The International Relations Journal

2017 San Francisco State University /Volume 36

The International Relations Journal San Francisco State University A Yearly Publication of the International Relations Department College of Liberal and Creative Arts 2017 San Francisco State University / Volume 36 Table of 02 Journal Staff 03 Editorial Policy contents 04 Acknowledgements 05 Dedication

06 The Role of Government in Economic Success: A Case Study of Taiwan Ka Chio

15 Migration in Central America christiana english

23 North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development Cody folmar

34 You Are Welcome Here: National Identity and Immigration in Euskadi, Basque Country Hallie hoffman

48 The Pan-Kurdish Myth Miles theodore popplewell

1 2017 San Francisco State University / Volume 36 Journal Staff

Managing Editors InDesign Layout Briana Abbink Nouf Aloufi Charlotte Ohrbom Maria Cruz Cardenas Karin Nordin

Writers Editors Alanoud Aloufi Naia Ardrey Manal Abdi Eva Charidas Adrienne Chukwuneta Ka Chio Mariah Cobb Caroline Cunningham Saher Ebadi Anas Elallame Daniel Frank Christina English Yena Kim Esvin Enrique Sara Lonegard Cody Folmar Joanalyn Santo Matignas Erica Gratton Nancy Ngo Hallie Hoffman Breanna Reeves Lisa Inoi Andre Saldan Almas Khan Megan Elizabeth Stone John Kulu Iris Tinsley Thomasin Joy Lauria Aimee Varghese Carina Darielle Melara Dani Walsh Miles Theodore Popplewell Noelle Walsh Cody Ryan Flavio Geovany Zanipatin

Statements and opinions expressed in The International Relations Journal are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Editors, the Editorial Board, the Faculty Advisor, or the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University.

2 2017 San Francisco State University / Volume 36 Editorial Policy

Overview

The International Relations Journal at San Francisco State University strives to exhibit the diverse range of undergraduate and graduate research interests that flourish in our department.

Each semester, the Journal is offered as a course in which students participate as writers or editors in a peer review process, or as administrative staff members who assist authors and editors as well as guide the Journal through its production.

The goal of the course is to expose students to the peer review process, focusing on academic standards of argumentation and factual accuracy, citation formatting, and collaborative editing using Microsoft Word’s “track changes” feature. More broadly, the Journal’s executive editors aim to help students develop writing/editing skills applicable in other courses and promote a deeper understanding of the discipline of International Relations as a whole.

Submissons & Process

The Journal encourages all students pursuing a B.A. or M.A. in International Relations to submit completed works (incomplete papers and abstracts are not accepted) at the beginning of each semester. From these submissions, the Journal’s executive editors assign students to positions on the writing and editorial boards as well as a number of administrative-level appoint- ments.

The course curriculum includes a number of informational workshops and at least three rounds of structured editing and revi- sion. All editing is anonymous and each submission is reviewed by three different editors.

The structured peer review is as follows: [1] a submission is first edited by an undergraduate or graduate “peer expert” who has conducted prior research on topics and/or regions relevant to the paper and can thus provide fact checking and citation suggestions; [2] second round editing focuses on clarity and academic tone my paring the manuscript with an editore unfamil- iar with the paper’s subject; [3] finally, the paper is edited for proper citation formatting and technical aspects. At the end of the semester, authors participating in this process are expected to submit a final manuscript for consideration by the Journal’s executive editors and the faculty advisor.

Publication of Articles

Only submissions that have gone through the peer review process and meet the content and formatting requirements will be considered for publication. The Journal is published yearly.

For Submissions and Back Issues: http://internationalrelations.sfsu.edu/content/international-relations-journal-0

For all other inquiries: Department of International Relations 1600 Holloway Avenue/HUM Room 282 San Francisco, California 94132 PHONE: 415.338.2654/ FA X: 415.338.2880

3 2017 San Francisco State University / Volume 36 Acknowledgements

The staff of The International Relations Journal is grateful for the continued funding allocated by the Instructionally Related Activities Committee and the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University for the production of this journal.

The production of this journal is a group effort and the managing editors would like to especially thank all the members of the editorial board and the contributing writers. The editorial board members edited the articles contained in this issue and both the editors and writers patiently endured the labor of multiple revisions of these articles, as well as corresponding with one another. The guidance and advice of Dr. Burcu Ellis in the International Relations Department has been indispensable to the publication of the Journal.

4 2017 San Francisco State University / Volume 36 dedication

To Professor Emeritus JoAnn Aviel:

With sincere gratitude for decades of dedication and teaching, we thank you.

- Model UN Students

5 1 Chio / Spring 2017

The Role of Government in Economic Success: A Case Study of Taiwan Taiwan’s economic development after 1945 is remarkable. Many Taiwanese By people have lifted out of poverty, and their living standard has significantly improved. Political economists and developmental economists generally consid- Ka Chio er Taiwan’s economic development a success, but they are puzzled by such a remarkable economic success given Taiwan’s limited land and scarce resources. This paper traces Taiwan’s economic history from 1945 to present. It analyzes the government’s role in economic recovery, agricultural reform, and import substitution in the 1950s, export promotion policy in the 1960s, industrial upgrading in the 1970s, and economic integration with Mainland China since the late 1980s. The author argues that state intervention played a key role in initiating, sustaining, and transforming Taiwan’s economy over the past decades, and Taiwan’s economic experience can be a model for developing countries who struggle with neoliberal economic policies.

aiwan1 is located off the south- live in poverty because its limited land Teastern coast of China. Its total and huge population are burdens for area is 36,193 square kilometers, and itself. Under Japanese colonial rule its total coastline is about 1,139 kilo- from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan’s economy meters.2 It is approximately 230 miles thrived and surpassed all of East Asia long and 85 miles wide at the center. except for Japan. After World War Taiwan’s size is roughly the size of Two, Taiwan’s economy worsened the Netherlands or the size of the U.S. dramatically. When the Republic of states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, China (ROC) moved its government to and Connecticut combined.3 As of Taiwan in 1949, some political econ- July 2014, Taiwan had a population of omists and development economists 23.4 million.4 In comparison to other called Taiwan a “basket case” – mean- countries, Taiwan ranks above average ing that it had little or no chance of in population (no. 49 of 221 countries) developing its economy. From 1945 and ranks just below average in land through the 1960s, Taiwan appeared area (no. 136 of 232 countries).5 to have uncompromising prospects From the above basic information, for economic success. From the mid- it seems that Taiwan is an underdevel- 1960s, however, Taiwan’s economy oped country and Taiwanese people took off and soon became a prosperous 6 1 The author would like to thank the peer country. In 2013, its nominal gross reviewers and Professor Joel Kassiola for their domestic product (GDP) and nominal feedback. GDP per capita respectively stood 2 “ROC Vital Information,” Republic of China at $489.13 billion and $20,952.7 Its Yearbook 2014, accessed on May 10, 2015, available at http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx- export volume was about $305.44 ?n=C2D16F4EFE88C268. billion, whereas its import volume was 3 John Franklin Cooper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview Press, 6 Ibid., 151. 2009), 2. 7 “ROC Vital Information,” Yearbook 2014; 4 “ROC Vital Information,” Yearbook 2014. Unless otherwise noted, the $ sign refers to the 5 Cooper, Taiwan, 2. U.S. Dollar. 6 Chio / Spring 2017

about $269.9 billion.8 Taiwan’s rankings in many the ROC government in 1949. After the outbreak of global survey rankings are respectable. For example, the Korean War, the U.S. immediately saw Taiwan as it ranked 17th in Heritage Foundation’s 2014 Index a geographically invaluable strategic point. Subse- of Economic Freedom and 14th in World Economic quently, the U.S. sent massive economic and military Forum’s 2014-2015 Global Competitiveness Index, aid to strength the ROC government on Taiwan and respectively. 9 helped revitalize the war-ravaged Taiwanese econ- Over the past decades, Taiwan’s economic omy. Between 1951 and 1965, the U.S. government development is remarkable. It has successfully sent over $4 billion to Taiwan in the form of grants, transformed itself from an unproductive country to a loans, and military equipment.11 Over the 1950s, prosperous country. It is not an exaggeration to call the U.S. economic assistance equaled about 6 % of its experience an economic success. In order to ex- Taiwan’s GDP and about 40% of its gross invest- amine Taiwan’s economic success, this paper traces ment. The ROC government spent 38% of the aid on Taiwan’s economic history from 1945 to present. It financing imports of immediate goods (mainly cot- attempts to answer two questions: 1) How did the ton, metals, and fertilizer), 30% on consumer goods government play a key role in initiating, sustaining, (mainly food), and 19% on capital goods (machin- and transforming Taiwan’s economy after 1945?, ery and tools). Without the U.S. assistance, Taiwan and 2) Can other developing countries learn from probably would not be able to go through the difficult Taiwan’s experience? In this paper, I argue that state 1950-1965 period.12 intervention played a key role in initiating, sustain- At the same time, the ROC government realized ing, and transforming Taiwan’s economy over the the importance of agriculture for sustainable econom- past decades, and Taiwan’s economic experience can ic development. The agricultural sector played three be a model for developing countries who struggle key roles for Taiwan’s early economic development. with neoliberal economic policies. This case study is First, it provided enough food to feed the population. of importance, as an uncompromising country with Second, it provided an exportable surplus to earn limited resources can modernize itself as long as the foreign currencies, mainly the U.S. dollar. Third, it state plays an active but appropriate role. could release labor to the industrial sector once the government reformed the agricultural sector success- 1945 to the 1950s: U.S. Assistance, Agricultural fully.13 In the late 1940s, agriculture became the most Reform, and Import Substitution important sector in Taiwan as it accounted for over From 1945 to the 1950s, although the U.S. 90% of its exports. Given the dominant role of agri- government supported Taiwan’s economy, the ROC culture, the government began to reform it in three government initiated agricultural reform and import stages from 1949. First, in early 1949 the government substitution policy. Immediately after World War II, forced landlords to reduce farm rent, limiting it to Japan returned Taiwan to the ROC, then-legitimate a maximum 37.5% of total main crops. Second, in government representing the whole of China. When June 1951 the government distributed public land on the ROC moved its central government to Taiwan in easy terms to farmers. Third, in 1953 the government 1949, it faced a war-ravaged economy that was pri- obligated landlords to keep a minimal size of their marily agricultural in nature. Revitalizing Taiwan’s land and to sell the rest of their land to farmers who economy became an urgent task for the new govern- currently rented the land. Landlords could get shares ment.10 and bonds in public enterprises for compensation. The United States heavily supported the ROC To ensure the government could extract surplus from government’s civil war against the Chinese Commu- the agricultural sector, the government monopolized nist Party before 1949. But later it ceased to support fertilizer and sold fertilizer to farmers at inflated pric- 8 Ibid. 11 Kuo-ting Li, The Evolution of Policy behind Taiwan’s De- 9 “Appendices,” Republic of China Yearbook 2014, accessed velopment Success (River Edge: World Scientific Publishing, May 12, 2015, available at http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/Content_ 1995), 61. List.aspx?n=1C0C7D3F4AE4620C. 12 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and 10 Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, Taiwan’s Political Econo- the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Prince- my: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress (Boulder: Lynne ton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 82. Reinner Publishers, 2012), 10. 13 Li, The Evolution, 39. 7 Chio / Spring 2017

es. It also collected crops from farmers at depressed NT$40.0 to $1, and it implemented multiple foreign prices.14 The results of the agricultural reform were exchange rates for different imports. Public sector splendid. Agricultural production grew by 4.6% in importers had more favorable rates than private the 1950s, and agriculture supplied the bulk of Tai- sector importers. No free market in foreign exchange wan’s exports for most of the 1950s.15 was allowed, as all foreign currencies had to be The government also took the issue of indus- turned in to the central bank. These policies helped trialization seriously. Given Taiwan’s lack of raw Taiwan’s entrepreneurs produce industrial and con- materials and its population then grew at over three sumer goods so as to replace imports in the domestic percent a year, raising living standards required market.18 labor-intensive production.16 After reforming the ag- From 1945 to the late 1950s, Taiwan’s economic ricultural sector, the government moved to promote performance was quite good. GDP grew 12% in 1952 the production of industrial and consumer goods. The and just over 9% in 1953 and 1954. It then declined basic goal of the import substitution policy was to over the next eight years, but the growth rate nev- develop domestic industries that could produce basic er declined below 5.5%. Manufacturing as part of necessities to replace the dependence on imports. In GDP rose from 11% to 17%. Although agriculture as Taiwan’s case, the government promoted cement, part of employment remained above 50%, the rate glass, fertilizer, textiles, and several others; only sug- declined steadily.19 Overall, the above-mentioned ar, tea, canned pineapple, and rice was encouraged to policies helped Taiwan recover from World War Two export.17 and lay the foundation for subsequent years’ econom- Taiwan’s import substitution policy had three ic development. parts. First, the government identified promising investment opportunities. It then devised plans and 1960s: Export Promotion Policy invited private entrepreneurs to carry them out. To In the early 1960s, Taiwan’s import substitution help private entrepreneurs get profits, the govern- policy began to run out of stream as slow econom- ment arranged low-interest loans and foreign aids for ic growth appeared and domestic market saturated them. Second, the government imposed tariffs and with domestically produced industrial and consumer instituted quotas on a wide range of imports with the goods. The government needed to revise its policy to exeception of raw materials and machinery. Luxu- change Taiwan’s course of economic development. ry goods and goods already produced domestically Under these circumstances, the government favored could not be easily imported. Tariff rates were high; export promotion policy in the 1960s. on average, tariff rates could range from 46% in The government implemented four new policies January 1955 to 65% in August 1959. Third, the gov- for the export sector. First, it passed a list of acts to ernment instituted a strict foreign currency control encourage investment in export and tax exemptions for both public sector and private sector importers to for exporters. In 1960, it enacted the Statute for the buy raw materials and machinery at favorable prices Encouragement of Investment to improve the export from abroad. In 1958, it devaluated the buying rate of investment climate. The Statute provided significant the New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) from NT$24.7 to $1 to tax exemptions for private exporters. For example, 14 Alice H. Amsden, “Taiwan’s Economic History: A Case any incomes earned from exports were exempted of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory” in The from the income taxes, and producers were exempt- Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Devel- ed from the payment of custom duties on imported opment and Global Change, ed. by J. Timmons Roberts, Amy machinery and equipment.20 Second, the government Bellone Hite, and Nitsan Chorev (Madlen: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 152-155. favorably treated export enterprises with import tax 15 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 11. rebates. In essence, customs duties incurred when 16 Wade, Governing the Market, 77. export enterprises imported raw materials from 17 Li-min Hsueh, Chen-kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Perkins, “The abroad. When export enterprises exported products, Policy Framework: The Early Years,” in Industrialization and the government returned the duties collected. The the State: The Changing Role of the Taiwan Government in the Economy, 1945-1998, ed. Li-min Hsueh, Chen-kuo Hsu, and 18 Ibid., 15-19. Dwight H. Perkins (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for Interna- 19 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 12-13. tional Development, 2001), 15. 20 Li, The Evolution, 78-79. 8 Chio / Spring 2017

amount of import tax rebates increased rapidly. In the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun- 1965, it was NT$1,795 million. In 1968, the figure tries (OPEC) quadrupled oil prices. Since Taiwan rose to NT$4,234 million. Third, the government imported most of its oil from the OPEC countries, encouraged publicly-owned banks to provide low-in- the rising oil prices immediately affected its domestic terest loans to private exporters. The Bank of Taiwan economy. Taiwan’s GDP grew at only 1% in 1974, started this program first. It had two different low-in- but it grew at an avarege of 10% per year over the terest loan programs. The first one would require past decade. Inflation rose from less than 2% be- private exporters to pay loans back in local currency tween 1961 and 1971 to 40% in 1974. At the same with higher interest rate, whereas the second one time, Taiwan was getting marginalized in interna- would require them to pay loans back in U.S. dollars tional community. More and more countries severed with lower interest rate. In 1960, the interest rate for their diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and Taiwan lost its the local currency loan program was 11.8%, but the membership in the United Nations in 1971.23 interest rate for the U.S. dollar loan program was 6%. Facing such grim external and internal situa- From 1962 to 1966, the two interest rates gradually tions, the ROC government did not feel frustrated but merged. In 1970, the government completely phased launched a series of big projects to reassert econom- out the local currency loan. Fourth, the government ic leadership and to offset its declining economic set up three export processing zones from 1965 to growth. First, the government raised interest rates 1971. These export processing zones lured domes- and prices to tackle rising inflation. In 1974, secured tic and foreign investors to invest in labor-intensive loan rate was raised to 16.5%, whereas long-term production. In the zones, exporters enjoyed simpli- deposit rate was raised to 15%. The prices of oil and fied application process and could easily buy and other energy-related products were raised more; the remit foreign currencies. All products produced government raised the prices of gasoline and electric- in the zones were exempted from taxes in the first ity by 80%. In late 1974, the government reduced in- place, rather than having to apply for rebates later. come taxes to stimulate the economy. These policies All products from the zones were exported to foreign involved high-risks, but they successfully stabilized countries, mainly the United States and Japan. These Taiwan’s economy. Within a few months, the rate of export processing zones were significant in terms of price increases began to fall.24 economic value. In 1969, Kaohsiung’s export pro- At the same time, the government took steps to cessing zone exported products worth $177 million accelerate the development of Taiwan’s heavy indus- and employed about 40,000 workers.21 try. In 1973, the government launched the Ten Major This export promotion policy resulted in a huge Development Projects at the cost of $5 billion.25 success. From 1962 to 1973, Taiwan’s economic These projects included steel, petrochemicals, ship- size grew by 11% on average. Manufacturing as part building, and nuclear energy. Some projects were of GDP rose from 17% in 1962 to 36% in 1973. In led by state corporations. For example, China Steel contrast, agriculture as part of GDP fell from 50% to Corporation was set up with total capital investment 31% on average. Exports as part of GDP rose from of NT$ 36.9 billion, of which only NT$ 682 million 11% in 1962 to 42% in 1973. Industrial goods dom- came from the private sector.26 It was essentially a inated Taiwan’s total exports, jumping from 50% to state-owned enterprise, and in the 1990s it became 85%. The industrial goods also changed from food the third most efficient producer in the world.27 Some processing and textiles to electronics, heavy chemi- projects involved large domestic private enterprises cals, and machinery though they primarily involved and multinational corporations such as China Pe- assembly works. Overall, the export promotion poli- troleum Corporation, a state-owned enterprise. The cy helped Taiwan become an industrialized country.22 energy crisis of 1973 aggravated shortages that had already impacted domestic supplies of petrochem- 1970s to the late 1980s: Industrial Upgrading Beginning from the early 1970s, Taiwan’s econo- 23 Wade, Governing the Market, 96. 24 Ibid., 97. my began to face a series of crises. In 1973 and 1974, 25 Cooper, Taiwan, 160. 21 Hsueh, Hus, and Perkins, “The Policy Framework,” 25-29. 26 Hsueh, Hsu, and Perkins, “The Policy Framework,” 42. 22 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 15-16. 27 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 19. 9 Chio / Spring 2017

icals. Consequently, China Petroleum Corporation Hua University, National Chiao Tung University, and built two large naphtha cracking plants. Each plant several state-owned and private research and devel- could produce 230,000 tons of ethylene annually. It opment (R&D) organizations. The Park brought the then cooperated with private enterprises to build 20 SMEs, the universities, and the R&D organizations midstream projects to produce synthetic fibers, inter- together, and it encouraged Taiwanese who studied mediates for plastic products, rubber, and detergent information technology abroad to come to invest materials. In 1974, capitals from private enterprises or work in the Park. The Park can be regarded as a accounted for about 43% of China Petroleum Corpo- joint project between the government and the SMEs. ration’s total investment.28 On the one hand, Taiwan’s The growth of the Park was very rapid. By the end heavy industry policy provided a countercyclical of 1992, 140 companies invested in it, and it had an stimulus to the sluggish economy. Yet this policy laid annual turnover of $3.5 billion.31 By May 2015, the a foundation to upgrade labor-intensive production Park had various high-tech industries ranging from and supplied materials for domestic industries. It integrated circuits and telecommunications to bio- actually could be seen as a second import substitution technology.32 policy. Both the public sector and the private sector played a role in implementing this second import Late 1980s to Present: Economic Integration with substitution policy. Due to this policy, Taiwan’s Mainland China heavy industry grew at a rate of 12.2% on average The year 1988 was a significant point for Tai- from 1977 to 1986. In contrast, its light industry grew wan’s economy. Beginning from 1988, Taiwan’s at a rate of 7.8%. During the 1976-1978 period, the GDP growth never sees double-digits. At the same economic growth returned to double-digit growth.29 time, Taiwan’s growing prosperity keeps driving Moreover, another economically phenomenal up labor wages, which in turn increase production success came from government assistance for Tai- costs. To resolve the problem of rising production wan’s private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) costs, more and more Taiwanese private enterprises because they innovated and upgraded Taiwan’s light move their assembly lines overseas. Since the 1980s, industry to advance technology. Taiwan’s SMEs were Mainland China embarks on economic reform to the driving force during the export promotion policy attract foreign investment. The opening of Mainland of the 1960s, as their exports accounted for almost China gives Taiwanese private enterprises an oppor- half of manufacturing production and two thirds of tunity to lower their production costs and become exports. They upgraded Taiwan’s light industries a new export destination. Mainland China is also from textile and shoe production in the 1960s to attractive since both sides share the same culture and low-tech electronics assembly in the early 1970s.30 language.33 The oil crisis of the 1970s accelerated their industrial After the ROC government repealed martial upgrading, in which the government played a role. law in Taiwan in 1988, exports to Mainland China When the first oil crisis hit Taiwan in late 1973, Tai- by Taiwanese private enterprises rose sharply. In wan’s government realized that Taiwan had to change 1988, Taiwan exported products worth $1.2 billion its economic structure and to quickly move from to Mainland China, and they constituted only 2.8% labor-intensive industry to capital or technology-in- of Taiwan’s total exports. In 1992, the figure rose to tensive industry. In 1979, the government approved $10.548 billion, and Taiwan’s exports to Mainland a science and technology plan. This plan listed many China accounted for 12.95% of its total exports. In programs to help the SMEs develop high-tech indus- 2000, Taiwan exported products worth $25.01 bil- try. Most importantly, the plan called for the estab- lion to Mainland China, and they constituted 16.86% lishment of a special area for the SMEs and the government to work together to foster high-tech industry. 31 Li, The Evolution, 180-181. In 1980, Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park (Park) 32 “Growth of Combined Sales by Industry,” Hsinchu Science was established. It was located near National Tsing Park Bureau, accessed on May 16, 2015, available athttp:// www.sipa.gov.tw/english/home.jsp?serno=201005030003&m- 28 Hsueh, Hsu, and Perkins, “The Policy Framework,” 39-40. serno=201005030001&menudata=EnglishMenu&contlink=con- 29 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 19-20. tent/20100614112938.jsp&level3=Y&serno3=201006140010. 30 Ibid., 19. 33 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 23. 10 Chio / Spring 2017

of Taiwan’s total exports.34 The latest figures show He also issued a guideline, stating that no Taiwanese that the export volume jumped to $77.279 billion in corporations should invest more than $50 million 2014, and they constituted 26.1 % of Taiwan’s total in Mainland China.38 The above FDI figures show, exports. Now Mainland China is Taiwan’s biggest however, that Lee’s policies did not work well. More trading country and largest export destination.35 At and more Taiwanese companies invest in Mainland the same time, more and more Taiwanese compa- China directly or through a third location. Realizing nies invest in Mainland China. The flow of Taiwan’s the ineffective government policies toward Mainland investment to Mainland China grows rapidly. In China, the ROC government adopted a new approach 1991, Mainland China accounted for 9.5% of Tai- in 2008. The administration of President Ma Ying- wan’s outbound investment. In 1995, the figure rose jeou encouraged the cross-strait trade and investment. to 44.6%. In 2000, the figure fell to 33.9%. These In June 2010, Taiwan and Mainland China signed figures are misleading to some extent, because some a free trade agreement-like document called Eco- Taiwanese private enterprisers never invest directly nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). in Mainland China from Taiwan. Instead, they set During the first phase of implementation, as many as up corporations or subsidiaries in other countries 539 Taiwanese exports (worth about $13.83 billion) and send their foreign direct investment (FDI) to to Mainland China could enjoy reduced tariff rate. Mainland China through these corporations or sub- The agreement also called for liberalization of more sidiaries. Therefore, Taiwan’s FDI in mainland China export and services in the years ahead.39 Overall, the could possibly be larger than the figures released by ECFA could pave the way for Taiwanese private en- the ROC government.36 Growing FDI is accompanied terprises to get into the Mainland China market more by more large-scaled and sophisticated investment. In easily, but it could also deepen Taiwan’s economic the early 1990s, the nature of Taiwan’s investment in dependence on Mainland China. Mainland China mainly concentrated on labor-intensive production. Beginning from the twenty-first cen- Assessment tury, however, Taiwan’s FDI in Mainland China has After many decades of economic growth, Tai- upgraded to heavy industry and information technol- wan’s economic structure has been transformed. ogy. Now it is estimated that about 75% of Mainland The changes are evident in many aspects. In 1952, China’s information technology exports come from agriculture accounted for about 56% of total em- factories owned by Taiwanese private enterprisers.37 ployment. In 1962, the figure fell to 50%. In 1973, The ROC government initially did not support the figure fell further to 31%. In 1987, the figure Taiwanese private enterprises to send their proj- declined to 15%. In 2000, the figure finally dropped ects and FDI to Mainland China, so it implemented to 8%. While agriculture as part of total employ- some policies to discourage them from doing so. In ment declined, exports as part of GDP rose. In 1952, 1995, then-ROC president Lee Teng-hui realized that exports accounted for 9% of Taiwan’s GDP. In 1973, Taiwan was becoming economically dependent on the figure rose to 42%. In 2000, exports accounted Mainland China. He initiated a “Go South” policy to for 47% of its GDP. Of the 47%, 99% were indus- encourage Taiwan’s business community to look for trial exports.40 Now Taiwan is no longer an agricul- trade and investment opportunities in Southeast Asia. ture-based country but an industrial and export-ori- 34 Ching-Chang Chen, “Understanding the Political Economy ented country. of Cross-Strait Security: A Missing Link,” Journal of Chinese At the same time, Taiwanese people could Political Science 15, no.4 (2010), 395. get benefits from the economic success. In 1952, 35 “Country Report: Trade and Service across the Taiwan Strait 2014, Chart 2,” PRC Ministry of Commerce, accessed Taiwan’s GDP per capita was $167. The figure on May 13, 2015, available at http://countryreport.mof- rose steadily. In 1973, it was $695. In 1987, the com.gov.cn/record/qikanlist110209.asp?qikanid=6975&title=2014%C4%EA%D6%D0%B9%FA%CC%A8%C- 38 Cooper, Taiwan, 211. D%E5%CA%A1%BB%F5%CE%EF%C3%B3%D2%D7%B- 39 Hong Zhao, “Taiwan-Mainland Economic Cooperation C%B0%C1%BD%B0%B6%CB%AB%B1%D- Framework Agreement,” National University of Singapore East F%C3%B3%D2%D7%B8%C5%BF%F6 (In Chinese). Asian Institute Background Brief No.549, accessed May 12, 36 Chen, “Understanding, ”397. 2015, available at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB549.pdf. 37 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 23-24. 40 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 13, 21, and 27. 11 Chio / Spring 2017

figure rose to $5,397.41 In 2012, the figure stood Lessons for Developing Countries at $20.386.42 GPD per capita is not the only mea- Developing countries hope that they could have surement to illustrate the improving living standard high incomes and better living standard one day. of Taiwanese people, because other measurements They have tried many methods to achieve econom- show similar results. The Gini Coefficient measures ic success. Beginning from the 1980s, developed a country’s income distribution. If a country’s coef- countries give them a prescription called neo-liberal ficient is bigger, that means the country has a serious economics. The developed countries believe that income inequality.43 Over the years, Taiwan’s Gini governments should not intervene in economy. In- Coefficient remains stable. In 1964, Taiwan’s Gini stead, governments should cut taxes and state spend- Coefficient was 0.321.44 In 2011, the figure was ing, privatize all state-owned enterprises, deregulate 0.342. Since the 0.4 level is used as a predictor for various industries, and allow foreign exchange rates social instability and China’s Gini Coefficient stood to flow freely. A lot of developing countries take this at 0.477 in 2011, Taiwan has done well to shrink prescription. After many years, however, they are still wealth gap.45 Another useful measurement is United either developing or underdeveloped. They do not Nations Development Program’s Human Develop- see any hope of transforming their worse economies. ment Index (HDI). The HDI measures a wide range Taiwan’s economic experience can be an alternative of indicators – not economic growth alone – to assess model to neo-liberal economics, and the developing a country’s overall development.46 Although Taiwan countries can replicate it or modify it for their own is not an UN member, it uses the HDI methodology benefits. Generally, Taiwan’s economic success has to calculate its own HDI. Among 188 countries in three components. the world, Taiwan ranked 21st in the HDI in 2014.47 First, the United States was, and still is, an im- Taiwan’s HDI score was as same as those of Austria, portant ally for Taiwan. When the ROC government Belgium, and Luxembourg, and its score was higher just moved to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan’s economy than that of Finland.48 was fragile. Thanks to the U.S. economic and military aid, Taiwan’s economy stabilized and Taiwan 41 Ibid., 13 and 21. 42 “Social Indicators 2014-Income and Expenditure,” ROC Na- did not need to afraid of Mainland China’s military tional Statistics, accessed May 14, 2015, available at http://eng. threat. When Taiwan was in the export promotion stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=36500&ctNode=3480&mp=5. years, the United States provided a market for Tai- 43 “The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure,” ROC Na- wan’s exports. During the industrial upgrading years, tional Statistics, accessed May 16, 2015, available at http://eng. many Taiwanese who studied information technology stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=8854&ctNode=1599&mp=5. in the United States returned to Taiwan. Although 44 “Gini Coefficient,”ROC National Statistics, accessed May the United States severed diplomatic relations with 16, 2015, available at http://www.stat.gov.tw/public/Attach- ment/41141183071.doc. Taiwan in 1979, the United States still militarily pro- 45 Sharon Chen and Chinmei Sung, “Taiwan Shrinks Wealth tects Taiwan’s security. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship Gap as Xi’s China Communists Struggle,” Bloomberg News, shows that a developing country who wishes to be- March 14, 2013, accessed May 16, 2015, available at http:// come a developed country needs a reliable ally. That www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-13/ ally needs to have resources to provide significant taiwan-shrinks-wealth-gap-as-xi-s-communists-struggle-in-chi- economic assistance and military assistance for the na. developing country. The developing country should 46 “FAQ for Human Development Index,” United Nations Development Program, accessed May 13, 2015, available use the assistance to finance government spending, at http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq-page/human-development-in- trade deficit and military. Taiwan has such a reliable dex-hdi#t292n36. ally, and this ally played an important role in early 47 Shu-yuan Lin and Maubo Chang, “Taiwan Ranks 21st in Taiwan’s economic recovery and development. World Human Development Index,” Central News Agency, Second, developing countries should reform their September 19, 2014, accessed May 6, 2015, available at http:// agriculture and use the surplus from agriculture to focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201409180039.aspx. finance industrialization. A lot of developing coun- 48 “2014 Human Development Report,” United Nations Devel- opment Program, accessed on May 13, 2015, available at http:// tries are primarily agricultural countries. Their people www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/events/2014/ work primarily in the agricultural sector, but their july/HDR2014.html. governments favor industrialization rather than agri- 12 Chio / Spring 2017

culture. Taiwan’s agricultural reform is a good model nology-based economy. During the past decades, for them. Taiwan managed to successfully reform state intervention played a key role in initiating, its agriculture. During its agricultural reform years, sustaining, and transforming Taiwan’s economy. At Taiwan did not only have enough food to feed its the same time, Taiwan has managed to improve its population, but it also had extra food to export. The people’s living standards and to distribute incomes surplus gained from exporting agricultural produce fairly and equally. Taiwan’s economic success totally became an important asset to finance Taiwan’s early contradicts neo-liberal economics, which advocates industrial projects. Taiwan’s agricultural reform had no state intervention. In the years ahead, Taiwan’s another important aspect: released people from the economy will face a significant problem: its growing agricultural sector and moved them to the industrial economic integration with Mainland China. Unlike sector. When its agricultural sector was reformed the United States, Taiwan does not view Mainland successfully, Taiwan needed fewer people to work in China as a reliable ally because Mainland China still its crop fields. People who previously worked in the views Taiwan as a renegade province. Now Taiwan’s crop fields then moved into cities to find jobs in the economy heavily relies on Mainland China. If the industrial sector. To become industrialized countries, relationship across the Taiwan Strait deteriorates, developing countries need money. They can earn Taiwan’s economy will suffer. The ROC government money from exporting their agricultural produce first. must seriously handle the issue of Mainland China. If they reform their agriculture successfully, their ag- Taiwan is a vibrant economy, and it will continue to ricultural sector will become mature. People will then be so. Overall, Taiwan’s economic success is a model leave their crop fields and find jobs in the industrial for developing countries. sector. Overall, Taiwan’s agricultural reform shows that agriculture can provide developing countries Author Biography finance and labor. Ka Chio will graduate with a Master of Arts in Third, developing countries should become Political Science from San Franciso State University export-oriented countries to gain U.S. dollars. Many in summer 2017. His areas of specialization include development economists argue that an export-orient- international politics, comparative politics, and ed country will create dependence on export destina- modern Chinese history. His research interests focus tions. If export destination countries become unstable on foreign policy analysis, political economy, democ- or hostile to developing countries, developing coun- ratization, and governance, especially with reference tries’ economies will suffer. However, Taiwan’s ex- to the Greater China Region (Mainland China, Hong port promotion policy shows that an export-oriented Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), East Asia, Southeast county can earn more money than an import institu- Asia, and Russia. He will complete his thesis on tion country. Dependence on the United States was Sino-Russian relations in this summer. He plans to not a big problem as the United States was a reliable obtain a J.D. and a Ph.D. and return to S.F. State Uni- ally for Taiwan. Therefore, it is important that devel- versity as a faculty in future. oping countries should find reliable and trustful allies as export destinations. Once developing countries Bibliography accumulate enough U.S. dollars through exportation, “2014 Human Development Report.” United Nations they will have enough financial resources to upgrade Development Program. Accessed on May 13, 2015. their industries. The newly-upgraded industries will Available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/ help them export products worth of more values at a home/presscenter/events/2014/july/HDR2014.html. later time. Amsden, Alice H. “Taiwan’s Economic History: A Conclusion Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Taiwan’s economic success is remarkable. Theory.” in The Globalization and Development Taiwan has managed to change its position on the Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global international division of labor, and it has success- Change, edited by J. Timmons Roberts, Amy Bel- fully changed its economic structure from agri- lone Hite, and Nitsan Chorev, 147-168. Madlen: culture-based economy to knowledge and tech- Wiley Blackwell, 2015. 13 Chio / Spring 2017

“Appendices.” Republic of China Yearbook 2014. serno=201005030001&menudata=English- Accessed May 12, 2015. Available at http://www. Menu&contlink=content/20100614112938. ey.gov.tw/en/Content_List.aspx?n=1C0C7D- jsp&level3=Y&serno3=201006140010. 3F4AE4620C. Hsueh, Li-min, Chen-kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Per- Chen, Ching-chang. “Understanding the Political kins. “The Policy Framework: The Early Years.” In Economy of Cross-Strait Security: A Missing Industrialization and the State: The Changing Role Link.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 15, of the Taiwan Government in the Economy, 1945- no.4 (2010): 391-412. 1998, edited by. Li-min Hsueh, Chen-kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Perkins, 11-50. Cambridge: Harvard Chen, Sharon and Chinmei Sung. “Taiwan Shrinks Institute for International Development, 2001. Wealth Gap as Xi’s China Communists Struggle.” Bloomberg News. March 14, 2013. Accessed May Li, Kuo-ting. The Evolution of Policy behind Tai- 16, 2015. Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ wan’s Development Success. River Edge: World news/articles/2013-03-13/taiwan-shrinks-wealth- Scientific Publishing, 1995. gap-as-xi-s-communists-struggle-in-china. Lin, Shu-yuan and Maubo Chang. “Taiwan Ranks Clark, Cal, and Alexander C. Tan. Taiwan’s Political 21st in World Human Development Index.” Cen- Economy: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress. tral News Agency. September 19, 2014. Accessed Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2012. May 6, 2015. Available at http://focustaiwan.tw/ news/asoc/201409180039.aspx. Cooper, John Franklin. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?. Boulder: Westview Press, 2009. “ROC Vital Information.” Republic of China Year- book 2014. Accessed on May 10, 2015. Available “Country Report: Trade and Service across the at http://www.ey.gov.tw /en/cp.aspx?n=C2D- Taiwan Strait 2014, Chart 2.” PRC Minis- 16F4EFE88C268. try of Commerce. Accessed on May 13, 2015. Available at http://countryreport.mofcom. “Social Indicators 2014-Income and Expenditure.” gov.cn/record/qikanlist110209.asp?qikan- ROC National Statistics. Accessed May 14, id=6975&title=2014%C4%EA%D6%D0%B9%- 2015. Available at http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?x- FA%CC%A8%CD%E5%%A1%BB% Item=36500&ctNode=3480&mp=5. F5%CE%EF%C3%B3%D2%D7%B- C%B0%C1%BD%B0%B6%CB%AB%B1%D- “The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure.” F%C3%B3%D2%D7%B8%C5%BF%F6 (In ROC National Statistics. Accessed May 16, Chinese). 2015. Available at http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?x- Item=8854&ctNode=1599&mp=5. “FAQ for Human Development Index.” United Nations Development Program. Accessed May 13, Wade, Robert. Governing the Market: Economic 2015. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq-page/ Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian human-development-index-hdi#t292n36. Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. “Gini Coefficient.”ROC National Statistics. Ac- cessed May 16, 2015. Available at http://www.stat. Zhao, Hong. “Taiwan-Mainland Economic Cooper- gov.tw/public/Attachment/41141183071.doc. ation Framework Agreement.” National Univer- sity of Singapore East Asian Institute Background “Growth of Combined Sales by Industry.” Hsin- Brief No.549. Accessed May 12, 2015. Available at chu Science Park Bureau. Accessed on May http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB549.pdf. 16, 2015. Available at http://www.sipa.gov.tw/ english/home.jsp?serno=201005030003&m- 14 2 English / Spring 2017 Migration in Central america

Central America has been facing corruption, violence, and economic By and dependency issues for many years. Many Central American migrants are fleeing their home countries and everything they know simply christina english in order to survive and allow their children to survive. However, the path to safety is much darker and more challenging than people assume. This paper will analyze and explain why migration from Central America into the United States has increased so rapidly and question why this issue is not being globally recognized as a refugee crisis. Governments are failing to recognize this topic as a refugee crisis simply because they are acting on their own state interests.

ittle action has been done to help help Central America’s leaders make Lease the situation. However, the the difficult reforms and investments passage of the 1986 Immigration required to address the region’s in- Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in the terlocking security, governance, and United States created a “border rush” economic challenges.3 This amount of of Salvadorians who sought refugee aid is approximately three times what in Canada to avoid deportation, which the United States generally has provid- then forced Canada to redesign its ed to Central America in the past. refugee determination system.1 The Major causes of the migration Mexican government has been rath- crisis include unsafe living situa- er harsh towards migrants from the tions in Central America, increasing south attempting to make their way to amounts of drug trafficking, and rising the United States. Joe Biden recent- murder rates, which results in people ly stated that, “The economies of El searching for a safer place to live and Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras raise their families. According to The remain bogged down as the rest of the Guardian, the murder rate in El Salva- Americas surge forward. Inadequate dor alone increased by 70 percent last education, institutional corruption, year (2015). Refugee advocates have rampant crime and a lack of invest- been organizing petitions, rallies, and ment are holding these countries back. demonstrations in an attempt to gain Six million young Central Americans attention and call for help.4 However, are to enter the labor force in the next Central American refugees continue to decade. If an opportunity isn’t there rank low in domestic political agendas for them, the entire Western Hemi- for the United States. This paper, will sphere will feel the consequences”.2 As outline different views on the issues of a result, President Obama requested $1 migration, compare the Central Ameri- billion from Congress as an attempt to can migration crisis to the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as discuss migration 1 García, María Cristina,Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the 3 AFP, “Obama to request $1 billion from United States, and Canada (Berkeley: U of Congress to help Central America.” The Tico California, 2006). Times, 2015. 2 Biden, Joseph R, “Joe Biden: A Plan for 4 Kingsley, Patrick, “What Caused the Ref- Central America.” New York Times., January ugee Crisis? You Asked Google - Here’s the 29, 2015. Answer.” The Guardian, December 9, 2015. 15 English / Spring 2017 as a human rights issue. Central American refugee crisis, especially recent attempts to coordinate a regional response to the Literature Review unique problems presented by immigrants. He also People migrate for many reasons, such as eco- focuses on refugees and the challenges of coordinat- nomic, political, environmental factors, or to join a ing such a regional response in the post-9/11 era.7 family member. Economic migration is the move- Many refugees enter Mexico as either a safe ment of people from one country to another to benefit haven or a place to pass through on their way to sal- from greater economic opportunities.5 It is often as- vation. Mexico had offered protection and safety to sumed that such migration primarily occurs between people seeking a place where they can feel safe and less economically developed countries, as well as to be treated humanely. According to Garcia, “In the the more economically developed countries and from twentieth century, over two hundred thousand peo- former colonies to the country that was the imperial ple fleeing persecution sought refuge in Mexico.”8 power. Political factors include that people are forced This suggests that Mexico was a welcoming host to to migrate because of war, state policies that discrim- these clandestine people. According to New York inate against particular groups of citizens and people Times author, Sonia Nazario, Mexico’s treatment who oppose those in power. These people are unable contradicts with the United States’ plan. The two to return home because they have fears of being countries have come up with an agreement to keep persecuted and are unlikely to receive any protection the Central American people out of the United States from their government. Environmental migrants are by not letting them pass through Mexico.9 According people who are forced to migrate from or flee their to Christopher Galeano, who spent time in Mexico home region due to sudden or long-term changes investigating what was happening to human rights to their local environment, which adversely affects groups there, “[t]he U.S. government is sponsoring their welfare or livelihood. This form of migration the hunting of migrants in Mexico to prevent them refers to members of a family coming to join one from reaching the U.S. It is forcing them to go back of their relatives who is residing in another country. to El Salvador, Honduras, to their deaths.”10 This commonly includes fiancé(e)s, (proposed) civil The ideas presented by Nazario and Garcia do partners, spouses, or unmarried same-sex partners, not complement each other. It appears as though dependent children and elderly relatives. Mexico is abandoning their moral approach to this is- Maria Cristina García, a historian and Andrew sue due to fulfilling the desires and promoting what is Carnegie Fellow, describes how the political up- in the best interest of the United States. This is a bold heaval in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala move on Mexico’s part; because instead of partnering has taken a devastating human toll in recent years.6 with their Latino neighbors, they are siding with their Many Central Americans have traveled north from North American neighbors. This is taking a strong their home countries to escape war and search for stance and clearly shows whom their allies are. safety. Garcia focuses on the period of time between Even though the Mexican government has 1974 and 1996 in which over two million of the chosen not to assist these refugees, and is even people who fled Central America settled in Mexico, taking actions to get rid of them, there are citizens the United States, and Canada. Garcia tells the story and non-governmental organizations who are taking of migration and how domestic and foreign-policy action to do what they believe is just. Garcia talks interests shaped the asylum policies of Mexico, the about how around the year 1990, “[a] few thousand United States, and Canada. She describes the ex- Nicaraguans were believed to be living and work- periences of the individuals and non-governmental ing without documentation in Mexico, particularly organizations that responded to the refugee crisis and in Mexico City, relying on church groups and their worked within and across borders to shape refugee network of family and friends for assistance” (Gar- policy. Garcia also addresses the legacies of the 7 Ibid. 5 “Economic Migration.” Striking Women, 2016. 8 Ibid. 6 García, María Cristina,Seeking Refuge: Central American 9 Nazario, Sonia, “The Refugees at Our Door.” The New York Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Berkeley: Times, October 10, 2015. U of California, 2006). 10 Ibid. 16 English / Spring 2017

cia, 47). This parallels to Transnational Advocacy based on granting annual contracts to prospective Networks. Groups such as church groups can work immigrants and on the system of ‘rotation.’14 This across nations by uniting people who have a similar constant rotation of foreign workers minimized the set of values and who have a benevolent nature. Soli- ability of the workers to put down roots in Germa- darity networks are groups of people who get togeth- ny and at the same time assured German capital of er to try to obtain what is best for the public and have a flexible labor supply, which could be recovered humans best interests in when working to help the during a recession. By admitting only single workers accommodation of misplaced people. rather than families, social support costs for families The United States of America loves to hold the were avoided. Additionally, by returning the workers image that they are the country where a “nobody” to their home countries through the rotation policy, can turn into “somebody”. The United States boasts no costs of non-productive old age were required.15 the idea of the American Dream. This impression A Liberal approach to migration, however, would lures in immigrants who are desperate for a shot argue that because we live in a world of anarchy, we at success. Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novel, One should not pick up conflict and war but rather think Hundred Years of Solitude, touches upon the idea of differently and take a different approach to address- how depressing it can be to realize that your life will ing the situation. Individual rights, democracy and be stagnant. The habitants of Macondo, the specific limitations on the powers of the state are emphasized. town discussed in the novel, are stuck in this commu- Within Liberalism, migrants should have more rights nity. They see another group called the Melquíades and especially have the right to safety. The Liberal represent this freely moving successful human while view focuses greatly on migration as a human rights they are confined by their place of residence. One issue. officer in the book explains that, “Bad luck doesn’t The Feminist perspective is the viewpoint that have any chinks in it,” he said with deep bitterness. all humans should be treated as equals, regardless of “I was born a son of a bitch and I’m going to die gender. This also can be viewed in the topic of migra- a son of a bitch.”11 This reflects the sentiments of tion, as all humans should be treated as equals re- many people who feel trapped in a situation but end gardless of nationality. There are certain morals that up staying lamentably put or take the risk to make a humane beings should share when dealing with the change. This change could be crossing the frontier condition of their fellow beings. Nobody deserves to into the United States of America. be treated as less-than another, regardless of gender or nationality. Women who are migrants or refugees Core Analysis - Theoretical Approaches to face different struggles than male migrants. For ex- Immigration ample, the female is usually expected to care for the From a Realist perspective, the overflow of im- children and elderly while also providing an income. migrants from Central America is an absolute crisis Women are also often more subject to sexual assault, because the migration issues threaten the security harassment and violence, causing them to live in a of the United States. In the past, migratory move- constant state of fear.16 From a Feminist perspective, ments have been highly organized. For example, in the migration crisis is a major violation of human 1946 Italy and Belgium signed an agreement, which rights. guaranteed a possible recruitment of 2,000 Italian The migrants fleeing war zones and other immigrants to Belgium per week.12 The Federal Re- life-threatening situations in Central America should public of Germany then established the ‘guestwork- be considered refugees and be allotted refugee status. er’ system in the post-war era.13 By 1973, 2.6 million However, this is not the case. The United States has immigrants had gone to Germany. Recruitment was been very strict in titling migrants as refugees. Fem- 14 Iosifides, Theodoros, Qualitative Methods in Migration Stud- 11 Marquez, Gabriel García. One Hundred Years of Solitude. ies : A Critical Realist Perspective. (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., (Editorial Sudamericanos, 1967). January 28, 2013). 12 Martiniello, Marco and Andrea Rea, “Belgium’s Immigra- 15 Ibid. tion Policy Brings Renewal and Challenges.” Migration Policy 16 Weiss, Julia. “Female refugees face physical assault, Institute, October 1, 2013. exploitation and sexual harassment on their journey through 13 Ibid. Europe.” Aljaezeera, January 18, 2016. 17 English / Spring 2017

inists would also argue that not only the woman mi- Syrians fleeing danger awarded refugee status but grants, but rather all of migrants, including children Central Americans in similar and legitimate predica- and men need political, social and economic equality. ments are not? According to the International Crisis Post-structuralism plays an important role in Group, “The refugee question remains at the heart of the issue of migration. Post-structuralism strives to politics, a recurrent source of passionate debate and give voice to the people who are powerless, such occasional trigger of violence.”19 Central American as migrants. This theory emphasizes that in order migrants are facing very similar circumstances as to understand world views, it is necessary to study many Syrians and refugees fleeing the Middle East. both the object itself and the systems of knowledge In a working paper discussing refugees and the peace that produce the object. In this particular case, un- process, Elia Zureik of the Institute for Palestine derstanding migration requires not only the study of Studies explains: migration but the various causes of it that shape the different aspects of the lives of migrants. It also in- Analysis of (voluntary) migration tends to cludes the structures and economies of the countries focus on individuals rather than groups. To that are affected by it. the extent that groups are considered, they are treated as aggregates of individuals rather than Comparing Central American Migration Crisis to as cohesive social units in the sociological Syrian Refugee Crisis sense of constituting communities with shared According to the United Nations High Commis- common historical experiences (Shami 1993). sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 3 million have In contrast with immigrant status, refugee sta- fled to Syria’s immediate neighbors Turkey, Lebanon, tus is the outcome of involuntary forms of mi- Jordan, and Iraq, while 6.5 million remain internally gration, in which displacement is often caused displaced within Syria. The Syrian refugee crisis was by events beyond the control of refugees, such initially triggered by the nature of the Syrian Civil as internal and external wars, state policies of War. Citizens are fleeing or have fled because they expulsion and exclusion, development projects, have given up hope for their country. According to and natural disasters.20 Patrick Kingsley from The Guardian, “Europe is an increasingly attractive option for Syrians since they Through this explanation, one can justify that the have no secure legal status in the countries where Central American “migrants” perfectly fit the mold of they now live.”17 In the Middle East, it is now almost what a “refugee” is. However, the Central Americans impossible for Syrians to gain legal entrance to the are still fleeing their countries continue to be labeled neighboring Arab countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, as migrants rather than refugees, despite their strug- and Jordan. Kingsley points out, “The vast majority gles in finding new places to settle and call home. do not have the right to work; none of them are for- It seems that the main distinction made between the mally recognized as refugees; and many of their chil- Central Americans and Syrians is that the Syrians dren are not in school. Some 400,000 Syrian children are fleeing to countries willing to help them and are have fallen outside the education system, according doing all that they can to open their doors as wide to Turkish officials.”18 At this point, it seems that the as possible in providing a safe and secure refuge for majority of Syrians have lost all hope in their country those fleeing danger. However, in the case of Central and see no reason in staying in their homeland. Many Americans it is more difficult to find a safe place Syrians are able to gain refugee status once they to flee to. Many Central Americans see the north as leave their homeland in search of safety and security. their only option due to the Darién Gap, which is the Although the Syrian refugee crisis truly is a break in the Pan-American Highway consisting of a crisis, these people fleeing their homes are almost large area of undeveloped swampland and forest be- immediately labeled as “refugees,” so why are 19 International Crisis Group, “Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s 17 Kingsley, Patrick, “What Caused the Refugee Crisis? You Palestinian Refugee Camps.” Columbia University Press, Feb- Asked Google - Here’s the Answer.” The Guardian, December ruary 19, 2009. 9, 2015. 20 Zureik, Elia, Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process. 18 Ibid. (Columbia University Press, May 1996.) 18 English / Spring 2017

tween Panama and Colombia. The Darién Gap makes Reasons for Migration it impossible for people or cars to pass between Pan- People migrate for many reasons, from seeking ama and Colombia.21 This leaves transportation via new job opportunities to seeking a safer environment boat or flight as the only options between Central and or different government, or even out of simple curi- South America. osity of a new lifestyle. However, migration out of Thus, migrating north has consistently prov- Central America and into North America has become en to be a much more attractive option for Central so prominent that it clearly needs to be classified as a American migrants. However, this theme of migrat- crisis. The table on the next page illustrates a trend in ing north has contributed to the issue of the lack of migration. refugee status given to the migrants. The issue of As shown below, migration was very low in the refuge is not being recognized as widely or open- 1960s and up until the 2000s increased at a stable ly as the Syrian refugee crisis because the United rate. However, between 2000 and 2009, the migration States is not prepared or willing to help the Central rate absolutely skyrocketed. The number of migrants Americans. As the United States policy on Central leaving Guatemala alone nearly doubled in those Americans gaining refugee status is now, according nine years. Other countries that showed an abnormal- to Susan Martin, an international migration professor ly high increase of citizens fleeing include El Salva- at Georgetown University and the author of several dor and Honduras. Nicaragua saw the biggest loss of books on humanitarian crises, “[Migrants] would citizens in the 1980s and 1990s due to the Sandinista have to prove they fear persecution on the basis of Revolution (1974-1979) and the Contra War (1979- their race, religion, nationality, political perspectives 1990).24 While some Central American countries or membership in a particular social group.”22 Cur- show obvious trends of migration, others demon- rent United States policy on Central Americans gain- strate a steady pace of population density. For exam- ing refugee status makes it very difficult for migrants ple, Belize, Panama and Costa Rica show no obvious to gain asylum. In addition to the difficulties of even trends of time periods with many citizens leaving and getting to the United States border, the U.S. is fund- migrating. These three countries have had no serious ing the Mexican border control to stop refugees and wars or specific times of danger and insecurity for send them home before they can make it to the U.S. their citizens. It is apparent that there is strong reason border. behind the unusually high number of citizens fleeing These migrants often times do not have the funds Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.25 or resources to escape the dangerous situations that In the path to leave their homeland, migrants are they face in their home countries. Those who are forced to pass through Mexico, which is becoming truly facing fear and have their lives threatened by a more difficult journey every day. According to gang violence still find it almost impossible to prove García: and legitimize this fear and/or life threatening cir- cumstance to the United States government. How- By the end of 2002, Mexico deported over ever, even for those who are able to prove their need three thousand Central Americans each week. for asylum, it is not always enough. Martin states, One critic of Mexico’s new policies explained “Violent threats, the type many have appare ntly told the post-9/11 era: ‘Anyone with any brains can U.N. workers they face from drug cartels and gangs see that Mexican foreign policy, with regards at home aren’t always enough to qualify for asylum, to migratory issues, tries to accommodate the immigration legal scholars and humanitarian aid United States and do its dirty work. . . . Mex- workers said.”23 ico has placed the tortilla curtain not at the Rio Grande but at its border with Guatemala to impede the entry of migrants from Central America and the rest of the world.26 21 Motlagh, Jason, “A Terrifying Journey Through the World’s Most Terrifying Jungle.” Outside Online, 2016. 24 Klerlein, Ellie, “Environmental Effects of Nicaraguan Armed 22 Abdulla, Halimah, “Immigrants or Refugees? A Difference Conflicts.” ICE Case Studies, November 2006. with Political Consequences.” CNN, July 17, 2016. 25 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 26 García, María Cristina,Seeking Refuge: Central American 19 English / Spring 2017

Central American Immigrants by Country of Origin, 1960 to 20091

Belize Costa Rica El Salvador Number (1,000s) Share* Number (1,000s) Share* Number (1,000s) Share* 1960 2.8 5.7 5.4 11.1 6.3 12.9 1970 8.9 7.8 16.7 14.7 15.7 13.8 1980 14.4 4.2 29.6 8.6 94.4 27.3 1990 30.0 2.7 22.3 2.0 465.4 42.1 2000 42.1 2.1 71.9 3.6 817.3 40.5 2009 48.6 1.7 86.3 3.0 1,149.9 39.4 Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama Number (1,000s) Share* Number (1,000s) Share* Number (1,000s) Share* Number (1,000s) Share* 1960 5.4 11.0 6.5 13.3 9.5 19.4 13.1 26.7 1970 17.4 15.2 19.1 16.8 16.1 14.2 20.0 17.6 1980 63.1 18.2 39.2 11.3 44.2 12.8 60.7 17.6 1990 225.7 20.4 108.9 9.8 168.7 15.2 85.7 7.7 2000 480.7 23.8 282.9 14.0 220.3 10.9 105.2 5.2 2009 798.7 27.4 467.9 16.1 253.3 8.7 103.8 3.6

Sourced from: (http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states-0)

It is devastating that these migrants are leaving It is apparent that overall, immigration laws and life-threatening situations in search of safety but are regulations have always been closely tied to econom- more often than not forced to continually face danger ic reasoning. In the case of Central American migra- in the journey to safety. The journey was not always tion, migrants are not being recognized as refugees this difficult, according to Payan: because obtaining the status of a refugee would entail the United States to offer more support and money. From 1848 to 1929, Mexicans crossed the bor- Currently, it seems as though the United States cares der freely. In this period, it was not illegal to more about funding the Mexican government and cross the border without papers. It sufficed to Mexican military to do whatever they can to stop declare one’s citizenship, if there was anyone the migrants from reaching the United States border. even guarding the point of entry (POE). The Therefore, the United States is ignoring this human immigration acts prior to 1929 included provi- rights issue just so that they do not have to deal with sions that allowed Mexicans to cross without it. The Syrian refugee crisis is being recognized papers. These acts were designed to exclude because numerous countries are working together persons of nationalities other than Mexican— to offer all that they can to give the Syrian refugees some actively targeted Asians, particularly the access to safety and liberty. In contrast, the United Chinese. But the 1929 Immigration Act made it States is not concerned with the hardships currently illegal to cross the border from Mexico without being faced in Central America and is putting more papers. This was, in some ways, a response to effort and money into hiding the problem and push- the economic hardship of the 1920s. With this ing the migrants away then actually dealing with it Act, open immigration was drastically cur- and helping these people struggling for their lives to tailed.27 find safety. Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Berkeley: U of California, 2006). Migration as a Human Rights Issue 27 Payan, Tony, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Migration truly is a human rights issue since Immigration, and Homeland Security. (Praeger Security Inter- national, 2006). 20 English / Spring 2017

it displaces women, children, and families, putting States. Along the way, this struggle has been accom- people in very vulnerable and dangerous situations. panied by governmental corruption, violence, and Migration and migrants are increasingly the focus of economic dependency. In recent years, migration human rights discussions. Yet the gap between policy from Central America into the United States has in- and protection remains wide. According to Stefanie creased more rapidly than ever before. This issue has Grant from the Migration Policy Institute: not yet been recognized globally as a refugee crisis due to the responsibility and investment that comes A migrant’s human rights are largely defined along with such a serious label. The United States by the migration “category” to which he or she actively chooses to push away and hide the issue of belongs, and by the reasons underlying that Central American migration rather than openly deal migration. At one end of the human rights/ with and resolve it. If the Central American migra- migration spectrum are voluntary migrants, tion crisis were to be globally recognized as a refugee including migrant workers and other economic crisis, the United States would be deemed the respon- migrants. At the other end, more than 10 mil- sible party to aid the region of Central America into lion refugees are forced to leave their countries safety. to escape persecution.28 Central American migrants fleeing violence and life-threatening situations, specifically in Guatema- As Grant explains, categorizing migrants can be la, Honduras and El Salvador, should be deemed as a very difficult process. There are currently such a refugees. They often face no choice but to flee their large number of people seeking asylum from danger- home country or be subject to persecution stemming ous circumstances that it can be almost impossible to from recent instability in those countries’ govern- compare every individual’s situation to one another ments and abnormally high rates of gang violence. and create a fair and even system to deal with these This issue of migration truly is a human rights issue. issues. The United States has offered asylum to a rel- It is continually failing to be recognized as a human atively small number of Central American migrants, rights issues due to the amount of responsibility that which has allowed them to lead safer lives and given would be placed on the United States to make for saf- more a sense of security. There are still thousands of er circumstances for refugees. Governments are fail- migrants being displaced from their families every ing to recognize this topic as a refugee crisis simply day, feeling helpless and desperate, subsequently because they are acting on their own state interests. falling victim to many human rights issues.29 Dealing with human rights issues and violations Author Biography is currently not of high priority of importance for the Christina English is a senior at San Francisco United States. It appears that human rights issues State University, studying International Relations and do not pose as a threat to the welfare of the United Spanish. She has taken a number of Latino Studies States, therefor it is of little concern to the U.S. gov- classes and is fascinated by Central American migra- ernment. If there is ever to be a change in the Central tion patterns and tendencies. In 2016, she spent two American migration issue the United States needs to months backpacking Central America to immerse change its outlook on the situation. This issue of mi- herself and strengthen her knowledge of the region. gration and human rights violations can be resolved This paper will discuss her findings on Central Amer- by creating a safer and more humane environment for ican migration. the people of Central America. Bibliography Conclusion Abdulla, Halimah, “Immigrants or Refugees? A Dif- Overall, Central America has been facing a ference with Political Consequences.” CNN, July long-time struggle for independence from the United 17, 2016.

28 Grant, Stefanie, “Migrants’ Human Rights: From the Mar- gins to the Mainstream.” Migration Policy Institute, March 1, AFP, “Obama to request $1 billion from Congress to 2005. help Central America.” The Tico Times, 2015. 29 Ibid. 21 English / Spring 2017

Bautista, Lola Quan, “Steadfast Movement Around World’s Most Terrifying Jungle.” Outside Online, Micronesia.” Lexington Books, August 2010. 2016.

Biden, Joseph R, “Joe Biden: A Plan for Central Nazario, Sonia, “The Refugees at Our Door.” The America.” New York Times., January 29, 2015. New York Times, October 10, 2015.

Booth, John A., and Thomas W. Walker, “Under- Paige, Jeffery M., Coffee and Power: Revolution and standing Central America.” Boulder: Westview, the Rise of Democracy in Central America. (Cam- 1989. bridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997).

“Economic Migration.” Striking Women, 2016. Passel, Jeffery S., The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the García, María Cristina,Seeking Refuge: Central U.S. (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006). American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Berkeley: U of California, Payan, Tony, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: 2006). Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security. (Praeger Security International, 2006). Grant, Stefanie, “Migrants’ Human Rights: From the Margins to the Mainstream.” Migration Policy “Striking Women.” Types of Migrants, (Leeds, UK: Institute, March 1, 2005. Arts & Humanities Research Council).

International Crisis Group, “Nurturing Instability: Terrazas, Aaron, “Central American Immigrants in Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps.” Columbia the United States.” Migration Policy Institute, Jan- University Press, February 19, 2009. uary 10, 2011.

Iosifides, Theodoros, Qualitative Methods in Migra- Weiss, Julia. “Female refugees face physical assault, tion Studies : A Critical Realist Perspective. exploitation and sexual harassment on their journey (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., January 28, 2013). through Europe.” Aljaezeera, January 18, 2016.

Klerlein, Ellie, “Environmental Effects of Nicara- Zureik, Elia, Palestinian Refugees and the Peace guan Armed Conflicts.”ICE Case Studies, Novem- Process. (Columbia University Press, May 1996.) ber 2006.

Kingsley, Patrick, “What Caused the Refugee Cri- sis? You Asked Google - Here’s the Answer.” The Guardian, December 9, 2015.

Marquez, Gabriel García. One Hundred Years of Soli- tude. (Editorial Sudamericanos, 1967).

Martinez, Ramiro Jr., Latino Homicide: Immigration, Violence, and Community. (Routledge, 2002).

Martiniello, Marco and Andrea Rea, “Belgium’s Im- migration Policy Brings Renewal and Challenges.” Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2013.

Motlagh, Jason, “A Terrifying Journey Through the

22 3 Folmar / Spring 2017

north korea’s nuclear weapons development

Since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, the Korean By Peninsula has been perpetually locked into a quasi-state of war, but one Cody folmar of which that has been defined as a tenuous cessation of open hostili- ties. Since North Korea has failed to provide sufficient military deterrence through conventional means, it has actively pursued the development of a domestic nuclear weapons and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program. Despite international condemnation in the form of multilateral sanctions imposed on the state of North Korea, it has not succeeded in dissuading them from their nuclear pursuit, nor did it prevent them in successfully producing a nuclear bomb.

his paper looks to assert that the security threats. Tdevelopment of the Democratic Since signing the armistice in People’s Republic of Korea’s nu- 1953, North Korea has built the sta- clear program delineates a posture tus of their regime by basing it upon of offensive realism in response to a hyper-militaristic mentality. This is specific historical context that has left very likely because since its inception, them with no alternative other than to North Korea has found itself locked maximize their military capability in into an emerging bipolar security order to preserve the survival of their structure, with one of the superpowers state. Despite having been a signatory stationed on its border that directly to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of threatening the survival of their state Nuclear Weapons, North Korea has with both superior conventional and aggressively pursued the development nuclear means.1 This was a major of their own domestic nuclear weap- motivating factor that convinced North ons program as a means of refusing Korea that it required its own nuclear to allow the global power structure to weapons program to bolster a signifi- limit how much power their state can cant deterrence to redress this ongoing attain. Global response of condemna- security anxiety. There is a building tion through international sanctions of historical context that would only toward the North Korean regime has continue to construct a perception in only increased the resolve in their North Korea that it cannot rely on perceived validity in the need to de- outside institutions or treaties to pro- velop nuclear weaponry as a means of vide a permanent means of security; deterrence. Although their nuclear pro- that only a continual stride towards gram is still relatively in its infancy, manufacturing an elaborate militaris- the rhetoric streaming through state- tic infrastructure could create enough run propaganda clearly demonstrates of a deterrence to ensure the survival that the program is being developed of their state. At a glance, this could as tool for elevating its stature within the global power structure, while also 1 Jae-bong Lee. “US Deployment of Nucle- being outwardly focused in providing ar Weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea’s Nuclear Development: Toward deterrence from foreign intervention Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” by what it perceives to be external The Asia-Pacific Journal 7, no. 8 (February 17, 2009). 23 Folmar / Spring 2017 appear as though the situation in North Korea does which necessitates devising strategies and building give some legitimacy to defensive realist stand point, the material means to ensure their own survival. The because it has caused an international reaction to try distrust among states leave them pre-occupied with and prevent North Korea’s ascent to a more power- establishing enough military power to act as a deter- ful position in the global security structure. But the rence toward other states, and forces states to con- fact that global efforts have little effect in preventing stantly look for ways to shift the balance of power in North Korea from attempting to maximize their own their favor. The constant competition among states military capacity through nuclear weaponry, coupled also invites the security dilemma, where the steps of with the rhetoric being broadcasted by North Korean one state takes vying to gain more power and en- propaganda, ultimately depicts a state that sees itself hance its standing within the global power structure, more as a major competitor in an offensive realist does so at the expense of other relative states. Since race to the top of the global power structure. the competition for power exists as a zero-sum game, it is difficult for states to gain more power without Literature Review threatening the security of other states.5 All realists believe that power is the currency of Offensive and defensive realists have different international politics, but the divide between classical perspectives regarding how much power is enough realism and structural realism resides in the explana- to establish an effective deterrence to ensure a state’s tion of why states seek power. Classical realists such security. Offensive realists, like John Mearsheimer, as Hans Morgenthau believed the drive behind states believe that states should attempt to gain additional seeking power was human nature; that all humans power at every feasible opportunity by any means seek a path to generate more power.2 Structural real- possible, and in maximizing their own power, states ists disagree; they do not consider human nature as a will enhance their standing within the global power critical motivator for why states want power, instead structure. According to the offensive realist perspec- they see it as the architecture of the international tive, these states will eventually move into a position system that pushes states to compete for power. Of- where they may be able to pursue hegemony, which fensive realist John Mearsheimer would describe the would ultimately ensure their own security.6 Defen- global structure as “a brutal arena where states look sive realists such as Kenneth Waltz, however, agree for opportunities to take advantage of each other.”3 that there are many incentives for states to incremen- This is because states never fully know the genuine tally gain additional power, but that states should intentions of other states within the structure. It is only strive for an appropriate amount of power this uncertainty that drives states to bolster their own relative to their closest competition. Defensive real- military capabilities to establish a formal deterrence ists argue that overexpansion will cause balancing in order to ensure their own survival. It is impossible to occur when a state becomes too powerful; where to predict if a state is actively seeking to alter the a coalition of states will form to prevent an aspiring current balance of power by acting as a revisionist hegemon’s ascent to becoming a dominating global state as a way to improve its own standing within the power.7 global power structure, or to preserve the balance of power as a status quo state.4 Core Analysis The ultimate goal and concern of a state is its The Origins of North Korea’s Nuclear Program own survival. Maintaining territorial borders and sov- In 1956, the Soviet Union began assisting North ereignty is the first priority in the hierarchy of goals Korea in establishing its own nuclear program and that states can pursue. States are rational actors that started the construction of a Soviet IRT-2M research understand that they exist in a system of self-help, reactor in Yongbyon. Then in 1959, the Soviet Union 2 Richard Lebow. “Classical Realism.” In International Rela- and North Korea signed a nuclear cooperation agree- tions Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 63. Oxford: Oxford ment which signaled an increase in nuclear technical University Press, 2013. knowledge that being was provided by the Soviet 3 Ibid., 61. 4 John Mearsheimer. “Structural Realism.” In International Re- 5 Ibid., 80. lations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 79. Oxford: Oxford 6 Ibid. University Press, 2013. 7 Ibid., 81. 24 Folmar / Spring 2017 Union.8 During this time North Korea was also able to validate this perspective by becoming a nuclear to maintain a near parity with the conventional mil- power. itary capacity of South Korea throughout the 1960s, where it was able to balance the perspective power North Korea Begins Its Clandestine Nuclear of its adversary through conventional weaponry.9 Weapons Program But when the Sino-Soviet split grew more pervasive, Throughout the 1970s, North Korea made several North Korea’s external support for its conventional formal requests toward the Soviet Union and China military began to wane as its relationship with its to solicit assistance in developing their own domestic benefactors became more complicated.10 By the early nuclear weapons program, but such requests were 1970’s, North Korea’s ability to maintain a balance routinely denied by both countries. During this time, of power on the Korean peninsula through conven- North Korea also began to independently start mod- tional means quickly began to erode, while South ernizing the IRT-2M research reactor that the Soviets Korea’s military capabilities had continued to ad- had provided them. Simultaneously, North Korea vance technologically while being fueled by a grow- also initiated construction of an indigenous copy of ing economy. Meanwhile, South Korea also benefited a British 5 mega-watt electric, gas cooled, graph- immensely from the additional security afforded by ite moderated reactor at the Yongbyon site in order the presence of the United States military that had to begin producing plutonium. This is a significant also deployed nuclear armaments on South Korean milestone where you can start seeing the intentions soil, which at its peak amounted up to 950 warheads for the North Korean nuclear program. It would of various sizes and delivery systems.11 allow them to continue their nuclear ambitions under In 1972, a diplomatic resolution was sought by the pretense of a peaceful research facility, but also both North and South Korea when they issued a joint theoretically allowed them to start producing enough statement in garnering a peaceful process towards weapons-grade plutonium separated from the ura- reunification, but this was eventually abandoned nium fuel rods to manufacture one nuclear bomb a the following year as little to no progress had been year.12 This demonstrates that the direction of North made. These factors all had an accumulated effect on Korea’s nuclear program had always focused towards driving North Korea to focus increasingly on devel- building a nuclear arsenal; because this specific size oping its own nuclear program as its best option at and style of reactor does not produce a tremendous maintaining deterrence. The fact that they were one amount of energy, but it is ideal for nations with lim- of the first nations threatened with nuclear weaponry ited nuclear infrastructure who are pursuing nuclear by the United States following WWII perhaps gen- weapons development.13 erated an internal perception that they are also peers of the United States, and therefore situated in similar International Attention and Scrutiny positions within the global power structure. This After the United States discovered the reactor would certainly provide motivation for North Korea was operational, they began pressuring the Soviet Union to force North Korea to join the Non-Pro- 8 Derek Bolton. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” American liferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Only after Security Project. August 08, 2012. Accessed April 13, 2016. http://www.americansecurityproject.org/north-koreas-nucle- conjoined pressure from both the United States and ar-program/. the Soviet Union did North Korea finally accede to 9 Jihwan Hwang. “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and signing the treaty in 1985. Almost immediately it Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea started becoming apparent that North Korea had very in Comparative Perspective.” World Affairs 168, no. 1 (Summer little intention of abiding by the conditions set forth 2005): 39-48. Accessed April 13, 2016. 10 Timothy Hildebrandt, Chen Jian, Samuel Kim, and Ha- 12 Siegfried Hecker. “Report on North Korean Nuclear Pro- zel Smith. “Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea gram.” Federation of American Scientists. November 15, 2006. Relations.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Accessed April 16, 2016. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/ September 2003. Accessed April 13, 2016. https://www.wilson- hecker1106.pdf. center.org/sites/default/files/asia_rpt115b.pdf. 13 Siegfried Hecker, Sean Lee, and Chaim Braun. “North 11 “US Nuclear Weapons in Korea.” The Nuclear Information Korea’s Choice: Bombs over Electricity.” The Bridge 40, no. 2 Project. September 28, 2005. Accessed April 26, 2016. http:// (Summer 2010): 5-6. Accessed April 13, 2016. https://www.nae. www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreahistory.htm. edu/File.aspx?id=20575. 25 Folmar / Spring 2017 by the NPT. One significant stipulation of the treaty Korea has also made strides in peripheral industries requires members to permit the International Atomic such as their ballistic missile program. North Korea Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect all plants contain- originally started with reverse-engineering Soviet ing nuclear material within 18 months of becoming a era Scud-B missiles that they obtained from Egypt, signatory. North Korea waited the entire 18 months creating a domestic version called the Hwasong-5.16 before informing the IAEA that they had sent the Throughout the 1980s North Korea became one of wrong forms pertaining to the inspections. The IAEA the leading exporters of not only ballistic missiles, responded by sending the correct forms and granting but also missile components and technology as well. North Korea an additional 18 months to complete By 1990, North Korea had reverse-engineered sever- them; meanwhile North Korea’s nuclear reactors al different Scud missile designs, which could carry remained operational, and they were able to separate a larger payload, and had successfully extended the enough weapons-grade plutonium from their nuclear potential reach of North Korean missiles. fuel rods to constitute one or two nuclear bombs.14 In 1992, Pakistan signaled to North Korea that North Korea did not fully abide by the safeguards as it was interested in acquiring missile technology outlined by the NPT until 1992. to help bolster its own nuclear weapons program. When IAEA inspectors were finally granted ac- At the time, Pakistan was experiencing a widening cess to North Korean facilities in 1992, they took nu- imbalance of air superiority with India after an order merous samples to measure the radioactive isotopes of F-16 aircraft from the United States had stalled. of the separated plutonium, and confirmed that North As an alternative, Pakistan began seeking an effec- Korea must have separated weapons-grade plutonium tive long range missile platform in which it could from their fuel rods on at least three separate occa- use as a nuclear delivery system. It is important to sions.15 Then in 1993, when the IAEA were going to note that although Pakistan’s own nuclear program make another round of inspections, they were re- started around the same time as North Korea’s, its stricted from accessing two specific installations that nuclear program was much more sophisticated. This they had visited the year before. North Korea cited is primarily due to the efforts of Abdul Qadeer Khan, that they were no longer associated with the nuclear a scientist who had previously worked for the nuclear program, and declared they were now military instal- program in the Netherlands; there he was working lations, and thus refused to permit access to either as a Dutch translator transcribing documents from site. German to Dutch. In 1974, he was given a highly North Korea’s refusal was cause for alarm for classified document detailing a sophisticated break- the IAEA who demanded a special inspection, which through in centrifuge technology used for enriching explicitly pertains to sites where it is suspected that uranium. In an act of espionage, Dr. Kahn smuggled fissile materials have been deliberately hidden. North the information back to revolutionize Pakistan’s own Korea’s response was to remove the IAEA inspectors nuclear program.17 This is significant because when from their country, and become the first and only Pakistan was brokering a deal with North Korea to nation to have ever withdrawn from the Non-Prolif- purchase ballistic missile designs, Dr. Kahn had an eration of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. This particular explicit role in the negotiations that would result in event is significant, because it illustrates the mindset bartering nuclear information pertaining to sophisti- North Korea has in regards to its nuclear program. It cated uranium enrichment.18 This collaboration was is explicitly directed towards weapons development, 16 Matthew McGrath, and Daniel Wertz. The National Com- and demonstrates that they will remain driven to this mitte on North Korea. August 2015. Accessed April 16, 2016. pursuit even in the face of global condemnation. http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Missile_Issue_ Brief.pdf. 17 Robert Windrem. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Father, Master Spy.” Ballistic Missile Development Msnbc.com. 2013. Accessed April 18, 2016. http://www.nbc- In parallel with their nuclear program, North news.com/id/3340760/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/ 14 Paul Leventhal, and Steven Dolley. “The North Korean pakistans-nuclear-father-master-spy/#.VxVD0zHjIlA. Nuclear Crisis.” International Physicians for the Prevention of 18 Hassan Abbas. “Causes That Led to Nuclear Proliferation Nuclear War. 1994. Accessed April 16, 2016. http://www.ippnw. from Pakistan to Iran, Libya, and North Korea: Investigating org/pdf/mgs/1-3-leventhal.pdf. the Role of the Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Network.” Fletch- 15 Ibid. er School of Law and Diplomacy. April 2008. Accessed 26 Folmar / Spring 2017

a watershed moment for North Korea’s own nuclear uranium enrichment program in 2002. This ultimate- program; the exchange of ballistic missile designs for ly led to the complete breakdown of the agreement, modern uranium enrichment centrifuges and exper- which was subsequently followed by President Bush tise became a defining moment in the expansion of declaring North Korea as part of the Axis of Evil. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. The relations between the two countries became outright hostile after the Los Angeles Times and New The 1994 Agreed Framework York Times obtained copies of the United States Bolstered by the acquisition of new centrifuges, Nuclear Posture Review in 2002; releasing excerpts North Korea immediately set out to covertly begin which explicitly stated that the United States includ- construction on a 50 MWe facility in Yongbyon, and ed North Korea in a list of potential targets worthy a 200 MWe facility in Taechon. Soon after breaking of a preeminent nuclear strike if deemed necessary.21 ground, construction was quickly halted when the This was ultimately the deciding factor that led North two new sites were discovered by the United States; Korea to resume their nuclear weapons program; and which would usher in a second round of negoti- in 2003 North Korean ambassador Ri Yong Ho pub- ations in another effort to convince North Korea licly declared to Reuters that “North Korea possesses to abandon its nuclear program. The 1994 Agreed a workable nuclear device.”22 Framework would see North Korea’s current reactors which could produce-weapons grade plutonium be First Successful Nuclear Test shutdown, they would then be replaced by two 1000 In 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear MWe light water reactors which could not produce bomb in an underground facility near the town of weapons-grade material. The agreement also stipulat- P’unggey, afterwards stating that their “nuclear test ed that North Korea would be provided with an annu- was entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, al shipment of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, that the sanctions and pressure,” adding that North Korea United States would relax sanctions levied against “was compelled to substantially prove its possession North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, of nukes to protect its sovereignty.”23 This is signif- and formal assurances that the United States would icant because it vocalizes North Korea’s perception not pose a military threat through either conventional of needing to maximize their power through nuclear or nuclear force. In exchange, North Korea would weapons as the only means of deterrence towards once again grant access for IAEA to inspect its nucle- having the world’s sole superpower stationed along ar facilities.19 their border, one that has historically and currently The negotiations behind the Agreed Framework threatened their state with the use of nuclear weap- did halt the further development of North Korea’s ons. program for some time; however bilateral talks became strained in 1998 when North Korea tested International Response an ICBM platform under the guise of putting the The international reaction to the successful nu- Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 satellite into space.20 The talks clear test was to condemn the actions of North Korea deteriorated altogether after Secretary of State James and introduce a new round of sanctions through Kelly accused North Korea of having a clandestine imposing U.N. Resolution 1718. These sanctions April 18, 2016. http://search.proquest.com.jpllnet.sfsu.edu/ required North Korea to “not conduct any further nu- docview/304336020?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=13802. clear test or launch of a ballistic missile,” “return to 19 AGREED FRAMEWORK OF 21 OCTOBER 1994 BE- the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- TWEEN THE UNITED S TATES OF AMERCIA AND THE ons and International Atomic Energy Agency safe- DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.” Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency. October 21, 1994. Accessed 21 Nuclear Posture Review.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. August April 18, 2016. https://web.archive.org/web/20031217175315/ 1, 2002. Accessed April 18, 2016. http://www.nti.org/analysis/ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/ articles/nuclear-posture-review/. infcirc457.pdf. 22 Kelsey Davenport. “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean 20 Kenneth Bacon. “DefenseLINK News: DoD News Briefing Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” Arms Control Association. Tuesday, September 8, 1998.” Office of the Assistant Secretary March 2016. Accessed April 18, 2016. https://www.armscontrol. of Defense. September 8, 1998. Accessed April 18, 2016. http:// org/factsheets/dprkchron. fas.org/spp/guide/dprk/t09081998_t9809asd.html. 23 Ibid. 27 Folmar / Spring 2017 guards,” “suspend all activities related to its ballistic Satellites and Nuclear Tests missile programme and in this context re-establish its After North Korea claimed to have held up its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile own end of the bargain, the United States, Japan, and launching,” and “abandon all nuclear weapons and South Korea began to alter the terms of the agree- existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifi- ment as they accused North Korea of providing an able and irreversible manner.”24 North Korea’s UN incomplete list of all the weapons grade plutonium envoy, Pak Gil Son, rejected the resolution as “unjus- they had produced.27 In protest of not fulfilling the tifiable.”25 He believed that the UN Security Council concessions that were agreed upon in 2007, North passed the resolution without considering the context Korea launched a modified version of its three-stage in which North Korea was pursuing a nuclear weap- Taepodong-2 ICBM, claiming it was a peaceful at- ons program; that it did not consider the pressure that tempt to put a satellite into orbit.28 The UN formally the United States was exerting on North Korea was condemned the missile launch as a violation of the an affront to their own state security. The resolution Security Council Resolution 1718, and introduced a also served to reinforce the North Korean suspicions new round of sanctions in the form of Security Coun- that it could not rely on international institutions in cil Resolution 1874. This new resolution further order to relieve their own national security concerns. enhanced financial restrictions, and called for an even Throughout 2007, the Six Party Talks was met more comprehensive embargo of weapons and weap- with a mix of intermittent concessions as well as ons technology to the country.29 The introduction of stonewalling. While there was plenty of dialogue further sanctions evoked North Korea to respond by between the parties involved, there were too many completely withdrawing from the Six Party Talks disagreements over the steps and time frames being process, and removing the IAEA inspectors once demanded of North Korea to suspend operations at again while proclaiming it will resume separating its Yongbyon 5 MWe facility. There was also a lack plutonium. One month later, North Korea conducted of consensus over what amount of compensation its second successful underground nuclear test with would be appropriate to persuade North Korea to an estimated yield of around 4 kilotons.30 This only shut down its reactor. Although there were small validated earlier suspicions that North Korea had not sporadic breakthroughs, most of the negotiations actually declared their entire plutonium stockpiles as became fairly convoluted as each party placed their required by agreements made during the Six Party own immediate priorities above creating a unified Talks, and perhaps raised concerns over whether any and cohesive direction in the denuclearization of amount of carrots or sticks could deviate North Ko- North Korea in manner that would provide a com- rea from its nuclear weapons program. promise with the demands and concerns of all the In 2010, North Korea unveiled a new uranium parties involved. Eventually, a small point of prog- enrichment facility and allowed Siegfried Hecker, ress emerged when it was agreed that North Korea the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, would partially disable its reactor and declare its full to bring a team of colleagues and investigate the new inventory of weapons-grade plutonium, and in return reactor. Hecker was surprised when he was shown would receive one million tons of heavy fuel oil as that the facility contained thousands of centrifuges well as $25 million in assets which had been frozen 27 “Punishing North Korea Won’t Work.” Bulletin of the Atomic 26 through international sanctions. Scientists. May 28, 2009. Accessed April 26, 2016. http:// 24 “SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS NUCLEAR TEST thebulletin.org/punishing-north-korea-wont-work. BY DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 28 Kelsey Davenport. “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nu- UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1718.” United clear and Missile Diplomacy.” Nations. October 14, 2006. Accessed April 19, 2016. http:// 29 “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm. Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Nu- 25 “UN Slaps Sanctions on North Korea.” BBC News. October clear Test, Toughens Sanctions | Meetings Coverage and Press 14, 2006. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ Releases.” UN News Center. June 12, 2009. Accessed May 04, asia-pacific/6051704.stm. 2016. http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm. 26 “The Six-Party Talks: Meeting North Korea’s Energy 30 Jeffrey Park. “The North Korean Nuclear Test: What the Needs.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. November 14, 2007. Seismic Data Says.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May 26, Accessed April 26, 2016. http://thebulletin.org/six-party-talks- 2009. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://thebulletin.org/north-kore- meeting-north-korea’s-energy-needs. an-nuclear-test-what-seismic-data-says. 28 Folmar / Spring 2017 when he was expecting to see only a couple dozen. demnation from the international community, North He also described the uranium enrichment facility as Korea was undeterred, and announced another launch “ultra-modern and clean,” unlike the previous North later that year in December. Korean sites he had inspected in the past with the North Korea immediately set about preparing a IAEA.31 North Korean officials told the team of sci- replacement Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite, and again entists that they had only begun construction in 2009, used their Taepodong-2 missile system. This time but given the scale and sophistication of the facility the missile stayed on course, all three booster stages this was impossible to believe. ignited successfully, and North Korea had put its first Hecker would admit later in a formal briefing, satellite into space.35 This was a significant achieve- that the centrifuges must have been installed in ment for North Korea, because not only had they another facility and then moved to the installation become one of only ten nations capable of putting where they were given a tour. Which alludes to the an object in orbit using their own domestic launch idea that North Korea must possibly have other clan- vehicles, but North Korea had also just advertised destine enrichment facilities, and if they do, it will that they can now field a missile capable of being be very difficult to detect them.32 Of course now we used as an ICBM with a potential range of around know the centrifuges had originally come from Paki- 6,000 kilometers.36 For North Korea this validated stan, but this in effect changes the framework of how their perception that they are a major player in the we can approach North Korea, because now we have global power structure; with this one launch they had realized that we have no idea how long their uranium ascended into a small circle of states with domestic program has been running, how many facilities they space programs, but perhaps even more importantly, may have, or if they are capable of producing highly they emerged as the eighth member in the small club enriched uranium as used in nuclear weapons. of nations to have genuine intercontinental ballistic missile capability. North Korea as a Space Power Following the successful missile launch, the UN After having demonstrated their capacity to once again introduced another round of sanctions maintain a sophisticated domestic nuclear program on North Korea for violating Resolutions 1718 and and their ability to manufacture nuclear weaponry, 1874. Resolution 2087 reiterated the call for strength- North Korea seemingly turned to focus on develop- ening international sanctions, and for North Korea ing a proficient delivery system. In April of 2012, to abandon is nuclear and ballistic missile programs. they attempted to launch the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 But it also introduced language that alluded to the satellite into space on an Unha-3 missile system, possibility that the UN Security Council would be which is essentially aTaepodong-2 ICBM.33 Just 90 open to taking preventative measures against future seconds after liftoff, the missile veered off its pro- provocations.37 jected course when the second stage boosters failed Demonstration of Progress to ignite, causing it to plunge into the Pacific Ocean North Korea once again responded to outside after breaking apart.34 Despite strongly worded con- pressures with a show of force, and detonated their third nuclear test a month after the new U.N. Res- 31 Siegfried Hecker. “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon olution. This time the detonation was estimated to Nuclear Complex.” Center for International Security and Co- operation. November 20, 2010. Accessed April 26, 2016. iis-db. stanford.edu/pubs/23035/HeckerYongbyon.pdf. 35 Jethro Mullen, and Paul Armstrong. “North Korea Carries 32 Peter Crail. “N. Korea Reveals Uranium-Enrichment Plant.” out Controversial Rocket Launch.” CNN. December 12, 2012. Arms Control Association. December 5, 2010. Accessed April Accessed May 04, 2016. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/11/ 26, 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/NorthKo- world/asia/north-korea-rocket-launch/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. rea. 36 “How Potent Are North Korea’s Threats?” BBC News. Sep- 33 Jack Kim. “FACTBOX: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 Long- tember 15, 2015. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/ range Missile.” Reuters. March 13, 2009. Accessed May 04, news/world-asia-21710644 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-taepodong- 37 “Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Tech- sb-idUSTRE52C1NG20090313. nology in Launch by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in 34 “North Korea: Satellite Fails to Enter Orbit.” CBSNews. Resolution 2087 (2013) | Meetings Coverage and Press Re- April 13, 2012. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.cbsnews. leases.” UN News Center. January 22, 2013. Accessed May 04, com/news/north-korea-satellite-fails-to-enter-orbit/. 2016. http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10891.doc.htm. 29 Folmar / Spring 2017

have yielded anywhere from 6 to 9 kilotons.38 The have occurred. The first possibility is that North Ko- larger yield in this test generated some new ques- rea was indeed attempting to test a hydrogen bomb, tions pertaining to the North Korea’s nuclear pro- and the fission device of the first stage did explode, gram. Since North Korea had suspended separation but failed in triggering a fusion reaction in the second of weapons grade plutonium for a period of time, it stage of the explosion.41 This could be why this test begged the question of how much plutonium they resembled the one conducted in 2013, but did not must have stockpiled. It also raised questions about have the hallmarks of a thermonuclear test. Another North Korea’s covert uranium enrichment facility, possibility is that they did not test a hydrogen bomb and whether they had attained the ability to produce at all, and had instead actually detonated a boosted highly enriched uranium that would be required to fission device. This would entail including some generate weapons-grade uranium, and if so how long fusion material like deuterium and tritium gas in the had they been capable of doing so and at what rate. core which would increase the rate and efficiency The larger yield may have also signified that they of the fission reaction, resulting in a higher explo- were becoming more sophisticated in their nuclear sive yield.42 This might explain why the yield was weapons design, as many scientists believe the size slightly larger than their previous nuclear test, but and yield of previous North Korean tests may have many scientists think it should have been larger than demonstrated a lack of refinement or development in the estimated 10 kilotons. If this is the case then it their design, and thus why they had produced smaller demonstrates that they are not quite at the level of yields than what many other nations were capable of engineering a more advanced fission device. But the with their first nuclear tests.39 most obvious option would be that they simply tested In January of 2016, North Korea conducted yet another basic form of fission detonation as they had another nuclear test at their underground facility previously, either with material from their plutonium outside of P’unggey. This time, North Korea declared stockpile, or possibly even highly enriched uranium to having detonated a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb; produced in the clandestine programs that Siegfried immediately hailing the test as a triumphant success. Hecker had previously alluded to. For the time being If true, this would be an impressive leap in North however, it is virtually impossible to know exact- Korean nuclear technology, well ahead of schedule ly what North Korea tested or how successful the from what anyone could have predicted, and could results were. have even more radical implications in altering the security situation in Korea. However, outside ob- Conclusion servers estimated the yield to have been only around North Korea has actively pursued a domestic 10 kilotons.40 This raised many doubts throughout nuclear weapons program since its very inception as the global community that the test could have been a state. It has defied international efforts to limit its a successful detonation of a thermonuclear device. acquisition of such weapons every step of the way, The explosive yield for fusion devices are generally and remains determined to build a formidable nuclear measured in megatons, and this test was only a little deterrent for what it perceives as legitimate outside larger than the nuclear test conducted in 2013. threats to its regime. Even as international sanctions Since the explosive yield did not match the pa- began to mount, North Korea has audaciously re- rameters associated with a thermonuclear device, this fused to allow the global community to limit their suggested several other explanations for what could ascent to becoming a nuclear power. They have been steadfast in their efforts of maximizing their military 38 He-suk Choi. “Estimates Differ on Size of N.K. Blast.” The Korea Herald. February 14, 2013. Accessed May 04, 2016. 41 Tong Zhao. “Understanding the Small Yield of North Ko- http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130214000765. rea’s Claimed H-Bomb Test.” Carnegie Endowment for Interna- 39 Jeffrey Park. “The North Korean Nuclear Test: What the tional Peace. January 7, 2016. Accessed May 06, 2016. http:// Seismic Data Says.” carnegietsinghua.org/2016/01/07/understanding-small-yield-of- 40 Ankit Panda. “North Korea Tests Nuclear Device, Claims north-korea-s-claimed-h-bomb-test/iscm. Successful Thermonuclear Detonation.” The Diplomat. Jan- 42 Charles Ferguson. “North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test: What uary 6, 2016. Accessed May 06, 2016. http://thediplomat. Does It Mean?” Federation of American Scientists. January com/2016/01/north-korea-tests-nuclear-device-claims-success- 8, 2016. Accessed May 6, 2016. https://fas.org/blogs/securi- ful-thermonuclear-detonation/. ty/2016/01/north-korea-nuclear/. 30 Folmar / Spring 2017

power in an effort to validate their own perception their resolve in the pursuit of power, and driven the of being a contender near the top of the global power North Korean program literally underground where structure. They have been one of the few nations to we can no longer obtain any major intelligence on have been legitimately threatened with nuclear arms their technological capabilities. The Hermit Kingdom by the United States, which in itself elevates their lives up to its nickname, as we can only observe and own recognition of being an acknowledged threat to estimate how sophisticated their weapons program a known superpower. has become, and since international response has North Korea sees its nuclear weapons program only responded through eliciting the use of ineffectu- as the primary means to balance the power between al sanctions, the North Korean nuclear weapons pro- itself and the United States, and that the only way it gram will continue unimpeded until the international could ensure its own survival was through maximiz- community responds with an appreciable means to ing its own power in a way that would provide de- slow or stop them, which is not likely to occur any terrence to prevent intervention and regime change. time soon. This in itself demonstrates that there is When the United States and South Korea regularly some validity to offensive realism’s call to obtain conduct massive war games and military exercises, power at any means necessary in order to present a North Korea regards such actions as a direct threat form of deterrence that will ensure the security of the to their survival since their own conventional forces state, because as we have seen from the UN response, are decades obsolete, leaving the pursuit of nuclear there are constraints to what level of commitment the weapons as being the only legitimate means of form- international community will undertake to prevent a ing a substantial deterrence. There is also fact that the state such as North Korea from making the ascent to United States still currently identifies North Korea becoming a nuclear power. as a legitimate target for preemptive nuclear strike as outlined by the United States Nuclear Posture Re- Author Biography view, which leaves North Korea with no other op- Cody Folmar is a senior at San Francisco State tions but to pursue nuclear weapons as the only form University, and is currently majoring in International of deterrence to that specific level of threat directed Relations with a focus on Intelligence and Security. towards it. Kim Jung Un addressed this directly after He has previously covered subjects such as the rapid conducting their forth nuclear test when he stated, development of global urbanization in conjuncture “The DPRK’s H-bomb test ... is a self-defensive step with the future of conducting military operations on for reliably defending the peace on the Korean Pen- urban terrain, as well as the Ukrainian revolution and insula and the regional security from the danger of subsequent civil war in Eastern Ukraine. He is also in nuclear war caused by the U.S.-led imperialists.”43 the process of starting an internship in the Bay Area Essentially, North Korea finds itself locked in the with a federal agency that falls under the umbrella of global arena with the other major contenders band- the Department of Homeland Security. wagoning together to prevent their state from rising the ranks of the global power structure. But North Bibliography Korea has remained undeterred every step of the way, Abbas, Hassan. “Causes That Led to Nuclear Pro- to the point where their nuclear program may now be liferation from Pakistan to Iran, Libya, and North immune to international sanctions, as their own do- Korea: Investigating the Role of the Dr. Abdul mestic production may have reached the point where Qadeer Khan Network.” Fletcher School of Law they no longer need to import major components or and Diplomacy. April 2008. Accessed April 18, outside technical expertise necessary to continue de- 2016. http://search.proquest.com.jpllnet.sfsu.edu/ veloping their program. Furthermore, the manner in docview/304336020?pq-origsite=summon&ac- which the international community has poised with countid=13802. the carrot or the stick approach has only solidified AGREED FRAMEWORK OF 21 OCTOBER 43 Jack Kim. “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Says H-bomb Test Self-defensive Step against the U.S.” Reuters. January 09, 2016. 1994 BETWEEN THE UNITED S TATES OF Accessed May 06, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nort- AMERCIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEO- hkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0UN0Y420160109. PLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.” International 31 Folmar / Spring 2017

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Bacon, Kenneth. “DefenseLINK News: DoD News Hildebrandt, Timothy, Chen Jian, Samuel Kim, and Briefing Tuesday, September 8, 1998.”Office of the Hazel Smith. “Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of Chi- Assistant Secretary of Defense. September 8, 1998. na-North Korea Relations.” Woodrow Wilson In- Accessed April 18, 2016. http://fas.org/spp/guide/ ternational Center for Scholars. September 2003. dprk/t09081998_t9809asd.html. Accessed April 13, 2016. https://www.wilsoncen- ter.org/sites/default/files/asia_rpt115b.pdf. Bolton, Derek. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” American Security Project. August 08, 2012. Ac- “How Potent Are North Korea’s Threats?” BBC cessed April 13, 2016. http://www.americansecuri- News. September 15, 2015. Accessed May typroject.org/north-koreas-nuclear-program/. 04, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world- asia-21710644. Choi, He-suk. “Estimates Differ on Size of N.K. Blast.” The Korea Herald. February 14, 2013. Ac- Hwang, Jihwan. “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, cessed May 04, 2016. http://www.koreaherald.com/ and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union view.php?ud=20130214000765. and North Korea in Comparative Perspective.” World Affairs 168, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 39-48. Crail, Peter. “N. Korea Reveals Uranium-Enrichment Accessed April 13, 2016. Plant.” Arms Control Association. December 5, 2010. Accessed April 26, 2016. https://www.arms- Kim, Jack. “FACTBOX: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 control.org/act/2010_12/NorthKorea. Long-range Missile.” Reuters. March 13, 2009. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.reuters. Davenport, Kelsey. “Chronology of U.S.-North Kore- com/article/us-korea-north-taepodong-sb-idUS- an Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” Arms Control TRE52C1NG20090313. Association. March 2016. Accessed April 18, 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. Kim, Jack. “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Says H-bomb Test Self-defensive Step against the U.S.” Ferguson, Charles. “North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Reuters. January 09, 2016. Accessed May 06, Test: What Does It Mean?” Federation of Amer- 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northko- ican Scientists. January 8, 2016. Accessed May rea-nuclear-idUSKCN0UN0Y420160109. 6, 2016. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/01/ north-korea-nuclear/. Lebow, Richard. “Classical Realism.” In Internation- al Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 63. Hecker, Siegfried. “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Yongbyon Nuclear Complex.” Center for Interna- tional Security and Cooperation. November 20, Lee, Jae-bong. “US Deployment of Nuclear Weapons 2010. Accessed April 26, 2016. iis-db.stanford.edu/ in 1950s South Korea & North Korea’s Nuclear pubs/23035/HeckerYongbyon.pdf. Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 7, no. Hecker, Siegfried. “Report on North Korean Nuclear 8 (February 17, 2009). Program.” Federation of American Scientists. No- vember 15, 2006. Accessed April 16, 2016. http:// Leventhal, Paul, and Steven Dolley. “The North fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/hecker1106.pdf. Korean Nuclear Crisis.” International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. 1994. Ac- Hecker, Siegfried, Sean Lee, and Chaim Braun. cessed April 16, 2016. http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/ 32 Folmar / Spring 2017

mgs/1-3-leventhal.pdf. Center. June 12, 2009. Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm. McGrath, Matthew, and Daniel Wertz. The National Committe on North Korea. August 2015. Accessed “SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS NUCLEAR April 16, 2016. http://www.ncnk.org/resources/ TEST BY DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC publications/Missile_Issue_Brief.pdf. OF KOREA, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RES- OLUTION 1718.” United Nations. October 14, Mearsheimer, John. “Structural Realism.” In Interna- 2006. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://www.un.org/ tional Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversi- press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm. ty, 79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. “Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Mullen, Jethro, and Paul Armstrong. “North Korea Technology in Launch by Democratic People’s Carries out Controversial Rocket Launch.” CNN. Republic of Korea, in Resolution 2087 (2013) | December 12, 2012. Accessed May 04, 2016. Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” UN News http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/11/world/asia/ Center. January 22, 2013. Accessed May 04, 2016. north-korea-rocket-launch/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10891.doc.htm.

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Panda, Ankit. “North Korea Tests Nuclear Device, “US Nuclear Weapons in Korea.” The Nuclear In- Claims Successful Thermonuclear Detonation.” formation Project. September 28, 2005. Accessed The Diplomat. January 6, 2016. Accessed May 06, April 26, 2016. http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/ 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/north-ko- koreahistory.htm. rea-tests-nuclear-device-claims-successful-thermonuclear-detonation/. Windrem, Robert. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Father, Master Spy.” Msnbc.com. 2013. Accessed April 18, 2016. Park, Jeffrey. “The North Korean Nuclear Test: What http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340760/ns/world_ the Seismic Data Says.” Bulletin of the Atomic news-south_and_central_asia/t/pakistans-nucle- Scientists. May 26, 2009. Accessed May 04, 2016. ar-father-master-spy/#.VxVD0zHjIlA. http://thebulletin.org/north-korean-nuclear-test- what-seismic-data-says. Zhao, Tong. “Understanding the Small Yield of North Korea’s Claimed H-Bomb Test.” Carnegie En- “Punishing North Korea Won’t Work.” Bulletin of the dowment for International Peace. January 7, 2016. Atomic Scientists. May 28, 2009. Accessed April Accessed May 06, 2016. http://carnegietsinghua. 26, 2016. http://thebulletin.org/punishing-north-ko- org/2016/01/07/understanding-small-yield-of- rea-wont-work. north-korea-s-claimed-h-bomb-test/iscm.

“Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Repub- lic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” UN News 33 4 Hoffman / Spring 2017

you are welcome here: national identity and immigration in Euskadi,

basque country Basque nationalism traces its origins to very exclusive and racially driven doctrines proclaiming the right to independence based on the Basque race. In literature, the case of By Basque minority nationalism is often associated with violence and made synonymous with separatist terrorism. The internal rifts within the evolving Basque nationalist narra- hallie hoffman tives display a deeply pluralized society residing at polar ends of the spectrum. Views towards immigrants tend to either advocate for models of civic liberalism or call for a retreat back to exclusion, with little to no ability to meet in the middle. Nevertheless, integration policies employed during the early 2000s population flow indicate a new consistency within Basque nationalism. Welcoming and inclusionary approaches to integration throughout Euskadi were made possible through the establishment of a new regional citizenship based on residence rather than ethnicity. The efforts of framing migration positively, and utilizing cultural priming techniques on Basque citizens, allude to a conscious decision to forge a new collective Basque identity based on values of inclusion and liberalism. Integration policies towards immigrants from diverse backgrounds were used to counter the political capacity of ETA terrorism and differentiate its identity from Spain’s, which held exclusionary policies towards immigrants at the time. This argument challenges common misconceptions that ethnic minority nationalists exclude immigrants from their movements out of fear that diversity will dilute their independence aims.

fter the fall of the Soviet Union, tionalist movement has included many Aa series of secessionist wars separatist organizations with varying erupted throughout Eastern Europe, platforms and narratives. However, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia.1 a consistent theme within Basque Modernization helped initiate move- nationalism is the claim to autonomy ments in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia based on the Basque ethnic identity where a rise in ethnic consciousness which has its own unique race, history, perpetuated a demand for political and culture. autonomy.2 Today, ethnic nationalist Ethnonationalist movements are movements and separatist behavior characterized as communities united portrayed by diasporic groups - such under a common descent, often times as the Basques in Spain- attest to the representing a region in search of a ongoing complexities and prevalence state.3 The identity construction pro- of nationalist ideology. Basque na- cess is an important consideration for tionalism promotes the political unity separatists seeking autonomy from the of the Basque people and culture, call- state. These movements turn inward to ing for independence across the three preserve a solidified regional identity Basque-speaking provinces. Its ori- through expressions of language and gins date back to the late 19th century culture. The construction of a strong during a period of forced assimilation nationalist identity is often necessary and restrictive policies from Spain. as breaking the territorial integrity of Throughout the years, the Basque na- a nation comes with major pushback from the state and requires the full 1 Steven Craig Roach. 2002. The Question of Cultural Autonomy: Reassessing the Merits mobilization of a group’s political, of Cultural Autonomy in the Post -Cold War. cultural, and ideological distinctions. University of Denver, 1. 3 Charles B. Keely. 1996. How Nation-States 2 Jack David Eller. 1997. Ethnicity, Culture, Create and Respond to Refugee Flows. The and ‘The Past’. Michigan Quarterly Review International Migration Review. Vol. 30, no. 4; 36, no. 4. 1046-1066 34 Hoffman / Spring 2017

Subsequently, symbols highlighting both major and Identity Construction minor differences from the state are often employed. The ideological perception of a nation and the As a logical extension, one would assume that the image it projects to the world are widely studied need for self-preservation would lead to unfavorable through a nationalist lens. The process of identity views of immigrants who could be perceived as a construction is a deliberate move to separate any threat to the stability of the movements which are political entity from the rest of the world. Scholars of ultimately rooted in race. Indeed, it is common for nationalism argue every nation develops a framework states striving to form their ethnonationalist identity to forming their collective identity to some degree, to encounter legal disputes over immigration flow. however debates surrounding levels of legality within However, this paper argues that this is not the case in his process differ. Brass presents a theoretical frame- a number of autonomous regions around the world work asserting that ethnicity and nationalism are that employ more welcoming immigration policies not inherent but rather conscious social and political compared to other states. At that juncture, this paper constructions put forth by the state.4 Triandafyllidou will a confront the question: Are minority nationalists argues that a nation’s identity is only made officially capable of integrating immigrants in their goal for recognizable through its contrast to other identities.5 self-determination without simultaneously diluting Anderson’s concept of the nation expands upon Marx their ethnic identity? idea of “imagined communities” meaning that identi- This paper demonstrates how ethnic groups may ty is not an organic structure but rather the result of a gain moral high ground, exert political control, and deliberate and tireless process of reconstruction. culturally prime their citizens to promote diversity The task of constructing an identity as far-reach- and human capital in their region through inclusive ing as a national identity requires that residents share migration policies that separate them from their fundamental attitudes and beliefs systems. This un- opponents who refuse entry to immigrants, especially derstanding of a nation creates a collective identity, asylum seekers. The case of the Basques will be used where residents associate their individual processes to demystify common correlations between dias- of thinking with that of the larger nation. In this poric communities and immigration. Considering the context, a person’s relationship to the nation blurs unique ethnic classification of Basque nationalism concepts of individuality with the greater concern and its roots in racially-driven doctrines, many would of upholding the national identity. It is within this assume that they would have strict restrictions on connection that strong sentiments of patriotism and immigrants of diverse backgrounds. However, this is national pride come into play. The “comradeship” of not the case: the autonomous region accepted consid- the community guarantees deep psychological con- erably more internally displaced people (IDPs) than nections that prevail regardless of injustice and ex- Spain during the diverse population flow in the early ploitation.6 Identity priming experiments in Western 2000s. Europe highlight how prioritizing national identity The inclusionary and multicultural policies put over personal identity results in the rise of exclusion- forth in the Basque integration plan helped to fur- ary sentiments towards immigrant groups.7 The ex- ther their independence aims and can be viewed as periment highlighted how approaches to immigration a response to Spain’s forced assimilation and ex- strictly from a national identity viewpoint result in clusionary immigration policies. It also represents a heightened fear towards immigrants with participants move away from a Basque nationalism commonly synonymous with violent ETA terrorism, as a way 4 Proshanta Nandi. 1995. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. Book Review. The International Migration to establish the true Basque identity and show how Review. 29, no. 2: 589-590. the nation wants to be perceived within Spain. This 5 Anna Triandafyllidou. 1998. National identity and the ‘other’. paper contributes to a crucial body of work by schol- Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 4: Abstract. ars challenging the assertion that immigrants dilute 6 Benedict Anderson. 1991. Imagined Communities, revised ethnic minority nationalists and their goal for inde- edition. London and New. 7 Paul Sniderman, Hagendoorn Louk, and Markus Prior. 2004. pendence. Rather, it will explore the mutually bene- Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary ficial relationship between the state, immigrants, and Reactions to Immigrant Minorities. American Political Science the separatists. Review. 98, no. 1: 45. 35 Hoffman / Spring 2017 citing serious concerns over economic and cultural chosen process of the nation may vary, more increas- integration as well as their overall safety.8 ingly we are witnessing a resurgence of forceful integration methods. Assumed Homogeneity It was the emergence of nationalist ideas in the Cultural Priming nineteenth century during the French Revolution that Policies of integration at the societal level help gave way to a new outward projection of nationalism, to eliminate discrimination in the labor market and focused on difference. Symbols reinforcing national forced cultural integration. The role of the communi- difference has proved dangerous over time, ultimate- ty may forge new attitudes of inclusivity that rethink ly devolving into a social tool used to gauge and a new regional identity rooted in diversity. Many differentiate between those who ‘belong’ within the times the national language that is adopted to accom- confounds of the nation’s identity and those on the pany these policies is crucial. The priming of citizens fringe. Forces of globalization have helped to rapidly can significantly influence public opinion and nation- intensify the exclusion of people residing outside of al identity. Symbols reinforced through narratives, the projected identity. Hobsbawm argues that there values in the media, entertainment, and even sporting is nothing less organic, or more dangerous, than the events may influence the way citizens form their own concept of an exclusive and singular national ethnic personal identity - as well as their views of immi- identity.9 When a nation aspires to be politically and grants within their society. culturally homogeneous; the urgency to eradicate the According to a global poll by the BBC in 2005, ‘others,’ a coined term used to address the groups citizens from all over the world listed national identi- who are most commonly viewed as a threat to the ty and religion are the two most defining elements of survival of the nation intensifies. These groups are their personal identity. Therefore, the reinforcement categorized to include ethnic minorities, immigrant of symbols - either exclusionary and inclusionary - communities, and a small nation existing within a toward immigrants can significantly influence public larger multinational state.10 Within this classification opinion. These symbols may galvanize citizens who of ‘other,’ the term is expanded to include an intensi- are already deeply concerned with their national fied threat known the ‘significant other.’ The nature identity. Conversely, symbols can be used to rein- of this paper will focus on the ‘significant other’ who force the mutual benefits of immigrant populations are perceived as the greatest danger to the state. The and the cultural diversity and economic incentives feature that causes this group to stand out above all they bring to the region. This paper focuses on the internal threats is their direct impact on the most cultural priming of a community including exercises defining aspects of the state. These groups inflict which encourage multiculturalism at the local level. anxiety into the heart of state through their ideals of Social conditioning may increase a region’s approach self-determination, along with territorial claims and to immigration by forming a civic identity, and in- ethnic disputes. In their more subtle form, the ‘signif- volving a citizen’s identification with a certain politi- icant other’ are believed to lead to the deterioration cal system thereby helping to establish his individual of language and culture by blurring of the ‘distinc- rights and duties. tiveness of the in-group.’11 In a multiethnic state, this path of ‘national unity’ is accompanied by programs Autonomy/Self-Determination of forced integration used to eliminate ethnic cultures State imposed goals of national homogeneity and and languages of the ‘significant others.’12 While the forced integration policies focused on the incinera- tion of cultural practices and language, are the most 8 Ibid. cited reasons prompting sub-nationals to pursue au- 9 Eric Hobsbawm. 1996. Language, culture, and national identity. Social Research: 1065-1080. tonomy. Sub-national groups are “culturally-distinct 13 10 Anna Triandafyllidou. 1998. “National identity and the ‘oth- nations below the level of the state.” Autonomy er’.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 4: 601. movements challenge the structure of the state and 11 Anna Triandafyllidou. 1998. “National identity and the ‘other’.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 4: 600. 13 Fiona Claire Barker. 2007. Redefining the Nation: Sub-state 12 Anthony D. Smith. 1991. National identity. University of nationalism and the political challenges of immigrant integra- Nevada Press, 75. tion. Harvard University. Abstract. 36 Hoffman / Spring 2017 appeal for sovereignty based on their distinct ethnic ‘popular perception,’ meaning that how secure sub- identity. Ghai identifies an overwhelming trend in re- state nationalists are in their separatist narrative will cent autonomous movements; suggesting that “it has influence their openness to multiculturalism.20 For been seen as a panacea for cultural diversity, and as, example, insecurity in Catalan nationalism led to an under the influence of identity politics dawns on us, increase in exclusionary policies against immigrants autonomy seems to provide the path to maintaining during the nation-building process.21 While there unity of a kind while conceding claims to self-gov- are those who discuss the tension over immigrant ernment.”14 Minority sub-nationalist groups typically integration, not all scholars believe they have to be achieve either full or partial autonomy through spe- exclusionary.22 Barker suggests that sub-nationalist cial forms of representation and power sharing.15 policies “varies across space and time” challenging Much like the process of identity construction the common conceptions that they are purely hos- within the nation; autonomous movements careful- tile.23 From this perspective, immigration can provide ly construct and repackage their ethnic identity to much needed economic advantages and remedies validate their appeal for self-determination. Smith, to demographic issues such as an aging population. the architect of the ‘core doctrine’ of early nationalist Ghai argues that through extensive studies in India, theory, correlates ethnic nationalism to the root cause Canada, and Spain; it is possible for ethnonationalist of universal minority plight.16 The reasoning behind autonomy arrangements to benefit both sides through this theory argues that the process by which ethnic the diffusion of conflict and creation of more peace- minorities redefine and construct their identity acts ful interactions within the state.24 to “politicize its culture and are drawn into purifying the community of ‘alien’ elements, which in turn Multiculturalism may lead to the expulsion and even the extermina- Integration policies pose a series of difficult tion of minorities, the ‘outsider within’.”17 Thus the questions for sub-nationalist groups. Methods range question is raised, are minority nationalists capable between multicultural policies in support of immi- of integrating immigrants in their quest for self-deter- grants unique ethnic identities and practices - and mination without simultaneously diluting their ethnic ‘one-sided’ policies of assimilation which pressure identity? Kymlicka suggests that at first glance, the immigrants to renounce aspects of their distinct cul- answer to this question points to a resounding ‘no’ as tural identity.25 These methods are derived from two immigrants are seen to pose a threat to sub-national- very opposing theories - one that promotes the na- ist movements.18 tional interests of the state mainly from an economic According to Bauböck, population flows and standpoint, and then social identity, which consider- immigration closely determine the boundaries of citizenship.19 The psychological fear of diluting precious 20 Victor M. Olivieri. 2015. Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics in Catalonia and the cultural practices and dying languages, therefore, has Basque Country. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Abstract. vast impacts on immigration policies. However, more 21 Victor M. Olivieri. 2015. Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: recently, scholars have argued that autonomous re- Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics in Catalonia and the gions can adopt policies that benefit both immigrants Basque Country. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17. and aims of separatism. Olivieri argues that immi- 22 Sanjay Jeram. 2013. Immigrants and the Basque nation: diversity as a new marker of identity. Ethnic and Racial Stud- gration policies and identity discourses are shaped by ies, 36:11, 1770-1788. Eve Hepburn and Michael Rosie. 2014. 14 Yash Ghai. Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Immigration, Nationalism, and Politics in Scotland. The Politics Claims in Multi-Ethnic States: 1. of Immigration in Multi-Level States: Governance and Political 15 Yash Ghai. Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Parties: 241-260. Claims in Multi-Ethnic States: 2. 23 Fiona Barker. 2010. Learning to be a majority: negotiating 16 Anthony D. Smith. 1994. Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight immigration, integration, and national membership in Quebec, of Minorities. J Refug Stud: 186. Political Science, 62, 1: Abstract. 17 Ibid. 24 Yash Ghai. 2000. Autonomy and ethnicity: negotiating 18 Will Kymlicka. 2001. Minority nationalism and multination competing claims in multi-ethnic states. Cambridge University federalism. Politics in the Vernacular: 91-119. Press. 19 Rainer Bauböck. 2007. Political boundaries in a multilevel 25 Sanjay Jeram and Adam Ilke. 2015. Diversity and National- democracy. Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances. Cambridge ism in the Basque Country and Flanders: Understanding Immi- University Press: 85-112. grants as Fellow Minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: 247. 37 Hoffman / Spring 2017 ations national identity a larger and most important article two of the statute, the provinces of Alava, marker of group membership.26 This paper focuses Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Navarra, were guaranteed on diversity, positing it as a new marker of identi- the right to self-governance.31 The larger entity of the ty. Multiculturalism invokes a pluralisation of the Basque Country was divided into three politically national identity and seeks to strengthen the sense of and legally distinct territories; the Basque Autono- the nation. In a multicultural society, integration for mous Community (BAC), the Autonomous Com- immigrants liberally manifests itself in many forms. munity of Navarre, and Iparralde also known as the It enables immigrant groups the right to pursue their French Basque Country.32 All three regions belong to ideal model of integration without positing one mod- a larger state; two within Spain (BAC and the Au- el as inherently better, nor making one more tangible tonomous Community of Navarre) while Iparralde than the other. belongs to the French Republic.33 For example, ethnic minority groups may wish As a minority nation, once subjected to overtly to pursue full assimilation - granting them all of the repressive forms of control by Spain, the Autono- rights of other integrated citizens, while others may mous Statute provided a legal framework for the his- want to maintain their cultural differences. Even toric territories to regain self-governance over their more, some will adopt a mixture of the two methods, institutions and organization.34 Under the statutes of creating what is called a “cosmopolitan mixed iden- autonomy, the Basque government assumes control tity.” Tariq Modood, a scholar of multiculturalism over “sectorial policies of integration including work, and advocate of minority rights, argues that within education, housing, healthcare, and social affairs.”35 integration there is no single model that is going to The 1981 Economic Agreement contributed to eco- be suitable for all groups. Therefore, in order to pro- nomic control by enabling each province manage- mote a fully functioning system capable of integrat- ment over sectors of integration, tax collection, and ing large numbers of minority groups, it is crucial to inspection as well as the redistribution of wealth.36 consider all possible models and political responses. Despite increased autonomy, the statute grants Spain exclusive power over immigration,37 prohibiting the Case Study: Basque Country Basque government from pursuing their own individ- Euskadi, also known as the Basque Country, is ualized model for immigration. However, integration the historic, territorial, and cultural representation of policies are the mode by which the Basque govern- the Basque people, who have inhabited the region ment has regained a sense of regional control while for several thousand years.27 Euskadi is situated at addressing the consequences of state-imposed immi- the edge of the Pyrenees Mountains and sprawls the otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive border between France and Spain on the Atlantic citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. coast.28 With a surface area of 20,664 kilometers Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque Country (CEIC/UPV): 4. and a population of approximately three million, 31 The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country. 1979: 1, the small ancient country maintains a strong identi- Article 2; http://www.basquecountry.eus/t32-448/en/contenidos/ ty.29 The Basques gained partial autonomy in 1979 informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_455/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf . when Spain’s constitution issued an official Auton- 32 Ramón Zallo and Mikel Ayuso. 2009. The Basque Country: omy Statute of Basque Country which established a Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque 30 Government. Preface. community of autonomous Basque regions. Within 33 Ibid. 26 Sniderman, p, Hagdendoorn, L. & Prior, M. 2004. Predis- 34 The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country. 1979: 1, posing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions Article 2; http://www.basquecountry.eus/t32-448/en/contenidos/ to Immigrant Minorities. American Political Science Review, informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_455/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf. 98: 1, 35-49. 35 Maite Fouassier. http://www.idees.net/files/941-18-docu- 27 Ramón Zallo and Mikel Ayuso. 2009. The Basque Country: ment/Euskadi.eng.pdf. Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque 36 Muriel, Daniel, and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The Management of Government. Preface. Otherness Beyond the State: Integration Policies and Inclusive 28 Ramón Zallo and Mikel Ayuso. 2009. The Basque Country: Citizenship as a Government Paradigm in the Basque Country. Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque Government. 8. Country (CEIC/UPV), 5. 29 Ibid. 37 Maite Fouassier. http://www.idees.net/files/941-18-docu- 30 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The management of ment/Euskadi.eng.pdf. 38 Hoffman / Spring 2017 gration laws.38 overwhelming threat to the very survival of Basque Country.43 Views towards immigration continued to Evolving Immigration narratives within Basque lean towards exclusion as Basque society increased Nationalism its capital and distinct classes were formed. The Integration policies employed during the early multifaceted society, was now apart of a three-tiered 2000s population flow allude to a new consistency society, including the upper middle class, urban low- within Basque nationalism premised upon models er class, and the new urban immigrants. Nationalism of civic engagement. However, early Basque re- became a plausible and tangible method to suppress gional politics favored policies of exclusion towards the zealous immigrant population thus preserving non-native groups. The “father” of Basque national- the Basque identity, “in the presence of the peaceful ism and leader of the PNV nationalist party, Sabino invasion of the maketos.”44 Arana, promoted ethnically based identities and used It wasn’t until 1932 that the PNV reversed these race as a marker for citizenship by differentiating be- policies and officially accepted non-ethnic Basques tween “true” native born Basques and non-native’s in as members of the Basque community.45 This shift order to exclude those on the periphery from gaining in policy prompted a gradual integration process membership.39 Arana first introduced the ideologi- for mainly Basque-born ethnic Spaniards. From the cal basis driving Basque nationalism during a major 1950’s onward, these groups integrated with relative population flood in the region prompted by a peri- ease due to their familiarity with Basque society and od of rapid industrialization. Starting in the 1880s, cultural practices. While this move can be seen as a immigrants migrated from Spain in large numbers step in the right direction for shifting conceptions of with aspirations of joining the major steel and min- ‘Basquesness’ or what it meant to be a Basque in the ing movements.40 In Bilbao alone, the population modern age, it failed to confront effective modes of increased from 35,505 in the year 1877 to 83,306 in integration for people coming from more diverse cor- 1900.41 Within this population increase, out of 80 per- ners of the world. The question of when and in what cent of the immigration demographic, approximately nature to integrate immigrants from places such as 50 percent of the incoming immigrant population North Africa and Europe wouldn’t be developed until identified as non-Basques.42 years later when the Basque identity was becoming The population flow experienced in Basque more secure and the nationalist movement was pick- Country during this time transitioned the region from ing up steam. a largely agrarian based economy towards a more In order to understand the modern form of diverse labor force with distinct economic classifica- Basque identity and separatism, one must consider tions. Arana viewed this new working class society of the years of forced exile and repression the Basques immigrants as a threat to the social cohesiveness of experienced under the Spanish dictatorship of Fran- the Basque identity. The subsequent cultural classifi- cisco Franco from 1939 to 1975. The Franco period cation of the nationalism birthed out of this fear, ulti- decimated all outward projects of Basque nationalism mately led to a correlation placing immigrants as an through concentrated efforts of political suppression and forced cultural cleansing. By eliminating the 38 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The Management of Otherness Beyond the State: Integration Policies and Inclusive symbols and practices fueling the various minori- Citizenship as a Government Paradigm in the Basque Country. ty aspirations of the region, Franco and his regime Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque hoped to target and subdue the groundwork acting Country (CEIC/UPV): 4-25 http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/tol- to support the political platforms of the autonomous erace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_Spain-BasqueCountry. movements. Until his death in 1975, the Basque pdf. 39 Jeram, Sanjay. 2015. More ‘Friends’ than ‘Foes’: Basque language, flag, songs, and celebrations were forbid- Nationalism and the Immigrant Question. Council for European Studies. 43 Manuel Romero. 2004. Basque Nationalism: History, Roots 40 Manuel Romero. 2004. Basque Nationalism: History, Roots and Possible Solutions. Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 5. and Possible Solutions. Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 44 Ibid. 4. 45 Jeram, Sanjay. 2015. More ‘Friends’ than ‘Foes’: Basque 41 Ibid. Nationalism and the Immigrant Question. Council for European 42 Ibid. Studies. 39 Hoffman / Spring 2017

den.46 Franco declared the northwestern provinces as it contributed to delineate the ‘boundaries’ of Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia as ‘traitorous provinces.’47 of the Basque community by sharply demarcat- Political and trade unions were completely outlawed ing outsiders from insiders.53 and there was an extreme amount of social repression often resulting in the imprisonment and execution of Conversi further concludes that nationalist mem- Basque citizens.48 During the Franco years, crucial bership focused on a citizen’s involvement in the aspects of the Basque identity were lost. To this day, armed struggle. A citizen’s level of belonging moved the region is attempting to compensate for the lack away from Arana’s manifesto built on race, towards a of written word and literature due to the linguistic person’s allegiance to ETA: repression during Franco’s regime.49 In 1959, a new player in Basque nationalism Basques, in ETA’s eyes, were distinguished emerged largely as a response to the brutal repres- from non-Basques mainly on the basis of their sion under the fascist regime. ETA (Euskadi Ta involvement in the struggle for Basque liber- Askatasuna) which translates to Basque Country and ation. Lacking a discrete and visible element Freedom, inserted itself into the spine of the Basque such as language, the requirements of Basque struggle for independence.50 ETA’s campaign based identity have shifted to a simpler voluntarist itself upon the Marxist ideology relying on a violent dimension. The more a person is involved in struggle, it represented a move away from traditional the struggle, the more he/she is accepted as a Basque independence models under the leadership of member of the national community. Hence, the the Basque Nationalist Party. At the height of ETA’s most radical option was likely to be considered influence during the final Francois years, each -ek also the most ‘Basque’ and thus the most mor- intza (ETA’s action) directly influenced the resulting ally acceptable. As a consequence, the social ‘popular mobilizations’ among the Basque soci- environment was far more polarized in Euskadi ety.51 The repressed youth were particularly drawn than in Catalonia, with each nationalist stress- to ETA’s campaign and micro-aggressions such as ing his/her nationalist credentials in order to be the Basque-Madrid conflict helped retain the need accepted by the ‘moral community.’54 for ETA’s presence.52 From the 1960’s onward, with ETA at the helm, the Basque identity was rooted in The downfall of ETA stemmed from a loss of violence and opposition. Conversi argues that during popular support from the people, combined with a this time, the focus of nationalism was made synony- concerted police enforcement effort and bipartisan mous with ETA’s violence: political pressure.55 The changing perception of Basque nationalism resulted in more inclusionary In the aims of the nationalists, violence proved policies towards immigrants.56 The shift from a to be an effective substitute for culture insofar nationalism rooted in race to “language and action,” led to a more open and inclusionary form of nation- 46 Sarah Wildman. 2009. Basque Without Borders. The New alism.57 Quite interestingly, the focus on integration York Times. 159, no. 54811: 1. 47 Ramón Zallo and Mikel Ayuso. 2009. The Basque Country: resulted in a scaling back in the pursuit of inde- Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque pendence from Spain, “as a lessening of out-group Government: 13. 48 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 49 Paul DeLaney. 1987. The Basque Country; After Centuries 54 Daniele Conversi. 1994. Language, Immigration and Nation- in Turmoil, A region’s Culture Seems on the Brink of a Revival. alism: Comparing the Basque and Catalan Cases. PhD Thesis. New York Times, Opposing Viewpoints in Context, jpllnet.sfsu. University of London; 259. edu/login?url=http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A176117834/ 55 BBC News. 2017. Timeline: ETA Campaign. http://www. OVIC?u=sfsu_main&xid=a76796b0. Accessed 11 Apr. 2017. bbc.com/news/world-europe-11181982. 50 BBC News. 2017. What is ETA? http://www.bbc.com/news/ 56 Victor M.Olivieri. 2015. Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: world-europe-11183574. Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics in Catalonia and the 51 Daniele Conversi. 1994. Language, Immigration and Nation- Basque Country. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1621. alism: Comparing the Basque and Catalan Cases. PhD Thesis. 57 Daniele Conversi. 1994. Language, Immigration and Nation- University of London; 258. alism: Comparing the Basque and Catalan Cases. PhD Thesis. 52 Ibid. University of London, Abstract. 40 Hoffman / Spring 2017

behavior and in-group bias in the Basque Country.”58 soli, which allow municipalities in Spain to register In other words, the Basque nationalist movement immigrants that are ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ according sourced this population flow to confront the inconsis- to Spanish immigration law.64 Instead, the Basque tency in its nationalism. government pursued an ideological basis for citizenship based on the jus domicile model- citizenship Framing Migration based on residence, “to extend equality of civil, so- The development of a first Basque integration cial, economic rights to everyone regardless of their policy began in 2001 with the Directorate of Immi- place of origin or legality, according to the Spanish gration under the auspices of the Ministry of Hous- immigration law.”65 The plan emphasized heightened ing and Social Affairs.59 The efforts of the ministry awareness and broad values of acceptance at a time resulted in the first Basque immigration plan (PVI) when Spain’s narrative focused on the political and issued in 2003 and set a precedent for future govern- social exclusion of immigrant populations. ment action by establishing policies of integration The PVI represents definitive opposition and for foreigners arriving in Basque Country.60 The condemnation of Spanish immigration policy, and plan reflected the exponential growth of immigrants additionally, it indicates a palpable social change from 21,140 in 2000 (1% of the total population) within the perception of Basque nationalism.66 The to 139,369 in 2010 (6.4% of the total population).61 policies aimed at integration set out to fundamentally This new wave of diverse immigrant workers came redefine what it meant to be Basque. Under the new from all over the world with four main host countries immigration plan, immigrants were only perceived as including, Latin America with 49.10 percent, Europe integrated once granted full citizenship. The narrative - 28.6 percent (particularly recent EU member coun- included all foreign variations of the ‘other,’ regard- tries), Africa - 17.39 percent, and Asia - 5.5 percent.62 less of their country of origin; “In summary, the The PVI developed broad parameters of Basque ‘other’ to whom the Basque immigration plans are citizenship and extended a set of rights and obli- directed is a foreign, non-European Community im- gations for all Basques.63 Reflecting the political migrant, with few resources and at risk of exclusion. climate, it condemned Spain’s government for their Nothing in those plans marks him from the viewpoint restrictive policies against immigrants based on of race, ethnic group or the idea of a minority; nor, in Spanish citizenship models, jus sanguinis and jus how he is conceived, is recourse taken to questions relating to racism, xenophobia or the rejection of 58 Victor M.Olivieri. 2015. Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: immigrants.”67 Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1621. The three main nationalist parties - the PNV, 59 Sanjay Jeram and Ilke Adam. 2015. Diversity and nation- Izquierda Unida (IV), and the Partido Popular (PP) - alism in the Basque Country and Flanders: understanding all subsequently endorsed the bill after it was draft- immigrants as fellow minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: ed.68 The tripartite coalition of nationalist groups in 248. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed April Basque Country partnered with immigrant organi- 12, 2017. 60 Sanjay Jeram. 2015. More ‘Friends’ than ‘Foes’: Basque zations to counter or in many ways work around the Nationalism and the Immigrant Question. Council for European Spanish controlled immigration laws. The coalition Studies. 61 Maite Martínez-Granado, Patxi Greño, and Mercedes 64 Ibid. Oleaga. 2012, “The Basque Country, Spain: Self- Evaluation 65 Ibid. Report”, OECD Reviews of Higher Education in Regional and 66 Olivieri, Victor M. 2015. Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: City Development, 16. http://www.oecd.org/edu/imhe/regional- Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics in Catalonia and the development. Basque Country. Ethnic and Racial Studies: 1621. 62 Ramón Zallo and Mikel Ayuso. 2009. The Basque Country: 67 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The management of Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive Government. 18. citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. 63 Jeram, Sanjay, and Ilke Adam. 2015. Diversity and na- Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque tionalism in the Basque Country and Flanders: understanding Country (CEIC/UPV): 8. immigrants as fellow minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: 68 Jeram, Sanjay. 2015. More ‘Friends’ than ‘Foes’: Basque 248. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed April Nationalism and the Immigrant Question. Council for European 12, 2017. Studies. 41 Hoffman / Spring 2017

formed a pro-immigrant discourse promoting liberal that permits inclusion without distinctions policies of acceptance using the 2003 PVI. Since that as the only way of achieving an intercultural time, the coalition has promoted a regional narrative society.72 that reinforces the ideological and political goals of the immigrant plan. The PP ultimately challenged Basque citizens are socially primed to view that the plan, citing that it was useless due to the con- immigrants as a cultural extension of their identity. trol of the Spanish state over immigration, however, Emerging narratives throughout Basque municipali- their endorsement remained. Despite the coalition ties posit assimilation of the ‘other’ with great impor- editing the bill twice, the political consensus of the tance to reinforce a new collective Basque identity.73 immigration plan has maintained its integrity. In order to assist non-Spanish and Euskera speakers, larger cities, such as Bilbao installed multilingual Public Policy Discourse machines in administrative offices to ensure that Basque public institutions and society play a immigrants had access to services and legal docu- significant and encouraging role within the imple- ments including housing and work permits.74 In 2004, mentation of integration policy. A statement by a center for immigrants called Norabide was opened the President of the Basque Regional Government in Vitoria offering legal advice, language classes, reinforces a new multicultural Basque society fol- psychological counseling and translation service for lowing years of conflict; “We went from a rural to immigrants.75 industrial people. Now we want Basque people from everywhere, from all ideologies, to come and partic- Social and NGO Participation ipate and debate their ideas about where we are and There is a heightened social awareness among where we’re going.’’69 Public institutions are viewed the Basque population including a tendency to as active participants responsible for carrying out participate in organizations and interact with other services guaranteeing the rights of citizenship.70 The members of their society.76 Labor unions or class guidelines of the 2003 PVI have been accompanied unions, business organizations, and social move- by policies of multiculturalism particularly in mu- ments are an ingrained aspect of a Basque citizens’ nicipalities with high immigrant populations.71 This life. Non-governmental organizations tend to focus interaction between levels of state and the public en- on promoting the living conditions for marginalized ables a consensus among Basque integration policy: 72 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The management of otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive Both the society and the Basque Public Admin- citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque istration must understand very clearly that we Country (CEIC/UPV): 9. .http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/toler- are living together with new citizens and that ace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_Spain-BasqueCountry. it is necessary to propitiate a structural change pdf. 73 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The management of 69 Paul DeLaney. 1987. The Basque Country; After Centuries otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive in Turmoil, A region’s Culture Seems on the Brink of a Revival. citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. New York Times, Opposing Viewpoints in Context, jpllnet.sfsu. Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque edu/login?url=http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A176117834/ Country (CEIC/UPV): 10 http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/toler- OVIC?u=sfsu_main&xid=a76796b0. Accessed 11 Apr. 2017. ace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_Spain-BasqueCountry. 70 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The management of pdf. otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive 74 Sanjay Jeram and Ilke Adam. 2015. Diversity and nation- citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. alism in the Basque Country and Flanders: understanding Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque immigrants as fellow minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: Country (CEIC/UPV): 9. http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/toler- 248. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed April ace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_Spain-BasqueCountry. 12, 2017. pdf. 75 Ibid. 71 Sanjay Jeram and Ilke Adam. 2015. Diversity and nation- 76 Ramón Zallo and Mikel Ayuso. 2009. The Basque Country: alism in the Basque Country and Flanders: understanding Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque immigrants as fellow minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: Government. 20. http://www.kultura.ejgv.euskadi.net/r46-714/ 248. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed April es/contenidos/informacion/ezagutu_eh/es_eza_eh/adjuntos/ 12, 2017. eza_en.pdf. 42 Hoffman / Spring 2017

or disadvantaged people and are particularly active By 2000, the number reached 56,068.83 The numbers in immigration issues and political asylum.77 The indicate an overwhelming rise in young immigrants Cear-Euskadi is an organization that promotes soli- in the region. Immigrant youth demographics come darity and integration of refugees from countries in with both a set of unique challenges and advantages conflict.78 Perhaps one of the reasons that the immi- within integration policy. On one hand, these youth gration plan has been so successful can be accredited are expected to successfully integrate into Basque to the multitude of surveys and reports conducted to state institutions and the educational system. This further understand the reality of immigration issues. may pose an overwhelming lifestyle change on an The Basque Observatory of Immigration Ikuspegi expedited learning track. However, the schooling posts an annual ‘yearbook’ that uses a statistical ap- system may be sourced as a vital asset in “solving the proach to comprehend immigration phenomenon in challenges of societal co-inclusion between natives various sectors including the educational system and and immigrants.”84 If integration programs and the labor markets.79 The Ikuspegi also conducts surveys curriculum are structured efficiently, the school can to weigh the attitudes towards immigration and the provide the knowledge needed for successful integra- integration process.80 The analysis provided by these tion; including a familiarity with the Basque lifestyle, various reports then is used to offer potential sugges- language, and customs.85 tions for migration and integration to policy makers. Within a school setting, immigrants may also The Basque Observatory of Immigration and become sensitized to the hardships of minority Ikuspegi additionally partners with the Basque Ser- culture; “they also become familiar with the experi- vice of Integration and Intercultural Coexistence Blit- ence of being different, and with the level of accep- zen to host conversations on integration and immi- tance or rejection this generates.”86 Furthermore, the gration.81 At a conference on Cultural and Religious school provides immigrant youth with the skills and Diversity in the Basque Country in 2013, politicians knowledge for their future occupation within Basque were invited to come together to confront the issues society. The Basque’s view all of these factors as directly impacting their immigrant populations. The potential opportunities to generate understanding deputy Minister of Social Affairs, Iñigo Pombo, used and acceptance in immigrant youth; the link between the conference to call for further collaboration be- education and integration is therefore undeniable. tween public institutions and the Basque society to In the educational system, specifically in the guarantee an “honest and civilized” society in which regions of Navarre and Basque Autonomous Coun- “institutions do not humiliate people and people do try (BAC), immigration has been debated within the not humiliate each other.”82 curriculum and debates over language instruction in pre-primary, primary school, secondary school, and Educational System pre-university or vocational training.87 The Basque In 1999, there were 6,291 foreign youth (ages educational opted for a narrative reflecting thoughtful zero through twenty-nine), living in Basque Country. policies of integration among immigrant children. The initial plan in 1982, the Special Education Plan, established the integration of schools. The Basque 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. Public School Law 1/1993; affirmed that “public 79 Gorka Moreno Márquez. 2014. Immigration in the Basque powers guarantee the provision of free and quality in- Country 2013 Yearbook: Immigration and the Impact of the struction for all, in a bilingual, diverse, Basque public Crisis. Country Coordinator Spain. European Website on Inte- school, serving Basque society socially, and cultural- gration: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/immigration-in-the-basque-country-2013- 83 Alfonso Unceta and Concepción Medrano, eds. 2010. Equal- yearbook-immigration-and-the-impact-of-the-crisis. ity, equity, and diversity: educational solutions in the Basque 80 Ibid. Country. No. 1. Center for Basque Studies: 139. https://basque. 81 Country Coordinator Spain 2013. Spain: Experts Address unr.edu/docs/CR1.pdf. Cultural and Religious Diversity in the Basque Country. Euro- 84 Ibid., 140. pean Website on Integration: European Commission. 85 Ibid., 139. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/spain-experts-ad- 86 Ibid., 140. dress-cultural-and-religious-diversity-in-the-basque-country. 87 Jasone Cenoz ed. 2008. Teaching through Basque: Achieve- 82 Ibid. ments and challenges. Vol. 21, no. 1. Multilingual Matters: 3-4. 43 Hoffman / Spring 2017

ly routed in its environment, particularly compensat- reinforcement” to support Euskara learners,94 realize ing for inequalities, and integrating diversity.”88 the necessity for more Euskara usage and are imple- In 2003, the Basque Ministry of Education mented to ensure its knowledge becomes a variable released a report entitled Programa para la atención of inclusion rather than exclusion.95 del alumnado inmigrante (Plan to care for immigrant pupils).89 The plan called for the specific focus of Analysis helping students from immigrant families and made The lessons learned from the evolution of the assisting immigrant children a concern of the great- Basque nationalist identity alludes to a larger mes- er society by citing that if not paid proper attention, sage within surges of intense forms of nationalism. neglect of the ‘other’ could ultimately result in Studying minority nationalist groups within Spain stunted educational opportunities for both native and is particularly useful within the field of international immigrant children alike.90 The 2003 program for affairs because it contributes unparalleled insight into Serving Immigrant Students established guidelines modern identity politics. The case of the Basques is for promoting acceptance in schools and “responding particularly useful at providing knowledge within to their linguistic, curricular, and tutorial education popular perception and identity due to its classifica- needs.”91 Therefore, narratives towards immigrants tion as a diasporic minority-nationalist group at ex- in Basque schools mirrored symbols of multicultural- treme risk of losing its linguistic and cultural history. ism put forth by the PNV immigration plan. Basque The Basque case exemplifies how integration policies educational authorities set out to develop extensive and the assimilation of immigrants can be initiated programs of acceptance and promotion of cultural di- largely through public mobilization. It shows how the versity.92 This can be seen in larger sweeping reform public of minority regions, or perhaps a state within programs aimed at interculturalism as well as through a nation, can concentrate on local policies granted small gestures. For example, in Basque Country under their control to make tangible change in their many primary school entrances include a welcoming society. Further, the pairing of policies at the govern- message written in the foreign languages represent- mental level with increased public agency through ed by the student body. 93 Programs for “linguistic framing and cultural priming tools, can help to create a system where inclusive policies are reinforced 88 Alfonso Unceta and Concepción Medrano, eds. 2010. Equal- through daily interactions between the locals and ity, equity, and diversity: educational solutions in the Basque immigrants. Country. No. 1. Center for Basque Studies: 140. https://basque. Integration policies used by the Basques under unr.edu/docs/CR1.pdf. the sectoral policies were sourced as the mechanisms 89 Sanjay Jeram and Ilke Adam. 2015. Diversity and nation- needed to perpetuate the ideological shift in the alism in the Basque Country and Flanders: understanding immigrants as fellow minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: larger Basque nationalist movement. With a nation- 248. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed April alism commonly made synonymous with violent 12, 2017. acts of terrorism, the Basque society and government 90 Ibid. collectively supported the open integration policies 91 Alfonso Unceta and Concepción Medrano, eds. 2010. Equal- employed in the 2000s under the PVI plan, in order ity, equity, and diversity: educational solutions in the Basque Country. No. 1. Center for Basque Studies: 140-141. https:// to reinvent Basque identity and shift common associ- basque.unr.edu/docs/CR1.pdf. ations with separatist terrorism. The stateless nation 92 Daniel Muriel and Gabriel Gatti. 2010. The management of reconceptualized the Basque identity through policies otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive of multiculturalism towards immigrants, in order to citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. exhibit the high level of unity within their collective Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque Country (CEIC/UPV): 22. http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/toler- nationalism while also indicating how they expected ace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_Spain-BasqueCountry. to be treated within Spain. pdf. 93 Sanjay Jeram and Ilke Adam. 2015. Diversity and nation- 94 Alfonso Unceta and Concepción Medrano, eds. 2010. Equal- alism in the Basque Country and Flanders: understanding ity, equity, and diversity: educational solutions in the Basque immigrants as fellow minorities. National Identities 17, no. 3: Country. No. 1. Center for Basque Studies: 141. https://basque. 248. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed April unr.edu/docs/CR1.pdf. 12, 2017. 95 Ibid. 44 Hoffman / Spring 2017

This paper concludes that the divergent nation- Sub-state nationalism and the political challenges alist ideologies first within the PNV and then ETA, of immigrant integration. PhD Thesis. Harvard required the complete mobilization of the Basque cit- University. izenry through societal framing and cultural priming techniques, in order to shift conceptions of Basque Barker, Fiona Claire. 2010. Learning to be a ma- nationalism and counter the ETA’s violent campaign. jority: negotiating immigration, integration, and The ideological and symbolic portrayal of Eus- national membership in Quebec, Political Science, kadi in this paper highlights how culturally diverse 62. that region truly is. Due to the fact it is not possible to trace the exact origin of its people and language, Bauböck, Rainer. 2007. Political Boundaries in a the Basque identity as an entity is highly pluralized Multilevel Democracy. Identities, Affiliations and and deeply fragmented. This stands in contrast to Allegiances. Cambridge University Press. the neighboring autonomous movements, such as in Catalonia, in the way that Basque movements of BBC News. 2017. Timeline: ETA Campaign. http:// independence appeared to be lacking a foundation www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11181982 with pronounced goals and values. However, despite cleavages, the Basque identity is unparalleled in its BBC News. 2017. What is ETA? http://www.bbc. strength; “Quite the contrary, it’s strongly opposition- com/news/world-europe-11183574 al and antagonistic character guarantees a continuous rehearsal of the nation as a ‘daily plebiscite’.”96 This Cenoz, Jasone. 2008. Teaching through Basque: constant ‘rehearsal’ acts as an ever-evolving pendu- Achievements and challenges. Vol. 21, no. 1. Mul- lum to which the Basque people conduct self-regu- tilingual Matters. lating checks and balances to their movements, and these pendulum swings have enabled the Basques to Conversi, Daniele. 1994. Language, Immigration and adjust in order to survive through the hard times, as Nationalism: Comparing the Basque and Catalan well as obtain strides forward during years with less Cases. PhD Thesis. University of London. repression. Over time, Basques have continuously reassessed their identity, reflecting on both their steps Country Coordinator Spain 2013. Spain: Experts forward, as well as backward, in their long walk Address Cultural and Religious Diversity in the towards independence. This does not indicate a weak Basque Country. European Website on Integration: sense of self, but rather alludes to the pure resiliency European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/mi- of the Basques, and their ability to think realistically grant-integration/news/spain-experts-address-cul- for their long-term goals of independence. tural-and-religious-diversity-in-the-basque-country.

Author Biography DeLaney, Paul. 1987. The Basque Country; After Hallie Hoffman is senior at SFSU studying in- Centuries in Turmoil, A region’s Culture Seems ternational relations. After graduation, she will move on the Brink of a Revival. New York Times, Op- to Mexico City to participate in a local human rights posing Viewpoints in Context, jpllnet.sfsu.edu/ campaign before relocating to New York. login?url=http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/ A176117834/OVIC?u=sfsu_main&xid=a76796b0. Bibliography Accessed 11 Apr. 2017. Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities, revised edition. London and New. Eller, Jack David. 1997. Ethnicity, Culture, and ‘The Past’. Michigan Quarterly Review 36, no. 4. Barker, Fiona Claire. 2007. Redefining the Nation: Fouassier, Maite. http://www.idees.net/ 96 Daniele Conversi. 1994. Language, Immigration and Nation- files/941-18-document/Euskadi.eng.pdf alism: Comparing the Basque and Catalan Cases. PhD Thesis. University of London; 259. 45 Hoffman / Spring 2017

Ghai, Yash. 2000. Autonomy and ethnicity: negotiat- tity Research Centre, University of the Basque ing competing claims in multi-ethnic states. Cam- Country (CEIC/UPV). http://www.ces.uc.pt/pro- bridge University Press. jectos/tolerace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_ Spain-BasqueCountry.pdf. Accessed 11 Apr. 2017. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1996. Language, culture, and national identity. Social research. Nandi, Proshanta. 1995. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. Book Review. The Inter- Jeram, Sanjay. 2013. Immigrants and the Basque na- national Migration Review. 29, no. 2. tion: diversity as a new marker of identity. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36:11, 1770-1788. Olivieri, Victor M. 2015. Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics Jeram, Sanjay. 2015. More ‘Friends’ than ‘Foes’: in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Ethnic and Basque Nationalism and the Immigrant Question. Racial Studies. Council for European Studies: http://councilforeu- ropeanstudies.org/critcom/more-friends-than-foes- Roach, Steven Craig. 2002. The Question of Cultur- basque-nationalism-and-the-immigrant-question/ al Autonomy: Reassessing the Merits of Cultural Autonomy in the Post -Cold War. University of Jeram, Sanjay and Ilke, Adam. 2015. Diversity and Denver, Order No. 3058539, 1. Nationalism in the Basque Country and Flanders: Understanding Immigrants as Fellow Minorities. Romero, Manuel. 2004. Basque Nationalism: Histo- National Identities, 17:3: 247. ry, Roots and Possible Solutions. Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA. Keely, Charles B. 1996. How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows. The International Smith, D. Anthony. 1994. Ethnic Nationalism and the Migration Review. Vol. 30, no. 4. Plight of Minorities. J Refug Stud.

Kymlicka, Will. 2001. Minority nationalism and mul- Smith, D. Anthony. 1991. National identity. Universi- tination federalism. Politics in the Vernacular. ty of Nevada Press.

Martínez-Granado, Maite, Greño, Patxi and Oleaga, Sniderman, Paul, Hagendoorn Louk, and Markus Mercedes. 2012. The Basque Country, Spain: Self- Prior. 2004. Predisposing Factors and Situational Evaluation Report, OECD Reviews of Higher Ed- Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant ucation in Regional and City Development. http:// Minorities. American Political Science Review. 98, www.oecd.org/edu/imhe/regionaldevelopment no. 1.

Márquez, Moreno Gorka. 2014. Immigration in the The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country. Basque Country 2013 Yearbook: Immigration and 1979: 1, Article 2; http://www.basquecountry.eus/ the Impact of the Crisis. Country Coordinator t32-448/en/contenidos/informacion/estatuto_guer- Spain. European Website on Integration: European nica/en_455/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf. Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/immigration-in-the-basque-country- Triandafyllidou, Anna. 1998. National identity and 2013-yearbook-immigration-and-the-impact-of- the ‘other’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 4. the-crisis Unceta, Alfonso and Concepción Medrano, eds. Muriel, Daniel and Gatti, Gabriel. 2010. The man- 2010. Equality, equity, and diversity: educational agement of otherness beyond the state: integration solutions in the Basque Country. No. 1. Center for policies and inclusive citizenship as a government Basque Studies: https://basque.unr.edu/docs/CR1. paradigm in the Basque Country. Collective Iden- pdf.

46 Hoffman / Spring 2017 Wildman, Sarah. 2009. Basque Without Borders. The New York Times. 159, no. 54811: 1.

Zallo, Ramón and Ayuso, Mikel. 2009. The Basque Country: Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions. Basque Government, http://www. kultura.ejgv.euskadi.net/r46-714/es/contenidos/ informacion/ezagutu_eh/es_eza_eh/adjuntos/ eza_en.pdf.

47 5 Popplewell / Spring 2017

The Pan-Kurdish Myth: A Study of Pan-Kurdish Nation- alism and Party Politics

This paper is designed to examine the issue of Pan-Kurdish nationalism: The By ideology of establishing a Kurdish nation-state out of the geographical Kurdish homeland that is currently possessed by four different countries. Miles Theodore Using various, primarily qualitative sources, the author will construct an Popplewell argument that puts the theory of Pan-Kurdism’s prevalence into question. Instead of a Pan-Kurdish narrative that unifies the Kurdish homeland into one single political movement that calls for unification, the political reality presents us with two divergent ideological camps, one dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), based in Iraq and led by Massoud Barzani, and the other dominated by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), based in Turkey and ideologically led by Abdullah Öcalan. The ideological argument between these two represent two different frameworks for nationalism, and through the presented data, are a major barrier to the existence of Pan-Kurdish rhetoric in the homeland.

his paper is meant to address the lenge of appropriately dealing with the Tbroad issue known to most schol- Kurdish question, specifically through ars as the “Kurdish question,” but with acknowledgment of the Kurds as a a focus to analyze the narrative of separate ethnic group with its own set Pan-Kurdish nationalism and to assess of political considerations to be made. just how pervasive this narrative is In the past few years, the presence in Kurdish politics. The “Kurdish of the Kurdish question has become question” pertains to the fact that the ever more prevalent in the mainstream Kurdish people, an ethno-linguis- media coverage. Since the rise of the tic group comprising roughly 30-35 Islamic State, the various Kurdish million people, live in a region split groups that have been combatting their between four different countries, all of expansion have also received a great which have put this group in positions increase in media coverage. In Syria, as minority groups who have experi- the Kurdish population in the north enced various levels of disenfranchise- has set up their own autonomous area, ment throughout the modern histories known as Rojava,1 to defend them- of these countries. The Kurds are often selves against ISIS expansion. Mean- referred to as the largest ethnic group while, the Kurdistan Regional Govern- without its own independent state, ment (KRG) in Iraq has been able to though the veracity of that assertion stop major ISIS offensives from taking is debatable. Nevertheless, the size any more territory. The KRG’s forces, of the Kurdish population is substan- known colloquially as the Peshmerga, tial, and their present situation in the 1 As of December 2016, the region’s official current state system has posed numer- name assigned by its government is the Dem- ous difficulties for all states involved ocratic Federal System of Northern Syria. De- in geopolitical affairs of the Middle spite this, the name Rojava, meaning “east” in East. All four countries (Turkey, Iraq, Kurdish, is still colloquially used to described this autonomous region in Syria, especially Syria, and Iran) have faced the chal- among its Kurdish residents. 48 Popplewell / Spring 2017 have been known for years to be an effective fight- mutually beneficial, though not always stable, part- ing force, and their greatest difficulty in their war nership. Indeed, the Kurdistan Regional Government with ISIS appears not to be due to training or morale has been cited by most western news outlets as the (KRG forces have been considered by most analysts one lasting success story that came out of the Iraq to be highly combat effective), but rather due to War. Economic development, boosted by the protec- logistic support and procuring appropriate weaponry tion offered by the no-fly zone, was able to flourish in and ammunition in order to continue their campaign. Kurdish-controlled Iraq while the rest of the country To the north of Syria and Iraq is Turkey, where the endured crippling decline brought on by sanctions. Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK (Partiya Karkarȇn While once-affluent areas of Baghdad have been Kurdistanȇ), have been in conflict with Ankara since transformed into slums, new housing development the 1970’s, with a brief ceasefire having ended in projects around cities like Erbil and Sulaymaniyah September 2014. may give the observer the impression that they are These political movement that are driven by a in some American suburb. Given the success of strong sense of Kurdish identity have been charac- the KRG in terms of maintaining a level of internal terized by the western media as actively pursuing stability and economic growth that the rest of Iraq is an independent Pan-Kurdish state. This characteri- still struggling with, many have seen this as a strong zation has also lead to assuming a strong cohesion indicator for supporting independence. between various Kurdish organizations throughout A final reason, and one that is most pertinent to these countries that desire an independent Pan-Kurd- recent events, involves the Kurds’ involvement in the ish state, one that would take territory from all four war against ISIS.3 Various Kurdish groups based not major countries in order to exist. There are a number just in Iraq and Syria, but also in Turkey, have chosen of factors that can lead to this assumption in the west. to conduct military campaigns against the Jihadist One reason is that the Kurdish people have, despite semi-state, but not without causing political compli- being territorially divided, have managed to main- cations that go beyond the issue of quelling political tain both linguistic and cultural identity, and this has Islamism. Nonetheless, the Kurds, especially in Iraq, been the primary point of contention that they have have been given increased media and political atten- shared with their central governments for decades. tion due to the relative competency and efficiency Another reason is that these Kurdish movements of their military forces. In fact, the cause of Kurdish have experienced, to varying degrees, oppression independence is now being discussed more openly in and/or disenfranchisement from aspects of politi- America and elsewhere, though current policymakers cal society in all of their home countries.2 Another are still adamant about maintaining the integrity of reason is the relative friendliness that many Kurdish Iraq as a country.4 However, it is difficult to translate groups have shown to Western powers, while other this support for KRG independence into support for a groups in the region have been quick to condemn full Pan-Kurdish state. any US or European involvement in Middle Eastern With all of these various, but related, reasons events. For example, since the first Gulf War ended that have been listed, the idea that there exists a in 1991, the US and the Iraqi Kurds have shared a Pan-Kurdish narrative in the political activities and discourse of the many Kurdish actors has been 2 It should be noted that all four of the major home states that the Kurds reside in are, or at some point were, driven by Na- assumed by many lay observers of Kurdish affairs. tional movements that inherently contradicted the ability of the After all, the Kurds throughout the Middle East Kurds, as a nation of their own, to operate as their own group. all share a sense of cultural unity and, to a degree, In Turkey, the rise of Kemalism coincided with increased linguistic unity as well. Also, the political values of oppression of the Kurds in the southeast of the country. In Syria democracy, more secularized society, and improved and Iraq, Arabist-driven Ba’athism clashed with Kurds’ desires to maintain their identity. Even in Iran, where the Islamic conditions for women, appear to be shared through- Republic has been less driven by nationalism, but more by polit- 3 The author, while acknowledging the primacy of the name icized Shi’ism, the predominantly Sunni Kurds have faced years Da’esh outside of US, has chosen to use the American colloqui- of varying degrees of political and religious persecution. What al term. all of these regimes share is their drive to establish homogeneity 4 Rudaw. (Nov. 3, 1015). US senator: arm Iraq’s Kurds and give within their states, thus denying the Kurds, as citizens of these them a country. Rudaw Media Network. Retrieved from http:// states, their ethnic identity. rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/110320151. 49 Popplewell / Spring 2017 out the population, no matter what home country. In particular, the level of work that has gone into Despite these generic facts about Kurdish political the subject of Iraqi Kurdistan has risen substantially identity, further investigation brings this common since the period of political and economic growth assumption into question. Are the Kurds as unitary began in 1992. The literary focus on Iraqi Kurdis- in their movements as we are lead to believe? Is tan should come as no surprise given the political Pan-Kurdism really as pervasive in the rhetoric as we context of recent years. Compared to every other are meant to believe? How internally stable would predominantly-Kurdish region, it is the only one to a Pan-Kurdish state be? We can even go further into have achieved universally-recognized autonomy.5 regional specifics and question the political unity of In 2011, the Institute for Global Leadership at Tufts areas such as Rojava and the KRG themselves. published its Fall publication of the New Initiative The author hopes to present a more scrutiniz- for Middle East Peace (NIMEP) Insights Journal, in ing analysis of the Pan-Kurdish narrative in order which undergraduates were given the opportunity to to present the complex network of Kurdish political write and publish academic pieces on various aspects groups that may in fact prove to be a greater barrier of the KRG. The volume possessed several pieces to the establishment of Pan-Kurdism than what has pertaining to KRG politics, military affairs, economic been previously estimated. When examining the nar- relations, as well as more social/health-related issues rative of Pan-Kurdism that we have been given, there of Iraqi Kurdistan. Even though the articles were are several implications that do not appear to present entirely written by undergraduates, their ability to themselves as facts in the Kurdish political system, travel to the KRG and have access to primary sourc- especially when it comes to political and ideological es, interviews, and first-hand observations have made unity. Instead of depicting a movement of pan-na- their subsequent studies valuable sources for future tional unity, this paper presents facts that question academic inquiries. that depiction and instead suggest a Kurdish world The aim of this paper, however, is to present a divided in political schism. broader picture of the Kurdish affairs that go beyond the scope of the KRG, though most of the Literature Review English-language literature related to the Kurds has The amount of scholarly research on Kurdish been focused on that area. One article that holds a studies has increased substantially over the past few place in the literary core of this project is “Construct- decades, with contributions coming from various ing narratives of Kurdish nationalism in the Urban academic disciplines, be it anthropology, sociolo- space of Diyarbakır, Turkey” by Muna Güvenҫ, pub- gy, economics, or political science. Institutionally, lished in the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements however, there have been few academic organi- Review, also in 2011. The premise of Güvenҫ’s work zations devoted to the study of Kurdish culture or is to analyze the driving forces of Kurdish identity politics. As of now, there is the Kurdish Studies in the urban space of Turkey, specifically within the Network (established in 2009), which does have its southeastern city of Diyarbakir, which is predomi- own journal, the Center for Kurdish Studies, based at nantly Kurdish. In a country like Turkey, where the the University of Exeter, and the recently established Turkish government has worked to expand Turkish Kurdish Political Studies program at Central Florida identity at the expense of other national rights, there University. Other than these institutions, and maybe is a great challenge to maintain and redevelop nation- a few smaller ones, there has been little academic al identity. The Kurds, making up a very significant concentration on Kurdish studies. The level of data minority in the country, have proven to be a major that has been collected, especially quantitative, is still roadblock to the nation-state ideal that the Turkish developing. However, the rise in interest is without government, since its Kemalist origins, has strived so a doubt substantial, very probably due to the Kurds’ hard to maintain. Güvenҫ, who claims Diyarbakir to rise in geopolitical significance. With this rise in in- 5 Syrian Rojava has also declared itself an autonomous region terest, from both academic sources and media, there of Syria in November 2013, due to the administrative crisis that is sufficient writing that has been compiled from has erupted from the civil war. Despite this, there has been no various journals and other sources that would make de-jure recognition yet by any other government, even in the KRG, where the parliament voted to recognize in October 2014, an effective analysis possible. but the Executive branch has yet to recognize. 50 Popplewell / Spring 2017

be “the central city for Kurdish politics,” (Güvenҫ, text that this paper has at its disposal. The PKK, p. 28), records the developments of modern Kurdish or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as it is known in En- political movements, mainly choosing to focus on the glish, ought to be considered a more important actor national movement that has operated within the legal in current political affairs than what many western framework of Turkey’s prescriptions for civil action. policy analysts have given them credit for. Based She goes on to analyze the remarkable fortitude of primarily on interviews that Marcus conducted with Kurdish identity that has been maintained in the area a number of former self-claimed PKK fighters, this by its civil society and local government. volume does much to provide a narrative of the PKK When it comes to the core problem that we face that is marred with military struggle, political chal- in the guise of Pan-Kurdism, the level of academic lenges, rhetorical transformation, and the crises of its interest is wanting. Instead, most academics have ever-present leader and founder, Abdullah Öcalan, chosen to compartmentalize the Kurds as a subject reverently called Apo, or “uncle” by supporters. Like into their home countries in virtually all aspects. Bajalan, Marcus paints a picture of dispute between Because of this, the problem of Pan-Kurdish nation- the PKK and the KDP-KRG in several instances. The alism is rarely asked, and very rarely even alluded to narrative that Marcus provides no doubt does much by scholars. Fortunately, Djene Rhys Bajalan has pre- to attributed several acts of ethnic fratricide to the sented a paper on this very subject, which delineated KDP, or Kurdistan Democratic Party. Marcus re- the status of the Pan-Kurdish nationalist movement counts, in the early history of the new Kurdish move- to a conference of the Association for the Study of ment in the 1970’s, when the KDP was in violent Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) in 2009. Bajalan conflict with the PUK (People’s Union of Kurdistan), goes further in his brief, but succinct, overview of the eventually laying a massive ambush for the PUK structural/ideological differences that exist in Kurd- Peshmerga in 1978.8 This would just be the first of ish nationalism, specifically focusing on the move- many years of violent clashes between the two major ments in Iraq and Turkey, given the politically-high parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. Marcus counts further profile that both movements have. He concludes that examples of inner clashes that exist throughout the there exists both a split between two movements for history of the Turkish and Iraqi regions. various reasons, but primarily due to the ideological We then have the doctoral thesis by Yesiltas differences that exist between the Turkish-Kurdish (2014). Aptly titled “Rethinking the National Ques- and the Iraqi-Kurdish movement (p. 13).6 Bajalan tion,” Yesiltas’ project is extremely ambitious, as she even goes as far as to say that instead of a Pan-Kurd- has chosen to cover the societal experiences of Kurds ist state is less likely than two Kurdish states actu- in all of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, making her ally forming, one governed by PKK ideology, and project both expansive, but well relevant to the sub- the other governed by the KDP-KRG. This would ject that we are examining. Yesiltas’ primary contri- certainly imply that the level of internal rhetorical bution is the theoretical direction that she has taken, dispute between these two groups is as great a barrier which turns away from what she refers to as the “nar- to a Pan-Kurdist state as the home countries like Iraq rowly scoped framework of ethnic nationalism” in or Turkey.7 order to analyze the way that Kurdish nationalism is Aliza Marcus’s book Blood and Belief (2007), articulated.9 By dividing her sections among the four which focuses on the PKK’s history (but goes further major Kurdish movements, Yesilitas provides quali- in dealing with the strenuous history it has shared tative data from each country that can then be ade- with the KDP), is the most extensive qualitative quately compared and contrasted. The author stress- es the role that the Kurds play in all of these regions 6 The level of ideological animosity between the more pro-western KRG (largely led by the KDP) and the Marxist-in- as democratizing agents in all four home countries. spired PKK has only grown in the past decades. This has only It is this role, Yesiltas argues, that has transformed been exacerbated by the KRG’s deepening trade relationship Kurdish nationalism from a nation-state driven par- with Turkey, which has become the regions greatest trading adigm to one that is governed by the popular desire partner. See economic report by Invest in Group (2013). This for democratization. In all four countries, Kurdish study is one of the few that has been able to fully grasp the issues. 8 (Marcus, p. 41) 7 (Bajalan, p. 15) 9 (Yesiltas, p. 33) 51 Popplewell / Spring 2017 nationalism has made the link that the achievement a capitalist framework. of their national rights can only be brought to frui- These sources, accompanied by others should tion by the transformation of their home states into give an efficient overview of the literary framework democratic polities, which would not be governed by in which this study will be conducted. The range of nation-building and homogeneity. focus and theoretical lenses is wide enough to give Arakelyan (2013) also covers the subject of an unhindered body of data that we can then method- Kurdish nationalist discourse, but with the core focus ologically utilize to conclude on the major hypothesis being made on the political paradigms in Iraqi Kurd- of this paper. istan, and analyses of Kurdish nationalism in the oth- The major methodological shortcoming that this er countries are pushed more to the periphery, though body of literature has is the temporal distance they all they are still presented to some extent. Despite this share from the current political realities of the Middle seeming imbalance in methodology, Arakelyan con- East. The spillover of the Syrian Civil War into Iraq, tributes to the discussion of Pan-Kurdish nationalism. most illustrated by ISIS’ declaration of the caliphate In doing so, he addresses the political paradigm of in June of 2014, has proven to be a major develop- the Kurdish diaspora and their support for Pan-Kurd- ment for the Kurdish movements that was all but to- ish statism. This ideology is most pervasive, rhetor- tally unanticipated by most scholars. Indeed, the rise ically, in the diaspora. The concluding reason that of ISIS just might be creating an epistemic shift in Arakelyan gives for this is their existence outside this section of academia, but the level of literary out- of the political frameworks that exist in the Kurdish put that has been published in the past few years has homeland (p. 33). Unbounded by the regionaliza- not been keeping up with the situational gravitas that tion that has split the Kurds apart in the Middle East, is ISIS’ encounter with Kurdish nationalism. One of diasporic Kurds are quick to unite and homogenize, the few academic acceptations is Gunter (2015), who identifying less as Kurds of a specific region, but as provides a good framework for analyzing the various unanimously Kurds of “the homeland.” political actors on the Kurdish side versus the spread An important primary source, written directly by of ISIS, and how the Kurdish actors in Syria and Iraq Abdullah Öcalan, is the treatise Democratic Confed- have articulated their political objectives to the rest eralism. Methodologically driven by Marxist-Lenin- of the world. ist theory, Öcalan’s piece divulges the ideological For years, political Jihadism and Kurdish society framework in which he desires the national rights of have not had the opportunity to interact that fre- Kurds to be maintained. He wholeheartedly rejects quently. In Iraq, the Kurds in the north were seldom the idea of the nation-state in his work, critiquing it victim to car-bombings or shootings, with most of the partly as thus: sectarian violence occurring in the south of the country between Arab Sunni and Shi’a groups, leaving “Assuming that we would compare the na- Iraqi Kurdistan almost free to pursue their economic tion-state to a living godthen nationalism would development. Kurds elsewhere, except perhaps in be the correspondent religion. In spite of some Iran,11 were not as exposed to religious sectarian seemingly positive elements, nation-state and violence. However, the spread of the Islamic State nationalism show metaphysical characteristics.”10 to Kurdish areas in both Syria and Iraq have been a growing focal point of concern for countless observ- Öcalan goes further to remark on the institution- ers, many of whom are more than willing to use the alized oppression of women as an inherent construct narrative of the Kurdish nation once again striving found in nation-state ideology, as well as further 11 The Kurdish movement in Iran witnesses a different structur- stressing likeness between the orthodoxy of traditional point of contention with their home government. The Islamic Republic disavows national identity, stressing the religious iden- al nationalism and religious extremism (p. 16). He tity instead. Their past attempts to reconcile with the Kurds by then goes on to state his principles of “democratic granting religious freedoms to account for their Sunni deviation confederalism,” a political theory of his development has largely been uneffective because of the very nature of the that he presents as an antidote to traditional na- Kurds’ movement, which is driven by ethnicity and language tion-building that is epistemically-constrained within rather than faith. This ideology is an issue of ontological security for the Islamic Republic, more so then a religious minority, 10 (Öcalan, 2011, p. 15) since nationalism constitutes religious unorthodoxy. 52 Popplewell / Spring 2017 against a new rival. Nonetheless, the relationship sented, this paper proposes the following hypothesis between ISIS and the Kurds is ironic, given their di- and questions for research: chotomizing disposition. After all, both ISIS and the Kurdish actors, by and large, see themselves as new Hypothesis: The prevalence of a Pan-Kurdish na- developments that are bringing about a geopolitical tionalism in the discourse of political movements in shift in the Middle East.12 the Kurdish homeland is not substantial. Question 1: How synchronized are the activities of Methodology and Research the various Kurdish political movements throughout Given the methodological constraints that have the four home countries? been previously stated, the vast majority of data Question 2: How vast is the ideological disparity presented here will be qualitative. This qualitative between the different Kurdish movements? design method will be conducted through the document analysis of various sources, both secondary This project’s case study will provide a narrative and primary. Academic literature printed in the last of political developments, based upon the accrued decade serves as the theoretical foundation of our data. First, the evolution of Kurdish nationalism will analysis. However, due to the lack of volume for be presented, with a primary focus on the movements contemporary13 academic output, primary sources in Turkey and Iraq, and their relations to one anoth- will be analyzed as well in order to supplement the er. This is due to both of these movements being the academic data and provided a more temporally-rel- primary actors within the greater model of Kurdish evant paradigm for discussion. Fortunately, news nationalism that exists in the Middle East. Then the organizations have provided much data input with schismatic framework that exists between these two regards to the political affairs of the various Kurdish movements will be presented, which will no doubt movements, especially in their relation to the ISIS question the veracity of the claim that Pan-Kurd- conflict that has shown no signs of ceasing anytime ish nationalism dominates the political discourse soon. The focus was to use English language arti- throughout the Kurdish homeland, especially through cles from Rudaw, a news organization based in Iraqi the policymakers of its various movements. Kurdistan, to provide most of the primary sources, as it is one of the few primary sources that the author Case Studies finds that gives political insight from the Iraqi Kurd- Troubles from Turkey ish framework through the English language. The early development of Kurdish nationalism This fact leads us to understand another limita- in Turkey stems directly as an antithesis to the as- tion, which is linguistic. There is very little doubt serted homogenization that occurred following the that the majority of literary output on the subject of establishment of the Republic in 1923. Sacrificing the Kurdish nationalism has been published in non-En- religious identity of the previous Ottoman Empire, glish languages (specifically languages such as Mustafa Kemal chose to establish a new norm of po- Turkish, Kurmanji, Sorani, Arabic, and others of the litical and societal secularism combined with the pre- region). This unfortunately cuts off what could be a dominance of Turkish ethnic identity. This served as significant portion of data that has yet to be translated a catalyst for the Kurdish religious brotherhoods that and exposed to the English-medium academic world. banned together in a short-lived rebellion in 1925.14 For the most part, the only way that access could be This rebellion was suppressed, and in 1934 the Turk- made was through their citations in academic sourc- ish government implemented a series of policies in es that have been used. Nonetheless, this limitation order to assimilate the Kurds into Turkish political would only be substantial should further research society, a process that has met with little success, but proceed in the future that would require great prima- has had a lasting impact.15 ry source material from the Kurdish perspective. The new wave of Kurdish nationalism began Through further analysis of the data to be pre- with the formation of PKK in 1975, led by Abdullah 14 Frisch, H. (2001). Middle East. In A. J. Motyl (Ed.), En- 12 Gunter, M. (2015). The Kurds in the changing political map cyclopedia of Nationalism: Fundamental Themes (Vol. 1, pp. of the Middle East. Kurdish Studies, 3(1), 65. 485-505). San Diego: Academic Press, 502. 13 Having been published in the last two years. 15 Ibid. 53 Popplewell / Spring 2017

Öcalan. This foundation coincided with develop- though his lack of presence has been a factor in some ments for Kurds in Iraq, where Mustafa Barzani’s instances. Indeed his imprisonment has done little to movement had been defeated militarily by Iraq’s curb the political influence and power that the PKK Baathist government. The primary reason that Öcalan has established. In Iran, for instance, PJAK (Free cited for Iraqi Kurdistan’s failure was that region’s Life of Kurdistan Party) has been strongly influenced movement’s continued ties to traditional clan-based by PKK ideology has waged a low-level insurgency “feudalism,” its reliance on the United States and the against the Iranian government for years,20 yet this Shah for support, and the political rhetoric that called still has not kept them from officially being desig- for autonomy, not independence.16 Öcalan’s organi- nated a terrorist group by Turkey and the U.S. Like- zation, on the other hand, was possessed a theoretical wise, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) in Syria has foundation born out of Marxism, diverging away been commonly linked to the PKK in both the west from nation-state ideology due to its perceived links and by oppositional groups, primarily the KDP.21 to both feudalism and capitalism, and thus antithet- In Turkey itself, the organization has expanded its ical to the democratic society that the movement presence into the social sphere, with southern cities was envisioning. Öcalan’s call for independence like Diyarbakir (the largest Kurdish majority city in of Kurds was a cry for freedom not just from other Turkey) having prominent politicians being jailed for nation-states, but from a Kurdish nation-state itself, their ties to the PKK.22 as such a reality would only serve to perpetuate the institutions of oppression that the PKK was trying Reconciliation in Iraq to dismantle.17 This aversion resulted in the political The PKK can be most sharply contrasted with philosophy of “democratic confederalism,” in which the KDP, both its philosophical and political rival nation-state independence would be disbanded in in the inner paradigm of Kurdish national politics. favor of collectives in Kurdistan, with no centralized Founded in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani, the party has political nexus that would serve to propagate a polit- always served as a foil to the nation-building of ical and economic elite.18 This Pan-Kurdism has met Iraq,23 where Arabization policies took place under with mixed results in the political discourse of the the Baathists. The ethnic struggle of the Kurds in Iraq Kurdish homeland, as the PKK has vilified any other was articulated through several experiences; in 1975 Kurdish group who sought regional autonomy and over 600,000 Kurds were deported from their homes not unification as “imperialist stooges.19 This tension in this program of Arabization.24 Examples such as has arisen out of the influence of the political frame- this one only adds to the social psychology of Kurd- works of the different home states. In Turkey, which ish nationalism. This deportation coincided with two was a firm US ally during the Cold War, the PKK major events: one being the defeat of the KDP in that naturally took up an anti-western position, and thus year and Barzani’s subsequent exile,25 and the other was labeled as a terrorist group not just by Turkey, the development of a new Kurdish party in Iraq, the but by the United States as well as other allied pow- PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). ers. This status continues today and has impacted the Headed by Jalal Talabani (who would later be political situations of the other Kurdish movements president of Post-Saddam Iraq), the PUK has served that stem from the PKK’s ideology. at varying instances as a partner and a rival for Essentially, this is the PKK’s political foundation support to the KDP. The rivalry between the KDP that has since become a major point of contention be- 20 (Arakelyan, 2013, p. 15), (Gunter, p. 76). tween them and more traditional or moderate Kurdish 21 Rudaw. (2015, Nov 3). State dept: US will not allow Turkey movements, namely in Iraq. In 1999, Öcalan was ar- to attack PYD in Syria. Rudaw Media Network. Retrieved from http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/110820151 rested and has since been serving life imprisonment. 22 (Güvenҫ, 2011, p. 36). This has not kept him, however, from publishing his 23 (MacQueen, 2015, p. 431). ideology and continuing to influence PKK activities, 24 (Bajalan, 2009, p. 6). 25 Barzani would die, exiled in the US, in 1979. His son, 16 (Marcus, 2007, p. 34). Massoud Barzani, has since been the leader of the KDP, as well 17 (Yesiltas, 2014, p. 15). as serving as the President of the KRG, which has currently 18 (Öcalan, 2011, p. 26). is controlled by a KDP-majority, since the position was made 19 (Bajalan, 2009, p. 13). official in 2005. 54 Popplewell / Spring 2017

and PUK appears to be mostly driven by clan iden- on-Kurd violence as much as possible, and there tity and personality politics, with the Barzani clan does appear to be improved rhetoric of good intent in the North (also Kurmanji-Kurdish speakers) and between both the PKK and the KDP, as both have the Talabanis in the south (who are Sorani speak- expressed solidarity in their commitment against a ers) forming two separate and constantly competing common enemy.30 However, this solidarity has not power blocs.26 So embedded, and yet ideologically improved into jointed activity between these groups, abstruse, is this rivalry that many Iraqi Kurds are un- nor has it shifted one another’s political positions able to explain the true differences between the two into harmony. The PKK still emphasis a new-wave groups. This rivalry culminated in several instances Marxist version of nationalism that calls for an of violence, most especially after the establishment independent Kurdistan governed through a non-cen- of Kurdish autonomy in 1992 under the new KRG. tralized democracy. The KDP, on the other hand, has In 1994, civil war broke out between the Peshmerga been known to constantly postpone a referendum on forces of both parties, an event that sharply contrast- independence, a referendum that Barzani himself has ed with the relative progress that had been made in instigated in order to keep the KDP name relevant in democratization of that region. The civil war would Pan-Kurdish politics, but only as a ploy to maintain not end until 1998, costing thousands of lives, and popular support, which is more open to independence had such a political spill-over that other state actors rhetoric than are KDP-led policy-makers.31 Referen- became involved, with Turkey supporting the KDP dum rhetoric has since largely been abandoned, with and Iran supporting the PUK.27 the most common excuse being that time and effort The strenuous relationship between the PUK and must be dedicated to defeating ISIS, and should not the KDP served to be the major barrier to establish- be diverted to such a vote. The more furtive reason, ing a permanent democratic structure in the KRG however, is that the KRG does not wish to jeopardize region.28 The tensions have gone down significantly its beneficial relationship with Turkey and the United since the US-mediated ceasefire in 1998 and even States by holding such a referendum that would only further since the KRG was officially declared in serve to cause further nationalist aggravation in the 2005. However, there still exists a lack of harmony neighboring Kurdish regions. in the political rhetoric between the KDP and the PUK, a dichotomization that is tied to Kurdish affairs Conclusion throughout the homeland. The rivalry is also another The Kurdish homeland is beset by division by dimension of the greater rivalry between the KDP their home states, and this, in turn, has caused dif- and the PKK, as both of these actors are competing ferent nationalist frameworks to develop in all four for political influence. While the PKK is driven by regions. The divergent movements that exist have a pro-independence rhetoric, the KDP is more con- shown facilitatory signs of reconciliation, especial- servative in its calls for regional autonomy and is ly in recent years, as certain Kurdish political and quick to avoid any such Pan-Kurdish rhetoric. These para-military factions have combined their operations rivalries represent an intense barricade to any form of to combat ISIS. However, there is still very little unified Pan-Kurdish political activity, and the politi- organizational unity in the broad network of Kurdish cal turmoil that can be traced to the Syrian Civil War nationalism, and the level of cooperation between has only served to further political stalemates be- two ideological camps (one headed by the PKK and tween groups such as the PUK, KDP, and PKK.29 the other by the KDP) is still very limited. What However, there is some cause for political opti- appears to the layperson to be a monolithic move- mism, for since the Kurdish civil war ended in 1998, ment with a singular geopolitical agenda is, in fact, a both political camps have been quick to avoid Kurd- wildly divided set of political and social factions. The data that has been presented largely sup- 26 (Devigne, 2011, p. 49). 27 (Arakelyan, 2013, p. 50). 30 (Yesiltas, 2014, p. 324). 28 (Yesiltas, 2014, p. 87). 31 Gutman, R. (2014, Sep 5) Kurds agree to postpone inde- 29 Rudaw. (2015, Nov 23). PUK official: US unhappy with pendence referendum. The Toronto Star. Retrieved from http:// Kurdish political stalemate. Rudaw Media Network. Retrieved www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/09/05/kurds_agree_to_post- from http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/231120155. pone_independence_referendum.html 55 Popplewell / Spring 2017 ports this conclusion, and has shown that there is Devigne, J. (2011). “Irreconcilable” Differences?: a deep-seated lack of Pan-Kurdish unity across the The Political Nature of the Peshmerga. NIMEP homeland, as both nationalist camps have shown a Insights, VI, 48-64. rivalry that is driven by various factors. The political legitimacy of the KDP rests on its relationship Gunter, M. (2015). The Kurds in the changing po- with official state powers like the US, Iraq, and litical map of the Middle East. Kurdish Studies, Turkey. This relationship sets itself apart from the 64-81. PKK, which has always been an actor outside of the peripheries of legitimate power. Furthermore, the Gutman, R. (2014, September 5). Kurds agree to ideological rivalry that the PKK has with the KDP, postpone independence referendum. Retrieved and thus the KRG, is driven by a postmodern theory from Toronto Star Website: http://www.thestar. of nationalism that the KRG policy makers simply com/news/world/2014/09/05/kurds_agree_to_post- do not follow, once again due to its relationship with pone_independence_referendum.html. legitimate states. With regards to the prospects of a Pan-Kurdish Güvenҫ, M. (2011). Constructing Narratives of Turk- state, the likelihood there is for such an outcome to ish Nationalism in the Urban Space of Diyarbakir, occur is constrained as much by internal Kurdish Turkey. Traditional Dwellings and Settlements politics as it is by the host states that have actively Review, 23(1), 25-40. tried to quell such nationalist activities for decades. The rhetoric, however, can be found in the Kurdish Invest in Group. (2013, OCT 07). Determined public, both in the homeland and in the diaspora, to Grow: Economy. Retrieved from Invest in and even in groups such as the PKK. But officially Group: http://investingroup.org/review/236/deter- designated institutions such as the KRG have con- mined-to-grow-economy-kurdistan/. stantly proved not to be supportive of such rhetoric, and as long as this is the case, then the likelihood of King, Diane (2014). Kurdistan on the Global Stage: Pan-Kurdish nationalism becoming a unifying norm Kinship, Land, and Community in Iraq. New will never become fully realized. Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Author Biography MacQueen, B. (2015). Democratization, elections, Miles Popplewell is a Master’s student in the and the ‘de facto state dilemma’: Iraq’s Kurdistan International Relations Department. His primary area Regional Government. Cooperation and Conflict, of interest is Middle Eastern studies, with an empha- 423-439. sis on Kurdish politics, culture, and language. He graduated from UC Berkeley in 2014 with a Bach- Marcus, A. (2007). Blood and Belief: The PKK and elor’s in History and Anthropology. He has taken the Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: courses in the Kurdish languages, and will be doing New York University Press. further studies for his Master’s Thesis. Monsour, R. (2012). The Role of Iraqi Kurdistan in Works Cited the Syrian-Kurd Pursuit of Autonomy. Doha: Al-Ja- Arakelyan, A. (2013). Emerging Paradigms of zeera Centre for Studies. Kurdish Nationhood in the Middle East. Yerevan: American Univerisity of Armenia. Öcalan, A. (2011). Democratic Confederalism. Lon- don-Cologne: Transmedia Publishing. Bajalan, D. R. (2009). Pan-Kurdish Nationalism: Theory or Praxis. ASEN Conference 2009. London: Rudaw. (2015, November 23). PUK official: US un- Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nation- happy with Kurdish political stalemate. Retrieved alism. Retrieved from www.Academia.edu. from Rudaw Media Network Website: http://rudaw. net/english/kurdistan/231120155.

56 Popplewell / Spring 2017

Rudaw. (2015, November 3). State dept: US will not allow Turkey to attack PYD in Syria. Retrieved from Rudaw Media Corporation Website: http:// rudaw.net/english/middleeast/110820151.

Rudaw. (2015, November 3). U.S. Senator: Arm Iraq’s Kurds and give them a country. Retrieved December 10, 2015, from Rudaw Media Network: http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/110320151.

Watts, Nicole (2010). Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Yesiltas, O. (2014). Rethinking the National Ques- tion: Anti-Statist Discourses within the Kurdish National Movement. Miami: FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations.