on unloading in some areas which accomplished the desired results as far as unloading was concerned but in many instances placed an increased burden on local facilities and personnel. One of the more important steps taken to relieve the situation was the coordination of requirements of the several components at bases in '7 in the Pacific Theater. Thus a duplication of requisitioning, transportation, and storage was eliminated.

The conception of using return shipping for return shipments destined for the P of 7 or some Zone of Interior installations was false in many instances. The fault generally rested with those

in charge of the loading. It was quite simple to load a few tons of cargo on a ship following the completion of its unloading, before it was moved away from the pier but the time required to dock and prepare for unloading at the port of embarkation made this method of transporting cargo very uneconomical. The solution was quite simple as it involved holding the return tonnage at the far shore port until sufficient had collected for a ship load.

Of the various emergency systems of vehicular transportation, possible the best known was the "Red Ball System." These systems were the answer to a temporary shortage of transportation and as

a rule served to augment rail transportation. Such transportation systems with accumulated maintenance and control problems were of

value only as a temporary expedient. The work horse of the land transportation system, the railroads, transported the major portion

of the tonnage to support the invasion of the continent, whereas

in the Pacific Theater little or no railroads were in use. The

latter condition was &ue t : the non-existence of railroads in most areas and the comparatively short distances which made truck

transportation more efficient. CONCLUSIONS

The following general conclusions have. been reached:

1. The lack of a coordination or control agency (,Army

Navy Munition Board Level) to screen, coordinate, and standardize

specifications prepared by the AArmy, Navy, and any other govern-

mental agency permits a duplication of procurement effort, which

is wasteful of manpower, material, and time.

2. There are no regulations requiring the universal

use of Federal Stock. Catalog Numbers. Accordingly the majority of

the technical services assign their own nomenclature and item number

for stock controls

3. Difference in allowances to units of the components

of armed forces, particularly so-called luxury items and living

accomaodations, creates a morale problem due to the basic unfairness

of plan.

4. Deficiencies of execution of prescribed documentation

procedure, resulted in failure to make,,maximum use of available

transportation and as a consequence failure to deliver all needed

supplies to the proper place to do the most good.

5. The lack of trained personnel in documentation procedure

was occasioned by the absence of uniform procedures during the early

phases of the war.

6. Adequate signal communication on the beaches during

the early phases of an amphibious operation is essential to satis-

factory logistical operation. Full information on contents of

shipping prior to arrival, aids materially in the planning,

7. Port rehabilitation, as a rule, proceeded more rapidly

than planned. Poor beaches must be expected and plans and operations

should be sufficiently flexible to take-this into account.

8. The anxiety for the. assurance for adequate supplies

ashore, and the desire for maximum utilization of ocean shipping

resulted in efficiency of unloading operations being placed on

measurement tonnage. 9. The disadvantages of the use of labor other than U. S.

military are outweighed by the advantages.

10. Planned build-up of service troops must be phased

closely with the combat troops to be supported.

11. Sources of labor other than armed forces, service troops,

were exploited to varying degrees during the past war, with a cor-

responding amount of success; number used from outside sources varied with the theaters with the most efficient results being ob-

tained during the Iropean Continental operation.

12. Use of shipping as mobile depots reduces the potential

tonnage available for basic mission, which is that of moving

cargo.

13. Losses in supplies and equipment through over-issue,

pilferage, and poor storage had a definite effect on theater

requirements.

14. The flexibility of "special loaded" ships in an amphi-

bious operation provided a flexible system capable of meeting the. need of a particular area.

RECD flDATI0N

It is recommended that:

1. A board be established on Army-Navy Munition Board

level with authority to screen, coordinate, and standardize speci-

fications prepared by the Army, Navy or any. other governmental

agency.

2. Obvious: inequalities existing between applicable Ax'my,

Navy, and Air Force T/ Ets, T/0 and E's, T/BA's or any other authorized allowance, be reviewed by the board referred to in (1)

above, and items controversial in nature and authorized for units

of one component only be deleted from the authorized equipment lists.

The need for such an item of equipmentcould then be justified as an operational project and allowances made for units of all com-

ponents under similar circumstances.

10 Documentation procedure as currently revised be uti-

lized where applicable during the occupational period,.and such

'changes may be made as are deemed necessary, in order to assure

a simple, workable, and up-to-date system.

4. Sufficient personnel be thoroughly trained in documentation procedure to assure the correct proportion of qualified

service personnel for future operations.

5. Specially loaded ships be considered an intergral part of the logistical planning for all future amphibious opera-

tions to the extent that they may be used as mobile depots. Such shipping should be made available to support assigned troops until such time as sufficient lodgement area is secured(Ifto permit proper dispersion of supply dumps ti2)sufficient time to debark the required service troops to adequately handle these supplies, and(AJ until the logistical organization ashore has had sufficient time to receive supplies resulting from an established requisitioning

syst em. :; e

e Appendix A

P OCI .J TT

The following quotations are believed to be representative

of the thinking of the majority of procurement planners today,

and will be used as a basis for subsequent discussion in this

analysis.

"Unless the military has realistic planning the best efforts

of industrial planners might well be failures." 1/ "The inevitable

ceiling on production requires that we fit our overall requirements and economy to our countryts resources and production potential." 2/

The subject of procurement will be considered from the standpoint of: (a) War Production Board, (b) 1~Pnufacture and Procurement of Spare Parts, (c) Hoarding, Repair and Maintenance, (d) Stand- ardization of Specifications, and (e) Inequalities in Allowances.

A. WAR PROrSECTION BOMl.O

The realization of the truth of the above quotations, was the

basis for the establishment of a civilian agency known as the Wfar

Production Board. This board was given final authority in integra-

tion and adjustment of all production programs, insofar as the con-

tribution made to the war effort was concerned. Allotments of production facilities and raw materials were made accordingly. The

first programs set-up for the Air Force, Navy, and Ground Forces were considered by the War Production Board as being unreliable due

to their greatness and the limitation on production capacity. This

resulted in a modification of strategic plans. These factors, -along

with the estimated short supply of several materials, indicate the

necessity for the formation of a similar agency in the event of

another war.

The wide expahse of operations and difficulties encountered in

getting timely and accurate information from all the bases in foreign

lands resulted in the adoption of a policy by Army Service Forces which assumed, that when an item was issued from its depots in the

Zone of Interior it could no longer be considered as an

1/ Lecture - "Industrial 1 obilization,"' by Col G. K. Heiss, Sp. Asst. Under Secretary of ~ar, 0050~ntf,5 ~arch 1947 2/ Lecture - "Procurement," by B~rig Gen Christ~as, CGSC, t Leav, ~nas, 5 F~rh 194 7 asset in the formation of an estimation of future needs. This method permitted better production control even though results, in some instances, were not noticeable until nine months later.

An ever present factor which gave rise to increased production difficulties was the changing of theater requirements. In consider- ing this problem, one must keep in mind that a period of twelve to twenty-four months was required between the time an item was designed until quantity delivery could be made in the theaters. 1/ This time lapse between design and delivery of an item is commonly called

"lead time," and may be defined as the interval or time lag between procurement, in accordance with established procurement objectives, and the delivery of the item. Any changes in requirements, troop lists, or tactics, must take this vital factor into consideration.

Planners must appreciate that changes requiring an increase will not receive same for several months and likewise changes permitting a decrease may cause an excess to accumulate in the theater before the effect of the change on the quantity in the "pipe line" will become noticeable. Lack of appreciation by staff planners in some

instances resulted in a "hand to mouth" planning or the submission

of monthly reports with the requirements alternately increasing and decreasing. Information from such sources tend to place the procure-

ment agencies in a compromising position as decreases in estimates

are adequate basis for cutbacks in production, renegotiation of con-

tracts, and decrease in labor requirements. Wdhereas, increase in

requirements occassion the necessity for additional materials,

labor, and time for training specialists required. It is understand-

able that this "whipsawed" effect on industry will eventually have

its attendant ill-will displayed by both labor and industry. An

examle of this type of planning isl1 the experience: surrounding

the production of "BombrrmbIncendiary M-'741" which follows:

"Original procurement schedule for this bomb, dated 9 Oct 1944,

based on requirements as received from the AAF, called for 12,307,820.

1/ Lecture - "Procurement" by Brig Gen Christmas at C&GSC, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 5 March 1947 On January 1945,. the total scheduled quantity was decreased to

11,189,822. On 7 February 1945 the total scheduled quantity was

increased to 13,680,000 and on 28 April 1945 it was increased to

20,632,290." 1/ The quantity required to fill the "pipe line"

or lines of communication between the source and destination was

considerable, and in the event the need for the items ceased to

exist, theuse of labor, raw materials and shipping at the expense

of critical and greatly needed items, is readily apparent. It must

be admitted that the replacement factors used for planning the North

African Campaign were inadequate, but they represented the best

information available. Information collected on requirements for

that campaign, as well as Sicily and Italy, indicated bolder estimates,

for future requirements to be used for the continental invasion, were

in order. This was not the case, and naturally led to continuous

changes in production aspects and the accompanying loss of production

efficiency.

Another factor vital to the support of contemplated operations

is the formation of a firm troop basis sufficiently far in advance

to permit computation of requirements and such additional changes to

be ,made as are necessary in the procurement progrra. 2/ This point

is further emphasized by (a.) the experience of the Western Task;

Force Headquarters which processed thirteen different lists of equip-

ment, and more than fifty-six changes in the designated units during,

one month and (b) the lack of an official troop forecast on which

to base planning by Service of Supply forthe entire Overlord opera-

tion until, the second quarter of 1944. 3/

B. ' 41JF C WqTHE KM PIRGUTh;I I T OOF FPAPTS .

At the beginning of World "filar I, England's state of preparedness

was such that all types of vehicles were used.. This resulted in the

use of sixty-seven different types of lorry in France by the end of

1/ Address, "Service, Supply., and Procurement," by It Cen LeRoy Lutes, Dir of SWP, W GS, given at Air College, Maxwell Field, 7 Jan 47. 2/ Lecture - "Direction of Service, Supply and.. Procurement," by Lt Cen Lutes, at O&GSC, Ft eavenorth, Aanss, 27Feb. 47 3/ "Logistics of Overlord," by Committee 2d Command Class, 1946 the first six months. The spare parts requirements amounting to

70,000 on hand at one tine, with one depot along turning out over

1,700,000 were considered enormous. Later production became

accelerated sufficiently to permit ngland and France to provide a

considerable amount of equipment for the U. S. troops overseas. l/

During; World 'gar II the situation was reversed in some respects. In

the beginning, all emphasis was placed on the production of the com-

pleted item, which soon resulted in a shortage of spare parts. In

addition, the rapid changes due to research and development added to the mounting requirements for spare parts. Every effort was exerted,

from purchase of certain spare parts from civilian agencies to command

emphasis on preventative maintenance in order to meet the situation.

The outgrowth of the shortage of end items and spare parts resulted

in the establishment of a system of priority of issue of all critical

items, which permitted a corresponding increase in the production of

spare parts.

C. STMNDMDIZATION OF s CIFICJ'ION .

The more military requirements can be geared to utilize existing

civilian production and facilities, the less effort is required for

the conversion to, and maintenance of wartime production recquirements. the This became apparent early in the war and has been/basis for considerable

effort toward standardization of specifications. Responsibilities

placed on the bureaus of the Navy Department and the services of the

Army for the procurement of items necessary' to assure the accomplishment

of their assigned missions, have accentuated this need. The many

instances of essentially the same item being manufactured for more

than one Army service or Navy bureau, each with its particular spec-

ification, created waste of material and manpower as well as confusion

in military and industrial supply procedures. This situation became

increasingly difficult during the war, when hundreds of new items and

spare parts with subsequent modifications or changes in design resulting

from research and development were being manufactured.

1/ Lecture on 'Supply, Organization, and Transportation," by Lt Col F.. K. Puckle, Asst Q. I!. General British Army,-War College, February 1918 The following agencies are charged with a responsibility for preparation and revision of specifications and for cooperation with standardizing agencies outside War Department in Simplification,

Standardization and Specification Activities: 1/

(a) Technical Services

(b) Technical Services, - Technical Committee

(d) Treasury Department - Federal Specifications

(e) Aeronautical Board

(f) Joint Army-Navy Committee on Specifications

(g) Interdepartmental Screw Thread Committee

(h) Department of Commerce - National Bureau of Standards

( i) 'ar and -Eergency Agencies

(j) American Standards Association

(k) Technical Societies

In addition there are several other agencies including Army Ground

Forces, Under Secretary of War, and Service, Supply and Procurement

Division, War Department General Staff which are charged with duty in

connection with specifications. The responsibilities of a number of the above listed agencies are. difficult to fix and correspondingly it

is difficult to indicate their full contribution toward standardization.

It is generally conceded that the Technical Services accomplish the majority of the preparation, modification or revision of specifications

for those items used by the army.

The following are types of specificatios which pertain to the

WTar Department: 2/

(a) Tentative Specifications

(b) U. S. Army Specifications

(d) Joint Army and Navy Specifications

(e) Federal Specifications

1/ . .850-25

2/ Conference "Requirements of New Developments and Other Government Agencies," by .Col James D. Sams, CetC, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas A major portion of material procurement was made by the technical services during the past war, using Tentative Spec-

ifications, and although regulations provide for Tentative

Specifications to be superceded'by U. S. Army Specification, within a period not to exceed six months, or if not needed will be cancelled. Such action was impracticable. There are no pro- visions in regulations requiring Universal use of, or organization responsible for, assignment of Federal Stock Catalog Numbers. The absence of any control or coordinating agencies resulted in duplication of effort.with more than one technical service preparing specifications for a similar item with each service assigning its

own nomenclature and catalogue number.

IJ. S. Army Specifications are, for the most part, derived from tentative specifications. They cover items most commonly used by more than one technical service. The lack of coordinating agency,

the trend toward joint specifications by W4ar and Navy Departments, and the desirability of conversion of all specifications to Federal

Specifications makes this grouping appear unnecessary and wasteful.

Both the Army Navy Specifications and Joint.-Army Navy Specifica- tions groups have as the titles imply, the mission of further stand-

ardization between the Army and Navy, and present no problem, as they aid in the standardization and requirements of both military

and industry and aid in converting to Federal Specifications.

Federal Specifications represents the classification toward which all standardization effort should be directed, with the

exception of purely military or secret items. This form represents

agreement on standardization between all governmental agencies, as well as to a considerable extent, with industry.

D. HOAiDTIN, REAIR AND 1iN1T T NTANE.

Each of these factors contributed to the increase of theater

requirements.

1. Hoarding

This instinct is normal to the average person and when combined with the ever present thought. of self preservation, there is little thought given to the possible ill effects created by the additional demands placed on procurement. This problem will always be present and control will result only from command supervision at all echelons.

2. Repair and Maintenance.

The lack of appreciation for the value of and necessity for, the preservation or equipment, was prevalent throughout the armed forces. The ideas that "it does not belong to me, and there is more where this came from" were altogether too prevalent. In our efforts to assure that ours was the best equipped;and best red arry, combined with the idea that, "the best is none too good," there was apparent lack of.appreciation ror values and we were more or less inclined to assume the, "C' est la Guerre" attitude. Instances such as the appreciation of values by the commander of a base section, who caused the repair of approximately 20,000,000 pieces of clothing which had been cast off as salvage requiring an average of three minutes per piece to repair, are evidence of the attitude of some individuals. Particularly, when lines or communication are stretched to-the maximum, and shortages of raw material ... increase the production efrort.

E. I3 -NEGALITIE$IN ALLOWANC~S.

Lack of uniformity for the basis of items issued to units of the armed services was particularly noticeable in the Pacific area.

Aside from the bad influence on morale created in many instances, the manufacture and use of critical items should have been given careful consideration. Instances in the early phases of an operation, such as the issue of quonset huts for storage purposes, construction materials and necessary tools, ice-cream freezers, etc., made available to units of one component working along-side of, and doing the same type of work as units from another component, without such facilities, are difficult to explain. Accordingly, shortages of critical items and transportation were not assumed in a proportionate share by the army and navy. These instances serve to indicate that estimates of produdt'ion requirements were unduly influenced by factors which should have been controlled; thereby relieving some of the tension on procurement and production, which would permit more realism in supply planning. .

= -'

.. a AIPMI~DX B

DOC IPTATION

Proof that a workable and well planned supply system is

in effect, is evidenced by 'the availability of sufficient supplies

at the right time to do the most good. Documentation, defined

as "The. provision of documents, copies, etc* in substantiation," 1/

plays a vital role in this sequence of activities. Since our pro-

duction facilities and sources of raw materials and labor were

taxed to the limit, in many instances, during World War II, it

is important that an analysis of this phase of supply planning

be considered. This subject will be considered from the viewpoint

of its effect on, (a) Utilization of manpower, (b) availability

of supply, (c) communications and, (d) record procedure.

A. M OaTPo'1JMR

The increasing demands for manpower during the past war is the basis for considerable thought on the subject of efficient utiliza-

tion of manpower in the event of a war in the future.

The requirements of both a sound mind and body for front line duty are apparent, however, the limitation of manpower and the desirability of having men with average or higher intelligence ratings in the various combat arms, if not controlled, will relegate the major portion of Class TV and V individuals to duty with the various services. "It is difficult to get combat leaders to understand this sufficiently to consent to the allocation and training of suitable personnel for these duties and the problem becomes particularly acute overseas." 2/

The effects of having a shortage of combat personnel are fully appreciated and as a result, in the past, combat personnel were echeloned with a ,higher priority than the proper number of service troops. Invariably this decision uti;mately necessitated the augmentation of the available service units with combat troops.

This procedure proved costly for two reasons: (1) Combat troops

1/ W ebster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th edition, 1943.

2/ A~dress by ~t, Gen L~eRoy XLutes, 5-jri c~T i~. and Procurement Div. 'VI1DG, at Alir College, ~iaxelL Field 7 Jan 194 7 and commanders lacked the training and appreciation of the worth of documentation and the losses of supplies in many instances did not warrant their use for such duty. (2) There is a let down of morale displayed by combat units selected for this type of duty.

The eprit-de-corps" built up in a combat unit is based on the ability of that unit in combat and any other activity will immediately reflect a loss or lowering of morale.

As campaigns progressed and supply requirements increased there were many instances where the receiving agencies utilized personnel from their own units to locate shipments coming from the rear to the front, in order to assure that the shipment was enroute and its time of arrival. 1/ The practice of having combat units sending representatives to contact the various dumps and depots at regular intervals either officially or unofficially, was considered to be good supply procedure by unit commanders. It is believed that this condition was the normal outgrowth of the lack of trained service personnel being landed in the early phases of the operations, and that the echelonment of service troops in proportion to the amount of supplies required to be processed, would have been a saving in manpower and. pointed toward much more efficient future supply operations.

B. SUPPLY

rte item lost in storage or intransit might as well have never been manufactured or shipped#" 2/ The correlation between this statement and documentation are portrayed by the experiences incident to the build'up of supplies in United Kingdom for the Bolero operation. The shortage of United States service troops in England required the British to receive and store American supplies. All of the British ports were handicapped by the lack. of labor, necessary to process supplies for British troops in foreign lands, and the necessity for clearing the docks rapidly due to losses which might have been incurred as a result of the almost nightly bombing raids.

1/ Page 91, Study #27, Mechanics of Supply in a Fast Moving Situation, T, BO RD

./ Alddress by SCtJ 0en Lute., Dir of SS~3 Division ~NDCS, at 0&GS Fft Levenorth, Kansase 27 Feb 1947 This situation required that incoming convoys be split up

and unloaded at several ports and immediately shipped to several British depots without adequate documentation. The fact that the supplies were unloaded and stored had little effect on the supply situation until located, identified, and inventoried. This temporary loss of supplies and organizational equipment resulted in the Services of Supply receiving a message from General Eisenhower stating that the supplies would have to be replaced as they could not be found. Approximately 260,000 measured tons of supplies, or forty-five days of combat maintenance and 10 1/F for the majority of the U. S. Forces assigned to the Center and Eastern Task Forces, were involved. In effect this amounted to an almost complete duplication of previous shipments for the-operation. Time was a very important factor at this stage as ships had to be loaded and sent to England in time to permit unloading and issuing some'of the supplies to units prior to their embarkation for the target, and other portions were to accompany these units as a part of the supply build-up.

Approximately 186,000 measured tons were loaded and shipped between

8 September and 16 October and eighteen additional ships were loaded in time to join the assault convoy which left -ESngland on

26 October.

Another instance where the lack of documentation resulted in similar reaction was reported by Colonel William C. Crosby, who observed a Signal Corps Warehouse at Fenschaven filled with supplies in ecactly the manner in which they arrived. It was poe- sible to find the same item stored in as many as fourteen different places. Locator cards had not been made, hence the procedure was to hunt for the supplies needed. 2/

Numerous other instances similar to the two references above could be mentioned but in all instances the loss of the item, even. though in some cases it was only for a short period of time, was such as to cause commanders to request supply sources in the

/ G-4 Report, OU1SA 2/ Report on Trip Though Pacific Ocean and South Pacific Ar3, by Col; Win.~ C. Cros'by,: 2 Dec 19344 2-of1. to provide replacements as' rapidly as possible. It is obvious that losses in the supply "pipelinee" resulting from poor documentation placed an increased burden on production and created shortages which directly influenced combat operations.

C. CO;' IJICATZONS

The consideration of communications as a factor in facilitat- ing good documentation is of primary importance. This subject may be divided into two parts for consideration, namely (1) the amphibious phase which includes that period of time required until ports become operative and (2) the land phase of the operations.

The plans made for the amphibious phase. of Operation Overlord were possibly the most elaborate conceived during the war. It was planned to forward copies'of the ships manifests either by boat or plane to the continent as soon as they were completed at

United Kingdom. The. time required to transmit these documents and deliver them to the proper headquarters was frequently greater than that required for the ship to move across the comparatively narrow stretch of water. The lack of information of the contents of the many ships awaiting discharge necessitated a ship to ship search for numerous critical items. This increased the labor requirements at an extremely critical period and in many instances caused the partial unloading of ships or the unloading of items with a low priority. 1/ In many instances 'the failure to locate an item resulted in the request for shipment of additional items from United Kingom and later the item origionally requested would be located. Another common source of confusion was the failure of the origionator to fill out way-bills properly. Errors of omission included absence of requisition numbers, proper nomenclature of items, and designation of locations.

Poor documentation, combined with the practice of breaking up and remaking trains, influenced delivery by land transportation

1/ Advance Sec., Coi Z "Operations History" - 1943-1945, Appendix B, Pt II, pg 8 to the extent that regulating stations sent personnel to the rear areas to locate and follow shipments of critical supplies in order to report their progress toward the forward ares.

In this manner the Regulating Station could keep the armies advised, Poor- or no-,instructions ' or incorrect documentation resulted in the arrival of convoys at division points in the lines of communications without sufficient inforrnatipn to indicate which army was to receive the -supplies. 1/

The following memorandum is quoted to portray a phase of documentation as it pretains to record procedure: "The uncertainty of supply flow gave rise to a situation where armies requisitioned more than ordinarily would be desired for army reserves. Restric- tions on army requisitions, except controlled items and-ammunition, were considered unjust as long as the uncertainty of the flow continued," 2/

'As has been previously mentioned, the rapid unloading of stocks regardless of the accuracy of records precluded the establishment of.a satisfactory control system. The urgency of the need and knowledge of when'item was located, were used by units of one- army in the early days as 'the justification for moving convoys into a dump, loading ad moving out. This action without the submission of a proper requisition or "tally-out" when loading was completed' contributed to the confused record situation. Violations of good principles of documentation were later reflected as a decrease in the quantities of resupply received as the records indicated these items were still someplace in the dumps. In addition, reports of battle losses were extremely difficult to secure, occasioned general failure on the part of rny and Advance Section

Service units to exchange information needed by both,

The back order system in use until March 1945 permitted

1/ History of 25th Regulating Station, Page 11-12 and 27. 2/ Memorandum for Supreme Commander S:'EA, through Commanding General Communications Zone. Subject: "The Supply Situation in Northern France," dated'25 Dec 1944 from Maj Gen L. R. Lutes, Director of Plans and Operations, ASF Washington, D. C. as recorded in Vol O G-4, Study 427. Fast M oving Situation, Theater General Board Report. items to be delivered to the requesting unit long after the neeI ceased to exist. In addition, it permitted back logsto accurulate which precluded the necessary emphasis on the expeditious delivery of items to the requesting unit.

Insufficient information on shipping tickets and way-bi.lls did not permit the identification of a particular shipment and consequently the maintenance of records was extremiely difficult.

The absence of this information resulted in the oldest requisitions being credited with the items involved rather than as a credit against a particular requisition. 1/ Fequently the only informa tion available to the re uisitionin ; agency would be the tonnage, class of supply.and service, and occasionally the applicable requisition.

Difficulties experienced by cormmunications zones in the supply of the combat forces in the early phase of the operations in France are indicated by the following remark, "It was discovered that

F+7tJA G-4 does not keep records -which would furnish the necessary tonnage data either on a basis of consumption to date or expected need in the future." 2/

Motor transportation was generally provided by the receiving agency for shipments of "less than carload" lots as the long trips by motor was preferable to delay in delivery or rurning the risk of losing the items due to poor documentation. 3/

Critical shortages of brake parts and stearing gear parts developed in the Italian Theater during the winter of 1943-1944.

After checking the supply source of the items in North Africa,

Lt.Gen Lutes located the missing parts on ships in the Naples harbor.

Poor tanifesting of shipping documents at Oram was determined as the cause. 4/

1/ History of the 42d Pegul tine Station, page b. 2/ Journal entry by Lt Col C. H. Plumenfeld, GSC, Asst AG of S G-4 rwjd Ech. Cone Zone, as recorded in C-4 History, fTUS A, Sec I. 3/ jlS7, Coy! "Operational History," 1943-45, Dg 75-76 4/ Address by Lt Gen Le Roy Lutes, Dir of Service, Supply and Procurement, Dir ?3GS, at Air Colle .e, i:ax aull Field 7 Jan 1947 It was estimated that the stock status reports submitted

by depots in New Guinea were approximately 507 accurate, The

reason given was failure of proper documentation, due to lack

of sufficient service personnel, and the unloading of ships

regardless of the ability to absorb and handle the supplies. 1/

Sixty--five hundred short tons were misdirected in ETO during the

first sixty days of combat. as a result of poor documentation. 2/

The foregoing remarks on documentation are examples of

evidence where through eagerness to process tonnage forced the

"supply pipelines" to increase the flow resulting in either

temporary or permanent losses occassioned by poor documentation,

Items which were eventually located were either not required, due

to reasons for which they were requisitioned ceased to exist,

or were surplus to the current requirement due to the subsequent

requisitions placed.on the production facilities in Zone of

Interior, There does not appear to be justification for the waste of manpower, transportation and raw materials caused by

the duplication.

1/ Interview with Lt Col R. W. May, Instructor, 0&t' C, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 Feb 47 . Formerly Chief of M ?ranch of Distribution Div SA and Stauff I New Guinea Base Section

2/ Lecture 1Docurienta tion,4'1 by Lt Col R. N. May, Instructor, Ce;GC', Ft Leav enort h, Kansas 13 Jan 1947 , +g

r ' ti ,

.- . ., APP IX C

PORTS AJ.D BEACHES

A study of this nature would be remiss if due consideration were not given to an analysis of the planning and actual results obtained from the use of ports and beaches.

Both Germany and Japan exerted every effort to deny the Allies the ports and their accompanying facilities. It was generally held by German military strategists that by denying the -Allies the ports along the continental coast line, it would be impossible to have a free movement of supplies, thereby bringing on a failure of the logistical support. Perhaps the best example of this strategy is exemplified by the fact that almost four months after landings had been made on the Brittiny Peninsula only the port of Cherbourg had been captured from the Axis. The damage to Cherbourg by the

Germans rendered it inoperative until 15 July. By continuing the use of the beaches, however, and _a few very minor ports 1,205,801

U. S. soldiers and 251,525 vehicles and the necessary accompanying supplies were ashore by 31 .August.,. In spite of the above accomplishments the tonnage actually unloaded over the beaches fell considerable short of the planned amount.

The following chart is included to portray the influence weilded by the tactical elements upon the accomplishment of the logistical phase of the invasion of Normandy: 1/

chart 1

- i ------~--j------Capacity Ports Capture Date D 30 D$60 t PlannedA: ctual : Planned : Actual:Planned:Actual ri n nn() 9()A() .nn .. . I MM Omaha iVVV . DD M;ulberry F'A" D 5000 5000. D Isigny P ") 500 500. 1300 D Grand Camp D D1 300 300. oo

Utah " D 4500 8000 4000. 6ooo. St:' Vasst D' 1100. 1100 1300 : n7'17- Bar Fleur 1000 1000. 640. Cherbourg. D 8 D, 121 : 6000 7000 5600 Granville D ~17, * D ,57: 700 1500 rr " St. Mialo D)725. 900. 2500. sr Brest D 50 D ,L 103: 1800 Rade De Brest ") 7'50 )7' 103: "-- 1440 Lorient D ' 50. * --- 800 Quiberon 171 40, 4000 r r * 1)7169: " St. Brienic D1) '40- : n7'1691 Moilaix D 7 50,

1/ Advance Section Communications Zone,"Operational History," 1943-1945 The followinig chart is included to show the differences between actual and. planned unloading up to D , 60:0~

Chart 2

Date : Planned : Actual Planned: Actual: Planned : Acitual

D : 2400 2800, : 5200, D, 1 65 00 4450 807, : 10950 :(16150)

7000 305 : 3300- 4375. :10300: 4680 :20.1 D ,'32 :(26450) (5487) : 6600 3122, 4400a 3163, : 11000 6285. :31.4 :(37450) (11772): 7000 36812- 4700, 2398 :11700 608o :38,4 :(49150) (17852) :

7000 8529.37 4700, : 2265, :11700 10794 : 47.1 :(60850) (28646) : 7000 5700, : 4144 : 12700 11523 : 54,6 : D,67 :(73550) (40169) 8000 8085- 5700 4033, : 13700 12118 :59.9 :(87250) (52287):

8000 9807 5700 : 4958. : 13700 14765 :66,4. :(100950):. : D"8 (67052) 8000 9008 5 700 5736 :13700. 14744 :71.3 -(31465o') (81796) ; D ,~10: 9000 8535 : 5931. : 14700: 14466 : 74.4 :(129350): (96262) : 5700 4 40 8 D ,1 11" 9100 8876 13660 :76.3 5 700 : (14415.0): (109922k~ D ,~ 12 10200 8670 : 5583. 15~900 14253 :77.6 5700 : :(160050),: (124175k D, 1.3 10200 5764 2575 : 15900 8339 : 75.3 :(175950) : (1325143 5700 : D 7' 14 10300 676 323. ::161000 999 :69.6 (191950): (133513)

~/Advance Section Communications Zone, "Operational History," 1943-1945 Chart 3

Supplies actually landed on the continent as compared with the planned or desired schedule* 1/

D 60 D 90

Planned (Long Tons) 1,640,000 3,070,000

Actual (Long Tons) 1,032,000 1,944,000

Chart 4

Logistical Build-Up of Supplies, Vehicles and Personnel 2/

D / 30 and D,'60

Date Planned Actual

D' 30 Stores (Tons) 613,150 411,130 Vehicles 131,970 99,415 Personnel 617,400 512,350

D / 60 Stores (Tons) 1,640,850 1,032,045 Vehicles 213,260 188,845 Personnel 926,500 949,995

D $ 90 Stores (Tons) 3,070,000 1,944,000

1/ Statistical Section, Eiq Fwd Echelon, Con Zone, as recorded in Theater General Board Report USFET G-4 Vol XK, Page 20.

2/ Statistical Section, Hg. Fwd Echelon Con Zone as reported in Study #27, USFET G-4, Vol. )M. The variation between the planned and actual tonnage unloaded as listed in the preceding charts was largely influenced by the slow progress made by the tactical troops during the early phase of the invasion which denied the use of many ports to the allies to the point that when they were captured their value to the support of the operation had ceased to exist.

The tactical situation was such that unloading was delayed to the extent that a considerable pool of ships had collected off shore by D / 2. Inm.ost cases the captain of each ship used his own discretion as to where the, ship would be anchored. This resulted in many of the ships being anchored at the wrong place and generally too far out. At this point the lack of realistic planning on the part of commanders resulted in a lack of cooperation and misunderstanding by individuals involved. The following extracts are quoted in order to point out the need for clear and concise plans in order to avoid jeopardizing the success of the support of the tactical elements.

"No attempt was made to catalogue the ships and when it was datermined that certain items were to be unloaded, representatives from group headquarters circulated among the ships, checking each one to determine the vessels to be unloaded. It was planned that the Naval Officer in Charge, Omaha Beach, was to keep group headquarters informed of the location of all vessels, but due to the late landing of his equipment and personnel he was unable to cope with the situation for some forty-eight hours or more after he assumed command . 2

1/ Operation Beport Neptune, /Omaha Beach Prov. Engr. Spec. Brig.

Gp. Oh. 15, page 174. "The army insisted on unloading ships on a priority basis

but the manifests were not available and the names of the ships

in the harbor were not known. Navy representatives had the

difficult job of'going around in small boars with all available

officers finding out what ships were present and what cargo they

had. This information was given to the army who indicated ihat

ships to unload. It was a rediculous situation. I requested

the army again and again to lift the priorities.*********** It

was not until ten minutes past twelve on June 12 that I was

sent for by the Chief of 'Staff to General Bradley and told to

unload without regard to priorities. Thirty-six hours later the

backlog was cleared. I mentioned this to the Allied Naval

Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Ramsey, on a tour of inspection he

was making and he said, 'It ought to go into the report in large

letters. Selective unloading after a bitter struggle when it

is impracticable to know what is in the harbor is not sound.

;hipty the ships and the priorities will takce care of themselves.',' 1/

The above extracts are not listed to promote a controversial

issue but rather to point out that if the plan for .unloading with-

out priority is followed, ships will be unloaded quickly. Unless,

however, there is a mutual understanding and realistic planning

which includes the required service troops and land transportation

available ready to receive and process this tonnage as rapidly

as unloaded, the net result will be piles of undocumented supplies.

This situation may create a false impression of the amount of

supplies available when the total tonnage is announced yet little

good can be accomplished when considerable quantities have been

allowed to accumulate due to the lack of handling personnel and

equipment. It immediately becomes apparent that the correlation between service troops and tonnage is of primary consideration in

realistic planning and that extra tonnage will only create confusion

and waste. From the standpoint of national economy, it would have been better if the items had never been requisitioned.

1/ Commander Support Craft, 1unfire11th Amphibious Force, who on 11 S~une waresa~ssignaed Temprary D~uty INOIO Omaha, inreport dated 3 July 144 in discusing Phase V - Post ssault and build-up. RecQded in Operation Rvpor reptune, Oamha each Prov 9ar 3;pec Bd:'~ 'Another indicatio'- of optimistic planning which lacked

the realism required for best results was the case of the port

of Cherbourg. This port at best was an unloading point for

personnel with an unloading capacity originally planned for

7800 tons. As was characteristic of a majority of ports the developed berth capacity exceeded the planned port capacity

and accordingly the planned figure was raised to 19,000 and finally 22,000 tons wwwhen the port was turned over to the

Normandy Base Section. Although the increase in the port capacity is praiseworthy, a considerable part of the increase was ineffective due to an insuffient amnount of railroad trackage leading toward the front lines. The lack of realism in this planning resulted in the collection of surplus supplies in dump areas in the vicinity of Cherbourg wh.ich were never moved.

1/ Cor~unicatios Zone Hiistory ection II, Chap I, age 45S -. r,,,Rj.. .: nS! . t f

J" I.

r A PSENIX )

SERVICE TROOP .Th3TUIR2METS

Some thought should be given to Service Troop Requirements when consideration is given to analysis of realism in supply planning.

The history of all wars, waged by nations which did not follow the principle of 100% manditory civilian mobilization, has indicated, in varying degrees, a lack of personnel available for the armed forces. This situation became most apparent during World War II with the result that there was a marked increase within the army in the study and application of the utilization of manpower.

Personnel requirements for production of war materials was the primary limiting factor on manpower availability and consequently numerous means to provide service troops and labor for the logistical support in the theaters of operations were utilized.

The training of units in the Zone of Interior was largely commensurate -ith the type of duty for which the particular unit was organized. Frequently the urgency of the need resulting from shortages of units and qualified technical personnel, necessitated the shipment overseas of units and personnel whose state of training left much to be desired. This was particularly true in the case of some port companies and some Army Air Force units. Obviously this state of training with the accompanying morale factor and the requirements for technical training directly affected the efficiency of the service output and maintenance standards.

Irrespective of the fact that the war resulted in the creation of more than a sufficient amount of work and accompanying increase in wages, there were, several instances where the direction of thinking and action of civilian labor organizations, handicapped the training of specialists and service units. To a minor degree this also influenced the accomplishment of planned logistical support of tactical operations. .Such instances were typified by stevedores striking, until an agreement was reached which fixed the limitation on the training of a port company to the physical' loading of only one ship.. This could easily increase to a magnitude, in the

event of another war, where a definite influence upon the. out-

come- of the war would be apparent and consequently would become

a menace to realistic supply planning.

Shortages of service personnel were most acute during the

early phases of amphibious operations with the result that usually

troops earmarked for combat operations were used to aid in the accomplishment of activities normally assigned to service troops. 1/

The lack of realism in planning of this nature is evidenced by the

waste of combat trained manpower and lowering of morale in the

units so utilized; in addition the lack of training in supply

proceedures-on the part of the combat troops resulted in poor

documentation, and storage which ultimately ended in loss and waste.

Invariably the necessary confusion during the early hours and days

of an amphibious operation combined w,iith the commanders desire of

assurance that his " t supplies" were across the beach, plus the willingness of the navy to unload rapidly, culminated in conglom-

erated piles of supplies which, until personnel was made available

for processing-it, was of no value to the assault echelons. When the .operation developed into a rapid advance the need for certain

types of supplies further aggravated the supply situation. The requirements for supporting the operation became increasingly difficult and as a consequence the piles continued to grow due

to the lack of qualified trained personnel. In addition, it was frequently considered necessary to use combat troops in mounting-

out areas, which lead to an. inefficiency in the system, due to the time lost when the combat troops were called forward to the continent,

and replacements were assigned.

The buildiup of service support during the operation Overlord

was based upon a slow and possibly deliberate offensive rather than

the disintergration of the enemy forces and the rapid pursuit;

1/ Lecture -- "Communications Zone", by Maj Gen T. B. Larkin, Quartermast er General. Given to the Service Class and Command Glass on 17 May 1946, C&GSC Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. -2-. consequently full logistical support was beyond the capabilities

of the service troops phased into the landing echelons during the

early days. Another factor contributing to the shortage was a

change in the tactical situation which required additional combat

troops to be landed in the early echelons, and service troops

phased back accordingly. 1/

Experiences gained from this war have indicated the value of

organization of Prisoner of War labor units.. These labor groups,

or units, were composed of men, who volunteered for this type of

duty, and were supervised by skeleton administrative organizations

composed of allied military personnel. The German leaders early

realized the value of this potential source of labor and devised

a system utilizing the manpower of the various countries whi ch came

under the influence of the Axis military operations. One notice-

able difference between the policies of the Allies*and the Germans,

on the use of Prisoners of War, was that in the early days of.the

-war the Axis practiced the principle of "work or be exterminated."

During the later phases, there was an appreciable change in the

German attitude on this subject, particularly where Western foes

were concerned.

Another valuable and lucretive source of labor was, secured

from personnel technically listed as Prisoners of War, but actually

men who were forced to fight on the side of the enemy due to the

political status of the country, and not as a result of the general

public opinion. The best example of this situation was the utiliza-

tion of Italian Prisoners of "War for organized service units. These

men, for the most part unskilled, were volunteers who were carefully

screened for any subversive activity, organized into units along

lines similar to United States Units, and were given adequate train-

ing, equipment and food (3100 calories), The result warranted War

fDepartment recognition to the extent that they were included as

a part of the troop basis for maintenance supply. By February 1945

there were 37,000 Italians assigned to such organizations.

1/ Logistis of Overlord, By Committee 2nd Command Cls, 1946g -3- A third source of labor may be recruited from the civilians of a friendly occupied land, or civilians from an enemy occupied country. In either case the value of, and the amount available is a variable predicated upon the food stocks of the land and the normal occupational pursuits of the inhabitants. During. the early days of the invasion of the continent, considerable difficulty was experienced in securing civilian labor to-work for United States.

The basis for this condition wus that the Germans had paid the natives of the area well for their labor and. produce, and there was a general dissatisfaction of the wage scale, workin' hours, and the prohibition.of using army stocks for feeding such labor. 1/

The civilian labor in France consisted of two catagories as follows:

1. Members of German labor battalions left behind by the

Germans.

2. Local civilians.

Members of the German labor battalions w ere knowjn as '-Todt

;porkers" and. since they were in some cases either Polish or Russian, they.could not be classified as Prisoners of.ear or as French refugees.

The forward progress of the combat units increased the terri- tory occupied which in turn increased the labor potential, combined with the wage payment of seven to nine francs per hour, the same as established by the Germans, attracted an average of three hundred civilian nployees by 26 June 1944. *1/

Although the use, of civilians in port operations was not desir- able it must be admitted that, the success of the military operations in all theaters was greatly facilitated by the use.of civilian labor, the value cf which was directly proportional to their standard of living before the war,

/ Adv. Sect. Con Z "Operational History" 1943-1945 - ,Appendix B

2/ Operation R~eport Neptune, Omaha Beach, Prov. ngr. Sp. Brig~. Gp. Chapter 27 -4-U A second instance worthy of mention of the use of civilians was during the operations in Luzon. The troop list requirement for service troops submitted by the Sixth Army Quartermaster was cut 40% by General Headquarters and the difference was made up from civilians, without seriously affecting the operation. ~/

Civilian labor available for war effort in the theater of operations may be considered in one of the following catagories:

a. Members of mobile civilian labor companies.

b. Static civilian employees.

Individuals who volunteered for work as indicated in category f'ag' above did not have "home ties".and due to their economic status were willing to live as members of labor companies in exchange for the prescribed wage, plus the very important item of wearing apparel and food. (3400 calories daily.) This provided a pool of labor of labor that reached a peak of 32,000 individuals by July 1945. Those individualy, who had established homes and had a family located in a commnunity and who did not want to move around from place' to place as the work assignments changed, were considered static civilian employees with theTU. S. Forces in liberated countries , al. approx- employed ~r imately 20,000 were/the U. S. occupational forces in Germany. 2/

No discussion of this subject of service troop requirements would' be complete without mention of the effort made toward the utilization of colored troops in our army. This source of manpower provided approximately 10% of the troop basis and consequently had to be utilized to the fullest. Due to native traits and characteristics, it~was observed that operations were not too successful when employed as large combat units operating alone, and in addition, instances, such as the observation made by Colonel Crosby, have been reported concerning their use as service troops. His report indicated that the colored service troops and anti aircraft units were used for labor at MVilne Bay. They were the poorest production of

1/ Sixth Army W Operation in the Luzon Campaign.-- by Brig Gen C . R. Lehner, "Military Reviewt" June 1946, Page 43.

2/ G-4 Report 'ETOUa. labor seen except the Japanese and Formosians employed in

Siapan. Native "fuzzy-wuzzies worked better than those mentioned. I/

On the other hand ample evidence is available to indicate the use of colored troops in small combat units with white troops, has been highly successful and the -wfork done by numerous service units was of the highest type. Although the problem of full utilization was not solved, it may be said that in the main the results obtained were directly proportional to the leadership

demonstrated by the assigned officer personnel. Officers having

an appreciation for racial characteristics, emotional reactions, standards of living and education have as a rule developed very

successful colored military organizations.

In passing it should be mentioned that North Africa was- a

fruitful source of labor, providing thousands of Arabs who were

used as a result of necessity and not by choice.

During the later phases of the war, effort was exerted to

utilize refugees and displaced personnel. The problem of supply

and movement of the large groups of persons classified in these

catagories became increasingly difficult, making it necessary to

organize camps for the various groups. Best results were obtained

when groups of persons having, the same political points of view

and nationality were assigned to the seine camp. Labor performed

by these people was on a voluntary basis with the understanding

that the employment would have no effect on movement to their

homes. This arrangement was :not the complete answer to the problem,

as is evidenced by G-4 record dated August 1-2 1944, regarding

the investigation of civilians employed, which indicated that over

a three weeks period there were 4000 French refugees in the Cotentin

Peninsula, and only four had indicated a willingness to accept

employment. 2/

1/ Report on Trip to Pacific Ocean Area and South West Pacific Area - by Col Vun. C. Crosby 12 Dec 1944

2/ 0-4 Report ETOUSA. Results later were more gratifying, although a. low percentage of the potential was actually used in a constructive manner.

The following table includes the personnel employed in the Con- munications Zone in the European Theater as of 30 April 1945: /

U. S. Military 582,827

Enemy Prisoners'of War 263,318

Civilian Labor 237,242

Italian Cooperators 38,264

It vsill be noted from the above .. fuig .-:: that, due to the shortage of service units, the United States military provided only 51.9% of the personnel utilized. This and other similar situations are influencing factors in thought concerning the requisitioning of labor, even friendly, when the military need became acute. The importance of this subject must be appreciated and considered fully if realism is to be included in supply plan- ing,.

Administration and. Logistical History of the E.T.O. His- torical Division, USF" T, Mar 1946. 7 RW S'TOR GEt

The correlation between storage and realistic supply planning is directly proportional to the tonnage requirements, personnel, and equipment available for handling it. Probably the following two experiences reported by Lajor General Conner, which occurred during 7orld War I will serve to best portray this relationship.

First, at the beginning of the war it was determined that there should be ninety days storage of supplies maintained. The different services submitted estimates which, when consolidated amounted to between three and five miles of covered storage. Four square miles of covered storage is practically four hundred linear miles of store-houses fifty feet wide. Only soldier labor was available for the construction and cutting of the lumber and actually sixty linear miles of store-houses fifty feet wide was built or aboue one sixth of the a aount requested from all departments. Secondly, since there was practically no cold storage in France, the quartermaster submitted. a figure of 92,500 tons of capacity as being needed, which

General Conners sent to a new officer 'in the G--4 section for necessary action. The indorsement indicates; .approval was soon prepared. Upon questioning the new officer it was found that the computations were based on 20 percent of fresh neat a day and regulations permitted fresh meat seven out of ten days. Based upon 2,000,000 men in

France, 92,000 tons was the correct figure for cold storage space.

Although the calculations were correct, a check on all the refrig- eration space in existance in the world, plus all that could possibly be made, could keep only 16,000 tons of storage space filled. So, --

16,000 tons was approved for storage space. 1/

1/ Lecture, 0-4, 0. H. Q., ,I F and its Major Problems," by Maj Gen rm D. Conner C. ., SOS, World War I, also the 0-4, G. H. "?. in France, A1rmy 'War College 14 May 1935 Increased developments and demands for mechanized equipment and accompanying supplies during World gar II increased the storage problems accordingly. The following table is indicative of a corresponding increase which applies to all theaters of operation and indicates the magnitude of the task confronting the comma nders and storage planners:

IT. S. Army Tonnage 1/

ETO (only) World War I

47,641,882 Long Tons 8,346,342 Long Tons

(Incl. 3,964,924 vehicles)

26,095, 698 Lone Tons UT. K.

Construction in addition to the above.

Shortages in service troops, shipping space and frequent chan~es of tactical plans emphasized the necessity for flexibility in the planning of the storage phase of an operation. The normal action of early echelon commanders was to unload the supplies for which they were responsible as rapidly as possible. In doing this emphasis Was placed upon measurement tonnage handled, using it as a standard of performance, whereas the number of items handled was frequently disregarded. This method proved successful only in instances w here there was adequate personnel to process and properly store the items as they were brought ashore. Frequently stock control personnel were unable to cope with the situation and in many instances supplies were either permanently or temporarily lost. Changing or shifting high priority from one critical item to another, plus changes in command responsibilities for dumps added to the confusion. The condition was frequently aggravated by changing cormanders as each successive commander knew less about the actual contents of his dump. 2/ An example of the ill effects which arose from placing emphasis on tonnage handled occurred at Ora Bay. Suppxlies were dumped in various storage areas; the engineer dump gave the appearance of having been piled with a

1/ x48 KillionlTons to Eisenhower," by Lt Col Randolph Leigh, page 6

2/ Advance Section Cormmunications Zone, "Operational His tory," 1943-4%5 steam shovel. The only clue to the contents of the pile was

the shipping document from the San Francisco Port of :S mbarkation

which the depot commander used as a stock record. The Pile was

searched every time a requisition was filled, and when an item was located a "tally-in" and "tally-out" were made at the same time,.

Again, on Siapan, suplies were hurriedly put ashore and dumped

on selected spots of ground which turned into mud holes during the

rainy season. The accompanying loss of time and e juipmient incurred was considerable, as sonic of the services worked jonthe to gather and

identify supplies.

During the past war the rei irements for protection of all kinds

of supplies frorm the elements varied from snow and. sub-zero weather to the extreme heat of the tropics and. from excessive rains to pro- longed dry spells, 1/ The insufficient amount of covered storage

on U.. -. end the European continent and the situation in the remain-

ing theaters ranging from little to none, gave emphasis to the pro-

tection of supplies by the method quite common to all called "Open

2torage, " The prnciples enployed in operation of open storage

areas are essentially the same as those used as a guide for covered

storage areas. However, an item lost due to a. lack of control over covered storage may eventually be located where as in the case of

open storage it may become completely lost.

The apparent lack of realism in planning for, and selection of

site location for open storage during the early phases of operations was shown to a varying degree in all theaters. Factors such as drainage, accessability, and cover must be considered carefully and

sited selected and developed accordinly. "Frequent ly terrain similar to the cultivated ground in the vicinity of Chartres, of necessity, had to be used. '"The air corps mark ed all buildings in the city of

Chartres for Ninth Air Force, including 200,000 square feet of excellent coverage which they did not use, and forced LJIIinto open storage for many critical engineer and signal items."

1/ ;The Lid is Off" by Lt Kr Schweitzer U, The -uartermaster Neviesw for Sept - Oct 1944, page 59 2/ Advance Section Gao munications Zone "Operational History" 1943-45. Sec TII, Oh ZI, pae '74 Fortunately, favorable weather prevailed during the period of

time this area was used for storage. Another instance of the

importance of site location and information on the weather and

terrain occurred in the early days at Finschhafen when 1400 vehicles were parked on an area that appeared to be hard. 4 en

the rains started the area was inaccessible for servicing vehicles for four *onths and thereafter the vehicles were pulled

out by use of artilley prime movers. Experiences such as the

one just described were the basis for the selection of the dump

sites in Hollandia by aerial reconnaissance. This was not too

successful either as some of the dump locations were on tops of mountains and there was insufficient time to change.. 1/

The progress made by the allies following the break-through

at St. Lo as well as information gathered concerning the economy

and manpower of the Axs were factors which developed an optimistic attitude concerning the early termination of the war. 2/ Although, the communications zone plan invisioned the development of a

system of depots (issue, filler, key, reserve, intermediate and general,) the progress was so rapid that stock levels could not be maintained. The capacity of the available transportation was

required by the army depots located in the Verdun'and Leige maintenance areas which were serving as a combination of all types of depots found in a communications zone. This procedure would not normally lead to a healthy depot system, however the absence of

Axis air power and the tactics of the Germans permitted its use.

The German counter offensive in Ardennes area directly affected the transporting and storing of supplies to the extent tiat the,

1/ Report on trip to Pacific Ocean and South West Pacific Area by Col Wi. C. Crosby 12 Dec 1944

2. UFT Report, Study No. 27 Mechanics of Supply in Fast Moving Situation. Page 11. "Sudden inability of the forward area to accept supplies accentuated by evacuation of supplies from forward dumps resulted in congestion of the entire supply pipe line." 1/

This was soon reflected at the ports where unloading operations

continued and supplies accumulated in considerable quantities due to the need for rail transportation. This condition was particularly true in Antwerp where, through an agreement with the British a limited amount- of space was made available for

storage. Actually, supplies were scattered over twenty-seven piers although Antwerp was not considered a depot. 2/ Irresec- tive of a maximum daily receipt capacity of 13,000 long tons,

Headquarters Communications Zone advised Advance Section Coi- munications Zone to be prepared to receive 22,000 longt'ons daily.

Repeated efforts were made by Advance Section Comnunications

Zone to point out the dangers of such a plan, however, no action was taken to correct this situation until early in December 1944.

By 30 December 1944, 125,000 tons of unclassified supplies had collected quayside at Antwerp. 3/ The backlog of freight cars

occassioned by the German :ounter ,.offensive December 1944 - Jan- uary 1945, which necessitated an embargo of freight movement to the Leige area, resulted in an accumulation of approximately

370,000 tons to be unloaded. 4/

.t is obvious that the emphasis was placed on clearing the port without a corresponding appreciation of processing and storing

in the depot area. The eventual establishment of additional depots

1/ G-4 Report 'ETOUSA

2/ Lecture "Service Supply and Procurement." Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes, C&GSC, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 Feb 1947

3/ ,S :Coin . "Opeat:onai i story ".,1943-1945, Sec I ,Chap IIP 105

4/ Interview with Colonel David Traub, Deputy Chief of Transportation, Communication Zone, ETO, as recorded in Theater General Board Report Vol. XI. in December 1944 did not prevent the near caotic situation

described above. It was 'not until the tactical situation

became stabalized that rail transportation was resumed and the

supply situation began to clear-up.

Communication facilities in some instances were slow and

dump commanders, with insufficient supplies available to fill a

requisition, were frequently faced with the decision of whether to permit trucks to return loaded with the supplies, which the dump commander thought should be moved forward, to wait for the specific supplies on the requisition, or send the trucks to another dump in an effort to' locate the correct items. 1/

Another problem that should be considered in any discussion

of realism in supply planning is the use of a floating reserve or floating storage. Due to the long lines of communications

and large amounts of tonnage to be transported, the allies were: constantly faced with a shortage of shipping. Consequently, the

Wffar Department was required to allocate shipping to the several

theaters. There was a tendency in all theaters, particularly in the early phases when the unloading facilities were taxed, to un-

load high priority supplies and either send the ship back to United

States partially loaded or wait until some future date to unload the remainder of the cargo. In either case this type of storage

contributed to the already existing shortage of shipping space.

The supply plan for the.invasion of the continent included maintenance shipping from United States as well as United Kindgom.

The slow progress made in unloading permitted two hundred forty

six commodity loaded ships to collect and await unloading. From

a tactical view-point this considerable amount of tonnage represented

floating or mobile depots. However, from the over-all transportation point of view this situation was considered undesirable. 2/

A successful storage plan must include adequate measures to

avoid losses due to pilferage. The utter disregard for government

1/ Advance Sec. Comm. Zone, "Operational History." 1943-45 Appendix B.

2/ G-4 H-istory ~OUS property on the part of somne individuals was sufficient cause

for considerable concern by commanders and supply planners.

Numerous instances of pilferage were observed during the beach

operation phases of most amphibious operations. In most in-

stances the source of the difficulties appeared to be troops

renainingaboard ship at the time of its unloading or those

permitted to loiter in the vicinity. 1/ The increase in the

length ofsupply lines magnified the opportunities for pilferage

by civilians or unscrupulous soldiers. The best records avail-

able indicate approximately 304 above normal Class I supplies were used over a period of time. One-third of the above excess required, or roughly, seven percent of the total consumed was

lost by pilferage. 2/

1/ "Supply Planning for Beach-head Operations," by Major i. G. Ashmore Q.M.C., January, February 1945. Quartermaster Review, page 19.

2/ G-4 History ETOIJSA t '~

.r_ Appendix F

TIRIANSPORTATION

On several occasions during the war, charges were made

by the War Shipping Administration,.shipping space was wasted,

due to the length of time ships were tied up in ports. The

army countered by questioning the diversion of shipping by the

War Shipping Administration to non-essential trade; (example:

shipment of bananas from the Caribbean areas.) 1/ It is

realized that a discussion of the War. Shipping Administration

is outside the province of this study, however, it is believed

that there is sufficient justification for a consideration of

the utilization of transportation, both land and water, in an

effort to determine its effect on realistic supply planning.

A. WAER TRANSPORTATION.

Regardless of the phenominal speed accelerated in the ship

building industry and the corresponding increase in trained

personnel to man these ships, it was not until the later phase

of the war that this mode of transportation ceased, to be critical.

It will be recalled that following V-E day some shipping previously

loaded, with Europe as a destination, was diverted to the Pacific

theater while all other available shipping was utilized for re-

deployment either via the United States or directly to the Pacific

theater. Consequently, at no time was it possible for operational

plans to be made without giving water transportation a high priority

in all consideration.

It has been stated by some military analysts that execution

of movement of the ships across the channel was the weakest part

of the invasion of the continent. There are those individuals who may contend that the fault rests with either one service or the other and will cite data, such as the Navy landing personnel on the wrong beach or in too deep water , Navy skippers failingto comply

1/ Fortune, September 1942 with the beach-masters signals, Navy was supposed to report

the arrival of each ship by name and number, or that the army

representatives ordered ships to move from one berth to another

without consulting with Navy representatives, etc. 1/ Now

t after all the smoke and noise have cleared away", it appears

that the mistakes are not chargeable to one or the other service

but to both for the lack of co-ordination an~d co-operation on the beach during the early days.

The. invasion involved more shipping than was ever envisioned before in an amphibious operation, and the team work required,

.increased proportionately. With the hundreds of ships collected

off shore and the strain placed on existing communications it is apparent that more practice and a better understanding, by those directly involved in the unloading activities, was needed. Regard- less of the accuracy in all phases of the supply planning, this apparent lack of realism in planning was the partial basis for logistical difficulties which beset the Allies for the greater portion of the time prior to the capitulation of the Germans.

Perhaps the "bugaboo" presented by "Order and Shipping Time"' presented more difficulties to the logistician than any other transportation factor. Time lag', between sixty and one hundred eighty days occurred, depending upon the theater, between the date of submission of requitions and the date the item was delivered to the port. It is evident that unless planning is sound and the approved plans are adhered to, logistical support will suffer accordingly..

The shortage of shipping, previously discussed, resulted in the War Department exerting every effort to shorten the turn-around time to the various theaters. This resolved itself into a problem of unloading the ships expeditiously. In some instances, bases were rated by the weight of the tonnage handled by the port. Some- times a maximum time limit on the length of time a ship could be-in

1/ Logistics of Overlord - by Committee 2nd Command Class, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 1946 port was established. This procedure established the immediate

desired results, that of getting the ships unloaded, but frequently

caused ships to be diverted to other ports for unloading. Later

it was necessary to handle and re-ship these same supplies to the port for which they were origionally destined. 1/ Another

situation occurred where the ships were unloaded on schedule, but

due to lack of dock space and service personnel, supplies were

improperly stored, -which added to the confusion and waste.

Another example of the lack of realism in supply planning is

indicated by a congestion of shipping at New Caledonia in 1942, when fighting was in progress on Guadalcanal. The tie-up amounted

to seventy-five ships awaiting discharge in a harbor which had only five berths available for unloading. At the rate of unloading

there were enough ships in the area to require three months to unload. The situation ashore was equally critical. Services were

competing for space to store equipment. Emnphasis on unloading; had caused a congestion to exist on the piers. The one small

railroad was overworked. The situation was such, that ships were brought to the docks and searched for high priority items and

if found, these items were unloaded and the ship returned to its anchorage. It developed that this situation was the result of each force requisitioning independently of the other, with the result that there was a duplication. Through the efforts of Gen0aj Lutes the first "Joint Logistical Board" of the war was formed when the

Navy and Army logistical groups co-ordinated their efforts and began establishing combined priorities on shipping scheduled to come into the theater. This required loading in U. S.. in accordance with these priorities, and brought to the theater according to the ability to unload. 2/

It is interesting to note the progress that was made along these lines as a testimony to more realism in supply planning. A shipping control officer at the Marianas, short title COrMA section,

1/ Interview with Lt Col R. "ff. May, former Chief of Q3vI Branch of Distribution fDiv, SAA and Staff Vin New Guinea Base Section 17 Feb47 / Address by Lt Gen Lutes, Dir Serice, Suply and Procurement Div, ~DGS, at Air Colege, I awell Field, 7 Jan 47 was charged with the regulation of maintenance shipping to

the area, in the area, and from the area. Through the efforts

of this organization a "cargo of materials furnished by the

arry on one island loaded by the marines, transported on craft

of the Amphibious Force Pacific, unloadedat another base by

a navy Special Construction Battalion and delivered to the Air

Force."t This satisfactory solution to a logistical problem

like many others was the outgrowth of situations such as that

di-scovered by Gen lutes at New Caledonia. "The elimination of

dual handling systems, the consolidations of supplies, the con-

sequent savings in warehouse space, and the availability of

certain facilities of each service to all services resulted in

a saving in manpower, time, and cost which represented no small

contribution to the war effort. 1/

another factor which must be given some thought is the util-

ization of return shipping from the theater to the port of embarka-

tion serving the theater. it would appear practical to place aboard

empty ships such tonnage as is available, however experience indicates

that there is a delay in turn around time, .affecting the port, due

to the small amount of tonnage in scattered loads. During a thirty

day period 134,000 LT (exclusive of ammunition) scattered over

one hundred five ships was unloaded at NXYP. The break-down of

ships was as follows: twenty-five carried less than fifty LT,

twenty seven carried less than two thousand LT and only twenty werefully loaded. 2/

The time requiredfor berthing a ship and all the prelimin-

maries incident to unloading was the same for a fifty ton load as

for a full load. The obvious solution to thie situation appears

to be to out load return tonnage only when there was sufficient

available to fill a ship.

1/ Joint logistics at an Advanced Base in Pacific by Col Harlan D. Bynell GSC, r Array Officer, Joint Staff

2/ G-4 History, 1T'US In passing, a few remarks concerning the use of the

UI3W" are appropriate, especially since there was an apparent lack of appreciation of the limitations of this.vehicle. The

%lTtJI soon became an indispensible piece of equipment in all theaters. The launching of preloaded 'tDIT~kW" from I's to transport supplies for the support of assault echelons became the accepted practice in all instances where shore approaches were considered favorable. Reports of losses resulting from launching the vehicles too early and too far out 1/ as uell as in heavy seas, are indicative that more emphasis should be placed on this subject by supply planners of the appropriate echelon.

B, LbiUD TMAN ?Q'ITA7TON.

(1) Vehicular.

All accounts concerning wars of the past have indicated the influence exerted by land transportation used in the support of the various armies involved.. The success of the cornmaner whose mission as aggressive offensive action, involving the capture and control of land areas, has always hinged on the availability and employment of land transportation. Well known examples of the influence wielded by effective transportation are typified by the failure of Napoleonts ambitions but ill fated attempt to conquer the Russians, due to the lack of transportation to support his operation logistically, and success resulting from the unique employment of elephants by Hannibal. Although the progress made by either side was negligible during the latter phases of World War I, it was reported that the most difficult supply problem of the war came immediately following the signing Of the armistice. This resulted from the planned concurrent advance to the Rhine River along the

entire front by the French, English, Belgian and United States1 armies.

The following is a comint made as the result of a study of the Supply of the U. S. Third Army during its advance: "The essential requirement

1/. Operations Report Neptune, 6th Engineer Special Brigade, Page 20 of modern armies are railroads and roads, the need for the

former becoming more urgent as distance from base and rapidity;

of advance are increased." 1/ This comment was applicable for

World Wr II to a far greater degree then World War I.

History offered little information that was of value for

the use of transportation planners and as a consequence follow-

ing the break through at St. Lo, the urgency of the need for

adequate logistical support for our rampaging armies during their

epoc making advance across Western Europe, gave birth to numerous

approaches toward its solution.

Tha fact that Advance Section Communications Zone was able

to deliver 4,250,515 tons of supplies to all supply agencies

during the period 2 September.1944 to 30 June 1945 is an indication

that the planning of transportation was headed in the right direction. 2/

However, it must be remecred that the rapid advance made across

France was forced to halt in order to provide time for the build-up

of essential supplies and maintenance incident to a continuati.on

of the advance.

The rapid increase in the lines of communication, combined with the lack of transportation made it impractical to build up

stocks in the Advance Section Communications Zone, and supply the

requirements of'the armies too. The follotiylng table is listed to portray the rapid change in depot stockage that took place as a result of the acute shortage of transportation during the indicated period of time: 3/

Class ASEC Depot iSC Depot Stockage (14T) Stockage (LTT) 12 August 1944 30 September 1944 46,531 1554 III pkg. 39,569 1584 V 210 ,054 2505 II r~ IV 11,838 141 51,912 4328 5,126 1181 Med. 6,636 4474 Ord. 10,878 453 12,514 1795 395,053 18,015 1/ "°The Supply of the Third Army on Its March Into Germany, " (World War I) by Lt Col James Hanson 2/ Advance Section Communications Zone "Operational Hi try r 1943-45, Appendix D. 3/ Advance Section, Communications Zone "Operational History," 1943-45, Sec III, Chap 1II 6 It soon became evident that this expansion of the lines

of communication had reached the point where the transportation

facilities as utilized could do little more than supply the

ary daily maintenance tonnage requirements. In addition, the

source of supply vas the beach and port area, as the estabilish-

men.t of sufficient filler depots had not been accomplished. The

outgrowth of the planning to meet this and similar situations, at

different times, was the establishment of military road systems

which were to be utilized by through truck traffic hauling supplies

from rear to forward areas within reach of arry dumps. The most

historic of these system;. was the "Red Ball Highway System." Rail

transportation had not-advanced sufficiently far, to alleviate

the strain placed on the transportation facilities and consequently

truck transportation was forced to carry the major portion of tonnage

required for the build-up of the supplies prior to a continuation

for the advance eastward. The "Red Ball" line included truck units

that could, be made available by communications zone and at one time

reached a rax -numof 140 truck companies used to support the two

armies. 1/ This transportation ,waspooled and utilized solely,

during this period, for the purpose of transporting critical supplies.

This effort toward the solution of the transportation problem did

not provide sufficient tonnage space for the requirements of all the using units and as a consequence armies were allocated tonnage in

accordance with requisitions submitted. Weight of items bec.mte one of the primary considerations and each consolidated requisition

submitted by the armies Was carefully scanned to assure requisition was covered by allocated tonnage. In order to avoid convoys return-

ing;empty or loading up with low priority items, a list of accept- able substitutes was supplied to Advance Section Service Representative. 2/

1/ Iecture - " uropean Theater Administrative Organization, " by Col W. W. Wendt,/CO&GSC , Ft Leavenworth, iTansas 7 5an 1947 Instructor 2/ "Requisitioning MHovement of .Supplies," Headquarters, 12th Army Group (G-4 & .Sup) 400.312, dated 28 Oct 1944 as recorded in Vol 1O( Theater General Board, USFT, Study P27rage 66 The "Red Ball" system of transportation Was continued until the build-up of supplies in forward area was assumed by the increase of the port capacities and the tonnage moved by railroad amounted to 25,000 tons.

Regardless of the success demonstrated by the systems used to augment existing transportation facilities, there were accompanying ill effects resulting from the continuous operation of these vehicles. Chief concern in this respect was that of proper nain- tenance. This problem was given careful consideration during the .planning stage and practical'steps were taken to modify the existing plans during the operation. Vehicles completely worn out as a result of such use, plus the vehicle deadline percentages covering the period of time under consideration, are indicative that 40 trucks per truck company is the maximum planning figuret- which may be used with safety. The, following table covers the percentage of vehicles deadlined during the period of time when maintenance' problems assumed most serious proportions:

Date Percentage Deadlinedlf

December 15 16.6

December 23 22.5 January 1 21.9 January 8 21.8 )) Average 21.9% January 15 21.3 January 25 22.8 February 1 21.0

February 8 18.2

It will be noted that the average percent of deadline vehicles during this period of time 'was 21.9% which left an average of 37 trucks per truck company operational.

(2) Rail Transportation.

This method of transportation is the most economical type which may be used to support a military operation. The scarcity of rail transportation in North Africa, the lack of rail transportation l/ Advance Section Communications Zone, "Operational History" 1943-45 Sec IV, Chap 1IT, page 113. 8 in the Pacific, and the thorough demolition of the track by

the. Germans as they retreated in Italy apparently influenced

the estimates of usable track remaining intact on the continent.

A a result, the usable railroad. track captured by "D" 120 far

exceeded the planned available track. Specifically the planning

figure was 757 miles and the actual miles of single track equivalent was 10,162 miles. To make the picture even brighter, large amounts

of repair materials were abandoned intact, by the Germans, which %

made shipment of a large percentage of like materials from England

or United States unnecessary. Contrasted with this bright outlook

on available transportation was the fact that the armies had advanced

much more rapidly than was ever conceived as being possible. The

existing lines of communications were strained to the utmost in

order to maintain the pace, and, ultimately, forward progress was

halted to permit a build-up of supplies to support a continuation

of the advance.

The port capacity at Cherbourg was increased far more than the

origional estimated capacity. The absence of realism in planning

is evident as the combined efforts of rail and truck transportation

were unable to move the tonnage unloaded and consequently a surplus

of stocks was accumulated, which were never used and were not in a position where they could safely be called reserve stocks, due to a

shortage of transportation.

The main deficiency of rail transportation was the lack of

control of train movements. In the early phases, due to poor

documentation, there was a lack of information from which control

could have been gained over the movements of trains loaded in rear

areas or near the beaches: Too frequently, trains were broken up

and remade without the knowledge of why the action was necessary, which naturally resulted in mixed deliveries. It was apparent that there was a need for a strong system of central control in

order to maintain a strict surveilance over the movement of all

shipping and be in a position to keep interested supply echelons advised on items, requisition numbers consignees as well as

tonnage enroute. 1/ The confusion and uncertainty occasioned

by the above described weaknesses were.further accentuated by

the Ardennes drive made by the Germans. The Germans ailed this

all important drive at Verdun and Leige knowing that our main

inland depots were located in these areas. The tactical maneuvering by the Army, in this area, to counter the German advance, clogged the roads and railroads and prohibited the unloading of any supplies in the forward area for approximately two weeks. The net result was a congestion of loaded rail cars which was not cleared up until late in January 1945. 2/

1/ Advance Sec. com. Zone, "Operational History. f 1943-45, Sec. ItI, Chap. III, Page 108

2/ Advance Sec. Corn. Zone, "Operational History." 1943-45, Appendix B. 7:,

r"s r '. ,.

+ ' f' tta...-." , ..... ,,.:mss,,, APPtENDIX G

ANALYTICAL STUDY

ALI-Z1 IN SU1PLY PLANNING

BIBLEEOG AHY

1.. Lecture, "Industrial Mobilization," by Col. . X. Heiss, Spec. Ass't, Under Sec ty of 1iTr. C&GSC, Ft Leavenwworth, Kansas, 5 1"I'arch 1947

2. Lecture, "Procurement," by Brig Gen Christmas; C&GSC, It Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 N-rch 1947

3. Lecture, "Director of Service, Sup ly and. Procurement" by Lt Gen LeRoy T. Lutes, CGS, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 February 1947

4, "Logistics of Overlord," by Committee 2d Command Class, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 1946

5. Lecture, "Supply, Organization, and Transportation," by Lt Col F. K. Puckle, Asq't General, British Army, 'War College, February 1916

6 Jebsterts Collegiate Dictionary, 5th Edition, 1943

7. Address, "Service, Supply, and Procurement, WNar Department General Staff," by Lt Gen Le Roy Lutes, Dir of SS&P, V DGS, at Maxwell Field, 7 January 1947

. Study x 2 7 , Theater General Board, USF.T, G-4, Vol i

9. Report on Trip Through Pacific Ocean and South Pacific Area, by Col 'er.. C. Crosley, 12 December 1944.

10. History of 25th Regulating Station, Page 11-12. and 27.

11. Memorandura for Supreme Commander $. A ', through Commanding General Communications Zone. Subject: "The Supply Situation in Northern France." Dated Dec 25 1944, from Lt Gen L. R. Lutes, Dir of Planning and'Operations, ASF, fashington, D. C. as recorded in Vol .CC,G-4, Study 27, Theater General Board, US:FT.

12. AR 850-25

13. History of the 42d Regulating Station, page 6

14. Conference, "Requirements of New Developments and Other Government Aigencies," by Col James D. Sams, CC, Ft Leav- enworth, Kansas, April 1947

15. Journal Entry by Lt Col C. H.. Plunenfeld, GSC, Asst' A.C of S G-4F~wd. Ech. Coin. Zone, as recorded in G-4 History, STOUSA, Sec I

16. Interview with Lt Col R. W. May, Instructor C&G3SC, Ft. Leav- enworth, Kansasg Feb 17, 1947 . Formerly Chief of Q. Branch of Dist. Division SWPA and Staff (QJ, New Guinea Base Section. 17. Lecture, "Documentation,. "by Lt Col R.. ,14'.May, Instructor, C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 13 Jan 1947.

18. Statistical Section, Hq. Fwd. 'Ech. Cona. Zone, as recorded in Theater General Board Report, USF G-4. Vol , Page 20.

19. Operations Report Neptune, Omaha Beach. :Engineer, Special Brigade Group, Ch 15, Page 174.

20. Commander Gunfire Support Craft,: 11th Amphibious Force, who on 11 June was assignied temporary duty NOIC Omaha, in report dated 3 July 1944 in discussing Phase V - Post Assault and build-up as recorded in Operation Report Neptune, Orha Beach Prov. Engr. Spec. Brig. Gp.

21. Communications Zone History Section IT, Chap. IV, Page 45.

22. Lecture, "Communications Zone," by Maj Gen T. B. Larkin, Quartermaster General. Given to the Service Class and Command Class O&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 May 1946.

23. Sixth Army QdVI Operation in the Luzon Campaign, by Brig Gen Lehner, Military Review, June 1946, Page 43.

24. G-4 Report, irJOUSA.

25. Administration and Loggistical History of the E.T.O. Histori- cal Division, USFET, Mar 1946.

26. Lecture, G-4, GHQ, "A. E. F. and Its Major Problems," by Maj Gen Vin. D. Conner, Commanding General, SOS, World War I, also G-4, G. H. Q., in France. Army War College, 14 May 1935.

27. "48 Million Tons to Eisenhower," by Lt Col Randolph Leigh, Page 6.

28. "The Lid is Off, " by Lt Win Schjoitzer Q. M. C. The Quartermaster Review, Sept-Oct 1944, page 59.

29. Interview ith Col David Traub, Deputy Chief of Transportation, Communications Zone, ETO, as recorded in Theater General Board Report, Vol. :II.

30. "Supply Planning for Beach- head Operations," by M1a jWinm CmG Ashmore, 'ViC January - February 1945. Quartermaster Review, Page 19.

31. Fortune Magazine, September 1942.

32. "Joint Logistics at an Advance Base in Pacific," by Col Harlan D. Bynell, GSC, Sr Army Officer, Joint Staff, Commander Marianas, Military Review, Aug 1946.

33. "The Supply of the Third Ary on Its March -Into Germany," World -War I by Lt Col James Hanson.

34. Lecture, "European Theater Administrative Organization.," by Col Wf. 7. Tendt, Instructor CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 January 1947. 35. "Requisitioning and Movement of Supplies," Headquatters 12th Army Group (G-4 Sup) 400.312, dated Oct 28, 1944, as recorded in Vol iX Theater, General Board Report, USFF Study #2 7 , Page 66.

36. Advance Section Communications Zone, "Operational History" 1943-45 Appendix B. Part II, Page 8.

37. Advance Section Communications Zone, "Operational History," 1943-1945, Sec IV, Chap II, Page 105.

38. Advance Section Communications Zone," "Operational History," 1943-45, Appendix D.

39. Advance Section Communications Zone, "Operational History," 1943-45, Sec. III, Chap III.

40, Advance Section Communications Zone, "Operational History," 1943-45, Sec. IV, Chap III, Page 113.