TRIP-100096; No of Pages 11 Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxx
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Insects and aviation safety: The case of the keyhole wasp Pachodynerus nasidens (Hymenoptera: Vespidae) in Australia ⁎ Alan P.N. House a, , Jackson G. Ring b, Matthew J. Hill c, Phillip P. Shaw d a Eco Logical Australia, 12 Creek St, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia b Brisbane Airport Corporation, 11 The Circuit, Brisbane Airport, Qld 4008, Australia c Qantas Engineering, Brisbane Domestic Satellite, Brisbane Airport, Qld 4008, Australia d Ecosure Pty Ltd, 10/37 Connor Street, Burleigh Heads, Qld 4220, Australia
ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
Article history: While birds and other vertebrates are well known hazards to aviation at airports, the threat posed by invertebrates is Received 19 December 2019 less well understood. Here we present an example of a serious risk to flight safety from the mud-nesting keyhole wasp Received in revised form 22 January 2020 (Pachodynerus nasidens) which views aircraft pitot probes as an attractive nesting opportunity at Brisbane Airport. Pitot Accepted 14 February 2020 probes measure airspeed, and obstructions can render measurements inaccurate, leading to serious and potentially cat- Available online xxxx astrophic consequences. We undertook experiments over 39 months to determine rates of nesting in pitot probes and the associated risk of blocked probes. We also examined how this risk was reduced by covering probes. A bow-tie risk Keywords: fi Wasp analysis was completed to assess the safety, reputation, one-off nancial loss, and injury and illness costs of a range of Aviation incidents of increasing severity, and climate modelling was used to show the potential spread of the keyhole wasp in Risk management Australia. The reduction in risk from covering 33% to 75% of all probes on arrival is substantial and made more sig- Pitot probe nificant when the costs of incidents are set against those of wasp management. The prospects for eradicating the key- Eradication hole wasp and the prospect of it spreading to other parts of Australia with suitable climatic conditions are discussed in Pachodynerus nasidens view of the substantial risk the species presents.
1. Introduction New Zealand 2.5 strikes/10,000 movements (Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, 2017); USA 1.7 strikes/10,000 movements (Federal Aviation Authority, 2019); Canada 4.0 strikes/10,000 movements (Trans- port Canada, 2017), but similar to those in climatically equivalent regions “They build very remarkable cells or nests of earth, finely tempered, and (e.g. Brazil, mean of three airports 6.6 strikes/10,000 movements formed in layers of tiny mud-pats, like a swallow's nest. Many of these (Mendonca et al., 2018). Costs of wildlife strikes are very substantial glob- were placed in a small wooden outhouse, between the upright studs ally – up to US$2 billion annually 2009 (Weller, 2014), and an annual cost and the boarding of the wall; several were formed on a shelf in the of US$72 million to civil aviation in Australia (McKee and Shaw, 2016). porch, where some small pieces of wood lying heaped together offered Costs are not confined to equipment repair or replacement: significant ex- convenient nooks; and one wasp, resolving to have a more costly lodg- pense may be incurred through delays in services, damage to reputation, ment than his friends, took possession of a meerschaum pipe-bowl loss of life and property, financial penalties and complex lawsuits (Dale, which lay on the same shelf, and very snugly laid out his house in its in- 2009). terior.” While birdstrikes, and strikes of other wildlife such as bats and ground- [(Meredith, 1849)] dwelling animals, make headlines (e.g. US 1549, Marra et al., 2009; AWACS Boeing 707, Flight Safety Foundation, 1996), threats to flight The risks to air travel posed by wildlife are well known. In Australia, safety from insects are less well understood. Our interest in the relation- aircraft-wildlife encounters increased steadily between 2008 and 2017, ships between insects and aircraft is limited to what they can tell us about with 16,626 confirmed birdstrikes with a high of 1921 in 2017 the mechanics of flight (e.g. Takahashi et al., 2018), how aircraft can aid (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2018) equating to 8.7 strikes per in insect detection for pest control or other purposes (e.g. Amendt et al., 10,000 aircraft movements. This rate is higher than that in other countries 2017; Stone and Mohammed, 2017) and disinsection to manage insects po- (e.g. UK 5.0 strikes/10,000 movements (Civil Aviation Authority, 2017); tentially carrying disease (Rayman, 2006; Mier-y-Teran-Romero et al., 2017). For wildlife management at airports, insects are generally seen as ⁎ fl Corresponding author. an attractant for birds that might pose a risk to ight safety (Cleary and E-mail address: [email protected]. (A.P.N. House). Dolbeer, 2005; Hauptfleisch and Dalton, 2015), rather than a risk in their
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2020.100096 2590-1982/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ 4.0/).
Please cite this article as: A.P.N. House, J.G. Ring, M.J. Hill, et al., Insects and aviation safety: The case of the keyhole wasp Pachodynerus nasidens (Hymenoptera: Vespidae) in Australia..., Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2020.100096 A.P.N. House et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxx own right. However, aviation authorities, airport managers, commercial high-energy stop causing brake overheating and tyre deflation when the carriers and private aviators are well aware of the threats posed by insects, take-off was rejected, resulting in the deployment of airport rescue and and especially mud wasps, to aircraft operations, although to date there has fire-fighting services (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008). On in- been no formal assessment of risk from these agents. spection, it was found that one pitot probe contained “wasp-related debris” In Australia, the recent discovery of an introduced mud wasp concluded to have caused anomalous speed readings between the pilot fly- (Pachodynerus nasidens Latreille – the keyhole wasp) has resulted in a ing and the pilot-not-flying instruments. Material retrieved from this probe novel hazard to aviation in Australia. This species is native to South and by the Australian Museum included fragments of an insect body resembling Central America and the Caribbean region (Carpenter, 1986; House et al., the head of a wasp. 2020), and typically uses man-made structures (or natural cavities) to con- An incident in November 2013 initiated a review of the impact of mud- struct nests provisioned with butterfly, moth or other insect larvae and nesting wasps on aircraft operations at Brisbane and a framework for capped with mud. At airports, ideally-sized cavities are abundant in airside reporting wasp-related incidents. In one of the most significant incidents machinery, including aircraft, where a number of suitable nesting opportu- at Brisbane to date, an Airbus A330 performed a rejected takeoff and nities are present: elevator feel differential probe (on tail), vent line to fuel returned after airspeed discrepancies between probes were identified dur- pressure gauge (under wing), total air temperature probe (front fuselage), ing the takeoff roll (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2016). Inspection engine tail pipe, engine temperature/pressure probe (rear of engine) and, and subsequent maintenance cleared the aircraft for a second take-off, but particularly, pitot probes. once airborne another airspeed discrepancy caused a mayday situation Here we report on the risk the keyhole wasp poses to aviation safety in and the aircraft returned under emergency procedures. Sand and mud con- Australia, using experimental data on nesting to model the probability of a sistent with a mud wasp nest was discovered in one probe. Since this inci- blocked probe; we assess the safety, financial, reputational, and operational dent, more detailed records of wasp-related issues have been made at costs of an escalating scale in severity of incidents caused by wasps nesting Brisbane and a total of 26 incidents were entered into the database between in pitot probes, and model the relationship between given acceptable levels November 2013 and April 2019. of risk and costs of over- and under-managing the problem. 2. Materials and methods 1.1. The hazard 2.1. Study site and probe experiment Pitot probes are hollow instruments projecting forwards from the air- craft fuselage which measure airspeed by registering differential pressures The study site (Brisbane Airport) is located on the eastern seaboard of between total pressure (from air entering the probe) and air in a static Australia (27.3911°S, 153.1197°E), on the shores of Moreton Bay, Queens- chamber (which may be incorporated into the pitot probe or be separate), land at approximately 4 m above sea level. It is flanked on the east by the using Bernoulli's equation (Morris and Langari, 2016). In large passenger Brisbane River, on the west by ecologically significant coastal wetlands aircraft pitot probes are normally mounted at the front of the aircraft on (mangroves and saltmarshes) and to the south by the city of Brisbane. both captain's and first officer's sides but a third may also be located on The climate is sub-tropical, with a long-term mean annual rainfall of the empennage (tail). 1190 mm, 50% of which falls between December and March. The annual Pitot probes are critical instruments in all aircraft. It is vital that pilots mean maximum temperature is 25.4 °C, and annual mean minimum is know their airspeed, especially for take-off and landing, and anomalies be- 15.7 °C, with fewer than two frost days per year (Bureau of Meteorology, tween airspeed indications between probes can lead to costly and hazard- 2019). ous rejected take-offs or air turn backs (e.g. (Australian Transport Safety In 2016, a monitoring program was established to identify the wasp spe- Bureau, 2016, 2006); or significant loss of life (Bureau d’Enquêtes et cies responsible for pitot probe blockages, the seasonal pattern of nesting, d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile, 2012; Boeing, 2003; the type of aircraft most likely to be impacted, and the location most at National Transport Safety Bureau, 1981). Obstruction by insects is risk (House et al., 2020). Replica pitot tubes were fixed to three sets of recognised as a threat to pitot probe function (Civil Aviation Safety panels erected at four locations at Brisbane airport including both domestic Authority, 2018; Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2018b, 2016, 2006. and international terminals (Fig. 1). The 3D-printed pitot tubes represented The maintenance manual for the Boeing 737–800 states: “Apitotprobeor airframes with specific movement frequency at the airport and a range of static port system blocked by foreign objects such as insects may cause aperture dimensions (2.5–8 mm) (Boeing 737-400, 737-800, 747-400, Air- large errors in airspeed-sensing and altitude-sensing signals, which may bus A330, De Haviland Dash-8 and Embraer 190). Panels were monitored lead to loss of safe flight”. weekly (during main breeding season) to monthly, and blocked probes re- Amongst instances of mud wasps causing problems for aircraft, a num- moved for incubation were replaced by empty probes of the same type. ber of tragic accidents involving pitot probes most likely blocked by wasps Blocked probes were incubated in mesh bags, and emerging adult insects are well known, including a Boeing 757 that crashed shortly after take-off retrieved and identified. from the Dominican Republic in February 1996, killing all 189 passengers To test whether female wasps could be deterred from nesting in pitot and crew (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation probes, a series of intercept traps were deployed at the airport in both civile, 2012). The pilots misjudged the aircraft speed because of anomalous airside (16 traps) and landside (11 traps) locations in November 2018. readings from the pitot probes. In an earlier incident, a Douglas DC-3 These were intended to provide wasps with alternative nesting sites away crashed into the Atlantic Ocean near the Bahamas after take-off from from stationary aircraft at gates. Each trap consisted of 68 cardboard West Palm Beach International Airport, Florida in 1980 (National tubes 8 mm in diameter and 153 mm long, with one open end. Blocked Transport Safety Bureau, 1981) with 34 lives lost. In both cases, mud- tubes were removed and replaced by clean ones weekly. dauber wasp nest material was found in the pitot heads and considered the most likely cause of the pitot system malfunction. 2.2. Incidence and prevalence rates 1.2. Wasp incidents at Brisbane Airport Standard methods of measuring prevalence and incidence used in epi- In January–March 2006 five incidents were reported at Brisbane Air- demiological studies (e.g. (Brinks and Landwehr, 2015) have been applied port in which pitot probes gave inconsistent airspeed readings in the cock- here as measures of the risk of pitot probes being blocked. Incidence is the pit and flights were either rejected during take-off roll or proceeded to their occurrence of new cases (i.e. blocked pitot probes) within a specified time destination with an erroneous airspeed indication on one of the three pitot period. Prevalence is the proportion of subjects (pitot probes) blocked at systems. All aircraft were Airbus A330s. Of these, one led to a dangerous any one time.
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Fig. 1. Left: Pitot probe panel established at Brisbane Airport, with 3D-printed probes of (from top) 747-400, 737-400, A330, 737-800, DHC-8. Panels were fixed so that probes were facing the same direction as aircraft probes when an aircraft was parked at the gate, and at a roughly equivalent height. Right: Female keyhole wasp (Pachodynerus nasidens) on 3D-printed DHC8 probe, Brisbane Airport, May 2016.
2.3. Failure rates 2.4. Risk assessments
A classic engineering approach to estimate failure rate was applied (e.g. To examine the potential risks to human life, financial performance and Finkelstein, 2008). This method assumes that there is no learning and adap- reputation, a standard risk assessment (consequence, likelihood), was un- tation by the wasps over time, but it provides a simple method to test the dertaken, based on the Qantas Group Risk Assessment Guide (internal impact of management measures. Qantas document), which is typical of processes used in the aviation indus- Using annual movement statistics for the airframes used in the monitor- try to assess and manage risk. Only the consequences relevant to the key- ing study (= total number of movements/2 identifying each arrival and de- hole wasp threat were included (Table 1). This allowed quantification of parture as one movement or one opportunity for nesting to occur), and the costs of each type of incident, and a detailed breakdown of issues relat- assuming there are three probes per aircraft, we can calculate the number ing to damage and liability. The scenario modelled was of a fully laden of probes potentially “available” for nesting in each year for the selected air- Boeing 737–800 (carrying 174 passengers and 7 crew): this represents the frames, and the number per hour for a range of turn-around scenarios. We current most common configuration for aircraft arriving and departing can calculate the failure rate as: the airport. A likelihood/consequence matrix (Table 2) was used to rate overall risk. The consequence levels are determined by the separate assess- Nb λ ¼ =t ment of consequence in Table 1. This assessment was done in a dedicated Np workshop involving airport management, the Civil Aviation Safety Author- ity, a major airline and researchers. where Nb = failure count (number of probes blocked), Np = number of Secondly, a qualitative bow-tie risk assessment model was constructed probes available, and t = total run time (hours). (de Ruijter and Guldenmund, 2016). This allows identification of controls Failure rates were modelled for four protection scenarios (0%, 33%, in place as well as control failures (escalation risks) and in turn how these 66% and 75% of probes covered) using mean time before failure principles. are managed (escalation factor controls). The bow-tie framework consists
The probability of failure Pf that x probes (or fewer) will be blocked in a of four elements: a top or critical event (i.e. the issue that causes a break- year with n probes available for nesting is given as the complement of: down in system function), threats that increase the likelihood of the event taking place (equivalent to fault tree analysis), barriers that hinder manage- n! x n−x ment of the system to prevent the event (event tree analysis), and conse- bxðÞ¼; n; Ps ðÞPs ðÞ1−P x!ðÞn−x ! quences (i.e. outcomes of the event once barriers are addressed) (de Ruijter and Guldenmund, 2016). Bow-tie diagrams are used extensively where the probability of success (no blocked probes) Ps =(1− Pf) in aviation risk management (Cacciabue et al., 2015; Kontogiannis et al., (National Aeronautic and Space Administration, 2019). The binomial dis- 2017). The critical event applied was a pitot probe blocked by a mud tribution is used as there are only two possible outcomes for each probe wasp nest causing an airspeed reading anomaly on the fight deck. (blocked or not blocked), and the Poisson distribution approximates to To assess how the acceptable level of risk (ALOR) changes the cost of the binomial when values of n (probes) are large, and x (blockages) are management, we used the method described in Davidson et al. (2015) for small, as we have in this instance. The complement simply means that the invasive species. This takes the cost of not acting (or under-management: sum of probabilities of a probe becoming blocked and of not becoming Type II errors) and compares them with the cost of action (or over- blocked is 1 (i.e. the sum of all possible outcomes). management: Type I errors). Type II errors are often assumed to be irrevers- Rates were based on the number of blocked probes in the experiment, ible. The intention is for these considerations to be made in the early stages scaled to reflect the number of probes potentially available for nesting at of an invasion, when the relative benefit of over management is high, and the airport in a year: number of arrival/departure cycles of the airframes the chances of success are greatest. We examined the relationship between chosen for the experiment, multiplied by three probes per aircraft. We ALOR and indicative costs of action in two scenarios: Type I error rates also ran the models assuming that probes were available for nesting (on av- fixed at 0.05 and 0.01, with a budget based on real costs of current manage- erage) 24, 16, 10, 6, 3 and 1 h to examine the effect of turn-around times on ment (pest control, this pitot probe study and the intercept traps) and the probe blockage risk. We assumed that all available probes in each scenario annual mean of indicative costs between November 2013 and April 2019, had an equal chance of being chosen for nesting. which we equate here with the cost of management to remove all risk.
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Table 1 Consequence table used in standard risk assessment (from Qantas Group Risk Assessment Guide). Consequence Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 type
Safety and Deviation Deviation with minimal Deviation with some Deviation impacting continued Condition impacting the Total loss of aircraft security of managed potential to impact safe potential to impact safe safe operation. Managed using immediate safe operation. flight using operation. Managed operation. Managed using multiple non-normal checklists Management requires standard using normal non-normal procedures. and procedures emergency actions to preserve procedures procedures. aircraft. Reputation Isolated, Isolated short-term Minor change to customer Moderate change to customer Major change in customer Significant change in brand short-term change to customer experience and/or experience, and/or advocacy advocacy and brand preference for many change to experience for a number advocacy for a number of for our brand for a number of preference for many stakeholders for a period of customer of customers, or < a customers, or extended stakeholders for < a year, or stakeholders for 1–2 years, or >2 years, or prolonged experience of week of local media local media coverage international media coverage (a sustained (
Table 2 Likelihood table used in risk assessment. Consequence
Likelihood Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Almost certain LOW MEDIUM HIGH EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME Expected to occur in most circumstances, inevitable, could occur within days to weeks. A Likely LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH EXTREME EXTREME Could occur in most circumstances, not surprised if it happens, could occur within months. B Possible VERY Might occur in some circumstances, has occurred in the business before, could occur within one to two LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH EXTREME LOW years. C Unlikely VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH Could occur in some circumstances, has occurred in a similar organisation, could occur within years. D LOW Rare VERY VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH May occur but only in exceptional circumstances, has occurred elsewhere, could occur within decades. E LOW LOW Very rare VERY VERY VERY LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM Theoretically plausible but not expected to occur, could occur once in every 100 years. F LOW LOW LOW
Indicative costs were set for the two incident types recorded at Brisbane be- probes to nest at Brisbane Airport. Preferred probes had an aperture tween those dates: low speed rejected takeoff (AUD$99,000 per incident) ≥4 mm diameter (A330, Boeing 737-400, 737-800, 747, and De Haviland and return to land (AUD$434,360 per incident). All incidents were costed Dash 8). Both domestic and international terminals are affected, with a con- assuming a Boeing 737–800 with 174 passengers and 7 crew. centration of nesting activity at one end of the domestic terminal, and nesting was recorded in 9 months of the year (September–June) a seasonal pattern similar to that in wild populations in the species' native range, 2.5. Risk of spread peaking in warmer and wetter months (November–May). However, key- hole wasp activity has been reported at the airport in all months, indicating The potential spread of the keyhole wasp in Australia was determined some level of threat the whole year round. Over the 39-month experimental using the CGIAR Climate Analogues tool (Climate Change Agriculture period, 60 probes were deployed and 93 blockages by P. nasidens were and Food Security, 2019). We used a coastal site near Florianópolis in recorded. southern Brazil (27° 41′ 22”S, 48° 38′ 27”W) as a source climate in the spe- cies' native range and which broadly matches latitude, distance from the ocean and altitude with those of Brisbane Airport, and ran three models: 3.1. Incidence and prevalence rates current climates in both source (Brazil) and target (Australia), current source and future target, and future source and future target. Current Using data from House et al. (2020), we calculated the incidence rate of data are based on historical climatic averages (1960–1990) and future pitot probe nesting. Sixty probes were available for nesting over a period of data were forecast to 2020–2049, using the SRES A1B emissions scenario 39 months. In this time, 93 probe blockages were recorded, with 38 adult (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2000). wasps emerging (23 males and 15 females) resulting in an average of 2.38 blockages per month, and 0.0397 blockages per probe per month. 3. Results Prevalence, calculated as the proportion (expressed as a percentage of the total population) of pitot probes blocked, was 3.97% over 39 months. The results of the experimental work to April 2019 are reported in Incidence and prevalence vary together, as in our system there is no “mor- House et al. (2020). Only one species of mud wasp (P. nasidens) used pitot tality” to reduce the population of probes available for nesting.
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The rate of accumulation of new blockages is not a smooth progression At the lower end of consequence, delays to flights that have returned to as there are within and between year influences of environment (House et gate after a low speed rejection can still incur a significant cost (Table 4), al., 2020)(Fig. 2), and no asymptote has been reached, indicating further whereas the loss of the aircraft and life is substantial. This assessment did potential for both incidence rate and prevalence (and therefore risk) to in- not include indirect impacts on other parts of airline businesses or associ- crease over time and that intervention is likely to be beneficial. ated businesses, or financial impacts of reputational brand damage as this is carrier-specific, or the loss of infrastructure and life if the aircraft is lost 3.2. Failure rate over land. In the bow-tie analysis (Fig. 5), the top event is a pitot probe blocked There is a dramatic reduction in risk, from approximately 26 blockages by a keyhole wasp. This can be mitigated by addressing the root causes per year if no probes are covered, to 10 if 33% of probes are covered, to 5 (i.e. fault tree). In our case, of the three groups of root causes, the con- if 66% are covered and to 3 if 75% are covered (Fig. 3). The probability trols of one (keyhole wasp ecology and behaviour) have been addressed that zero probes will be blocked in a year is 0.3 if 66% of probes are covered, entirely, those of another (maintenance regime) is partly addressed by and 0.5 if 75% of probes are covered, assuming that all probes are available the local policy of covering probes by some carriers, whilst the controls for nesting for 24 h/day. When the length of time an aircraft is present at a possible for pitot probe design and function have not been addressed. gate is also reduced (Fig. 3) the number of blockages and the probability of There are a number of reasons for this, including the difficulty in re- blockage are further reduced. However, there is still a 3% chance (i.e. resid- designing probes to exclude wasps but not impair airflow, and the sub- fi ual risk) that a probe will be blocked if 75% of all probes are covered (Psmin = stantial costs of retro- tting new probes to all aircraft in the Australian 0.9698), and the aircraft is on the ground for 1 h (Fig. 4), and the benefitof fleet. applying covers accrues at a faster rate as turn-around times increase. On the event tree side of the bow-tie diagram, the responses avail- We can further examine the risk by including the likelihood of nesting able to pilots depend on the stage of flight the airspeed anomaly is reg- based on the effect of the intercept traps on the population of wasps istered, and the functioning of flight instruments and the training they attempting to nest in probes. The average rate of probe blockage was have received. If we assume that all pilots receive adequate training, 0.442 blockages/year before the intercept traps were installed, and 0.72 the instruments are operating correctly and the response to any given blockages/year after installation. However, the number of successful nests scenario is appropriate, then the only corrective actions can be made (i.e. those that hatched adult wasps) fell from 0.48 wasps/blockage to on the fault tree side. 0.06 wasps/blockage, an 8-fold decline. Although the number of nesting The results of the over- or under-management scenarios on real costs of events increased, the impact on the wasp population appears to be dra- control of the keyhole wasp are shown in Fig. 6. Clearly, the greater ALOR, matic, and further monitoring is required to see if this effect is carried for- the lower the costs of control, and the more certainty that management will ward. As the act of nesting is primarily responsible for the risk and not work (i.e. Type I error rate = 0.05) and the more costs can be reduced. At successful nesting, we do not include any potential impacts of the intercept present the ratio of cost of incidents to cost of management is 19.74, sug- traps in this analysis. gesting that operators are nearly 20 times more willing to take the risk of an incident than to spend adequately on managing the problem. 3.3. Risk assessments
The standard risk assessment included a review of individual risks to 3.4. Risk of spread safety of flight, brand reputation, one-off financial loss, and injury and ill- ness applied to a range of possible outcomes of increasing severity: low Climate futures modelling (Fig. 7) shows that much of the eastern sea- speed rejection of take-off, high speed rejected takeoff, runway excursion, board of Australia is potentially suitable for the persistence of the keyhole air return and total loss of aircraft. These possible outcomes all stem from wasp, under current and future climate scenarios, although other criteria airspeed anomalies detected by the flight crew: the phase of take-off in must also be met (e.g. suitable prey availability). Within the zone of which the decision is made (to proceed or abort) determines the outcome. >60% climate similarity in 2020–2049 there are 11 certified airports As expected, the risks increase dramatically with increasing severity of Australian (in addition to Brisbane) that could be at risk if the wasp is incident, but some aspects are high risk even at relatively low levels of phys- transported there. Four of these (Sunshine Coast, Gold Coast, Sydney and ical peril (Table 3). Perth) are international ports.
100 90 80 70 60 50
blockages 40 30 20 10 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 months
Fig. 2. Cumulative experimental pitot probe blockages (≡ nesting) over 39 months. Total of 60 probes available, 93 blockages.
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1 1 1 h 3h 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4 Probability Probability
0.2 0.2
0 0 01234 01234567
1 1 6h 10 h 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4 Probablity Probability
0.2 0.2
0 0 012345678910 02468101214
1 1 16 h 24 h 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4 Probability Probability 0.2 0.2
0 0 024681012141618 0 2 4 6 8 101214161820222426 Number of blockages Number of blockages
Fig. 3. Probability of failure (i.e. x pitot blockages or fewer in one year) with 0%, 33%, 66% and 75% of probes covered and average time at gate for aircraft of 1, 3, 6, 10, 16 and24h.
4. Discussion hatching from blocked probes, but not the number of blockages which is the critical safety issue for aircraft. The keyhole wasp is a known hazard to aviation in many tropical and A NOTAM (notice to airmen) warning of the potential risk to aircraft sub-tropical areas in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Its was issued at Brisbane in February 2014 and a warning about mud wasp ac- highly plastic nesting behaviour allows it to take advantage of man-made tivity at Brisbane was included in the ERSA (En Route Supplement cavities, including those in aircraft. The recent discovery of the species in Australia) to the Aeronautical Information Package for airmen, issued by Australia, and a series of serious incidents at Brisbane Airport, has elevated Air Services Australia, in the same year. the issue to a significant and potentially catastrophic threat. Currently, a number of carriers at Brisbane have local policies of cover- ing pitot probes on arrival, but this is not mandatory. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority issued an airworthiness bulletin listing several recommen- 4.1. Airport, carrier and aviation authority responses dations to reduce risk (Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 2018), including ap- plying pitot probe covers as soon as possible on arrival (after necessary Routine pest management at Brisbane Airport has included the removal cool-down time), checking these covers for damage, and closely inspecting of mud wasp nests (of species other than P. nasidens)fromterminalbuild- aircraft after long-term storage in the open. The Civil Aviation Safety ings and other structures since 2006. The number of nests treated has fallen Authority (2018) noted that standard pre-flight air data module checks dramatically over time: however, this has not reduced the threat from key- with built-in testing equipment will not detect probe blockages in station- hole wasps, which do not build complete nests and very sparingly use the ary aircraft. Also, standard pre-flight walk-around inspections may not de- nests of other species (Freeman and Jayasingh, 1975). Deployment of inter- tect a compromised, uncovered pitot probe, as the first material inserted cept traps in late 2018 appears to have reduced the number of wasps (of either mud or prey) cannot be seen without close inspection using a
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0.8
0.6 smin P 0.4
0.2
0 04812162024 Hours uncovered
0% 33% 66% 75%
Fig. 4. Probability of 0 probes blocked in one year (Psmin) with time probes are uncovered, for 0%, 33%, 66% and 75% of probes covered.
Table 3 mobilisation) after take-off from Brisbane and made a heavy landing. It Risk assessment results. was discovered that probe covers applied on arrival had not been removed fi Outcome Consequence Likelihood Risk (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2018b). A second risk identi ed with level probe covers is that the pitot probe head can be contaminated by fragments
Low speed rejected takeoff frayed from the frequent use of Kevlar covers. Safety and security of flight 2 LIKELY MEDIUM Carriers are justifiably concerned that the risk of leaving covers on may Reputation 2 LIKELY MEDIUM be greater than that presented by the keyhole wasp, although it is arguable One-off financial benefit or loss (revenue or 2 LIKELY LOW that the consequence is less as the worst outcome of leaving covers on cash) would be a high-speed rejected take-off. However, the failure rate analyses Injury and illness 1 UNLIKELY VERY LOW do show that applying covers reduces the risk of nesting substantially, even High speed rejected takeoff if covering every probe on aircraft at the gates is not practical; this is espe- Safety and security of flight 2 LIKELY MEDIUM cially beneficial if turn-around times are short. The time taken to approach Reputation 3 LIKELY HIGH ps = 1 is reduced dramatically by covering probes and shorter gate times, One-off financial benefit or loss (revenue or 1 LIKELY LOW cash) but there is still the potential for four blockages per year even if 75% of Injury and illness 1 UNLIKELY VERY probes are covered and gate times are limited to 1 h. Aircraft are stationary LOW at gates for a range of times (from under 1 h to overnight), but this analysis Return to land allows authorities to examine the residual risk of blockage given a range of fl Safety and security of ight 4 POSSIBLE HIGH policies and turn-around times. Reputation 3 LIKELY HIGH One-off financial benefit or loss (revenue or 2 LIKELY LOW Engineering solutions to prevent pitot blockages are generally incom- cash) patible with the function of the instrument, although Jackson (2015) has Injury and illness 2 POSSIBLE LOW proposed a design that uses optical sensors to detect debris or ice. This so- Runway overrun lution has not yet been incorporated into operational aircraft, but this ap- Safety and security of flight 5 POSSIBLE HIGH proach (or variant) and LiDAR-based airspeed measurement systems (e.g. Reputation 4 POSSIBLE HIGH One-off financial benefit or loss (revenue or POSSIBLE MEDIUM (Verbeek and Jentink, 2012) will possibly replace conventional pitot cash) probe systems in time. Injury and illness 4 POSSIBLE HIGH Loss of aircraft Safety and security of flight 6 RARE HIGH 4.2. Pest control options Reputation 6 RARE HIGH One-off financial benefit or loss (revenue or 6 RARE HIGH As a relatively recent arrival in Australia, the chances of eradicating the cash) keyhole wasp would appear to be good. As far as is known the species is still Injury and illness 6 RARE HIGH restricted to the Brisbane area, centred on the airport precinct: survey and surveillance in the wider Brisbane area has not detected the species (R. Wylie pers. comm.). However, standard cost/benefit analyses of eradica- borescope or similar inspection tool: therefore, covers are the preferred tion versus other responses (i.e. containment, control) do not apply where management control. there is not an immediate and demonstrable import or export benefit. In The simple procedure of applying pitot covers to aircraft at gates or in the case of the keyhole wasp, the benefit of action is the reduction in likeli- storage, as recommended by manufacturers (Boeing, 2003; Duquesne hood of a serious (and expensive) outcome. Aircraft will continue to arrive et al., 2016) and aviation authorities (Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and depart whether a loss has been incurred or not, so decisions around 2018) incurs its own risks: failure to remove covers. In July 2018, an eradication therefore must be taken with a future loss expected, despite A330 bound for Kuala Lumpur issued a pan-pan distress call (an urgent sit- the actual incidents that have been reported and the (rare) catastrophic uation requiring air traffic control attention and emergency services consequences experienced. The risk analysis has shown that the likelihood
7 A.P.N. House et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxx
Table 4 Indicative direct costs of increasingly serious outcomes due to an undetected keyhole wasp nest in a pitot probe. Case aircraft is a Boeing 737-800 with 174 passengers and 7 crew. Outcome Type of cost Estimated itemised cost (A$ 2019) Total cost (A$ 2019)
low speed rejection • replacement and testing of probe • $8500 $98,500 • time out of service • $1000 / min. for 90 min. high speed rejection • replacement and testing of probe, single wheel brake replacement, tyre replacement • $35,000 $160,220-198,500 • passenger care • time out of service • $5220a–$43,500b • $1000 / min. for 120 min. return to land • replacement and testing of probe, fuel burn/dump, landing fees, incidentals • $25,000 $210,220-248,500 • passenger care • time out of service • $5220a–$43,500b • $1000 / min. for 180 min. runway excursion • aircraft recovery, replacement and testing of probe, brake packs, tyres, engine repair/replacement • $10,000,000 >$15 M • passenger care • time out of service • $5220a–$43,500b • $1000 / min. loss of aircraft • replace aircraft, time out of service, life insurance pay outs • > $100 M > $4100 M a Assumes A$30 meal voucher per passenger and re-booked same day. b Assumes A$250 per passenger overnight and re-booked next day.
of an adverse incident occurring as a result of keyhole wasp activity was has declined since their introduction (House et al., 2020). Introducing a rated no higher than likely, but the consequence could be catastrophic. targeted keyhole wasp control plan early (i.e. before the population ex- Early intervention in pest management relies on early detection pands to off-airport areas or to other airports) may also take advantage (Hulme, 2009), but recognising the risk is also critical. Fraser et al. of any Allee effects that may occur (reduction in fitness due to limited (2006) show that eradicating an invasive species is most likely the pre- populationsize),althoughwedonotknowatwhatsizeofpopulation ferred option if there is an immediate financial benefit to be derived these effects would be manifest (if at all). Allee effects are known to from the eradication, and where uncertainty about the success of erad- be an effective containing mechanism in some insect pests (e.g. ication is low. Eradicating pests from man-made habitats (such as air- European gypsy moth in the USA, Tobin et al., 2009), and data from ports) depends on the spatial extent of infestation and is clearly more this study suggests that this may be playing a part in reducing successful possible at a local scale (Pluess et al., 2012b). Although mud nesting nesting in pitot probes. As we have no reason to expect that there will wasp species are prone to parasitism and predation by range of other not be further arrivals of the keyhole wasp in Australia, the use of inter- organisms, biological control has had limited success (Beggs et al., cept traps will ensure a strong Allee effect is maintained, thus reducing 2011), and in a solitary species such as the keyhole wasp the low den- the risk of population growth and dispersal (McDermott and Finnoff, sity and widely dispersed nature of the population would presumably 2016). limit success (Zaviezo and Mills, 2000; Samaková et al., 2019). Several Given the relatively recent arrival of the keyhole wasp in Australia, the technologies are available for detecting and eradicating social wasps limited extent of the known infestation, and our knowledge of nesting pref- (Turchi and Derijard, 2018), but many do not apply to solitary nesting erences and risk factors, we believe that eradication of the species from species. Australia is possible. Eradication programs can be evaluated using four potential success factors: reaction time, size of infested area, biological knowledge and 4.3. Risk of spread in Australia preparedness to act, and insularity. An analysis of 136 pest eradication programs (Pluess et al., 2012a) showed that only one of these potential The keyhole wasp's ability to survive long-distance transport has factors (extent of infestation) was important for a successful outcome. allowed it to spread from its native range in southern and central America For wasps (Vespidae) in general there are very few cases of targeted con- to the USA (Carpenter, 1986) and various locations in the Pacific Ocean trol programs once the species has become established (Beggs et al., (Yamane et al., 1996), and now to Australia. As far as we are aware, it is cur- 2011), and although P. nasidens is a solitary species the particular threat rently confined to the Brisbane area, mainly in the Brisbane Airport pre- it poses to aviation theoretically makes it an important target for con- cinct but has also been recorded at the nearby Port of Brisbane (R. Wylie trol. The relative costs of pre-emptive, over-management action (i.e. pers. comm.). There is also an unconfirmed record of the species in Emerald the current management strategy, 2019 cost approx. AUD$80,000) (central Queensland). can be kept low relative to the cost of under-management if this is This spread is most likely to have been through shipping, although equated with the cost of incidents (mean annual cost AUD$1.6 M). In re- wasps are possibly carried on aircraft as much of the spread is post ality, managers are reluctant to spend on prevention, as the returns on World War 2 as air traffic increased in the region. The appearance of investment are less certain than the gain realised from control (Finnoff P. nasidens in Hawaii as early as 1912 confirmsthatitarrivedbyboat, et al., 2007). as the first crossing of the Pacific to Hawaii (O'ahu) by airplane from At Brisbane Airport, removing nests from blocked dummy pitot the west coast of USA (Oakland) did not take place until 1927 (Ryan, probes and intercept traps is effectively a breeding disruption technique 2018). if it operates more efficiently than the population taking advantage of Tramp species such as the keyhole wasp are most likely to be the additional available nesting sites. This is a common practice in inte- transported as larvae or pupae (rather than adults) in nests attached to ship- grated pest insect management and isusedaspartofintegratedstrate- ping crates or other cargo, or to the ships themselves. However, aircraft lug- gies (Rodriguez-Saona and Stelinski, 2009; Suckling et al., 2013). gage bay temperatures may be sufficiently high (7 °C to over 25 °C: Emond There is some evidence (House et al., 2020) that intercept traps are re- et al., 1999) to allow an adult wasp to survive, and even wheel-wells may be ducing the available adult breeding population since breeding success suitable for shorter and lower altitude flights (18 °C: Perry, 2002)oreven (i.e. successful emergence of adult wasps from the replica pitot probes) long-distance high altitude (12,000 m) flights (8–25 °C: Russell, 1987).
8 A.P.N. House et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxx
Fig. 5. Bow-tie diagram for keyhole wasp risk analysis. Under outcomes, the severity of consequences is ordered (left to right): safety and security of flight, reputation, one-off financial loss (revenue or cash), injury and illness.
Invertebrates are especially good stowaways, accounting for over 90% of all the region would be a matter of fortune rather than management, as it is stowaway introductions of pests to South Africa (Faulkner et al., 2016). clearly an adaptable, long-distance traveller, and is not dependent on However, to spread further in Australia from Brisbane Airport the species specialised nesting sites or food resources. Local control measures may be need not take such risks: as an import hub Brisbane Airport receives around reducing the risk at Brisbane Airport, but may not be enough to prevent 52,600 t of freight per year, most of which is transported from the airport by the keyhole wasp hitching a ride on road, sea or even air transport to road, providing the keyhole wasp with significant opportunities to disperse other ports. Surveillance programs (e.g. Wylie et al., 2008) have not in- where climatic conditions are generally suitable. Similar opportunities cluded the keyhole wasp to date: it is not yet classed as an agricultural, so- present at the Port of Brisbane. That it may not yet have dispersed outside cial or environmental pest in Australia. If eradication is not attempted, then
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14
12
10
8
6
4
ALOR mean annual cost (AUD$M) 2
0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 Type II error rate (ALOR)
Type I error = 0.05 Type I error = 0.1
Fig. 6. Relationship between indicative cost of management and acceptable level of risk, for Type I error rates of 0.05 and 0.1.
9 A.P.N. House et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxx
surveillance and precautionary measures such as pitot probe covers are the minimum response required to ensure that Australia does not suffer a re- peat of the 1996 Caribbean tragedy.
Acknowledgements
We are extremely grateful to Brian Ford (Qantas) for making the printed pitot probes used in the experiment. Our thanks also to Dave Selby and Pe- ter Dunlop (BAC) for early enthusiasm for this project; Chris Burwell (Queensland Museum) for help with wasp identification; Chuck Davies and Matt Molin (CASA) for supervising the risk and bow-tie analyses; Ross Wylie (Biosecurity Queensland) for discussions on biosecurity and wasp ecology; and Ailsa Kerswell, Jeff McKee, Susan House and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. This work was funded by BAC.
References
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