The "Self-Limiting" Future of Nuclear Power

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DECEMBER 9, 2011 | No. 738 THE "SELF-LIMITING" FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER There are a very large number of studies all of which reach the similar conclusion: THE "SELF-LIMITING" FUTURE energy efficiency programs and renewable power technologies are better than OF NUCLEAR POWER 1 nuclear power plants. The fact that these studies come from a variety of sources, across the political spectrum, and from different disciplines, suggests that there 1. Why does nuclear power is a consensus among abroad base of independent, non-partisan experts that persist 1 nuclear power plants are a poor choice for producing electricity. So why, then, does nuclear power persist? Is it the superficially attractive narrative associated 2. Market Failure and with nuclear energy that conflates it with national progress and pride, alongside Externalities 3 an immensely powerful and effective lobby, a new generation that has either forgotten or never known why it failed previously, deeply rooted habits that favor 3. Subsidies and the giant power stations, and lazy reporting by a credulous press? Socialization of Risk 4

(738.6203) Benjamin K. Sovacool - In Nuclear power generators cannot be 4. Hubris and Technological a chapter of his new book 'Contesting mass-produced. They take much longer Fantasy 6 the Future of Nuclear Power –A Critical to build, and are therefore exposed to Global Assessment of Atomic Energy' escalating interest rates, inaccurate 4.b. Conclusion 9 Benjamin K. Sovacool argues that three demand forecasts, and unforeseen primary culprits exist: the true costs of labor conflicts. Their centralization End notes 9 nuclear energy are not borne by those requires costly and expansive transmis- benefiting from it, resulting in what sion and distribution systems. Modern economists call "market failure"; many nuclear reactors are prone to a dete- of the costs and risks involved with nu- riorating energy pay back ratio for the clear electricity are passed directly onto nuclear fuel cycle, produce hazardous ratepayers; and nuclear power has, and extremely long- lived waste, have since its inception, been associated large water requirements, and possess with complex notions of progress and a larger carbon footprint than energy modernity that make it seductive, despi- efficiency and every form of renewable te all of its intractable challenges. Taken electricity. together, these three culprits - market failure and externalities, the socializa- All is not lost, however. As this book tion of risk, and hubris and technologi- also shows, renewable power techno- cal fantasy - largely explain why nuclear logies reduce dependence on foreign power plants flourish. sources of uranium, and therefore create a more secure fuel supply chain that 1. Why does nuclear power persist minimizes exposure to economic and Benjamin Franklin once wrote that "the political changes abroad. Renewable great advantage of being a reasonable technologies decentralize electricity creature is that you can find a reason for supply, so that an accidental or inten- whatever you do." The nuclear power tional outage would affect a smaller industry possesses no shortage of argu- amount of capacity than an outage at a ments in favor of a nuclear renaissance, larger nuclear facility. Renewable energy many of them reasonable at first glance. technologies improve the reliability of Yet, the central premise of 'Contesting power generation by conserving or the Future of Nuclear Power' is that a producing power close to the end-user, global nuclear renaissance would bring and by minimizing the need to produce, immense technical, economic, envi- transport, and store hazardous and ra- ronmental, political, and social costs. dioactive fuel. Unlike generators relying

1 on uranium and recycled plutonium, renewable generator are not subject to the The simple fact that energy effici- volatility of global fuel markets. They can also respond more rapidly to supply and ency programs and renewable power demand fluctuations, improving the efficiency of the electricity market. Most sig- technologies are better than nuclear nificantly, renewable power technologies have enormous environmental benefits, power plants has not been advanced since their use tends to avoid air pollution and the dangers and risks of extracting by this book alone. Indeed, there are uranium. They generate electricity without releasing significant quantities of CO2 a very large number of studies all of and other greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change as well as life- which reach a similar conclusion. The endangering nitrogen oxides, sulfurdioxides, particulate matter, and mercury. They fact that these studies come from a also create power without relying on the extraction of uranium and its associated variety of sources (academic journals, digging, drilling, mining, leaching, transporting, storing, sequestering, and pol- magazines, and reports) across the luting of land. In the end, nuclear reactors and renewable power generators do the political spectrum (including business, b1088_Chapsameter-0 thing:8.qxd they 3/2 produce2/2011 electrical11:36 AM energy Page 2(kWh).46 Why rely on a nuclear system science, civil society, and medicine) that is subject to highlyb10 8uncertain8 Contesti nprojectionsg the Future o faboutNuclear uraniumPower availability, centrally and from different disciplines (physics, administered by technocratic elites, and vulnerable to the ebb and flow of interna- economics, epidemiology, and poli- tional politics (requiring garrison- like security measures at multiple points in the tics) suggests that there is a consen- supply chain), when superior alternatives exist? sus among abroad base of independent, nonpartisan experts that nuclear 246 Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power power plants are a poor choice for producing electricity . Table 1: Disadvantages of Modern Nuclear Power Plants So why, then, does nuclear power Dimension Category Explanation persist? One study supposed that it is the superficially attractive narrative Technical Safety and accidents Human error and technological failure have associated with nuclear energy that resulted in hundreds of incidents and accidents; conflates it with national progress and the impact of a serious accident, even if the pride, alongside an immensely power- probability is low, would be catastrophic ful and effective lobby, a new genera- Materials and labor A shortage of key components and skilled labor tion that has either forgotten or never could result in increased costs for nuclear power known why it failed previously, deeply plants and/or slow any transition to a nuclear rooted habits that favor giant power renaissance stations, and lazy reporting by a cre- Fuel availability and The energy intensity of the nuclear fuel cycle and dulous press.(*1) This chapter argues energy payback declining reserves of high-quality uranium result that three primary culprits exist: the in a low energy payback ratio, whereby plants true costs of nuclear energy are not must operate for decades before they produce borne by those benefiting from it, re- any net energy sulting in what economists call "mar- Economic Construction and Long construction lead times for new plants create ket failure"; many of the costs and risk operating costs substantial risk of cost overruns and create s involved with nuclear electricity are expected high future operating costs passed directly onto ratepayers; and Reprocessing costs Reprocessing of nuclear fuel costs billions of nuclear power has, since its inception, dollars and creates its own security risks related been associated with complex notions to the availability of plutonium of progress and modernity that make Waste storage costs Hundreds of millions of dollars each year must be it seductive, despite all of its intracta- spent on onsite storage, to say nothing of the ble challenges. Taken together, these gargantuan cost of building permanent geologic three culprits - market failure and repositories for spent fuel externalities, the socialization of risk , Decommissioning Decommissioning costs can sometimes be greater and hubris and technological fantasy costs than the costs of building a plant in the first place - largely explain why nuclear power Fuel costs Uranium reserves are consolidated among a small plants flourish. When these conditions number of countries, and dependence on foreign change (i.e. when the full costs of suppliers runs the risk of disruption and price nuclear energy become apparent or volatility can no longer be socialized, or when Security costs Nuclear facilities must be rigorously guarded and the allure of nuclear fission fades), the protected drive towards nuclear energy stalls. Research costs The next generation of nuclear reactors will require In short, if nuclear energy is to have billions of dollars in research funds and subsidies any future at all, it will be what Joseph Environmental Land use — Underground mining, open-pit mining, and Romm has called a "self-limiting" one. uranium mining in situ leaching of uranium create serious (*2) environmental hazards and can contaminate water supplies

(Continued)

CONTESTING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER - A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy © World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. http://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html

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The “Self-Limiting” Future of Nuclear Power 247 Nuclear power plants have a plethora of Table 1: (Continued) these types of externalities that most pro- Dimension Category Explanation ducers and users of nuclear energy do not Land use — More than 10,000 metric tons of waste are created have to pay for. A partial list would at least waste storage each year by commercial nuclear reactors include: around the world; the waste they produce is * Catastrophic risks such as nuclear melt- extremely hazardous and difficult to store Water use and Existing nuclear power plants consume and downs and accidents contamination withdraw vast quantities of water needed for * An increased probability of wars due to operation; risk entrainment, impingement, and rapid uranium extraction, the boom and thermal discharges; and can contaminate water supplies with tritium and other radioactive bust cycles of uranium mining communities, pollutants or the inability to secure fissile materials as- Climate change The carbon footprint for a typical nuclear reactor sociated with the nuclear fuel cycle could be equivalent to that of fossil fuels in the * Public health issues such as chronic next few decades if high-grade uranium ores continue to be exhausted, as nuclear reactors exposure to radiation and its consequent entail considerable greenhouse gas emissions advanced morbidity and mortality, as well from their lifecycle (much greater than from as worker exposure to toxic substances and renewable energy resources and some other occupational accidents and hazards alternatives); the heat discharges from nuclear power plants also indirectly contribute to global * Direct land use by power plants, uranium warming mines, enrichment stations, and storage Medical and health Operating nuclear reactors have been shown to create facilities risks health risks for local communities and workers Sociopolitical Transmission and Nuclear power plants rely on a complex distribution * The destruction of land by uranium mining distribution system that is subject to cascading failures easily and leaching, including acid drainage and vulnerability induced by severe weather, human error, sabotage, resettlement or even the interference of small animals * The effects of water pollution on fisheries Plant and reactor Nuclear power plants and research reactors continue insecurity to be attractive targets for terrorists and criminals and freshwater ecosystems, which are Weapons All stages of the nuclear fuel cycle produce fissile sensitive to water chemistry, as well as the proliferation material that can be used to manufacture release of radionuclides into water sources weapons of mass destruction * Consumptive water use, with consequent Military conflict Nuclear power plants are often bombed and attacked during military campaigns impacts on agriculture and ecosystems Maritime and The movement of nuclear fuel and waste is subject where water is scarce transport to accidents, piracy, and theft * Continual maintenance of caches of spent security Community Nuclear facilities are often sited and located in nuclear fuel marginalization peripheral areas that marginalize communities * Changes to the local and regional economic structure through the loss of labor and jobs, transfer of wealth, and reductions in gross domestic product 2.CONTESTING Market THE Failure FUTURE andOF NUCLEAR Externalities POWER - A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy * Incidence of noise and reduced amenity, © World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. Ashttp://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html almost any smart undergraduate student of economics knows, free lower property values near nuclear plants, markets for anything - from tomatoes to Tomahawk missiles – need multi- and aesthetic objections. ple criteria to function properly. One of them is that all costs must be fully internalized in the price of a given good or commodity; if one person is able Even though this list is incomplete, one to shift the costs to someone else while still reaping the benefits, then the study analyzed 132 externality estimates market has failed to distribute benefits equally and equitably, creating what associated with electricity generation in is known as market failure. At the heart of the market failure discussion is the a variety of countries with an assortment concept of an externality. of different energy systems.(*6) The study found that net social costs for nuclear Defined as costs and benefits resulting from an activity that do not accrue to power ranged from a low of less than 1 cent the parties involved in the activity, externalities have won attention in recent per kWh to a high of almost 65 cents per decades as an important (albeit often ignored) aspect of energy production kWh, with a mean of 8.6 cents per kWh. As and use.(*3) Externalities are part of the "overall social cost of producing Table 2 documents, the external costs for energy, including the value of any damages to the environment, human nuclear power were twice as high as that of health, or infrastructure."(*4) Another definition of externalities is "inadver- hydroelectric systems, more than 12 times tent and unaccounted for effects of one or more parties on the welfare of higher than that of solar power, and almost another."(*5) 30 times higher than that of wind power. The amount of 8.6 cents per kWh may not Take the classic example of unregulated pollution from a smokestack. A sound like much; but if correct, it means factory produces items that are priced by taking into account the demand for that, since nuclear units produced 2,601 the products as well as labor, capital, and other costs, but the damages from billion kWh of energy in 2008, they also the factory's pollution - health and other effects – are true costs borne by generated US $ 223.7 billion in global social society that are unaccounted for in the price of the factory's product. These and environmental damages. latter costs are commonly referred to as "externalities" because people tend to consume them as by products of other activities that are external to In other words, nuclear power generation market transactions and, therefore, unpriced. This means that the factory created US$ 223.7 billion of additional produces a volume of items that is less than "socially optimal," resulting in costs that are not assumed in traditional a net welfare loss to society in the form of morbidity, mortality, and reduced estimates of nuclear power's price. Many of productivity. these costs are "hidden" because neither nuclear producers nor consumers have to

Nuclear Monitor 738 3 Table 2: Negative Externalities Associated with Nuclear and Renewable Sources of Electricity (cents / kWh, in 1998 USD)

Nuclear Biomass Hydroelectric Solar Wind

Minimum 0.0003 0 0.02 0 0 Maximum 64.45 22.09 26.26 1.69 0.80 Mean 8.63 5.20 3.84 0.69 0.29 Standard deviation 18.62 6.11 8.40 0.57 0.20 pay for these additional expenses. Instead, the external costs of nuclear and delegated the authority to set waste dis- energy are shifted to society at large. What is interesting is that - when posal standards to the National Academy of Sci- one takes the negative externalities associated with nuclear power, fossil ence rather than public participation. However, fuels, and renewable sources of electricity, and adds them on top of exis- it failed to incentivize any one to build a new ting production costs - Figure 1 shows that wind, geothermal, hydroelec- nuclear power plant.(*9) The Energy Policy Act tric, and biomass plants are already cheaper than existing nuclear units. of 2005 only worsened the disparity by lavishing Put simply, if the true cost of nuclear energy matched its price, nuclear the nuclear industry with US$ 13 billion worth of energy would never be competitive with renewable energy (or energy ef- loan guarantees, US$ 3 billion in research, US$ ficiency) in any free market. 2 billion in public insurance against delays, US$ 1.3 billion in tax breaks, an extra 1.8 cents/ kWh 3. Subsidies and the Socialization of Risk in operating subsidies, and limited liability for Because of their capital intensity and financial risk, nuclear power plants accidents. Yet even this was not enough, des- are only cost-competitive when they are underwritten with gargantuan pite the fact that these subsidies covered 80% public subsidies. Put in other terms, absent an enormous diversion of tax- of the costs of a new nuclear plant.(*10) payer funding, no rational investor would ever finance a nuclear power plant. As one economist put it, investing in nuclear power without the pro- vision of government subsidies is about as useful as "watching a movie Table 3: see pag. 5 with the sound turned off."(*7) One 2009 assessment of the global nuclear industry identified no less than ten types of subsidies given to nuclear These subsidies are in addition to numerous power plant operators around the world, as presented in Table 3. other benefits the nuclear industry already en- joys: free offsite security, no substantive public Consider the US, where one would think that the electricity market opera- participation or judicial review of licensing, and ted freely and with little distortion from subsidies. In fact, the US electri- payments to operators to store waste. The city sector is heavily subsidized, and most subsidies have gone to nuclear subsidy established by the Price± Anderson power plants. From 1947 to 1999, federal subsidies for nuclear power in Act, which ironically charges tax payers for the US totaled US$ 145.4 billion (in 1999 USD). Even in fiscal year 1979, liability insurance against nuclear accidents that when subsidies for renewable energy peaked in the US at US$ 1.5 billion, could kill them, alone is possibly estimated to the Department of Energy (DOE) devoted more than 58% of its research be worth more than twice the entire research budget to nuclear power. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 promised U S $ budget of the US DOE.(*11) According to one 100 million in new funding for reactor designs, set limits on utility pay- estimate, nuclear power operators would be b 1 0 8 _ C h a p t e r - . q x d 3 / 2 : 6 A M P g 5 ments for decommissioning, responsible for only 2% of the cost of a worst- b1088_Chapter-08.qxd 3/22/2011 11:36 AM Page 254 b1088 Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power case accident, with tax payers picking up the Figure 1: Production and External Costs for Electricity Generators (in rest of the tab.(*12)

US cents / kWh) 2 5 6

254 Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power Interestingly, this very issue of limited liability for nuclear plants could derail the recent "123 40 deal" made between the US and India. For the 35 deal to go through, Indian legislation must cap External 30 Cost nuclear liability; but when lawmakers put forth 25 Production Cost a Civil Nuclear Liability Bill that limited dama- 20 ges at US$ 450 million in the event of a nuclear 15 accident, the Indian Supreme Court argued that b 1 0 8

10 it violated Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Table 3: (Continued) C o n t e s 5 The presiding judge in the case stated that the Type Subsidy Explanation Examples C

0 o

main lesson from the Bhopal disaster was that i n g n t

foreign hazardous industries must be made e s t i n g

Waste Nuclear waste Policies that convert this very high-risk, capital-intensive, Government-run long-term management of t h e absolutely liable for any damage caused from management, management fixed-cost endeavor into something the reactors reactor waste F t h e their facilities.(*13) u t r Technology Market Cost External Cost plant closure (and investors) no longer have to worry much about Payments to existing reactors to store waste onsite F u Solar Panels 39 0.9 Plant Policies that reduce the break-even charges needed Tax-advantaged accrual of decommissioning funds e t u r Oil 12.1 17.3 One interesting comparison is to look at subsi- o decommissioning, for nuclear operations; for fuel chain facilities, Government-provided decommissioning support f e Coal 7.2 19.1 N

dies for wind, solar, and nuclear power for their o f Natural gas 8.2 12 remediation very large public liabilities result u c l e a r

Solar thermal 18.8 0.9 respective first 15 years of operation. Nuclear N Nuclear 4.9 11.1 Market price Market onuses and Policies that enable nuclear plants to earn higher revenues Inclusion of nuclear power in renewable u c l e a r Biomass 5.5 6.7 power in the US received subsidies worth

support incentives on power sales than they would be able to in a energy portfolios or feed-in tariffs P

Hydroelectric 2.8 4.9 US$15.30 per kWh between 1947 and 1961, o w e r

Geothermal 6.4 0.7 competitive market Transfer of capital costs to ratepayers via stranded P Wind 5.6 0.4 o compared to subsidies worth only US$ 7.19 per cost rules, or similar transfer of cost recovery w e

kWh for solar power and 46 cents per kWh for r Figure 1: Production and External Costs for Electricity Generators (in US cents/kWh) wind power between 1975 and 1989. During the and delegated the authority to set waste disposal standards to the National Academy of Science rather than public participation. However, it failed to incentivize anyone to build a new nuclear power plant.17 The Energy Policy 4 NuclearAct of 2Mo005 onitnly wororse n738ed the disparity by lavishing the nuclear industry with US$13 billion worth of loan guarantees, US$3 billion in research, US$2 billion in public insurance against delays, US$1.3 billion in tax

CONTESTING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER - A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy © World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. http://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html

CONTESTING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER - A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy © World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. http://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html b 1 0 8 _ C h a p t e r - . q x d 3 / 2 : 6 A M P g 5

Table 3: Subsidies Common to Nuclear Power Plants Around the World16

Type Subsidy Explanation Examples

Capital costs Subsidized access Policies that dramatically reduce the cost of capital for Direct government loans to credit nuclear plants by enabling them to obtain debt at Government guaranteed loans the government’s cost of borrowing, and to use high Direct government investment in nuclear-related T h e b 1 0 8 levels of this inexpensive debt rather than much infrastructure “

more expensive equity S e l f - L

Rate-basing of in- Policies that allow recovery of plant investment prior Work-in-process allowance for funds used during C o n t process plants to commencing operations, and that shift performance construction i m t e s t i n g and investment risks from owners to ratepayers i n g

Subsidized Policies that reduce the after-tax cost of capital goods Accelerated depreciation t h e ” F

capital goods deployed in the nuclear sector; in the case of R&D, Research and development u t r F u

the internal cost to develop new product lines or Investment tax or production tax credits t u r e e

modify old ones is reduced Capital write-offs transferred to taxpayer o o f f N

Operating Fuel and Policies that socialize the risks of building, operating, Government-owned or government-subsidized N u c l e a r costs enrichment and remediating fuel chain facilities, and that reduce enrichment facilities u c l e a r the cost of fuel inputs to reactors Subsidized access to uranium ore P P o Accident and Policies that reduce insurance costs for all participants of Caps on mandated liability coverage o w e r w e

attack risks the nuclear fuel chain, and that shift accident risks from r investors to the surrounding population and taxpayers Industry oversight Subsidies that disadvantage less oversight-intensive Government oversight of domestic industry competitors, if not fully funded by user fees International oversight through IAEA Emissions Windfall grants of carbon credits that can be immediately Privileges under carbon constraints resold, and earmarked funds

(Continued) 2 5 first 15 years, nuclear and wind power produced about the residential customers will begin paying US$ 100 per year in same amount of energy: 2.6 billion kWh for nuclear power, higher bills from 2009 to 2016 to help Progress Energy fund a and 1.9 billion kWh for wind power. But, nuclear subsidies new nuclear unit. South Carolina had to pass a 37% rate hike

CONTESTING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER - A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy outweighed wind subsidies by more than© World a Scientific factor Publishing of Co. Pte.40, Ltd. re- before it could consider financing a new reactor.(*18) ceiving US$ 39.4 billion compared to windhttp://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html 's US$ 900 million over the 15-year period.(*14) How does the nuclear industry get such sweet subsidies? Part of the explanation may lie in lobbying. In the US, the In- The trend of grossly subsidizing nuclear energy holds true vestigative Reporting Workshop at American University found globally, as nuclear power has received more public research that the nuclear industry spent more than US$ 600 million on funding than any other source since the 1970s.(*15) This is lobbying and US$ 63 million on campaign contributions from especially true for many other industrialized countries, inclu- 1999 to 2009.(*19) In many ways, the nuclear power industry ding Canada, France, Germany , Japan, Sweden, and the UK 's efforts to win support are a textbook case of how the influ- (illustrated in Figure 2). As the numbers show, nuclear energy ence game is played in Washington. Besides the money spent has received 54.8% of all research subsidies among Interna- on lobbying and campaign contributions, the industry - led b 1 0 8 _ C h a p t e r - . q x d 3 / 2 : 6 A M P g 5 tional Energy Agency (IEA) countries, compared to only 8.7% by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) - has created a network for renewables and 8.9% for energy efficiency. It may come of allies who give speeches, quote one another approvingly, as no surprise that the only way for utilities to embrace new and showcase one another on their websites. The effect is an nuclear units is to receive large subsidies or raise electricity echo chamber of sup port for nuclear power. prices for consumers. Some states now allow utilities to 2 5 6 increase electricity rates to finance new plants years before 4. Hubris and Technological Fantasy construction even begins.(*16) In Georgia, these rate incre- One final factor pushing nuclear power is its association with ases will amount to a "subsidy" of US$ 14 billion on top of progress, complexity , and modernity . Early advocates pro- an additional US$ 8.3 billion of federal loan guarantees given mised not only a future of electricity too cheap to meter, but by the Obama administration.(*17) In Levy County , Florida, an age of peace and plenty (without high prices or shortages) b 1 0 8

Table 3: (Continued) C o n t e s

Type Subsidy Explanation Examples C o i n g n t e s t i n g

Waste Nuclear waste Policies that convert this very high-risk, capital-intensive, Government-run long-term management of t h e management, management fixed-cost endeavor into something the reactors reactor waste F t h e plant closure (and investors) no longer have to worry much about Payments to existing reactors to store waste onsite u t r F u

Plant Policies that reduce the break-even charges needed Tax-advantaged accrual of decommissioning funds e t u r o

decommissioning, for nuclear operations; for fuel chain facilities, Government-provided decommissioning support f e N o f

remediation very large public liabilities result u c l e a r N

Market price Market onuses and Policies that enable nuclear plants to earn higher revenues Inclusion of nuclear power in renewable u c l e a r

support incentives on power sales than they would be able to in a energy portfolios or feed-in tariffs P o w e r

competitive market Transfer of capital costs to ratepayers via stranded P o

cost rules, or similar transfer of cost recovery w e r

Nuclear Monitor 738 5

CONTESTING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER - A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy © World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. http://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html b1088_Chapter-08.qxd 3/22/2011 11:36 AM Page 258 b1088 Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power

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20000

18000

16000 Other

14000 Storage

12000 Fuel Cells and Hydrogen

10000 Nuclear

Renewables 8000

Fossil Fuels 6000 Energy Efficiency 4000

2000

0 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 1 9 8 1 9 0 1 9 1 9 2 1 9 3 1 9 4 1 9 5 1 9 6 1 9 7 1 9 8 1 9 2 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 0 3 2 0 4 2 0 5 2 0 6 2 0 7

1974–2007 1998–2007

Cumulative % Cumulative % Group Total Share Total Share

Energy efficiency 38,422 8.9 14,893 14.2 Fossil fuels 55,027 12.8 11,114 10.6 Renewable energy 37,333 8.7 10,709 10.2 Nuclear fission and fusion 236,328 54.8 43,667 41.5 Hydrogen and fuel cells 2,824 0.7 2,824 2.7 Transmission and storage 15,717 3.6 5,388 5.1 Other 45,204 10.5 16,599 15.8 Total 430,855 100 105,194 100 Nuclear Share of Country Total (%) Canada 39.0 28.8 France 81.4 72.5 Germany 67.0 41.0 Japan 72.7 67.2 Sweden 15.2 6.7 United Kingdom 69.0 32.7 United States 38.1 13.2

Figure 2: Government-Funded Subsidies for Nuclear Fission and Fusion Within International Energy Agency Countries , 1974 ± 2007 (in millionsFigure of2: 2007Gove rUnSD)ment-Funded Subsidies for Nuclear Fission and Fusion Within International Energy Agency Countries, 1974–2007 (in millions of 2007 USD) in which atomic energy would provide the power needed to commercial nuclear program formally began in 1972, when desalinate water for the thirsty , irrigate deserts for the hungry the central government approved the first nuclear program , and fuel interstellar travel deep into outer space. Other exci- - known as the 728 Project - to develop submarine reactors. ting opportunities included atomic golf balls that could always Nuclear energy quickly became attached to aspirations of be found and a nuclear- powered airplane, which the US Chinese economic power and the legitimatization of China federal governmentCONTESTING even spent THE FUTURE US$ OF1.5 NUCLEAR billion POWER researching - A Critical Global Assessmentas a superpower. of Atomic Energy Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, China © World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. between 1946 andhttp://www.worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html 1961.(*20) experienced massive deficits in electricity supply, with annual demand for electricity surpassing supply by as much as This section suggests that one explanation for the attractive- 70 billion kWh. The government had to replace m ore than ness of nuclear energy could be its association with national 100,000 boilers at conventional power plants between 1972 visions of progress. While these visions vary by country and and 1978, and rolling black outs hit every major province wit- over time, John Byrne and Steven Hoffman propose that the hin China at least twice a year for much of the two decades. single most consistent predictor of whether a society will Nuclear power was seen as instrumental in overcoming the embrace nuclear energy is their ability to think in the ´future energy supply deficits, improving Chinese economic tense". That is, planners and promoters become enthralled competitiveness, "catching up" with Taiwan and other indus- by the possible benefits of nuclear energy in the future, and trialized countries, and enhancing national prestige. Chinese are willing to accept the costs in the present to realize them. officials even toyed with the idea of exporting both nuclear Put another way, they tend to overestimate the advantages of technology and electricity to the rest of Asia; and built one nuclear energy and discount its future costs in the absence of facility, the Yibin Fuel Component Factory in Sichuan, to knowledge about current economic or technical compatibility; manufacture prefabricated components of nuclear power the reality of present risks and costs is discounted by the plants for export. They sold one set of components to Paki- unrealized possibilities of future gain.(*21) Indeed, the energy stan in 1989, and planned to earn billions of dollars of foreign historian Martin Melosi has noted that "it's amazing that com- exchange exporting similar packages to Africa and the rest of mercialization of nuclear power occurred at all.... The energy the developing world.(*23) market had little to do with this important event, since there was no pressing need for a new source of power in the United France, 1945 ± 1970 States. There was, however, strong interest in enhancing Left in the devastation caused by the German occupation American prestige."(*22) Although these psychological bene- and fighting of 1944± 1945, French technical and scienti- fits are intangible, they are often believed to be real. A cursory fic experts linked nuclear power to French "radiance" and look at the genesis of nuclear programs in eight countries identity.(*24) Nuclear energy was central to this campaign of - China, France, India, Japan, the former Soviet Union, the French economic modernization; and research, development, US, Spain, and Canada - reveals that, in each case, optimism and construction were dominated by the government. The in the technology and an overarching vision of what nuclear Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA), formed in 1945, energy could deliver in the future played a role in trumping had a close association with the bureaucracy in Paris and the concerns about present costs. military, and was charged with developing indigenous French reactors.(*25) China , 1953 ± 1992 The prospect of developing nuclear power was first broached Nuclear energy was seen as a tool to not only provide much- in China's first Five- Year Plan in 1953, which emphasized needed electricity to France, but also revitalize the national the need for a centralized nuclear development program economy. Nuclear reactors offered the chance for French managed by the government and state enterprises. China's planners to rebuild infrastructure, promote industry, and

6 Nuclear Monitor 738 augment political influence simultaneously. One key compo- of indigenous energy resources justified a massive expansion nent of this push was the notion of dirigisme, or the idea that of the nuclear program , including commitment to plutonium- government-led intervention and planning was the best way fueled fast breeder reactors. Japanese officials believed that to respond to social problems. Another component was the a greater national risk was posed by dependence on imported notion of French "national champions," or the idea that key energy than by a network of nuclear power plants. sectors of the economy (such as the state owned nuclear ma- nufacturer Framatome) deserved special protection and sup- Soviet Union, 1954 ± 1986 port from the government.(*26) After the creation and demon- The former Soviet Union was home to the first nuclear power stration of the atomic bomb, "nuclear technology became a plant in the world, a 5-MW graphite- moderated reactor at quintessential symbol of modernity and national power".(*27) Obninsk that was built in 1954 and similar to the later design which failed at Chernobyl in 1986. India , 1945 ± 1980 Atomic energy was linked to visions of a radiant communist The Indian government began investigating nuclear energy in future. The one-party Communist system, its control over 1945, when they formed the Tata Institute of Fundamental Re- the media, and the suppression of doubts about science search and appointed a prominent physicist, Homi Bhabha, and technology provided an ideal environment for nuclear as its director.(*28) In 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first expansion. Nuclear energy was quickly attached to the infal- Prim e Minister, made an impassioned speech to the General libility of Soviet science and technology, as well as the idea of Assembly of India advocating nuclear energy; later that year, a progressive communist regime free from energy shortages an advisory board (the Atomic Energy Commission) was es- and wants. As a central slogan of the Soviet nuclear industry tablished under the Indian Ministry of Natural Resources and put it, "Let the atom be a worker, not a soldier."(*32) Atomic Scientific Research to further study the issue.(*29) By August energy came to represent not only a source of electricity 1956, the first research reactor was operational, despite the supply for government planners, but also a pathway towards accidental death of Bhabha. developing breeder reactors that would meet all of the country's energy needs, a first step towards perfecting nuclear- The fledgling nuclear energy program was seamlessly powered engines for aircraft and automobiles, a system for connected to a vision of a prosperous and technologically producing radiation to preserve food, a source of knowledge advanced Indian society. Upon attaining independence, the about nuclear technology that could help the Soviet Union Indian economy was dominated by the agrarian sector while build advanced weapons, and a mechanism of political con- the industrial sector was in a primitive state. From the outset, trol whereby planners dispersed nuclear reactors to the re- planners conceived of the national nuclear program as key publics to strengthen ties and political adherence.(*33) It also to confirming the country's standing in the modern era, thus went hand-in-hand with an agenda to convert an agrarian and intersecting with the widely held belief that energy abundance peasant society into a "well oiled machine of workers" tireles- underpinned social progress. Nehru argued in 1948 that sly committed to communism.(*34) India had failed to capitalize on the first Industrial Revolution due to lack of technical skill, and believed that success in Early successes in nuclear research were seen as positive the ongoing second Industrial Revolution was predicated proof of the legitimacy of the entire way of Soviet thinking, on engineering prowess, typified by nuclear power. Later in and the promise of nuclear energy also reassured Soviet the 1970s, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reiterated Nehru's leaders about the concentration of the empire's energy position that nuclear power was an essential technology for reserves in Siberia and the Caspian Sea. Soviet engineers rescuing developing economies such as India's from "poverty quickly became caught up in the fantasy of a nuclear Soviet and ignorance". She was convinced that a bold display of Union, and spoke publicly about the applications of gamma scientific and technological might could impress the populace ray mineral prospecting and oil surveying, the use of radiation enough to win her re-election.(*30) for industrial monitoring and quality control, the creation of atomic fertilizers and viruses, and the irradiation of food and Japan, 1955 ± 1990 other items to prolong their shelf life. Soviet nuclear energy Following defeat in World War II, much like France, Japan was "the instruction of nature at its finest" ; and it was be- was in ruins. More than 30% of the Japanese population was lieved that widespread use would produce the energy needed homeless, communication and transport network s were in to fill deserts with water, build canals, excavate waste sites, shambles, and industrial capacity had been bombed into and accelerate industry. One plan even called for the melting insignificance.(*31) With the support of Occupation funding, and diversion of Siberian rivers so that the heavily populated Japan embarked on a modernization program that would Ukraine and Volga Basin regions could be irrigated.(*35) achieve unprecedented economic success. The promise of generating cheap energy through applied nuclear technology Nuclear power in the Soviet Union therefore fused together meshed perfectly with government aspirations to enhance faith in Soviet science and technology, secrecy, defense, and the international competitiveness of industry. Japan's nuclear gigantism.(*36) Russian planners were captivated by science power program was officially launched when the government and technology, and became fascinated with the techno- passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955, which set out logy on display. Khrushchev encouraged Soviet scientists the criteria under which peaceful development of nuclear to "accelerate the construction of communism" by imitating technology was to be undertaken. Government development Western methods of scientific experiment and management, funding, which commenced that year, led to the inaugura- culminating in the belief that atomic energy was almost a tion of Japan's first nuclear energy plant, the Tokai Nuclear magical sort of alchemy. Radioisotopes were believed to help Power Plant, in 1966. Japan's nuclear energy program was grow food quicker and cure diseases. This reaffirmed political an offspring of aspirations for enhanced national energy control to an inner elite of party members, and created pres- security. National planners came to see nuclear technology sure for scientists to avoid delays in nuclear projects that as an important export product - a tool to not only free the could result in their arrest, dismissal, imprisonment, or even nation from energy dependence, but also extend its economic death. Nuclear energy was also pursued on security ground reach into the Pacific and the world at large. The sheer lack s to ensure parity with Western military might and secure

Nuclear Monitor 738 7 Russian borders from invasion or interference; Soviet military nment fully embraced nuclear power and passed the Atomic planners spent billions of dollars researching nuclear-powered Energy Act of 1954 – the same year that President Dwight rockets, jets, ships, and satellites. Eisenhower pledged to "strip the atom 's military casing and adapt it to the art of peace."(*43) The central theme behind United States , 1942 ± 1979 the "Atoms for Peace project was to show that the power of While the Soviet Union exhibited grand visions for nuclear the atom could be converted from a terrifying military force to energy, perhaps they paled in comparison to those in the a benign commodity. The role of the government was to be a US, where the atomic age began in December 1942 with an custodian of atoms.(*44) experiment at the University of Chicago and culminated in the completion of the Manhattan Project. By the end of World Lewis Strauss, Chairperson of the AEC, remarked that atomic War II, planners were looking for civilian applications of the power would usher in an age where: atom, and its possibilities were seen as endless. Scarcely one It is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy in year after the War ended, Congress established the Ato- their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter, will know of mic Energy Commission (AEC), which believed that atomic great periodic regional famines in the world only as matters energy should not only enhance defense but also "promote of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them world peace, improve the public welfare, and strengthen free and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great competition in private enterprise."(*37) The AEC was esta- speeds, and will experience a lifespan far longer than ours as blished as an executive agency with complete control over disease yields and man comes to understand what causes nuclear development and exclusive ownership of fissionable him to age.(*45) materials and all facilities. The creation of the AEC gave the federal government control and authority over all aspects of Partially captivated by such optimism, Eisenhower's "Atoms the technology. Put another way, the AEC was given ”mono- for Peace" program granted US$ 475 million in funds to pro- poly like powers protected by the cover of national security". mote nuclear power abroad and Walt Disney even produced a (*38) (This emphases on peace is a bit ironic, given that, television show entitled "Our Friend, the Atom." when the US Air Force discovered that the Soviet Union had detonated a nuclear device in September 1949, the civilian One of the drivers behind atomic energy in the U S was reactor program was intertwined with military efforts; generals competition with the Soviet Union. Developments outside the hoped that civilian reactors could produce a "quantum jump" nuclear industry during the 1940s and 1950s - such as the to develop a thermonuclear weapon.)(*39) Alger Hiss case, the pro-Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet blockade of West Germany, the Chinese Revolution, as As one example of the hype surrounding nuclear energy, the well as Soviet progress in developing atom bombs, hydrogen same month the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima bombs, and nuclear reactors - convinced many American and Nagasaki, the pocket book The Atomic Age Opens was planners that they were in a "race to save the world from published and widely read. The book depicted a future world communism." Nuclear power was one key component of win- in which coal and petroleum would go unused, and existing ning this race. It is illustrative that the first nuclear plant built hydroelectric facilities would be abandoned and as "obsolete by the AEC in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, started in 1953 as the stagecoach" was in 1945. To give the general public directly after the Soviet Union exploded its H-bomb, and that some feeling for the vast amounts of energy soon to be theirs, the reason for choosing to go forward was not to produce a the authors calculated the atomic power of ordinary things: "cost-competitive" plant but to show the world that the US one pound of water had enough energy to heat 100 million could design and operate a reactor.(*46) tons of water, a handful of snow could power an entire city, and the energy in a small paper railway ticket was sufficient Spain, 1951 ± 1980 to power a heavy passenger train several times around the Spain pursued a path of nuclear power partly because of its earth.(*40) Robert M. Hutchins, President of the University of technocratic government, imperialist ambitions, utopian thin- Chicago, stated in 1946 that nuclear power would make "heat king, and Cold War relationships. Its quest for nuclear energy so plentiful that it will even be used to melt snow as it falls." began in the early 1940s. After the atom bombs were drop- Hutchins went on to suggest that "a very few individuals ped on Japan, Spanish leaders were convinced that military working a few hours a day at very easy tasks in the central might lay in nuclear weapons, not in soldiers or ships. The atomic power plant will provide all the heat, light, and power country also happened to be sitting on what was believed to required by the community and these utilities will be so cheap be one-seventh of the world's recoverable uranium depo- that their cost can hardly be reckoned".(*41) sits. Planners there established the Junta de Energia Nu- clear (Nuclear Energy Board, or JEN) in 1951, and promoted Nuclear energy promotion also reinforced national values and nuclear power on the grounds that Spain had to be involved ideas about technology and nature. The anthropologist Gary with important developments in science. As a consequence Downey argues that advanced technology has always been of its dictatorship and its collaboration with the Third Reich correlated with progress in the US, and was initially used to during World War II, Spain was excluded from international distinguish the American colonies from their English counter- forums until 1955 and did not receive economic aid under parts. Thus, nuclear energy was seen as politically necessary the Marshall Plan. Impoverished by war, Spanish planners to avoid the risks of communism, and was key to a postwar therefore saw nuclear energy as an inexhaustible source of identity shaped in defiance to Marxism and Communism. energy necessary to power Spain's national reconstruction, Military planners believed that demonstrating the civilian ap- development, and industrialization.(*47) plications of the atom would also affirm the American system of private enterprise, showcase the expertise of scientists, Canada , 1942 ± 1994 increase personal living standards, and defend the democra- Canada's nuclear power industry can be traced back to ura- tic lifestyle against Communist intrusion.(*42) nium mining, which was initially under private control during World War II and operated to meet the needs of British and Less than ten years after Hutchins' statement, the US gover- US military research. Under the 1943 Quebec Agreement,

8 Nuclear Monitor 738 Canada funneled high-quality uranium to the Manhattan stead to invest in the deployment of technologies that require Project and clandestine British weapons programs; but when little to no energy inputs so as to harness free and clean fuels the war ended, the government declared all "works, under- widely throughout the world. takings, and substances relating to atomic energy to be for the general advantage of Canada." One year later, in 1944, Policy makers should peek beyond the smoke- and - mirrors construction began on an experimental research reactor. Kabuki dance used to obscure the obvious advantages of Canada later passed the Atomic Energy Control Act of 1946, renewable technologies and the obvious costs of nuclear sys- which gave the government complete control over nuclear tems. Any effective response to electricity demand in a world energy, expropriated all private uranium companies, esta- facing climate change involves enormous expansion in our blished a Crown corporation (Eldorado Mining and Refining use of renewable technologies and a steady abandonment of Limited), and prohibited all other actors from selling uranium nuclear power. in Canada to any one other than this entity until 1959. Also, in 1952, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited was established as a government agency to coordinate research and regulate the export of nuclear materials and equipment.(*48) The belief at Published by kind permission of by Benjamin K Sovacool the time was that Canada would be well positioned to supply (National University of Singapore, Singapore). His new book the world fleet of reactors with uranium, making the country "Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power. A Critical Global As- a de facto power broker in the transition to a global atomic sessment of Atomic Energy" is available through: http://www. economy. worldscibooks.com/environsci/7895.html ISBN: 978-981-4322-75-1 4.b Conclusion In each of the above historical cases, planners pursued nuclear power not solely based on its costs and benefits in the End notes present, but with hope about potential future gains, national (*1) Amory B. Lovins, Imran Sheikh, and Alex Markevich, visions, and technological optimism. As this overview shows, "Forget Nuclear", Rocky Mountain Institute Solutions 24(1) these visions differed by country and overtime. Yet despite (Spring, 2008), p. 27. such differences, each of them painted nuclear energy as lea- (*2) Joseph Romm, The Self Limiting Future of Nuclear Power ding to national “radiance,” economic revitalization, progress, (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress Action and the possibility of a better future of some type. Their pre- Fund, June 2008). valence reminds us that energy policy making is not always (*3) John Carlin, Environmental Externalities in Electric Power guided by coldly rational thinking alone, and that energy Markets: Acid Rain, Urban Ozone, and Climate Change (Wa- systems can play a forceful role in shaping norms and ideals shington, D.C.: NARUC, 1993). about what the future may hold. However, it also illustrates (*4) Russell Lee, "Externalities and Electric Power: An Inte- that nuclear power was never initially designed or intended to grated Assessment Approach" (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge be a cost-competitive source of electricity supply. National Laboratory, 1995, CONF-9507-206-2). (*5) US Department of Energy and the Commission of the In the end, the choice between nuclear power and its cleaner European Communities, "U.S .- EC Fuel Cycle Study: Back- alternatives boils down to a simple question: Do we want a ground Document to the Approach and Issues," Report No. nuclear economy, which is centrally administered by techni- 1 on the External Costs and Benefits of Fuel Cycles (Oak cal specialists, completely reliant on government subsidies, Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 1992, dependent on future breakthroughs in research, and sure to ORNL/M-2500). promote international proliferation and worsen inequity (*6) Thomas Sundqvist and Patrik Soderholm, "Valuing the and vulnerability, that requires draconian security measures, Environmental Impacts of Electricity Generation: A Critical wastefully generates and distributes electricity, remains based Survey," Journal of Energy Literature 8(2) (2002), pp. 1-18; on highly uncertain projections about theoretical nuclear de- and Thomas Sundqvist, "What Causes the Disparity of Elec- signs and available fuel, fouls water and the land, and trashes tricity Externality Estimates? ,"Energy Policy 32 (2004), pp. the planet for many future generations? 1753-1766. Or, do we want a small- to-medium - scale decentralized (*7) Jim Giles, "When the Price Is Right: Chernobyl and the electricity system, which is more efficient, independent Future," Nature 440 (2006), p. 984. from government funding, and encompassing commercially (*8) Mycle Schneider, Steve Thomas, Antony Froggatt, and available technologies, that operates with minimal harm to Doug Koplow, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2009 the environment, remains resilient to disruptions and terrorist (Paris: German Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Con- assaults, is equally available to all future generations, and is servation and Reactor Safety , August 2009, UM0901290). highly beneficial to all income groups? (*9) John Byrne and Steven M. Hoffman, "The Ideology of Progress and the Globalisation of Nuclear Power," in John When the true costs of nuclear energy are compared to Byrne and Steven M. Hoffman (eds.), Governing the Atom: the true benefits of renewable technologies, the answer is The Politics of Risk (London: Transaction Publishers, 1996), almost too obvious. In a carbon constrained world, continued pp. 17-18. investment in nuclear technologies still on the drawing board (*10) Amory B. Lovins, "Energy Myth Nine -Energy Efficiency makes little sense, especially as such technologies rely on Improvements Have Already Reached Their Potential," in diminishing stocks of usable uranium that will require more Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. Brown (eds.), Energy and more energy inputs in order to be enriched to fuel-grade and American Society- Thirteen Myths (New York: Springer, status. Why invest in nuclear energy as a solution to global 2007), pp . 259-260; and Dan Watkiss, "The Middle Ages of climate change when, by the time such systems come online, Our Energy Policy - Will the Renaissance Be Nuclear?, "Elec- enriching the fuel for them will require emitting as much car- tric Light & Power (May/June, 2008), pp. 12-18. bon as today 's fossil fuel systems? (*11) Benjamin K. Sovacool and Christopher Cooper, "Nu- Any rational investor, regulator, and citizen would choose in- clear Nonsense: Why Nuclear Power Is No Answer to Climate

Nuclear Monitor 738 9 Change and the World 's Post-Kyoto Energy Challenges," lysis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983). William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 33(1) (*29) See ibid.; and Manu V. Mathai, "Elements of an Alterna- (2008), pp. 1-119. tive to Nuclear Power as a Response to the Energy - Envi- (*12) Quoted in Travis Madsen, Johanna Neumann, and Emily ronment Crisis in India," Bulletin of Science, Technology, & Rusch, The High Cost of Nuclear Power: Why America Should Society 29(2) (April, 2009), pp. 139-150. Choose a Clean Energy Future over New Nuclear Reactors (*30) Byrne and Hoffman (1996), pp. 11-46. (Baltimore: Mary;and PIRG Foundation, March 2009), p. 9. (*31) J.W. Hall, Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times (*13) Aarti Dhar and J. Venkatesan, "Limiting Nuclear Liability (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Publishers, 1990). Is a Violation of Rights: Sorabjee," The Hind u (December 11, (*32) Paul R. Josephson, Red A tom: Russia's Nuclear Power 2009), p. 12. Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman, (*14) Marshall Goldberg, Federal Energy Subsidies: Not All 1999), p. 38. Technologies Are Created Equal (Washington, D.C.: Rene- (*33) Josephson (1999). wable Energy Policy Project, July 2000, Report No. 11). (*34) Paul R. Josephson, "`Projects of the Century'" in Soviet (*15) Sovacool and Cooper (2008). History: Large- Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev," (*16) Matthew L. Wald , "In Finland, Nuclear Renaissance Technology and Culture 36(3) (July, 1995), pp. 519-559. Runs into Trouble," New York Times, May 29, 2009. (*35) Ibid. (*17) Steven Mufson, "Nuclear Projects Face Financial Obsta- (*36) Josephson (1999); and ibid. cles," Washington Post, March 2, 2010, p. A1. (*37) Alice L. Buck , A History of the Atomic Energy Commis- (*18) Madsen et al. (2009). sion (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Energy, July 1983, (*19) Judy Pasternak, "Nuclear Energy Lobby Working Hard to DOE/ES - 0003/1), p. 1. Win Support," McClatchy Newspapers, January 24, 2010. (*38) Lee Clarke, "The Origins of Nuclear Power: A Case of (*20) Otis Dudley Duncan, "Sociologists Should Reconsider Institutional Conflict," Social Problems 32(5) (June, 1985), p. Nuclear Energy," Social Forces 57(1) (September, 1978), pp. 477. 1-22. (*39) See Buck (1983); and ibid., pp. 474-487. (*21) Byrne and Hoffman (1996), pp. 11-46. (*40) Editors of Pocket Books, The Atomic Age Opens (New (*22) Martin Melosi, "Energy Transitions in Historical Perspec- York: Pocket Books, 1945), p p . 202± 203. tive," in Laura Nader (ed.), The Energy Reader (London: Wiley (*41) Daniel Ford , Meltdown: The Secret Papers of the Atomic - Blackwell, 2010), pp. 45-60. Energy Commission (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. (*23) Michael G. Gallagher, "Nuclear Power and Mainland 30. China's Energy Future," Issues and Studies 26(12) (1990), pp. (*42) Gary L. Downey, "Risk in Culture: The American Conflict 100-120. over Nuclear Power," Cultural Anthropology 1(4) (1986), pp. (*24) For an excellent history of nuclear power in France, see 388-412. Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power (*43) Richard Munson, From Edison to Enron: The Business and National Identity After World War II (Cambridge, MA : of Power and What It Means for the Future of Electricity MIT Press, 1998); and L. Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy (London: Praeger, 2005), p. 80. in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton (*44) Shelia Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, "Containing the University Press, 1965). Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the (*25) Wolfgang Rudig, "Outcomes of Nuclear Technology Po- United States and South Korea," Minerva 47(2) (2009), pp. licy: Do Varying Political Styles Make a Difference?" Journal 119-146. of Public Policy 7(4) (1988), pp. 389-430. (*45) Lewis Strauss, "Speech to the National Association of (*26) See Gene I. Rochlin, "Broken Plowshare: System Failure Science Writers, September 16th, 1954," New York Times and the Nuclear Power Industry", in Jane Summerton (ed.), (September 17, 1954), p. 1A . Changing Large Technical Systems (San Francisco: Westview (*46) Clarke (1985), pp. 474-487. Press, 1994), pp. 231-261; and Michael T. Hatch, "Nuclear (*47) Albert Presas I. Puig, "Science on the Periphery : The Power and Postindustrial Politics in the West," in John Byrne Spanish Reception of Nuclear Energy," Minerva 43 (2005), pp. and Steven M. Hoffman (eds.), Governing the Atom: The 197-218. Politics of Risk (London: Transaction Publishers, 1996), pp . (*48) Constance D. Hunt, "Canadian Policy and the Export of 201-246. Nuclear Energy," University of Toronto Law Journal 27 (Winter, (*27) Hecht (1998), p. 2. 1977), pp. 69-104. (*28) David Hart, Nuclear Power in India: A Comparative Ana-

10 Nuclear Monitor 738

WISE/NIRS NUCLEAR MONITOR WISE AMSTERDAM/NIRS ISSN: 1570-4629 The Nuclear Information & Resource Service was founded in 1978 and is based in Washington, US. The World Information Service on Energy was set up in the same year Editorial team: Dirk Bannink and houses in Amsterdam, Netherlands. NIRS and WISE Amsterdam joined forces in 2000, creating a worldwide network of information and resource centers for citizens and This issue of the Nuclear Monitor is written by environmental organizations concerned about nuclear power, radioactive waste, Benjamin K. Sovacool (National University of radiation, and sustainable energy issues. Singapore, Singapore). With his kind permission we publish large parts of Chapter 8 (The "self- The WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor publishes international information in English 20 limiting" future of nuclear power) of his new times a year. A Spanish translation of this newsletter is available on the WISE Amsterdam book: "Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power. website (www.antenna.nl/wise/esp). A Russian version is published by WISE Russia and A Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy". a Ukrainian version is published by WISE Ukraine. The WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor ISBN: 978-981-4322-75-1. can be obtained both on paper and in an email version (pdf format). Old issues are (after Available through: http://www.worldscibooks. two months) available through the WISE Amsterdam homepage: www.antenna.nl/wise. com/environsci/7895.html

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