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Home , Charles Helou, Khazen, Lebanese Civil War

IT WOULD SURELY BE THE SECOND: , , AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 By Sean Foley1*

This essay will discuss how three factors shattered this seemingly permanent settlement. First, the military balance following the Six-Day War ended the role of and as bases for attacks on Israel and, eventually, the intention that these states would deliver a victory over Israel for the . Second, Israel's total victory over Arab armies empowered the Palestinians to take direct command of their struggle to eradicate Israel, and to use Lebanon, which already housed 110,000 from the , as a base for direct attack of Israeli territory. Third, the Palestinians' use of Lebanese territory to attack Israel, combined with Israel's retalia- tion, strained Lebanon's already fragile political institutions to the point of collapse and postponed any hope of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon for years.

In the four decades between the advent of the Israel.2 The Israeli-Lebanese border wit- Six-Day War in 1967 and 2003, there have nessed less violence than marked Israel's bor- been few places which have witnessed more ders with Egypt, Syria, and in the violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict than 1950s and 1960s. Of the armistice agree- Lebanon and the lands adjacent to its border ments that Israel reached with its four with Israel. Throughout that period, the peo- neighbors in 1949, the only agreement fully ples of these areas suffered invasion, shelling, operative by the time the Six-Day War broke attacks, and occupation. By contrast, Israel's out was with Lebanon. 3 From the perspective borders with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria have of the Maronite-dominated and Western- remained largely quiet, particularly since the leaning government of Lebanon, it was as end of the October 1973 war. though the partition of in 1947 and In this context it is easy to forget that Is- the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949 had per- rael's border with Lebanon was the quietest in manently settled the Palestinian que stion. 4 the region in the years between 1949 and 1967, and that Lebanon, along with Jordan, was seen as one of the Arab states most "likely" to reach a permanent agreement with

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COMPLEMENTARY STATES AND A paltry military meant that it was never a mili- "MODEL" ARMISTICE tary or a political threat to Israel and that Bei- A chief factor contributing to the stability rut could opt out of the Arab military struggle of Lebanese-Israeli relations in the two de c- against Israel even if it might serve as a ades before the Six-Day War was the com- headquarters for Palestinian organizations or plementary nature of the two nations. Both as a supply route to ther states that housed Israel and Lebanon controlled tiny national Palestinian forces. Importantly, the other territories bordering the Mediterranean, with Arab states respected Lebanese neutrality and very small national populations and limited they only authorized Jordan, Syria, and Egypt natural resources. Both states bordered much to serve as bases for Palestinian guerilla at- larger states and maintained close ties with tacks against Israel.5 the West. Although the government of Leba- Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Israel non attempted to be ne utral in international and Lebanon upheld the armistice that they affairs, often shared Jerusalem's broad signed in 1949 with few problems. (By con- support of U.S. goals in the and trast, Israel suspended its Mixed Armistice was less militant than either Syria or Egypt in Commission with Egypt in 1956, after the its reaction to crises in Arab relations with occurrence of many cross-border attacks.)6 the West. Beirut's policies were sufficiently The Israeli military withdrew from positions pro-Western that Washington readily dis- in , and Beirut and Jerusa- patched troops there when the Lebanese gov- lem agreed the armistice line would follow ernment requested assistance to restore order the international boundary of 1920 between in 1958. Lebanon and Palestine. Subsequently the The states were also very different from border between the two nations was virtually one another. While the Israelis adhered to a sealed. 7 dynamic and ethnically exclusive nationa l- ism, the Lebanese built a pluralistic society in WANDERING COWS AND A FRAGILE which a power-sharing agreement, the 1943 PEACE , protected the rights of various In 1961, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben communities. Israelis also sought strong, effi- Gurion told U.S. Ambassador to the United cient state institutions which could maintain Nations Adlai Stevenson, "Lebanon is ready military forces second to none in the region. to live in peace with Israel now."8 Perhaps National conscription was required of all even more indicative of the Israeli perspec- Jewish Israeli citizens. By contrast, the Leba- tive on the Israeli-Lebanese border, and rela- nese preferred a weak army and state and saw tions with Lebanon in general, were the no need for a draft. views of Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir. These differences had three important She told President John Kennedy in a January consequences. First, Lebanon was able to 1963 meeting: absorb 110,000 Palestinian refugees during and after the 1948 war. Second, Lebanon's

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Israel has never had real trouble with acutely aware of the ability of other govern- Lebanon. Cows occasionally wander ments to influence Lebanese politics. More- over the border from Lebanon and are over, the events of 1958 and the attempted sent back, Meir said. Girls in the Is- coup of 1962 reinforced their fear of Leba- raeli army may get lost and wander nese nationals committed to involving Leba- across the Lebanese border, but they non deeply in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 15 are very politely returned. None of the While many of the Palestinian refugees had incidents are serious. 9 found new lives in Lebanon, the fact that most of them were Muslim threatened the Was this serene, bucolic image of peaceful nation's communal balance. In addition, the relations shared by the Lebanese government 1949 Armistice cut off southern Lebanon officials? The answer is both yes and no. from its traditional trading partners in Pales- Lebanese officials acknowledged their weak tine. Consequently, many of southern Leba- position in regional politics. Their nation's non's Shia immigrated to Lebanese cities in foreign policy—while officially neutral—was search of better livelihoods. All of these pro-Western, and, in the words of Lebanese problems were compounded by the uneven Foreign Minister Hakim, "closest of all Arab growth of Lebanon's economy (in favor of states to U.S. policies and ideals."10 Any sug- tertiary trade and cities) and the Lebanese gestion otherwise, Lebanese President Che- government's failure to implement meaning- hab told a U.S. official in 1962, was only ful social and economic reforms.16 "protocolaire."11 These twin factors govern- These conditions led to "a loss in confi- ing Lebanon's foreign policy ensured that dence" in the country's central government Lebanon favored a peaceful solution to the and contributed to the growth of organiza- Arab-Israeli dispute which did not assume tions critical of Lebanon's pro-Western Israel's destruction.12 However, Lebanon orientation and the political arrangements en- "could not take any lead but would go along shrined in the 1943 National Pact. By April with anything acceptable to other Arab coun- 1967, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Dwight tries."13 Lebanese delegates to the MAC Porter, bitterly complained to Lebanese "perpetuated the sense that there was no real President Charles Helou about the growing fight between Israel and Lebanon; [they] en- anti-American tone of the Lebanese press and couraged the Israelis in the oft-repeated society. 17 In early June of that year, U.S. offi- maxim that while Lebanon could not be the cials noted that a number of leading moderate first Arab country to make peace with Israel, Lebanese believed that U.S. policies were it would surely be the second."14 biased and supported "a minority [Jews] for Lebanese officials also had strong dome s- political purposes."18 At the same time, Por- tic reasons to seek a solution to the Arab- ter and other senior U.S. officials repeatedly Israeli dispute in the 1960s. They were stressed to the Lebanese government that no

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Sean Foley solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute proposed mander of the Lebanese Army, who saw a by the would "endanger" Leba- Lebanese attack on Israel in June 1967 as non's internal balance.19 suicidal. 23 Because the Lebanese army failed to at- ENTERING THE 1967 WAR THROUGH tack Israel, Lebanon emerged from the war as THE BACKDOOR the only Arab state in the that did not Still, Lebanese, U.S., and Israeli officials lose prestige and territory to successful Israeli failed to recognize the fundamental danger to attacks.24 U.S. officials speculated as early as the peace on the Lebanese-Israeli border and mid-June 1967 that a Lebanese-Israeli settle- to the future of any durable peace between ment was possible, and they worked to re- Israel and Lebanon, and ultimately between store U.S. financial and military assistance to Arabs and Israel in general: Lebanon's weak Lebanon quickly.25 McGeorge Bundy, Presi- military. 20 In the years before the 1967 war dent Johnson's special assistant for national the weak military was not a problem. There security affairs, noted in a memorandum that were few Palestinian guerrillas for the Leba- there was real value in "cautious military nese army to control, and violations of the hand-holding with really decent Arabs (like sealed border were very rare. the strong Lebanese general [Bustani] who Indeed, Lebanon's weak army turned out seems to have kept the Lebanon out of the to be a national asset when war finally ar- war)."26 rived in June 1967, for two reasons. For its part, the Lebanese government was First, Israel was "content to leave Lebanon satisfied that the war weakened the Arab alone," as long as Beirut did not provoke any states most hostile to Israel (Egypt and thing.21 Second, Lebanon's weak military Syria), and therefore promised to relieve any helped the government of Lebanon to justify pressure for future attacks on Israel. Despite the nation's failure to participate in the war reports from senior government officials and despite the fact that Lebanese Muslims ove r- Arab diplomats in Beirut of continued Leba- whelmingly supported attacking Israel. nese anger at American policy toward Israel, In 1967, popular support for going to war the Lebanese government permitted U.S. with Israel was so strong that the United tourists to return to Lebanon well before States, evacuated American citizens, the CIA Washington lifted the travel ban to the coun- warned of attacks on the American Unive r- try, which had been put in place during the sity in Beirut, reports surfaced of a planned Six-Day War.27 Furthermore, the new Arab- pogrom against Jews in Beirut, and the Leba- Israeli borders appeared, "easier to defend nese government seriously contemplated ei- and patrol than before," and made the possi- ther a limited unilateral Lebanese military bility of guerilla infiltrations into Israel seem action against Israel, or a joint military opera- significantly le ss likely. 28 This issue was a tion with Syria.22 Reportedly those plans key consideration given that Israel withdrew were never carried out because of the firm from the Military Armistice Commission fol- opposition of General Emile Bustani, com- lowing the war.29

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However, the new regional dynamic that INTO THE ABYSS emerged immediately after the war was far Israel's policy goal was simple: to force more dangerous to Lebanon and its relation- Beirut and Amman to rein in the Palestinian ship to Israel than it initially appeared. Be- forces, launching attacks on Israel from their cause the Palestinians could no longer depend territories. In the case of Jordan, the policy on the armies of other Arab states to defeat worked. 36 In the case of Lebanon, Israeli pol- Israel, they turned to a logical alternative: icy backfired. Horrified by the attack on the airport and the frequent Palestinian-Israeli guerilla warfare. Under the leadership clashes, the Lebanese Army launched a series of Yasir Arafat's newly activated Fa- of attacks on Palestinian forces in Lebanon tah organization, the Palestinians starting in 1969. The attacks failed to elimi- launched attacks from Jordan and nate them but instead led to a dangerous split Lebanon. By December 1968, there in Lebanon's government. President Charles were daily clashes between Palestini- Helou felt that the attacks were necessary to ans based in Lebanon and Jordan, and protect Lebanon's sovereignty. In contrast, the Israeli army. 30 Prime Minister Rashid Karame argued that the nation's sovereignty was inextricably These events came to a head for Lebanon on linked to the Palestinians' freedom of action December 26, 1968, when two members of in Lebanon. 37 Karame's position also re- the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- flected the pressure that Lebanese Muslim tine (PFLP), based in Beirut, Lebanon, at- politicians faced after tacked an Israeli El Al aircraft in Athens, decided to link the Palestinian cause in 1968 Greece. Israel held Lebanon responsible for with his own popular, leftist Lebanese reform the attacks, justifying its beliefs to U.S. offi- program.38 In addition, the army's attacks and cials by noting that "no government harbor- failure to eliminate the Palestinian forces let ing [PFLP] can be immune from responsibil- Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser in- ity for actions of these [types of] organiza- tervene, leading to the Cairo Accord which, tions."31 On December 28, 1968, 45 Israeli for the first time, gave international Arab commandos landed at Beirut International sanction to the Palestinians' use of Lebanon Airport and destroyed 13 Lebanese owned as a base to attack Israel. 39 aircraft.32 Despite vigorous protests by the While the accord gave the Lebanese mili- United States and Lebanon against the raid on tary and civilian authorities the right to exer- the airport,33 Israeli raids continued against cise full control in any part of the country, the Lebanon and Jordan. 34 As a Lebanese histo- Palestinians broadly interpreted it as a carte rian put it, Lebanon had now actively entered blanche to launch more attacks on Israel. the conflict "but through the backdoor."35 When the army attempted to reassert

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Sean Foley control over the Palestinian refugee camps on done, Lebanese society might have had the the edges of Beirut in May 1973, the Pales- time to resurrect the past relationship with tinians and many Muslim and leftist Leba- Israel and possibly stave off, or at least miti- nese responded by staging popular uprisings gate, the Lebanese . For the Israelis, in the cities of and Tripoli, as well as dealing directly with Lebanon forced them to the Muslim areas of Beirut. The United States devote ever greater military resources to pro- would not intervene in Lebanon's crisis in the tecting the nation's northern border; in addi- mid , as it had done in the crisis of tion, they had to endure ever higher civilian 1958. Washington and Moscow both stepped and military casualties in the Galilee and to back and allowed Lebanese and other re- abandon any hope of reaching a long-term gional actors, few of whom were interested in agreement with Lebanon. 40 a durable peace, to take the initiative.

CONCLUSION *Sean Foley is a Royden B. Davis Fellow at There is little question that Israel's rela- Georgetown and will be an Assistant Profes- tionship with Lebanon was substantially be t- sor of History at DePauw University starting ter in the years leading up to the 1967 Six- in August 2005. Day War than it would be in the years that An earlier version of this article was pre- followed. The "sealed" Israeli-Lebanese bor- sented at the U.S. Department of State's con- der and the commitment of other Arab states ference "The United States, the Middle East, to Palestinian affairs allowed Lebanon to and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held on more or less ignore the Arab-Israeli dispute January 12 and 13, 2004. and the existence of Israel. Israel could also ignore Lebanon since few Palestinian attacks originated there, and Lebanon maintained NOTES paltry military forces. However, the new re- gional political dynamic caused by the Six- 1I thank Dr. Rashid Khalidi and Mr. David Day War in 1967 changed the bilateral rela- Makovsky for commenting on this paper in tionship by forcing both sides to confront the January, 2004. Any mistakes that I have other's existence directly. made in this text are entirely my own. For the Lebanese, this change would mean 2For more on this issue, see Irene Gendzier, that they would play a central role in the ""The Declassified Lebanon, 1948-1958,"" in Arab-Israeli conflict and would have to revise Halim Barakat (ed.), Toward A Viable Leba- the assumptions that had governed their po- non, (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univer- litical life since 1943. Here, the military sity Center for Contemporary Arab Studies), weakness of Lebanon is critical: had the p. 198. Lebanese been able to crush the Palestinians 3Israeli Foreign Ministry, "Armistice Agree- in much the same way that the Jordanians had ments: Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974,"

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http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01 the people or the armed forces of the other; it 8w0 (Accessed on December 19, 2003). being understood that the use of the term 4Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered 'planned' in this context has no bearing on Country, Myths and Realities of the Wars in normal staff planning as generally practiced Lebanon. Revised Edition (New York: Heims in military organizations."" Israel Foreign and Myers Publishers, 2002), p. 79. For more Ministry, "The Armistice Agreements: Vol- on Lebanese-Israeli relations before 1948, see umes 1-2: 1947-1974: III." Laura Eisenberg, My Enemy's Enemy: Leba- http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01 non in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900- 8r0 (Accessed on December 24, 2003). 1948 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University 8Telegram from the Mission to the United Press, 1994) and , Lebanese Nations to the Department of State, No. 60, : The Rise and Fall of New York, June 2, 1961, U.S. Department of an Ethnic Resistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Rienner, 1995). 1961-1963, 17: Near East, 1961-1962, 5Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x Lebanon: A History of Internationalization of vii/17705.htm (Accessed on December 23, Communal Conflict (New York: Columbia 2003). University Press, 2002), pp. 216-17. Arab 9Memorandum of Conversation, Foreign Re- League Conferences held in Cairo in January, lations of the United States, No. 121, Palm 1964 and in Khartoum in August, 1967 au- Beach, Florida, December 27, 1962, U.S. thorized Palestinian guerillas to launch at- Department of State, Foreign Relations of the tacks into Israel only from Jordan, Syria, and United States, 1961-1963, 18: Near East, Egypt. Lebanon was not mentioned either 1962-1963, time. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x 6Major William D. Claytor, viii/26200.htm (Accessed on December 23, Truce Supervision Organization: History and 2003). U.S. Marine Involvement; 10Telegram from the Department of State to http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/librar the Embassy in Lebanon, Washington, No. y/report/1990/CWD.htm (Accessed on De- 379, January 13, 1967, U.S. Department of cember 27, 2003). Israel denounced its Armi- State, Foreign Relations of the United States, stice with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria after 1964-1968, 18: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964- the Six-Day War of June 1967. 67, 7The agreement required both sides to agree http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/histor that ""No aggressive action by the armed y/vol_xviii/zl.html (Accessed on December forces - land, sea or air - of either party shall 24, 2003). be undertaken, planned, or threatened against

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11Chehab made this comment to the U.S. State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Ambassador to Lebanon Armin Meyer in 1961-1963, 17: Near East, 1961-1962, 1962. Protocolaire translates to ""protocol; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x formulary; (State) etiquette."" Cassell's vii/17716.htm (Accessed on December 23, French-English; English-French Dictionary, 2003). 20th ed., s.v. ""protocolaire."" Meyer further 13Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to notes: ""When I mentioned Karame had the Department of State, No. 268, Beirut, stressed at outset of our talk yesterday that Lebanon, May 8, 1962, Ibid. It should be Lebanon was a non-aligned, Chehab laugh- noted that U.S. officials were well aware of ingly declared Karame merely being 'proto- this fact. A March 1968 Telegram from the colaire.' He repeatedly emphasized Lebanon's U.S. Embassy in Jordan to the Department of pro-West orientation despite [the] fact that State states ""Over the years we have also for tactical political purposes GOL professes been very much aware of another lesson--that neutrality."" While responding to this paper, it is impossible for a leader of one of the Professor Rashid Khalidi questioned the no- smaller Arab states, such as Lebanon or Jor- tion that we could talk of a unified Lebanese dan, to make a separate peace with Israel and government in the same way that we talk survive."" Telegraph from the U.S. Embassy about unified American, Egyptian, or Chinese in Jordan, No. 109, Amman, Jordan, March governments. While Professor's Khalidi's vast 12, 1968, U.S. Department of State, Foreign knowledge on contemporary Middle East af- Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, fairs is above doubt, this conversation sug- 20: Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967-1968, gests that he might want to revisit his view on http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x this issue, at least in regards to Lebanon's x/2665.htm (Accessed on December 24, government in the 1960s. Telegram From the 2003). Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of 14Laura Eisenberg, ""Israel's South Lebanon State, No. 165, U.S. Department of State, Imbroglio,"" Middle East Quarterly Vol. 4, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- No. 2 (June 1997): pp. 60-79, 1963, 17: Near East, 1961-1962, http://www.meforum.org/article/352 (Ac- http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x cessed on December 23, 2003). Eisenberg's vii/17710.htm (Accessed on December 13, article mainly deals with post 1968 Lebanese- 2000); U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Lebanon, Isareli relations and does not touch on the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Chiefs of Mis- 1967 Six-Day War directly. Lebanon's desire sion, to have good relations with Israel at all costs http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/com/10904.h was illustrated by a CIA research reported tm, (Accessed on March 14, 2004). cited by Gendzier, ""Largely as a result of 12Telegram from the Embassy in Syria to the this moderating influence, Lebanon's contri- Department of State, No. 258, , bution to the fight against Israel has become Syr ia, April 27, 1962, U.S Department of modest. Even though Israeli forces now oc-

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cupy certain areas in southern Lebanon, the Press/Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Lebanese government, with an eye to its for- 1988): pp. 27-41. Owen notes, for instance, mer relations with Israel, has refrained from that the tertiary trade grew from less than two complaining at the UN."" Gendzier, ""The thirds of Lebanon's Gross National Product Declassified Lebanon"", p. 194. [GNP] to more than three quarters of GNP. 15For more on the 1962 Coup and the Leba- At the same time, GNP attributable to the ag- nese government's paranoid reaction to it, see ricultural sector declined by 50% during the Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to same time period (pp. 30-4). Please also see the Department of State, Beirut, Lebanon, , A House of Many Mansions: a No. 158, January 8, 1962, U.S. Department of Reconsidered. (London: State, Foreign Relations of the United States, I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 190-91 and Frederic C. 1961-1963, 17: Near East, 1961-1962, Hof, Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x Frontier, 1916-1984 (London: Westview vii/17710.htm (Accessed on December 24, Press, 1985), pp. 64-5. 2003); Telegram From the Department of 17Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to State to the Embassy in Lebanon, No. 160, the Department of State, No. 408, Beirut, Washington, January 11, 1962, Ibid; Tele- Lebanon, April 20, 1967, U.S. Department of gram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Department of State, No. 162, Beirut, Leba- 1964-1968, 18: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964- non, January 13, 1962, Ibid; Telegram From 67, the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/histor State, No. 165, Beirut, Lebanon, January 16, y/vol_xviii/zo.html (Accessed on December 1962, Ibid; and Telegram From the Depart- 23, 2003). ment of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 18Memorandum for the Record, No. 72, No. 180, Washington, January 30, 1962, U.S Washington, May 26, 1967, U.S. Department Department of State, Foreign Relations of the of State, Foreign Relations of the United United States, 1961-1963, 17: Near East, States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1961-1962, 1964-1967, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x http://www/state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x vii/17711.htm (Accessed on December 26, ix/28054.htm (Accessed on March 10, 2004). 2003). Similar attitudes were voiced by moderate 16For more on this phenomenon, see Roger Saudi Arabians, Iraqis, and Kuwaitis at the Owen, ""The Economic History of Lebanon, time. 1943-1974: Its Salient Features,"" in Halim 19Circular Telegram From the Department of Barakat (ed.) Toward a Viable Lebanon, State to Certain Posts, No. 34. Washington, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University April 15, 1961, U.S. Department of State,

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- http://infotrac.galegroup.com/galenet/wash43 1963, 17: Near East, 1961-1962, 584 (Accessed on December 19 and 22, http://www/state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/x 2003). viii/26162.htm (Accessed on December 24, 22Department of State Telegram, No. 11321, 2003). U.S. officials also recognized in pri- Beirut, Lebanon, June 8, 1967 and Depart- vate, that a crisis in the Middle East would ment of State Telegram, No. 3971, June 6, weaken Lebanon's government, which they 1967. The Israeli government warned that it characterized as one of the few Middle East- had no hostile intentions against Lebanon, but ern governments that wanted peace ""very ""if the pogrom occurs, it cannot stand idly badly."" Briefing Notes for Director of Cen- by."" Ibid, p. 143. tral Intelligence Helms for Use at a White 23Wade Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in House Meeting, No. 45, Washington, May Lebanon 1943-1976 (London: Ithaca Press, 23, 1967, U.S. Department of State, Foreign 1985), p. 89. Hof questions the accuracy of Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, this account due to the factual errors in the 19: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967, New York Times article in which this story http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x first surfaced. Hof, Galilee Divided, p. 67. ix/28053.htm (Accessed on March 10, 2004); Recently declassified memoranda from John- Memorandum for the Record, No. 72, Wash- son Administration officials, however, sug- ington, May 26, 1967, U.S. Department of gest that Bustani might have kept Lebanon State, Foreign Relations of the United States, out of the war. Memorandum From the Ex- 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964- ecutive Secretary of the NSC Special Com- 1967, mittee (Bundy) to President Johnson, No. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x 311, Washington, June 21, 1967, U.S. De- ix/28054.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). partment of State, Foreign Relations of the 20An intelligence memorandum prepared by United States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli the CIA in late May, 1967 observed that Dispute, 1964-1967, ""Lebanon has no offensive capability."" In- http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x telligence Memorandum Prepared by the ix/28060.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). Central Intelligence Agency, No. 76, Wash- 24Those losses in territorial, morale, and ma- ington, May 26, 1967, U.S. Department of terial terms were enormous. According to a State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Special National Intelligence Assessment 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964- prepared in early August 1967, the Israelis 1967, had destroyed as much as two thirds of the http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and held ix/28052.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). ""several thousand commissioned and non- 21CIA Memorandum on the Objectives of commissioned UAR officer prisoners, includ- Middle East Combatants, Gale Group, ""De- ing nine generals."" Special National Intelli- classified Documents,"" gence Estimate, Intelligence Memorandum

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Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Dispute, 1964-1967, No. 414, Washington, August 10, 1967, U.S. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x Department of State, Foreign Relations of the ix/28063.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004); United States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to Dispute, 1964-1967, the Department of State, No. 519, Beirut, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x Lebanon, November 10, 1967, U.S. Depart- ix/28066.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). ment of State, Foreign Relations of the 25Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant United States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli Secretary of Defense for International Secu- Dispute, 1964-1967, rity Affairs (Hoopes) to Secretary of Defense http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x McNamara, No. 226, Washington, June 8, ix/28070.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). 1967, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Re- 28Special National Intelligence Estimate, No. lations of the United States, 1964-1968, 19: 414, Washington, August 10, 1967, U.S. De- Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967, partment of State, Foreign Relations of the http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x United States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli ix/28059.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). Dispute, 1964-1967, 26Memorandum From the Executive Secre- http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x tary of the NSC Special Committee (Bundy) ix/28066.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). to President Johnson, No. 311, U.S. Depart- 29For more on Israel's decision to withdraw ment of State, Foreign Relations of the from the MAC, see Hof, Galilee Divided, pp. United States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli 67-8. Dispute, 1964-1967, 30Picard, Lebanon, pp. 81-3. It is important to http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x remember that both Jordan and Lebanon had ix/28060.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004). populations of Palestinians, relatively weak 27Telegram From the Department of State to governments, and porous borders. In 1967 the Embassy in Lebanon, No. 177, Washing- and 1968, commandos and weapons flowed ton, June 7, 1967, U.S. Department of State, freely into southern Lebanon and to Jordan. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964- Funds too poured into the country from 1968, 19: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967, wealthy Palestinians and Arab Gulf states. It http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x has been estimated that the Palestinian popu- ix/28058.htm (Accessed on March 13, 2004); lation of Lebanon rose to 240,000 in 1970 Telegram From the President's Special Con- and by another 100,000 in 1971. However, sultant (Bundy) to President Johnson, No. these population numbers may have been ex- 341, Washington, July 4, 1967, U.S. Depart- aggerated. I thank Professor Khalidi for ment of State, Foreign Relations of the bringing this issue to my attention. United States, 1964-1968, 19: Arab-Israeli

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Sean Foley

31Telegram from the Department of State to called "","" the Jordanian the Embassy in Israel, No. 369, Washington, army decimated the Palestinians. Nine December 29, 1968, U.S. Department of months later the Jordanian government ex- State, Foreign Relations of the Unite States, pelled all Palestinian political groups from 1964-1968, 20: Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967- Jordan and prohibited Palestinian guerillas 1968, from using Jordan as a base to attack Israel. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x The Jordanian army owed its allegiance and x/2676.htm (Accessed on December 23, livelihood to the Jordanian king; if he were to 2003). fall, they would certainly fall with him. 32Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction Equally important, U.S. and Israeli officials of Lebanon (New York: Antheneum, 1990), believed that the fall of the Jordanian monar- p. 75. chy would lead to a dangerous instability in 33Telegram From the Department of State to the region and were prepared to intervene di- the Embassy in Israel, No. 369, Washington, rectly. Ibid , pp. 123-8 December 29, 1968, U.S. Department of 37Picard, Lebanon, p. 85. State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 38Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in 1964-1968, 20: Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967- Lebanon 1943-1976, pp. 92-3. 1968, 39Khazen, Breakdown, pp. 140-75. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x 40It should be noted that the Israelis would x/2676.htm (Accessed on December 23, attempt to reach a settlement after the 1982 2003); Telegram From the Department of Arab-Israeli war with little success. For more State to the Embassy in Lebanon, No. 370, on this attempt, see Charles Smith, Palestine Washington, December 29, 1968, Ibid; and and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th ed. (Boston, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), pp. 372-91. the Department of State, No. 375, Beirut, Lebanon, December 31, 1968, Ibid. 34Between June 1968 and June 1974 the Lebanese Army would count 30,000 Israeli violations of Lebanese national territory alone. The Lebanese army never looked more impotent. Picard, Lebanon, p. 83. 35Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State of Lebanon: 1967-1976 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 140-75. 36In September, 1970 Palestinian guerillas came into open contact with the Jordanian government, and, in what would be later

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