Ministerial Council of the Hellenic Republic

S P E C I A L I Z E D A G E N C I E S T H E P R I C E O F H O P E MINISTERIAL COUNCIL OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 31st North American Model United Nations at the University of Toronto! Our names are Jonathan Mostovoy and Elise Wagner and we will be your Greek Financial Crisis committee chairs. Jonathan is a student of the University of Toronto where he is studying Mathematical Applications in Economics and Finance. Elise is also a student at the University of Toronto where she is specializing in International Relations.

As delegates of the Greek Financial Crisis Committee, you will spend the next four days emulating the real-life, ongoing decision-making process being made by today’s most prevalent politicians, economists and other relevant personnel concerned with the Greek financial crisis. It is our hope that such a scenario will provide a forum for instructive, innovative, entertaining, and challenging debate and consensus building.

We look forward to meeting all of you and witnessing your imaginative solutions to some of the most pressing global issues at NAMUN 2016.

Sincerely,

Elise and Jonathan

Background Guide Content

Historical Background The development of an interdependent European Economy The global economy The financial crisis of 2007/2008 The financial crisis in Greece

Greece Today Present economic situation Grexit Political Turmoil Future projections

Committee The Goal Committee Structure Resolutions and Voting The Press

Committee Composition Cabinet Positions Personal Finances

Further Research Key Questions for the Cabinet Recommended Resources

Historical Background

Prediction is, by definition, absolutely and entirely impossible. Every single economic model that attempts to accurately predict the future will inevitably fail at some point. However, armed with historical know-how of similar situations, probabilistic prediction is one of the greatest tools of modern day economics.1 It is our hope that the following brief historical background of today’s extremely volatile economy of Greece, Europe and the world will provide you with a wealth of knowledge to help address the many questions Greek and European political leaders must deal with concurrently.

1.1 The Development of an Interdependent European Economy

Europeans throughout history have long awaited the arrival of a stable, secure and prosperous region to live in. In the aftermath of World War II, the pressure for such a reality finally gave way to a string of events that would charter the continent to this ubiquitous desire. However, such events came not in the form of political or militaristic domination, but rather a constructive and dynamic set of economic agreements and treaties between independent European states.

The European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) was the first of such economic agreements to transpire. Signed in Paris in 1951, the ECSC brought France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries together in a multi-lateral agreement with the aim of organizing free movement of coal and steel, and free access to sources of production.2 Soon after, at the Treaty of Rome (1957), the European Economic Community was created. This new organization established itself as more than a simple agreement and became a supranational organization moderating and mediating accessible and effective trade.3

1 Gilboa, Itzhak, Andrew Postlewaite, and David Schmeidler. "Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling, Second Version." SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN Journal, 2008. 2 "EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law- ECSC." European Union Law. 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015. 3 Eichengreen, Barry. "European Economic Community." Library of Economics and Liberty. 1992. Accessed September 1, 2015.

At the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EEC transformed into what we all now know: the European Union (EU). The EU is a political and economic organization consisting of 28 member states. The EU operates through a system of supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the European Parliament.4A gradual transition of increasing interdependence between European countries was finalized in 2002 when 19 of the 26 EU countries adopted the Euro (currency).5

Under the Maastricht convergence criteria, states joining the euro must have sensible and regulated economic policies. The following are the main governing rules: states must ensure inflation remains below 1.5%, budget deficits below 3% of GDP, and a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 60%. In 2002, when joining the Euro seemed a great economic advantage, many of the first 19 adopters made major economic policy reforms to adopt the Euro. However, these standards seemed to be forgotten at the present: the eagerness of EU officials to develop a large and competitive Eurozone led them to not enforce these protective economic measures.6 Thus, the economic volatility amongst the European countries was not minimized while unconditionally linked to one other - the hubris of the Euro was established.

1.2 The Global Economy

Four decades ago, an entrepreneur building a new restaurant probably had one or two local banks that could have provided him with a loan to start his business. Today, that same entrepreneur could quickly search online for a variety of loans offered from different countries with lower interest rates and in different currencies. Globalization, as it stands today, is not merely an increase in global trade, diplomacy and shared information, but an irreversible dependence on each other’s economies.

We would strongly suggest the following two articles that describe the development and present situation of the global economy we all live in.

4 "The History of the European Union." EUROPA. 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015. 5 "Who Cann Join and When? - The Euro." European Commission. 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015. 6 "The Euro." EUROPA - European Union. 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015.

• http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/03/hausler.htm • http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/05/06/the-pros-and-cons-of-globalization/

1.3 The Financial Crisis of 2007-08

When the Lehman Brothers, an enormous global investment bank, collapsed in September of 2008 it brought down the world’s financial system. A few trillion dollars of taxpayer-financed bailouts later, we can still see the adverse effects of this global economic meltdown transpiring today. Many nations’ GDP are still below their pre-crisis peak, especially in Europe, where the financial crisis of 2008 has now shaped into the euro crisis.

Years before the 2007-08 crisis, irresponsible mortgage lending in America became an extremely new lucrative business for banks. Home loans were given out to “sub-prime” borrowers with poor credit histories – many of these borrows struggled to pay back the loans. These risky mortgages were then passed on to (very imaginative) financial engineers, who turned them into “low-risk” securities by mixing and matching large numbers of subprime and normal mortgages into one. The big banks that were issuing these securities argued that the property markets in different American cities were not highly correlated, and in fact in some instances had negative correlation. Unsurprisingly, this was an entirely fallacious assumption. Beginning in 2006, American housing markets began losing value and collectively lost well over a 1/3rd of its value by 2008 – a big problem for the holders of these assumed “low-risk” securities.7

When America’s housing market turned, a chain reaction exposed how fragile and synthetic the global financial system was (and for that matter still is, but that’s for another section). The clever financial engineering (like aggregating subprime mortgages) proved superbly risky. Mortgage- backed securities became essentially worthless, and many of the financial securities’ rating agencies were exposed as having zero credibility when it came to their rating schemes. A global fire sale of these securities made a huge dent in many banks’ balance sheets since enormous losses had been incurred through acquiring and then selling these securities. This sharp decline in the

7 "Crash Course; the Origins of the Financial Crisis." The Economist, September 7, 2013.

evaluations of some of the largest firms in the world was quickly reflected in the common markets, and thus how a whole lot of people quickly lost their savings.8

Financial failures were at the heart of the crash. But the banks were not the only institutions to blame - central bankers and other regulators bear responsibility too. Central bankers encouraged huge capital inflows from Asia and Europe, in which through the borrowing from American money-market funds (mistake #1), they were able to purchase high yield risky American securities (mistake #2).9

As noted above, it wasn’t just the Americans that brought down the global economy, but Asia and Europe as well. For example, the creation of the Euro spurred an extraordinary expansion of the financial sector both within the Euro area and in nearby banking hubs such as London and Switzerland – all of which eagerly embraced risky investments from America, which would eventually crash in 2007-08.10 The next section will be devoted to a discussion on how the 2007- 08 global financial crash transformed into the Euro debt crisis, and into the Greek crisis of today.

1.4 Financial Crisis in Greece

During the first decade from when the Euro had first been in circulation, Southern European economies took on huge current-account deficits while countries in northern Europe ran offsetting surpluses. The Economist explains:

“The imbalances were financed by credit flows from the Eurozone core to the overheated housing markets of countries like Spain and Ireland. The euro crisis has in this respect been a continuation of the (global) financial crisis by other means, as markets have agonized over the weaknesses of European banks loaded with bad debts following property busts. The European Central Bank did nothing to restrain the credit surge on

8 Gjerstad, Steven, and Vernon L. Smith. "From Bubble to Depression?" Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2009. 9 The Economist, 2013 10 The Economist, 2013

the periphery, believing, wrongly, that current-account imbalances did not matter in a monetary union.”

Between 2008 and 2010, credit rating agencies responded to the spiralling downward Greek economy by downgrading the Greek government debt to junk bond status (below investment grade). The only way the Greek government could fully finance its operations was by the sale of bonds, now due to the skepticism and aversion of the international community to 11 purchasing Greek bonds, the government had to increase bond yields to completely unsustainable territory.

On May 2, 2010, the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (colloquially known as the “Troika”), provided a €110 billion bailout loan to rescue Greece from sovereign default and cover the government’s financial needs until June 2013. However, this loan came with the condition that several austerity measures, structural reforms, and privatization of government assets be implemented. Unfortunately, only a year later, an even worse recession along with a delayed implementation of the conditions associated with the initial loan by the Greek government put Greece in the position of once again asking the EU and IMF for a bailout package. Consequently, €130 billion in extra loans were provided to the country.12

From the time the second bailout package was given until 2014, things had not been too terrible. Greece was showing some economic growth despite the large amounts of austerity measures. However, in the final fiscal quarter of 2014, Greece was headed into yet another recession. The Greek parliament called a general election for December 2014. This election resulted in the formation of a radically left-wing political coalition (SYRIZA).13 The new government refused to respect the terms of Greece’s current bailout agreement. This bold political decision resulted in

11 "Harmonised Long-term Interest Rates for Convergence Assessment Purposes." The European Central Bank. August 12, 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015. 12 "Full List of Greek Austerity/bailout Measures/conditions up to 2015." 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015. 13 Stamouli, Netktaria. "Greece Inches Toward Election." Wall Street Journal. August 24, 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015.

Troika suspending all scheduled remaining aid to Greece under its current program – at least until the Greek government would either accept the previously negotiated conditions for its loan, or new conditions were applied to a new deal. The sudden increase in the government’s financial insecurity resulted in plummeting stock prices at the Athens Stock Exchange, while interest rates for the Greek government at the private lending level spiked as the government now needed cash to finance itself yet again. On August 14, 2015, the Eurogroup of euro-zone finance ministers jumped back on the bail-out train and gave the go ahead to a bail-out valued at €86 billion, now the third such decision since May 2010.14

Greece Today 2.1 Present Economic Situation

While the global economy has begun to recover, the situation in Europe has not yet gotten better. To start, Greece has the worst unemployment, worst government debt per capita, worst poverty rate, and cheapest labour costs in the entire European Union. The effect that such characteristics have on standards of living and the progression of the European economy is profound.

There is an enormous amount of lending by European private banks and rich European countries (such as Germany) to economically disadvantaged countries. At the same time, in rich countries that are now accustomed to providing huge bailouts to other countries, we can see how their domestic economic policies and projections are inaccurate and not nearly as effective as hoped as well as how they plan on continuing to financing such projects.15

Figure 2.1.1 illustrates the ongoing problem of Greece’s debt. Where Japan (blue) has the highest level of state debt in the world, Greece (red) has the second highest at 178.2% of GDP in 2014.16 To illustrate, the United States is also included (purple).

14 "Full List of Greek Austerity/bailout Measures/conditions up to 2015." 2015 15 Norris, Floyd. "As the U.S. Borrows, Who Lends?" New York Times, September 21, 2012. 16 https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/07/the-20-countries-with-the-greatest-public-debt/

Figure 2.1.1: General Government Debt (Total, % of GDP, 1995-2014)

We highly recommend that you read the “Greece” entry in the CIA’s World Factbook to better understand the current social and economic situation. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html

2.2 Grexit

A plausible course of action for Greece would be to leave the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe (EMU), and return to its national currency (the drachma) to regain its ability to conduct independent monetary and exchange rate policies. This course of action has been nicknamed the “Grexit”. However, such an option is not being seriously considered, except as a last resort. If a country were to leave the euro zone due to debt problems, this could lead to a chain of events with potentially disastrous consequences: it could shatter the confidence of investors in the ability of euro zone countries to pay back their debts, leading to: sales of euro assets, a drastic fall

in the value of the euro, inability of governments to borrow, a series of defaults in countries within the EMU, possibly extending to other indebted countries outside the euro zone (such as the United Kingdom), and a serious European financial slowdown.

Since exchange rate adjustments are not possible within the euro zone, there is an urgent need for another adjustment mechanism for EMU to work. Many economists argue that the present EMU institutions must be supplemented by an EMU-wide fiscal authority, with powers to tax, spend and invest, transfer funds and monitor member countries. This would allow depressed areas to receive the necessary funds and investments to boost their growth. Yet there is tremendous opposition to this within the EMU countries themselves. Some of the countries that are by far the strongest opponents to close cooperation and fiscal policy coordination are the same ones that have gained the most from European integration.

Over the longer term, it appears unlikely that the EMU can work without fiscal mechanisms of coordination, mutual support and surveillance, which would also allow its members to share both the benefits and costs of EMU membership more equally.

2.3 Political Turmoil

Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s prime minister, resigned on August 20th, 2015 with the intention of winning a new mandate. The move followed a revolt by hardline legislators in his left-wing Syriza party over austerity measures, wiping out Mr. Tsipras’s majority in parliament. On September 20, 2015, Mr. Tsipras led his party to a surprisingly big victory, and only fell short of an absolute majority by six seats. By forming a coalition with ANEL and its leader, Panos Kammenos, Mr. Tsipras was able to yet again form an anti-austerity government.

For consistently updated news and information, please visit this link frequently: https://www.google.ca/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF- 8#tbm=nws&q=greek+debt

2.4 Future Projections

After having the extreme left once again win the recent election by forming a coalition government, will this government become more receptive to its creditors’ demands of economic contractionary policies such as greater taxation and other policies crafted for Greece from abroad

to ensure repayment of loans, or will they seek to completely derail all negotiations up until this point? The OECD projects that in 2016, Greece will gain momentum in regards to economic growth, and that unemployment will decline slightly. Deflation, however, will continue. 17 However, the OECD does have the reputation for being a little too optimistic in most situations.

Committee

On February 17th, 2016, as the Second Cabinet of Alexis Tsipras, you begin your five-year mandate given to you by the Greek people on September 20th, 2015. With a majority in the Hellenic parliament, this may be the turning point of Greece’s recent misfortune to a brighter, richer future.

3.1 The Goal

Your task will be to as the Greek cabinet to determine an effective solution to Greece’s debt crisis. As elected officials, you will have to work to maintain the standard of living of your country while also meeting your financial obligations. How you do this is up to you.

3.2 Committee Structure

The Greek cabinet has the power to impose any domestic of foreign policy it so wishes, such as public spending packages, austerity measures, or any other legislation pertinent to the crisis at hand. As the cabinet of a parliamentary republic, the Prime Minister is your leader. Each committee member is an elected representative in the Greek government and will hold that seat for the entirety of the conference.

3.3 Resolutions and Voting

17 "Economic Outlook, Analysis and Forecasts." OECD's Greece Economic Projections. June 1, 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015.

For the purposes of this committee, you will be submitting resolutions to the chairs. To pass any resolution, you will need a simple majority of the Greek Cabinet. Each member has one vote, except for the Prime Minister, who will have 1.5 votes. The Prime Minister will also receive one veto for the entirety of the conference. He or she may use this at any point and on any decision or legislation that the cabinet is attempting to make.

3.4 The Press

The Greek financial crisis has captured the attention of the entire world. As the Greek Cabinet, the entire globe, as well as your constituents, scrutinize your every move waiting for success or failure. The press represents these public opinions. It is a major political institution that, if used correctly, can propel your country out of the situation it is in. It can also destroy the confidence of the investors in Greece’s economy as well as its Eurozone partners.

In this committee, you will be able to interact with four major press outlets, described below. You may submit press releases to one or all of them at anytime so as to communicate your policies to your constituents and the rest of the world. You may also submit “tips” to the press. Remember, once you send something to the press, they may do whatever they wish with the information you have provided them.

Avgi (daily newspaper) Political leaning: left Founded in 1952, Avgi has been known since 1974 to be associated with left leaning political parties. Today, it consistently aligns itself with the politics of Syriza and has a small and supportive readership.

Kathimerini (daily newspaper) Political leaning: right Established in 1919, this daily newspaper is traditionally conservative but recently has begun to occasionally publish left-leaning editorial content. There is also an English version published in the United States for Greek expats.

Greek Reporter (online tabloid) Political leaning: neutral The Greek Reporter is an online news site founded in 2009. It was originally named “Greek Hollywood Reporter” before expanding to regular news service for Greek diaspora around the world. However, it still enjoys reporting the occasional scandal, political or otherwise.

The Economist (weekly news magazine) Political leaning: centre The Economist is one of the foremost sources of economic journalism. With a weekly circulation totalling over 8 million, creditors, investors, and the general populace pay attention when the Economist has something to say. The Economist will only report on the status of loans, loan repayments, fiscal policy, and other similar topics.

Your Roles

This section will be dedicated to explaining all of your respective positions for the committee. Ensure that you locate your position and familiarize yourself with your viewpoints and policies for conference day.

4.1 Cabinet Positions

The following is a list of the current Greek Cabinet members, with their portfolio, party affiliation, and a short description of their career and other relevant information. Links to various online sources have been added to aid you in your understanding of your role and help begin your own research.

Alexis Tsipras, Prime Minister (SYRIZA) Charismatic, confident, and anti-austerity, this former member of the Communist Party of Greece has had a meteoric rise, not to mention winning the snap election in September of 2015 after previously losing the confidence of the house. Watch an excerpt from an impassioned campaign speech from 2014 here as well as his interview with former US President Bill Clinton at the 2015 Clinton Global Initiative Meeting here to better understand his policies and his vision of Greece.

Yannis Dragasakis, Deputy Prime Minister (SYRIZA) Another former member of Greece’s communist party, Mr. Dragasakis was first elected to the Hellenic Parliament in 1989. He is an experienced politician as well as a former professor of political economy at the University of Athens. A vocal and powerful member of the cabinet, he is often in the press supporting Syriza’s policy.

Giorgos Stathakis, Minister of the Economy, Development, and Tourism (SYRIZA) Mr. Stathakis was first elected to the Hellenic Parliament in 2012. Since early 2015, he has served in the capacity if Minister of the Economy. Before his political career, he was Vice-Rector of the University of Crete, where he remains a professor of political economy. Read this short interview with BBC here.

Panos Kammenos, Minister of Defence (ANEL) Mr. Kammenos is the leader of the right wing ANEL party. His and his party members have aligned themselves with SYRIZA to achieve a majority in the Hellenic Parliament. ANEL has risen high in its short lifetime, having only been founded in 2012 as an offshoot of the larger New Democracy party. Read The Guardian’s profile on ANEL and its “particularly virulent” leader here.

Panagiotis Kouroumblis, Minister of the Interior (SYRIZA) First elected in 1996, Mr. Kouroumbolis became the first blind Member of the Hellenic Parliament in Greece’s history. After the election in January of 2015, was appointed Minister of Health. However, after the September 2015 election, he was awarded the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. He is considered one of the more “hardline” left politicians in the Greek Cabinet and is very vocal in his opposition of privatization.

Euclid Tsakalotos, Minister of Finance (SYRIZA) Mr. Tsakalotos is an Oxford-trained economist, professor, and author. While at Oxford, he joined the student wing of the Communist Party of Greece. He was first elected in the May 2015 legislative elections and was appointed to the cabinet in September 2015. He is married to Heather Gibson, the Director-Advisor of the central Bank of Greece. Read his profile in the Financial Times here.

Nikos Filis, Minister of Education (SYRIZA) A journalist by training, Mr. Filis was first elected to the Hellenic parliament in January 2015. Since 2008, he has been the director of the Avgi newspaper. Mr. Filis is known to say controversial statements to the press.

Panos Skourletis, Minister of the Environment and Energy (SYRIZA) Formerly the Minister of Labour, Mr. Skourletis has served in this portfolio since July 2015. He first entered Greek federal politics representing the Synaspismos party and subsequently joined Syriza after his party did so. Mr. Skourletis was recently overruled in a national court in his attempt to close mines in Northern Greece.

Nikos Paraskevopoulos, Minister of Justice (Independent) Mr. Paraskevopoulos was elected to the Hellenic Parliament in Sept 2015. A criminologist, he had previously worked in the Ministry of Justice, as well as heading various national institutions. Mr. Paraskevopoulos famously demanded war reparations from Germany and threatened to seize German assets in Greece in March 2015.

Nikos Kotzias, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Independent) Mr. Kotzias is professor of political science and international and European studies at the University of Piraeus. He has worked in the Greek diplomatic corps for many years, becoming an ambassador in 2005. He is also the author of over twenty-four books on various economic and political subjects.

Georgios Katrougalos, Minister of Labour (SYRIZA) After a successful career as a lawyer and academic, Mr. Katrougalos served as Member of the European Parliament for Greece with SYRIZA from July 2014 to January 2015. He then was appointed Minister of Labour in September 2015. He splits his time between the Hellenic Parliament and Democratis University of Thrace where he is a professor of public law. Watch him on the BBC News television programme HARDtalk here.

Andreas Xanthos, Minister of Health (SYRIZA) Dr. Xanthos is microbiologist and was first elected to the Hellenic Parliament in 2012. He was appointed Minister of Health in September 2015. The Greek public health system is in a dire financial crisis and Dr. Xanthos has been vocal about these problems in the press.

Christos Spirtzis, Minister of Infrastructure (Independent) After studying engineering at the University of Thrace, Mr. Spirtzis embarked on a successful private sector career before becoming a politician. He known to clash with his political colleagues and has previously lead factions against party leadership when representing left-leaning PASOK. In September 2015, he promised to halt the privatization of fourteen regional Greek airports.

Thodoris Dritsas, Minister of Maritime Affairs (SYRIZA) Mr. Dritsas began was first elected to the Hellenic Parliament in 2007. He famously cancelled the privatization of Piraeus Port Authority on the way to his swearing-in ceremony in September of 2015. The deal, previously agreed upon by the first Tsipris government in February 2015, was reportedly worth €800 million.

Evangelos Apostolou, Minister of Agricultural Development (SYNASPISMOS) After studying forestry and working in the finance sector, Mr. Apostolou began is political career with the political party Synaspismos. He followed his party when they joined the Syriza coalition in 2012. He previously served as deputy Minister of Agriculture from Jan to August 2015 before being promoted after the September 2015 elections.

Aristides Baltas, Minister of Culture and Sport (SYRIZA) A founding member of the Sryiza coalition, Mr. Baltas was previously part of its policy planning committee. Mr. Baltas served as the Minister of Education from January to August 2015 before being appointed to his current portfolio after the September 2015 election. He is also one of Greece’s preeminent scientists.

Andreas Papastavrou, Permanent Representative to the EU While not an official member of the Greek Cabinet, Mr. Papastavrou will prove to be very beneficial when it comes to communicating and negotiating with fellow Eurozone countries. He is a lawyer by trade and can speak five European languages. He is also an active speaker in the international affairs conference circuit. Mr. Papastavrou spent five years as the Deputy Permanent Representative to the EU until his promotion in November 2015.

4.2 Personal Finances

The wealth of the individual also plays a role in this committee. Perhaps you’re looking for a vote on a piece of legislation. Maybe you need a positive response from the press or, even better, a negative response to the goals of a political opponent. You may be able to “persuade” them using

personal assets. However, using too many personal “gifts” may alert the press to your generous manner. Furthermore, your country is in a desperate financial struggle. Imagine what would happen if the general populace found out how much you are worth due to your easily persuaded nature. Delegates may endeavor to creatively utilize their assets and income to further their political goals.

Further Research

Key Questions for the Cabinet

1. What type of austerity policies will need to be put in place for a reduction of the risk involved with the loans provided by the Eurozone lenders? 2. What are the unacceptable policies for the Troika to impose on Greece? 3. How can the current account balance be improved? 4. Is privatization of government owned property a viable option? 5. How should the cabinet prioritize government social spending versus loan repayment? 6. Should Greece exit the European Union (Grexit) and begin its own currency to finance its debts? 7. What would the majority of Greek citizens think about your decision? What would the majority of European citizens think about this decision? 8. Does Greece owe Europe or does Europe owe Greece?

Recommended Resources

The following resources may be us use to you for further research.

1. The results of the September Greek election: http://www.wsj.com/articles/syriza-ahead-in- greek-election-according-to-exit-polls-1442767118 2. The third bailout: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/08/greece-and- euro?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07 3. OECD’s Greek economy forecast: http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/greece-economic- forecast-summary.htm

4. A “caretaker cabinet”: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/greeces-new-prime- minister-names-caretaker-cabinet/2015/08/28/a6aeeb36-4d63-11e5-80c2- 106ea7fb80d4_story.html 5. Reasons for the Sept election: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/greece-gets-145- billion-to-pay-debts-part-of-new-bailout/2015/08/20/0f998a3a-4705-11e5-9f53- d1e3ddfd0cda_story.html 6. Advice for the Greek Government: http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/08/21/greece- needs-less-politics-and-more-business/