This Document IS a HOLDING of the ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO

~1Pd~XTIC~L STUDY '~R~AII31 IN OV~SIA2 arl13 li Realism in overseas supply pia zing, by L~t Gol C. B. Henderson. CCISC. 1946-47. JUiN 2 1 1965 This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO. N-128.20 COPY NO. W Col: J Th GNERALC STAFF C0ILB(JE Regular. Course 1946-4'1 ANALYTICAL STUD~Y RR LI 'tIN OVERSEAS SUPPLY IPLAN TING Page The Problem 1 Facts Bearing on the Problem .. ............ 1-2 Discussion .. ..... .... ... .. 2-8 Conclusions.............. ....... 9-10 Recommendations....................10-11 Appendix A - Procurement Appendix B - Documentation. Appendix C - Port and Beach Activity Appendix D - Service Troop Requirements. Appendix EL - Storage Appendix F- Transportation Appendix G- Bibliography Submnitted by: Carroll B. Henderson Lt Col, Cavalry REAi=SM IN OV1RIS SUPPLY IMPJING A. ?ROBL A. A picture of the phases of supply planning in the Zone of Interior and overseas theaters, is here presented, with the idea of indicating the apparent lack of realism and appreciation for the critical factors limiting the receipts and distribution of cargo. While it is appreciated that all phases cannot be considered in a study of this.scope, it is believed that sufficient information is available to develop solutions to the principal problems affecting the matching of supply demands to lines of communications capabilities. It must be appreciated that the allied nations won the war due to overwhelming superiority of natural resources and nan-power, of which the united States contributed the maximum end products and accompanying jobs which ultimately determined the destruction of the Axis Forces. In making a study of this nature it is necessary to accept, without comment, the accomplishments well done, and emphasize the errors in planning and execution. B. FACTO"BEARING ON TII~ PROBL . Throughout the war, the almost universal tendency on the part of overseas commanders to ask for more supplies than the theater distribution systems could absorb, resulted invariably in the existance of one or more of the following conditions: (1) ~cessive quantities in the transportation "pipe-line.' (2) Necessity of unloading and storing low priority cargoes when facilities were overloaded. (3) Large amounts of supplies, which never reached the front, being transported and stored at tremendous effort. (4) aste of shipping with resultant curtailment of other critical shipping programs. Recent experimental. developments of atomic energy and improvements in air transport, are indications that in the event of another l major conflict, deception and shock Will play an important part, perhaps the most vital role rather. than overhel ming superiority of manpower and materials. Accepting this observ- .ation as a.premise, it is obvious that the military system utilizing proceedures having the fewest mistakes, regardless of its potential, stand the best chance of winning or surviving. The following doctrine outlined in Field Service Manual, "Administration," is quoted and accepted as the fundamental basis for all subsequent discussion and findings. "nxiety for certainty of supply creates a desire to accu- mulate large stocks in combat areas, but need for flexibility in the supply system dictates a minimum stock level to enable combat units to meet rapidly moving situations and to maintain safety of supplies from capture, distruction or abandonment." C. DISCUSSION. Although numerous factors affect realistic supply planning, it is believed that the most predominent can be' analyzed by consideration of the following topics: (1) Procurement. (2) Documentation. (3) Port and Beach Activities* (4) Service Troop Requirements. (5) Storage. (6) Transportation. (1). Procurement (Jppendix A) Speculations and forecasts of requirements of the near future must of necessity.be based on experience and lessons learned during the war years of 1940-45. Conclusive evidence is available to prove that the production, procurement, and man-power potential of the United States are not unlimited. The phenominal increase in production, attributable to native ingenuity being applied on the production line, was approaching or had reached maximum per- formance by early 1945. Shortages of critical materials accentuated the develorment of synthetics for use as substitutes-in some instances; whereas in other instances, strict 'regulations were inforced on utilization of end products by both civilian and military agencies. Measures initiated to establish production priorities allocate production facilities and raw materials, were only.successful in varying degrees. Throughout the entire war, the production and procurement of itens essential to a supply service for tb.e accomplishment of its mission, was the sole responsibility of that particular service. The net result of this procedure was in many instances a duplication of procurement effort, by more than one supply agency, to secure the same type of items. This condition was an outgrowth of the systems and procedures followed during World far I, and any indications of "mpire Building" by the services could be attributed to the lack of procurement, coordination and standardization of specifications. Lack of latitude in procurement resulted in each service writing its own particular specification for an item and wpith the exception of the CQuartermaster and Ordnance services, each developed its own particular nomenclature and stock record number. It appears that the several agencies preparing, coordinating, recording and promulgating specifications are more than sufficient to process all classes of supplies and equipment required by the armed forces. It appears obvious that there is a need for an agency to control and coordinate all activities pertaining to standardization of specifications. In addition the advantges resulting in a saving in time and the elimina- tion of duplication of effort and manpower occasioned by the universal adoption of Feeral Stock Catalog Numbers makes the effort required appear worthwhile. (2) DOCUir i TTICTAT (Appendix B) Prior to the war there was little evidence to indicate the magnitude of the tonnage or the thousands of items which were later transported to every part of the world, As a consequence, the significance of the full importance of the relationship of documentation to items and tonnage was not fully realized until the later phases of the European operations. Consideration of tbis ;phase of supply planning must atlays include the factors of (1) Utilization of P~anpoer, (2) ~EAailability of Supptly, (3) Comunications and? (4) Record proeittre. Pioity was given to the selection of personnel for combat troops resulting in most instances in a shortage of trained service personnel. The in the- depots and dumps results are readily apparent. Paperwork/became secondary as physical handling of tonnage received first consideration. Personnel normally assigned to documentation duties were needed to augment the generally insufficient handling personnel. The practice of augmenting service troops with combat troops was considered justifiable although the loss of efficiency due to the lack of trainim was apparent.. Temporary or permanent loss of supplies was proportional to the emphasis on tonnage moved and the corresponding lack of documentation. Inefficient use of transportation and the failure to deliver the maximum supplies are direct results of poor or ineffective documentation. Adequate communications and accurate records procedure were the object of gradual and progressive improvements. In most instances these improvements in procedure were made as indicated by experience only, as the individuals responsible had not pre- viously been sufficiently trained. (3) PORTS AIM BiACF (Appendix C) Possibly the most important phase of amphibious operations involved the study of the ports and beaches, to include their tactical and supply potential. The tactics generally applied by the Axis was to restrict the movement of the allied forces by denying them port facilities, regardless of cost. This principle was predicated on the belief that an amphibious force could not be supported over beaches sufficiently to permit the waging of an offensive war. The fallacy of this thinking was shown when major operations in all theaters were supplied for protracted periods of time by use of beaches only. It is interesting to note, as a matter of comparison, in the Normandy invasion the over optimistic planning of the initial tactical phase as well as the tonnage to be unloaded, and the pessimistic approach by logistical planners as to the capacities of the ports and beaches. The retarding of the tactical progress had a corresponding effect on unloading activities and thereby was a contributing factor in the accumulation of a back log of shipping in the vicinity. The desire on the part of most commanders to unload as much tonnage as possible in the early phase of operations is not without fault as the generally crowded areas immediately in rear of the beaches do not permit satisfactory beach operations. Selective unloading and complete unloading were highly controversial subjects during the war. From the navy and transportation point of view, the back- log of partially unloaded ships carrying items of low priority; was wasteful of transportation which was an ever present critical factor. Complete unloading had its accompanying problems. It results in the dumping of tonnages on the beaches and in dumps with the ideas of identification and documentation generally becoming

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