Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring Pilot Project

March 2021

Inside Introduction Pg 2 Methodology Pg 2 Tribesman against Tribesman, not Tribe against Tribe Pg 3 Incident Orientation Pg 5 2 Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring Pilot Project

Introduction Methodology

Geography his report introduces an ongoing pilot study by This report concerns data collected in the month of March T COAR to monitor stability and social tensions in 2021 from Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor governorates. northeast Syria. Building on COAR’s previous work on The portion of Deir-ez-Zor that lies outside the control Syria’s eastern region, the project employs incident of the SDF and is, therefore, beyond the reach of most monitoring through data collected and verified by COAR donor-funded activities, is excluded. Moreover, al-Hol field researchers and classified according to a broad set camp is assessed as a standalone geography due to its of predetermined stability and social tension indicators. unique status and the contrast in observed incidents This report presents initial data collected in the month between it and the surrounding Al-Hasakeh countryside. of March 2021, and it focuses in large part on Arab The incidents recorded are verifiable physical incidents. tribes in the region. Arab tribesmen represent a majority population in every major community in northeast Classifications Syria, and they are a plurality or sizable minority in Two local field researchers based in Al-Hasakeh and Deir- nearly all such communities. To understand the issues ez-Zor governorates collected incident data directly and affecting the region’s tribes is to better understand the through their personal networks of local sources and region itself. field observers. In conjunction with these researchers, COAR has analysed incidents and classified them on a In its totality, this project sets out to identify the preliminary basis in several ways. In addition to basic most relevant factors now shaping the operational information regarding actor identity and geography, environment for donor-funded aid activities, stabilisation incidents have been grouped according to a set of broad initiatives, and political and strategic decision-making thematic categories. Most importantly for the purpose concerning northeast Syria. As active conflict in Syria of assessing stability, COAR has classified incidents slows and regional borders harden, it will become according to their directionality vis-à-vis local social and increasingly important for international relief and non- power dynamics. Incidents that reflect tensions within or humanitarian initiatives to grapple with the local and between social groups of roughly equivalent power or regional conflict-drivers that this project aims to assess. standing are classified as having a horizontal direction. By contrast, incidents that reflect tension or conflict between local actors and formal or de-facto authorities or power structures are classified as being vertical in nature.

Incident Directionality (March 2021) Horizontal tensions reﬂect conlict among members or groups within the same stratum. Vertical incidents indicate tensions or active conﬂict challenging existing power structures. District

Ras Al Ain 3 2 Horizontal Vertical Al Mayadin 4 4

Al-Malikeyyeh 1 7

Al-Hol Camp 12 8

Abu Kamal 16 14

Quamishli 117

Al-Hasakeh 3 20

Deir-ez-Zor 15 47

20 0 20 40 60 Northeast Syria 3 Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring Pilot Project

a pre-existing interpersonal dispute. That said, a large proportion of events showed tribal mediation at work. Tribesman against Approximately 40 percent of all events involving tribes Tribesman, not Tribe were tribal meetings (8) that either aimed to mediate tribal disputes or address broad-based social issues such against Tribe as community, security, or military conscription. Tribes’ capacity to mediate such conflicts is especially critical given the limited legitimacy of the SDF and Asayish rab tribes are unquestionably an important social among such networks. A force in eastern Syria. However, the precise roles played by tribes in the political, security, and Historical experiences of marginalisation and conflict governance spheres are frequently misunderstood are also reflected in the March data. Geographically, (See: Tribal Tribulations). Quantifying how members Hajin, Basira, and Susat districts in southern Deir-ez- of tribes engage each other and various authorities is Zoe Governorate witnessed the greatest concentration therefore an important first step toward mapping the of incidents involving tribal actors (15 events). broader stability dynamics of eastern Syria. Notably, these districts are among the most chronically underserved in all of eastern Syria: Squalid living The March monitoring data offer a few preliminary conditions, SDF security campaigns, and fuel shortages insights regarding tribes’ disproportionate role in have prompted protests and other social flare-ups in governance, social, and security affairs. Primarily, the these areas in the past. Meanwhile, only three incidents incidents suggest a high degree of tribal insularity. — two assassination attempts and a tribal meeting Roughly three-quarters of incidents in which the — were reported in all of Al-Hasakeh Governorate. In main actor is affiliated with a tribe, the other involved terms of tribal actors, Al-E’keidat tribe was involved parties were actors from the same tribe. Crucially, in no in more incidents than any other tribe, predominantly recorded incidents did tribes clash with other tribes. In intra-tribal incidents and mediation events. Al-E’keidat the recorded events, such events were often triggered is among the tribes that has been most heavily involved by personal disputes over economic issues (e.g. land in social tension events in the past, which have widened use), and in several cases they represented a relapse of cleavages within and among the tribe’s families.

March Family / Social Incidents Clashes within tribes were the most common March incident involving tribal actors. Mediation events almost always followed.

Armed Clash

Minor Security

Tribal Meeting / Mediation

Assassination / Killing 4 Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring Pilot Project

March IS Incidents Al-Hasakeh IS was active in March, but its reach has been limited — for now Aleppo Ar-Raqqa Idleb Lattakia

Hama Deir-ez-Zor Al-Malikeyyeh Tartous Quamishli Jawadiyah Homs Amuda Qahtaniyyeh Darbasiyah Ya'robiyah Damascus Rural Damascus

Quneitra Dar’a As-Sweida Be'r Al-Hulo Tal Hmis Al-Wardeyyeh Ras Al Ain Tal Tamer

Al-Hasakeh Hole*

Areesheh

Shadadah

Kisreh Markada Outside of intended area of study

No incidents Tabni Sur 1 -- 3 Khasham Deir-ez-Zor Basira 4 -- 7 Muhasan 8 -- 11 Thiban Al Mayadin Hajin Ashara

Jalaa Susat

Abu Kamal

* All incidents recorded in Al-Hol Camp

IS and the Tribes communities and the SDF for recruitment. Roughly 51 percent of all monitored events (88 in Deir-ez-Zor) Despite its territorial defeat in March 2019, the Islamic took place in communities in eastearn rural Deir-ez-Zor State (IS) remained an important actor in northeast Governorate, among the areas most heavily impacted by Syria in March 2021. The data show IS or IS-affiliated poor economic conditions within the entire study area. individuals were involved in 28 events. Of these, nearly Additionally, members of the SDF or affiliates of the 40 percent occurred in al-Hol camp, which witnessed Autonomous Administration, or their local interlocutors, a large-scale SDF-led security campaign. All other IS- were the main targets of attacks across the northeast. linked incidents were recorded in various locations This suggests an intent on the part of IS to undermine across Deir-ez-Zor Governorate. As seen with an uptick local governance and raise the cost of cooperation in IS attacks in Homs and Hama, IS-linked incidents in with the Autonomous Administration and its affiliated Deir-ez-Zor in March were primarily confined to hit- security forces. In response to pressures such as these, and-run attacks. on 11 March, eight members of the newly established civil council in Basira, central Deir-ez-Zor, resigned due IS has increasingly hewed to a domestic, localised to security concerns. Interestingly, no recorded March agenda that has particular significance for marginalised incidents involved a direct interaction between tribal regions with large Arab tribal populations. March data actors and IS.1 The absence of such events is likely a suggest that IS is seeking to capitalise on harsh economic result of the inchoate IS group’s efforts to attract Arab conditions and the hostile relationship between local tribesmen to join its ranks.

1 Where ambiguity exists, every attempt has been made to classify events according to the perceived motivation. For instance, in the case of an Arab tribesman who is a member of the SDF, the event would be classified as targeting either an SDF member or tribesman, according to the predominant motivating factor, as determined by field researchers. Northeast Syria 5 Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring Pilot Project

SDF and the Tribes The relationship between the SDF and local communities is one of the most important for stability in northeast Incident Orientation Syria. The SDF’s engagement with local communities is ver time, the changes to the orientation of incidents not uniform, although a considerable proportion of all O is expected to be a key indicator of stability writ incidents involving the SDF were counter-IS operations. large. Horizontal incidents, i.e. incidents that affect actors That said, the patterns of regional incidents in March or groups across a single social stratum, can be seen as vary according to security, geographic, and social one indicator of social cohesion, or its absence.2 Vertical factors. In Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, the SDF largely incidents — that is, incidents showing tension between pursued security objectives, and more than 61 percent of formal or de facto authorities and population groups — events (38 incidents) involving SDF in the governorate can be seen as one (of many) indicators of challenges were arrests, security campaigns, or clashes with local to popular legitimacy for governing authorities, in this actors. Events of this nature accounted for 44 percent case the Autonomous Administration. of SDF-related incidents (16 in total) in Al-Hasakeh (outside al-Hol camp), while all of the observed events Two-thirds of recorded March incidents showed vertical in al-Hol Camp were security-driven. tensions. The majority of these events concerned protests against local authorities, or were responses to After community insecurity (e.g. robberies, petty security operations by authorities. On a fundamental crime, etc.), restrictions on accessibility, poor services, level, vertical incidents in northeast Syria reflect the and governance decisions made by Autonomous hostile relationship between controlling actors and local Administration authorities were the primary trigger communities (e.g. in Deir-ez-Zor), and to a lesser extent, of incidents, protests, and strikes. Eight protests were the influence of international actors (e.g. Al-Hasakeh recorded against the Autonomous Administration in and Quamishli). One notable dimension of the tension communities in Deir-ez-Zor such as Hajin, Abu Hamam, over administrative legitimacy is service-related events, Mhemideh, Lower Safira and Gharanij. Most notably, which were numerous and are predominantly vertical. the decision to terminate the contracts of 264 Deir-ez- Zor Civil Council workers prompted a series of protests One-third of recorded events showed horizontal tension, north of Deir-ez-Zor city. primarily concerning minor social tensions. Horizontal events were recorded in Abu Kamal, Ras Al Ain, and The combination of local instability, poor services, and Al Mayadin districts and al-Hol camp. the limited capacity of the Autonomous Administration to respond to local security and social tensions are among the factors that have prompted Arab tribes in Deir-ez- Zor (and to a lesser extent in Al-Hasakeh) to distance themselves militarily and socially from the SDF. This has manifested in two ways: first, frequent reliance on local tribal councils for mediation of local disputes and the enforcement of tribal law or custom; second, moves to establish tribal military groups resembling the Shammar tribe’s Sanadeed forces. Although nominally under the command structure of the SDF, such militias aim to bring operational autonomy to the tribes by allowing them to complete military service in their own communities.

While security has been the main concern of the SDF in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, the struggle for influence plays a role in shaping the SDF’s geopolitical engagement strategy in Al-Hasakeh Governorate. The multiplicity of controlling actors in the governorate, especially the joint control of SDF and Government of Syria over Al- Hasakeh and Quamishli city, has been a major source of instability in both cities, which has resulted in clashes and restrictions on mobility.

2 Like community acceptance, social cohesion is a simplistic term to define a highly complex, context-dependent set of conditions. The Wartime and Post-Conflict Syria project (WPCS) is funded by the European Union and implemented through a partnership between the European University Institute (Middle East Directions Programme) and the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR). WPCS will provide operational and strategic analysis to policymakers and programmers concerning prospects, challenges, trends, and policy options with respect to a conflict and post-conflict Syria. WPCS also aims to stimulate new approaches and policy responses to the Syrian conflict through a regular dialogue between researchers, policymakers and donors, and implementers, as well as to build a new network of Syrian researchers that will contribute to research informing international policy and practice related to their country. The content compiled and presented by COAR is by no means exhaustive and does not reflect COAR’s formal position, political or otherwise, on the aforementioned topics. The information, assessments, and analysis provided by COAR are only to inform humanitarian and development programs and policy. While this publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union, its contents are the sole responsibility of COAR Global LTD, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.