207 Ethics of Disagreement in Islam: a Historical Perspective (Part –

Insight Islamicus Vol. 19, 2019 Ethics of Disagreement in Islam: A Historical Perspective (Part – II) Prof. Manzoor Ahmad Bhat Dr. Khalida Majid 1. Ethics of Disagreement in the Time of Four Imams After the age of companions of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.A.W.S) and their eminent successor, there were many intellectual and rationalist tendencies as there were groups, with each group formulating to own methods and principles for interpreting the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnat and for dealing with new controversies. There was a pressing need to put in place some controls for regulating the situation, for specifying the methodologies that could be used for deriving positive laws from the divine revelation and for specifying what was allowed and what was not in the conduct of controversies. In the period from the end of the first century after the Hijrah to the middle of the third century – there appeared some thirteen schools of thought in Islam jurisprudence. However, the ‘aimmah whose schools have lasted to this day, who have followers throughout the Muslim world, and whose principles and jurisprudence are still employed in assessing issues and in making legal judgments are mainly four : Abu Hanifah, Malik, Al-Shafi’ī and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. All of them were leaders of correct path and they encouraged and guided the masses towards the correct path as well. Any slanderous remark cast against them is a sure sign of the deprivation of Allah’s mercy. These schools of thought show the differences because of the three main factors viz linguist factors, factors pertaining to the transmission of hadith, and factors pertaining to the principles and rules of deduction.1 When Muslim jurists discuss the beginning of Ikhtilaf, they always refer to the practice of Muslims at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.A.W.S). According to them, the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.A.W.S) himself in some cases legitimated Ikhtilaf or provided opportunities for difference in judgment, since he gave Head and Professor, Shah-i-Hamadan Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, (J & K). Former Research Scholar Shah-i-Hamadan Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar. 207 Insight Islamicus Vol. 19, 2019 instructions which could be interpreted in more than one way or he validated two different actions with regard to the same situation.2 Muslim jurists further believe that there was much evidence for Ikhtilaf immediately following the demise of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.A.W.S). Ikhtilaf in legal opinions, which occurred between one caliph and another, among the companions and especially, among the successors of the companions. Furthermore, numerous differences even contradictions have been noted within the corpus of prophetic Ahādīth which were major source of legislation.3 When faced by such difference, Muslim scholars usually try to harmonize the contradictory over Ahādīth by saying, for example, that all of them are acceptable but only one is recommended while the second is permissible and the third is obligatory and, so forth, they might also say that two different Ahādīth came from different periods, and that the later one has abrogated the former. Example of Ikhtilāf among later generations can also be seen in ‘Ancient schools’ of law which flourished in particular localities. The jurists within them produced the early corpus of Islamic law, but this corpus was for from homogenous.4 And in the generation of the successors, there was even greater boon for Ikhtilaf so much so that the masters of the former schools and later schools refused to consider the opinions of the successors as then trustworthy of Islamic law. Good examples of Ikhtilāf within the same region are those between Abu Hanifah and Ibn Abi Layla.5 Ikhtilāf among Muslim jurists occurred orally as well in writing. The former occurred directly in debate and indirectly through teaching; the latter emerged in records of letters and books. At the same time, the circles of the grand scholars developed into the centers for their thought and later became the centers of schools which were attributed to their personal names: Abu Hanifah in Baghdad, Sufyan al-Thawri in Basra.6 Malik b. Anas and al-Layth exchanged letters on the question of combining two prayers in one (jam’) at the time of rain. Malik supported the combination; al-Layth rejected it. Malik argued with al- Layth on the authority of a hadith, which according to Malik, was fully practiced by the companions and later by the Medinans. Al-Layth rejected Malik’s view, arguing that the companion Muadh bin Jabal in Syria did not practice the combination because rain occurred more often in Syria than in Madinah. If the combination were very easy to do so, the people of Syria would have almost always combined prayers, since rain was very frequent in that area, argued al-Layth.7 208 Insight Islamicus Vol. 19, 2019 Since early times, Muslim jurists also wrote books on Ikhtilāf, one type of which can be called polemical, whereas the other can be called descriptive. The former are those which were written to support the author’s respective opinions and the opinions of their schools and to argue against the opinions of others. Examples of these are al-Radd ‘al Siyar-al Awza’i of Abu Yusuf, Kitab al- Hujja ‘al Ahl al-Madina of al-Shayab, and al-Radd ‘al Muhmmad bin al-Hassan of al-Shafi’i,. On every topic of discussion in his al-Radd ‘al Siyar-al Awza’i, Abu Yusuf first states Abu Hanifah opinion and then cities al Awzai’s opinion and argument against it. Abu Yusuf and then rejects al-Awzai’s opinions with detailed counter arguments. Abu Yusuf always uses a counter hadith to reject al-Awzai’s argument from hadith.8 Similarly, in his Kitab al-Hujja ‘al Ahl al-Madina, al-shayab n starts with the opinion of Abu Hanifah on every topic of discussion. He then states the Medinese’s opinion, which mostly contradicts Abu Hanifah’s. Finally, alshayab n rejects the argument of Medinese’s especially Malik, in more detailed argumentation for example, when al-shayab n discusses, ‘who is more appropriate to give a little female orphan in marriage: her grandfather or her brother?9 He starts with Abu Hanifah’s opinion that it is her grandfather. He adds that Abu Hanifah’s is also reported to have said that there is no legal consequence to those who receive a recommendation about marriage, dead though they might furthermore, Abu Hanifah said that marriage basically belongs to guardians and the most appropriate persons to give a little female orphan in marriage is her father, then her grandfather, and finally her brother. In contrast, the Madinese believe that the orphan’s brother is more appropriate than her grandfather to give her in marriage and the two who receives a recommendation about marriage from her father is more appropriate than her brother to give her in marriage. After al-shayabani presents both opposing opinions, he gives a long argument in the support of Abu Hanifah against the Medinese.10 This is an example of his argument against the Medinese. In his al- Radd ‘al Muhmmad bin al-Hassan, al-shayabani , al-Shafi’i as a defender of Medinese, rejects Abu Hanifa’s opinion, which is supported by al-Shayabani’s argument. Like the companions of the first generation and their immediate successors, the leading scholars of the 2nd and 3rd centuries had many differences on issues which required Ijtihād. Since their difference was not motivated by any form of egoism or desire to create discord, one can venture to say that they were all on the right 209 Insight Islamicus Vol. 19, 2019 path. They were highly trained and qualified, and this is why their verdicts were accommodated by scholars of all ages. When faced with a difficult issue, some jurists would consult to the literature of another school without any hesitation or embarrassment, even though they might not agree on the type of evidence used. They of course felt free to consult any substantiated text. They were easy-going, open-minded and their concern was to facilitated matters for people. There were several differences relating, for example, to the preparation for and the performance of salah. Some recited Bismillah at the beginning of surah-al-fatihah some did not. Some uttered it aloud and others did not. Some recited Qunut supplication as the part of dawn prayer while others did not. Some renewed their ablution after nose-bleeding, vomiting and cupping while others did not. Some considered that any physical contact with women nullified Wudu, others did not, some renewed their Wudu after eating camel meat or food cooked on a direct fire while others precepted no need for that. However, the main fact is that these differences never prevented them from performing salah behind each other.11 In fact, there is a vast distinction between fundamental and secondary differences. Those who consider this secondary difference equal to the fundamental differences and apply the Quranic verses and Ahadith about the evil of differences to the secondary difference are either ignorant or deceived into believing otherwise. There is no doubt, that the shar’iah has placed great ease and flexibility on the secondary differences. If this was not the case, the Ummah would have been encumbered with difficulties beyond their endurance. This was one of the reasons why Imam Malik declined to comply with caliph Harun Rashid’s request for him to hang a copy of his Muwatta’ upon the wall of the Kaba and issued a command for everyone to adhere to it, in order to ensure that people did not differ over religious matters.

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