ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AN D INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN :
The Europeanization of Post-Communist Tripartis m
Elena A. Iankova Cornell University
The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 910 17th Street, N.W. Suite 30 0 Washington, D .C. 2000 6
TITLE VIII PROGRAM
Project Information
Sponsoring Institution : Cornell University
Principal Investigators : Peter Katzenstein and Elena Iankov a
Council Contract Number : 814-16g
Date : May 31, 2000
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The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Counci l for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U .S . Department of State unde r Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author .
ii Executive summar y
Literature on transition in post-communist Europe has emphasized the role of Western models i n the establishment of new institutional structures in the aftermath of 1989 . This paper explores the establishment of "tripartism" — government-union-employer negotiations over the distribution of th e burdens and rewards of transition — in order to trace the extent, mechanisms and impact of Western
European influences. By providing a detailed historical account of the emergence of tripartism i n
Bulgaria, the paper demonstrates that in the early stages of transition, "soft Europeanization, " characterized by lesson-drawing and learning from Western examples, prevailed . In the more recen t stages, direct institutional transfer, or "hard" Europeanization, has been a result of the European Unio n
(EU) accession process, especially the need of Central and Eastern European countries to harmonize thei r internal laws with the EU common law, the acquis communautaire .
iii Introduction : pre-accession aspects of Europeanizatio n
The transition literature has widely acknowledged the search for "Western" models in post - communist Europe (often denoted as "imitation") in the immediate aftermath of 1989, for the sake o f quick establishment of market-oriented institutional structures (Elster et al ., 1998 : 235-238 ; Lijphart and
Waisman, 1996) . The institutional restructuring underway was not a simple process of imitating Western
institutions, however (Jacoby, 1998) . This paper focuses on the institution of tripartism — e .g . government-union-employer talks as a bargained exchange for the more equal distribution of the pain s and rewards of transition — in order to identify the extent to which post-communist tripartism was shape d by Western European influences . as well as the rationale for this shaping and the channels through whic h
it occurred .
The question about the foreign modeling of the institution of tripartism is especially important ,
first, in light of the fact that tripartism did not exist in state socialist Europe before 1989, emerge d everywhere in the region at the very outset of the transition process, and by 1998 was consolidated as an enduring institution (lankova . 1998) . And second, the "model " of tripartism is especially characteristic , even seems to be a "reserved" brand, of Western European corporatist countries (Schmitter and Grote ,
1997: Fajertag and Pochet, 1997) . This model has also been actively promoted – though with dubiou s results – at the European level (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991 : Gorges, 1996 ; Falkner, 1998) or, as students of multi-level governance assert, in a framework of European multi-level decision-making (Grande ,
1996). With the European Union's (EU) opening of accession talks with ten central and Easter n
European (CEE) applicants for EU membership – with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sloveni a and Estonia. in March 1998, and with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, in Februar y
2000 – the EU has been singled out as the most important and influential source of foreign institutiona l design in the post-communist region .
These developments raise the question of the Europeanization of post-communist tripartism, a s part of an increasingly evolving process of the Europeanization of post-communist politics, policies and
institutions (Aniol, 1995 and 1996 : Agh, 1999 ; Grabbe, 1999 : Jacoby. 1999) . "Europeanization, " a
I recently coined term in European regional integration theory, has been traditionally used to delineate th e definition of national state and interest group interests in an international and institutional context tha t includes the EU (Andersen and Eliassen, 1993 : Sandholtz 1993 ; Ladrech 1994) . The main proposition of the "Europeanization" argument is that states define their interests in a different way as members of th e
EU than they would without it, and that "European" identity should be sought not exclusively at th e
European supranational level but as increasingly interwoven in the matrix of domestic politics an d institutions of member states (Sandholtz, 1993 : Ladrech. 1994), or in the matrix of inseparable interdependent levels of governance (Olsen . 1996) : and that policy domains are moved from the sphere o f nation-state governance up to the supranational level of EU institutions and are then implemented b y member states (Forder and Menon, 1998 : Caporaso et al ., 1998) .
The Europeanization of domestic politics . policies and institutions in non-EU member states as a result of general processes of regionalization, and especially in nation-states aspiring for EU membership , has been only sporadically explored . Moreover, research in this area has predominantly stemmed from studies of the Southern enlargement of the EU (Greece in 1981 . and Portugal and Spain in 1986) whic h required much greater pre-accession and post-accession change and adaptation to the requirements of E U membership, in contrast to the more recent 1995 enlargement which included economically much mor e developed and politically much more consolidated nations . e .g . Sweden, Finland and Austria (Borras e t al ., 1998: Borzel, 1998 ; Featherstone . 1998 ; Borras-Alomar, 1999) . The Europeanization of post - communist politics, policies and institutions is an area which has only recently attracted academi c attention, with the EU eastward enlargement project, and remains generally embedded in studies about th e consequences of the EU's eastward enlargement on EU institutions, governance rules and policies (Nell o and Smith. 1997: Mayhew, 1998; Grabbe and Hughes, 1998 : van Brabant, 1999: Curzon Price et al .,
1999 ; Henderson, 1999) .
A focus on the institution of post-communist tripartism is particularly useful because it clearly reveals two different aspects of the process of Europeanization that are especially characteristic of non -
member states aspiring for EU membership . The first one is "soft" Europeanization : changes in domestic politics, policies and institutions as a result of "Western" modeling, including Europea n
transnational and transgovernmental processes and even the impact of global actors, such as the IMF an d
the World Bank, the policies of which became interwoven with European regionalization in light of th e anticipated accession of CEE countries to the EU. The second aspect of the Europeanization of CE E politics, policies and institutions is the "hard" one . "Hard" Europeanization denotes changes in CEE polities that stem from the EU's requirement that CEE candidates for membership implement in full th e
80,000-page body of EU common law, the acquis communautaire, as a precondition for their entry int o the EU (Preston, 1997) .
This paper explores these two aspects of the Europeanization of post-communist tripartism b y
focusing on the institutional implications of the "European" factor from the very beginning of the post -
1989 reconstruction of the region . I provide an in-depth analysis of the emergence, development an d consolidation of tripartite forums in Bulgaria. Bulgaria is often considered to have the most developed tripartite-corporatist structures in the post-communist region, with thirteen different tripartite bodie s established since 1997-98 (See Table 1, at the end of this paper) . Some of these bodies have decision -
making powers over the management of social funds and labor affairs and are involved in virtually al l
levels of bargaining (e .g ., national, sectoral and regional) .
I address the issue of institutional design of tripartism by applying a corporatist institutionalis t perspective . This perspective is part of what B . Guy Peters called "societal institutionalism," a specifi c combination/unification of the three major institutionalist perspectives — historical, rational choice, and
sociological (normative) institutionalism (Peters, 1999 : 117) . Under corporatist institutionalism, th e relationship between government and interest groups could be viewed as aimed at an "appropriat e behavior" understood as general consensus (the normative-institutionalist perspective) ; as "path - dependent" (the historical-institutionalist perspective): but also as "rational" (the rational choic e perspective) (See also Hall and Taylor, 1996 ; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 : March and Olsen, 1984 an d
1994 ; Knight, 1992) . Corporatist institutionalism presents tripartism as three-layered — normative, historical an d
rational-choice (See Figure 1, at the end of this paper) — with corporatist compromise as the glue linking
together the layers . The normative basis of post-communist tripartism is a shared understanding of th e
necessity to cooperate in the preservation of social peace and the legitimation of actors in the period o f
transformation . Added to this cultural-normative perspective is a second, historical layer that reflects the
concrete input of social actors' past practices . The legacies of state socialism have produced conflictin g
pressures on post-communist tripartism . On the one hand, they left a highly communitarian culture tha t
generally fosters corporatist linkages between the state and social groups . On the other hand the decades -
long experience with transmission-belt political arrangements left the working population at larg e
generally ill-disposed towards close collaboration with a still reforming state . The third, rational-choic e
layer of post-communist tripartism reflects a rational process of social actors' differing strategi c
commitments to social partnership and their attempts — within the constraints imposed by the first two
layers — to maximize their individual gains from corporatist bargaining .
Based on a detailed historical account of the emergence and development of tripartism i n
Bulgaria, I argue in the next section that as far as the birth and initial development of the institution o f
tripartism is concerned, domestic innovation mixed with "lesson drawing " and "learning experience "
(Rose, 1991) prevailed over any direct institutional transfer and imitation of existing Western Europea n
tripartite structures. Initially tripartism was mostly shaped by twin domestic necessities — the need t o
secure social peace and legitimate the actors in times of rapidly falling living standards and uncertainty ,
as a result of economic, political, and legislative reforms . That domestic effort, had it not bee n
recommended by common sense alone, would have gained high priority because of pressure fro m
international lending institutions and the European Union, which offered to make loans to the region onl y
provided that certain conditions of social peace were met . Overall, the initial development of Bulgarian
tripartism reveals a "soft" Europeanization in an international and institutional context that included no t
only the EU and the Western European model of capitalism, but also global actors such as the IMF, th e
World Bank and foreign corporations with subsidiaries in the region .
4 With the advancement of transformation and the European integration process, another section o f this paper reveals, direct institutional transfer from Europe has become more prominent . With th e
speeded-up accession process and the stepped-up harmonization of CEE countries' laws with the E U common law, the acquis communautaire, the applicants for EU membership became subject to th e requirement to "establish and maintain social dialogue" as a precondition for their entry . While this E U requirement is not stringent with respect to details, it is nonetheless viewed as important for defendin g tripartism against potential attempts by neo-liberal governments to abolish it , ' and may, as a result, lead to tripartism's further development as an enduring institutional structure .
As part of both the "soft" and "hard " Europeanization of tripartism, I trace three consecutive step s of increasing institutional transfer from the European Union : (1) the EU ' s PHARE "Social Dialogue "
Project; (2) the establishment of temporary, EU accession-driven tripartite institutions such as the Counci l
for the Ratification of the European Social Charter (Revised), and the Joint EU-Bulgaria Consultativ e
Committee on Economic and Social Issues ; and (3) attempts to establish an Economic and Social Counci l as an enduring, EU-designed institutional structure of tripartism .
The finaly section analyzes how the general trend from domestic innovation and lesson-drawin g
to EU-driven institutional transfer in post-communist tripartism 's Europeanization applies to interna l
three-layered complex interactions .
"Soft" Europeanization : lesson-drawing, international conditionality and domestic innovatio n
Tripartism and collective bargaining can operate as viable mechanisms for the regulation of th e
terms and conditions of employment where there is a market economy, especially labor markets, an d
where there are clearly differentiated social groups with contrasting interests . Under state socialism, thes e
conditions were missing . In Bulgaria and other Soviet bloc countries, state socialism abolished privat e
property and markets . Labor markets were paralyzed by administrative control, and wage bargaining was
replaced by central planning . As far as the second basic precondition is concerned, the rulin
" nature ofg marxist-leninist ideology regarded conflicts in the sphere of labor as contradicting the "true socialis m
5 as a classless society based on public (state) ownership . The alleged supremacy of the "common " interes t over individual and group interests created, in theory, fully harmonious relations between the state and th e trade unions .
The "harmony" and "unity" of all interests were additionally strengthened by the absence of rea l employers and the lack of autonomous partners . Although not involved in bargaining over employmen t conditions, the Bulgarian trade unions had been allocated some state distributive functions in the areas o f health care, recreational facilities, and pension benefits . At the national level unions were formall y
involved, together with state organs, in the preparation of normative documents concerning labor an d social issues and living standards, which were jointly signed by the government and the central organs o f trade unions. However, all these activities required preliminary communist party approval .
In search of institutional solution s
ln November 1989-March 1990, in the context of a severe strike wave in Bulgaria, a genuin e search for institutional solutions to the problem of mounting industrial unrest was spontaneously initiated .
Union activists at various levels became involved in a "learning experience" and "lesson-drawing," e .g ., the interpretation and adaptation of Western achievements "collective bargaining," and its activ e promotion in emerging market conditions . At that time, highly qualified International Labor Organizatin
(ILO) and EU experts on tripartism and collective bargaining had not yet landed in Bulgaria . Bulgarian social actors, and the unions in particular. looked for "Western" models, not to copy them, even fo r administrative expedience, but to build upon them a "return to normalcy" under the conditions of a market economy, while catching up with the advanced practices of collective bargaining in the mos t developed market economies in the world .
In early 1990. when Bulgarians started exploring the Western experience in combating strike s and other industrial unrest, they were looking not for "tripartism" but for "collective bargaining," a n institution which was familiar to Bulgarians from the pre-WWII past, though with pro-fascist elements i n the period 1936-41 (Tseneva . 1991) . "Tipartism " as a term was unknown to both academic circles in th e
6 field of labor relations, and to the more policy-oriented experts of the social actors . Yet, in practice , given the domestic conditions of a prevailing state property and an overwhelming state involvement i n the economy, it was tripartism that was established in Bulgaria by March 1990. The first normative documents prepared by the Bulgarian "social partners" to regulate their relationships included : the elaboration of the Law on the Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes which was adopted by the Gran d
National Assembly on March 6, 1990 ; the signing of a General Agreement on urgent social and economi c problems, between the government, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions In Bulgaria (CITUB ) and the National Union of Economic Managers (NUEM) (15 March 1990) ; and the adoption by the socia l partners of General Guidelines for the Conclusion of Collective Contracts and Agreements During 199 0
(5 April 1990) . The creation on April 5, 1990 of a National Commission for Coordination of Interests , marked the institutionalization of this sort of social dialogue in Bulgaria .
The National Commission for Coordination of Interests aimed at arriving at mutually acceptabl e decisions concerning economic reforms and the social consequences of the reforms, including labo r relations issues, social security and living standards, and the resolution of important labor conflicts , including those where strike actions were legally forbidden . In early 1993, following the adoption of a new Labor Code which made social dialogue and social partnership mandatory, the National Council fo r
Tripartite Cooperation (NCTC) was formed. It continues to this day and comprises representatives of th e g overnment and of the organizations of employees and employers recognized by the Council of Minister s as being nationally representative . On the union side, these are the CITUB and Podkrepa CL . On the employers' side, these include the Bulgarian Industrial Association, the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerc e and Industry, the Union of Economic Enterprises, and the Vazrazhdane Union of Private Producers .
The NCTC focuses much of its attention on wages . The social partners have to agree on th e national minimum wage and other protected payments – monthly additional children's payments an d unemployment benefits – which are calculated as a percentage of the minimum wage . Strategies and policies in the area of employment and unemployment are also regularly discussed by the NCTC, an d important laws and normative documents eventually issued by the government often have been prepared by the NCTC . The goals. principles, criteria and mechanisms of incomes policy have also been a majo r area of discussions within the tripartite forum, as well as most aspects of the economic reforms . These include price controls on selected basic goods and other goods produced by state monopolies : legislation concerning the -financing of small and medium enterprise development ; and privatization and industria l restructuring .
As the Bulgarian economy deteriorated sharply in 1996, as a result of mismanagement by th e
Videnov government, social dialogue within the NCTC was discontinued . Massive protest actions and strikes across the country in December 1996 and January 1997 led to the resignation of the Socialis t government and to early parliamentary elections in April 1997 . In July 1997, following general elections , the UDF-based Kostov cabinet was formed, as was a currency board that pegged the Bulgarian currency , the Lev, to the German mark .
A Charter for Social Cooperation and Memorandum for Priority Common Action, signed i n
October 1997 between the Prime Minister and the social partners . aimed to mobilize a broad socia l consensus so as to continue economic and social reforms in the country, and promote democratization .
Through a series of laws adopted in 1997-1998, the Kostov government created additional tripartit e organs to complement the NCTC in all major areas of the social sphere . in accordance with the prioritie s set in the government program Bulgaria 2001 for the period 1997-2001 . The program emphasized the social market economy as the economic guarantee for the development of industry and for the rights an d freedoms of individuals (Bulgarian Government, 1997) . The social market order included privat e property and the creation of markets, free bargaining, and a well-developed social security system . The government policy in the social sphere included several major high-priority goals, among which were a panoply of reforms – in the social security system . in incomes policy and social assistance, and in health and safety at work, for example -- and the creation of labor markets . The government program emphasized the tripartite character of the management and control of a variety of social funds .
Consistent with the social-dialogue orientation of the new government, a total of 13 corporatis t structures arose in Bulgaria after 1997 eight tripartite forums and five tripartite boards for th e
8 management of social funds (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 1998a) . Many of the tripartite organ s departed from their classical tripartite character and became multipartite, including nongovernmenta l organizations and various professional organizations . Moreover, the tripartite organs developed not onl y as organs of consultation but as bodies through which social groups became directly involved in th e decision-making process .
In addition to the NCTC . the social partners created the following specialized national tripartit e forums, to facilitate the conciliation of interests on a broad variety of social issues : the National Counci l on Unemployment Protection and Employment Promotion (to regulate unemployment insurance policy , employment promotion. and vocational training of persons of working age) ; the National Council on
Vocational Training (to approve state policy in the area of vocational training) ; the Supervisory Board of the National Employment Office (to approve basic guidelines on the implementation of the state policy o n employment promotion, organization of professional training and retraining, and unemploymen t protection); the National Council on Working Conditions (for coordination of state policy for th e promotion of health and safety at work) ; the Managing Board of the Working Conditions Fund (t o exercise control over the management of the Working Conditions Fund) ; the Council on Socia l
Assistance (to analyze the development of social assistance in the country); the Managing Board of the
Social Assistance Fund (to exercise control over the Fund); the Supervisory Board of the National Socia l
Security Institute (to exercise control over the National Fund for Social Security) ; the National Council on
Rehabilitation and Social Integration (a consultative organ to the Council of Ministers in the area o f rehabilitation and social integration) ; the Managing Board of the Rehabilitation and Social Integration
Fund (to exercise control over the Fund) ; a tripartite Meeting of Representatives as a governing body o f the National Health Insurance Bank ; and a Consultative Council for Legislative Initiatives at th e
Bulgarian Parliament (with the aim of improving the quality of social dialogue in Bulgaria and guaranteeing transparency of public debates on the most important areas of social legislation : socia l reforms, and harmonization of Bulgarian social and labor legislation with European common law) .
9 The PHARE "Social Dialogue" projec t
It was at least a few months after the creation of the first tripartite body in Bulgaria in April 199 0 that experts from the ILO were mobilized in numerous seminars and workshops with all actors to clarif y the concept and meaning of the "Western " mechanism of collective bargaining . And much later, in 1993, after the adoption of a new labor code which made tripartism mandatory, the EU developed a specia l
"Social Dialogue " Project under its PHARE assistance program for the region .
The project was part of PHARE's Democracy Program aimed at building institutions and civi l society in the countries of CEE, but the amount for the Democracy Program has been relatively small : only 0 .4% of total PHARE assistance to CEE (Commission of the EC, 1997) . The "Social Dialogue "
Project ran until 1998 and had as its major goal strengthening the organizational capacity of the socia l actors and educating them in social dialogue and negotiations as an alternative to spontaneous strik e actions in the emerging market environment (ISA and PHARE, 1994) . Expert assistance and offic e equipment have been provided to the social partners under this program . In order to promote socia l dialogue in Bulgaria and across CEE countries, arrangements were made for representatives of the socia l partners and governments in both Western and Eastern Europe to visit one another . For example, the
Bulgarian social partners made study visits not only to Western European countries with developed socia l dialogue structures, but also to Poland and Hungary . Such trips, which involved briefing session s beforehand and group learning sessions afterward, were aimed at giving CEE social partners concentrate d exposure to other countries ' approaches to equivalent work .
A series of policy seminars was also organized under the "Social Dialogue " Project . Training t o develop social dialogue at branch and regional levels became the crucial element of the project . Different courses were set up at different levels, covering the major areas of skill the social partners needed, such a s the structure of the market economy and industrial relations, labor and social welfare legislation , privatization and employment contracts, negotiation skills, development of a local economy, employe r and trade union structures and organizations, conflict management, and general technical skills for use a t the base organization .
1 0 The Project aimed also at strengthening and professionalizing the structures of the social partner s in order to ensure the adequate functioning of social dialogue: developing an arbitration and conciliatio n service and strengthening the structures and processes of the industrial court ; and establishing a n information and resource base to meet the social partners' needs . A major emphasis was placed on training the trainers, with expert assistance from Western Europe . The EU's "Social Dialogue" Projec t has, thus, significantly strengthened tripartite institutions in Bulgaria and across post-communist Europe .
Tripartism and the conditionality of the international lending communit y
The West ' s first response to the revolutions in the East was broad. coordinated support .
Significant resources were mobilized through the establishment of the G24 coordination process in 1989 ; the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the PHARE grant program ,
which were conceived specifically to serve the region ; increasing loans to the region by the Internationa l
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), an d
the European Investment Bank : and the establishment of significant bilateral aid programs in the United
States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France . The largest pure grant donor has been the EU, mainl y
through its PHARE program (Mayhew. 1998 : 135) .
Some have viewed the international financial institutions as having a positive impact on domesti c
restructuring. Others, pointing to the global impact of neo-liberalism and the allegedly "dictatorial "
character of the IMF, have argued for the installation of "peripheral capitalism" in the CEE regio n
(Mommen, 1993). It is certainly true that since 1989 these institutions have turned into external policy -
making centers for setting up the guidelines for a market economy in CEE ; they have played the role o f
"shadow partners" in domestic policy-making and national tripartism (Petkov, 1996) .
The IMF's approach to the emergence of new capitalist regimes in CEE has been to provid e
financial, technical, and policy assistance to reorient the political economies toward market-based system s
that are integrated into the international economy . The IMF appears to have been a consistent champion
of neo-liberalism in Bulgaria and elsewhere in CEE : especially notable was its establishment i n Bulgaria
1 1 in July 1997 of an emergency assistance program providing $657 million and the introduction of a currency board . But over time the emphasis on social issues has increased (Camdessus, 1995) .
This has been part of a broader shift in recent IMF policies from providing temporary financing t o countries to achieve sound money, stable exchange rates, and open markets, toward offering assistanc e
for policy initiatives addressing a wider range of issues, including increased spending on basic huma n
needs, on adequate social protection for vulnerable groups, and, most important, on the promotion of a
more effective dialogue on economic policy among governments, labor, business, and the rest of civi l
society (Camdessus. 1998) . Stand-by agreements with Bulgaria, among others . have specificall y
addressed crucial social needs . such as raising the levels of wages and pensions and restructuring th e
social safety net (IMF Press Releases, #97 :15 and 95/14) . IMF missions have also required th e
conclusion of national social peace agreements as a condition for granting loans . Negotiations between
the IMF and national governments have been broadened to include representatives of trade unions an d
employers' organizations . In Bulgaria, the 1992 revival of tripartism – following its deadlock after the
neo-liberal UDF government of Filip Dimitrov came to power in 1991 – was closely linked t o
negotiations with the IMF (Thirkell and Tseneva, 1992) .
With the introduction of a currency board in Bulgaria in July 1997 that pegged the Bulgaria n
currency, the Lev . to the German mark, the role of the IMF has become particularly important in Bulgaria n
tripartism. The introduction of a currency board under the insistence of the IMF stabilized the Bulgaria n
currency. Consumer price inflation dropped to only 1 percent in December 1998, from 578 .5 percent a
year earlier, and stood at 1 .7 percent in the twelve months prior to July 1999 (Wyzan, 1999 ; Done, 1998 :
1I : Agency for Economic Analyses and Prognoses, 1998) . The currency board arrangement, however ,
challenged the government and the social partners to work closely with the international financia l
institutions which became an important part of the revised social dialogue system. Under the conditions
of a Charter for Social Cooperation and Memorandum for Priority Common Action (signed in Octobe r
1997 between the prime minister and the social partners), the unions agreed to allow the Currency Board
1 2 to start working, accepting the need to preserve the social peace, under the condition that there would be a deeper social dialogue .
The World Bank has also been committed to helping the CEE countries modernize and adap t their economies . including their social security systems, as a necessary foundation for the creation of a competitive capitalist economy (Gedeon, 1997) . The World Bank has provided broad-gauged support – over US$1 billion to date for I5 projects in Bulgaria (World Bank Press Releases, 1999) . The Bank concludes social protection adjustment loan agreements with CEE countries, focusing on reforms in socia l insurance (including pensions, health insurance, and insurance covering short-term unemployment , sickness, and maternity), unemployment programs, and social assistance . In Hungary, the World Bank' s
Human Resources Development Program promoted the establishment of a number of regional retrainin g centers to be run by a national tripartite body, the National Training Council (Hethy, 1994 : 316) .
With the expansion of the EU's eastward enlargement project, the international financia l
institutions and especially the World Bank have been actively involved in the preparations of the CE E
countries for accession . The EU's Copenhagen accession criteria of 1993 and accession partnershi p
agreements with the CEE applicants for EU membership from the summer of 1998 have become a
benchmark for international financial institutions and corporate investors with long-term interests in th e
region. In view of the limited resources available from PHARE, the EU envisaged close cooperation wit h
the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Worl d
Bank. In October 1997 the EU set up a joint working group to determine how the four institutions ca n
best coordinate their interventions in the candidate countries . A Memorandum of Understanding spellin g
out the modus operandi among these institutions was signed in March 1998 . The World Bank ha d
already held discussions with most of the candidate countries to determine what type of assistance would
best help them meet membership requirements. In Brussels in December 1997 . the European Union an d
the World Bank established a joint accession initiative with the ten applicant countries, the so-calle d
European Borrowers Network Initiative . The Network concentrates on the organization of educationa l
and training seminars in Brussels for government and business officials from the ten applicant countries .2
1 3 These developments point towards the close and complex interweaving of processes o f
Europeanization with processes of globalization . They represent a constitutive part of the "soft " dimension of the Europeanization of CEE politics, policies and institutions during the accession process , as long as the EU ' s conditionality of accession contradicts in practice the conditionality of th e international financial institutions related to their lending policies for the region, and can lead t o compromises and changes in the scope of initial conditionalities .
Tripartism and foreign investors
Private actors were also vitally important in the transition to capitalism . Actually, the key principle of the IMF and World Bank's financial involvement in the region has not been direct infusion of money through their own resources, but rather efforts to attract other financial flows to the countries , particularly the private investment and foreign direct investment that result from successful economi c stabilization and reform programs .
By creating their own interest organizations . and/or through their membership in domesti c business associations and networks for active political lobbying, foreign companies are able to influenc e government policies aimed at restructuring the corporate sector and the domestic macroeconomi c environment. Despite the possibility that "investment wars" (Bergsten, 1974 : Bergsten et al . . 1978) wil l result as growth rates, efficiency, and living standards are raised through technology transfer, new an d better management techniques are introduced, improved market access in other countries is gained, an d competition is increased . foreign companies are no longer viewed with suspicion by national government s as creating an unhealthy dependence of the host nation upon foreign capital (Graham, 1996 : Moran ,
1998) .
Through their engagement in domestic t r ipartite arrangements, foreign corporate actors ca n
influence public policy at all levels . Many of the largest foreign firms that have invested in Bulgaria are
members of the Bulgarian International Business Association (BIBA) . Founded in 1992, BIBA activel y
promotes the interests of foreign corporations . It maintains a regular dialogue with the Bulgari a
1 4 Investment Forum, the Bulgarian government, and international financial institutions . Collaboration between domestic employer organizations and those of international companies is often prompted by th e
need to consolidate the employer side . In Bulgaria, BIBA consults regularly with domestic busines s
organizations, such as the Bulgarian Industrial Association, before submitting its annual white paper t o
government and parliament with proposed changes in legislation .
Towards a "hard" Europeanization of tripartis m
The expansion of Bulgarian tripartism in 1997-98 . while provoked by a purely domestic need to
preserve social peace following a drastic financial crisis in the fall of 1996, nonetheless reflected a n
increased impact of the process of eastward enlargement of the EU, and Bulgaria's aspirations fo r
membership in the club. It also marked a shift from soft to hard Europeanization of tripartism . '
According to the Charter for Social Cooperation signed by the social partners in October 1997, the goa l
already was also to bring social dialogue "ill the style that takes place in many European countries "
(Ministry of Labor and Social Policy . 1997) .
The EU impact on Bulgarian tripartism developed in three major steps : (1) the launch of the EU' s
PHARE "Social Dialogue" Project (1993-98), as discussed in the previous section ; (2) the establishmen t
of temporary, EU accession-driven tripartite institutions such as the Council for the Ratification of the
European Social Charter (Revised) (1998), and the Joint EU-Bulgaria Consultative Committee o n
Economic and Social Issues (1999) ; and (3) continuing and somewhat controversial efforts to establish a n
Economic and Social Council as an enduring, EU-designed institutional structure for tripartism .
Council for the Ratification of the European Social Charter (Revised )
The EU's Agenda 2000, the accession partnership agreement with Bulgaria concluded in 1998 ,
and the EU decision to open accession negotiations with Bulgaria in February 2000 have determine d
Bulgaria's future direction and the priorities of the Kostov government . Since 1997, the process o f
European integration has developed domestically at the level of institutional infrastructure and judicia l
1 5 norms – all draft laws require special certificates that show the degree of their harmonization wit h
European standards and directives (Center for the Study of Democracy, 1998 ; Pan, 26 July 1999) .
Directly linked with the European integration process was the creation of a fourteenth socia l dialogue forum – the Council for the Ratification of the Social Charter (Revised) . One of the few firm accession requirements of the EU in regard to the social acquis has been the ratification by each applican t country of the Social Charter (Revised) of the Council of Europe . On September 21, 1998, Bulgarian
Minister of Labor and Social Policy Neikov signed the European Social Charter, and national preparatio n
began for its ratification .
The Council for the Ratification of the European Social Charter (Revised) was established in th e
fall of 1998 with the aim of giving voice to the government regarding the ratification of the Social Charter by mid-2000, and of implementing the obligations following the ratification . The Ratification Counci l
must work to win acceptance not only of specific articles that need to be ratified according to th e
requirements for ratification, but also of an additional number of articles or numbered paragraphs, t o
make a total of not less than sixteen articles or sixty-three numbered paragraphs (Council of Europe ,
1998). In the course of its work on the ratification of the European Social Charter and the fulfillment of all obligations subsequent to ratification . the Council must follow the social policy of the Council o f
Europe . It thus plays the role of intermediary for all adopted European measures, for the European facet s of Bulgarian social cohesion, and for full harmonization of Bulgarian social legislation with the basi c
standardizing and coordinating documents of the Council of Europe . One of the strategic goals of th e
Council is to increase the transparency in its activities and to promote mutual trust between stat e
institutions and civil society .
The Council includes representatives of state institutions, organizations of employers , organizations of workers, professional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, local authorities , and research institutions and organizations – a total of some 40 different institutions and organizations .
This is the widest institutional structure among any of Bulgaria's tripartite organizations to date . Each
organization participating in the Council's work nominates one representative to the Council . The
1 6 Council is chaired by the minister of Labor and Social Policy . Members of the Council can form faction s or working groups, according to various group interests . Opinions on finished draft documents are vote d on at a plenary session of the Council and are adopted by a three-fourths majority (Ministry of Labor an d
Social Policy, 1998b) .
The Council had four sessions by mid-1999 – on January 13, 1999, February 3, 1999, Februar y
24, 1999, and April 19 . 1999. The third session was a joint meeting with representatives of the Council o f
Europe. The work of the Council focused on the selection of articles for ratification in three major group s of social rights : protection of employment . protection outside the workplace, and "social protection" (fo r example, unemployment benefits and health insurance) for the population .
The screening of social legislation as part of the overall screening process initiated by the EU in
1998 was an area in which the Bulgarian social partners became actively involved, through the elaboration of a Joint Action Plan with the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (Ivan Neikov, 1999) .
Moreover, with the opening up of accession negotiations in early 2000, the government decided t o include the social partners from the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation in the EU accession negotiations, specifically in the discussions on the free movement of people, social policy, an d employment . The social partners will also take part In the management of the resources of the EU pre - accession funds (Pari, January II, 2000) .
Overall, in regard to compliance with the EU's social acquis, virtually all influential groups i n
Bulgaria have come to accept the need for harmonization of Bulgarian social legislation with the EU common law, because they expect improvements in living standards to follow harmonization . Problem s thus arise not between the EU and Bulgaria and not among the various social interests in Bulgaria, bu t rather between those working in the financial sphere and those working in the social sphere withi n
Bulgarian government ;
Conflicts also arise between the EU requirements and the IMF and World Bank conditions fo r granting loans . Thus, for example, whereas effective oversight of health care will require extensiv e administration, the lMF and World Bank require a 4-percent lay-off of all administrative personnel ,
1 7 including administrators in agencies charged with oversight and control . More tension arises between the
EU acquis and the ratification of some of the ILO recommendations . For example, ILO conventions require the abolition of female work in mines for the purpose of preserving women's reproductiv e function. The EU, however, insists that Bulgaria denounce these conventions, because they contradict th e principle of equal opportunity . '
Joint Consultative Committee on Social and Economic Issue s
The formation of the EU-Bulgaria Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) was another majo r tripartite development in Bulgaria initiated by the process of European integration . The decision to form the Consultative Committee was made by the EU-Bulgaria Association Council on September 15 . 1998 , and the Committee ' s inaugural meeting was held in Bulgaria on January 17, 1999 . It is multipartite , comprising six representatives from the economic and social interests of the EU (the Economic and Socia l
Committee of the European Communities, ESC) and six from Bulgarian economic and social interest s
(EU-Bulgaria Joint Consultative Committee, 1999) .
Among the more than 200 advisory bodies to the major EU institutions, the Economic and Socia l
Committee of the European Union plays a special role in the accession process . Although it has not bee n seen as a powerful EU institution, the Committee has played a prominent role in enforcing social dialogu e in the region. It has drawn up and adopted numerous opinions and reports to offer constructive advice t o the EU authorities facing the challenge of enlargement (Economic and Social Committee of the EC ,
1998a and 1998b) . In these opinions the Committee has insisted that a broader public within th e applicant countries should be involved in the accession process, not just political, economic, and lega l experts .
The Bulgarian part of the EU-Bulgaria JCC was constituted at the end of October 1998 . It comprises three groups : employers (the Bulgarian Industrial Association) ; trade unions (the CITUB an d
Podkrepa) : and ohter interests (the Federation of Consumers in Bulgaria ; the Bulgarian Women's Union ; the Federation of Consumers: and a farmers' Federation of the Cooperatives in Bulgaria) . The ESC part
1 8 of the Joint Consultative Committee also comprises three groups : employers (the Assembly of Frenc h
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, ACFCI : the General Italian Confederation of Commerce, Tourism , and Services, Confcommercio ; and the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers) ; employee s
(the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation, FNV, and the French Democratic Confederation of Labor ,
CFDT): and other interests (the Greek Economic Chamber, and the Central Union of Agricultura l
Producers and Forest Owners MTK, Finland) . The Bulgarian secretariat to the JCC is administered b y the Bulgarian Industrial Association, and its chairman was elected chairman of the Bulgarian part of th e
Committee . The ESC's Division of External Relations organizes the secretariat of the ESC part of th e
Committee .
The purposes of the JCC are to prepare the ground for enlargement of the EU by promotin g dialogue and to support the professional organizations of the partner country in their efforts to create a functioning society in which their consultation by the government is an integral part of the decision - making process . This has become particularly important with the start of accession negotiations betwee n the Bulgarian government and the EU . Another task of the JCC is to assist and consult the EU-Bulgari a
Association Council on the promotion of dialogue and cooperation between the economic and socia l interest groups in the EU and those in Bulgaria . The dialogue covers all economic and social aspects of
EU-Bulgaria relations in light of the Association/Europe Agreement and the Accession Partnership
Agreement between the EU and Bulgaria .
Economic and Social Counci l
A "loose " EU requirement in terms of social dialogue in applicant countries is for the establishment of an Economic and Social Council as a purely consultative organ, whose recommendation s need not necessarily he followed by the government : still, all draft laws have to be submitted beforehan d to the Economic and Social Council for review. This Council directly corresponds to the Europea n standards for economic and social councils . The creation of the Council was envisaged under the PHARE program, and its formation became part of the Kostov government program in the social sphere. under
1 9 recommendations from EU experts . ' A draft law for the Economic and Social Council is expected to b e adopted by Parliament in April-May 2000. The Council is to expand to overlap civil society and develo p as a multilateral inter-institutional structure, with representatives of trade unions . employers, women' s organizations, consumers ' organizations, and organizations of cooperatives . and a chair jointly appointe d by the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the Parliament, and the president (Ministry of Labor an d
Social Policy, 1999 : Daskalova, 1999) .
In light of the extensive tripartite system that has developed so far in the country, the creation o f an additional tripartite structure – the Economic and Social Council — challenges Bulgarian tripartism i n important ways . As a result, despite the fact that the idea of the creation of this Council was launched a s early as 1993 through the EU's "Social Dialogue " Project. the Bulgarian social partners are still debatin g its creation . Behind these prolonged debates is the lack of any real need to create an additional tripartite structure that, at best, will come to duplicate already existing tripartite forums . On the one hand, the
National Council for Tripartite Cooperation already satisfies the minimal EU accession requirement o f
"social dialogue " as government consultations with social groups, and even goes beyond purel y consultative functions . to add some important decision-making responsibilities for the social partners i n the areas of minimum wages and the social sphere . On the other hand . twelve additional tripartite institutions have already established tripartism's outreach to society at large . as suggested by the
Economic and Social Council .
The screening process of the Bulgarian social legislation revealed, however, that the EU expert s participating in the screening exercise were "surprised" by the proliferation of so many tripartit e institutions at the national level in Bulgaria . ' Keeping in mind that Bulgaria has, so far, developed the most elaborate system of national, regional and sectoral social dialogues in the CEE region, it is strikin g that in its evaluation of the implementation of the acquis by the CEE applicant countries, the Commissio n of the European Communities has assessed the development of social dialo g ue in Bulgaria as "stil l embryonic, although the Government and the employers' and workers' organizations have signed a
Charter on Social Partnership " (Commission of the EC . 1999) .
2 0 Conclusion s
It would be wrong to suppose that tripartism developed in Bulgaria as an "institutional transfer "
from "corporatist" Europe in the early months of transition, or because of European common law and E U requirements for social dialogue in the advanced stage of transformation . The tripartite institutio n emerged in Bulgaria long before those influences were born, under the complex combined influences of a
variety of "Western" sources, including the European "social partnership " model and financial and
technical assistance from the EU under its PHARE "Social Dialogue " project. These "soft"
Europeanization trends were significantly interwoven with the policies and conditionality of internationa l
lending institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank . and the organized lobbying pressures of foreig n
corporate actors .
Bulgaria is a classic example of how a variety of domestic and international actors and pressures
were pushing in the same direction, towards tripartite cooperation . As early as March 1990, the socia l
partners established a tripartite forum as a predominantly domestic innovation to cope with rising socia l
tension and help organizational restructuring and consolidation along economically, not ideologically -
based cleavages . As soon as a more neo-liberal oriented government came to power, however (1991), th e
normative foundations of tripartism were shaken by the government ' s firm anti-tripartism . as a rationa l
ideological stand and well-articulated public policy . This challenge to tripartism was short-lived ,
however, because of the interference of international lending institutions . The IMF required that th e
government restore and maintain social dialogue as a condition for its revitalizing financial injections .
Reluctantly, the government did so in the summer of 1992 .
These swings in Bulgarian tripartism show that, in its formative years, post-communist tripartism
went beyond its all-encompassing, pressing cultural-normative foundation, to also reflect a rational clash
of actors' conflicting ideologies and commitments to social dialogue, and their burdened corporatist pas t
during state socialism . Initially the tripartite structures played the role of an escape valve for politica l
tension – they were widely viewed as psychoanalytical talk-shops where the social partners could meet ,
quarrel with each other, and then relax, because either the problems were plainly insurmountable, with
2 1 nothing to be done, or they were seen in different lights by different parties, in which case the socia l partners could understand each other through an open exchange of views . " There was not much left fo r the extensive counter-influence of past "transmission belt" politics, on the one hand . and rational inter- actor bargaining over the distribution of the pains and rewards of transition, on the other .
Bulgaria's case also demonstrates that in post-communist countries, with their foreign-debt
burdens and their aspirations for EU membership, the international community can have a decisive sa y over tripartism's future. In contrast to the shift from tripartism's normative to its rational-choice laye r
with the maturing of transformation, the EU accession process has generally boosted the importance o f
the normative layer of tripartism, versus the rational-choice one . A consensus on accession already exists .
Even Leszek Balcerowicz. the prominent Polish neo-liberal, while raising concerns about the EU ' s
imposition of its social standards in its eastward expansion, has acknowledged that little can be done t o
counterbalance this trend in the central and Eastern European applicants, as long as they wish to becom e
EU members (Balcerowicz, 1999) .
By the same token, it may well be that EU experts, EU Integration and EU norms regarding th e
establishment and maintenance of social dialogue as part of advanced accession requirements since 199 7
have fortified social dialogue in the country, by preventing the advent of a strict neo-liberal governmen t
with no commitment to social partnership . A part of this gradually expanding trend towards a "hard "
Europeanization of tripartism is another. much broader issue : to what extent will this permanent socia l
dialogue will be meaningful? The difficulties of establishing an Economic and Social Council in Bulgari a
point towards an institutional bifurcation of tripartite structures during accession — one set of institutions
actually serves domestic purposes, and another set of institutions serves the purposes of accession to th e
EU . without any vitality beyond the formal accession procedures .
An additional international challenge to a meaningful post-communist tripartism is the fact tha t
social dialogue, as practiced in most of continental Western Europe, is a moving target . Searching fo r
new solutions to the challenges of globalization and European integration, Western European countrie s
have recently combined established national corporatist schemes with the "neo-liberal" regime, resultin g
2 2 in the tentative emergence of a new socio-economic order and a new model of capitalism, argue Marti n
Rhodes and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (Rhodes and van Apeldoorn, 1997) . This transnational form o f capitalism does not simply replicate an Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal regime on a grand scale, but rathe r integrates elements of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance and economic organization with establishe d national institutions, norms, and rules. Such general European developments point to the potentia l increase of the complexity and interweaving of "soft" and "hard" Europeanization trends in CEE' s accession to the EU .
2 3
Table 1 The Institutional Design of Bulgarian Tripartism
Tripartite Forums Year o f Establishment
------
A. Domestic Innovatio n
1 A . National Commission for Coordination of Interests 1990-9 1 1B . National Standing Tripartite Commission fo r Coordination of Interests 1991-92 IC . National Council for Social Partnership 1992 ID . National Council for Tripartite Cooperation since 199 3
2A. Supervisory Board of the Vocational Training an d Unemployment Fun d 1991-96 2B. Supervisory Board of the National Employment Offic e since 199 8
3 . National Council on Unemployment Protection an d Employment Promotion since 199 8 4. National Council on Vocational Trainin g since 199 8 5. National Council on Work Condition s since 199 8 6. Managing Board of the Work Conditions Fund since 199 8 Council on Social Assistanc e since 199 8 8 . Managing Board of the-Social Assistance Fun d since 199 8 9 Supervisory Board of the National Social Securit y Institute since 199 8 10 . National Council on Rehabilitation and Socia l lntegratio n since 199 8 1 I Managing Board of the Rehabilitation and Socia l lntegration Fun d since 199 8 12. Meeting of Representatives of the National Health Insurance Bank since 199 8 13. Consultative Council for Legislative Initiatives at th e Bulgarian Parliamen t since Oct . 199 7
B . Institutional Transfer : Impact of EU Accession
14. Council for the Ratification of the European Socia l Charter (Temporary) 199 8 15. Joint EU-Bulgaria Consultative Committee (Temporary) 1999 16. Economic and Social Council 2000 (to be established )
2 4 Figure 1 Dynamics of Post-Communis t Tripartism
A. Early Transformatio n
Rationa l Social Actors ' Layer Commitment to Socia l Partnershi p State Socialist Legacie s Historica l (communitarian culture ; Layer transmission-belt politics )
Normativ e International Community Layer (conditionality for grantin g loans )
Legitimatio n
Social Peac e
B. Advanced Transformatio n
Rationa l Social Actors ' Layer Commitment to Socia l Partnershi p
Historica l State Socialist Legacie s Layer (communitarian culture ; transmission-belt politics ) International Community Normative Laye r Social Peac e
C. Impact of Accession to the European Unio n
Rationa l Social Actors ' Layer Commitment to Socia l Partnershi p State Socialist Legacie s Historica l (communitarian culture ; Layer transmission-belt politics )
Normativ e International Communit y Layer (Accession to the EU )
Social Peace
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3 0 Endnotes
Interview with Aleksander Bozhkov, deputy prime minister, minister of Industry and chair of the Nationa l Council for Tripartite Cooperation, 28 July 1999 ; Interviews with Ivan Neikov, minister of Labor and Social Policy , 15, 16 and 28 July 1999 ; Interview with Dimiter Manolov, vice-president of Podkrepa CL, 21 July 1999 ; Intervie w with Grigor Gradev, director of the Institute for Trade Union and Social Studies and executive secretary of th e CITUB, 21 July 1999; Interview with Vikran Tebeian, vice-president of the Bulgarian Industrial Association, 2 8 July 1999 : Interview with Svetlana Djankova, vice-president of the Parliamentary Group of the UDF and chair , Permanent Parliamentary Commission on Labor and Social Policy, 30 July 1999 . Interviews at the World Bank – Washington D .C ., April 1998 and February 1999 . Interview with Iliana Derilova, executive secretary of the Bulgarian International Business Association , Sofia. March and July 1999 . ' Here by "hard" Europeanization I mean not only the domestic efforts to implement the EU " hard" common law, but also efforts to comply with the EU "soft" legislation, which is more characteristic for the socia l sphere . Interviews with Vladimir Kisjov, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ivan Neikov, minister of Labo r and Social Policy, July-August 1999 . " Interview data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. summer 1999 . Telephone interview with Ivan Neikov, minister of Labor and Social Policy . 12 March 2000 . 8 Interview data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, summer 1999 . 9 Interview with Aleksander Bozhkov . deputy prime minister, minister of Industry and chair of the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation, 28 July 1999 .
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