3.04: Electricity Sector-Stranded Debt
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Chapter 3 Ministry of Finance Section 3.04 Electricity Sector— Stranded Debt successor companies on April 1, 1999. The new Background entities and their functions were: • Ontario Power Generation (OPG) for electri- city generation; We provided updates in past Annual Reports on Hydro One for wholesale power transmission the electricity sector’s stranded debt, defined as • and retail distribution; that portion of the total debt of the old Ontario the Electrical Safety Authority for electrical Hydro that could not be serviced in a competitive • inspection; market environment when the electricity sector the Independent Electricity Market Operator was restructured 12 years ago. We provide another • to manage the power grid and the wholesale such update this year, along with information on electricity market; and the Debt Retirement Charge (DRC), a component of • the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation nearly every Ontario ratepayer’s electricity bill. Chapter 3 • VFM Section 3.04 (OEFC) to manage the legacy debt and other liabilities not transferred from the old Ontario Hydro to successor companies. Detailed Review Observations The intent of restructuring was to have the new entities operate in a commercial manner, with a strong financial footing that would make them HOW DID THE STRANDED DEBT ARISE? more efficient and effective and lead to prices that With passage of the Energy Competition Act, 1998 were as low as possible for consumers. (which included the Ontario Energy Board Act, Under the old monopolistic rate-regulated 1998 and the Electricity Act, 1998), the Ontario system, Ontario Hydro tried to set electricity prices government launched a major restructuring of the at a level that ensured all costs, including principal province’s electricity industry. and interest payments on debt, were eventually The two most significant aspects of this restruc- recovered from customers. With the introduction of turing were the creation of competitive wholesale competition, however, Ontario Hydro’s commercial and retail markets for electricity that opened May 1, successor companies no longer have the assurance 2002, and the breakup of Ontario Hydro into five that they can recover all costs, especially those 121 122 2011 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario incurred in previous years and still outstanding, Figure 1: Financial Impact of the Restructuring of the through free-market electricity rates. Electricity Sector ($ billion) One of the most critical steps in the restructur- Source of data: Ministry of Finance ing process was to determine the fair market value of the Ontario Hydro assets transferred to the new Former Ontario Hydro debt and liabilities 38.1 entities. Both Ontario Hydro and the government, less assisted by private-sector investment firms and Value of new generation and service companies 17. 2 other experts, recognized that the market value of equals these assets in a competitive environment would Stranded debt 20.9 be significantly less than the amounts recorded in less Expected dedicated revenue streams 13.1 Ontario Hydro’s books. It was anticipated that in a equals competitive market, revenues and profits generated Residual stranded debt 7. 8 by the successor companies would not be sufficient either to justify the existing recorded asset values or Electricity Act provided for other revenue streams, to service Ontario Hydro’s substantial outstanding and the government developed a long-term plan to debt. provide the OEFC with revenue streams to service On April 1, 1999, the Ministry of Finance the existing debt and ultimately retire the stranded determined that Ontario Hydro’s total debt and debt. A key government policy decision at the time other liabilities stood at $38.1 billion, which greatly was that all electricity-sector debt would be repaid exceeded the estimated $17.2-billion market value by the electricity sector and ratepayers rather than of the assets being transferred to the new entities. from general tax revenues. The resulting shortfall of $20.9 billion was deter- To service and retire the $20.9 billion in mined to be “stranded debt,” representing the total stranded debt, the government established a long- debt and other liabilities of Ontario Hydro that term plan wherein the burden of debt repayment could not be serviced in a competitive environment. would be borne partly through dedicated revenues Responsibility for servicing and managing the from the electricity-sector companies—OPG, Hydro Chapter 3 • VFM Section 3.04 legacy debt of Ontario Hydro, which includes One, and Municipal Electrical Utilities (MEUs)— the stranded debt, was given to the OEFC, whose and partly by electricity consumers. This would be opening balance sheet reflected a stranded debt broken down for the electricity sector as follows: or unfunded liability of $19.4 billion. This The electricity companies would make pay- amount represented the difference between the • ments in lieu of taxes (PILs) to the OEFC. $18.7-billion value of assets assumed by the OEFC PILs are equivalent to the corporate income, and the $38.1 billion of Ontario Hydro legacy debt property, and capital taxes paid by private and other liabilities that the OEFC also took on. It corporations. Before April 1, 1999, these com- should be noted that the stranded-debt figure of panies were not required to make any of these $19.4 billion listed as an unfunded liability in the payments. OEFC’s April 1, 1999, financial statements does not The cumulative annual combined profits of agree exactly with the total of $20.9 billion in Figure 1 • OPG and Hydro One in excess of the govern- because of certain accounting adjustments, consisting ment’s $520-million annual interest cost of its mainly of $1.2 billion in deferred debt costs. investments in the two companies would go Because the OEFC had neither the assets nor toward repaying stranded debt. the expected revenue streams from the value of the As of April 1, 1999, the present value of these other Ontario Hydro successor companies to fully two dedicated revenue streams was estimated at service the debt obligations it had assumed, the Electricity Sector—Stranded Debt 123 $13.1 billion. The estimated balance remaining Figure 2: Progress in Repayment of the Stranded Debt, on the $20.9-billion stranded debt, amounting 1999/2000–2010/11 ($ billion) to $7.8 billion, was called the “residual stranded Source of data: OEFC debt,” and the Electricity Act provided for a new Debt Retirement Charge (DRC) to be paid by elec- Fiscal Year End tricity consumers until the residual stranded debt at April 1, 1999 19.4 was retired. In essence, this was the estimated por- 1999/2000 20.0 tion of the stranded debt that could not be serviced 2000/01 20.0 by the estimated present value of the two dedicated 2001/02 20.1 revenue streams from the electricity companies. 2002/03 20.2 This structure was intended to achieve the 2003/04 20.6 elimination of the stranded debt in a prudent man- 2004/05 20.4 ner, and to distribute the burden of debt repayment 2005/06 19.3 between electricity consumers and the electricity 2006/07 18.3 2007/08 17. 2 sector (OPG, Hydro One, and MEUs). 2008/09 16.2 Figure 1 illustrates the significant determina- 2009/10 14.8 tions made at the time of restructuring. 2010/11 13.4 PROGRESS IN RETIRING THE STRANDED varied from a low of $321 million in the 2010/11 fis- DEBT cal year to a high of $949 million in 2005/06, while electricity-sector dedicated income has ranged from Figure 2 illustrates the progress made in reducing $0 in 2001/02, 2003/04, and 2008/09 to a high of the total stranded debt as reflected in the OEFC’s $771 million in 2010/11. audited financial statements. It should be noted As we reported in last year’s Annual Report, that the OEFC’s financial statements currently some of the factors that have affected OPG’s profit- report only the total outstanding stranded debt and ability over the past 11 years include the following: not the residual stranded debt, which is a compon- Chapter 3 • VFM Section 3.04 Electricity-generation projects such as the ent of total stranded debt. This is consistent with • Niagara tunnel project have had cost over- the Electricity Act, 1998, which requires that the runs, with costs being almost double their ori- outstanding amount of the residual stranded debt ginal estimates and completion dates running need only be determined and disclosed “from time years behind schedule. to time,” as discussed later in this section. Investment returns on the $11-billion nuclear Progress in retiring the overall stranded debt • removal and waste management funds, over this period has been slower than anticipated, reflected in OPG’s financial statements, have due primarily to the lower-than-expected profitabil- been volatile. Canadian accounting standards ity of Hydro One and, particularly, OPG. The lower require OPG to reflect unrealized gains and their respective earnings, the lower the PILs they losses in its net income. make to the OEFC, and the less they contribute to There has been public and political pressure to the electricity-sector dedicated income payments. • keep electricity rates low, which impacts the The uncertainty inherent in forecasting the finan- profitability of the sector. cial performance of the electricity sector becomes As well, OPG’s future profitability and, apparent on examination of the actual revenues consequently, the pace of the reduction of the produced by this sector. As reported in the OEFC’s recorded stranded-debt balance may be impacted audited financial statements, PILs revenues have 124 2011 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario by uncertainty about which costs the Ontario In announcing the DRC in 2000, the then Minis- Energy Board (OEB), which regulates rates, will ter of Energy said that the objective of it was to pay allow OPG to pass on to its customers.