brie po L ic F turning presence Y into power: LESSONS FROM tHe eASTern neigHbourHood nicu popescu and Andrew wilson Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood Policy SU Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood (ENP) in 2003, the European Union has become more Policy (ENP) in 2003, the European Union present and involved in the affairs of its eastern neighbours has become the biggest trading partner of than ever before. It has become the biggest trading partner most of the states in the region, embarked of most of the states in the region, embarked on association MMA on association and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, and offered visa and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But the and offered visa facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But it has EU has not succeeded in turning this presence not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In security into power. In fact, as the EU has become more involved in the eastern neighbourhood, and democracy terms, the EU has failed not only to achieve its ability to influence political developments most of its objectives, but also to prevent a deterioration of in the region has stagnated at best. With the trends on the ground. In fact, every country in the region exception of Moldova, all of the EU’s eastern except Moldova is less democratic now than it was five years neighbours have gone in the wrong direction in ago. As the EU’s southern neighbourhood goes through r the last few years. a democratic transformation of its own, it is particularly Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into important that Europe learns the lessons of this failure to Y power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian consolidate democracy in post-revolutionary societies in the and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of eastern neighbourhood like Georgia and Ukraine. the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the At the same time, with some member states preoccupied eastern neighbourhood to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors; with the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, and the EU’s own limited commitment to the there is also a danger that things will get even worse in the ENP. The EU should continue to increase its eastern Europe. As revolutions have toppled dictatorships own visibility and outreach with the public, in Tunisia and Egypt and threatened other regimes in business interests and state institutions in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it should the southern neighbourhood, the eastern neighbourhood not rely on soft power alone. Instead, it should seems to be moving in the opposite direction – in other also aim to develop a more transactional words, towards authoritarian consolidation. While the relationship with its eastern neighbours – in EU’s southern neighbours look like the eastern neighbours other words, to decide what its interests are, be less diplomatic with interlocutors and set tough did in the revolutionary years of 2003 to 2005, the eastern conditions on issues such as visa liberalisation. neighbourhood looks increasingly like the south did a few years ago – a collection of states with close economic relations ST with Europe but centralised, non-competitive politics, which The EU has also launched a dialogue on visa-free regimes A e can routinely afford to ignore the EU on key political and with Ukraine and Moldova, and embarked on visa-facilitation e H security questions. To prevent this trend continuing, the EU agreements with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even t will need to put much more energy into its policies towards Belarus might follow. EU funding for the eastern and IN Eastern Europe in order to turn its presence into power. southern neighbourhood has gone from €8.4 billion in the 2000-2006 financial perspective to €11.2 billion for 2007- UTIONS 2013 – an increase of 32 percent. L o The EU’s increasing presence… The EU’s approach has been based on offering some carrots V and using almost no sticks (except for travel bans and asset RE e Since 2004, the EU has been more present in the eastern freezes for Belarusian leaders). In a sense, this approach H t neighbourhood – which comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, has been a success. Progress has been made against the M Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – than ever before. opposition or scepticism of some member states that were RO The EU trades more than Russia with each of the six Eastern either unwilling to commit more resources to the eastern F Partnership (EaP) states except Belarus, and it is also moving neighbourhood or careful not to complicate relations with towards Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements Russia. However, although the EU has made progress in ESSONS (DCFTA) with most of its neighbours. its neighbourhood policy, it has failed to keep up with even : L faster negative trends in the region. ENP e H t 50% . but limited power 45% ING 40% K IN 35% Power is not simply a matter of resources deployed on the H 30% ground and rising shares in foreign trade. Rather, it is 25% RET primarily the ability to achieve outcomes, set the agenda 20% 1 15% and define what others want. EU power in the eastern 10% neighbourhood would mean that Brussels was increasingly 5% able to nudge its neighbours towards more democracy and 0% Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan Ukraine Moldova Belarus reforms and greater support for EU interests and values in the region. But the EU’s influence on its eastern neighbours’ Figure 1 reform and democratisation trajectories or foreign policies EU share of foreign trade of EaP states and on conflict resolution in the region has been marginal at Source: European Commission best. In other words, presence has not turned automatically into power. In fact, as the EU’s attention on and involvement The EU has also become increasingly involved in conflict in the eastern neighbourhood has grown, its ability to management in the eastern neighbourhood. The EU is a influence political developments in the region has stagnated mediator in the talks between Moldova and the secessionist at best. region of Transnistria, and it deploys a 120-strong EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Ukraine and Moldova. It Meanwhile, almost all of the EU’s eastern neighbours have also has a 200-strong EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and gone in the wrong direction in the last few years. Azerbaijan is a mediator in the Geneva talks between Russia, Georgia has switched to a lifetime presidency; in 2008, Armenia and the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. arranged a Putin-style succession triggering clashes that left This means that there are more crisis management personnel at least 10 people dead; and Georgia went through a growing deployed in EU missions in the eastern neighbourhood than centralisation of power and a war with Russia in 2008. in any other region except the Balkans. Between 2005 and 2010, the leaders of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution squandered their power and Viktor Yanukovych Two dozen EU high-level advisors are embedded in the moved quickly to assert a dangerously high degree of political Armenian and Moldovan governments working with local centralisation after being elected president in 2010. Finally, institutions to promote reforms, and a Border Support Team Belarus ended two years of rapprochement with the EU with www.ecfr.eu has worked with border guards in Georgia. Since the launch a crackdown on the opposition after the election in December of the ENP, the EU and its member states have also beefed 2010. Only Moldova has proved an exception so far, although up their diplomatic presence in the neighbourhood. The its political system has yet to stabilise and the unsolved number of EU delegations in the region has increased from conflict in Transnistria is still a burden. In any case, it is too two to six, so that the EU is now represented in each of the small to be a regional game-changer. eastern neighbours. The size of these delegations has also May 2011 been increasing. /31 The EU’s contractual relations with its neighbours have also r F advanced. The EU is negotiating Association Agreements ec with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 1 See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 2 New York: Public Affairs, 2004. Figure 2 Even more worryingly for the EU, what were once supposed to Democracy scores, 2001-2010 be big carrots are now increasingly seen in the neighbourhood as sticks. In countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, Deep and 4 Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements are seen as imposing burdens of red tape with few short-term benefits. Even some 4.5 European officials are having second thoughts about the DCFTA. “It brings no short-term benefits and incurs a lot of 5 costs,” says one. “It is far from being a carrot.”3 As a result, free-trade talks with Georgia did not progress because of 5.5 Georgian delaying tactics, and talks with Ukraine have been 6 stuck for a few years owing to protectionist instincts on both sides. Meanwhile, talks with Moldova have not even started 6.5 because of EU delaying tactics. 7 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends. The Armenia Belarus Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Ukraine first is regional: the increasingly authoritarian and semi- authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states.