BRIE F PO L IC

turning presence

Y into power: LESSONS FROM THE EASTern neighbourhood Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson

Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood Policy SU Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood (ENP) in 2003, the has become more Policy (ENP) in 2003, the European Union present and involved in the affairs of its eastern neighbours has become the biggest trading partner of than ever before. It has become the biggest trading partner most of the states in the region, embarked of most of the states in the region, embarked on association MMA on association and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, and offered visa and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But the and offered visa facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But it has EU has not succeeded in turning this presence not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In security into power. In fact, as the EU has become more involved in the eastern neighbourhood, and democracy terms, the EU has failed not only to achieve its ability to influence political developments most of its objectives, but also to prevent a deterioration of in the region has stagnated at best. With the trends on the ground. In fact, every country in the region exception of Moldova, all of the EU’s eastern except Moldova is less democratic now than it was five years neighbours have gone in the wrong direction in ago. As the EU’s southern neighbourhood goes through

R the last few years. a democratic transformation of its own, it is particularly Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into important that Europe learns the lessons of this failure to Y power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian consolidate democracy in post-revolutionary societies in the and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of eastern neighbourhood like Georgia and . the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the At the same time, with some member states preoccupied eastern neighbourhood to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors; with the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, and the EU’s own limited commitment to the there is also a danger that things will get even worse in the ENP. The EU should continue to increase its eastern Europe. As revolutions have toppled dictatorships own visibility and outreach with the public, in Tunisia and Egypt and threatened other regimes in business interests and state institutions in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it should the southern neighbourhood, the eastern neighbourhood not rely on soft power alone. Instead, it should seems to be moving in the opposite direction – in other also aim to develop a more transactional words, towards authoritarian consolidation. While the relationship with its eastern neighbours – in EU’s southern neighbours look like the eastern neighbours other words, to decide what its interests are, be less diplomatic with interlocutors and set tough did in the revolutionary years of 2003 to 2005, the eastern conditions on issues such as visa liberalisation. neighbourhood looks increasingly like the south did a few years ago – a collection of states with close economic relations 2 ECFR/31 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu RETHINKING THE ENP: LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE EAST Armenian and Moldovan governments working with local local with working governments Moldovan and Armenian Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Ukraine and Moldova. It It Moldova. and Ukraine to (EUBAM) Mission Assistance The EU’s increasing presence… EU share of foreign trade of EaP states (DCFTA) with most of its neighbours. The EU’s contractualEU’sThe relationsneighbours itswith alsohave Eastern Europe in order to turn its presence into power. Two dozen EU high-level advisors are embedded in the the in embedded are advisors high-level EU dozen Two This means that there are more crisis management personnel conflict in involved increasingly become also has EU The TheEU trades more than Russia with each of the six Eastern Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – than ever before. ever than – Ukraine and Moldova Georgia, Belarus, Partnership (EaP) states except Belarus, and it is also moving advanced. The EU is negotiating Association Agreements Agreements Association negotiating is EU The advanced. and the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.South andAbkhazia of secessionistregionsthe and also has a 200-strong EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and eastern neighbours. The size of these delegations has also also has delegations these of size The neighbours. eastern deployedmissionsEUin easternthe in neighbourhood than can routinely afford to ignore the EU on key political and and political key on EU the ignore to afford routinely can of the ENP, the EU and its member states have also beefed also have statesmember its and EU the ENP, the of Figure 1 with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan. and Armenia Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, with number of EU delegations in the region has increasedfrom hasregion the delegationsin EU of number region of Transnistria, and it deploys a 120-strong EU Border neighbourhood – which comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, comprises which – neighbourhood withEurope butcentralised, non-competitive politics, which will need to put much more energy into its policiestowardsitsinto energy more much put to needwill aaeet n h esen egbuho. h E i a secessionist the is between Moldovaandtalks the mediatorin EU The neighbourhood. eastern the in management two to six, so that the EU is now represented in each of the of eachrepresented innow is EU the that so six, to two towards Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements Agreements Trade Free Comprehensive and Deep towards institutions to promote reforms, and a Border Support Team in any other region except the Balkans. is a mediator in the Geneva talks between Russia, Georgia Georgia Russia, between talks Geneva the in mediator a is securityquestions.prevent Totrendthiscontinuing, EU the has workedhasborderwithGeorgia.guards in launchSince the up their diplomatic presence in the neighbourhood. The The neighbourhood. the in presence diplomatic their up Since 2004, the EU has been more present in the eastern eastern the in present more been has EU the 2004, Since been increasing. Source: 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Moldova Belarus . . . but limited power 2013 – an increase of 32 percent. 2007- for billion €11.2 to perspective financial 2000-2006 2010. Only Moldova has proved an exception so far, although The EU has also launched a dialogue on visa-free regimes regimes visa-free on dialogue a launched also has EU The The EU’s approach has been based on offeringapproachEU’sbasedcarrotsonbeensomeThe has Russia. However, although the EU has made progress in in progress made has EU the although However, Russia. Belarus might follow. EU funding for the eastern and and eastern the for funding EU follow. might Belarus Revolution squandered their power and Viktor YanukovychViktor and powerRevolutionsquanderedtheir Belarusended two years ofrapprochement with the EUwith Orange Ukraine’s of leaders the 2010, and 2005 Between 1  Power is not simply a matter of resources deployed on the the on deployed resources of matter a simply not is Power agreements with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even Even Azerbaijan. and Armenia Georgia, with agreements and using almost no sticks (except for travel bans and assetand bans travel (exceptforsticks noalmost usingand a crackdown on the opposition after the election in December atleast 10 people dead; and Georgia went through agrowing Putin-stylearrangeda succession triggering clashesleftthat Meanwhile, almost all of the EU’s eastern neighbours have neighbours eastern EU’s the of all almost Meanwhile, at best. andonconflict resolution intheregion hasbeen marginal at and democracy more towards neighbours its nudge to able n dfn wa ohr want. others what define and either unwilling to commit more resources to the eastern eastern the to resources more commit to unwilling either gone in the wrongthedirectiongoneinyears. lastfew the Azerbaijan in ground and rising shares in foreign trade. Rather, it is is it Rather, trade. foreign in shares rising and ground opposition or scepticism of some member states that were were that states member some of scepticism or opposition conflictTransnistriain burden.toostillcase,isany isait In Finally, 2010. in presidentelected being centralisationafter 2008. in Russia with war a and power of centralisation with Ukraine and Moldova, and embarked on visa-facilitation neighbourhood or careful not to complicate relations with with relations complicate to not careful or neighbourhood reform and democratisation trajectories or foreign policies foreign or trajectories democratisation and reform in values and interests EU for support greater and reforms increasingly was that mean would neighbourhood moved quickly to assert a dangerously high degree of political the region. But the EU’s influence on its easterninfluenceEU’sitsneighbours’region.theon theBut its neighbourhood policy, it has failed to keep up with even with up keep to failed has neighbourhoodit policy,its southern neighbourhood has gone from €8.4 billion in the in billion €8.4 from gone has neighbourhood southern its political system has yet to stabilise and the unsolved unsolved the and stabilise to yet has system political its in the eastern neighbourhood has grown, its ability to to ability its grown, has influencepolitical developments regionstagnatedthehas in neighbourhood eastern the in into power. In fact, as the EU’s attention on and involvement has been a success. Progress has been made against the the against made been has Progress success. a been has small to be a regional game-changer. has switched to a lifetime presidency; in 2008, Armenia Armenia 2008, in presidency; lifetime a to switched has primarily the ability to achieve outcomes, set the agenda agenda the set outcomes, achieve to ability the primarily faster negative trends in the region. approach this sense, a In leaders). Belarusian for freezes best. In other words, presence has not turned automaticallyturnednotpresencewords, hasother In best. New York:PublicAffairs, 2004. See, forexample,Joseph S.Nye, Soft Power:TheMeans toSuccessinWorldPolitics 1 EU power in the eastern eastern the in power EU . Figure 2 Even more worryingly for the EU, what were once supposed to Democracy scores, 2001-2010 be big carrots are now increasingly seen in the neighbourhood as sticks. In countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, Deep and 4 Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements are seen as imposing burdens of red tape with few short-term benefits. Even some 4.5 European officials are having second thoughts about the DCFTA. “It brings no short-term benefits and incurs a lot of 5 costs,” says one. “It is far from being a carrot.”3 As a result, free-trade talks with Georgia did not progress because of 5.5 Georgian delaying tactics, and talks with Ukraine have been

6 stuck for a few years owing to protectionist instincts on both sides. Meanwhile, talks with Moldova have not even started 6.5 because of EU delaying tactics.

7 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends. The Armenia Belarus Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Ukraine first is regional: the increasingly authoritarian and semi- authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states. Source: Freedom House Nations in Transit The second is global: the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the eastern neighbourhood to play Even the EU’s limited policy achievements in the region have “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors. lagged far behind need. The EU delegations in the region The third is internal: the preoccupation of the EU first with remain small (often as few as two or three diplomats) and are institutional reforms and then with the management of the heavily geared towards technical assistance and development economic crisis. projects rather than political and security issues. Although the EU has increased its role in conflict management in the eastern neighbourhood, the total number of people it has on Strong regimes, weak states the ground remains tiny. For example, the combined number of EU personnel in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Despite zigzagging through “coloured revolutions” and Moldova and Ukraine and the EU Monitoring Mission in counter-revolutions, the general trend among the EU’s Georgia is minuscule compared to the 4,827 people that eastern neighbours during the last decade has been state EU member states currently provide to the United Nations’ capture and authoritarian consolidation rather than peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.2 In fact, Bangladesh has transition towards free politics and economies. The elites more peacekeeping personnel in Lebanon than the whole of in most neighbourhood countries prefer “stabilisation” to the EU does in the entire eastern neighbourhood. transition: they would rather freeze the status quo of partial reform, in particular by blending oligarchic networks with Figure 3 corrupt officials, rather than strengthen state institutions. Personnel in EU crisis management missions Elites thus get the benefits of state capture (e.g. the virtual compared to EU member states’ contribution to the privatisation of state institutions which are used for private United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) gains) while local societies bear the cost. As a result, much of the eastern neighbourhood is stuck somewhere between dictatorship and democracy, and between command economies and free markets.

EU TOTAL MISSIONS

EU MEMBER STATES IN UNFIL

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

Sources: and United Nations

2 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) home page, available at http:// www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/index.shtml. 3 Interview with EU official, Brussels, February 2010 3 4 ECFR/31 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu RETHINKING THE ENP: LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE EAST This process of domestic political consolidation has has consolidation political domestic of process This 4  Governance scores, 2002-2008 and helping transition, helping and change and to promote its interests and values. The The values. and interests its promote to and change drasticallyopportunitiesreducedinfluence.theEU Very for demonstrators in December 2010 and reversing its tentative on down crackingBelarus and Ukraine in power to coming often, the problem is not that the EU is not offeringenoughnot is EU thethat not problemis theoften, Figure 4 report published in 2009 argued, the EU’s basic approach approach basic EU’s the argued, 2009 in published report EU to permeable less much now are states neighbourhood neighbours are increasingly closed. aims norms EU of export The EU. the withrapprochement Yanukovych with particularly continued, have report makes it more and more difficult for the EU both to induce to both EU the fordifficult more and more it makes o h rgo hs en rdctd n n “enlargement- an on predicated been has region the to to its neighbours but rather that authoritarian consolidation to create increasingly open societies, but the EU’s eastern eastern EU’s the but societies, open increasingly create to influence than Central Europe or the Balkans. As an ECFR an As Balkans. the or Europe Central than influence lite” model aimed at exporting the the exporting at aimed model lite” post-transition. Source: World Bank 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 neighbourhood_report.pdf. Relations, June2009, availableathttp://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ECFR_eastern_ Russian powerinthetroubledneighbourhood Nicu PopescuandAndrewWilson, 2001 Armenia 2002 2003 Belarus 4 Since 2009 the trends described in the the in described trends the 2009 Since 2004

but the states in it are increasingly increasingly are it in states the but Azerbaijan The limitsofenlargement-lite:Europeanand 2005 2006 , EuropeanCouncilonForeign Georgia communautaire acquis 2007 2008 Moldova 2009 Ukraine 2010 As for Georgia, it is undoubtedly something of a leader in in leader a of something undoubtedly is it Georgia, for As Press freedom in the eastern and southern In some ways, the eastern neighbourhood now looks looks now neighbourhood eastern the ways, some In Corruption in the eastern neighbourhood, 2003-2010 and centralised around the president. easternneighbours still score much better than the southern only Moldova bucks the trend of political centralisation. centralisation. political of trend the bucks Moldova only neighbourhoods, 2004-2010 Figure 5 Figure 6 neighbours, many of them run the risk of repeating the same regimes rather than dynamic states in search of European European of search in states dynamic than rather regimes revolutions this year. The EU faces consolidated authoritarian the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours for decades. So far, far, So decades. for neighbours Mediterranean EU’s the institutional reforms, but its politics remains too polarised too remains politics its but reforms, institutional increasinglysouthernlikethe neighbourhood beforedidthe solutions. Whereas in most reform indexes – be it democracy, pattern of stagnation in partial reform which characterised which reform partial in stagnation of pattern the – business doing of costs or corruption freedom, press Source: Transparency International Source: Reporters Without Borders, 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 2004 2001 Eastern neighbourhood Eastern Armenia 2002 2005 2006 2003 Belarus 2004 2007 Azerbaijan World Press Freedom Index 2010 Southern neighbourhood Southern 2008 2005 2006 2009 Georgia 2007 2010 2008 Moldova 2009 Ukraine 2010 A multi-polar environment new eastern European Titoism primarily benefits local elites. Whereas post-war Yugoslavia was relatively prosperous, the The second trend that has significantly undermined the resources the neo-Titoists get from balancing rarely trickle EU’s usual foreign policy modus operandi is the multi- down. Moreover, the freedom to manoeuvre that neo-Titoist polar environment in which the eastern neighbours operate. regimes have creates a temptation to be adventurist. They are Whereas the EU had a quasi-monopoly of influence in also prone to over-reach, as with Ukrainian and Belarusian Central Europe and the Balkans in the 1990s, it must now blackmail over energy transit. The overspill of “local” compete with Russia, Turkey, Iran and increasingly even problems into the EU is an obvious danger. China for influence in the eastern neighbourhood. This allows the neighbourhood states to play a “neo-Titoist” game Finally, neo-Titoism undermines the traditional EU strategy of balancing to win resources and strengthen local elites, and of conditional engagement. To put it crudely, the neo- it provides an excuse for a lack of reform. Titoists take the money and run –- as a recent joke in the neighbourhood has it, “you cannot buy politicians, you can Meanwhile, American attention to the region is more sporadic only rent them.” In this respect, neo-Titoism differs from than ever. Preoccupied by the rise of China and events in the original. Titoism produced potential new Western allies, Afghanistan and Iran, the United States increasingly expects increased connections with the West, not least through the EU to deal with its own neighbours alone. If the Obama visa-free travel for Yugoslav citizens, and made the West administration’s priority has always been prioritisation, popular in Yugoslavia. Neo-Titoism in Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are currently seen as the Caucasus, on the other hand, undermines the EU’s entire neither a necessary part of broader global solutions nor as approach to the region. It is increasingly difficult to promote a part of broader problems. Relative US neglect ought to the classic Schuman model of technical followed by political have increased the pressure on the EU to step in and do convergence with states whose foreign policies are annoyingly more, but it has not. At the same time, however, China’s non- pendular. conditional mode of engagement gives local elites more room for manoeuvre. All of these trends have reinforced each other by affecting EU policy performance. A do-it-yourself ENP

While some eastern European leaders have regretted the US The third reason why the ENP has underperformed so far is retreat, most have welcomed China’s rise, which they hope the EU’s own lack of commitment in the neighbourhood. As will expand their room for foreign policy manoeuvre, reduce a senior EU official puts it, “our partners are less interested their economic dependence on both Russia and, to a lesser in the ENP than we are, and we are not that interested extent, the EU, and allow them to escape the conditionality- ourselves”.5 Another European official calls the ENP the EU’s based engagement of the West. Economically, however, “bastard child” – a surrogate for enlargement rather than a China mainly offers specific deals and trade credits (Belarus’s tool for the EU to pursue its interests in the neighbourhood. economic support from China, for example, may be more Thus, although the EU has a massive presence in the limited than President Alexander Lukashenka makes it look). neighbourhood, it has had a laid-back, hands-off attitude Beijing is therefore more important as a foreign policy prop to the ENP: it was something the EU expected its eastern – though it often seems like a weak third leg on an unstable neighbours to deliver themselves and at their own pace, as if chair. it had little stake in the outcome.

Russia, meanwhile, has changed its approach to the region A good example of this “do-it-yourself” ENP is the EU’s stated in the last three years. Moscow may have intended the war objective of establishing a common aviation area between with Georgia in August 2008 to intimidate its neighbours, but it and its neighbours by 2010. So far, only Georgia has instead it spooked them. As a result, Russia has now shifted negotiated an air transport liberalisation agreement, while from the use of hard power to the use of more soft power in negotiations with other states in the eastern neighbourhood its “near abroad”. The global economic crisis has also forced such as Ukraine have now been overtaken by southern Russia towards a policy of selective engagement that limits neighbours such as Morocco and pre-revolutionary Tunisia.6 the eastern neighbourhood states’ freedom of manoeuvre in some areas (for example, in security policy) but deliberately The main reason for this lack of commitment has been expands it in others (for example, Moscow gives a green light that, since the launch of the ENP in 2003, the EU has been to local elites’ business practices in a way that the EU never preoccupied first with its own institutional reforms and then – would). almost immediately after they had been completed – with the consequences of the economic crisis and the eurozone crisis. This situation has created fragile, highly personalised regimes As a result, foreign policy has been sidelined. But even in terms which are inherently problematic or unstable: either awkward characters entrench themselves, like Lukashenka in Belarus, or each election leads to new leaders and new problems, as 5 Interview with EU official, Brussels, February 2011. with post-Orange Revolution Ukraine from 2005 to 2010. 6 Communication from the Commission – Common Aviation Area with the But unlike the original variant in post-war Yugoslavia, the Neighbouring Countries by 2010: Progress Report, 1 October 2008, available at http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0596:EN:NOT. 5 6 ECFR/31 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu RETHINKING THE ENP: LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE EAST – for example, most European leaders ignored the first EaP first the ignored leaders European most example, for – An additionalAn reasonthisforcommitment lackof tohadhas 04, also created apathy and fatigue. As a result, the EU has EU the result, a As fatigue.and apathycreated also 04, 2008was not the EU’s fault, it failed on numerous occasions EU seriously opposed the aim, but because too few cared cared few too because but aim, the opposed seriously EU (OSCE) border-monitoring mission to Georgia, which had had which Georgia, to mission border-monitoring (OSCE) EU has also frequently tried to compensate for this lack of of lack this for compensate to tried frequently also has EU The EU also acted as if soft power could replace rather rather replace could power soft if as acted also EU The Korea. The slow progress towards free trade with the EU’s EU’s the with trade free towards progress slow The Korea. But even on key issues where the EU’s public appeal and and appeal public EU’s the where issues key on even But and Tunisia,andalmostnowis certainEU the focus towhatever and were therefore not even technically part of the ENP, which it resolution–conflict example,for – stake at visibilitywas a clear political strategy with money. All too often, it tried tried it often, too All money. with strategy political clear a and Iraq and the rise of China. The lack of any positive positive any of lack The China. of rise the and Iraq and gradual destabilisation and growing security tensions. The The tensions. security growing and destabilisation gradual enough about it. except Ukraine have negligible economies, there was little little was there economies, negligible have Ukraine except do with the way the EU works. Much of the EU’s power in the difficulties came from the reluctance of key member states member key of reluctance the from came difficulties cow. devoted few foreign policy resources to the neighbourhood the to resources policy foreign few devoted dynamictheeasternin neighbourhood itself, especially after on post-Soviet conflicts were run by the Council of Europe of Council the by run were conflicts post-Soviet on of foreignpriorities,policymuchwerestatesmemberof many neighbours came about not so much because anyone in the in anyonebecause much so not about neighbourscame with Armenia or Moldova was a worthy foreign policy goal, policy foreign worthy a was Moldova or Armenia with neighbourhood derives not so much from its foreign policy as war. For example, in 2005, the EU refused to take over over take to refused EU the 2005, in example, For war. of war Georgia-Russia the Although Russia. with relations complicatingirritatingneighbourhood,orof fearfor mainly was run by the European Commission. However, the greatest which merely reinforced the perception of the EU as a cash a as EU the perceptionof reinforcedthemerely which with it simply because it was attractive rather than becausethan attractiverather was it becausesimply it with converge and EU the to listen would states neighbourhood more focused on other issues such as the wars in Afghanistan their time and attention in free-trade negotiations with South the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Europe in Co-operation and Security for Organisation the the to up run the in policies prevention conflict pursue to substantialplayato conflictrolein resolution easternthein than designing functioning political and security strategies, security and political functioning designing than itselfpoliticalbuyinfluenceoffering to ratherlimited byaid it made more sense for officials involved in trade to invest invest to trade in involved officials for sense more made it trade free that think might Service Action External the in incentiveofficialsmostEUforinvest to time, personnel and than complement hard power. It hoped that the eastern eastern the that hoped It power. hard complement than integrationfromfunding– freetoachievetradeto – foreign suchbutfromits ability mobiliseto other areasEuropean of Egypt in revolutions the Following 2009. May in summit it offered something. However, the EU’s reliance on soft soft on reliance EU’s the However, something. offered it hopes briefly flared with the “colouredbrieflyhopestheflaredrevolutions”with 2003- of political attention in them. For example, while diplomats diplomats while example, For them. in attention political policygoals.However, easternbecausetheofneighboursall lackedcoherence. Before theLisbon treaty, theEU’spolicies foreign policy energy it has primarily on the south. been terminated by Russia. This created much more room for Above all, the EU should put more political weight behind behind weight political more put should EU the all, Above Increasing soft power 7  EUoften lacks partners who could promote its agenda and it European Commission sometimes tries to do inside the EU. the inside do to CommissiontriessometimesEuropean The priority for the EU should be to deliver on promises it promises on deliver to be should EU the for priority The The EU alsoneedsinvestEUThetohigh-visibility more in evenand However,this does notmean that theEU should downgrade Better delivery will enable the EU to insist with greater greater with insist to EU the enable will delivery Better about 40 percent at the end of 2008. of end the atpercent 40 about visibility, and position itself to become more effective if andvisibility,effectivebecome morepositionifitselftoand also have a bad record in sticking to their promises. which neighbours, its from delivery better on assertiveness danger of becoming politically irrelevant. Ukraine,mediadeliverin tofailed Georgiaand delivered in defining clearer red lines and actively policing them, and and them, policing actively and lines red clearer defining of the EaP in 2009, democracy in the eastern neighbourhood delayed or watered down in working groups in Brussels. Brussels. in groups working in down watered or delayed often,EU promises from the highest level have been blocked, when conditions change in the neighbourhood countries or countriesneighbourhood the in changeconditions when neighbourhood in accordance with its views. Since the launch region.Not just the elites but also the public increasingly see management missions. But the EU has not been able to to able been not has EU the But missions. management to increase its own visibility and outreach with the public, public, the with outreach and visibility own its increase to the shape and change to power the into presence this turn the EU as irrelevant to them. For example, support for EU for support example, For them. to irrelevant as EU the becausemoresotheEU’shalf-heartedthe engagement with the promotion of air transport liberalisation. More integrated tradenegotiations andintensifyingby visadialogues. Alltoo its presence in the neighbourhood.shouldcontinuethepresenceEU inits The increased assistance, association talks, more trade, and crisis intheregion. But, inthe meantime, theEU should also fight power soft EU’s the increase will it short, In EU. the inside investing more political capital in the neighbourhood. policies, its of edge the sharpening by power short-term its improve the EU’s performance in the eastern neighbourhood integration in Ukraine plunged from 65 percent in 2002 to 2002 in percent 65 from plungedUkraine in integration the in power soft of lot a it cost actually has neighbours its should seek to bolster both the EU’s soft and hard power alike. has alsohaslostallureitssomeofregion.the in short,in In is it deteriorated,further“colouredhasrevolutions”under- have harderpursueinterestsowntoitsregionthedevelop and in has already made, particularly by being less protectionistlessparticularlybeingalreadymade,in hasby power,willfriends,winhelpitEUthe increase leverage and into automatically or immediately turn not does presence power alone has failed to alter trends on the ground – all all – ground the on trends alter to failed has alone power populist policies in the neighbourhood that replicate what the Since the launch of the ENP in 2003, the EU has significantly freedom has worsened, and corruption has grown. Today, the business interests and state institutions. Even though such though Even institutions. state and interests business build up its presence in the eastern neighbourhood – through 2002-2008, available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=387. Razumkov Centre,“Does UkraineneedtojointheEuropeanUnion?”, sociologicalpoll, 7 Thus, any strategy tostrategy anyThus, air transport between the EU and neighbouring countries A more transactional relationship will improve tourist, business and family ties. The EU could let its eastern neighbours join the EU-wide cap on roaming At the same time that it supports reforms in the eastern charges, reduce bank-card charges when travelling abroad, neighbourhood in this way, the EU should not automatically or encourage neighbours to join EU smoking bans. The aim assume that it is more attractive than the other external of such initiatives would be to continue to build up the EU’s players with which it now finds itself competing for influence soft power as the basis for circumventing non-reformist elites in the neighbourhood. The EU should therefore aim to build and to invest in policies that give significant benefits to the a more transactional relationship with its eastern neighbours. citizens of the EU and its neighbouring countries. The European Commission already elaborated a so-called policy matrix – a shopping list of mutual expectations whereby Similarly, the EU should become the voice of EU businesses reforms by neighbours are matched by EU responses (mainly in the region through the creation of EU Chambers of assistance). This is a good start but it needs to be expanded Commerce that could act as concerted lobbies vis-à-vis their in scope to include more political and security issues. This host governments to push for improved governance and a approach will build more predictability in relationships better business climate that reflects both EU standards and and create a better link between EU offers and neighbours’ reduced corruption. Engagement between EU embassies progress. Developing a policy matrix for relations with Russia and local business associations should also be bolstered. EU which includes some of neighbourhood issues, such as the member states could grant students from the EaP countries conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, might also streamline EU the status of “home” students to make it cheaper for them to policies and thinking. study in the EU. The next step is for the EU, once it has decided what its The EU also needs to invest more in lasting institutional interests are, to be less diplomatic with interlocutors – even partnerships with key institutions in the eastern its best partners in the region. This may actually help them: neighbourhood such as interior ministries. These often are tough love in private is ammunition against the existing anti- among the most corrupt, closed and anti-reformist institutions reform lobbies in each of the partner governments. in the region, but that is exactly why they are important to engage. The EU should provide comprehensive assistance to For example, the EU should take a tough but fair approach improve border controls and policing in the region, building to visa dialogues, which provide the EU with a powerful on its extensive experience in the Western Balkans and with instrument to achieve its interests in the neighbourhood. the EUBAM mission to Ukraine and Moldova. The EU needs This can translate into improved border-management more mini-EUBAMs in the region that work actively with practices and reformed law-enforcement institutions in both border guards and the police. EU member states should the region. It is in the EU’s interest to find other ways to also consider creating joint border patrols and joint border/ improve the management of migration flows by improving customs posts, particularly with Ukraine and Moldova. co-operation with its neighbours, beefing up their capacity to manage migration, and making them share the costs At a time of austerity, it is unlikely that EU member states will of controlling migration. It is in the EU’s interest for all commit significant new resources to the EaP countries. This its neighbours to introduce biometric passports, build up means that the EU will have to drastically improve delivery functioning border, customs and police services, and co- and enhance co-ordination. Bilateral funding should be operate with EU agencies such as the European Agency for pulled together into EU-wide consortia in order to better co- the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External ordinate development assistance. Yet a rethink of how and, in Borders (FRONTEX). These instruments will help the EU particular, where the EU spends its money is also necessary. better control migration flows. The EU should focus financial assistance on those neighbours that perform best in terms of reforms or that refocus virtually The EU should therefore be strict about the conditions that all of this assistance to support for civil society and democracy. its neighbours have to fulfil in order to qualify for visa-free The EU should also redirect the financial assistance it offers travel. It should be ready to abolish visas for Ukraine and to countries like China, Russia or India to the neighbourhood. Moldova (and Russia), which in return would share the costs These high-growth great powers can afford to spend funds of managing mobility in a wider Europe by modelling their on projects – from high-speed rail to nuclear and space institutions and policies on those of the EU. When one of these programmes - that most EU member states cannot . While countries fulfils EU conditions, its example could also have a the few hundred million euros the EU offers these countries significant effect in focusing minds and accelerating reforms in assistance do not buy it any influence, they could make a in the others. The EU will benefit from an increased number significant difference in the neighbourhood. of tourists, improved business links and family ties, the replacement of illegal immigration by circular migration, and, most of all, the transformation of its neighbours into credible partners in terms of managing migration flows. Eventually, Schengen visas would be no longer necessary because there would be other, more effective ways to manage migration, in which the EU’s neighbours would play a significant part. 7 8 ECFR/31 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu RETHINKING THE ENP: LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE EAST The EU is not likely to achieve many quick and easy successes even the most solid-looking political regimes can collapse in a realities, take a more interest-based approach, and prepare and interest-basedapproach,more a takerealities, recent the as However, revolutionary overnight. upheavals in the reversed southern neighbourhood be show, not will matter of weeks. The EU shouldthereforeEUweeks.recognise The matterof current trends that have diminished the EU’s power in the region region the in power EU’s the diminished have that trends itself to take advantage of the next opportunity when it comes. structuralthree neighbourhood.The eastern the of most in About the authors Acknowledgements

Nicu Popescu is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European The authors would like to thank Ben Judah and Jana Kobzova Council on Foreign Relations. Specialising in the EU’s for their contribution to the policy brief. eastern neighbourhood and Russia, he holds a doctorate in international relations from the Central European University in Budapest. From 2005–07 he was research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, and he was previously a visiting fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Throughout 2010 he was senior foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Moldova. His publications for ECFR include The Limits of enlargement-lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighbourhood (with Andrew Wilson, 2009) and A Power Audit of EU-Russia relations (with Mark Leonard, 2007).

Andrew Wilson is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and a reader in Ukrainian Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) at University College . He has previously held academic positions at the London School of Economics and Cambridge. His most recent books are The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (third edition, 2009), Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2005) and Virtual Politics: Faking democracy in the Post-Soviet World (2005). His publications for ECFR include The Limits of Enlargement-lite: EU and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood (with Nicu Popescu) and Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of Putin’s Succession (February 2008).

9 10 ECFR/31 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu RETHINKING THE ENP: LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE EAST www.ecfr.eu individuals or institutions. with other organisations but does not make grants to Stiftung Mercator and Steven Heinz. ECFR works in partnership Communitas Foundation, the Italian UniCredit group, the Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Spanish foundation FRIDE (La Fundación para las Relaciones ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the • • • that define its activities: ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements values-based European foreign policy. across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its The A Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje. within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - A pan- BOUT media outlets. of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished A distinctive research and policy development process. communications. offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and ECFR plans to open offices in and Brussels. Our Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome and Sofia. In the future ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in A physical presence in the main E uropean

EC E uropean F R C ouncil on Foreign C ouncil. ECFR has brought together a R EU elations member states. (ECFR) is the GmbH Roland BergerStrategyConsultants Chairman, Founder andHonorary R former PrimeMinister Governor, NationalBankofPoland; Marek Deputy Director, ElPaís Lluís MP; formerForeignMinister D President oftheEuropeanConvention Former PrimeMinisterandvice G President Management Initiative;former Chairman oftheBoard,Crisis Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Party spokesperson fortheSocialDemocratic Committeeandforeignpolicy Affairs Deputy ChairmanoftheForeign U and ChairmanofBavarianNordicA/S President andCEO,A.J.AamundA/S Asger Aamund ( countries. candidate and states member EU the from figures cultural and activists leaders, business intellectuals, public ministers, and parliamentarians former and current commissioners, European presidents, ministers, prime former are Relations Foreign on Council European the of members Among of EastAnglia;former HomeSecretary Visiting ProfessorofPolitics,University C Journalist Director ofMelakInvestments/ I California Catalunya andUniversityofSouthern Professor, UniversitatObertade Manuel Cooperation Minister forInternationalDevelopment G former PrimeMinister President oftheEuropeanParliament; Jerzy and CentralEurope Chairman of the Institute for the Danube E Writer andacademic I Minister () Ambassador totheUSA;formerPrime Former EuropeanCommission John Commissioner Vice PresidentoftheSenate;formerEU E President ofVenture EquityBulgariaLtd Founder, CommunitasFoundationand S Lewiatan Confederation ofPrivateEmployers- Economist. PresidentofthePolish Henryka Foreign Minister C Council; formerPrimeMinister Chairman, PrimeMinister’s Economic Jan Krzysztof of America United KingdomandtheStates Former AmbassadortoJapan,the B Reconstruction andDevelopment Chief Economist,EuropeanBankfor E pek an rhrad mma rik vetoslav oland harles arl oris ora rban Ahlin ( iuliano Amato ( unilla B B B B C uruma ( B erglöf ( B B B ildt ( assets ( em ruton ( ianchieri ( akoyannis ( B B B uzek ( B C C C onino ( elka ( usek (Austria) erger ( arlsson ( B larke ( astells ( B T S ochniarz ( aha ( ojilov ( weden) S T S P I S weden) reland) P B he weden) oland) pain) I oland) ielecki ( taly) G U T D I I urkey) taly) S N nited Kingdom) S ermany) taly) B enmark) G pain) weden) etherlands) ulgaria) reece) P oland) P oland) (Bratislava) Marshall FundoftheUnitedStates Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German P Parliament formerMemberofEuropean office; (Confindustria)-Brussels Industry Director, ConfederationofItalian G former PrimeMinister Member ofEuropeanParliament; Jean-Luc Poet andCulturalCritic Aleš Foreign Minister Ahmet Commission Vice PresidentoftheEuropean President, FriendsofEurope;former E Aspen InstituteItalia Director GeneralInternationalActivities, Marta Minister andForeign Progressive Studies;formerPrime President, FoundationforEuropean President, ItalianieuropeiFoundation; Massimo Action Service Counsellor oftheEuropeanExternal R Member ofEuropeanParliament D former StateSecretary Ambassador totheUnitedKingdom; N Minister Gulbenkian Foundation;formerForeign Trustee totheBoardofCalouste ( T Economics Emeritus Professor, LondonSchoolof ( Anthony International Relations(IPRI) Chairman ofthePortugueseInstitute C University Professor ofEuropeanStudies,Oxford ( T Foreign Minister Speaker oftheParliament;former Jaime Investment Bank Business Leader;formerCEOCarnegie Karin Forseke ( Chancellor Former ForeignMinisterandvice- Joschka Fischer ( Foreign Minister President, ChamberofDeputies;former G Policy Representative forForeignandSecurity European Commission/EUHigh Adviser totheVicePresidentof S former ForeignMinister Chairman, BalticDevelopmentForum; U Former FinanceMinister Hans Member ofEuropeanParliament Andrew President, DEMOSHungary T Economy andDevelopment Vice-President andDirectorofGlobal Kemal P U U eresa tienne imothy ibor teven avol obert arlos aniel ffe icola ianfranco ianfranco Fini ( ortugal) nited Kingdom) nited Kingdom) D E D E llemann-Jensen ( D ebeljak ( G D G ichel ( C C D P essewffy (Hungary) D C E emeš ( D lase ( ama ( assù ( ohn- atricio D aspar ( verts ( ervis ( G ooper ( avutoglu ( G avignon ( D D uff ( arton Ash iddens ’Alema ( ehaene ( D G B ell’Alba ( S U I P S ermany) T endit ( T taly) weden) S S G urkey) P ortugal) lovakia) nited Kingdom) he U weden/ lovenia) I G ortugal) ouveia taly) nited Kingdom)

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G elgium) I ermany) taly) D US enmark) A) Heather Grabbe Caio Koch-Weser () Cem Özdemir (Germany) Rory Stewart () (United Kingdom) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen Member of Parliament Executive Director, Open Society former State Secretary (Green Party) Institute – Brussels Dominique Strauss-Kahn Rem Koolhaas (The Netherlands) Ana Palacio (Spain) () Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Managing Director, International Director of the Centre on International Graduate School of Design, Harvard President and General Counsel of the Monetary Fund; former Finance Conflict Resolution, Columbia University World Bank Group Minister University (New York); Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; former Under- Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Simon Panek () Alexander Stubb (Finland) Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal Chairman, People in Need Foundation Foreign Minister Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Strategies Operations at the UN Operations at Chris Patten (United Kingdom) the UN Michael Stürmer (Germany) Aleksander Kwasniewski Chancellor of Oxford University and Chief Correspondent, Die Welt Fernando Andresen Guimarães () co-chair of the International Crisis Former President of Poland Group; former EU Commissioner Ion Sturza () (Portugal) President, GreenLight Invest.; former Deputy Political Director, Directorate Mart Laar (Estonia) Diana Pinto (France) Prime Minister of the Republic of General for External Relations, MP; former Prime Minister Historian and author Moldova European Commission Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Helle Thorning Schmidt Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Managing Director for Russia, Eastern Director, Bruegel and Professor at Universite Paris-Dauphine (Denmark) (Germany) Neighbourhood & Western Balkans, Leader of the Social Democratic Party Fomer Defence Minister European External Action Service; Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) former Foreign Minister Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) István Gyarmati (Hungary) MP and Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Director at the Finnish Institute for President and CEO, International Pascal Lamy (France) International relations Centre for Democratic Transition Honorary President, Notre Europe and Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Director-General of WTO; former EU MP; former Foreign Minister Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Commissioner Professor, University of Athens and Chairman, Defence Commission; Andrew Puddephatt President, ELIAMEP former Defence Minister Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) Director, European Council on Foreign (United Kingdom) Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Pierre Hassner (France) Relations Director, Global Partners & Associated MP; former Foreign Minister Research Director emeritus, CERI Ltd. (Sciences-PO) Juan Fernando López Aguilar Daniel Valtchev (Bulgaria) (Spain) Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) Former deputy PM and Minister of Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic) Member of ; MP, President of the National Education Former President former Minister of Justice Committee for Monitoring the EU Accession Negotiations and Professor Vaira Vike- Freiberga (Latvia) Steven Heinz (Austria) Adam Lury (United Kingdom) of Sociology, University of Zagreb Former President Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, CEO, Menemsha Ltd Lansdowne Partners Ltd George Robertson Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) David Miliband (United Kingdom) Lawyer; former EU Commissioner Annette Heuser (Germany) (United Kingdom) Former Secretary General of NATO Andre Wilkens (Germany) Executive Director, Bertelsmann MP, Former Secretary of State for Foundation Washington DC Albert Rohan (Austria) Director for International Relations, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Former Secretary General for Foreign Stiftung Mercator Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Alain Minc (France) Affairs Shirley Williams Co-founder of Spanish newspaper Head of AM Conseil; former chairman, El País; President, FRIDE Le Monde Dariusz Rosati (Poland) (United Kingdom) Former Foreign Minister Professor Emeritus, Kennedy School Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) of Government; former Leader of the (The Netherlands) Foreign Minister; former Defence Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Liberal Democrats in the House of Former NATO Secretary General Minister; former Member of European Former Foreign Minister; Co-Chairman Lords Parliament of Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Danuta Hübner (Poland) Matters, Commissioner of Euro- Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Politician, former EU Commissioner Dominique Moisi (France) Atlantic Security Initiative Ambassador to Brazil and professor of economics and Senior Adviser, IFRI since 2009 Member of the European Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Parliament and Chair of the Regional Pierre Moscovici (France) CEO, Proventus Development Committee. MP; former Minister for European Affairs Stefano Sannino (Italy) Michiel van Hulten Deputy Director General for Enlargement, European Commission (The Netherlands) Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Former Member of European Director, Advanced Social and Political Pierre Schori (Sweden) Parliament Research Institute, University of Latvia Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Hildegard Müller (Germany) former Director General, FRIDE; former Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) SRSG to Cote d´Ivoire Member of European Parliament Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) MP; former Chancellor Former Ambassador and former Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Executive Director, Crisis Management President, Eurointelligence ASBL Initiative Kalypso Nicolaïdis (Greece/ (Czech Republic) Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) France) Foreign Minister Chairman, Munich Security Professor of International Relations, Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) Conference; Global Head of University of Oxford Head of Institutional and International Government Affairs Allianz SE Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) Relations, UniCredit Lionel Jospin (France) Director-General, Institute of Narcís Serra (Spain) Former Prime Minister International and European Affairs Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Vice President of the Spanish Professor, London School of Economics CEO, Audiovisuel Extérieur de la Government France Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Radosław Sikorski (Poland) Executive Editor of Le Monde (Poland) Foreign Minister Former Foreign Minister Glenys Kinnock Aleksander Smolar (Poland) Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory (United Kingdom) Foundation Former Member of European CEO, European Council on Foreign Parliament; Shadow Lords Relations; former Europe Director, Javier Solana (Spain) Spokesperson on International Amnesty International Former EU High Representative for the Development Mabel van Oranje Common Foreign and Security Policy & Secretary-General of the Council of the Olli Kivinen (Finland) (The Netherlands) EU; former Secretary General of NATO Writer and columnist CEO, the Elders George Soros (Hungary/USA) Gerald Knaus (Austria) Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) Founder and Chairman, Open Society Chairman of the European Stability Member of the Board, Fomento de Initiative and Carr Center Fellow Construcciones y Contratas; former EU Institute Commissioner Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Playwright and Academic 11 12 ECFR/31 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu RETHINKING THE ENP: LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE EAST [email protected] 35 OldQueenStreet,London,SW1H9JA,UnitedKingdom Published bytheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations(ECFR), ISBN: 978-1-906538-30-9 © ECFRMay2011. affiliated. institutions withwhichtheauthorsare European Parliamentorotherpartiesand the viewsofGreenGroupin of itsauthors.Itdoesnotrepresent Relations, representsonlytheviews of theEuropeanCouncilonForeign positions. 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September 2009 (ECFR/16) Leonard and Andrew Wilson, edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark W (ECFR/15) Brantner, September 2009 Richard Gowan and Franziska UN T June 2009 (ECFR/14) Wilson, Nicu Popescu and Andrew the A (ECFR/11) Daniel Korski, March 2009 R (ECFR/05) Andrew Wilson, February 2008 E T (ECFR/13) Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 Framework for T B April 2009 (ECFR/12) John Fox and Francois Godement, R S (ECFR/10) Mark Leonard, December 2008 Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and relationship R (ECFR/09) Pierre Noel, November 2008 P R A (ECFR/07) Andrew Wilson, August 2008 Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and G C Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) and of the deal with B (ECFR/08) Brantner, September 2008 Richard Gowan and Franziska Meeting Medvedev: (ECFR/04) Daniel Korski, January 2008 war Afghanistan: (ECFR/03) Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 E P November 2007 (ECFR/02) Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, R A October 2007 (ECFR/01) Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, Herbivorous of N A owards a uropean and urope? he he Limits of haping e-energising elations e-wiring the ower at the ights? An Audit of oland’s second return to elations eyond the “ an the eyond l ew eorgia? P G P hat does so S : 2009 annual review ower Audit of ower Audit of lobal Force for Human oft T EU D roubled W ava efence P and human rights at the orld P utin D EU ower and the E ependence: How to i urope’s Afghan R la N win the ussian R O S ew P ussia think? b N E W E rder: uccession P UN owers l US nlargement-lite: urope’s forgotten E R eighbourhood olicy e ar on C urope’s ussian T ounterterrorism ransatlantic f - EU EU ro EU G T E as P he - -

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